

United States Army Special Operations Command

**SOF Campaign Planner's Handbook of
Operational Art and Design**



**Version 2.0
16 September 2014**

**HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-9110**



MESSAGE TO SPECIAL OPERATORS

As the Army Special Operations Force (ARSOF) community looks beyond the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, we see a complex, ill-structured, intractable future operating environment. We note the major global social, political, informational and economic trends underway and the converging competition between nation states and non-state actors. These forces are intertwined and compete for relative superiority over the physical, cognitive and moral security, and adequate governance, of key populations - which will increasingly unfold in militarily significant urban terrain.

The recent Russian incursion in Ukraine, the activities of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, social unrest and civil war in parts of the African continent, and China's use of coercive influence against its neighbors, speak to the challenges that Irregular Warfare poses to United States national security interests. ARSOF are optimized to develop and accrue deep cultural, relationship and partner capability knowledge within a given country or region - and are thus uniquely positioned to operate in the Human Domain and generate persistent influence to counter such Irregular Warfare threats to the Nation.

The effectiveness of today's Army special operators at the tactical level is unmatched in any setting or environment. However, to provide the Nation with an expanded range of strategic options the future will demand, we must hone our capabilities at the operational level - specifically - our ability to design, plan and conduct discrete multi-year special operations campaigns that integrate the full suite of SOF / CF / JIIM and partner capabilities with the objective of shaping the operating environment to counter threats and advance U.S. interests.

This second iteration of the USASOC Campaign Planner's Handbook represents a maturation of Special Operations Force (SOF) Operational Art and Design. It is informed by Joint Vision 2020, USSOCOM 2020 Strategy, 38th CSA's Marching Orders, ARSOF 2022 Part II and Global Trends 2030 from the National Intelligence Council. This handbook serves as the cornerstone for strategic / operational planning by SOF campaign planners at SOTFs / CJSOTFs / SOC Forwards / SOJTFs / Theater Special Operations Commands, Geographic Combatant Commands, and Interagency settings.



**CHARLES T. CLEVELAND
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USA
COMMANDING**

Acknowledgments

In order to develop the United States Army Special Operations (USASOC) SOF Campaign Planner's Handbook of Operational Art and Design, the writing team conducted a thorough review of strategic guidance and existing planning tools and methods, referencing publications, manuals, and guidance letters from across the Army, Joint Force, and academia. We extend special thanks to USSOCOM's Washington Office and National Defense University for hosting and providing a world-class facility in support of the writing teams' efforts. Lastly, we acknowledge many that have come before us and contributed to the evolution of operational design. Great care was taken and deliberate effort made to appropriately represent original thoughts and works. Any oversight in this area is due to the scope and volume of the sources reviewed and is unintentional.

USASOC Campaign Planner's Handbook writing team:

Editor:

LTC Gittipong Paruchabutr, G9, United States Army Special Operations Command

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command:

Dr. Christopher Parapone, Dean, College Of Professional & Continuing Education,
Army Logistics University

Dr. Geoffrey Demarest, Research Analyst, G2, Foreign Military Studies Office

U.S. Army Special Operations Command:

LTC Grant Martin, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

MAJ (P) Christopher Kirk, United States Army Special Operations Aviation Command

MAJ Cody Brown, United States Army Special Forces Command, Office of Special Warfare

MAJ Curtis Clayton, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade

MAJ William Harris, 5th Special Forces Group

MAJ Thomas Heilman, 528th Sustainment Brigade

MAJ Brian Kaiser, Military Information Support Operations Command

The USASOC Campaign Planner's Handbook is approved for release by the Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) as of 16 September 2014. It will be reviewed in the fourth quarter of every fiscal year to ensure the content remains current and adaptive to emerging issues, challenges, and opportunities.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Organization. The Planner's handbook is organized into three general parts:

Part I: Foundation. Chapters 1-5 will introduce the SOF Campaign Planner to key concepts, guidance, and theory of SOF Operations. The Chapters consists of general campaign planners' guidance, an update of various Strategic Guidance documents to include ARSOF 2022, The National Intelligence Council's Global Trends 2030 and Presidential Policy Directive -23. Lastly, key concepts in employment of SOF forces are described in the ARSOF Operating Concept, Counter Unconventional Warfare Strategy, and an introduction to a theory of SOF Operational Art. The theory introduces how SOF Irregular Warfare Campaigns, executed persistently over time, increases Physical, Cognitive, and Moral access to unified action partners in order to increase their will and capacity, or facilitate SOF unilateral actions, to decisively engage threats and advance US Strategic interests.

Part II: Methodology. Chapters 6-8, the "Core" of the SOF Planner's handbook, will introduce Design methodology and SOF application of Design and approaches to Campaign Planning. Chapter 8, from the first iteration of the Planner's handbook, introduces SOF Operational Design Elements. It is important to note that the scope of this handbook is not to instruct the planner on other doctrinal processes such as the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) or the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). Design is not a replacement for these other methodologies; Design informs the planner executing JOPP, MDMP, or other planning processes as required. The Planner must and will produce actionable plans for execution.

Part III: Application. Chapter 9 and Appendixes: Historical vignettes and practical application. Historical Vignettes highlighting successful and unsuccessful long-duration, low-visibility, irregular SOF-centric Campaigns using the common rubric of SOF Operational Art and Design. Vignettes chosen were US Campaigns to support the government of Columbia and Philippines, British support to the Sultan of Oman countering the Dhofar Rebellion and Israeli support to the South Lebanese Army in contrast to Iranian support to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Planner's Appendixes. Various Tips, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) are included to assist the planner in the processes of leading and conducting planning sessions:

- a. Planning Group Leader's Techniques.
- b. Planning Checks (PCs) / Planning Inspections (PIs).
- c. Planner's tool kit to test Operational Approaches.
- d. DOD Authorities and Legal Considerations.

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CHAPTER I HANDBOOK PURPOSE AND PLANNERS GUIDANCE

... *'You know quite well that the natives always side with the stronger party'*

- Askari warrior to Von Lettow Vorbeck¹

I.1 INTRODUCTION

As its central audience, this handbook seeks the mid-career military officer, warrant officer, or non-commissioned officer who receives SOF campaign planning duties, perhaps as a staff planner in a large US military command or in an inter-agency or international coalition planning cell. The handbook is intended to help that individual gain perspective and begin confidently using a method that fits the unique conditions typical of SOF missions. The handbook also seeks to inform a larger audience of interested individuals regarding that unique set of conditions and the approach offered to address them. Experiences during the past two decades, along with expectations regarding the future, counsel an approach to SOF planning, and therefore SOF campaign planning, that is unique to SOF. That does not mean that the SOF planning approach rejects or disposes of proven military planning methods, but rather that it complements and builds on them.

A SOF campaign planner orchestrates SOF efforts within an extended geographic space and period of time to achieve strategic objectives. The space might be defined as a region and the time period as extending beyond the period of physical presence of individual SOF members, teams or units. Restated, SOF campaign planning involves composition of multiple SOF efforts over time, and the orientation of those SOF efforts to achieve US strategic and political objectives. Every SOF campaign plan identifies an individual who has the responsibility to explicitly align SOF efforts within the pertinent geography and time span. It is especially that individual at whom this handbook is aimed.

I.2 PLANNERS' GUIDANCE

Most core SOF activities (as listed in Army FM 3-05 and Joint Pub 3-05) address foreign behavior that our country, through its senior leadership, deems to be intolerable. Other SOF activities include diplomatic, humanitarian, reconnaissance or training efforts, or a combination of these four. However, those activities that most demand the prudent employment of coercive force incline toward three time-based categories of unacceptable foreign behavior: past, present and future. These time-based categories allow for efficient discussion because the foreign behaviors in question tend to display distinct characteristics accordingly. For instance, the command authority may order apprehension of the perpetrators of a heinous act (a bombing, kidnapping, massacre, and etcetera). The offense against the country or against an ally may be ongoing, such as an illicit drug trade, sponsorship of a terrorist network, or providing safe-havens for these activities to exist. It may be that SOF forces are called upon to alleviate our countrymen's and our leaders' fear of a dangerous behavior that has not yet occurred, such as the use of a nuclear weapon. In all three cases, it is an impunity enjoyed by some kind of foreign actor that is at issue -- impunity meaning something unacceptable to our country that the foreign actor is trying to get away with.

¹ From Lettow-Vorbeck, Paul Emil von. *My Reminiscences of East Africa*. Nashville: Battery Press, 1990, reprinted from 1920 edition, p. 32

The prevailing vision of our future operating environment predicts an increasing amount of such intolerable foreign behavior by state or non-state actors to which our country's leaders may want to answer with coercive force, or with a broad range of elements of power that includes some degree of coercive force. In other words, we will observe an increased number of actions for which some foreign entity or entities are culpable and for which they will seek impunity. It is highly likely that our country's leadership will want the option of applying coercive force to deny that impunity across an increasingly large global geographic extent. Conversely, our country's leadership will call on SOF forces to conduct activities to support a Host Nations' efforts to mitigate these unacceptable behaviors. Nevertheless, our predictions regarding the future operating environment also feature a growing world population, more urban landscape, increased expectations regarding the rule of law, and heightened public sensitivity to what might be considered disproportional application of force. Meanwhile, we can anticipate decreasing overall material resources for our application of that force. In such a combination of conditions, increased US application of SOF is predictable, as SOF offers a timely, tailored, discreet, efficient, disciplined and effective form of influence.

SOF are organized, trained, and equipped for countering irregular opponents and working with partners in irregular conflicts. U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), as an integral part of the U.S. Army, provides the forces and capabilities required to provide our Nation's leaders with a broad array of options to advance U.S. Strategic Interests.

It is, then, the purpose of this handbook to help SOF planners tailor activities to meet the promise of timeliness, efficiency, and discretion. Meanwhile, the SOF planner especially should remain aware that the best efforts (those that meet the suggested criteria) may include elements that are the purview of other government agencies, civil organizations or international partners. The best solutions might involve a relatively minor coercive ingredient. Various options or tools other than the direct application of lethal force exist within US SOF itself. In Irregular Warfare campaigns military tactical actions must support the comprehensive political plan -- a requirement of which the SOF campaign planner is especially aware.

Critique of mission requirements or orders. Typically, a SOF mission will follow the injunctions of Mission Command in that it will fully express the mission originator's intent. It is crucial for commanders and planners at all levels to have conversations about the intent, strategy, and vision for the campaign. If the initiator's full intent has not been expressed or is not understood by those receiving it, it is expected of the receivers that they request clarification, and that in any event, mission statements should be cross-examined to determine the whole nature of the mission's goals and anticipated outcomes. In addition, under the tenets of Mission Command, receivers of a SOF mission request should not treat critique of the mission as a planning step that, once completed, is no longer revisited. As a campaign unfolds, we expect circumstances to reveal previously unforeseen consequences and opportunities. The original mission order or request should be cross-examined continuously in light of discovered risks and opportunities, and these should be quickly communicated to the originator.

A SOF campaign plan should evince a comprehensive appreciation of national interests affected by the operation, including potential conflicts among these interests and the interests of foreign entities. Critical examination should be undertaken to identify optional courses of action and determine necessary resources to be associated with those options. SOF planning should also be undertaken as a continuing opportunity to reassess, change, improve or even scrap the mission itself. The planner should explicitly consider opportunity costs, that is, what options or

opportunities might be foregone by conducting the mission. Unintended second and third-order consequences of a mission are to be made explicit when possible. Assumptions underlying the mission orders or requests will be explicitly restated and critiqued.

Measures of effectiveness. Whether or not a SOF mission is or is not accomplished, or the degree to which it is accomplished can always be measured. (For further detail reference Presidential Policy Directive 23,) However, the SOF planner should include a clear statement of the measurement, to include any resources necessary to be expended or additional risks taken to make the measurement. For policy makers to provide an effective strategy, they need a clear expression of the costs and risks associated with the military means they may choose to employ. (Or, for that matter, any means.) Ideally, mission statements, as translated by the planner into actions that can be taken in time and space, will reveal obvious measurements of success. The planner should restate or append every order and mission statement so as to make measurement of success as explicit as possible from the outset and, to the degree possible, have the assertion of the measurement of success ratified by the mission originator. In what is perhaps the simplest case, for instance, in which a SOF element is to bring to justice someone who has committed a heinous act, the planner will specifically include an assertion such as, “success or failure in the accomplishment of this mission will be measured by whether or not the perpetrators are apprehended, perfect accomplishment being that perpetrators are apprehended and brought alive (to a specific location within a specific amount of time from a specific date).” Such conditions for patent measurement, however, are rare. At the other extreme will be missions that suppose improvements in some abstract good throughout some broad space, such as, “improve stability in such-and-such a country.” In such cases it is all the more important that the SOF planner restate or translate the originator’s intent to assert what improvement will look like and by when. That improvement is to be made visible – at least by way of a measurement ratified by the originators. A vague quantity like ‘stability’ will be measured by proxies such as the number of un-solved murders or the price of eggs. Ambiguous political language needs to be translated by the planner into observable, measurable and achievable goals and, as much as possible; the planner should attempt to gain a consensus among the various mission initiators and participants regarding that translation. One of the principles of measurement is the establishment of a baseline of data. The SOF planner should assert those baselines (including how the baseline is to be established and what resources are necessary to establish it) at the outset of mission planning. Increasingly, the irregular nature of SOF Campaigns may call for new paradigms of measurements as it applies to campaigns that aim to quantify or qualify how the nation measures strategic advancement by successive comparisons of relative advantages (explored in more detail in chapter VI).

In establishing measurements of success as an integral part of mission critique, the SOF planner should be explicit in asserting that a measurement is one of effectiveness, as differentiated from measurements of input or effort. Measures of effort and effectiveness may on occasion overlap, and this should be made explicit. For instance, in long-term presence operations, SOF man-years on the ground in a foreign area may be a reasonable proxy for improved relationships. While it may be that long-term presence of US SOF has soured a foreign population and made enemies, this has not been the historical experience. With few exceptions, the long-term presence of US SOF elements in foreign areas has greatly improved relationships.

Mission anticipation or engagement. Many SOF missions are actually missions in anticipation of future missions. To be effective, SOF operations require detailed knowledge of the environment and of potential local allies. To gain such knowledge and develop consequential relationships, SOF must be persistently, physically present in an area well in advance of a conflict. Without this persistent presence, many SOF capabilities will not be available in a time of crisis. These presence activities can be considered as missions, preparations for missions or as capacity building of the force. In any case, SOF requires long term physical presence in foreign lands.

Delineation of Authorities. SOF members and units typically face what may (at least according to the principle of unity of command) seem a less than aerodynamic array of individuals who have some degree of decision authority over presence and location, personnel behavior, activity or even mission intent. The reasons for this SOF fact of life are rooted in the growth of multiple large organizations with varied and occasionally incompatible goals, and which share some overseas geographies. In many of those geographies, the SOF effort is a subordinate or supporting effort. A SOF element may find itself expected to simultaneously answer, in one way or another, to an ambassador, a commander, a secretary, a director of Operations and a Chief of Station. SOF planners learn and clearly communicate to all of the applicable authorities and permissions for a given campaign. The SOF planner should consider this challenge early in the design of SOF efforts so as to alleviate confrontation between institutions and facilitate the accomplishment of the SOF mission. The robust provision of independent resources (transportation, lodging and day-to-day communications means), for instance, can often alleviate concerns of many would-be stakeholders. SOF operators and planners should strive to build mutual trust and shared understanding with all stakeholders.

A SOF mission designed in such a way as to save money through the borrowing of existing resources belonging to other government entities can cause a weakening of unity of command or exacerbate a set of frictions that is common to many SOF efforts. Prominent among those organizations with which SOF units are likely to find both capable assistance and potential conflicts of interest are US defense attaché offices and permanent military assistance missions in many countries. Because many SOF efforts and the missions of attaché and military assistance officers are inherently associated with reconnaissance and the continuous building of foreign good will, the SOF planner will almost always explicitly include the socializing of SOF plans with these organizations. When additional every-day resources can be made available by SOF elements to other US entities, it often facilitates collaboration.

Underlying considerations for SOF plan-making. The SOF planning effort can be considered as an expanding consideration of options, risks and details -- rather than as a step-by-step procedure. Although some parts of a planning effort can logically only be completed after completion of other steps (a plan for how to close with a targeted individual, for instance, can only be completed in detail after the individual is located), the overall thought process remains agile enough that new knowledge, whether in the form of a better idea or additional information, can be incorporated into plans and appropriately affect all relevant elements. As with other military planning, basic principles (In this list, principles for joint operations from FM 3-05 = objective, offense, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, simplicity, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy) should be presumed to apply. For many SOF operations it is also presumed that some of the principles of war are going to have a reduced weight (maneuver, perhaps) or that a given SOF mission is itself being used to address a

principle of warfare in the context of a larger regular operation (economy of force, perhaps). This handbook is provided in light of an expectation that an increasing number of SOF missions will be ordered as an application of power unconnected to conventional military actions, rather than as an adjunct, support to, or force-multiplier for a larger conventional command within the US armed forces. It may be that conventional forces will be employed in support of SOF deployments, as reserves or contingency forces. This relationship between SOF and conventional forces (conventional forces supplying contingent strength in support of SOF plans) is highlighted herein.

The following are six precepts or predicates that are likely to inform and underpin all likely SOF missions. To the extent SOF campaigns cannot be reconciled with these predicates, SOF operators and mission accomplishment may be put at additional risk.

1. ***The First Law of Geography.*** The first Law of Geography states that all things influence everything else, but that near things influence each other more than distant things. *Distance* is a consequential factor in military planning. As a general rule, the farther the distance a unit is sent, the less strength it will have when there. Distance, meanwhile, should be measured in multiple ways, especially as what is often called ‘cost distance’, or the measurement of distance in terms of time, fuel, water etcetera. SOF planners should be careful to cross-examine all plans to measure the distances involved in terms of all relevant factors. While this passage examines the law as focused on physical aspects; it also applies to cognitive, moral, and legal considerations as well. The planning team must have an appreciation / understanding of the differences across all domains- Human, Cyber, Sea, Air, and Land.
2. ***The Culminating Point.*** The culminating point, for the purposes of SOF plans, is a theoretical point in time and space beyond which it is imprudent to continue doing what a unit is doing or be located where it is located. The distance to the culminating point is the *risk distance* or *prudent risk distance*. The question of whether or not it is prudent to stay at an outpost, continue a pursuit, or attempt to reach a target in a remote location ultimately belongs to the chain of commanders. Plans, however, should be made explicit in stating the opinion of the planners regarding the outer limits of prudence in terms of place and time, and should include decision points at which estimates regarding the culminating point are to be expressly reviewed.
3. ***Consequence of strength.*** At all levels and scales of armed competition (therefore all core SOF applications), a basic rule of strategy holds that if a force meets (wittingly or unwittingly) an opposing force of greater strength, the weaker force must have a secure route of withdrawal. In other words, competence in command implies correct measurement of relative strength at all potential points of encounter. Prudence of command implies that, if there is a possibility or intention of encountering a force of superior strength (at the time and place of encounter) that an exit plan is in place. Significantly, planning should not be based only on how this principle affects our commander’ decisions and options, but on how it affects potential opponents’ actions and options. Guerrilla warfare is almost synonymous with hit-and-run, run being almost as important as hit. Therefore, the pursuit is revealed as a most consequential event in armed competition, whether that competition involves a single criminal fugitive or a field army. For the fugitive, winning the pursuit is at the heart of survival. SOF plans should explicitly address the exit, withdrawal, retreat, or return plans of our forces and of all potential opposition forces.

4. **Reserves.** Reserves are used to counter unexpected opposition or exploit opportunities that are initially considered either unlikely or are considered likely but the timing of which is speculative. They are also used to win pursuits. All aspects of the reserve forces should be included in SOF plans, and whenever time allows, plans for reserves for the reserves. The notion of reserve, however, should be adjusted for SOF operations. In regular warfare, a reserve force might be small relative to the size and strength of the ‘committed’ forces. The size of the reserve or contingency force in a SOF effort or campaign plan may have to be several or many times the size of the originally committed unit. The use of the reserve force or forces is a key element of the SOF plans ‘decision’ or reflection points, as one of the most consequential decisions of senior leadership may involve the commitment of the reserves.
5. **Deception.** All SOF plans should include an interwoven deception plan. The deception should address the committed unit and all reserve and contingent forces.
6. **Dynamic interplay.** SOF plans should explicitly include and consider a sequence of ‘what if’s’. The discussion of hypotheticals will consider various encounters and various possible decisions regarding as many formulae of competitive challengers as planning time allows. Under review and reconsideration in light of each hypothetical are the strength estimates (and risk distances) of both friendly and enemy units, the appropriateness of all reflection points for the recalculation of these strength estimates, and will include the employment of all reserves and reserves of the reserves.

A starting point for planning: Seven initial planning elements or activities are listed below. They may be taken as steps, but the order of the steps is not overly consequential because they influence one another and might be constantly revisited while the sister elements are developed.

1. **Determine and express the impunity to be confronted.** Identify and explicitly state what intolerable behavior some foreigner is trying to get away with and that the mission originator intends to address. Did that behavior occur in the past, is it ongoing, or is it a feared future possibility? Is it more than one of these? Note that even what appears to be a purely humanitarian assistance mission may involve an intolerable behavior. If, for instance, a natural disaster were to occur in a poor country and the government of the country along with the world community were all on-board to help deliver emergency supplies to an easily locatable victim population, there is still probably an element of negative behavior that we (as an armed force) are explicitly or tacitly being asked to address. What measures can be taken to prevent looting? What perfidious organizations might use the crisis to infiltrate and organize criminal or insurgent cells? Be sure to address those elements of the mission statement and intent that go to the SOF *raison d’être*.

It is possible that after cross- examination and interchange with the originator, neither the mission statement nor the originator’s intent can be said to include a specifiable human target identity that is trying to get away with some behavior we find intolerable. Sometimes the mission may be as amorphous as a “We want the people of that country to be more inclined to help us if we ever need them...” These missions fall into the categories of diplomacy and persuasion. They still involve target audiences, a requirement to reach those audiences, and the possibility of opposition. As with the humanitarian mission used as an example above, even these abstract missions require that the planner anticipate contact with other organizations (including armed organizations) intent on confounding our actions.

2. **Determine the distances to be covered**, including relevant cost distances (ie, gas, time, money) in order for SOF forces or partner forces to come into actionable contact with target(s) or influence audience(s). The measurement of distance requires starting points and end points. These determinations of distance include the requirement to sustain forces and withdraw them. Additionally, risk increases if the balance of intelligence between friendly and enemy forces shifts in favor of the enemy over time. A small element may enjoy anonymity in a foreign land for only so long. Meanwhile, information naturally flows to the force that controls, secures, and influences the population of a given area. In other words, cost and risk distances change over time.
3. **Assert a measure of the relative strength** of the SOF element and any partner forces deployed as compared to any opposition (with emphasis on physical coercive opposition strength, but also in terms of the intended influence if the SOF mission is not a direct action). Make this measurement at the planned place or places of contact, as well as during approach and withdrawal.
4. **Include, if appropriate, reflection points**. SOF plans can usefully include explicit reflection or decision points. These are points in space and time that are highlighted in plans because of an express decision to be made or considered. A reflection point might be occasioned because knowledge needed to make a prudent choice (which way to go, who to pay, and etcetera) is not yet available. The reflection point might be one at which significantly greater risk or costs are about to be imposed, the reflection point allowing consideration of mission remorse, that is, a reconsideration of the cost benefits of continuing the effort, including opportunity costs. The reflection point might instead be one at which the arrival of certain opportunities might first be recognizable. It might be a point at which sufficient strength or capacity has or has not been achieved such that the effort can be continued or expanded in some way. Although the SOF planner can specify these reflection points, some SOF efforts benefit from many or even continuous reflection points. The specification of reflection points can rationalize the timing of policy-makers or senior leaders intervention into the effort in order to review the progress against intentions. They can also aid in comparing the relative contribution of disparate potential inputs.
5. **Assert a set of options** that any opposition might reasonably make at various times during the deployment, where and when those opposition reactions would have effect, and what the relative strengths would be at those points in time and space.
6. **Assert the amount of strength that SOF would need** in order to answer unlikely and less likely reactions potentially made by targets, opposition (including third-party) or influence audiences. For instance, in the case of a retreat by the target, what is the strength of the SOF to pursue (how far and for how much time)?
7. **Assure that the plan addresses all elements of withdrawal** that will or might become necessary at those times and places wherein the SOF may be confronted by a relatively stronger opposition, and is thereby compelled to withdraw. These assertions can be accompanied by additional assertions regarding the amount of US reserve or contingency force that could be applied to rebalance relative strength in order to retain SOF presence or mission initiative. A withdraw plan should also be asserted for that occasion when the mission is successfully complete. Some missions may contemplate no end, or at least no end until conditions have changed to a degree that is currently not foreseeable.

Additional considerations for SOF plan-making. The following are additional considerations that a SOF Planner should take in account due to both the unique qualities of a SOF operation and the interdependence of SOF operations and Conventional Force operations.

1. **Counter-SOF.** More and more countries are developing and fielding their own SOF. A growing set of US SOF efforts will involve countering foreign SOF, and US SOF initiatives will be increasingly challenged by foreign counter-SOF. This reality is best reflected in the initial, deception, dynamic interplay and campaign planning.
2. **Reaction and contingency plans.** Ready reaction and contingency forces may be appropriate as reserve forces in support of SOF efforts. In some instances, a SOF plan would logically call upon conventional force ready-reaction or contingency units, usually as a reserve force, and more especially in the event of a necessary extraction under exceptional circumstances. Mention of regular force structure in SOF plans demands a highlighted and explicit effort at socialization and multi-agency acceptance of the plan. Tactical SOF elements will plan their missions with multiple contingency plans because their small size and distance from base can make them vulnerable to a number of threats. At the campaign level, SOF planners analyze the level of risk, including soliciting input from the tactical units, and ensure that sufficient reaction forces are available to mitigate those risks to acceptable levels. Reaction forces may include conventional forces, SOF elements, and/or partner forces. SOF campaign planners and commanders routinely discuss the risks inherent in plans to help determine acceptable levels of risk, which risks to take in order to gain specific advantages over an opponent, and how to mitigate risks.
3. **Indirection.** Many SOF efforts are intended to affect a target individual or group, but by way of the influence our forces can have on some other, third party. We may determine that the best approach to affect a terrorist group, for instance, is to pledge support and assistance to another country, which in turn may propose to assist a third non-governmental group to take direct action.
4. **Center of Gravity.** Sometimes there exists a place (or maybe a capability you or your opponent possesses) the domination of which can dramatically change the probable outcome of a contest. It might be thought of as a checkmate square, or something our control of which so confounds our opponent that the result of the contest is foretold. It is a term used variously, however. It can be confused with the ‘main objective’, ‘biggest advantage’, or a ‘first priority’. Some argue whether or not there can be only one or many, or if a center of gravity has to exist at all. SOF planners remain aware of the possible existence of a center or centers of gravity.
5. **Distinguishing SOF from conventional operations for the purpose of planning.** There are two broad categories of distinction between SOF and conventional force employment for the United States. One is related to diplomacy and the other to the nature and locations of armed competition in the foreseeable future. The presence of regular US units is considered an affront to sovereignty in many parts of the world. For instance, the United States has never deployed regular troop units to South America, and to do so today would likely cause a diplomatic firestorm and impel a set of reprisals that would probably outweigh whatever military benefit the use of such a deployment might have intended. On the other hand, many US SOF deployments have been welcomed at one time or another by the various countries of the continent. SOF deployments are by their nature not undertaken to hold terrain, an aspect that lends itself to foreign state acceptance. The relatively greater emphasis on cultural awareness and diplomatic skill in SOF education and training adds to this advantage.

Beyond diplomatic compatibility, SOF is generally better suited than conventional forces to the successful prosecution of irregular war because SOF are specifically organized for irregular warfare, while conventional forces must prepare for the full spectrum of conflict, and especially for employment at the ‘conventional’ or ‘regular’ end of that spectrum. Irregular warfare is often waged by fighters lacking the institutional strength of the modern nation-state. It does not feature large formations that are maneuvered in relation to one another. A SOF unit is far less likely to find a similar SOF unit aligned on its right and left flank, as would a conventional military unit in a regular war. Irregular does not imply uncommon, however. Irregular wars are currently on-going and extremely likely in the future, whereas conventional or regular warfare, while dangerous, are less likely to occur.

Irregular war is an umbrella term as Figure I-1 below suggests.



Figure I-1: Irregular War

The chart in figure I-2 below depicts five relevant and highly inter-related characteristics of irregular war that make SOF units a more appropriate tool than regular units.




Figure I-2: Irregular War's Five Relevant Characteristics

1. More civilians or non-fighters are in the geography of concern who we cannot or do not wish to just remove -- we deal with them in place. This condition requires an increase in methods and resources oriented toward protection and care of the population. Activities typically involve more surgical coercive or physical operations, plans that cause physical engagements to occur away from civilian concentrations when possible, warning efforts, the observation of due process and habeas corpus, respect for property, and the use of non-lethal means of control.
2. Contending forces have to manage the question of anonymity -- who within a population is siding with whom. Typically, effective response to the challenge of anonymity includes, in addition to traditional detective and intelligence practices, governance measures like the development of property records, establishment of institutions for civil conflict resolution, personal identification systems, censuses and other inventories, and the establishment of fair weights and measures.
3. The phenomenon of incorporeal presence is more consequential -- emotive or psychological quantities in the population, like ideological or religious affinity, hate, resentment, or fear. The answer to this phenomenon is generally termed engagement or persuasion. In some countries it is even referred to as 'romancing' the population. Requirements include long-term efforts to learn desires, elements of honor and dishonor, special dates and times (of celebration and mourning, for instance) and especially efforts to learn the appropriate languages. Success at redressing or rebalancing psychological presence is dependent on these types of activity.

4. There exist greater numbers of layers of legalities with which we are obliged to reconcile our actions -- we may face the impositions of not just the laws of war and military operational law, but of contract law, migration law, foreign criminal law, international commercial law, as well as administrative laws of many kinds. It takes some time and direct familiarity with foreign human geography to meet the requirements imposed by this factor.
5. The armed contenders may or may not belong to, associate with or be sponsored by an existing country of the international system. They are likely to fall into any and several of the categories listed in figure I-2 above. This phenomenon implies a potential need for various simultaneous types of engagement activity, and the necessary reconciliation of various engagements. In many situations the phenomenon implies more study of cost distances, estimations of risk distances, the mapping of sanctuaries for multiple organizations including routes to and from these sanctuaries, and the dynamic measurement of relative strength as to each organization.

The concept of risk distance warns that in all military endeavors there exist points in time and space beyond which it is imprudent to continue a mission. United States forces arrive at such points of imprudence much more quickly depending on the footprint of a deployment, the discretion with which individuals or units act and the acceptance, goodwill or willing access the unit or individuals might enjoy. Our doctrinal definition of strategy is the prudent employment of national power. US SOF units can prudently reach and remain in more places, covering a far greater extent of the earth's land surface, than can US regular military units. SOF, in other words, greatly expands the amount of land available to the prudent employment of US land power. Meanwhile, SOF contributes land power options at a lessened cost to other elements of national power that might otherwise have to be taxed in support.




Figure I-3: Irregular War Match SOF Comparative Strengths (William Harris, *Special Operations, Irregular Warfare, and Operational Art: A Theory of Special Operations*)

Figure 1-3 above shows how other aspects of irregular war match SOF comparative strengths. Chapter V, a theory of SOF Operational Art, discusses this concept in detail.

The theory introduces how SOF Irregular Warfare Campaigns, executed persistently over time, increases Physical, Cognitive, and Moral access to unified action partners in order to increase their will and capacity, or facilitate SOF unilateral actions, to decisively engage threats and advance US Strategic interests. The goal of linking SOF tactical actions in an irregular warfare campaign should always seek to advance Physical, Cognitive, or Moral access.

Strategic guidance and future operating concepts. SOF planners are advised to be familiar with certain high-level expressions of US national interest, intention and concepts for the future use of all elements of national power. A familiarity with the language of these documents allows the SOF planner to more fluently align SOF plans with the vision of senior leaders.

The future operating environment. Several global trends seem to be shaping the future as it concerns the employment of US power. One is continuing urbanization. Along with urbanization, however, we may witness an expansion of rural areas made available as venues for armed competition. Another trend is the continuing diffusion of power having an international or transnational reach. An increasing number of individuals and organizations are accumulating and can exert power beyond national borders. A third oft-noted trend is that of precipitously diminished costs and broadened availability in electronic communications. This combination alone (of greater population concentrations, greater numbers of potentially dangerous power-wielding entities, and increasingly sophisticated means of communication) means that actors that have done, are doing or intend to do harm to the United States will find or build an increasing number of geographically distinct and disperse sanctuaries. While regular US units are not likely to be timely responsive to this trend, the United States is uniquely positioned with its SOF to address the phenomenon of multiple disperse sanctuaries effectively.

I.3 CONCLUSION

The SOF Planner must understand and combine both the unique SOF operational considerations and the conventional military considerations of any plan in a broad spectrum of time, distance, acceptable risk, and resources. This chapter has attempted to provide guidance for this difficult yet not insurmountable task that a SOF Campaign Planner has before them. Along with providing this guidance many additional considerations for planners and concepts were introduced which will be further expounded upon in the following chapters of this handbook.

CHAPTER II STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

"Credible deterrence results from both the capabilities to deny an aggressor the prospect of achieving his objectives and from the complementary capability to impose unacceptable cost on the aggressor."

-Defense Strategic Guidance January 2012

II.1 INTRODUCTION

SOF campaign planners must pay attention to policy announcements by the administration as well as verbal guidance given by senior officers. They should communicate this guidance down to the tactical units that will execute the SOF campaign. The strategic documents listed below are good sources for identifying U.S. national interests in a particular situation (there will be conflicts between these prioritized interests). This is critical since the commander must design his campaign to achieve national objectives. Frequently SOF campaigns will occur before the government can formulate a policy statement into an open strategic document. This is why planners often include policy announcements such as presidential / key leader speeches in their planning. Additionally, the lead planners must have or create access to the command group in order to listen to informal discussions for the purposes of more fully appreciating the commander's vision for the campaign. SOF campaigns occur in ambiguous and politically sensitive environments and evolve over time as tactical units develop the situation. Those tactical units must be able to benefit from an understanding of the United States' strategic approach to regional challenges in order to adapt the campaign to the reality on the ground.




a. 2010 National Security Strategy. "We will continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations and meeting increasingly sophisticated security threats, while ensuring our force is ready to address the full range of military operations."



b. Defense Strategic Guidance January 2012. "Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost and small-footprint approaches to achieve security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence and advisory capabilities." "Credible deterrence results from both the capabilities to deny an aggressor the prospect of achieving his objectives and from the complementary capability to impose unacceptable cost on the aggressor."



c. Capstone Concept for Joint Operations 2020. "Future Joint Forces will leverage better integration to improve cross-domain synergy—the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities across domains in time and space. While the U.S. military maintains unique advantages in every domain, it is our ability to project force across domains that so often generates our decisive advantage. In the future, emerging capabilities and doctrine will make cross-domain synergy possible at increasingly lower echelons."



d. 38th Chief of Staff of the Army's (CSA's) Marching Orders. "Army leaders accept that there are no predetermined solutions to problems. Army leaders adapt their thinking, formations, and employment techniques to the specific situation they face. This requires an adaptable and innovative mind, a willingness to accept prudent risk in unfamiliar or rapidly changing situations, and an ability to adjust based on continuous assessment. Accordingly, thorough understanding and wise application of cultural knowledge and language skills are tantamount to our success. So too are training, leader development, and personnel policies aimed at fostering creativity at every level."



e. USSOCOM 2020.

(1) "The Global SOF Enterprise will become a globally networked force of special operations forces, services, interagency, allies and partners able to rapidly or persistently address regional contingencies and threats to stability."

(2) "USSOCOM must not only continue to pursue terrorists whenever we may find them, we must rebalance the force and tenaciously embrace indirect operations in the Human Domain - the totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that influence human behavior in a population-centric conflict."

(3) "We must think differently, seek greater understanding of local, regional, and global contexts and strengthen trust through interagency and partner cooperation."

(4) "While SOF is designed to contribute to or support efforts in every domain of warfare, the vast majority of SOF expertise lies in the Human Domain of competition, conflict and war. The Human Domain is about developing understanding of, and nurturing influence among critical populaces. Operating in the Human Domain is a Core Competency of SOF and we are uniquely suited for successful operations or campaigns to win population-centric conflicts."



f. U.S. Army 2012 Strategic Planning Guidance.

(1) "Vision: The Army is globally engaged and regionally responsive; it is an indispensable partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to combatant commanders in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment. As part of the Joint Force and as America's Army, in all that we offer, we guarantee the agility, versatility, and depth to Prevent, Shape, and Win."

(2) "Army units will be increasingly focused on preparing for missions within specific geographical combatant commands. This regional alignment...will be further enhanced by increasing the integration of conventional and special operations forces."



g. The U.S. Army Capstone Concept. "The Army must achieve SOF and conventional force interdependence to lock in the advances of the last decade of conflict, more effectively counter future threats, and shape the operational environment. The Army must establish a range of personnel, training, and command and support relationships between SOF and CF."



h. Presidential Policy Directive 23- Security Sector Assistance. "This directive is aimed at strengthening the ability of the United States to help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity, consistent with the principles of good governance and rule of law. The United States has long recognized that the diversity and complexity of the threats to our national interest require a collaborative approach, both within the United States Government and among allies, partners, and multilateral organizations."



i. Strategic Landpower. "That competition and conflict are about people is hardly a revelation. Nevertheless, this fundamental premise often has not received the central emphasis that it should in U.S. military deliberation. War is inarguably the toughest of physical challenges, and we therefore tend to focus on the clash and lose sight of the will. In fact, the neglect or misjudgment of population-centric considerations in U.S. strategic calculations is easily documented. Time and again, the U.S. has undertaken to engage in conflict without fully considering the physical, cultural, and social environments that comprise what some have called the "human domain."



j. ARSOF 2022. "Over the next decade, Army special operations forces will remain actively engaged in protecting our homeland and our national-security interests abroad. Our force will be called upon to face a number of threats occurring in multi-dimensional, hybrid-operating environments. It is imperative that our force understands not only the threats that may develop over the next decade, but also the changing environment in which we will be called to operate."



k. ARSOF 2022 Part II. "ARSOF 2022 is built upon key foundational concepts: 1) a clear command vision and desired end state; 2) the two critical capabilities we provide the nation – *special warfare* and *surgical strike* ; 3) an understanding of the operational environment in which ARSOF primarily operates; and 4) a commander’s assessment of our current gaps and seams."



l. Global Trends 2030 Alternative Worlds. "This report is intended to stimulate thinking about the rapid and vast geopolitical changes characterizing the world today and possible global trajectories during the next 15-20 years."

GT2030 Explains in detail four "megatrends" that are shaping the FOE now-(1) Individual Empowerment, (2) Diffusion of Power, (3) Demographic Patterns. (4) Food, Water, Energy Nexus; Six "game changers" that have the most potential impact in the FOE: (1) Crisis-Prone Global Economies, (2) Governance Gaps, (3) Potential for Increased Conflict, (4) Wider Scope of Regional Instability, (5) Impact of New Technologies, and (6) The role of the United States. GT2030 makes predictions, based on the combination of these factors, on four potential worlds: (1) Stalled Engines,(2) Fusion,(3) Gini-Out-of-Bottle and (4) Non-state World. This document provides the planner a situational strategic template for the Future Operating Environment.

CHAPTER III CONCEPTS IN THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

“It is virtually impossible to rank, in terms of long range importance, the numerous, potential threats to U.S. national security... it is the multiplicity and interconnectedness of potential threats, and the actors behind them that constitute our biggest challenge.”

– James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence²

III.1 INTRODUCTION

Fiscal realities, political conditions and the changing character of warfare will challenge the U.S. military's ability to engage in large scale expeditionary land wars in the next decade. In order to meet this challenge, Special Operations Forces must adapt and develop concepts to provide suitable solutions to our Nation's leaders. Our experience over the past decade combined with the characteristics of the Future Operating Environment are the driving forces behind the development of these concepts and paint a picture of a world quite different from what we have experienced to date.

III.2 WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED

Over the past decade, USASOC built a robust capability to target terrorist networks and an unmatched capacity for counterinsurgency operations. At its peak, the level of support to joint-force headquarters in the U.S. Central Command area of operations was the largest sustained effort in our history. As a force, our Soldiers have performed magnificently during two of the Nation's longest wars while executing a wide range of demanding and high-risk operations in hostile environments. As the nature and extent of our engagements in the Middle East change, it is critical to review the lessons learned over the past decade, assess our current situation, and explore requirements for the future force.

Perhaps the most significant change of the past decade is the evolution of the Human Domain. During World War I, aerial platforms were used as a means of fire and observation in land combat. By the end of World War II, airspace had evolved into a distinct domain because its control became recognized as a key to success in the war. National leadership directed the establishment of a separate department of the Air Force in order to develop the required and unique doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities solutions needed to dominate this newly contested space. A similar appreciation for influencing populations now suggests the need for establishment of a Human Domain.

III.3 FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

“The world of 2030 will be radically transformed from our world today. By 2030, no country—whether the US, China, or any other large country—will be a hegemonic power. The empowerment of individuals and diffusion of power among states and from states to informal networks will have a dramatic impact, largely reversing the historic rise of the West since 1750, restoring Asia's weight in the global economy, and ushering in a new era of “democratization” at the international and domestic level. In addition to individual empowerment and the diffusion of

² James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Jan. 31, 2012, 1.

state power, we believe that two other *megatrends* will shape our world out to 2030: demographic patterns, especially rapid aging; and growing resource demands which, in the cases of food and water, might lead to scarcities. These trends, which are virtually certain, exist today, but during the next 15-20 years they will gain much greater momentum.” (GT2030; Page iii)

We will increasingly act in multi-dimensional, hybrid operating environments, which will require the force to operate within, and seamlessly shift between, ethnic enclaves in the center of sprawling megacities and austere rural villages. The rise of non-state and long-duration special operations campaigns demonstrate the need for mission-specific command elements and a different cognitive approach to these problems. This increases the demand from TSOCs and joint force commanders for operational-level capabilities in support of long-duration, regionally focused campaign plans. To meet both the scope and scale of this demand, TSOCs and joint task force commanders require our ARSOF formations to provide a combination of responsive reach-back support and scalable, tailored command and control options in situations ranging from steady state to crisis.

Campaign-capable forces that can conduct special warfare and incorporate surgical strike must inherently maintain situational understanding, have a greater degree of adaptability and be able to plan and conduct long-term operations. These forces must also be able to collaborate with other designated stakeholders in support of regional plans as well as integrate knowledge found in academia and other government and non-government institutions. Ultimately, SOF must apply these capabilities in a coherent manner in support of our national interests as we form the foundation of the Global SOF Network and a Global Landpower Network — a confederation of allies, partners and surrogates as illustrated in the figure below.




Figure III-1: ARSOF 2022 Assessment and Priorities

Conditions across the strategic environment indicate future conflict will not be confined to one category. It will range in scope from major conventional conflicts to humanitarian support and nation-building missions. Very capable adversaries will continue to challenge U.S. interests globally, while rising military powers will work to advance their regional and global interests. Enemies will seek to exploit their asymmetric advantages wherever possible; USASOC’s

training; education, capabilities and concept development must reflect this reality. The momentum of human interaction is reaching unprecedented levels; enabled by generational leaps in personal communication technologies and an associated social-media explosion, with little to no state control of those technologies and applications.




Figure III-2: U.S. Army's Range of Military Operations and Special Operations Core Competency.

We must be prepared to conduct special operations in more restrictive areas than those that we have experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade. As the challenges for access and placement increase, infiltration and exfiltration options will be reduced and ARSOF will become the more subtle option for decision makers to affect desired change and meet future threats. This subtle option will require us to fill the interagency seams and capability gaps observed over the years. The application of SOF operational design presents a solution to bridge these seams and gaps across all domains as seen in the figure below. We must generate capacity for shared understanding to allow for effective campaign production.




Figure III-3: SOF Operational Design and Domain Integration

“ . . . the idea of the future being different from the present is so repugnant to our conventional modes of thought and behavior that we, most of us, offer a great resistance to acting on it in practice.”

John Maynard Keynes, 1937 (*National Intelligence Council*)

The need for special operations campaigns that tie SOF tactical capabilities to U.S. regional or national objectives became apparent. Efforts over the past decade focused on building partner-nation capacity, advising partner forces, and conducting some unilateral activities to safeguard U.S. interests outside of declared theaters of armed conflict. To support the development of these operational-level efforts, theater special operations commands (TSOCs) required individuals with competency to design plans. These campaigns, many of them SOF-centric, consisted of multiple lines of effort developed and synchronized by the TSOCs to achieve discrete outcomes in support of the geographic combatant commanders’ overall strategy. We will increasingly need special operations campaign planners who understand the full range of special operations capabilities and can weave their operations together over time to achieve U.S. objectives.

The importance of SOF interdependence with Army conventional forces also became evident. Across the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, we forged relationships with the conventional force that resulted in operational effectiveness unparalleled in our history. By improving interdependence, we enabled seamless and consistent application of combat power across the full range of military operations.

Finally, to meet our nation’s current and future requirements, USASOC must update its SOF mission command construct, and strengthen its deployed formations through a concerted effort to provide campaign development support. SOF campaigns, the development thereof, and design will build the blue print to challenge the global trends we face. SOF operational design describes our persistent engagements and synchronizes our nation’s efforts from special warfare to surgical strike. This process must support and fully integrate into the broader Army, USSOCOM, and inter agency processes. As one of the foundational documents, the ARSOF Operating Concept hosts the ideas to which we will meet these demands.

III.4 ARSOF OPERATING CONCEPT

Based on the expectation that the Future Operating Environment will be much different than what we’ve previously experienced, our nation’s military must revise its way of doing business. As fiscal austerity and hybrid threats converge, the U.S. requires a force of uncommon agility with personnel who are practiced in “wars amongst the people.”³ To facilitate success in this area, Special Operations Forces will be required to support and enable the Global SOF Network – “A globally networked force of SOF, interagency, allies, and partners able to rapidly respond and persistently address regional contingencies and threats to stability.”⁴ This network is part of the Strategic Landpower initiative which proposes that the joint force employ land forces to gain a political and psychological advantage by understanding and influencing behaviors and perceptions in the human domain. ARSOF’s Operating Concept advances the understanding of this initiative by describing how special warfare and surgical strike activities work in concert to achieve national security objectives.

³ ARSOF Operating Concept, pg 2.

⁴ SOCOM 2020, pg 6.

As the American way of warfare adapts to the realities of the 21st century, the Global Campaign Plan - Special Operations (GCP-SO) enabled by the Global SOF Network (GSN) will play a significant role. In particular, the GCP-SO will potentially change the prevailing paradigm of warfare's character and conduct which for many years has been based on the conventional force-dominated six-phase (Phase 0-5), joint construct. The emerging concept of Strategic Landpower provides a unique perspective to this process of change, as it emphasizes the importance of the "human domain" in warfare. This emphasis will lead to military and non-military forces capable of decisively understanding populations in the operational environment in order to act meaningfully to influence human behavior toward achieving the desired outcomes.⁵

The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) provides the nation with two exquisite and unique critical capabilities: special warfare and surgical strike. Through these complementary capabilities, ARSOF units execute activities across the range of military operations to support national policy and specific theater requirements. These two critical capabilities of Army Special Operations can reduce the U.S. footprint in foreign territories and increase the effectiveness of larger-scale military alternatives.

Surgical Strike. Surgical strike involves "the execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations forces in hostile, denied or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence threats." Executed unilaterally or collaboratively, surgical strike extends America's operational reach and influence by engaging global targets with discriminating precision. To do this, surgical strike applies detailed analysis and precise employment to reduce operational uncertainty and collateral damage.

Special Warfare. Special warfare is an umbrella term indicating Operating Force conduct of combinations of unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, military information support operations, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (e.g. UW, FID, MISO, CT, COIN) through and with indigenous personnel. With discreet, precise, politically astute and scalable capabilities, ARSOF frequently undertake politically sensitive missions over extended periods of time in hostile, austere and denied environments. Here, ARSOF's deep language and cultural expertise enhances unit survivability through the recognition and understanding of emerging threats. Such expertise also grants Army special operators influence over the human domain in pursuit of U.S. objectives, to avoid conflict, or bring about a quick and enduring victory. Likewise, ARSOF operators must be proficient in small-unit tactics and building indigenous forces, alongside which they will fight in permissive, uncertain and hostile environments. Moreover, successful special warfare will require ARSOF's low signature capabilities.

⁵ LTG Charles T. Cleveland and LTC Stuart L. Farris, *Toward Strategic Landpower*, Army Magazine, Jul 2013, 21-22.




Figure III-4: The Spectrum of Special Warfare

Defining Characteristics of Special Warfare and Surgical Strike. Special warfare and surgical strike are complementary, rather than mutually exclusive. ARSOF will employ surgical strike activities to shape the operational environment or influence selected target audiences in support of broader strategic objectives. Although the typical strike can be short in duration, interagency and host nation partnerships can develop the target and facilitate post-operation activities, thus aiding the planning process focus on critical operational or strategic targets, and include counter-proliferation, counterterrorism, and hostage rescue and recovery operations. Table III-1 compares the characteristics of special warfare and surgical strike in light of four principal criteria: how the unit views the population, how the unit deals with the population, the focus of preparation of the environment (PE) and the time horizon.

Table III-1. Characteristics of Special Warfare and Surgical Strike.

	Special Warfare	Surgical Strike
Population Viewed As	The Environment	An Obstacle
Population Dealt With By	Engagement	Avoid/Control
PE Focus	Enduring Network Development	Target Centric
Time Horizon	Mid to Long Term	Short to Mid Term
Speed of Execution	Gradual	Near Instantaneous
Prime Requirement	Patience	Speed
Communications	Low Signature	Robust
Measure of Effectiveness	Systemic Change	Threat Eliminated
Risk Tolerance	Significant	Minimal

III.5 THE HUMAN DOMAIN AND SOF IMPLICATION:

The human domain is the totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that influence human behavior to the extent that success of any military strategy, operation, or tactical action depends on the application of unique capabilities that are designed to fight and win population-centric conflicts (SOCOM 2020).

Special Operations power achieves the predominance of its effects *in the Human Domain*. Special Operations Power is inherently Joint and can ‘cross-cut’ domains. Special operations are also used to influence, enable, coerce, and achieve control and relative superiority. This allows our forces the ability to achieve both military and political objectives in the national security arena. These acts are both offensive and defensive in nature. If conditions are favorable in the environment, SOF can dominate the situation using service enablers and leveraging indigenous forces and other attributes of the Human Domain.

III.6 COUNTER UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

(Excerpted from USASOC G9's Counter Unconventional Warfare White Paper, September, 2014)

Purpose. Counter-UW describes an over-arching strategy that synchronizes IW and JIIM operations and activities to effectively counter adversary UW campaigns. This paper provides a conceptual framework for counter-unconventional warfare, based on Colonel (Retired) USA David Maxwell's counter-unconventional warfare thesis presented at a Silent Quest Enabling Event at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. It presents counter-unconventional warfare as a viable strategic approach for U.S. policy makers to apply against future irregular threats to U.S. objectives.

Background. Joint doctrine defines unconventional warfare (UW) as "activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area." UW is one of the five operations and activities of Irregular Warfare (IW), and deals with indigenous groups resisting and often attempting to overthrow their actual or de facto government. Events in Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine provide current examples where state and non-state actors are executing UW to coerce, disrupt, and overthrow the established governments. The Sunni Muslim jihadi extremist claim an Islamic State ranging from eastern Syria to northwestern Iraq with a goal of overthrowing the Shiite run governments and establishing a Muslim Caliphate across the region.

Russian actions in Ukraine provide an example of a state actor executing UW activities. Russia is employing special forces, agents, and provocateurs in eastern and southern Ukraine to cause chaos and intimidate the population into acquiescing to a separation from the government in Kiev. Russia is also providing funding, weapons, and on-the-ground coordination of support for the pro-Russian separatists. The U.S. and most of Europe are concerned that these Russian UW activities could expand to other countries in the region such as the Baltic States and Moldova that have nascent pro-Russian separatist movements.

Russian sponsorship of "pro-Russian" separatists attempting to destabilize the government of Ukraine is in accordance with their Military Doctrine 2010. Their actions have reenergized the debate over a strategy for countering UW. David Maxwell describes counter-unconventional warfare as "operations and activities conducted by the U.S. Government and supported by SOF [special operations forces] against an adversarial state or non-state sponsor of unconventional warfare in order to decrease the sponsor's capacity to employ unconventional warfare to achieve strategic aims. As such, Counter-UW may comprehensively employ political, economic, military, and psychological pressure in order to affect both an adversarial sponsor's will and capabilities." Likewise, Maxwell characterizes counter-unconventional warfare (C-UW) efforts as "protracted and psychological-centric in nature" and focuses on decreasing the sponsor's ability and will to support elements of a resistance or insurgency.

The U.S. Government needs an adaptive, holistic approach to counter such adversary UW campaigns, whether in a single country, in a region, or globally. Depending on the situation, the Department of State (DoS) or DoD could lead the effort. Over the past 12 years of war, the U.S. Armed Forces have demonstrated superiority in traditional warfare and have improved core activities or operations in certain aspects of irregular warfare (IW), including counterterrorism (CT), counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations (SO). The U.S. military succeeded in traditional warfare during Operation Iraqi Freedom where U.S. and coalition conventional forces

supported by special operations forces (SOF) quickly overwhelmed Iraqi conventional forces, defeating them at every turn from the line of departure at the Iraq and Kuwaiti border through the political capital of Bagdad. However the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq revealed a systemic deficiency in U.S. government and joint forces ability to prosecute viable and effective COIN operations. Senior leader recognition of this deficiency led to the development of a new Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency in 2006 and the subsequent U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide to provide interagency decision makers a broad framework and practical guidelines for a whole-of-government approach to COIN.

The framework and relevant expertise gained from COIN in Iraq provides an important ingredient but is insufficient to solve the problem of countering the UW occurring in the Ukraine. Employed in concert with other IW pillars such as Foreign Internal Defense (FID), the U.S. military has sufficient processes and means to work with a host nation (such as Ukraine) to contain and to mitigate the insurrections and disruptions in their territory. The essential missing element is a process and means to curtail the external sponsorship (such as Russia) which provides the foundational motivation, resources, and support to the separatist movements. The importance of Russia's sponsorship is evident in the separatist movements, and is entirely consistent with insurrections throughout history which almost always have failed without the support of an external source. Any conceptual framework to counter-UW must adopt a whole-of-government approach that has the structure and a coherent strategy to support the host nation with all the relevant pillars of irregular warfare as well as non-warfare aspects such as the information, economic, financial, legal and political dimensions. This whole-of-government approach must bring its concerted power to bear against the sponsor who nurtures the environment in which it is possible for a resistance movement to survive and expand. History has shown that severing the insurgency from its sponsor will lead to the resistance movement becoming increasingly isolated and to its eventual demise.

Central Idea. Counter-unconventional warfare (C-UW) describes a strategy encompassing a whole-of-government approach to synchronize the operations and activities of irregular warfare and to integrate joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partner efforts against adversary unconventional warfare activities.




Figure III-5: Counter-UW Synchronization. *Counter UW synchronizes the effects of IW and our JIIM partners*

III.7 CONCLUSION

Future trends can converge to generate a strikingly non-permissive, actor-rich operating environment typified by high degrees of socio-political volatility and fragmentation. Similarly, irregular warfare and limited conflicts are certain to persist around the globe and will influence the future of the U.S. and our allies. To prevail in future low-intensity conflicts, the U.S. will require agile, adaptive and culturally astute SOF operators and teams - the best educated, trained and equipped special operations formations in the world.

ARSOF have always functioned as a strategic bridging force, serving as the connective tissue: among indigenous forces and populations, within our military, and inside the interagency community. While that cannot change, we are not content to maintain the status quo. Even while in the fight, we must become students of not only our adversaries but also of our past to build on lessons learned from previous engagements. We also must grasp the future, in order to develop the techniques and strategies necessary to remain the force of choice for decision makers. It is imperative that we be prepared to meet these challenges head on.

By embracing the changes outlined within the Global SOF Network, Strategic Landpower Initiative, ARSOF Operating Concept and considering new ideas like Counter Unconventional Warfare, ARSOF will be prepared to thrive in the complex operating environment of the 21st century. By improving and revising our special warfare and surgical strike capabilities along with state-of-the-art technology used by educated and culturally savvy operators, we can ensure the defense of our nation and aid that of our partners.

CHAPTER IV INTERDEPENDENCE OF SOF

IV.1 INTRODUCTION

SOF Commanders and staff plan campaigns, major operations, and engagements either in a supporting or supported role with unified action partners using the elements of operational design based on situation. Many SOF core operations and activities are conducted in support of other Unified Action Partners (UAP), including other US Government agencies, multinational partnerships, or intergovernmental organizations. For example, Security Force Assistance (SFA), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Stability Operations are normally led by other Unified Action Partners.

SOF Operational Design is optimized in the Human Domain and in non-DoD led operations.

The human domain is the totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that influence human behavior to the extent that success of any military strategy, operation, or tactical action depends on the application of unique capabilities that are designed to fight and win population-centric conflicts (SOCOM 2020).

Irregular Warfare is primarily conducted in the Human Domain. Political/diplomatic action, interagency capabilities, and the SOF component of military action fuse to address problems that Combined Arms Maneuver in the Land Domain is not well structured to solve. The following diagrams illustrate where ARSOF core competencies fall along the range of governmental actions and the Human and Land Domains.




Figure IV-1: ARSOFs Role across the Range of Government Actions within International Competition.




Figure IV-2. Planning Frameworks in relation to the Operating Environment.

Figure IV-2, highlights (red boxes) the optimization of SOF Campaigns in relation to the doctrinal (JP 5.0) depiction. The Army is principally responsible for generating forces to the Joint Force Commander for sustained, expeditionary land warfare across the Human and Land Domains. Special Operations, as a core competency of the Army, is optimized for small footprint, long-duration, low-visibility Campaigns, potentially conducted under a combination of Title 22 and 50 Authorities. SOF Campaigns to decisively engage adversaries in Irregular Warfare are depicted in current Joint Campaign doctrine as “Phase 0 – Shaping” operations.

IV.2. UNIFIED ACTION. SOF commanders understand the instruments of national power (e.g. Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) and that any one instrument may be the main effort over the others in the range of government actions within international competition (see figure 4-1). Therefore, SOF Commanders employ unified action to not only integrate other operations from joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational organizations in almost all SOF core operations and activities (see figure 4-1). *Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1).* Unified action is the DoD doctrinal term that represents a comprehensive approach. Unified action is promoted through close, continuous coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures and bureaucratic and personnel limitations.

SOF facilitates the blending of capabilities between UAP into one uninterrupted range of options for US policy makers. SOF bridges the critical seams of SOF-UAP relationships to effectively contribute to unity of effort. SOF Operational Design takes in account of the human domain based on the situation and enables/informs commanders, staff, and UAP to organize and integrate relationships vertically and horizontally.




Figure IV-3: Unified Action.

IV.3 JIIM, UNIFIED ACTION PARTNERS AND STAKEHOLDERS. Several overlapping terms are used to describe the range of actors relevant to unified action. Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) is a commonly used term that emphasizes US and foreign government entities. *UAP are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations (ADRP 3-0).* While this definition does not explicitly include Host Nation or Partner Nation forces or organizations, these are also key entities that must be understood and leveraged in the SOF Campaign Plan. SOF facilitates the potential of unified action partners (UAP) and stakeholders across the range of unified action operations, actions, and activities. SOF and Conventional Forces may use title 10, 50, and 22 authorities to integrate their operations within the political and diplomatic action range of government activities within international competition. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is an example of how SOF integrates with UAPs including the Department of State country team and partner nation security forces.

SOF Commanders, staff, and UAP consider impacts of campaigns, operations, and engagements on stakeholders and their interests. *Stakeholders is a person, organization or group with an interest in or concern about something. In design key stakeholders have both high interest and high impact on the problem situation (King, Thinking Skills Resources, 4; SAMS, Art of Design Student Text, 2010).*

Table IV-1: Unified Action Partners (UAP) and Stakeholders

Joint	Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1)
Interagency	United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense (JP 3-08). The Interagency plan to a joint campaign order will be on Annex V. Interagency Operations.
Intergovernmental organizations (IGO)	An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO (JP 3-08).
Multinational	Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. See also alliance; coalition (JP 5-0).
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO)	A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO.
Indigenous populations and institutions (IPI)	The civilian construct of an area of operations, to include its population (legal citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, and all categories of dislocated civilians), governmental, tribal, commercial, and private organizations and entities.
Stakeholders	Stakeholders is a person, organization or group with an interest in or concern about something. In design key stakeholders have both high interest and high impact on the problem situation (King, Thinking Skills Resources, 4; SAMS, Art of Design Student Text, 2010).
Host Nation	Nation state that hosts US and partner nation forces and organizations to conduct operations, activities, and actions in the host nation. Host Nations also have their own Joint, Interagency, Multinational parts and relationships with the same or other UAPs.
Partner Nation	Nation state that conducts operations, activities, and actions with the US. A partner nation could be a US ally and/or a coalition partner. Partner Nations also have their own Joint, Interagency, Multinational parts and relationships with the same or other UAPs.

IV.4 DEFENSE, DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT, HOST/PARTNER NATION

HIERARCHY OF PLANS. Each UAP, has a hierarchy of plans and orders in which they follow. The U.S. Government, including the DoD, integrate, coordinate, and synchronize these plans to plan, prepare, execute operations, activities, and actions to where unity of effort is achieved. The following table is the hierarchy of strategic and operational documents from UAPs.

Table IV-2: UAP Hierarchy of Plans Comparative Table.

DoD (Proponent)	DoS/USAID	Other Nation
National Security Strategy (POTUS)	National Security Strategy	Some nations have a version of a national security strategy
National Defense Strategy (SecDef)	N/A	Differs from country to country
Quadrennial Defense Review	Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review	
National Military Strategy (CJSC)	Bureau Strategic Resource Plan	
Theater Campaign Plan (GCC)		
Theater Campaign Support Plan (TSOC)		
Operations Plan (OPLAN)		
	Integrated Country Strategy	

Outside a Declared Theater of Active Armed Conflict the US Ambassador to a country, in his role as Chief of Mission, is responsible for overseeing the efforts of all US agencies in that country. The primary document the Chief of Mission uses to synchronize this is the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). The ICS is informed by a series of strategic documents including the National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), Department of State-USAID Agency Priority Goals, and various regional plans. The ICS includes a narrative of the Chief of Mission’s Priorities, a Country Context section that describes the environment, broad Mission Goals that are derived from the Department of State-USAID Agency Priority Goals and are tailored to that specific country, and Mission Objectives that support those goals. All of the agencies represented in that country, including the DoD through the Defense Attaché, contribute to the ICS. The ICS is a key document SOF planners should be familiar with when designing a regional or country campaign plan.

IV.5 VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL RELATIONSHIPS. A vertical focus emphasizes receiving and accomplishing tasks from a higher headquarters. Horizontal integration cuts across organizational lines to create partnerships among stakeholders and contribute to unified actions and unity of effort. Therefore, commanders, staff, and unified action partners must consider both focuses, vertical and horizontal, to employ in a campaign in order to foster trust, get buy-in, and aid synergy. An example of a SOF capability is the Civil Military Support Element (CMSE), which CMSEs conduct local and regional engagements to counter violent extremist efforts to win public support and build sanctuaries by exploiting the local population. In coordination with the country team and Host Nation (HN), the CMSE is useful for a whole-of-

government approach to support both the USG objectives to gain access, integrate actions horizontally and vertically, and to routinely engage with a HN government and the indigenous population in coordination with the Chief of Mission (COM) and country team.

Communications are a frequent challenge to horizontal communication. UAPs often have difficulty finding a medium to effectively collaorate and share information. Technical platforms may or may not be available to assist with this challenge, depending on the situation. Often SOF units must use relationship developed over time with UAPs to overcome these communication challenges.




Figure IV-4: Example of Vertical and Horizontal Organizational Relationships.

IV.6 JOINT, WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT, AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES.

SOF commanders and staff, using the Mission Command War Fighting Function (WfF), focus on tying unity of effort with UAPs when designing approaches to campaigns, major operations, and engagements. SOF commanders, staffs, and UAP and/or stakeholders have a vested interest in the effects resulting from a campaign, major operation, and engagement. SOF commanders, staff, and unified action partners choose the various approaches based on the situation. These approaches include a joint, whole-of-government, and comprehensive approach in order to achieve unified action and unity of effort. *A comprehensive approach integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal (ADRP 7-0).* In other words, a comprehensive approach integrates cooperative efforts of US joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational (HN/PN), HN/PN indigenous populations and institutions (HN/PN's joint and interagency), private sector, and stakeholders. Depending on the situation, SOF commanders, staffs, and UAP may choose a *whole of government approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort (JP 3-08).*




Figure IV-5: Approaches to Produce Unified Action

SOF commanders and staff must understand the unified action environment in order to integrate multiple stakeholders and UAPs with diverse perspectives, authorities, capabilities, and objectives to work toward the desired end state of a campaign. SOF commanders and staff must be able to establish unifying goals, understand mutual needs and interdependence, and each UAPs and stakeholder's long-term and short-term objectives.

IV.7 JOINT FORCE C2 OPTIONS. SOF commanders and staffs must understand the spectrum of special warfare and the situations that come about that may require a mix of approaches. This enables the SOF commander to bring these forces and their capabilities to bear on the problem. Commanders must understand the interaction and role of core and regionally expert elements to leverage standing Joint and Interagency ties to provide responsive, informed C2 options to the Joint Force.




Figure IV-6: Leveraging Joint and Interagency Ties to the Joint Force.

SOF commanders, staff, and unified action partners may establish joint interagency, intergovernmental, multination coordination centers, groups, boards, cells, and liaisons in order to optimize SOF and UAP interdependence and to achieve unity of effort in campaigns. Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) at the GCC level is an example. Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) will typically include interagency liaisons and develop ways to integrate efforts. Subordinate SOF headquarters mirror these efforts to varying degrees, depending on the situation.

IV.8 COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

(This section is excerpted from Joint Pub 3-05, Special Operations, Chapter III)

The tailored C2 support of GCC plans starts with a SOC-FWD capability resident within the TSOC, or provided through attached forces. The C2 process is scalable based on the size of the force and tailored to the situation (such as integrated with CF, multinational, or intergovernmental partners) (see Figure III-5). TSOCs may choose to establish intermediate and/or distributed command elements from the TSOC, normally as a SOC-FWD element. The TSOC has multiple options for tasking and deploying C2 elements in order to match SOF capabilities and meet GCC requirements. Examples of forward-deployed SOF elements include the SOC-FWD, SOTF, JSOTF, and SOJTF—each C2 element is designed to meet unique operational requirements. As an operation matures, the SOC-FWD can expand to multiple SOTFs, or a SOC-FWD can form the nucleus of a JSOTF or SOJTF. The various SOF C2 elements can provide timely information, halt or delay the development of hostilities, and provide time for the JFC to prepare and deploy a larger CF/SOF integrated response.




Figure IV-7 JP3-05 Special Operations Notional Command and Control Options

IV.8.1 Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence.

SOF's primary role in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence is in support of a broader whole-of-government approach, integrated with both USG and partner capabilities. SOF's unique capabilities support the US military instrument of national power and support the USG departments and agencies, partner nations, or intergovernmental organizations (e.g., UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) to protect and advance national security interests, deter conflict, and shape regional security. SOF provides a critical capability for the GCC to support and influence these activities. SOF provides an efficient and effective DOD commitment that builds and develops regional security forces while maintaining a positive forward presence during persistent engagement and pre-crisis periods. The military and security cooperation engagements during these activities emphasize the regional stabilization goals outlined within the GCC's TCP. During this stage, distributed SOF elements influence stability through building or sustaining partnerships, and developing capability and capacity in Foreign Special Forces. *For more information, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.*

Based on these small decentralized engagement activities, linked as part of broader campaigns and regional strategies, large C2 organizations are not required to coordinate in-country activities or multiple actions across the region. During these activities, SOF elements are under the OPCON of the CDRTSOC in support of the TCP or emerging regional security concerns. Within a supported country, the senior US representative is the COM or US ambassador. The senior DOD representative within the country team is the senior defense official (SDO) or defense attaché (DATT) who is responsible for partner nation military engagements and DOD security actions. SOF elements are deployed within chosen countries and coordinate with US country teams through the DATT office or designated DOD office. Although SOF elements under the OPCON of the CDRTSOC, the supporting SOF element has coordination responsibilities with the country team. The scale of the activity in a designated country or region may require a larger forward-deployed C2 element. The decision is based on GCC guidance, mission analysis, and TSOC requirements for effective C2 based on force structure. Larger engagements within a chosen country may require a SOTF-level C2 capability, where multiple SOF elements are conducting activities at multiple locations. When the CDRTSOC organizes a C2 capability at any level, the primary intent is a flattened command structure versus a hierarchical one to facilitate control and mission command execution.

IV.8.2 Crisis Response and Limited Contingencies.

The CDRTSOC plays a critical role during regional crisis response operations supporting the GCC, both as the special operations advisor and as the SOF component

commander. The CDRTSOC has SOF elements in theater for supporting contingencies. If the SOF supporting element is deployed from the US, the CDRTSOC normally maintains the role as the supported SOF commander with OPCON over all SOF. Normally, the TSOC will initially deploy a small C2 element forward to allow time for larger C2 options dependent upon force apportionment. In larger contingencies, the CDRTSOC may deploy forward as the JFSOCC or designate a JFSOCC to a JTF, who is normally selected from the largest provider of forces.

IV8.3 Major Operations and Campaigns.

Major operations and campaigns are inherently joint that require robust C2 architectures. The buildup of forces can progress from a battalion size force during crisis response or limited contingency operations to a corps-level force during major operations or a campaign. Prior established SOF contingency C2 elements may facilitate the buildup of supporting joint forces. An evolution of force buildup will influence established SOF C2 structures resulting in a possible operational handover to, and potential integration with, an incoming JTF. As major operations and campaigns develop, modifying the SOF C2 organization(s) to better enable interdependence and synchronization with the larger US and MNFs is critical to success.

The establishment of a SOJTF (as in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) can improve CF/SOF integration and interdependence. The SOJTF acts as a single HQ to plan and coordinate all special operations in theater; and employ and sustain US and multinational SOF. The SOJTF increases synergies in intelligence, communications, and information sharing, improves manpower efficiency, improves critical enablers to the force, and enhances coordination between all special operations in theater.

SOF has inherent capability for contingency or crisis response operations.

Initially, the TSOC may provide organic C2 for the special operation or activity required in theater. When the GCC designates a JTF to assume mission requirements, the TSOC may send SOF liaison element representation to the JTF to coordinate special operations in the region or maintain C2 of special operations from the TSOC. These decisions are determined as the CDRTSOC evaluates the CF/SOF

IV.9 CONUS BASED ARSOF ORGANIZATIONS

JIIM/SOF integration is not only a concern for forward deployed headquarters. In support of ARSOF efforts to operationalize the CONUS base, organizations such as the Civil Military Advisory Group (CMAG), MISOC Effects Group (MEG), Office of Special Warfare, and Interagency/Multinational Liaisons work to integrate JIIM and SOF efforts while executing their roles in training and supporting ARSOF forces. These organization develop relationships with potential UAPs over time and can be a useful interface for SOF planners. The following is a brief description of the CMAG, MEG, and SOST.

- **CMAG.** The CMAG provides a conduit between 95th CA BDE (A)/ARSOF and Interagency (IA) partners in Washington, DC. Once the CMAG links in CA Companies and CA Teams (CMSE) with IA partners, the teams can integrate IA partners in the teams planning and preparation of their civil military engagement (CME) plan. The principle IA partners that CMAG communicates with include USAID (also, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance – OFDA, and Office of Transition Initiative –OTI) for development, DoS for governance (Defense Integration Team), US Institute for Peace (Conflict Mitigation), and other IGOs including the International Committee of the Red Cross. The CMAG is not meant or designed to act independent of GCCs / TSOCs and it is not a force allocation or resourcing board. It

Integrates influence capabilities for component subordinate commanders / command subordinate units and operationalizes the CONUS-based entities like the MEG.

- MEG. The MISOC Effects Group is a collaborative forum / working group - set in an interagency space - with the objective of connecting and harnessing CONUS based Influence Entities / Networks in support of the forward effort. The MEG functions as an enabler for the Interagency / GCCs and TSOCs and paces off their operations, actions, and activities. It harnesses the intellectual / human capacity of CONUS based Inform and Influence Activities and Information Related Capabilities. The MEG works in concert with a broad range of Joint and Interagency partners to support Combatant Commander and Ambassador objectives. The MEG is not meant or designed to act independent of GCCs / TSOCs and it is not a force allocation or resourcing board. It Integrates influence capabilities for component subordinate commanders / command subordinate units and operationalizes the CONUS-based entities like the CMAG.
- Special Operations Support Team (SOST) (USSOCOM IA Partnership Program) advances TSOC and the USSOCOM Component priorities with the Interagency and other NCR-based partners, through a robust SOST network, in order to achieve CDRUSSOCOM objectives. It is responsible for synchronizing planning for global operations against terrorist networks, and will do so in coordination with other combatant commands, the Services, and as directed, and: USSOCOM provides military representation to US national agencies and international agencies for matters related to global operations against terrorist networks as directed.

SOF commanders and staff can do the following to plan, prepare, execute and assess operations with the elements above.

- Pre-mission Coordination (i.e. conference)
- Training support
- Mission support (i.e. operational reachback)
- Post-mission Feedback (i.e. AAR/Lessons Learned)

SOF commanders and staffs must understand objectives/goals, authorities and missions of UAPs that affect there area of operations. SOF commanders and staff must be aware of legal considerations within UAPs when conducting operations, activities, and actions. Below are the US Diplomacy, Development, and Defense IA Partner mission, and activities.

Table IV-3: UAP Authorities, and Goals/Objectives.

Interagency Partner	Mission	Activity
Department of State (Diplomacy)	Shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just, and democratic world and foster conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the American people and people everywhere.	Lead agency for Diplomatic Engagement. The lead agency for Security Cooperation/FID.
US Agency for International Aid (USAID) (Development)	Partners to end extreme poverty and to promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity.	Lead agency for development, elections, and humanitarian relief.
Department of Defense (Defense)	Provide military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country.	Lead agency for Combat Operations. Coordinates with partners in CT, Anticorruption and Disarmament Operations, Actions, and Activities

SOF Commanders and staff must conduct a Stakeholders Analysis to develop situational understanding of UAP and stakeholders’ interest in any given operation, activity, or action. When planning, preparing, and executing operations in a given area, SOF commanders and staff may use the following questions to ensure the plan addresses stakeholder interests, which may become obstacles.

<p>Stakeholder Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have I identified all the Stakeholders (SH)? • Have I identified SH capabilities? • Have I identified SH competing and complimentary interests? • Have I identified methods to share information and facilitate communication/collaboration? • Have I created a contact roster and "who's who" smart book? • Have I created a glossary of terms and definitions that includes cross references with our own language? • Have I resolved considerations of clearance level and organizational culture? • Have I graphically depicted SH relevant data as it relates to the problem and our collaboration via diagram, sketch, or overlay with a narrative?
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Figure IV-8: Stakeholder Development.

The following table is an example that could be used to record the results of a stakeholder analysis.

Table IV-4: Stakeholder Analysis

Stake Holder	Purpose/Interests	Authorities	Relationship with SOF/TSOC/US Forces	Relationship among other UAPs
Colombia National Police (CNP)	Law Enforcement; prevent and disrupt criminal organizations. Provide civil security	Colombian Law XXX	SOF / USAID trains CNP to conduct CMO.	Some NGOs and IPIs have a strained relationship with the CNP




Figure IV 9: Example of Interagency and DoD Relationships

CONCLUSION. SOF, Conventional Forces, and UAP integration is and will be the norm in today's and tomorrow's complex and challenging operational environment. Because war and conflict are politics by other means, US SOF will most likely be the force of choice for policy makers to employ its capability along with UAP in an area of operation. The complex and ill-structured environment of the human domain adds to the complexity of the environment, which demands SOF, USG agencies, and other UAPs to be prepared for. The human domain does not easily present an enemy center of gravity or one group of interconnected actors for the US to apply its instruments of national power. On the contrary, actors and groups in the human domain are interrelated and do not present the same center of gravity throughout time. It is important to understand UAPs and stakeholders in order to apply their capabilities in the human domain because introducing their actions and involvement could either have negative impacts against an external threat in the human domain or against the UAPs themselves. Therefore, SOF commanders and staffs must understand the strengths and weakness of the Joint Force and UAPs and their opportunities and threats when employed with SOF when developing a campaign in the human domain.

CHAPTER V A THEORY OF SOF OPERATIONAL ART

“There is, however, one kind of special unit which should be retained—that designed to be employed in small parties, usually behind the enemy, on tasks beyond the normal scope of warfare in the field. There will be an increasing need for highly qualified and individually trained men—and women—to sabotage vital installations, to spread rumours, to misdirect the enemy, to transmit intelligence, to kill or kidnap individuals, and to inspire resistance movements.”

—William Slim, Defeat into Victory

V.1 INTRODUCTION

For special operations to be useful for policy-makers in achieving strategic objectives, the operators, leaders, and planners must be able to combine the tactical effects of special operations (both Special Warfare and Surgical Strike) into campaigns that achieve the strategic objective—an operational art of special operations. One way of approaching the question of how to design and execute special operations campaigns is to develop a theory about how special operations can achieve the policy-makers’ goals. Doing this requires a solid grasp of what special operations are and how they differ from conventional forces. The fundamental difference is that our country organizes, trains, and equips its special operations forces for a particular set of missions, while it maintains the general purpose force to cover the full spectrum of threats. Our nation has chosen to do this because these missions, including Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Direction Action (DA), Military Information Support Operations (MISO), Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) and others, have become increasingly important to our national interest over the past century. In this time, warfare has evolved to the point where irregular threats pose a more significant threat than at any time in the past. At the same time, the complexity of modern combined arms warfare has also advanced, widening the gulf between conventional and irregular war. Because irregular warfare has advanced so much in the recent past, and because our nation organizes its special operations forces primarily for these threats, we should not separate the theories of special operations and irregular warfare. As the discussion below shows, special operations campaigns can have different guiding tenets than those of conventional campaigns. Specifically, successful irregular and SOF campaigns build the political solution throughout the campaign, steadily expanding the friendly coalition’s physical access to terrain and people; the cognitive or intelligence understanding of the threat and local politics; and, increasing the size of the friendly coalition while fracturing the enemy coalition and maintaining a strong negotiating position with coalition allies. By planning every tactical action to expand these three forms of access, SOF campaigns build toward the desired strategic objective.

The theory defines special operations forces as those forces organized to combat irregulars and irregular warfare as war fought by institutionally weak combatants, as opposed to conventional warfare between institutionally strong states. A study of the evolution of irregular warfare and its theoretical underpinnings leads to five characteristics that differentiate it from conventional warfare. These characteristics define an opaque form of warfare, requiring physical, cognitive, and moral access to successfully pursue strategic objectives. The theory then proposes a set of tenets to guide operational planners and leaders in arranging SOF tactical actions to achieve a strategic objective.

V.2 IRREGULAR WARFARE AND INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTH

Military forces are the institutions that societies use to wage war.⁶ Institutions form the basis for human communities, from the smallest group to a modern superpower. Institutions “are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies.”⁷ A military institution is the set of formal and informal rules that allow its members to interact to create combat power. The institution serves a common goal by “constrain[ing] the behavior of all” members, incentivizing them to act in concert.⁸ Some military institutions are stronger than others, channeling more human activity towards a single goal. For example, the governments of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom were able to extract far more resources, in blood and treasure, from their populations to wage World War I than in any other previous war. For four bloody years they were able to maintain sufficient domestic unity and military discipline to continue to feed young men into the trenches. By contrast, most states in the world at that time could not have mobilized anywhere near the same level of money, labor, or industrial output.⁹ The nascent states of Africa for example, could barely enforce the most basic decrees of the government outside the confines of the capital. This institutional weakness resulted in far weaker military forces.¹⁰

This weakness extends to all of the war fighting functions reducing the capability of these forces to maneuver, control, and sustain forces in combat. Consequently, these weak forces frequently use ambushes and raids as their preferred form of maneuver. Authors who discuss guerrilla warfare frequently mention that the forces appear, strike, and then disappear. The military institutions cannot support sustained operations. They choose ambushes out of necessity not choice. Mao Zedong, one of the acknowledged champions of guerrilla warfare, stated that guerrilla warfare was a temporary expedient until the conventional balance of power enabled the communists to take the offensive conventionally.¹¹ The example of Hizbollah, an irregular force that strengthened its institutions to the point where it could wage conventional defensive battles, adds further support to the idea that weak institutions choose guerrilla warfare out of necessity.

Tactically, the ability to resist force distinguishes institutionally strong combatants from institutionally weak combatants. In the physical sciences, the ability to resist shearing force distinguishes between the three primary phases of matter—solid, liquid, and gas. A solid has exponentially greater resistance to shearing force than a liquid, and a liquid greater than a gas.¹²

⁶This section parallels the argument put forth in William Harris, “Institutions at War,” unpublished paper, Advanced Military Studies Program, 11 March 2013.

⁷Douglass C. North, “Economic Performance through Time” (Nobelprize.org, 1993), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html (accessed May 14, 2013).

⁸Gary M. Shiffman and James J. Jochum, *Economic Instruments of Security Policy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 18.

⁹Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1992).

¹⁰Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 130–133.

¹¹Mao Zedong, *Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan* (Marxists.org, 1938), http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_08.htm (accessed 12 February 2013).

¹²Natalie Wolchover, “Solid or Liquid? Physicists Redefine States of Matter,” *Simons Science News* (April 2013): 1–4, <https://simonsfoundation.org/features/science-news/solid-or-liquid-physicists-redefine-states-of-matter/>

Similarly, guerrillas, partisans, terrorists, and other irregulars have an exponentially weaker ability to defend terrain against military force. While irregulars can make life miserable for a conventional army, they have minimal ability to deny terrain to a conventional army. The irregulars may be able to deter the conventional army from occupying a piece of terrain because the cost of clearing the terrain of irregulars is greater than the value of holding that terrain. Nevertheless, the irregulars at best can only disrupt conventional forces in terrain that the conventional forces value. The Russian partisans on the Eastern Front in World War II are an example. They were able to occupy terrain that the Germans considered of minimal value and disrupt the German lines of communication, but they could not prevent the Germans from seizing key terrain.¹³

When opposing an institutionally stronger foe that operates in a more regular manner, irregulars will refuse decisive battle and disappear into the wilderness or the population.¹⁴ Against other irregulars, they may attempt to defend terrain but will usually conform to a raiding model because they cannot sustain combat for extended periods. Moreover, their institutional weakness means that they have less capability to ensure their fighters will continue to fight in the more lethal conditions of sustained close combat. Additionally, they are unable to guarantee their fighters impunity. The soldiers of a regular army can show their affiliation in the open without fear of arrest while irregulars lack the strength to protect their soldiers in this way.¹⁵

Irregulars' institutional weakness saps their potential combat power because they are more inherently coalition units. Irregular forces have exponentially less political unity than regular forces.¹⁶ While institutionally strong combatants can convince soldiers from distant parts of their country to endure the horrendous conditions of Verdun or Stalingrad in a battle culture of forbearance, irregulars are far less willing to endure sustained combat.¹⁷ Weak military institutions are less able to prevent undisciplined behavior such as fleeing the battlefield without orders, refusing to advance under fire, refusing to endure privation, stealing supplies, choosing sleep over delivering needed supplies to combat units, or abusing the civilian population. They also are less effective at building tightly bound units whose soldiers desire the approbation of their comrades and fear failing their brothers in arms. Weak institutions place fewer constraints on individuals and are less effective at providing inducements. Consequently, they are less effective at focusing individual efforts towards a collective goal. This limits irregulars' tactical capabilities to short actions that quickly culminate. Additionally, it may destroy the group's legitimacy with the population.

(accessed May 1, 2013); F Sausset, G Biroli, and J Kurchan, "Do solids flow?," *arXiv* (June 2010): 1–10, <http://arxiv.org/pdf/1001.0918.pdf> (accessed May 1, 2013).

¹³Earl F. Ziemke, *Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2002), 304–308.

¹⁴Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical & Critical Study* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004), xvi.

¹⁵Geoff Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011), 483–484.

¹⁶Ida Rudolfson, *State Capacity, Inequality and Inter-group Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Oslo, Norway: University of Oslo, 2013); Hanne Fjelde and Desiree Nilsson, "Rebels against Rebels: Explaining Violence between Rebel Groups," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 4 (2012): 604–628.

¹⁷Alistair Horne, *The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916* (London: Penguin Group, 1993); John Lynn, "Forging the Western Army in Seventeenth-century France," in *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050*, ed. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 35–56.

Operationally and strategically, the motley collection of individuals and small groups that compose irregular forces are a coalition with widely divergent interests and strategic end states.¹⁸ Some irregular forces successfully meld these disparate groups into a more coherent whole by steadily improving the institutional constraints on individual and group behavior. The Chinese Communists, following Mao Zedong, steadily increased their control of their coalition of rebels until they had developed the institutional capability to wage sustained conventional operations. Mao Zedong specifically addressed the importance strengthening institutions in a revolutionary movement to obviate the deleterious of poor discipline and competing goals that institutional weakness entails.¹⁹ Successful irregulars like Mao frequently succeed because they are able to consolidate their coalition into a tighter institutional framework through ideology, norm formation, and other social movement mechanisms.²⁰

These groups are also more likely to fracture because they are pursuing different strategic end states just as coalitions of states can fracture. One of the most common features of irregular war is fratricide amongst supposedly aligned irregular groups.²¹ Irregular warfare is inherently local because weak institutions have minimal ability to build situational understanding in fractured populations. Instead, they build coalitions with various groups in an attempt to achieve their strategic goals. However, these coalitions are incredibly weak because each party has a poor understanding of the dynamics that influence other coalition members. They do not have the physical or cognitive access to control groups.²² Consequently, coalitions frequently fracture, with coalition partners fighting each other, undermining each other's positions, or making a separate peace.

¹⁸Stathis N. Kalyvas, "The Ontology of 'Political Violence' Action and Identity in Civil Wars," *Perspectives on Politics* 1, no. 3 (September 2003): 475–494.

¹⁹Mao Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Breiningville, PA: BN Publishers, 2007), 43, 54, 57, 82; Mao Zedong, *Problems of War and Strategy* (Marxists.org, 1938), 11, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_12.htm (accessed February 12, 2013); Mao Zedong, *Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War* (Marxists.org, 1936), 17, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_08.htm (accessed January 31, 2013); Zedong, *Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan*, 15–16.

²⁰Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Anchor Books, 1966); Donatella Della Porta, *Social Movements* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006); Eli Berman, *Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009); Neil J. Smelser, *The Faces of Terrorism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Anthony C. Lopez, Rose McDermott, and Michael Bang Peterson, "States in Mind: Evolution, Coalitional Psychology, and International Politics," *International Security* 36, no. 2 (2011): 48–83.

²¹Jesse Driscoll, "Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars? Rebel Fragmentation as Peace Building," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 1 (2012): 118–149; Seden Akcinaroglu, "Rebel Interdependencies and Civil War Outcomes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 5 (2012): 879–903; Wendy Pearlman and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, "Nonstate Actors, Fragmentation, and Conflict Processes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 1 (2012): 3–15; Fotini Christia, "Following the Money: Muslim versus Muslim in Bosnia's Civil War," *Comparative Politics* 40, no. 4 (July 2008): 461–480; Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Kristin M Bakke, and Lee J M Seymour, "Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow: Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation in Self-Determination Disputes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 1 (2012): 67–93.

²²Kalyvas, "The Ontology of 'Political Violence' Action and Identity in Civil Wars"; Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Paul Staniland, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 1 (February 15, 2012): 16–40; Paul S. Staniland, "Explaining Cohesion, Fragmentation, and Control in Insurgent Groups" (Phd diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010).

Some authors, such as Thomas Hammes, have argued that the decentralized insurgencies reflect a more advanced form of warfare than the United States' industrial age military.²³ However, institutionally weak combatants fight as decentralized networks because of necessity not desire.²⁴ Hezbollah's choice to transform into a more centralized hierarchical military force reflects the fact that denying Israel access to Lebanon requires conventional not guerrilla tactics and those conventional tactics require stronger institutions.²⁵ Jeffrey Record agrees that irregular warfare is not a new superior form of decentralized operations. Instead, irregulars only defeat regular opponents if they have "stronger political will, superior strategy, or external help."²⁶

Irregulars' institutional weakness shapes the character of irregular warfare. Short-term offensive actions are the most frequent form of maneuver because irregulars lack the institutional strength to defend terrain against superior conventional militaries or sustain tactical action in width, depth, or over extended periods. Additionally, institutional weakness leads to compartmentalized and opaque human terrain because there is a lack of intelligence about the civilian population and other armed groups.²⁷ Finally, institutional weakness makes irregular warfare a form of armed political campaigning. Irregulars lack the ability to decisively conquer other groups, so they must build inherently unstable coalitions. These theoretical consequences of the nature of human institutions combine with the evolution of irregular warfare over human history.²⁸ Guerrilla and other varieties of irregular warfare have existed throughout human history.²⁹ However, the form of warfare in any given time is the result of an historical process. Several historical processes have given rise to irregular warfare as a functionally separate domain of war and shaped its nature and importance for future national security policy.

V.3 THE EVOLUTION OF IRREGULAR WARFARE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Three broad trends combined to shape the nature of contemporary irregular warfare: the reaction to the increasing sophistication of high intensity industrial warfare, advances in the operational ability of irregular forces, and the changing nature of the international system. Together these three trends have made total state-on-state warfare less common, increased the effectiveness of irregular warfare, and increased the distance between regular and irregular operational art.

²³Thomas Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone* (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2006).

²⁴Jacob N. Shapiro and David A. Siegel, "Heterogeneous Motivations, Discipline, and the Management of Terrorist Organizations" (paper presented at the 2009 International Studies Association Meeting, New York, NY, 15-18 February, 2009).

²⁵Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Nicholas Blanford, *Warriors of God* (New York: Random House, 2011). This argument echoes Mao Zedong's position that guerrilla warfare should be a transitional phase until the revolutionaries are ready for conventional warfare. Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare*; Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War* (Marxists.org, 1938), 46, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_09.htm (accessed 12 February 2013); Zedong, *Problems of War and Strategy*, 10.

²⁶Jeffrey Record, *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009), 132.

²⁷Martin Dimitrov and Joseph Sasoon, "Ensuring Compliance: Strategies for Popular Cooptation by the Party and State Security in Communist Europe and in Ba'athist Iraq," paper presented at Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 20 January 2012.

²⁸For an example of how historical processes shape the nature of warfare, see: Clausewitz, *On War*, 586–593.

²⁹Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare From Ancient Times to the Present*.

Increasing Sophistication of Industrial Warfare

Warfare evolved over the past three centuries, increasing in complexity, destructiveness, and scale. Numerous authors, debate the timing of modern warfare's emergence, but there is little doubt that it has evolved into something qualitatively different. From the armies that fought entire battles within sight of the commanding general, the modern industrialized states developed advanced militaries that fought cohesive campaigns across entire continents and oceans, combining all arms of warfare, and mobilizing the full strength of their economies and populations. This increasing complexity and institutional strength divided the world into combatants who could wage war effectively using this increasingly complex grammar of modern warfare and those who could not. The Persian Gulf War is a salient example of this divide. The mismatch between the abilities of the United States and Iraq to wage war convinced many countries that they could not compete with the United States in modern combined arms maneuver warfare.³⁰ Consequently, they sought ways to avoid the obvious U.S. strengths while still obtaining their strategic objectives. One of these ways was to focus on irregular warfare.

Advances in Irregular Warfare

While having an historical pedigree to the dawn of recorded history, irregular warfare has evolved over the past centuries.³¹ The military experts during the Napoleonic era recognized the use of small detachments to harass the enemy's lines of communication and gather intelligence. Military thinkers, including Clausewitz, who taught a class on guerrilla warfare, recognized that the soldiers of these small units required attributes such as greater individual initiative than regulars did.³² The innovation in the Napoleonic Wars was the potential of waging war with the whole people in the form of an insurgency. The resistance movements against the French in Spain and in Tyrol are two examples.³³ Clausewitz proposed adopting this guerrilla policy in Prussia after the defeat of Prussia's conventional army.³⁴ This advice constituted a fundamental change from the conception of guerrilla warfare as a small adjunct to conventional forces to the possibility of a war amongst the people. The nascent potential was present in the American Revolution, although the leaders of the newborn state chose to avoid such a revolutionary strategy.³⁵

Irregular warfare remained a secondary form of warfare for over a century. Although the Western colonial armies faced irregular opponents on a regular basis, their technological

³⁰For example see Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), <http://cryptome.org/cuw.zip> (accessed 15 May 2013).

³¹Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare From Ancient Times to the Present*.

³²Clausewitz stated that "the individual Hussar or Jager has an enterprising spirit, a degree of self-reliance and faith in his own luck which is almost unimaginable to somebody who has always served in line [among the regulars]. In the light of his experience and customs, he feels calm and unruffled while carrying out diverse and difficult missions which would make a [regular soldier] very anxious." Beatrice Heuser, "Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed Between Partisan War and People's War," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, no. 1 (February 2010): 139–162.

³³David Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York: Scribner, 1966), 659-660; Christopher Daase, "Clausewitz and Small Wars," in *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, 2007, 21–23.

³⁴Heuser, "Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed Between Partisan War and People's War."

³⁵John Shy, *A People Numerous & Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1990).

overmatch allowed them to achieve tactical victories even when vastly outnumbered.³⁶ As even Karl Marx recognized, the state of technology gave a critical advantage to the counterinsurgents, who suppressed several revolts across Europe during the nineteenth century.³⁷ Nevertheless, irregulars continued to disrupt conventional forces. The U.S. Army's expeditionary force under Major General Winfield Scott in the Mexican War had to devote a quarter of its force to securing its lines of communication against guerrillas.³⁸ Scott's forces benefited from the unwillingness of the Mexican landowners to empower the lower classes by arming them.³⁹ The Mexican leaders chose to ally with their opponents who had limited aims instead of waging a revolutionary war.⁴⁰ Waging a revolutionary war would unleash social forces that would undermine the rule of the landed elite. The Parisian rulers of France made a similar choice after the disastrous French conventional defeats during the Franco-Prussian Wars. Although irregular *franc-tireurs* were harassing the Prussia Army occupying France, the government in Paris chose to negotiate rather than risk a total social revolution by empowering groups that they could not control and could desire a communist revolution of the masses.⁴¹

The Marxism that the rulers in Paris feared was a strengthening force that would strengthen the irregulars over time. These ideological components improved the revolutionaries' capabilities by enabling external assistance. Previously, most irregular wars were local affairs, isolated from the rest of the world. The counterinsurgents could draw resources from the wider world while the insurgents could not. The failed revolts in the Vendee and Tyrol against Revolutionary France are two examples of isolated irregular forces, while the access to British support sustained the Spanish resistance to French rule.⁴² The spread of a global ideology provided a medium for communicating ideas between different irregular groups. It encouraged irregulars to actually revolt, as in the 1848 revolts across Europe.⁴³ At the end of the century, a global anarchist movement successfully assassinated numerous national leaders around the world, including President William McKinley. The ideological umbrella of the anarchist movement provided a series of linkages across national borders that transmitted tactical and technical knowledge.⁴⁴

After World War II, the global communist, anti-colonialist, and then the violent Salafist Islamist movements provided connections between disparate actors to transmit knowledge and motivation. These movements increased the external support to groups that otherwise would

³⁶Douglas Porch, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 376–407; Charles E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996).

³⁷John Shy and Thomas Collier, "Revolutionary War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Peret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 825-826.

³⁸Irving W. Levinson, *Wars Within War: Mexican Guerrillas, Domestic Elites, and the United States of America* (Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press, 2005).

³⁹Pedro Santoni, "A Fear of the People: The Civic Militia of Mexico in 1845," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 68, no. 2 (May 1988): 270; William A. Depalo, *The Mexican National Army, 1822-1852* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 139.

⁴⁰Levinson, *Wars Within War: Mexican Guerrillas, Domestic Elites, and the United States of America*.

⁴¹Geoffrey Wawro, *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁴²Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical & Critical Study*, 29, 39, 42.

⁴³Kurt Weyland, "The Diffusion of Revolution: '1848' in Europe and Latin America," *International Organization* 63, no. 3 (2009): 391–423.

⁴⁴Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 6-9.

have been isolated. External support is a critical element for insurgencies.⁴⁵ Its increase over the past century has significantly increased the strength of irregulars combating regular forces.⁴⁶ In the past two decades, information technologies have also greatly strengthened the transnational connections that support irregulars. The internet, cell phones, social media, and modern finance have all made the provision of external support in the form of expertise, propaganda, motivation, and money far easier.⁴⁷

Other technological changes have also strengthened the hand of irregulars. Since World War II the communications technology of irregular forces has improved, enabling irregulars to coordinate their disparate efforts more efficiently.⁴⁸ In the current Syrian war, the insurgents are using advanced anonymous cyber technology to improve their combat efficiency.⁴⁹ Whereas in past revolutionary conflicts, the regular forces had advantages in tactical communications, irregulars leveled the competition.

The status of weapons technology has increasingly favored the individual infantryman over the past decades. The amount of firepower that one soldier can wield has increased since World War II. Irregulars in World War II had basic anti-tank weapons and roadside bombs.⁵⁰ In the past sixty years, these technologies have advanced, giving individual fighters gains in relative combat power against armored vehicles and aircraft. Anti-tank rockets and missiles, developed by industrialized states for conventional war, have proliferated making armored vehicles more vulnerable to irregulars. Additionally, roadside bomb technology has advanced significantly over the past two decades. Hizbollah began developing new techniques against the Israeli Defense Forces in the 1990s. Then the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan advanced these technologies much further, leaving all armored vehicles vulnerable to relatively cheap weapons. Armored vehicles remain crucial for conventional war. The Israeli's suffered badly in their 2006 war against Hizbollah in part because of their deficits in mechanized training. However, future weapons development will probably continue to favor firepower and the individual infantryman.⁵¹ This will reinforce one of the characteristics of irregular warfare—the dominance of the offense at the tactical level. Guerrillas fight as guerrillas, refusing battle except on very favorable terms, because they lack the combat power to defend territory. This weakness of the defense is a direct result of their institutional weakness. Instead of defending ground, they disperse and hide. This leads to ambushes and raids as the dominant tactical form of maneuver in irregular warfare. Irregulars culminate too quickly to sustain combat when their opponents attempt to seize the initiative by attacking.

⁴⁵Record, *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win*, 133.

⁴⁶Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, "Rage against the Machines : Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," *International Organization* 63, no. 1 (2009): 67–106.

⁴⁷Brian Petit, "Social Media and UW," *Special Warfare* 25, no. 2 (2012): 1–8; Hugh Ward and Peter John, "Competitive Learning in Yardstick Competition: Testing Models of Policy Diffusion With Performance Data," *Political Science Research and Methods* 1, no. 01 (June 12, 2013): 3–25.

⁴⁸Shy and Collier, "Revolutionary War."

⁴⁹Jay Newton-small, "Hillary's Little Startup: How the U.S. Is Using Technology to Aid Syria's Rebels," *Time*, June 2012, <http://world.time.com/2012/06/13/hillarys-little-startup-how-the-u-s-is-using-technology-to-aid-syrias-rebels/> (accessed 20 June 2013).

⁵⁰For example, guerrillas in Greece and Yugoslavia interdicted Axis lines of communication with roadside bombs: William Harris, *Instilling Aggressiveness: US Advisors and Greek Combat Leadership in the Greek Civil War, 1947-1949* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2013).

⁵¹George Friedman and Meredith Friedman, *The Future of War* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1998).

Irregular forces' technological and organizational changes made irregulars increasingly more effective over the past two centuries. While irregulars cannot compete conventionally unless they increase their institutional strength, the evolution of irregular warfare has advanced to the point where irregulars can coordinate tactical actions in time, space, and purpose.⁵² Coeval with these irregular advances, the operational art of conventional warfare advanced, becoming far more complex. The advancement in conventional operational art resulted in a military equivalent of the "Matthew Effect," where those industrialized states that could practice modern operational art became stronger, while those states that were uncompetitive, lost the ability to compete conventionally at all.⁵³ In the wake of the Gulf War, this has led some combatants to emphasize irregular operational art. Given the advances in the two separate types of operational art, it is useful to describe irregular warfare as a functionally separate domain of war. Concomitant with the rise in effectiveness and prevalence of irregular warfare, governments increasingly created more special operations units to combat the irregular threat.⁵⁴

V.4 THE USEFULNESS OF THE DEFINITION

Defining special operations forces as those units a state organizes, trains, and equips for irregular warfare, the warfare of institutionally weak combatants has several advantages. First, it identifies the fundamental differences in different grammars of war that exist in the contemporary world.⁵⁵ This conceptual clarity explains phenomenon in the world, such as the decreasing effectiveness of conventional forces against irregulars.⁵⁶ Conventional forces, which are organized, trained, and equipped to wage the increasingly sophisticated warfare against institutionally strong opponents, are at a comparative disadvantage when facing institutionally weak opponents because of their general purpose vice specialized nature.

Second, the definition highlights the limitations of special operations. These forces have severe limitations in conventional warfare where the enemy's institutional strength enables it to wage sustained combat that irregulars cannot endure. Even in mostly conventional wars, special operations forces were successful around the edges, where the enemy's weaknesses provided openings. For example, in World War II the Allies were able to use special operations in territory occupied by the Germans, but not in Germany. In the occupied territories, the Germans lacked access to the situation, allowing some allied special operations forces to work in the shadows. To be successful, special operations forces must satisfy requirements for physically accessing the terrain where irregulars are fighting, cognitively accessing the opaque situation, and having the moral access to build legitimacy.

⁵²The advances in irregular combat power enables them to coordinate actions in time, space, and purpose, but does not necessarily mean that they will conduct this coordination which is at the core of operational art's linkage of tactical actions to strategic purposes.

⁵³"For whoever has will be given more, and they will have abundance. Whoever does not have, even what they have will be taken from them." Matthew 25:29, New International Version.

⁵⁴Christopher Marsh, "The Rise of SOF Power," paper presented at the Midwest ISA Conference, St. Louis, MO, November 7-8 2013. Marsh argues that, following Waltz, international relations theory predicts that military innovations will diffuse around the world as states adapt to the threats they face. Cf. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 127.

⁵⁵Providing this conceptual clarity is one of the requirements for policy-relevant studies according to George and Bennett: George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 270-272.

⁵⁶Lyall and Wilson, "Rage against the Machines : Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars."

This leads to the third benefit of this definition. It provides characteristics from which a theory of victory in irregular warfare can flow. Irregular warfare is functionally different because of the institutional weakness of the combatants. Five fundamental characteristics differentiate irregular warfare from its conventional sibling. First, the institutional weakness means that the institutions face a severe limit in their ability to exert control over distance.⁵⁷ They have a very steep gradient to their operational reach because of the fundamentally local nature of irregular warfare.⁵⁸ The physical and cognitive compartmentalization of irregular warfare limits the control over distance. Second, the institutional weakness leads to the dominance of short-term offensives at the tactical level. Defense is only feasible against weak attacks.

There is an important caveat to this limited operational reach is the ability of transnational terrorists to conduct direct action on a global scale. The 11 September 2001 attacks are the most prominent example. These attacks and other similar attacks poignantly demonstrate how globalization, increased border permeability, and improved irregular organizational skills are more lethal now than at any point in world history. However, while these terrorists and other irregulars have increased strike capabilities for short-term tactical actions, their institutional weakness and the compartmentalized human terrain still limit their ability to control territory and populations.

Third, the tactical and strategic levels of war are very close in irregular warfare. While the strategic and tactical levels have spread out in conventional warfare since the Napoleonic Wars, leaving a widening gap requiring the formal study of the operational level of war, in irregular warfare there is a very small gap between the tactical and strategic levels. This is a direct result of the fact that the institutionally weak combatants have less ability to force the other actors in their coalition to subordinate those actors' personal preferences to the collective goal.⁵⁹ Consequently, these other actors, village elders, landowners, gangs, warlords, etc. are pursuing their own strategic end states. The special operators who intervene in irregular warfare are far from the strategic level of their own state, but they are directly acting on the strategic level of the local actors.

Fourth, this leads to the conclusion that the operational art of irregular warfare is violent competitive coalition building. The actors are building alliances and coalitions. They are running armed political campaigns to gain the willing support of an increasing percentage of the population. They use war as "a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse."⁶⁰ Fighting is an integral part of the equation, but it should be subordinate to the political campaign.⁶¹

Fifth, intervening powers face a mismatch in types of war. Many of the local actors in the theater are waging a total war, while the external actors are waging an inherently limited conflict.⁶² This

⁵⁷Joshua R. Gubler and Joel Sawat Selway, "Horizontal Inequality, Crosscutting Cleavages, and Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 2 (2012): 206–232.

⁵⁸Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*.

⁵⁹Staniland, "Explaining Cohesion, Fragmentation, and Control in Insurgent Groups"; Staniland, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries."

⁶⁰Clausewitz, *On War*, 87.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, 88–89, 90–99.

⁶²Ivan Arreguín-toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (2001): 93–128; Michael T. Koch and Patricia Sullivan, "Should I Stay or Should I Go Now? Partisanship, Approval, and the Duration of Major Power Democratic Military Interventions," *The Journal of Politics* 72, no. 3

difference leads to a political sensitivity to costs by the external actors that the locals may not face. This political sensitivity places unique requirements on the special operations campaign, such as avoiding entrapment in the conflict.

These five characteristics form the basis of the tenets of special operations operational art in the next section. Before advancing, however, it is useful to address potential counterarguments to the typology presented here. One counterargument to this definition is that it excludes several types of operations that many associate with special operations. First, it excludes several great raids that the histories of special operations frequently discuss.⁶³ The problem with this argument is that it overstates the military utility of these great raids. While many of these raids are examples of elite forces and incredible courage, there are very few points in modern warfare where a single tactical action can achieve strategic effects.⁶⁴ As states developed modern operational art, they increased their resiliency to the point where there are no single points of failure. The only potential partial exception to this relates to weapons of mass destruction, when those resources are centralized. However, states like Iran have learned that they must disperse their nuclear, biological, and chemical capability to ensure survivability.

Second, some special operations, such as Operation Eagle Claw and the raid on Entebbe, do not seem to fit neatly within the idea of irregular warfare. They appear to be *coup-de-mains*, sometimes against the regular forces of an opposing state. These operations differ from conventional operations because they are still in the domain of institutionally weak adversaries. If Iran was not just emerging from the throes of a revolution and had the competent air defenses of an institutionally strong state, then Operation Eagle Claw would not have been feasible. Similarly, the raid on Entebbe was only feasible because Uganda did not have the combat power to resist the Israeli attack. If the hijackers had taken the hostages to Syria, the mission would not have been feasible because the Syrian military presented a serious conventional threat even though Syria is much closer than Uganda.

Another counterargument is that the conventional, general-purpose forces are involved in irregular warfare, specifically counterinsurgency. Moreover, one of the lessons of the invasion of Iraq appears to be the importance of planning for counterinsurgency operations after the defeat of the enemy's conventional force. The answer is that while conventional forces will have to engage irregulars, especially after a war and to secure their rear areas, the *raison d'être* of the conventional forces is prevailing in land operations against conventional militaries, a task for which special operations forces are wholly unsuited. The conventional forces must devote significant time and resources to proficiency at the conventional operational and tactical art, tasks which have become much more complicated since the Napoleonic Wars. That leaves less time for mastering the operational art of irregular warfare, which has also increased in sophistication since the Napoleonic Wars. In the 1973 October War, the Egyptians were able to mitigate their weakness in the air domain of the war against Israel through a very sophisticated Soviet air defense system. This Egyptian effort did not dominate the air domain; they denied it as a line of operation into their rear area. Similarly, conventional forces dedicated to conventional war militate against the deleterious effects of irregulars, but they are less capable of successfully

(2010): 616-629; Erin Marie Simpson, "The Perils of Third-Party Counterinsurgency Campaigns" (Ph.d. diss., Harvard University, 2010).

⁶³For example, see: McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice*.

⁶⁴Kiras, *Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terror*, 78–82.

contesting the domain of irregular institutionally weak combatants. Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson demonstrated that the effectiveness of conventional militaries against insurgents decreased as they mechanized because mechanization dramatically reduces ratio of intelligence per soldier.⁶⁵

V.5 TENETS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS OPERATIONAL ART

Irregular warfare's inherent characteristics give rise to a particular set of tenets for the operational art of special operations. Modern operational art arose from a set of factors that define modern conventional warfare. These include the institutional strength of industrialized states and modern technology that led to the vast scale and complexity of modern conventional warfare. Unable to compete with modern states in conventional warfare, institutionally weak combatants have improved a second grammar. Special operations forces, those forces specifically designed to contest the domain of irregular warfare in foreign countries require an operational art tailored to the characteristics of the irregular warfare domain. These characteristics, the difficulty of projecting power over distance, the advantage of the tactical offensive, the proximity of the strategic and tactical levels, and warfare as armed coalition building give rise to a potential operational art based around the problem of access. The graphic below depicts the relationship between irregular warfare, special operations operational art, and special operations forces.

Conventional forces gain access through projecting brute power within their operational reach and impose a peace by disarming the adversary.⁶⁶ The fundamental problems for conventional forces revolve around initiative and synchronizing combined arms maneuver in time, space, and purpose.⁶⁷ The fundamental operational problem for special operations forces is how to gain physical, cognitive, and moral access necessary to achieve the strategic objective because the characteristics of irregular warfare deny these three forms of access.⁶⁸ Each of these three major components of the operational art contains subordinate tenets that constitute a theory of special operations.

Physical, cognitive, and moral access all provide the special operations forces with a position of relative advantage, an operational art concept that corresponds with Admiral McRaven's tactical theory of relative superiority.⁶⁹ This idea of position is similar to Sun Tzu's idea of strategic advantage flowing from a strategic position.⁷⁰ From a position of continuing relative advantage, the special operations forces can influence the relevant audiences, their local allies, the neutral

⁶⁵Lyall and Wilson, "Rage against the Machines : Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars."

⁶⁶Clausewitz, *On War*, 77.

⁶⁷Department of the Army, *ADP 3-0 Unified Land Operations*, 5–8.

⁶⁸The physical, cognitive, moral aspects framework is parallel two other models. Clausewitz describes physical and moral factors in war. He divides the moral factors into intellectual, emotional, and psychological elements, which overlap the cognitive and moral dimensions in this model: Clausewitz, *On War*, 136–139. John Boyd uses a moral-mental-physical model that derives from his understanding of different ways of warfare: Osinga, *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*, 214.

⁶⁹McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice*. The U.S. Army's understanding of operational art includes the gaining and maintaining of a position of relative advantage in its definition of unified land operations: Department of the Army, *ADP 3-0 Unified Land Operations*.

⁷⁰Sun Tzu, *Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare*, ed. Roger Ames, trans. Roger Ames (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993); Roger Ames, "Introduction," in *Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare*, ed. Roger Ames (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), 82.

population, and the enemy through lethal and non-lethal means to accept the U.S. strategic objective. To seize this position of advantage, the special operations forces should design a campaign in which each tactical action steadily expands the campaign's physical, cognitive, and moral access over time.⁷¹ Simultaneously, the campaign should deny the enemy the initiative or advantage in any of these types of access to the opaque and compartmentalized human and physical terrain where irregulars tend to fight.⁷² The proximity of the strategic and tactical levels in irregular warfare means that the nature of strategy should have a greater influence on special operations operational art than conventional operational art. Consequently, the idea of continuation, which Everett Dolman avers is central to strategy, has a strong influence.⁷³ Special operations campaigns should steadily improve their position of advantage like a political party attempts to steadily improve its influence in the population. The campaign should seek continual expansion of access to and influence over the population by arranging tactical actions along each of the tenets.

⁷¹The proximity of the strategic and tactical levels means that the nature of strategy has more of an immediate impact on special operations operational art.

⁷²The ideas of complex adaptive systems informed this argument. Cf. Osinga, *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*; Yaneer Bar-Yam, *Making Things Work: Solving Complex Problems in a Complex World* (Cambridge, MA: NECSI Knowledge Press, 2004).

⁷³Dolman, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principles in the Space and Information Age*, 4. Dolman's position parallels B. H. Liddell Hart's description of grand strategy (which is the same as the U.S. military's current usage of strategy) as seeking a better peace. Harts ideas on grand strategy also inform the ideas of moral access below. B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Meridian, 1991), 353.




Figure V-1: Characteristics of Irregular Warfare to Special Operations Operational Art and Forces (*William Harris, SAMS Monograph; Special Operations, Irregular Warfare, and Operational Art: A Theory of Special Operations*).

V.6 PHYSICAL ACCESS

Projecting military force into the theater of operations is one of the most difficult military tasks, as the current debates over emerging anti-access threats attest.⁷⁴ Physical access is the ability to place and maintain combat power in a theater of operations. For the operational art of special operations, the conflict's political sensitivity complicates physical access, leading to a small force size. The initial insertion of forces can be difficult, but it can be easier than sustaining those forces. Additionally, there is an offensive component to physical access--isolating the theater to deny physical access to the enemy.

V.7 COGNITIVE ACCESS

Cognitive access is the understanding of the physical, human, and enemy situations. It is the collection and understanding of intelligence, specifically defensive, offensive, and political intelligence. All of the characteristics of irregular warfare make it an intelligence-centric activity. Poor intelligence contributes to the steep drop in power over distance. The tactical dominance of the offensive places a premium on defensive intelligence. The proximity of the strategic and tactical levels and armed coalition building reward those with the best offensive and political

⁷⁴Department of Defense, *Joint Operational Access Concept* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2012).

intelligence. The failure to build superiority in cognitive access over time can lead to the overall failure of the campaign. For example, the German intelligence and subversion campaign in the United Kingdom failed because the British exploited a massive cognitive access superiority to undermine the entire German organization in Britain.⁷⁵ The British were unable, however, to establish an organization inside Germany because of the efficient German counterintelligence inside Germany.⁷⁶ This is in stark contrast to other theaters such as France and Greece where the British and U.S. special operations forces were able to establish cognitive access.⁷⁷ A crucial aspect of intelligence for irregular warfare, perhaps of greater importance than targeting intelligence is political intelligence-information about the political and social leaders and dynamics that enable leaders to build a political coalition.

V.8 MORAL ACCESS

Moral access is the ability to build a coalition based on more than renting a warlord, to paraphrase Fouad Ajami.⁷⁸ Moral access provides the standing and the credibility necessary to form an alliance of interests with the host of groups and individuals who act in irregular warfare. The grammar of irregular warfare is ultimately about violent coalition building to achieve what Clausewitz described as “public opinion.”⁷⁹ Moreover, the proximity of the strategic and tactical levels in irregular war makes the special operators political operatives because they are directly affecting the strategic level of actors in the irregular war. Without the moral position from which to negotiate, an intervening power only has bribery to use to buy allies or affect the strategy of critical actors. The academic literature on alliances and coalitions, however, indicates that material benefits do not effectively buy allies, but can cement alliances of interest after their formation.⁸⁰ Three elements of establishing moral access support the pursuit of strategic objectives: maintaining a strong negotiating position with the principle partners, building legitimacy, and dividing the enemy.

V.9 SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CHARACTERISTICS

These tenets of special operations operational art give rise to several characteristics that should describe units that states organize to contest the domain of weak institutions and intervene in irregular warfare. The logistical and protection constraints of physical access (insertion and sustainment) and maintaining a negotiating position to avoid entrapment led to the requirement for small teams with a small footprint. To maximize the effectiveness of this small package, the force should maximize the ratio of intelligence to soldier. In other words, the goal (although it is unattainable) is for every soldier to be materially involved in defensive, offensive, or political intelligence and daily contact with the indigenous population. That requires language and

⁷⁵John C. Masterman, *The Double Cross System* (Ithaca, NY: Yale University Press, 1972).

⁷⁶F. H. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Volume Two* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 125.

⁷⁷Irwin, *The Jedburghs*; Harris, *Instilling Aggressiveness: US Advisors and Greek Combat Leadership in the Greek Civil War, 1947-1949*.

⁷⁸Fouad Ajami, “Afghanistan’s Corruption, and America’s Too,” *Bloomberg News*, May 3, 2013, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-02/afghanistan-s-corruption-and-america-s-too.html> (accessed 15 June 2013).

⁷⁹Clausewitz, *On War*, 596. Dr. Joe Strange and Colonel Richard Irons argue that the idea of a morale center of gravity is central to Clausewitz’s discussion of strategic centers of gravity: Joe Strange and Richard Iron, “Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities” (Quantico, VA, n.d.).

⁸⁰Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985): 28.

cultural skills. The dominance of the tactical offense, political sensitivity, and the need to demonstrate tactical competence to increase denunciations and encourage coalition building leads to the requirement for forces that have superior small unit tactical capabilities relative to the enemy, neutrals, and friendly indigenous forces. The need for tactical success and the mitigation of the numerous risks associated with physical access lead to the requirement for mature operators that can creatively solve problems. The imperatives of moral access, especially building legitimacy, lead to the requirement for highly disciplined individuals. Therefore, special operations forces are units organized, trained, equipped, and employed for irregular warfare and operate in small teams of highly disciplined and creative soldiers who are relatively tactically superior and maximize intelligence for tactics and strategy.

V.10 CONCLUSION

Since the formation of special operations forces in the Second World War, a precise understanding of special operations has remained obscure. This lack of understanding can lead to the misuse of special operations forces, a problem that has motivated many of the authors who have sought to develop a theory of special operations.⁸¹ This study formulated a theory to fill this void by focusing on those factors that truly separate special from conventional operations and operational art of special operations. The fundamental difference is that special operations forces exist to combat irregular enemies. States create special operations forces to wage irregular warfare.

The fundamental difference between irregular and regular warfare is the combatants' institutional strength. Waging war is a collective human endeavor that requires the cooperation under the most trying of circumstances. Conventional militaries' familiarity with modern combined arms warfare obscures the critical features of irregular warfare, even though it is the older form of warfare. Institutional weakness constrains irregulars into certain operational approaches. They lack the ability to mount sustained tactical action, defend terrain, synchronize operations above the small unit level, or conduct modern combined arms warfare. Consequently, they wage war in the shadows, using guerrilla tactics, terrorism, and subversion.

As the survivors of an evolutionary competition of war in Europe that reinforced the institutional strength of the states, western states developed the organization of warfare to new heights of sophistication over the past two centuries.⁸² The dominance of these industrial states at modern combined arms warfare created an incentive for weaker institutions that could not compete in conventional warfare to make advancements in irregular warfare. While irregular warfare has an ancient pedigree—it was the first form of warfare—other advancements provided irregulars the opportunity to combat the growing power of the state.⁸³ The spread of nationalism and ideology provided links between groups that had previously been isolated and vulnerable to state coercion. Money, knowledge, and material flowed along these links. World War II brought the next major advancement in irregular warfare. The requirements of total war led the combatants to field special operations forces to wage irregular war against the enemy's rear. While these nascent attempts were not uniformly successful, they did spread weapons, radios, and ideas to irregulars

⁸¹Both Gray and Kiras write about this problem: Kiras, *Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terror*; Gray, "Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When do Special Operations Succeed?"

⁸²Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 224–227.

⁸³Azar Gat, *War in Human Civilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare From Ancient Times to the Present*.

around the world. The nuclear stalemate of the Cold War created incentives for the superpowers to compete below the threshold of vital national interests through irregular warfare. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War and led to a new international structure where weak states increasingly collapsed in a wave of irregular warfare. Further technological advances, such as inexpensive weapons and communications, favored the irregular at the expense of conventional militaries.

Outside of the developed states, weak institutions frequently fail to suppress the challenge of newly empowered irregulars. The spread of irregular wars, ethnic conflicts, failed states, insurgencies, rebellions, and terrorism all attest to this trend. These irregular conflicts have critical characteristics that can inform the operational design of an intervening power. These conflicts show the dominant characteristics of irregular warfare: the inability to project power over distance; the prevalence of short-term offensive actions; the proximity of the tactical and strategic levels of war; violent competitive coalition building; and the mismatch between limited war for intervening powers and total war for indigenous combatants. These five characteristics lead to three broad requirements for intervening special operations forces to successfully access the irregular domain to achieve a strategic purpose: physical, cognitive, and moral access. Special operations campaigns should build a position of continuing relative advantage through steady expansion of physical, cognitive, and moral access.⁸⁴

Physical access consists of inserting the forces into the theater, sustaining them in the theater, and isolating the theater from enemy access. Cognitive access consists of operations to build defensive intelligence to protect the very vulnerable forces, offensive intelligence to support precise strikes, and political intelligence to support the creation of an ever-growing coalition. Moral access consists of maintenance of a strong negotiating position with local allies to influence them toward the strategic purpose, building legitimacy to expand the coalition, and dividing the enemy's coalition. The continual expansion of these three forms of access over time can create a position of advantage, from which special operations forces can favorably influence the population, allies, and enemies to achieve a strategic objective. Consequently, special operations leaders should orient and arrange their tactical actions toward the continual expansion of these three forms of access and degrading the enemy's access.

These tenets do not neatly correspond with the elements of operational design. Centuries of conventional warfare experience gave form to these elements. Campaigns involving irregular warfare and special operations can successfully employ these conceptual planning tools. Additionally, planners can profitably combine the traditional elements and the proposed tenets. However, the tendency of the traditional tools is to create conceptual difficulty when applied to irregular warfare and special operations because they grew from insights gleaned from conventional wars' separate grammar of how tactical actions combine to create strategic effect. For example, the idea of decisive battle permeates the tenets of operational design. This is most obvious in the "decisive points" element, but it is also a hidden idea behind the narrative of center of gravity and end state. In irregular warfare, while the short-term tactical actions should be tactically decisive, the war will frequently be the antithesis of decisive. It is a violent political

⁸⁴Dolman, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principles in the Space and Information Age*, 4; Osinga, *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*, 166–172; Department of the Army, *ADP 3-0 Unified Land Operations*, iii.

campaign with an uncertain end state based on building an ever-growing coalition of actors with independent strategic objectives.⁸⁵

Additionally, there are nuances that the elements of operational design do not necessarily include that the proposed theory emphasizes. The emphasis on cognitive access tends to force a much closer connection between intelligence and operations, and place an emphasis on political intelligence. The elements of operational design do not reinforce this connection. The elements of operational art also lack the emphasis on moral access and coalitional warfare that is the very core of irregular and special operations warfare. Special operations operational art requires an intimate connection between intelligence and operations—to the point where they are indistinguishable—that constantly supports the moral access to wage the violent competitive war of coalition building. Special operations campaigns employ special warfare and surgical strike tactical actions to build alliances, fracture enemy alliances, and build a sustainable political solution.

Institutions are the formal and informal rules that guide human interaction. The nature of human institutions shape the nature of the wars they fight. In the modern world, there is an increasingly wide divergence in the institutional strength of different countries, giving rise to two increasingly distinct forms of warfare. These forms of warfare have distinct grammars that govern how tactical actions can produce strategic effects. Institutionally strong modern states field conventional militaries and will increasingly field special operations forces designed to contest the irregular domain. Those special operations forces that understand the nature of irregular warfare and design their campaigns to support an ever-growing political coalition will tend to be more successful. However, special operations forces cannot dominate irregular campaigns without the willing support of the indigenous people. The people must willingly agree to the strategic end state that the intervening power desires. Otherwise, the campaign will fail. The fighting is a subordinate element of the political movement. Irregular warfare, while it may lack ballot boxes, is ultimately about the choices of individuals and the future that they desire.

⁸⁵This focus on continuing instead of a clear end state closely aligns with Dolman's assertion that strategy is about continuation, not ending. Dolman, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principles in the Space and Information Age*, 4.

CHAPTER VI SOF DESIGN CONTINUUM

Massed formations will remain an option but increasingly they will not be the option of choice. Further, smarter positioning of forces, as well as greater use of prepositioned stocks and rapid expeditionary basing, will increase overall operational reach. More nimble command and control will also allow resources to be allocated, shifted, and de-conflicted more fluidly among combatant commanders as strategic priorities evolve. The result is a more agile Joint Force able to aggregate, reconfigure, and disaggregate as required.

--Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, Sep 12, p. 5

VI.1 INTRODUCTION

Rather than portraying SOF operational design as something separate from more traditional design methods described in both Army and joint doctrine, this handbook describes design as a continuum. On the left of the continuum operations SOF designs are *horizontally* focused in that a host of organizations are involved and military operations are often not the “main effort;” hence, *disaggregated* from larger, conventional military formations. Disaggregated operations are characterized by loosely coupled interdependencies between SOF and the conventional force. On the right of the continuum, SOF design reflects an integrated effort “nested” *vertically* within a traditional military hierarchy and where SOF operations are part of larger aggregated military operations. Aggregated operations are associated with tightly coupled interdependencies between SOF and the conventional force (the nature of interdependencies are described in more detail in Chapter IV). The SOF staff planner must interpret the situation and decide the appropriateness of where along the design continuum to emphasize efforts for the design project at hand (see Figure VI-1).




Figure VI-1: The SOF Design Continuum

This framework does not replace existing doctrinal concepts as much as it recognizes traditional planning processes and elements of design associated with the right side of the diagram as much as offering different processes and design considerations associated more with the left side. When faced with an emerging situation the SOF staff planner must remain agile and able to

“oscillate” along the continuum to draw on different tools from at any given time in order to best design in the context at hand. This chapter describes the characteristics of the SOF Design Continuum. It is the challenge of the SOF staff planner to design an approach largely unique to the situation at hand. Figure VI-2 shows a comparison of the design elements needed at both ends of the continuum.

	Disaggregated Special Operations Unique or <i>unorthodox</i> modes of deployment, employment, and redeployment, TTP, equipment and training often conducted discretely in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments. More loosely coupled.	Aggregated Special Operations Doctrinal or conventional modes of deployment, employment, and redeployment, TTP, equipment and training requiring relatively large-scale land- or sea- bases of operations. More tightly coupled.
Methods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Decentralized Planning (horizontal focus) → Holistic view of situation leads to <i>appreciation</i> → Acknowledge interrelationships of problems (complex, interactive variables, non-isolatable) → Successive (incremental) comparisons of relative advantage → Keeping options open → Fragmented activities → Implicit capabilities, semiotics, and human engagement → Improvisational Jazz → <i>Planning</i> is but one method of design 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ← Centralized Planning (vertical focus) ← Analysis of situation leads to <i>understanding</i> ← Define problem ← Define end state ← COA Selection ← Integration of activities ← Explicit capabilities, terms, and graphic controls ← Orchestration ← <i>Design</i> is a method and subset of planning
Knowledge Structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Morphological (linguistics, colloquialisms, etc.) → Highly subjective/contextual (interpretivism) → Rich description/narrative → Anthropological (relational, indeterminate, complex causality) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ← Categorical (e.g., analysis of operational and mission variables) ← Highly objective/generalizable (realism) ← Doctrinal terms, processes ← Scientific-like cause-and-effect (effects-based operations)
Nature of Humans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Focus is on culture and influence → Empathize and affect meaning in social actions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ← Focus is on modifying behavior through “carrot and stick” ← Find and effect behaviors in social action
Organizing Principles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Bottom-up (small-team centric) → Customized down to individual level → Time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ← Top-down (commander-centric) ← Modular task organization of standardized functional capabilities/units (tailored) ← Shared doctrinal basis of structuring forces that subscribe to use of combined arms, joint interdependence, synchronization, nested- and phased- operations.
Emphasis in Staff Training and Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Plan how to learn (<i>action learning</i>) → Immersive/free-form/encourage <i>bricolage</i> → Rotate from field to HQs staff and back often 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ← Learn how to plan ← Simulation/Rehearsal/drills ← Specialized planners

Figure VI-2: Relative Aggregation of Special Operations

Part I. The SOF Approach: *The Continuum—Special Operations disaggregation (loosely-coupled interdependence) with respect to Special Operations aggregation (tightly-coupled interdependence)*

The SOF Design Continuum is a diagnostic tool to assist the SOF staff planner to make sense of the situation one is confronting. Disaggregated operations, indicating loosely coupled interdependencies with the conventional force, require unique flexibility from unified action relationships with other organizations to how the SOF operators learn and assess. The extremes of this continuum differ in the ways in which one’s methods, structure, theory of social change, organization, training and education differ. For disaggregation, one’s methods will have a more “flattened”, horizontal focus, one’s knowledge structures are more contextual, influencing others is the preferred approach to human social change, one operates more in a bottom-up manner, and one’s emphasis is on engagement, or, learning while acting.

Disaggregated operations describe how SOF act relatively autonomous, independent of the conventional force – not requiring traditional forms of command and control and planning methods more associated with centralized or horizontal (top-down) decision making.⁸⁶

The SOF staff planner's approach in light of the need for more disaggregated operations strives to promote maximum freedom of action due to the human-relations nature of the situation. Rather than driven by comprehensive planning necessary with aggregated operations, the interrelationships among social problems, due to their complex and non-isolatable nature, disaggregated operations demand an incremental approach – using successive limited comparisons to assess relative advantage as the situation unfolds. Keeping one's options open and constantly improvising-while-acting (also called *action learning*) are methods practiced in disaggregated operations. Activities across these operations are often fragmented and may seem paradoxical at times. Capabilities required in disaggregated operations are more implicit and symbolic meanings may have more importance than explicit behaviors. Human engagement is the focus.⁸⁷ In lieu of *planning* in the conventional sense, *learning* becomes the key to successful operations.

The extremes of this continuum differ in the ways in which one's methods, structure, theory of social change, organization, training and education differ. In disaggregated operations, one's organizational view is more "flattened", or horizontally-focused. SOF knowledge structures are more fluid and contextual. The Greek philosopher Heraclitus described this sort of fluidity in knowledge as "never stepping into the same river twice."

In terms of one's knowledge structure and framing, more disaggregated operations require unorthodox situation framing, often necessitating creative and unique views of situations and ways of learning. Operations involve interpreting meaning and shaping the perceptions of others, all the while attempting to appreciate their viewpoints. This becomes increasingly important the more one is associated with the human domain. Rich description and narrative are the skills of the SOF staff planner with which both to make sense of events as well as communicate to others about them. This requires a more anthropological approach that takes into account relational, indeterminate, and complex causality.

Closely tied to situational framing is how SOF views the nature of human social change and how approaches are designed to result in social change. Focusing on culture and influence and prioritizing empathetic appreciation for meanings and how others make sense of the world are important concepts within the human domain and disaggregated operations. Organizing along bottom-up methods and allowing individuals and teams to customize their approaches and activities is characteristic of the need for disaggregation and the more complex task of influencing others. Lastly, staff training and education for disaggregated environments is more likely to reflect planning how one will learn (based on the situational context), the importance of breadth of experience, valuing those that immerse themselves in the situation versus those that do analysis in the rear, and rotating personnel back and forth between staff and the field often.

⁸⁶ Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, "Mission Command", White Paper, 3 APR 2012.

⁸⁷ In Afghanistan, many SOF grew beards and were criticized even within SOF circles as doing this unnecessarily. The importance, however, of a male having a beard within Afghan society is difficult to explicitly measure, however, for those attempting to build rapport, is a no-brainer. If human engagement is important, then implicit meanings and trusting subordinate elements to make those types of decisions are critical.

Aggregated operations are those that must be closely synchronized as to ways and means to achieve the desired end state. Here SOF operations are nested to logically support the next higher echelon of command. Centralized planning and effects-based assessments characterize the far-right of the continuum. The methods within aggregated operations are more characteristic of orthodox approaches to warfare. These include conventional elements of design. This form of operating is highly dependent upon clear direction from one's higher authorities. The definition of the problem and commander's intent are clearly stated up front as are the selection of a preferred course of action to pursue. The integration of activities accomplished by explicitly and predetermined capabilities is essential.

Knowledge structure and framing within aggregated operations are more categorical (e.g., rely on predefined terms and concepts found in conventional doctrine). Knowledge is considered objective and generalizable. Scientific-like cause-and-effect relationships are sought and lines of effort and operations are planned.

In terms of organizing principles, top-down direction is essential in highly-aggregated operations. Warfighting functions are arranged and organizations are designed by assigned tasks (i.e. "task forces"). Standardization of terms and concepts permit standardization and an expected performance. Combined arms maneuver (implying synchronizing of all functions) and nesting of tasks within phased planning also characterize how most capabilities will be organized to perform aggregated operations.

Finally, the emphasis on staff training and education to support highly aggregated operations is found within process-centric approaches (such as mastering the Army military decision making and the joint operation planning processes), a preference for depth of experience (functional specialists), pre-planned tasks and drills to-standard, and functional planners who come together to integrate functional tasks into operations. These kinds of experiences and practice, along with the related education required, value a highly developed and rehearsed course of action, assume comprehensiveness by connecting all levels of command to the highest commander's intent, and hinge mainly on excellence within execution according to standardized methods of approaching familiar problem sets.

In conclusion, no one operation falls neatly on the left (Human Domain) or the right (Land Domain) of the spectrum of the range of military operations, thus the notions of disaggregated and aggregated simply describe a continuum in which certain characteristics will drive the need for certain tools. This is part of the art piece in the term operational art: as part of a continuing reassessment of what kind of environment one is in, the artist then crafts an approach largely unique to that situation. This means picking and choosing (and constantly reevaluating and remaining flexible) different tools for which to approach one's unique situation. The tools described below are examples and by no means are to be taken as sufficient. The other part of being an operational artist is to develop new tools, or put old tools together in new ways. Part 2 of this chapter describes some of the tools found on both sides of the aforementioned spectrum.

Part II: Staff Ambidexterity: Oscillation between irregular and regular campaign design elements.

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, both address irregular warfare (IW) as a violent struggle among state and non- state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Non-state actors often seek to create instability and disrupt and negate state legitimacy and governance to gain and maintain control or influence over and the support of a relevant population. Non- state actors use political, psychological, and economic methods, reinforced with military- type activities that favor indirect approaches and asymmetric means. Countering these methods requires a different mindset and different capabilities than traditional warfare methods.

JP 3-0, p. II-1

Part I of Chapter Six described characteristics across the continuum of disaggregated and aggregated operations. This part of the chapter describes some tools and approaches SOF staff planners may exercise along the continuum depending on the situation at hand. Table VI-1 shows the elements of design continuum contrasting irregular (depicted as “unorthodox”) campaign designs as compared with regular (depicted as “orthodox”) campaign designs.

Table VI 1: Elements of Design Continuum

Unorthodox Campaigning	Orthodox Campaigning
Action Learning (dealing with emergence)	Comprehensive Planning; Anticipation
Horizontal-focus <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rich Description (narrative about context) • Images that communicate complexity • Awareness of tacit knowledge (knowledge that cannot be conveyed) etc. 	Vertical-focus (Phasing and Transitions; Arranging Operations; Tempo; Direct and Indirect Approach; enemy-centric action; primarily kinetic, oriented on CoG)
Sources of Sensemaking <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stakeholders • Immersive Learning (population-centric, reflective practice) • Critical thinking (“Reflexivity”), etc. 	End State and Conditions; Termination , Objectives and Effects
Emergent Social Networks (complex thinking)	Center of Gravity (CoG) ; Decisive Points; Lines of Operations and Lines of Effort (analytic thinking)
Cultural Intelligence (to include one’s own) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • History • Religion • Nationality/Clan/Sect • Language • Market • Politics (power sharing) 	Forces and Functions (Destroying/disrupting enemy’s)
Extent of Influence, Persistence	Operational Reach, Culmination
Unorthodox Basing	Orthodox Basing
Risk (to trust)	Risk (to operations)

As the opening quote indicates, irregular approaches are called for in Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. It is logical then to develop the idea of irregular campaigns that are more disaggregated, tend to be longer-term, and rely less on detailed planning and more on deep immersion to engage indigenous peoples. Thus, when designing disaggregated operations, **action learning** is an important design element. Action learning is an individual and collaborative approach to facing novel, problematic situations for which ambiguous and emergent tasks become the vehicle for learning. This is an important concept in irregular campaigns that cannot rely on mission analysis to produce essential tasks as is the object of regular campaign planning. Small SOF teams of highly qualified personnel are routinely sent out to do engagement-types of

operations wherein influence, building rapport and trust, maintaining a persistent presence, and making sense of the situation are ongoing activities that require learning-in-action.

Both SOF headquarters and the teams operating within irregular campaigns must engage in critical reflective practice – a design approach that fundamentally questions the institutional and personal obstacles to learning and focuses on how to mitigate those obstacles. The concept of *cultural intelligence* is also a valuable goal within the Human Domain requiring anthropological approaches that can include interpreting how different groups of people sense time, use narrative, view symbols, and organize these and more to establish worldviews which help them make sense of their world.

Regular campaign designs are those associated with comprehensive planning wherein specific and explicit objectives are determined largely beforehand and conditions are described as to how one will know when operations have been successful. These objectives (and desired effects) are linked together in a phased manner using design elements that include Center of Gravity, Decisive Points, Lines of Operation and Effort, and nested purposes. Friendly functions and forces are geared towards disaffecting the enemy's forces and functions. This means that planned objectives, mission analyses, and enemy-focused intelligence preparation of the environment are important and should be logically linked (through lines of effort/operations) with strategic objectives.

Because of the ability to measure progress explicitly in aggregated operations, the orthodox tool of determining a culmination point makes sense, which, again, is linked to strategic objectives. Explicit sustainment, basing, and command and control elements are valuable tools within aggregated operations. Additionally, one should normally apply a vertical focus with primarily top-down direction and planning in addition to remaining mainly kinetic and enemy-focused. Lastly, most of the risk analysis should take into consideration the risks to one's operations. This is a hyper short-term focus that is enabled by savvy planners who are able to distill explicitly military tasks and objectives from strategic guidance. This last point cannot be emphasized enough: the more planners are able to winnow down tacit guidance into explicit objectives that are military in nature, the more likely the military will be successful in reaching those military objectives. In the absence of such luxury, however, the ability to use more unorthodox tools is critical for those times wherein disaggregated operations support long-term efforts that have very highly uncertain ends associated with them.

VI.2 CONCLUSION

SOF planners must be able to recognize the environment in which they exist, one in which aggregated operations or disaggregated operations will characterize the majority of the situation, acknowledging that this environment is ever-changing. They must then craft an approach using tools that fall along a spectrum between those operations that tend to deal more in the Human Domain and those that deal more in the Land Domain. Explicit missions and objectives that deal more in the Land Domain and are recognized in such concepts as Combined Arms Maneuver require a different set of tools than those that are more tacit and deal in the Human Domain and are closer to Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense. No situation will ever be one extreme or the other, however, and thus planners must craft a unique approach that borrows tools from all sides of the spectrum, possibly even creating new ones or assembling and applying known tools in new ways. This is the art of operational art and requires a depth of knowledge in reflexive thinking, orthodox planning, and unorthodox approaches to situations. It also requires a breadth of knowledge in how to apply one's thinking and approaches within certain contexts. Another part of Design is designing one's interaction with others in terms of initiating the execution of operations. Chapter VII covers incorporating one's Design efforts into the three scenarios most likely to be experienced by SOF planners: the GCC's JOPP, the IA's process, and the political process.

CHAPTER VII SOF OP DESIGN: A GUIDE TO METHODS AND APPLICATIONS

SOF are often working in “indeterminate zones of practice,” finding themselves ... in the midst of a series of shifting events and so they never can at any moment consider the whole import of an event that is occurring. Moment by moment the event is imperceptibly shaping itself, and at every moment of this continuous, uninterrupted shaping of events, SOF are in the midst of a most complex play of intrigues, worries, contingencies, authorities, projects, counsels, threats and deceptions, and are continually obliged to reply to innumerable questions ... which constantly conflict with one another.

– Adapted from Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*

The song can be played exactly as scored or with improvisation, but one would not expect an improvisational [SOF planner] to play one song over and over....

–Karl E. Weick, “Improvisation as a Mindset”

VII.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter seeks to provide some direction to SOF staff planners in the reflective practice of design. Many of the suggestions here are by no means “silver bullets.” Above all these considerations are intended to assist in developing interpersonal and inter-organizational relations that foster the designing of unified action. As such, Part 1 proposes a *SOF planner’s design ethic* – the *shoulds* and *oughts*, or rules of thumb for design work. Part 2 outlines a SOF approach to design when inter-organizational approaches are needed, complementing the ideals of ethical practice presented in Part 1. Finally, Part 3 offers a reading list to assist the SOF staff planner to continue to self-develop into a more competent member of a design team.

VII.2 PART 1. THE SOF PLANNER’S DESIGN ETHIC

Praxis and Phronesis. *Praxis* (nexus of theory and application) and *phronesis* (wisdom and judgment⁸⁸) of the SOF staff planner is reflected in this ability and together define the professional, reflective practice. So, SOF planning praxis and phronesis together promote a SOF planner’s design ethic that guides professional practice. The concept of *reflective practice* is the ideal associated with *praxis*. Reflective practice involves both critical reasoning and creativity. As each situation presents some degree of novelty, critical reflection involves questioning the adequacy of frameworks or frames of reference (e.g., orthodox elements of design) one has learned in order to make sense of them and communicate that sense-making. Creativity is a fluid process involving the improvisational creation of unorthodox frameworks to make better sense of novelty – usually spurred once realizing that the orthodox frames of reference are not working.

- a. **Appreciate.** The concept of *appreciation*⁸⁹ is associated with phronesis. Appreciation is quite different from the term “understanding” – often used in U.S. doctrinal manuals – in that appreciation allows one to admit situational understanding may be both ephemeral (as the

⁸⁸ John Shotter and Haridimos Tsoukas (2014). “In Search of Phronesis: Leadership and the Art of Judgment,” *Academy of Management Learning and Education*, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 224-243.

⁸⁹ Geoffrey Vickers refers to appreciation as “making judgments of fact about the ‘state of the system,’” both internally and in its external relations. See Geoffrey Vickers (1965). *The Art of Judgment: A Study of Policymaking* (NY: Basic Books), p. 40. Also, “clear perception or recognition of aesthetic quality” according to Webster’s *New Universal Unabridged Dictionary*, 1989. Gregory Bateson described it as looking at life through a “big enough macroscope.” Gregory Bateson, *Mind and Nature, A Necessary Unity* (NY: Bantam, 1979), p. 229.

complexity of the situation evolves) and may actually reflect one's own cultural hubris – highlighting that one may claim understanding, and, only in retrospect, acknowledge grudgingly that one never really understood. The art of judgment (a key facet of phronesis) accepts that intuition (also known as “tacit knowledge,” or knowing more than one can say) may guide the SOF planner's appreciation of the situation with respect to others' appreciations.

- b. **Diagnose Situations.** The operational design continua described in chapters V and VI are intended to serve as diagnostic frameworks for the SOF planner, who learns the process of oscillating “fluidly” between the poles as they diagnose and make sense of situations. The SOF staff planner is challenged to (1) influence and communicate to those who subscribe to more orthodox ways of campaign planning by translating unorthodox approaches into a language their fellow military planners are accustomed; and (2) listen to the ideas and concepts others, particularly from those outside the military culture, in order to appreciate the situation from their points of view. Hence, the application of SOF operational design process involves setting conditions for effective dialogue – fostering participation in the interpretation of complex situations.
- c. **Systems Thinking.** Also known as holistic thinking, systems thinking involves an ecological or open-systems approach to design, best described in contrast to reductionism and associated methods of analysis (i.e. breaking things down into parts). Whereas scientific thinking consists prevalently in the logical manipulation of relationships between variables, the holistic logic of systems is *Gestalt*-like and requires thinking about the organization of the whole while appreciating the dynamic and synergistic qualities of the multiplicity of interacting events.⁹⁰ Rather than analysis (breaking down), systems thinking is about synthesis. Systems thinking requires more of an “organismic” philosophy and should not be confused with systems analysis that is more of a machine-like methodology.⁹¹
- d. **Think along Continua** (not categories). Chapters V and VI presented a theory of operational art and design in terms of continua – between the aggregated and disaggregated campaigning and between orthodox and unorthodox design elements. No circumstance will be alike in the call for design; hence, design is associated with customization. Accordingly, a design ethic should guide the praxis and phronesis of the SOF staff planner as they navigate through the complexities of their work. What follows are discussions of the additional ethics of the SOF staff planner and the SOF design approach.
- e. **Improvise.** While the SOF design approach does not promote a set methodology, it embraces the idea of being open to both orthodox- and unorthodox- methods (i.e. a “fluid” or improvisational approach). The nature of improvisation may be best explained through a contrast of music analogies. Through comprehensive planning, horizontally-focused, aggregated operations are like orchestrated music, where synchronization of each musician in

⁹⁰ A. Angyal, “A Logic of Systems,” in F. E. Emory (Ed.) *Systems Thinking*, (pp. 17-29) (Middlesex, UK: Penguin) 1969, pp. 17-20. In that regard, “systems thinking” (more of an “organic philosophy”) should not be confused with “systems analysis” (more of a machine-like methodology where if one understands the parts, they can better understand the whole).

⁹¹ Peter Senge maintains that the construction of causal loop diagrams may allow us to appreciate “the ‘structures’ that underlie complex systems,” and for gaining insight into potential high- from low- leverages to change them. That is “by seeing wholes we learn how to foster [system] health.” Peter Senge (1990). *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*, (New York: Doubleday), p. 69. In complex systems, “*doing the obvious thing does not produce the obvious, desired outcome*” (emphasis in original, p. 71).

the orchestra is vital and inherent to the composer's (a.k.a. orthodox planner's) creation of sheet music and the ability of the conductor (a.k.a. the senior military commander) to execute in a synchronized fashion. "Everyone has to be on the same sheet of music" for the benefit of audience expectations (a.k.a. the policymakers, the media, populations, etc.). However, horizontally-focused, disaggregated operations are more akin to playing improvisational jazz, where the players are expert with their instruments (a.k.a. core competencies) but perform based on improvising from a familiar theme (a.k.a. the strategic intent); yet, allow for emergence to take the song where it needs to go while in the action of playing it (a.k.a. action learning).⁹² The SOF staff planner appreciates both the need for the detailed orchestration of major operations and campaigns through comprehensive planning processes (such as MDMP and JOPP) and the essentiality of the improvisational style activities associated with special operations.

- f. **Embrace Value Paradox.** Paradox (the simultaneous existence of incommensurate ideas) is normal in and among social groups and societies. For example, political systems may seek to find balance among four competing values: equity, liberty, efficiency (or free market values), and security.⁹³ After 9-11, the United States' political system tried to find an adaptive balance between the polar opposites of liberty and security illustrated with the NSA surveillance program—a process that will go on *ad infinitum*. The passage of the Affordable Health Care Act illustrates the struggle between equity (the well-being of the disadvantaged) and efficiency (the ideals associated with a free-market, competitive health care approach). Our Westernized cultural proclivity is to find ways to simplify explanations and remove paradox. The SOF designer recognizes that there are competing values that frame what "the problem" is and how it should be resolved. For example, vertically-focused operations require a nesting of hierarchical (strategic, operational, and tactical) objectives and end state – the military frames of reference. Horizontally-focused operations require a more collaborative approach, working with partners who may frame quite differently according to their institutional values. The SOF planner recognizes these ongoing tensions and knows there will be "inequivalent descriptions" of what's going on and what needs to be done about it.⁹⁴ The SOF planner must be able to appreciate these paradoxical situations as normal. Complex situations and systems thinking demand these multiple, diverse perspectives and interpretations. The SOF planner works to perceive the situation through the eyes of others. Such a multifaceted appreciation of the situation involves listening skills, negotiation, and dialogue with others who have diverse perspectives. While opposing views on ends and means may go unreconciled in a design team, establishing trustworthiness and finding ways to agree to a binding purpose may be the only vestiges for some form of unified action.
- g. **Build Trust Horizontally and Vertically.** Design is a participative decision-making process involving complex interpersonal and inter-organizational dependencies (more like those needed in a basketball team than a swim team). A design team relies on collaborative inquiry, negotiation, consensus building, and diplomacy. Ideally, the design team commits to a *shared disdain for potential guile and deceit of its members and the institutions they represent*. Such shared disdain calls for an antidote – trust. Hence, the SOF planner is a

⁹² Karl E. Weick (1998). "Improvisation as a Mindset for Organizational Analysis." *Organization Science* 9: 543-555.

⁹³ Deborah Stone (1997). *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making*. New York: W.W. Norton.

⁹⁴ Haridimos Tsoukas and Mary Jo Hatch (2001). "Complex Thinking, Complex Practice: The Case for a Narrative Approach to Organizational Complexity." *Human Relations* 54 (8): 979-1013.

student of trust-building among individuals and groups that are germane to unified action. There are three key dimensions of trust building worth considering:

- **Vulnerability** in trust relationships between parties is contingent on emotional aspects (such as fear and feelings of confidence or bonding), cognitive aspects (preconscious expectations or predisposition-to-trust associated with lifelong socialization) as well as behavioral aspects (observable histories of reliability or of violations). In general, the deeper the dependence or interdependence (both functions of vulnerability), the stronger the trust relationship needs to be; and, the more trust in the relationship, the less vulnerable one will be. Betrayals of trust are often seen as taking advantage of the vulnerability of the betrayed party, manifested through feelings such as discrimination, indiscretion, unreliability, cheating, abuse, neglect, self-esteem, and poor coordination or information sharing.⁹⁵ The SOF planner's ongoing assessment of vulnerabilities, interdependencies, and histories of betrayals up and down the military chain as well as laterally across organizational boundaries is one key to assessing the chances of unified action.
- The **institution** is another common theme among students of trust is that of an organizational or associational context. This dimension is examined as the values, habitual rules, structural, and reputation-building aspects that set conditions for trust among institutions and among the members within those institutions. Setting conditions for trust include building *competence* (extent that members see the institution as effective); *openness* (seeing others as approachable and honest); *concern* (a climate of sincerity and caring); *reliability* (behavioral consistency and congruity); and, *identification* (perception of fairness in how the paradoxes of individual- versus group- interests are managed).⁹⁶ How others perceive in the special operations community as a trustworthy institution may affect the way the SOF planner is considered trustworthy in collaboration with other organizations or within a SOF-conventional force joint planning group.
- **Time** available is a measure of *opportunity to form trusting relationships*. Group work resulting from crises often cause need for stranger-based or *swift trust* relationships such as required to quickly form effective inter-organizational planning teams. Time, as a dimension of trust, increases in importance as vulnerability associated with interdependence increases. The shorter the time available to build trust, the more reliance that a party to a trusting relationship has to have on the reputation of the institution they represent. Investing time in building relationships during non-crisis periods increases chances for trustworthiness when a crisis hits.⁹⁷ For SOF operators, "phase zero" activities may not be as important as the engagement opportunities they present to build trusting relationships. The same rule of thumb applies to SOF staff planners—don't wait for a crisis to establish interpersonal and inter-organizational trustworthiness if at all possible.

⁹⁵ Blair H. Sheppard and Dana M. Sherman (1998). "The Grammars of Trust: A Model and General Implications," *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 422-437.

⁹⁶ Pamela Shockley-Zalabak, Kathleen Ellis, and Gaynelle Winograd (2000). "Organizational Trust: What It Means, Why It Matters," *Organization Development Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 35-48.

⁹⁷ Debra Meyerson, Karl E. Weick, Roderick M. Kramer (1996). "Swift Trust and Temporary Groups, in Roderick M. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler, (Eds.), *Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research* (pp. 166-195). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

- h. **Practice Institutional- and Self- Criticism and Find Humor.** Related to the ethic of embracing value complexity, the SOF planner invents methods to deconstruct orthodoxy – exposing the taken-for-granted, “commonsense,” habitual approaches to thinking and acting. This may be considered an “irreverent leadership” quality. To be deviant is to be irreverent and to be irreverent is to be creative – essential to the process of participating in critical dialogue while influencing others’ frames of reference. Of course, there are social risks to this sort of irreverence. SOF planners develop courage and are prepared to handle social ostracism, even delivered by one’s own institution, in the process of being critical. However, the SOF planner is politically savvy enough to know when it is appropriate to accept such risk and openly practice this ethic. Finally, as it is hypocrisy that transforms thinking, not conformance, finding humor in a “serious,” complex, paradoxical situation can liberate creative juices in one’s own thinking as well as in others’. Humor is an important quality of a design team in that laughter may also be a sign of comradeship and the lifting of otherwise social barriers to a creative climate. On the other hand, what is considered funny is a cultural manifestation, so care must be taken to find humor that resonates cross-culturally.
- i. **Become Excellent at Oscillating Between Traditional Planning and Human Relations.** When faced with highly complex situations, it is difficult to explain what is going on let alone what to do about it. The art of “telling the story” is vital to the practice and communicative qualities required of SOF operational design. Faced with the rather *disorganized* reality depicted in Chapter II of this Handbook, the designer, in order to seek effective unified action, “we must organize our thinking” using “the narrative perspective.”⁹⁸ While the traditional planning processes (e.g., MDMP and JOPP) have a certain language mode associated with doctrinal terms and definitions, the narrative mode provides an alternative paradigm (see chart on page VII-6⁹⁹). The SOF staff planner is agnostic as to which is the “better approach”; and instead allows the situation to dictate how they diagnose and oscillate along the continuum between the approaches.

⁹⁸ Tsoukas and Hatch (2001), pp. 980-981.

⁹⁹ Ibid, this chart is adapted from p. 983.

Table VII-1: Design Continuum

Design Continuum	Human Relations	Planning
Central Issue	<i>Describe</i> to communicate appreciation of the complexity at hand (in terms of subjective reality)—contributing to <i>intuition</i> .	<i>Define</i> the problem (in terms of objective reality)—contributing to rational decision-making and the <i>rational</i> application of ways and means to ends.
Basis of Reasoning for Action (Action = meaning + behavior)	Emphasis on <i>meaning</i> —how should we construct meaning in our actions with respect to how we envision “their” constructions of meaning for their actions? <i>Influence through speech.</i>	Emphasis on <i>behavior</i> —what should we be <u>doing</u> with respect to what “they” are <u>doing</u> ? <i>Carrots and sticks.</i>
Methods	Good storytelling; inspiring, holistic accounts of what’s going on and what could happen, power arrangements, subterfuge, and so forth; effective use of simile. <i>Aesthetics</i> matter.	Mission analysis, COA development, COA selection, phased-implementation, termination, and so forth. <i>Aristotelian logic</i> applies (“scientific method,” hypothesis testing, etc.).
Key Characteristics	Relational frames of reference (like “Yin and Yang”); use of continua; find paradox and expose irony to gain insight. Improvisational use of capabilities. <i>Appreciation.</i>	Categorical frames of reference; remove contradiction. For example: “Apply functional capabilities against operational requirements.” <i>Understanding.</i>

VII.3 PART 2. APPROACHING THE DESIGN TEAM/PLANNING GROUP/INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE/ETC.

1. **Group Work is a Recursive Learning Process.** The single greatest challenge for the SOF staff planner is to develop strategies for dealing with partners in an interactive design process. This is an ongoing, dynamic, social-psychological learning process and not something that can be thought through completely beforehand. Nevertheless there may be important process considerations that can help the SOF staff planner help engage and influence the partners (and embrace the idea that this engagement and influence process is mutual).
2. **The Inter-organizational Design Process.** Instead of framing design as a planning problem, here we begin by framing design as a human relations problem. There is arguably a progression of designing-for-relationship building that is worthy of consideration, outlined as follows (note this framework avoids military doctrinal terms that would be considered jargon to non-DOD partners). Again, the process is recursive, so the design will not line up like progressive steps in MDMP or JOPP. In fact, the design project group may not get past a. or b. in the design process, yet the organizations those members represent may well be actively engaged in practice.

- **Purpose.** In forming (and sustaining) a group the first order of business is to find and agree on “a binding intent worthy of pursuit.”¹⁰⁰ The consensus on intent of the design project should be revisited by the group often enough to assure the design effort, no matter how exploratory, has a sufficient shared sense of direction as not become “lost at sea.” The intent may change based on the learning that has occurred since inception and during these re-visitations.
- **Principles.** The group should consider a set of guidelines indicating “how members will conduct themselves in the pursuit of purpose.”¹⁰¹ For example, principles may drive conversations toward the authorities and permissions needed to do something. Frankly, this may be as far as the group gets; however, it may be enough for some unity of action to unfold.
- **People.** Design of human relations is ultimately about agreement or at least consensus, often among otherwise disparate organizations and their own agendas. There may be no formal hierarchical arrangement associated with the military penchant for clear lines of authority; hence, the opportunity to engage and influence may be the only sources of power in such a group. Membership in a design project group should answer the question, “Who needs to participate in this design project?” Here is where the politics of forming groups and the emergence of power arrangements in groups comes into play (where there are two or more people interacting, there are politics involved). Considerations about dealing with other people include:
 - **Organized Anarchy.** The SOF staff planner may seldom find themselves as the lead agent for a design project; often finding their participation formally subordinated to a higher echelon headquarters or to another agency or lead government. The issue is then how the SOF staff planner is “invited to the table” and may represent the equities desired of the SOF community potentially affected by the project design. Faced with potential “organized anarchy” of a design project, the SOF staff planner realizes that “making do, improvising, and cobbling together a *bricolage*” of otherwise in-tact, self-contained, regional- or domain-specific organizations is the name of the game.¹⁰² Group dynamics is about getting into the flow (as in improvisational jazz). “It is about heart as much as head.”¹⁰³
 - **The Nature of Consensus.** Consensus building often takes the form of “power politics” as various institutional representatives come together vying for influence and power. The SOF staff planner must be savvy enough to understand that for their voice to be heard and have an effect on the group’s design process. S/he should pay respects to the potential Machiavellian side of consensus-building strategies (the following are adapted from the work of Marcia V. Wilkof).¹⁰⁴
 - Frame-consensus through *exhaustion* is a tactic for generating consensus used when a design issue has been hashed and rehashed over a period of time and one party finally gets so tired

¹⁰⁰ Karl E. Weick (2004). “Rethinking Organizational Design” (pp. 36-53) in Richard J. Boland (Ed.) *Managing as Designing* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Business Books), p. 38.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p. 38.

¹⁰² Ibid, p. 38.

¹⁰³ Ibid, p. 39.

¹⁰⁴ Marcia V. Wilkof (1989). “Organizational Culture and Decision Making: A Case of Consensus Management.” *R&D Management*, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 185–200.

or decides they have better things to do that they do not want to spend any more time and just shut up about the issue at hand.

- Frame-consensus through *pruning* consists of cutting down the list of influential people among whom design-consensus by agreement is attempted. This is a tactic to avoid getting many people involved in doctrine writing or making war plans by not telling many there is a project underway; thus, those who do not know will not or cannot object. This tactic is risky because people finally find out they may upset the façade of consensus. The goal is to have enough influential people on board that when others find out they go along with the project.
- Frame-consensus through *destruction of credibility* consists of rendering others non-influential by calling their credibility into question so that they will shut up or so that others will stop listening to them. The two major ways of calling others' credibility into question are by bringing up design mistakes made on past projects or by demonstrating in front of many others that they are wrong on a set of doctrinal issues.
- Frame-consensus through *ignoring others* is when one does not listen to someone else or some other group. The hope is that the people or group in question are not influential and/or will tire of fighting over the design issue and give up.
- Frame-consensus through *exchange* is generated when at least two parties agree that neither party will create problems for the other's design project.
- Frame-consensus through sidetracking is accomplished by getting a party who has been critical of a certain design project interested in other projects, thus eliminating him/her from the design team.
- Frame-consensus through *flattery* is implemented by elevating others' influence so that s/he is no longer critical of a design project. This is accomplished by diverting their attention to a small, insignificant design issue, elevating their influence vis-à-vis that issue and thus increasing his/her positive visibility in the institution. Their gratitude for getting positive exposure prevents them from being overly critical of the design project or other issues.
- Frame-consensus through *co-opting* consists of making others who have been critical of a design project a member of the team. The purpose is to change their criticism from a destructive to a constructive, sensible form. Because they are now members of the project team, they feel more ownership for the problem and feels that their criticism applies to the work they are doing as well as the work that other team members are doing.
- Frame-consensus through *threat*, when it works at all, only works in a superior-subordinate relationship. This form of consensus building usually operates implicitly and infrequently in professional organizations. In essence it is agreement obtained through fear of a poor performance review, loss of job and pension. This "commander-centric" tactic does not work well because talented people can usually find a job somewhere else and/or that it is difficult to fire people especially in government bureaucracies.
- Frame-consensus through the *use of ambiguity* is when one successfully uses unclear terms of reference that means something different to each group involved in a design project so that each thinks they have the correct definition; hence, agree to the frame without really having a true consensus of (shared) meaning. Here designs or plans are written to be purposefully ambiguous.
- Frame-consensus through *misinforming* is when a participant purposely uses made-up facts to support getting to consensus. This tactic is viewed by the liar as a necessary evil, in order to achieve consensus through feigned expertise (i.e. the ends justifies the means); so, they may actually believe this to be a morally-clean tactic.

- **Concept.** Much like a concept of operations in the traditional military, this applies to figuring out “the set relationships among the partners’ organizations that allow for the pursuit of purpose in accordance with the agreed-to principles.”¹⁰⁵
- **Structure.** Much like a written operation plan or order gives structure to military participants in their joint contribution, some sort of charter should be formalized to give some contract-like substance to the design agreement among the partners.
- **Practices.** As the partners actually perform activities, there should be continued deliberations and decisions that bring the design to life and update the design to include revisiting all of the concerns above. The SOF staff planner should not expect such military-oriented planning tools, such as branch concept plans and phased sequential plans to be formalized. There may be no integrated plan of action; rather, a shared sense of purpose may be all that is possible.

VII.4 PART 3. THE SELF-DEVELOPING SOF STAFF PLANNER

We must place students into situations of uncertainty and complexity where creativity, adaptability, critical thinking and independent, rapid decision-making are essential elements.

--Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, Mission Command White Paper, April 2012, p. 6.

1. **Thinking in Time.**¹⁰⁶ Chapter VIII of this Handbook provides some historic vignettes to consider in light of the foregoing chapters. The idea is to give the SOF staff planner an azimuth and gain a deeper appreciation of SOF military history. While history does not repeat itself, there are patterns that can be discerned that serve to inform intuition and help to analogously make sense of otherwise completely novel situations.
2. **Use of Theory.** In addition to the footnotes provided throughout this Handbook, there are a host of additional sources recommended here for self-development:

Design Theory

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¹⁰⁵ Weick (2004), p. 38.

¹⁰⁶ Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May (1986). *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*. New York: Free Press.

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Participative or Group Decision-Making

Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow (1999), *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (2nd ed.), New York: Longman.

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CHAPTER VIII SOF OPERATIONAL DESIGN ELEMENTS

"Today, the Army must consider the possibility that military success in modern "wars among the people" will require ever increasing interdependence among the military services and interagency partners. It will also require that the Army develop a new set of DOTMLPF solutions for operating in an emerging domain of warfare, referred to by U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as the Human Domain."

-LTG Cleveland, LTC Stuart Farris in "Toward Strategic Landpower"

VIII.1 INTRODUCTION.

Based on Chapters VI and VII, SOF Operational Design is not a new or independent concept along the design continuum. SOF Operational Design, as defined by this Handbook, is tailored for optimization towards the disaggregated end of the Spectrum, to create a full range of options and special warfare solutions necessary to maintain the strategic advantage in the future operating environment as referenced in Chapter II. Collectively, these documents illustrate a complex FOE best characterized by uncertainty; ill-structured, population-centric security challenges; constrained resources; and waning popular tolerance or endurance for large-scale extended conflict.



This chapter begins with a discussion of Operational Design's development during a period of high intensity conflict and the influence of persistent direct action-centric thinking; next, we discuss the parallel role of special warfare activities conducted in the full spectrum of operations and emphasize the importance of special warfare activities and SOF solutions in the future operating environment. Finally, we introduce SOF Operational Design as a timely and relevant evolution of Operational Design with elements distinctively tailored to help campaign designers conceptualize and develop SOF-centric solutions based on the unique and complex challenges and opportunities anticipated in the FOE.

VIII.2 OPERATIONAL DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT

Operational Design was developed in 2008: at the time, 7 years into a persistent conflict dominated by direct action (DA), counter- terrorism (CT), counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and post conflict transitions to village stability and reconstruction activities. Even operations and activities traditionally considered "shaping" took place within a conceptual JOPP Phase 3 framework that was precipitated by direct action, the events of 9/11. FM 5-0 states the advent of design directly:

The introduction of design into Army doctrine seeks to secure the lessons of eight years of war and provide a cognitive tool to commanders who will encounter complex, ill-structured problems in future operational environments like in March 2003. Division Commanders... were ordered to maneuver their units from Kuwait and into Iraq to defeat the Iraqi Army and to seize key cities and infrastructure. This was a task familiar to each of them – a structured problem – and they communicated their intent and began to build orders through the military decision making process. Soon after accomplishing their mission, they were issued further instructions to "establish a safe and secure environment" in Ninewa Province, Diyala Province, and Baghdad. This was a task unfamiliar to them, an ill- structured problem... full spectrum operations

conducted among the population are effective only when commanders understand the issues in the context of the complex issues facing the population." p. 3-4.

VIII.3 SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND SPECIAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES.

Despite the overwhelming attention paid to the direct action-type operations taking place in the Middle East since 2001, Special Operations Forces have been conducting parallel, persistent, and equally important shaping efforts globally whereby the Department of Defense along with various stakeholders work by, with, and through host nation counterparts to shape conditions that are favorable to U.S. strategic objectives. Throughout history, these efforts have been known by different, sometimes disputed and highly contentious names, some of which include low intensity, indirect, integrated, operations short of war, military operations other than war (MOOTW), asymmetric, unconventional, irregular, "the long war," persistent engagement, inform and influence, special warfare, stability, and pre-intervention. The efforts are composed of a diverse array of unique operations and activities traditionally referred to in the context of the SOF Core Competency arena and include foreign internal defense (FID), building partner nation capacity (BPC), civil-military operations (CMO), counter proliferation, and joint combined exchange training (JCETs).

As strategic policy projects increased reliance on unconventional-type activities in the FOE, these efforts and the proficiency with which the special operations community conducts them have been illuminated in recent literature, reports, and Senior Leader engagements:

Special Operations forces are serving in about 70 countries and very few deployments involve commando missions. Most are supporting U.S. embassies, training foreign forces or strengthening bonds with allied militaries. ... "It's hard, slow, and methodical work that does not lend itself to a quick win," - Admiral William McRaven, May 2013.¹⁰⁷

"When you think of SOF, you think of direct action, but it is really a ying and yang of direction action and indirect action. ... We want to push that line more to the right where it is more indirect," - Major General Mark Clark, May 2013.¹⁰⁸

VIII.4 AN EVOLVED CONCEPT.

As evolved from the current Joint definition of Operational Design, SOF Operational Design adds to the existing knowledge of Operational Design and calibrates its application for the Irregular Warfare: unconventional-type operations and unified action/"whole-of government" approaches that will be more commonplace than their direct action counterpart in the FOE. With collaboration as a central tenant, SOF Operational Design facilitates interdependence not only with Department of Defense counterparts but with any key leader, organization, or institution that may have a problem-related interest or influence. The term "stakeholders" (SH), which emphasizes collaboration with all interested parties, reflects the importance of expanded collaboration and fulfills the ARSOF 2022 directive to "optimize SOF/CF/JIIM interdependence."

¹⁰⁷ National Defense Magazine, "Special Operations Mission to Require New Doctrine," Stew Magnuson, May 2013.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.




Figure VIII-1: ARSOF 2022 Priorities Inform SOF Operational Design

In this iteration of evolution, SOF Operational Design, maintains the structural elements of Operational Design and includes elements inherent to effective UW-type, low-intensity, indirect approaches, and the development of similar strategic options. The elements of SOF Operational Design are dynamic and interrelated within an integrated planning framework not only capable of providing viable solutions to ill-structured problems but also customized to produce alternative, nonconventional strategic options for national leaders (see Figure VIII-4, SOF Operational Design Flow) as they seek to resolve the unique and complex global security challenges and opportunities of the future.

Table VIII-1: Design Elements Comparison

DESIGN ELEMENTS COMPARISON	
OPERATIONAL DESIGN	SOF OPERATIONAL DESIGN
Termination	Culture
Military End State	Problem Characterization
Objective	Stakeholder (SH) Development
Effect	Center of Gravity / Decisive Point
Center of Gravity	Operational Time
Decisive point	SOF / CF / JIIM / SH Approach
Line of Operation	Collaboration Model
Line of Effort	Nesting End States – National Strategic <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interagency • Military • Partners
Direct and Indirect Approach	Objective / LOO and LOE
Anticipation	Culmination
Operational Reach	Termination Criteria
Culmination	
Arranging Operations	
Forces and Functions	

VIII.5 SOF OPERATIONAL DESIGN PLANNING TERMS

- SOF Operational Art
- SOF Operational Environment
- SOF Operational Approach
- SOF Campaigns

Figure VIII-2: SOF Operational Design Planning Terms

a. SOF Operational Art. The continuous cognitive approach by commanders and staffs, anchored in the process of critical thinking, to develop strategies that organizes/integrates and employs stakeholder capabilities and expertise to Shape, Prevent, and Win campaigns for our Nation.

b. SOF Operational Environment. A composite of the domains, circumstances, relationships, and cognitive and physical influences - aggregated to form the environmental conditions - that both positively and negatively affect U.S. strategic interests within a given operational area - which increasingly in the FOE - will require the enduring employment of SOF capabilities and other military capabilities - in concert with stakeholder capabilities - to continually shape desired environmental conditions in support of the national strategic end state. This complex operational environment - with varying levels of stability, security, governance, intractability, and problem clarity - demands purposeful collaboration and nesting of stakeholder plans and capabilities to maximize desired conditions for U.S. interests.

c. SOF Operational Approach. A description of the comprehensive coherent SOF/CF/JIIM and stakeholder actions, with an assessment of the aggregated risk, to transform current conditions in the operational environment to those conditions desired at end state. This approach

capitalizes on stakeholder interdependence and synergy to maximize campaign outcomes for the national strategic end state.

d. SOF Campaigns. A series of special warfare and surgical strike operations nested with our partners in operational time, the operational environment, and toward a coherent purpose to achieve the national strategic end state. SOF campaigns recognize the base assumptions of the future operating environment of 2022 and beyond - specifically - the trends within the global environment / available fiscal resources / waning political will for large-scale deployments and the continued march of technology and interconnectivity - and how these macro assumptions inform comprehensive SOF campaigns.

VIII.6 SOF OPERATIONAL DESIGN ELEMENTS, DEFINED.

➤ Culture	➤ Nesting End States
➤ Problem Characterization	▪ National / Strategic
➤ Stakeholder (SH) Development	• Interagency
➤ Center of Gravity / Decisive Point	• Military
➤ Operational Time	• Partners
➤ SOF / CF / JIIM / SH Approach	➤ Objective / LOO and LOE
➤ Collaboration Model	➤ Culmination
	➤ Termination Criteria

Figure VIII-3: SOF Operational Design Elements

a. Culture. For the purpose of the SOF Operational Design, the planning factor of "Culture" includes all aspects of the human population in the operational environment and those of stakeholders, their institutions, and organizations. It encompasses language, religion, cuisine, aesthetics, values, social conventions, gender roles, recreational activities, and social structure as observed firsthand and also understood through a deliberate and comprehensive analysis of collected sociocultural, anthropologic, and ethnographic data that result from organic and external relationships. Contemporary cultural analysis includes social media mapping, digital collection, and online sentiment analysis. In SOF Operational Design, culture is the critical element in developing a population-centric approach.

b. Problem Characterization. Problem characterization is the development of an appreciation for the true nature and scope of the problem and its relationship with the environment within the operational context; this allows for the identification of available information sources and existing gaps in understanding as well as the risk associated with limited understanding. The range of potential planning efforts and solutions is impacted significantly within complex environments by how a problem is defined, how it is explored through planning elements, and how it is framed. Additionally, problem characterization must take into account stakeholder perspectives that may not completely align with those of the SOF Commander. Lastly, complex problems may present no immediate or single definitive solution; rather, they might be best resolved through the modification of conditions using a range of multidisciplinary approaches. In SOF Operational Design, defining the problem is a critical early step and a key element, foundational to the planning process.

c. Stakeholder (SH) Development. Stakeholder (SH) development creates a collaborative setting where multiple decision makers and staffs plan concurrently and in parallel. Partners have a vested interest in the problem set and provide resources to accomplish common objectives in order to meet a national or strategic end state. In complex environments, reduction of the

number of stakeholders helps to simplify problem complexity as planners work toward affecting the environment; however, it also reduces the level of environmental understanding and capabilities that can be applied. Vested stakeholders can be created through the identification of commonalities in end states, timelines, and goals. In SOF Operational Design, stakeholder development expands the range of capabilities available to the planner while reducing risk, expanding unity of effort, and potentially conserving resources.

d. Center of Gravity / Decisive Point Analysis. Center of gravity (COG) is defined as the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. It is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, behavior or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success.¹⁰⁹ SOF Planners must account not only for the possibility that there may be multiple COGs (due to the complexity of the operational environment and as a result of stakeholder perspectives and actions), but also that some COGs may not present themselves during the planning process and may not appear until much later in the campaign. Complexity often requires the application of a comprehensive approach and creates the potential that an identified COG may shift once stakeholders (to include SOF) begin acting in the environment; this drives the constant cycle of reframing. In SOF Operational Design, the complex operational environment can be characterized by periodic shifts of COGs and decisive points, often occurring in rapid succession, necessitating a flexible approach and continual re-assessment.

e. Operational Time. Operational time is the temporal measurement of an operational approach, ranging between an event found in a current condition and the achievement of acceptable conditions relative to a particular campaign or major operation. Operational time may be measured as a mathematical representation of a chronological interval; however, in SOF Operational Environments, different cultural considerations of time are a potential risk factor that must be accounted for because stakeholder, adversary, and/or populous understanding of time may not be congruent with one's own understanding of time. As a planning factor, Operational Time can impact termination criteria, as strategic end states are often tied to political will. In the contemporary operational environment, the application of large-scale force may erode political will, thus compressing time available to complete a campaign. In SOF Operational Design, Operational Time is a major planning factor that incorporates potential shifts in national or political will on strategic end states and also considers how other stakeholders in the operational environment view time as a resource. For SOF planners, judicious application of force or capability and an expanded reliance on an operationalized CONUS base mitigates the risk of fluctuating or extended operational timelines as well as conserves resources.

f. SOF / CF / JIIM / SH Approach. The SOF/CF/JIIM/SH Approach is the manner in which stakeholders contend with a COG by employing capabilities and resources to positively affect LOOs and LOEs that support the achievement of desired conditions at end state. In SOF Operational Design, approach should also account for efforts of stakeholders and their desired end states. Additionally, SOF campaigns often

USSOCOM defines Human Domain:

“the totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that influence human behavior to the extent that success of any military strategy, operation, or tactical action depends on the application of unique capabilities that are designed to fight and win population-centric conflicts.”

SOCOM 2020

¹⁰⁹ Base definition extracted from JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, August 2011; expanded to encompass complex FOE and population-centric considerations.

incorporate the less traditional, population-centric, and environmentally focused approaches; these approaches often include the application of a full range of stakeholder capabilities as well as potential strike or decisive operations.

g. Collaboration Model. The collaboration model identifies the intersection of objectives and end states and establishes a process for cooperation and information sharing between multiple partners and stakeholders. Resources, priorities, and support for sustainability are placed against mutual stakeholder objectives to achieve results and prevent the unintended duplication of effort while maximizing the efficient use of resources. When working in the collaborative environment, SOF Planners must appreciate the capabilities of stakeholders, account for competing priorities, as well as capitalize on commonalities in end states. Close collaboration through appropriate venues (e.g., boards, bureaus, centers, cells, working groups, and forums) is essential to ensure interoperability and develop an appreciation of differing approaches and priorities. In SOF Operational Design, the pursuit of competing priorities by multiple stakeholders requires a model and method for collaboration to achieve unity of effort.

h. Nesting End States. Nesting end states is the process or art of integrating and synchronizing the higher headquarter and adjacent unit's plans and policies in order to maximize efforts and effectively manage resources. It is necessary to not only complement national strategic and military plans but also the policies and plans of stakeholders. Analysis must be conducted on applicable partner's approach and objectives within the context of the environment to identify commonalities in end states, nest when possible, deconflict as necessary, and facilitate stakeholder development. In SOF Operational Design, nesting of end states is central to developing a SOF/CF/JIIM/SH approach.

- i. National Strategic.
- ii. Interagency.
- iii. Military.
- iv. Partners.

i. Objectives / LOO / LOE. The "objective" is a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every approach should be directed. Once the end state is understood and termination criteria established, SOF Operational Design continues with an analysis of strategic and operational stakeholder objectives. SOF planning integrates military Operations, Actions, and Activities (OAAs) and capabilities with those of other stakeholder capabilities in time, space, and purpose to ensure actions are unified toward the achievement of individual and collective objectives. Objectives and their supporting effects provide the basis for identifying tasks to be accomplished. In SOF Operational Design, SOF Planners must often assess, apply, and synchronize a broad range of stakeholder capabilities; LOE provides a framework in which to streamline and simplify capabilities assessment, application, and synchronization. LOE is also a method to link diverse capabilities, tasks, effects, conditions, and desired end states and in addition it is an important tool used to achieve unity of effort in operations involving stakeholders.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ Definition extracted from JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, August 2011; expanded to include collaboration and SH considerations.

j. Culmination. Culmination is defined as the point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations. It is that point in time and/or space at which the operation can no longer maintain momentum.¹¹¹ In SOF Operational Design, culmination is the point at which a particular line of effort (LOE) is no longer having a net positive impact on the environmental or human factors upon which it is focused. In complex environments, actions taken by any key actor and even environmental factors can have a significant impact on conditions and desired end states, as every element in a complex system affects another. SOF Planners must anticipate and monitor these variables, particularly impacts of their efforts in addition to those of stakeholders, which may or may not have been integrated into the campaign plan. This is accomplished through the continuous cycle of reframing the environment. During reframing, SOF Planners should ensure that operations, though achieving desired conditions, are not also creating unintended undesirable conditions that may lead to premature culmination if not properly addressed. Premature culmination presents a strategic risk that the SOF Planners must mitigate. In SOF Operational Design, it is paramount to understand the limit of the effectiveness of one's operations in time and space as well as the ability to achieve intended effects and avoid unintended effects.

k. Termination Criteria. Termination criteria are the standards that must be met in order to determine if a problem is resolved or to justify the conclusion of an operation – the point at which the conditions are met to achieve U.S. National Strategic objectives. After successfully meeting the termination criteria, reframing should take place to identify any new or emerging changes in the environment. In SOF Operational Design, there is often not a single definitive solution to the complex problem set faced by the SOF Planner, and therefore, termination criteria can be diverse and multidisciplinary. If acceptable conditions are met and can be maintained without the application of a collaborative approach, termination criteria can be defined as SOF transitioning the effort to partners. Thus, SOF Planners must carefully consider their capabilities or what specific conditions they are attempting to create in the operational environment before defining termination criteria and employing assets.

VIII.7 SOF OPERATIONAL DESIGN FLOW.

a. The SOF Operational Design Flow establishes the framework which consists of 11 interrelated elements that are nested within four critical planning components. The framework is dynamic and attuned to both internal and external elements. Once the initial framework is established and operational risks and opportunities are identified, continuous reframing is conducted to identify emerging risks and opportunities that need to be mitigated or exploited. Requirements to adapt and adjust the approach are identified early allowing operational time and space to ensure proactive options are available and the strategic advantage is maintained.

b. Steps in the design flow follow doctrinal guidelines as established by Army Design Methodology. The first step in SOF Operational Design is framing the Environment. In this stage, key factors of culture, problem characterization, and stakeholder development must be explored and fully appreciated and / or understood for defined problem sets: current and desired conditions are clear, or approximate advancement of Strategic interest as determined by the Planner. As a transition is made to the second step, developing the Operational Approach, centers of gravity and decisive point analysis are conducted. This collaborative effort among all

¹¹¹ Ibid; definition expanded to include dynamics and interrelationships in the complex operating environment; reframing concept is illustrated in Figure VI-5, "The Flow," below.

stakeholders within nested end states informs the development of the SOF/CF/JIIM/SH Approach. The approach, through expanded reliance on CONUS base operationalization and judicious application of force or capability, is responsive to operational time considerations. Once the approach is determined, nested end states are revalidated in the context of SOF Operational Art implementation, step 3. In this step, conceptual problem framing is fused with mechanical planning to validate the approach based on problem characterization, nested end states, and capabilities in order to provide a deliberate and detailed transition from design to planning. In step 4, Planning and Executing SOF Campaigns, specific objectives, culmination, and termination criteria are identified. As the framework is being constructed, operational risks and opportunities are identified throughout. Once applied, continuous reframing is conducted to identify emerging operational risks and opportunities.




Figure VIII-4: SOF Operational Design Flow

CHAPTER IX SOF CAMPAIGN HISTORICAL VIGNETTES

IX.1 INTRODUCTION

Although every war is unique, history can provide a useful guide to educate our force on the dynamics of war. This chapter will show four case studies that reveal the complexities of SOF campaigns discussed in previous chapters. These vignettes show that the themes discussed above resonate through the history of SOF and irregular warfare. These themes include:

- the criticality of developing comprehensive political plans
- building influence, control and security of the people
- building stakeholder ownership
- employing all the elements of national power in a whole of government approach
- the centrality of intelligence, especially political intelligence, and planning for developing that intelligence
- the benefits of persistent presence to build relationships, access, intelligence, and coalitions
- campaigns that build coalitions, fracture enemy coalitions, and separate the enemy from the people
- the difficulties of negotiating with partner forces, and the importance of maintaining negotiating leverage over them

These vignettes will cover these themes and include non-U.S. examples, as befits a force that focuses on understanding foreign cultures and histories. The Oman case is one of the best examples of a small footprint campaign to enable a partner government and force to defeat an insurgency. The British and Omanis developed a whole-of-government campaign that included the raising of tribal militias, intelligence operations, civil-military operations, information operations, and adapting the campaign over time. In the Philippines, the United States has maintained a role since the Spanish-American War. Over the past century, United States forces have enabled partner forces and the government of the Philippines to counter several insurgencies, including the Hukbalahaps, the New People's Army, Abu Sayyaf, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The United States has also had a persistent presence in Colombia, using a small footprint to steadily aid partners to build their political control of the country. Finally, the Lebanon vignette shows the efforts of two states to employ surrogate forces against each other.

IX.2 DHOFAR REBELLION IN OMAN

One of the best examples of a successful SOF campaign is the British support to the Sultan of Oman in countering the Dhofar Rebellion, which lasted from 1964 to 1975. During this campaign, the Sultanate of Oman, with British, Jordanian, and Iranian assistance, implemented a whole-of-government approach that defeated the communist-backed Peoples' Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). The British, Omanis, and their partners planned and executed a campaign that continually built and expanded a position of advantage physically, cognitively, and politically. There were several key components of this campaign. First, it required willing partners. The British government concluded that the campaign would fail if the Omanis were not willing and able to make the necessary reforms. Second, once the partners were willing to implement the required reforms, the British used their strong understanding of the problem that their long engagement in the country and assessment of Dhofar by operators to develop an initial campaign plan. This plan focused on steadily

expanding the government's physical control of terrain by intelligence driven operations and nesting all actions inside the comprehensive political plan to make allies of former foes. Third, the British continually adapted the campaign plan as the situation and their understanding of the situation changed.

The Dhofar Rebellion started as the Dhofaris, a distinctly different people than the rest of Omanis, resented their second-class treatment by the Omani government. The communists capitalized on these political and economic grievances to build a movement to combat the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF). This organization, which received external aid from other Marxist allies, mobilized the Dhofari population of the mountainous western province and pushed out the SAF. While the British Officials in Oman requested assistance, London chose not to assist the country until the Sultan began making the necessary reforms. He refused. His intransigence continued until his son overthrew him in a coup d'tat. Immediately announcing a new government and numerous reforms, the new Sultan, a graduate of the British Sandhurst Military Academy, brought immediate hope to the bleak military situation. The British decided to provide aid to the new Monarch's plans. An assessment by the commander of 22 Special Air Service on the situation in Dhofar formed the basis of the combined Omani-British plan to retake Dhofar. The plan consisted of five fronts, or lines of effort: intelligence, information [military information support operations], medical, veterinary, and creating Dhofari units to fight for the Sultan. Benefiting from the recommendations of the tactical unit that would execute the operation and years of British officers serving in the SAF also provided critical depth of knowledge and trust to the combined plan. The plan sought to undermine rebel support, secure the population, and defeat the rebels through this comprehensive political and military plan.

The Special Air Service inserted operational and intelligence teams into Dhofar to begin developing the situation. Beginning in areas that the SAF or their Iranian or Baluchi allies occupied, the Special Air Service operators recruited the Dhofari tribesmen into a tribal army. They capitalized on resentment of rebel conscription and attempts to suppress tribal authority. Steadily the combined force expanded its control, with the SAF's operations enabling the political plan to split the rebel coalition and expand the coalition of Dhofaris loyal to the Sultan. The Sultan supported this effort by ordering all government ministries to make Dhofar their first priority. The SAS operators had to modify their initial plan, which entailed using the tribal bands in a vast offensive across the province, when they realized that these tribal units had limited willingness to undertake large scale offensive far from their villages. The SAS quickly adapted their campaign, increasing the focus on deliberately developing intelligence; securing village; raising a tribal militia to control the population and destroy nearby rebel units; and winning the loyalty of the tribes by paying the militia, information operations, providing wells, and providing veterinary services for the livestock.

The campaign achieved a remarkable level of unity of effort between the Omanis and the British. There were at least two major factors in developing this unity effort. The first major factor was the persistent engagement of the British in Oman, including seconding officers into the Sultan's service, training Omani units, and educating Omani leaders in the United Kingdom. Second, the British ensured that the Omanis' took ownership of the problem by refusing to aid until the government undertook the necessary reforms and required the Omani government to pay for the British aid. The Sultan had to pay for all of the British aid, including the salaries of the British forces deployed to the operation. While these two factors may not be present in all cases, they

highlight the necessity of developing host-nation ownership for achieving unity of effort, which is necessary for successful campaigns.

IX.3 PHILIPPINES JSOTF-P

One of the most cited examples of US Special Warfare Campaign success is that of the Joint Special Operations Task force - Philippines (JSOTF-P). It is chosen as an example because the campaign epitomizes the advantages gained by the application of force through persistent SOF engagement with a partner nation. It also highlights the understanding and focus of these forces' in ever increasing their partner's advantage within the physical, cognitive, and political spaces of the Human Domain. Finally, it is chosen because it illustrates the success of designing a comprehensive campaign with an knowledge of the environment that is constantly assessed and revised to meet the challenges and opportunities that arise during the execution of a campaign.

History: The United States has a long history of Irregular Warfare involvement in the Philippines dating back to the Spanish American War during which the U.S. Army gained a majority of its Counter-insurgency experience. Throughout the rest of the 20th century the U.S. involvement included fighting an insurgency with the Philippine's against the Japanese occupation along with multiple iterations of advising and assisting the Government of the Philippines against a variety of threats including the Hukbalahaps, New People's Army, Abu Sayyaf Group, Jemaah Islamiya, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. This long relationship though it had waned in the 1990s played a crucial role in the success of operations in the Philippines along with influencing the reasons for choosing the response of a small footprint Special Operations Force. It was through this backdrop of history that the United States was initially asked to advise and assist Philippine Forces against the Abu Suyaaf Group (ASG) with the deployment of 1st BN, 1st Special Forces Group, under Joint Task Force 510 in March of 2001. Following the events of 9/11 the Department of State and the Bush administration saw the opportunity to expand the scope of the original Task Force under the Global War on Terrorism and so JSOTF-P under Operation Enduring Freedom- Philippines was born.

In the early days of the creation of JTF 510 the SOCPAC Commander BG Donald Wurster and 1st SFG(A) Commander Colonel David Fridovich set out to create a strategy for the employment of SOF in the Philippines. They did this by first attempting to understand the environment and conditions that existed in the conflict. One of their first actions was reading the Constitution of the Philippines which made them aware that there was no specific legal prohibition to U.S. forces conducting combat operations in the Philippines. This realization though not legally restrictive was weighed against the U.S. past role of colonizer along with how the perception of a large unrestricted response would further support the adversary's narrative against the Government of the Philippines. Thus the decision was made that at its core the strategy should employ an indirect approach supporting Philippine sovereignty and restricting U.S. unilateral military operations to further support this goal.

Strategy: This strategy of indirect approach was molded into a campaign by imagining it through the lens of the McCormick Strategic COIN model known as the Diamond Model. The Diamond Model stressed the roles that the Counter-Insurgent has to play in building coalitions locally and internationally along with fracturing enemy coalitions to separate the populations' support from the insurgency. It further stresses a holistic approach in that insists on the close coordination and action of both the Government and Military in combating an insurgency. The model addresses this holistic approach through 5 legs or interactions between the elements of the

Insurgent, Counter-Insurgent, Population, and International Community. These interactions of the elements consist of gaining the support of the population, disrupting the opponents control over the population, direct action against the opponent, disrupting the opponents' relationships with the International Community, and establishing relationships with the International Community.¹¹²

The planners re-imaged this model in that they removed themselves from the role of the Counter-Insurgent to the role of the support of the Counter-Insurgent in that all actions would be taken by, through, and with Philippine Forces in the lead. The JSOTF further refined the campaign by creating Lines of Operation (LOOs) that focused on supporting and influencing the Philippine Forces and Government to take actions that addressed the Diamond Model interactions in a balanced approach. Key to providing this balanced response by the Philippine Government was the JSOTF's coordination and incorporation of operations with the U.S. Department of State Country Team efforts. This created not only relationships based solely military to military but pushed interaction from local to national and international with all levels and agencies in the Philippine Government. This was crucial due to the international support and highly political nature of the threats in the Philippines.

Execution: The LOOs of Capacity Building, Targeted Civil Military Operations, Influence Operations, and Information Gathering and Sharing, were created. The execution of the Capacity Building was primarily accomplished by conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID) advise and assist operations in order to increase the effectiveness and capacity of Philippine Forces to conduct operations in Direct Action, CMO, and Influence Operations. Targeted CMO operations were led by Philippine Forces and executed for specific goals among selected populations. Influence or Information Operations were conducted to emphasize the successes of the first two LOOs. The Information Gathering and Sharing was focused on increasing the Philippine's Intelligence and information dominance over their adversaries through both training and additional U.S. asset support.¹¹³ All of these lines of operation were constantly being checked against meeting the criteria of being by, with or through Philippine actors. This enforcement of by, with, or through forced U.S. forces to create capacity that would be sustainable by Philippine Forces along with creating greater ownership of the problem by the Philippine Government and Forces as a whole.

Results: As of June 2014, JSOTF-P was disbanded declaring success while leaving a small contingent of training forces in the Philippines to continue the relationship built over the last 14 years. So how effective was the overall strategy? First, the perspective of time may prove that the JSOTF-P indirect approach was more or less effective but here is what we can infer so far. There have been both successes and setbacks but for the most part the JSOTF and the Philippine Forces learned from both. The best example of this ebb and flow of success and setback would be the expulsion of ASG from the Island of Basilan in 2004. This success was followed with a rapid withdrawal of Philippine Forces before security could be sustained locally leading to a re-emergence of ASG on Basilan in 2008. This lesson of when to withdrawal and setting of

¹¹² McCormick, Gordon (1987), *The Shining Path and Peruvian terrorism*, RAND Corporation, Document Number: P-7297 often called Magic Diamond

¹¹³ Farris, Stuart (2009), *Joint Special Operations Task Force- Philippines*, School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph

sustainable local security conditions before withdrawing is still being learned primarily because the Philippine Government has to resolve itself to make lasting changes to the underlying conditions that supports the unrest. Despite this and other setbacks the overall situation is as follows. The Abu Sayaaf Group which was initially at 2,000 to 1,500 members is now at an estimated 300 members that have largely abandoned their political stance and resorted to criminal activities such as narco-trafficking and kidnapping. ASG has not mounted a significant attack against the populace since 2005. ASG's ties to Al Qaida have largely been severed with the capture or killing of the key members of the group that originally aligned themselves to AQ. Jemaah Islamiyah's presence in Mindanao is greatly reduced with their international support also being damaged leaving approximately only 50 foreign fighters left in the Philippines. The Philippine Armed forces have increased capacity in combat medical support, patrolling, intelligence gathering from tactical to national levels, and the integration of air, maritime, and land operations night or day.¹¹⁴ The approach for this greater force capacity was also refocused from its former use of large scale search and destroy operations resulting in high levels of collateral damage to focused target operations combined with rapid response of CMO and Influence Operations to mitigate and enhance the Direct Action. Overall, for an investment of no more than 600 men at one time and no more the \$52 million a year in support the concept of indirect support proved highly successful.

IX.4 COLOMBIA

The influence of US SOF in Colombia has been especially positive. For decades, a changing variety of organizations (governments, guerrillas, criminal gangs, militias, international organizations, NGOs) have prosecuted what is an archetypical irregular war in northern South America and the Caribbean -- centered on Colombia. Colombian society has witnessed seemingly every ugly aspect of that war, including landmines, industrial-scale kidnapping, infrastructure assaults, environmental degradation, terrorist bombings, massacres, forced displacements and other human rights violations. The society has also changed in ways that cannot be disassociated from the war, but that were also driven by other, peaceful factors. In the early 1960's most of the population lived in what we would consider rural conditions and confines, while today the great majority of Colombians lives what we would identify as an urban if not cosmopolitan life. The Constitution of Colombia evolved; as did Colombian military institutions; and both of these changes must be principally ascribed to the war. Some guerrilla groups were militarily defeated, their organizational lives ending in negotiations that reincorporated many of their leaders into peaceful political life. Other organizations were all but destroyed, but two (the ELN and especially the FARC, have survived to continue tormenting Colombia. It is worth noting that during this entire period, Colombians exercised a vibrant if imperfect electoral democracy in which more than a dozen presidents were peacefully chosen and replaced according to constitutional schedule. The Colombian economy is in relatively solid condition, Colombia contributes globally at the highest levels in many cultural categories, and Colombia's is often cited in various surveys and investigations as one of the happiest societies in the world. In other words, Colombia, although it has suffered five decades of what must be considered among the world's most costly irregular wars, has more than simply survived. Throughout, US support has contributed positively to helping consecutive Colombian

¹¹⁴ Farris, Stuart(2009), Joint Special Operations Task Force- Philippines, pages 50-55 , School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph

governments confront an often confounding array of brutal challengers. The robust US-Colombian military relationship is long-rooted, going back to before the Korean War. Over the years, tens of thousands of Colombian soldiers and officers have received US military training to one degree or another. Within this institutional relationship (and consequently its many interpersonal relationships) US SOF found both willing and capable partners. Around 2000, President Bill Clinton determined that a major infusion of assistance (in the form of support to what became known as Plan Colombia) was needed to avert a political crisis in Colombia. Included in that support (which began to arrive at a significant scale around 2002) was augmented US SOF activities and presence in Colombia, mostly in the form of training, organizational and planning assistance.

Strategy and Geography. During the period between about 2002 and 2010, Colombia's senior leadership, starting with then-President Álvaro Uribe, took an aggressive posture toward the FARC that placed emphasis on pursuing FARC units, especially its top leadership. In *Colombia's Road to Recovery*, scholar David Spencer summarized the Colombian approach as follows:

“The military strategy developed three lines of strategic action: active area control, sustained offensive operations, and special operations. Active area control was designed to occupy all national territory to protect the population and reduce the armed groups’ freedom to maneuver. All of the municipalities that had been abandoned during previous governments were re-occupied and garrisoned with soldiers and police....Sustained offensive operations were designed to permanently attack the insurgent groups to diminish their numbers and reduce their morale. The primary forces used for this were the mobile brigades. ...Special operations had two objectives: to rescue hostages in the hands of the armed groups and to attack their strategic leaders, particularly those of the FARC. The army organized a special operations command composed of a Commando and a Lancero battalion. ...The special operations also carried out a campaign called ‘Kidnapped but Never Forgotten’ to find and rescue the remaining hostages. ... Special operations also crossed the borders and by different means captured high-level FARC leaders such as Simon Trinidad in Ecuador and Rodrigo Granda in Venezuela.”

US and Colombian SOF campaign planning faced a number of salient human and physical geographic features that together composed a unique challenge. While the Colombian war is often described as an insurgency and as an internal war, a review of FARC and ELN lines of communication and escape to sanctuary, and of the often contiguous smuggling routes, leads to a realization that the war is regional one. SOF activities throughout the region had to be carefully orchestrated. The effect that international sovereignty had on operational risk (including as it was interpreted by the various approval authorities that the SOF planner had to satisfy) especially influenced the SOF planner's options.

Not only is Colombia famously mountainous, its mountains are in many areas geographically proximate to one of two oceans or to navigable rivers leading out of the country. Not only is much of southeastern Colombia covered in thick jungle, much of the rest of the country, at least at lower altitudes, is home to dense jungle-like flora. Any one of the three phenomena (international borders, rugged mountain slopes, and ultra-dense flora) serve to give advantage to the fugitive attempting to out-run or out-distance pursuing government forces. These geographies tend to help reduce the prudent risk distances, or ‘reach’, of pursuers, that is, decrease the distance that the pursuers can travel before reaching a point beyond which it is

imprudent to continue. In Colombia exists an interwoven abundance of all three types of escape-geography. To compensate for the advantage given to the fugitive, Colombian government forces applied physical technologies, innovative techniques and procedures, and the laborious creation of intelligence networks. SOF, uniquely designed for such activities, naturally played a prominent role.

While the effect on military actions of Colombia's geography is most clearly felt in relation to direct action missions, it also creates and exposes places where longer-term, population-oriented psychological efforts have been imperative. The escape geographies just discussed implicate a specific set of communities. Communities located along guerrilla lines of communication or smuggling routes are far more likely to be the victims of extreme violence. Perhaps coincidentally located in the venue of violent competition, they also become the objects of that competition because violent groups must assure themselves of civil collaboration (or at least civilian silence) in order to make good their escapes. Added to the question of psychological preparation of remote communities, Colombian military planners had to contend with increasingly sophisticated public legal and informational battles in which every encounter with the civilian population would be called into question.

In their campaign plans, Colombian SOF had to continually re-calculate distances and relative strength, attempting in the aggregate to extend the prudent reach of their units while decreasing the prudent reach of their adversaries. SOF campaign planners had to orchestrate SOF activities so as not to negatively affect activities elsewhere in the country and the region (including SOF and non-SOF) and to shape each activity so as to enhance the product of the next whenever possible.

STRATEGY AND RESULTS . The US SOF portion of Plan Colombia spurred a growth in the quantity and quality of Colombian special operations units. At first, however, the USSOF campaign did not meet with universal approval. As to the overall grade given to USSOF activities in Colombia circa 2005, Mark Moyar, et al, state in their monograph *Persistent Engagement in Colombia* (reprising language from an article by Douglass Porch and Christopher Muller):

The MILGP saw itself as focused on security cooperation, long-term institution building, and self-sustainability, which it believed that USSOF were not accomplishing because of their focus on building small elite units that remained reliant on the United States. One MILGP lieutenant colonel asserted, "We don't want to create capacities that only the US can support, so that when we go away we leave nothing behind, no institutional knowledge is created."107 Members of the MILGP criticized SOF for the short duration of their deployments, their lack of understanding of the operational environment, and their tendency to transplant solutions from Iraq and Afghanistan.

That criticism was addressed by adjusting, at the campaign level, the approach USSOF took in its relationship with its Colombian counterparts. Of the situation in 2010, Moyar *et al* cite David Spencer and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

By 2010, U.S. advisors considered Colombian Special Forces to be as well trained and equipped as USSOF, and more capable overall than many first-world SOF. In addition, their interoperability with USSOF was considered excellent. 122 Colombian military special operations forces and the Junglas began exporting security expertise and conducting training exchanges in over 20 countries, predominantly in Latin America but also in Afghanistan and several African countries.123

Reading. The above paragraphs give a meager account of a history worth closer study for SOF campaign planning lessons. In addition to the Spencer and Moyar pieces quoted above, Robert Ramsey's *From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Yaque* is of value. All three are easily available online. More is written in Spanish, and many useful Spanish titles can be found in the references of Geoff Demarest's *Risk Distance: The Loss of Strength Gradient and Colombia's Geography of Impunity*.

IX.5 LEBANON

When the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) invaded Lebanon in 1982, they began working with a Lebanese militia to help secure the territory they controlled. As they withdrew to a security buffer along the border in 1985, they formalized the militia into the South Lebanon Army under the command of Major Saad Haddad, an officer in the Lebanese Armed Forces. The IDF used this South Lebanon Army as an outer ring of defense to keep Lebanese and Palestinian attackers away from Israeli cities. The IDF supported its SLA surrogates and created a special unit to advise and liaison with the SLA. To ensure loyalty of the SLA fighters, the IDF attempted to make them as dependent as possible on the IDF, providing special privileges such as access to Israeli markets. The 2,500-man SLA guarded an area of 1,000 square kilometers for many years.

The distrust between the IDF and SLA gradually increased, resulting in the IDF placing more stringent requirements on the SLA, including banning cell phones, carefully monitoring supplies, and increasing counter-intelligence operations. The SLA members in turn began to resent their unequal status in their partnership with the IDF. The IDF suspicions had a basis in truth as the Shia Lebanese movement Hezbollah had begun exploiting rifts in the SLA to recruit agents.

The SLA activities were mostly restricted to military tasks such as operating checkpoints. They had limited intelligence activities and minimal political activities except for Major Haddad's negotiations with other armed groups in Lebanon. This was partly the result of the IDF's focus on limited security operations and wariness of being drawn deeper into Lebanese politics. The result is that the SLA and the IDF had no comprehensive political plan for Southern Lebanon. In 1985, this deficiency was not immediately a problem because the IDF had inflicted heavy damage on the Palestinians and hostile Lebanese groups. With no apparent major challenge, the IDF and the SLA did not adapt their plan. However, in the aftermath of the war, Hezbollah began to expand its physical access across Lebanon, its intelligence operations, and its political campaign for the hearts and minds of the Lebanese people.

Hezbollah, the Party of God, began expanding its operations from a handful of high-profile terrorist attacks to guerrilla operations that gained control of an increasingly large area of the Shia-dominated areas of southern Lebanon. Simultaneously a Lebanese movement focused on resistance against Israel and a proxy of Revolutionary Iran, Hezbollah focused on much more than a narrow military task. With Iranian advice, training, and material support, Hezbollah engaged in a campaign that included strong social services, intelligence, and information operations in addition to military operations against Lebanese rivals, the SLA, and Israel.

The extensive Hezbollah intelligence operations infiltrated most of Lebanon and into Israel, providing a detailed and accurate understanding of their enemies and Lebanese politics. Aided by advice and expertise from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, Hezbollah intelligence provided timely and detailed intelligence to guide targeting and support the party's political campaign. These intelligence operations enabled Hezbollah to emplace roadside bombs within fifty meters of IDF positions, infiltrate SLA units, and lure IDF special operations forces into ambushes. The Hezbollah roadside bomb program had so much success that the IDF chose to move all of its soldiers by air instead of ground convoy. The Iranian sponsors and Hezbollah leaders made a deliberate effort to constantly expand intelligence and integrate it with operations as a bedrock of their campaign.

Hezbollah's political program focused on cultivating popular support. While both Hezbollah and SLA ignored the provisions of the 1989 agreement that officially ended the war, the Lebanese people largely perceived Hezbollah's defiance as legitimate. The Revolutionary Guards encouraged Hezbollah to expand its popular support in Lebanon, even if this meant that Hezbollah at times disagreed with Iranian objectives. The Iranian special operations forces allowed their Hezbollah allies to take ownership of the problem and build their own base of support in Lebanon, while the IDF tried to limit the SLA's base of support and maximize their dependency on Israel. Instead of cultivating the people, the SLA extorted money from the civilian population and operated notorious prisons with endemic torture.

In 2000, when the IDF pulled out of their buffer zone in Lebanon, the SLA rapidly collapsed. Numerous SLA positions capitulated to Hezbollah units while the remaining SLA fighters fled to Israel with their families. Having no political support in Lebanon and infiltrated by Hezbollah, SLA leadership and cohesion collapsed when the IDF withdrew. Hezbollah continued to expand its political campaign. Additionally, Hezbollah continued to adapt its campaign to changing situations. For example it changed its position and began participating in Lebanese parliamentary politics, establishing a decisive voting bloc in the government.

CHAPTER X IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

“As a force, we must continuously learn, anticipate, and evolve in order to defeat an adaptive enemy and the uncertain threats of the 21st century. Without question, over the next decade, we will face complex challenges that will test the mettle of our force.”

-LTG Charles T. Cleveland, Commanding General
United States Army Special Operations Command

X.1 Introduction. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the implications of SOF Campaigning, focusing on doctrine as well as education and training. Doctrine and education/training, however, are just two areas of the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis model that will require a review as a result of SOF Operational Design implementation. This chapter will use the introduction of AirLand Battle in the early 1980s as a comparative example of potential changes in these key areas.

Doctrine. The need to construct comprehensive SOF Campaigns in the FOE will drive the development of new doctrine that more appropriately match the capabilities and approaches required of SOF. This situation was mirrored during the development of AirLand Battle.

Immediately after the development of the AirLand Battle concept in the early 1980's the Command General Staff College (CGSC), under the leadership of one of AirLand Battle's principle architects, then Colonel Huda Was de Czege, authored a new version of FM 100-5, *Operations*. This revision of an Army capstone field manual resulted in numerous revisions of tactical doctrine manuals across the force.

In the current environment, USASOC, through the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), has recently published ADP 3-05, *Special Operations*, which will serve as foundational doctrine for forces conducting special warfare operations within the FOE. As with the revision of FM 100-5 that followed AirLand Battle development, the publication of ADP 3-05 will drive significant changes in ARSOF tactical doctrine across various specialties as well as potential revisions across the Joint Force to more effectively meet future challenges and opportunities.

While much attention is devoted to the threat aspects of the FOE, it is also important to note that the rapid development of technology, an acknowledged factor in the FOE, will also present risks and opportunities that impact SOF campaign design. The rapid growth of information technology and associated social media is a prime example of an emergent technology that will need to be accounted for in any comprehensive methodology and associated operational and tactical doctrine.

Education and Training. Complementing the need for developing new doctrine to address the FOE is the need to develop new, and to modify existing, educational and training materials. Once again, the development of Air Land Battle provides historical guideposts for the way ahead.

After he revised FM 100-5, *Operations*, 1983, COL de Czege founded and served as the

first director of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). The stated reason for the creation of SAMS was to bridge the gap between the tactical planning education offered at CGSC and the grand strategy and national security policy education conducted at the War College. Planners with an advanced education in operational art would be required to execute the campaigns envisioned in the AirLand Battle Operational Concept.

Just as the foundation of SAMS addressed specific knowledge requirements created by changing conditions and operational concepts introduced with AirLand Battle, the need to develop a program to train and educate planners in the SOF Community is evident. While existing professional development entities do train planners schooled in the concept of operational design, the Army and Joint professional development systems do not produce SOF campaign planners with the required specialization or in the required quantity. To that end, USAJFKSWCS plays a critical role again by integrating the concepts of SOF Operational Design into its existing professional military education (PME) and training as well as by developing specialized courses for personnel designated to conduct campaign planning at the Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) and Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) levels.

X.2 Conclusion. The Nation, and particularly the Department of Defense, is at a moment as profound as that of the 1980s during which Air Land Battle drove doctrinal changes – a moment when the current prevailing strategy may not meet the challenges of the future and a new way of thinking and acting is required to maintain U.S. National Security. From this new way of thinking springs a wide range of outputs across the range of the DOTMLPF paradigm, including the process by which planners analyze situations and develop a range of solutions for the problems perceived in the environment. The blueprint to transform ARSOF to meet the challenges of the future operating environment laid out in ARSOF 2022 is comprehensive and the development of SOF Operational Design is only one aspect of that plan. However, it is an essential element of Lieutenant General Cleveland’s challenge to begin "thinking differently," particularly in how we conduct special warfare at the operational level.

As the Department of Defense and U.S. Special Operations Command's largest command with the most diverse range of special operations capabilities, USASOC shoulders the responsibility to codify its experiences from the past 13 years of war and provide innovative structures and methodologies to meet the challenges and opportunities of the future. Through SOF Operational Design, USASOC fulfills this responsibility, establishes a means to explore and introduce an expanded range of strategic options to solve the complex problems anticipated in the FOE, and offers a viable instrument to bridge a gap that exists in the current Operational Art and Design body of knowledge. In doing so, **SOF Operational Art and Design provides better options for the Nation to Shape, Prevent, and Win in the future operating environment.**

APPENDIX A PLANNING GROUP LEADER'S TECHNIQUES

A.1. Techniques for leading a planning group:

- a. The leader of a planning group, whether it is a Joint Planning Group, Operational Planning Team, Working Group, or other any other type of planning team, is first and foremost a leader. This leader should first develop a plan to plan.
- b. The team leader should have direct access with the command group so that the planning effort benefits from a continuous dialogue with the commander. This enables the planners to develop a fuller understanding of the commander's intent and benefit from the command group's experience and broader perspective.
- c. When building a planning team, the team leader can look at the problem and figure out which organizations should be represented because they are stakeholders, key supporting units, critical staff sections, etc. To ensure that the right people are on the planning group, the team leader should describe what is expected from the members to the stakeholders. This will enable the leaders of those organizations to send the right people. For example, in many cases the planning team members should be subject matter experts in their collateral areas and have the trust and confidence of their parent organization to make tentative decisions for those organizations.
- d. Planning team members from subordinate or tactical units are critical members of any SOF planning team. SOF puts heavy emphasis on the perspective and input of tactical units. This is because in the ambiguous, inherently political, and profoundly local nature of irregular warfare, those small units that have built relationships in a particular area have a particular expertise that is essential for planning. The planning team leader should particularly focus on ensuring that these members have a good understanding of the strategic situation and all of the dynamics in the situation.
- e. A highly effective technique is to ask these team members and their parent organizations to produce estimates for how they would execute a particular mission. These estimates, because they are based on ground truth, may frequently be more feasible and effective than a staff-produced course of action.
- f. Before each meeting, the team leader should develop a purpose for the meeting, what the members should come prepared to discuss, and what the desired output is. If the planning team is at the point of developing a product, the team leader should develop the format before the planning team begins work. For example, if the team is using the Joint Operational Planning Process, the team leader should have the format for Course of Action Development complete before the planning team begins this step of the process.
- g. Team leaders should maintain a balance between having enough meetings to generate shared understanding and purpose while not too many that the team members do not have the time to actually do work.
- h. Planning team leaders should resist doing all of the work themselves. They need to be able to step back from the planning effort to identify the planning gaps and focus the planning effort on the critical factors. The art of planning is reflecting on how the process is going, filling the gaps, and mastering the planning tools to support the operators on the ground and achieving the strategic objective.
- i. A critical aspect in SOF planning is determining what the critical factors are. Because they frequently find themselves in unique or unorthodox situations, the critical factors

may be different in each campaign. For example, logistical support for a unconventional warfare campaign may be the critical factor that requires operational level planning because of the difficulties of clandestine logistics. On the other hand, the necessary authorities and permissions for providing operational advice and intelligence support may be the critical factor in a foreign internal defense campaign. In politically sensitive environments, the number of operators in country (“BOG”) may be the critical factor that policy makers use to manage the risk, so that the risk and cost do come out of balance with the United States’ ends.

- j. The more stakeholders that come from organizations external to the SOF community, the more imperative it is for the planners to communicate the plan in plain English, with minimal acronyms and jargon. Even doctrinally defined terms like counter-terrorism mean very different things to different people. A major portion of the SOF campaign planner’s responsibility is to explain the SOF efforts in terms that key stakeholders, especially policy-makers and Chiefs-of-Mission can understand and support. For Joint Planning environment, it will be essential to have a printed copy of the most current version of JP1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, available online.
- k. Because SOF campaigns are frequently politically sensitive, the planning team should ensure that they capture all of the strategic guidance and provide that to the tactical units that execute the campaign. This guidance comes from the formal strategic documents such as the National Security Strategy and from informal sources such as Presidential speeches. Providing this information to the planning team and the units of action can provide a richer understanding of ambiguous and complex situations. This richer understanding enables those subordinate leaders to use their own initiative to adapt to local conditions to achieve the United States’ strategic objectives.
- l. Because many policy-makers are unfamiliar with the detail of military operations and SOF operations, SOF planners may need to explain how SOF tactics work in plain English, so that the policy-makers understand why certain permissions or enablers are required for the operation.
- m. When explaining the campaign the SOF planner should be able to explain the theory of how the campaign will achieve the political objective. By making this theory explicit, it should highlight the assumptions that the plan is based on. This is very useful because it can tell the planners when conditions on the ground have invalidated one of the assumptions, requiring a change in the plan, ending the campaign, or presenting a new opportunity to exploit.

A.2 Planning in the absence of clear end states:

- a. Although our PME and doctrine assumes that policy-makers will provide clear and concise strategic guidance, in the ambiguous, highly political, and rapidly changing environment that SOF operate in, SOF planners will frequently have minimal strategic guidance. The situation sometimes is so complex that it is not possible for policy-makers to accurately predict how the ends and means will balance. This means that they will ask the planners for options. These options, in the absence of a decided end state, should be options for achieving different end states. This allows the policy-makers to decide which objective is feasible at an acceptable cost and level of risk.

- b.** In this situation, it is particularly important for the planners to describe how the planned campaign could achieve the strategic objective.
- c.** In this situation, there will likely be competing national interests, requiring the planners and all of the stakeholders to recognize which national interests are of higher priority. For example, upholding an international treaty or counter-narcotics regime may be lower in priority than preventing the destabilization of a key ally.
- d.** The situation may be so nebulous that the planners could easily list out tens of different options. If this is the case, it may be useful to focus on only a handful of options. Otherwise, there is a risk of failing to communicate the options to all of the stakeholders. The planners should choose a handful of options that cover most if not all of the spectrum of possible options. The options should not be incrementally different. To make the policy choices clear, each option should be qualitatively different so that the stakeholders and policymakers clearly understand the different options and what the potential advantages and costs of each option are.
- e.** These options should be presented in as simple a manner as possible, highlighting the key issues for policy-makers, not details of execution that the tactical SOF units will figure out in the bottom-up SOF manner.
- f.** Presenting the plan in a simple manner does not mean having only a “power-point deep” plan. Only planners who fully understand the situation and have developed the course of action in terms of all the warfighting functions can accurately summarize a plan down to the essential points.
- g.** In ambiguous situations, it is important to bring the unit that would execute the operation into the operational planning as early as possible. Ideally, based on SOF’s persistent presence, this unit will have subject matter experts on that country. These subject matter experts should have the opportunity to discuss the concept with the planning team and the command group to provide ground truth reality to the planning. If possible, these subject matter experts can participate in the actual planning, providing input on how the teams would execute the plan.

APPENDIX B - PC / PIs (Planning Checks / Planning Inspections)

1. Introduction. This appendix contains three sections to help the SOF Planner organize and prepare the team to conduct SOF Operational Design. The first section contains a basic list of recommended reading and publications the team should be familiar with and have on hand while designing/planning. This list serves as an initial introduction and familiarization to design and is by no means all-inclusive or exhaustive. The second section discusses the importance of setting a climate and resourcing a workspace conducive to designing. The third section reviews the SOF Operational Design flow and poses questions to serve as conceptual linkages between SOF Operational Design and the operations process which includes enduring and persistent feedback at the operational and tactical levels in order to identify emerging problems or opportunities and capabilities that inform the design process and direct campaign conceptualization. While the material is presented in list form, it is not intended to be sequential nor does it outline a "step by step" process or template. Rather, this appendix offers suggestions to help conduct SOF Operational Design and facilitate its interface with the operations process. As an initial resource, it serves as a reminder that even in one's approach to planning itself, "failing to plan is planning to fail." That is, the most important thing is not that you remember these specific recommendations but that you remember the importance of SOF Operational Design preparation particularly as it applies to developing the level of proficiency necessary to tie tactical capabilities to regional or national strategies.

c. As the Community integrates and exercises SOF Operational Design, best practices will emerge and while they might not be applicable to every design team scenario, they will be shared through our campaign of learning so that, as a Community, we mature in the design process and continually improve the interface between design, planning, and execution. The best practices and lessons learned will be consolidated and updated in this handbook during the annual review in the fourth quarter of every fiscal year.

2. Recommended reading and publications to have on hand.

- a. Recommended Reading (always check internet resources for most current versions).
 1. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, *Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*, January 28, 2008.
 2. *Army Design Methodology, Commander's Resource*, February 2012.
 3. *Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare*, August 2006.
 4. *Campaign Planning Handbook*, AY 20XX, US Army War College. (Updated every Academic year)
 5. Banach, S.J. & Ryan, A. (2009). The Art of Design, a Design Methodology. *Military Review*, 89, 105-115.
 6. Grigsby, W., Gorman S., Marr, J., Stewart, M., & Schifferle, P. (2011). Integrated planning- The operations process, Design, and the military decision making process. *Military Review*, Jan-Feb 2011, 28-35.
 7. Perez, C. (2011). A Practical Guide to Design: A way to think about it and a way to do it. *Military Review*, March-April 2011, 41-51.
 8. Banach, S.J. (2009). Educating by Design, preparing leaders for a complex world. *Military Review*, March-April 2009, 96-103.

9. Kem, J. (2009). Design: Tools of the Trade.
 10. JSOU Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Manual, April 2011.
- b. Publications to have on hand (always check internet resources for most current versions).
1. JP1-02. Joint Terms and Definitions
 2. JP 3-0. *Joint Operations*. August 11, 2011.
 3. JP 5-0. *Joint Operation Planning*. August 11, 2011.
 4. JP 3-05 Special Operations. July 16, 2014
 5. FM 1-02. *Operational Terms and Graphics*. September 2009.
 6. FM 3-0. *Operations*. February 2008.
 7. FM 5-0. *The Operations Process*. March 2010.
 8. ADP/ADRP 3-05. *Special Operations*. August 31, 2012.
 9. ADP/ADRP 5-0. *The Operations Process*. May 17, 2012.
 10. ADP 3-0. *Unified Land Operations*. October 10, 2011.
 11. ADRP 6-0. *Mission Command*. May 17, 2012.
 12. Joint Staff, J-7. *Planner's Handbook for Operational Design*. 7 October 2011.
 13. SAMS Art of Design Student Text, Version 2.0. May 2010.

3. Setting the climate and resourcing the workspace for design.

"It is important to consider how you set up a room so that you can effectively sit around and think about things. People don't think about the physical environment enough. That really does impact your thinking."¹¹⁵

-Strategic Planner, J5; SAMS graduate

a. Climate and Task Organization.

"...commanders should be transparent with subordinates and convince them that their views, ideas, and perspectives are invaluable to the success of the organization. ...The commander must take care to avoid organizational obstacles and be willing to share the work of command, including allowing subordinates and staff officers to exercise healthy initiative and experimentation.... None of this is new, of course. Good commanders have done it for years. The point here is that these conditions are essential for the practice of Design. Where they are absent, Design simply won't work."

-SAMS Art of Design Student Text Version 2.0

(1) Establishing a climate, appropriately task organizing, and adequately resourcing a workspace that is conducive to the thinking, analytical, and learning components of SOF Operational Design is the first and only prescribed step we outline for the SOF Planner. In other words, before the team sets about the execution of SOF Operational Design, they must prepare - which can prove as difficult a task as the design itself. While much preparation will be driven by experience and preferences, it is worth noting some initial considerations in order to establish a universal starting point and frame of reference.

¹¹⁵ Army Design Methodology Commander's Resource, February 2012. p. 35.

(2) Despite the many models, diagrams, lists, and heuristics, design methodology lacks a prescribed, "color-by-number" process and experts in the field are reluctant to entertain the idea. The general advice provided in *Army Design Methodology Commander's Resource* reinforces this sentiment, "The Commander (or other individual leading ADM) can provide important support for the activity by making available a flexible structure for the team's discourse," but follows up with a discussion on the importance of balancing the Commander's involvement: too much risks premature and unintended compliance, while too little results in a design that misses the intent. JP 5-0 further defines the Commander's role in setting a proper climate, "Operational design requires the commander to encourage discourse and leverage dialogue and collaboration to identify and solve complex, ill-defined problems. To that end, the commander must empower organizational learning and develop methods to determine if modifying the operational approach is necessary during the course of an operation."

(3) Resources offer general consensus on a recommended team size of about 6-9 people with SME augmentation as required and emphasize the importance of the personnel selected. The *Army Design Methodology Commander's resource* offers a list of desirable skills and attributes, among them: comfort with ambiguity, open mindedness, an inquisitive and curious nature, creative and innovative thinking, active listening, valuing different points of view, formal training in ADM, and being an expert in one's assigned field. The individual charged with leading the design effort should, in addition to these qualities, demonstrate ability to manage team dynamics: leverage diverse strengths through the non-standard application of individual skills, knowledge, and experience where it is needed most.

b. Workspace resources and materials.

(1) The SOF Planner is the most important resource in the design process. The complex FOE will require tactical and technical proficiency in innovative, creative, and critical thinking. The SOF Planner ideally possesses a diverse operational background, having worked at various echelons of command including Combined and Joint, with experience in the traditional and unconventional styles of warfare. Not all SOF Planners can be expected to have the same background and experience, yet all are expected to be well versed in and have a graduate level of competence when it comes to designing and planning campaigns that require SOF capabilities. As a planner and member of a team that may or may not understand SOF core competencies or capabilities you must be skilled in team dynamics and integration and be able to communicate intent, purpose, and objective in the languages of other organizations. Therefore, personal and professional development is instrumental in the effort to master the SOF Operational Design craft.

(2) The physical area in which design is conducted requires deliberate consideration and thoughtful preparation. As experience with the process increases, these considerations will become second nature and every design team will have their preferences in set up and resources. Even then, do not allow your team to get complacent in the process and always be willing to try new things. The following considerations are excerpted from the *Army Design Methodology Commander's Resource*:

- a. The Space:
 - i. A dedicated area where products and materials will not be disrupted.
 - ii. Clean and organized.
 - iii. Comfortable, with room to spread out.
 - iv. Facilitates small and large group discussions.
- b. Connectivity – phone, VTC, computers, projection, printers, scanner, fax.
- c. Plenty of wall space.
- d. Table space.
- e. Low traffic.
- f. Cabinets to store materials.
- g. Resources:
- h. Whiteboards, butcher-block.
- i. Markers and drawing tools, dry-erase.
- j. Post-it notes – various sizes, colors.
 - i. Tape.
 - ii. Climate Control equipment.
- k. Notepads, sketch paper.
- l. Laptop computer.
- m. Projector.
- n. Audio recorder.
- o. Camera.
 - i. Copier – color/black and white.
 - ii. Printer, Scanner, Fax.
- p. Maps.
- q. Overlays.
- r. SITREPS.
- s. Digital Products.
- t. Contact Rosters.
- u. Calendar.
- v. Publications and reference library– planning, operational, academic.
- w. Graphical display example print-outs.
 - i. Clock.
 - ii. Timer.
 - iii. Electronic Data Storage and transfer equipment.
 - iv. Calculator.

4. Questions related to SOF Operational Design Flow and the conceptual linkage between SOF Operational Design and the Operations Process.

a. The following questions facilitate considerations for the specific design elements nested within their respective critical planning component. The interrelatedness of the elements and planning components within the framework is important to keep in mind particularly as a continual process of reframing calibrates understanding of the elements and identifies emerging risks and opportunities which may require adjustments to the operational approach. Strategic, operational, and tactical implications must also be taken into account.

b. The questions below are initial considerations to stimulate critical, creative, and analytical thinking. As SOF Operational Design is practiced, it is likely that each element will warrant its own annex complete with considerations, vignettes, and examples for graphical display.

1. Framing the SOF Environment:

(a) Culture.

- What are the types of cultures within the environment and how do they affect environmental conditions?
- Have I considered our own culture, local cultures, and sub-cultures?
- Have I maximized the resources available to understand culture?
- Have I identified ways to influence within this culture?
- Have I graphically depicted culturally relevant data via diagram, sketch, or overlay with a narrative?

(b) Problem Characterization.

- What are my gaps in understanding this situation?
- How are the various stakeholders defining this problem and why?
- How many problems are there and can I explain them?
- What is the root problem?
- What challenges, opportunities, and risks do the problems present?
- Have I maximized the resources available to understand the problem?
- Have I graphically depicted problem characterizations via diagram, sketch, or overlay with a narrative?

(c) Stakeholder Development.

- Have I identified all the Stakeholders (SH)?
- Have I identified SH capabilities?
- Have I identified SH competing and complimentary interests?
- Have I identified methods to share information and facilitate communication/collaboration?
- Have I created a contact roster and "who's who" smart book?
- Have I created a glossary of terms and definitions that includes cross references with our own language?
- Have I resolved considerations of clearance level and organizational culture?
- Have I graphically depicted SH relevant data as it relates to the problem and our collaboration via diagram, sketch, or overlay with a narrative?

(d) Nesting of End States.

- Have I reviewed and internalized national strategic end states and those of higher commands?
- Do I know the strategic objectives of the local government (ie. Mission Strategic Resource Plan (MSRP))?

- Do I understand the constraints or limitations strategic end states impose on our approach?
- Do I understand how our approach nests within and supports the strategic end state? Can I explain the relevant conceptual and detailed planning elements of the various approaches as they relate to the strategic, operational, and tactical level?
- Have I established a method to inform the end states our approach is nested within?
- Can I anticipate how changes in strategic ends states will affect our approach?
- Have I graphically depicted all relevant end state data as it relates to the problem and our approach via diagram, sketch, or overlay with a narrative?

(e) Center of Gravity/Decisive Point Analysis.

- What are the center's of gravity and why?
- What are the Decisive Points and why?
- Have I prioritized COGs and Decisive Points?
- How will the conditions change when a COG is eliminated? Threat COAs?
- When was the last time we reframed the situation?
- Have I maximized the resources available to identify centers of gravity and decisive points?
- What are our centers of gravity?
- How are our centers of gravity and decisive points different from SHs?
- Have I graphically depicted all relevant end state data as it relates to the problem and our approach via diagram, sketch, or overlay with a narrative?

2. Developing the SOF Operational Approach.

(a) Nesting of End States.

- How do our end states nest with those of other SHs?
- Have we capitalized on mutually supportive end states to strengthen relationships and facilitate collaboration?
- Are nested end states defining and driving the establishment of a SOF/CF/JIIM/SH approach?
- Have I graphically depicted all relevant data as it relates to the problem and our approach via diagram, sketch, or overlay with a narrative?

(b) Center of Gravity/Decisive Point Analysis.

- How has SH development informed the center of gravity and decisive point analysis?
- Have we identified and deconflicted resources and capabilities to affect necessary changes accordingly?

- Have we considered second and third order affects of our inputs and activity in the system?

(c) Operational Time.

- How is time affecting the approach?
- What affects the various interpretations of time in this situation?
- Have we considered operational and cultural interpretations of time?
- How would we rate our responsiveness to operational time – our ability to adapt and adjust to changing conditions?
- Am I effectively managing operational time available?
- Have I graphically depicted time relevant data as it relates to the problem and our approach via diagram, sketch, or overlay with a narrative?

(d) Collaboration Model.

- Have I identified all the Stakeholders (SH)?
- Have I identified SH capabilities?
- Who represents the collective group - who has the authority to speak? "Figurehead"
- Have I established a SOF/CF/JIIM/SH approach?
- Have I identified SH competing and complementary interests?
- Have I identified methods to share information and facilitate communication/collaboration? Have I resolved considerations of clearance level and organizational culture?
- Have I graphically depicted SH relevant data as it related to the problem and our collaboration via diagram, sketch, or overlay with a narrative?

3. Implementing the SOF Operational Art.

(a) General.

- Have I cross-referenced considerations related to the following elements:
operational time
the collaboration model
the SOF/CF/JIIM/SH approach?
- Have I provided a narrative that explains these interrelated elements and how they might inform the Commanders' application of Operational Art?
- Do I understand the SH capabilities and limitations?
- Can I anticipate the Commander's direction and preferred approach?
- Have I established necessary rapport and demonstrated the competence to adequately advise the Commander?

(b) Nested End States.

- Can I explain how conceptual planning and detailed planning are interrelated and validate the operational approach selected?
- How do the problem characterization, nested end states, and SH capabilities influence the approach?

- Can I explain the transition between conceptual and detailed planning?
- Have we identified and mitigated risks associated with the initiation of the approach?
- Can I explain contingency plans for the required adaptation of approach?
- Can I explain the doctrinal foundation or justification of the approach and the unique capabilities it requires?
- Can I explain the components that make this a SOF-centered approach and how tactical capabilities are tied to regional and national strategies?
- Have I conducted the proper checks to validate the plan and actions prior to execution?

4. Planning and Executing SOF Campaigns.

(a) Objectives LOO/LOE.

- Have I identified specific objectives and aligned them with desired environmental conditions they are aimed to achieve?
- Have I synchronized and deconflicted objectives?
- Do the lines of effort facilitate feedback and assessment in a way that effectively informs the reframing process and provides useful information?
- Have I graphically depicted objectives and lines of effort as they relate to the larger campaign via diagram, sketch, or overlay with narrative?

(b) Culmination.

- Have I clearly defined culmination criteria and the various elements (friendly, neutral, hostile, environmental) that can potentially influence culmination?
- How will conditions change with culmination? Threat COAs?
- Have I allowed for the early detection of culmination criteria that enables the implementation of preventative measures?
- Have I identified contingency plans, to include the resources and assets of SHs?
- Have I prioritized indicators and corresponding responses?

(c) Termination Criteria.

- Have I clearly defined termination criteria and the various elements (friendly, neutral, hostile, environmental) that can potentially influence, accelerate or delay termination?
- Are the conditions that need to be met prior to termination clearly understood and easy to identify?
- What are the anticipated changes in environment upon termination?
- What are the follow-on objectives, if any?
- Have I established a method to determine progress towards and proximity to termination criteria?

APPENDIX C - PLANNERS TOOL KIT

The following are a list of analytical tools, information sharing techniques, and techniques for checking ones logic that the planner or planning team may find useful. All of these tools have been developed to assist individuals with solving complex problems while mitigating group think and incorporating the information and knowledge of the entire group into the effort of creating a plan. Just like in a tool kit for a carpenter no one tool solves all the planner's issues or is the best tool to use for every job.

Structured Analytical Tools

- 9 Step Cultural Methodology
- TRIZ
- Stakeholder Mapping techniques
- Divergence - Convergence
- Outside-In Thinking

Diagnostic Tools

- Pre-mortem Analysis
- ADSO "String of Pearls" Assumption Analysis
- Quality of Information Check
- Analysis of Competing Hypothesis (ACH)

Information Sharing / Groupthink Mitigation Tools

- Weighted Anonymous Feedback
- Dot Voting
- Circle of Voices
- Group think Mitigation Tips

Structured Analytical Tools

9 Step Cultural Methodology

This is an analytic tool to promote better understanding of a foreign culture. By understanding others better, we may be better able to engage a foreign culture.

When to Use

This is a basic tool and should be used at the start of the decision making process in order to best ensure that alternative perspectives and information is available during both the design and mission analysis steps of the process.

Value Added

Thorough use of the cultural analytical methodology will ensure an enhanced and more nuanced decision as the methodology presents information to the commander through the lens of the four ways of seeing. Wise use of the four ways of seeing step in the method will present a commander with an initial first look at his mission and associated tasks through the eyes of the range of potential adversaries in a region as well as the people of the region.

The Method

Steps 1 & 9 are analytical. Steps 2-8 are collection focused. Step 9 must occur last and step 1 must occur first, but thereafter each situation may present information or opportunities in such a way as to alter your sequence.




Figure C-1: Assess a Culture

Step 1 – Establish a base line of understanding by examining the four ways of seeing.

- **How X views itself.** This must be the first step of any cross cultural analysis. *What are our fundamental beliefs about our motives, our values, and ourselves?*
- **How Y views itself.** The next critical step is to identify what our “object believes about itself”. People must be careful not to allow personal judgment to color this analysis. If for instance, they believe they are God’s chosen group - whether we believe “they are”, or not, is not germane at this time.
- **How X views Y.** The next step is to address ‘how we view them’ as well as identify disconnects between ‘how we view them’ and ‘how they view themselves’ – these are the critical friction points that cultural analysis and planning must address. Our treatment of the object group must be consistent and ‘fair’ based on how they view themselves vice how we view them.
- **How Y views X.** In turn, we need to understand how they view us vice how we view our actions and ourselves. We must direct our info campaign at closing the gap between their perception of us and how we want to be viewed.

Step 9 – Conduct a cognitive analysis. In what ways does the collected data (steps 2-8) shape how ‘they’ think?

Several factors underpin the development of culture. They include:

- Geography – desert dwellers think differently about the world than forest dwellers.
- History – historically invaded or isolated, ruled by heredity or ruled by law.

- Religion – belief system of our opponent, key sites, organization of society, interpersonal relationships between our forces and the population.
- Significant emotional events in the life of the country – coups, assassinations, contact with other cultures.
- Economics – agrarian, nomadic, industrial.

Step 2 – What defines the Social System?

a. Roles of family and tribe.

b. Roles in ascribing status: *region, education, religion, etc.*

c. Is status acquired through birth or achieved through action (social mobility)?

- What are the common child rearing practices, and how do they differ by gender and class?
- From which side of the family does descent originate?
- What is the nature of marriage in society: who decides, what are the power relationships internal/external to the married unit, monogamy, or polygamy?
- Is there a nuclear family or extended family units?
- What is the social contract in each state? What do the citizens expect the state to provide and in return for what? Is this contract intact?
- Is the society pluralistic, synergetic, or assimilatory?

Step 3 – What are the sources of power? For example: charisma, violence, legal basis, etc.

- Do the powerful live ‘for’ or ‘off’ politics?
- What is the role of patronage, what characterizes a patron?
- Are politics used for religious purposes or religion used for political purposes?
- What are the key institutions in the social structure, how did the leaders of those institutions acquire their role?
- How do state bureaucracies relate to other elements of the social structure – tribe, religion ethnicity?

Step 4 – What are the critical narratives of the cultural history?

- What do people believe about themselves and where they came from?
- What are the stories taught in school?
- What are the key myths associated with social control?
- What are the societies’ origin myths?
- What role did colonialism play?
- How does strength of nationhood and citizenship relate to a core concept?

Step 5 – What is the role of the formal and informal economy?

- Is what would be termed bribery and corruption in the West endemic? If so, what do locals consider corrupt?
- Do the elites own wealth, or own power that in turn accumulates wealth?
- How is the economy fundamentally different or similar to our own?
 - Who pays what for individual health care?
 - What is the nature of home ownership? Elderly care? Investments?
- What kind of goods and services are found in the informal economy? How big is the informal economy vice the formal economy? If it is large – why?

Step 6 – What Cultural forms and Semiotics are endemic to the society?

- What do they celebrate, what are the symbols associated with those celebrations, how does this reflect a different perspective than the West (rituals, ceremonies, etc)? Any rites of passage, degradation, enhancement, renewal, conflict reduction, or integration?
- How do they sanction societal members? What is the role of criticism/alienation?
- Who are the heroes –what stories are told about them, what traits emphasized?
- What is the role of emotional outburst – restrained, accepted, gender specific?

Step 7 – What sociolinguistics are evident?

- What is the nature of routine greetings and farewells?
- What are the concepts that translate only with difficulty – identify and attempt to understand them
- What US concepts present difficulty to linguists attempting to translate into the native language – indicates that the underlying logic of the concept may be foreign as well.
- What is the role of exaggeration and overstatement?

Step 8 – What are their core emotional beliefs?

- For what reasons would people in the society kill someone?
 - On behalf of the state?
 - To restore personal or family honor?
 - As appropriate vengeance? (Rule of law – rape, murder, incest, etc)
- To what degree do they value human life?¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ Red Team Handbook April 2012, University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, pages 140-145.

TRIZ

Triz is a problem-solving, analysis and forecasting tool derived from the study of patterns of invention. It was developed by the Soviet inventor and science fiction author Genrich Altshuller and his colleagues in the 1940s. In English it is typically translated as “the Theory of Inventive Problem Solving.” It is sometimes used in Six Sigma processes, in project management and risk management systems, and in organizational innovation initiatives. The full TRIZ process includes many problem-solving strategies. As a Liberating Structure, we only use one piece of the TRIZ approach.

Think about a difficult and complex problem you need to solve. Describe as many of the key elements of the result you want as you can. Be as specific as possible.

Next, design a comprehensive system that makes it absolutely impossible to get that result. What policies, practices, and ways of operating would make it 100% certain there is no way any of the things you want can happen.

Does the system you’ve designed have anything in common with the current state of affairs?

What would it take to eliminate similarities between the current system and the adverse system you designed?¹¹⁷

TRIZ is a process that emerged from engineering. You can find out more about it at

<http://www.triz.co.uk>.

Stakeholder Mapping & Analysis


Stakeholder mapping is a diagnostic tool for use in analysis, influence, negotiation, and decision support.

Step 1: Identify Stakeholders

Stakeholders can be:

- Internal or external
- Senior or subordinate, or horizontal levels
- Strategic, Operational, or Tactical
- Individual, organization, or entity

¹¹⁷ Red Team and Army Logistics University Handbook August 2014, Army Logistics University, page 13

Step 2: Identify Stakeholder Black/White/Grey Affiliation (reference Fig C-2)**Figure C-2: Stakeholder Ways of Seeing****Step 3: Analyze Grey Stakeholder Four Ways of Seeing**

Thorough research should be conducted to complete the analysis of these perceptions as it is more complex than the simple model implies, for several reasons:

- Seldom, if ever, will there be only two actors in the system under study.
- All the actors' perceptions and inter-relationships within the system must be considered in order to provide context for the analysis.
- How each actor perceives and defines the organizational or Operational Environment, strategic goals, and plans must be considered.
- It must be realized that actors and organizations may hold perceptions, both accurate and inaccurate.
- Perceptions of the external audience(s) to whom we and our allies are playing cannot be discounted.

Step 4: Analyze Stakeholders Lines of Effort (LOE) Interests.

- After a thorough assessment of the Stakeholder, the Red Team defines the Stakeholder's LOEs. Begin with the "fence sitters."
- Determine what the Stakeholder's Desired effect is within each LOE.
- Next, the Stakeholder's desired effect in the Lines of Effort (LOE) is assessed within the Commander's LOOs.





Figure C-3: Stakeholder Lines of Effort

Step 5: Red Team Analysis:

Organizational Mind Mapping. There is no one way to conduct Red Team analysis. Mind Mapping may be useful in organizational analysis: after identification of stakeholders, categorization is required. This is done by using a whiteboard or flip chart.



The arrows are representative of potential links between the stakeholders, e.g. command relationships, habitual collaboration, common interests, etc.

Step 6: Another method for Analysis

Once stakeholder interests have been mapped, they must be prioritized. A common approach is to map the interest and influence of each stakeholder group based on a chart like this one:




Figure C-4: Stakeholder Interest

Once the stakeholders have been mapped, focus of effort can be placed on the highest priority groups while providing sufficient information to keep the less influential groups happy.¹¹⁸

Divergence - Convergence

This is the single most important Liberating structure. It is based on the idea that before tackling an issue, we must think first, write down our thoughts, and then share them in a disciplined fashion.

Most frequently this is done by going around the room and taking one idea from each member of the group. You cannot share more than one as to give others a chance to contribute. If someone else offers something on your list, then scratch it out and offer something not yet raised. This goes on until all lists are exhausted.¹¹⁹

Outside-In Thinking

¹¹⁸ Red Team and Army Logistics University Handbook August 2014, Army Logistics University, pages 19-22.

¹¹⁹ Red Team and Army Logistics University Handbook August 2014, Army Logistics University, page 18

Used to identify the full range of basic forces, factors, and trends that would indirectly shape an issue.

When to Use

At the conceptualization of an analytic project, when the goal is to identify all the critical, external factors that could influence how a particular situation will develop. It would work well for a group of analysts responsible for a range of functional and/or regional issues. When assembling a large database that must identify a number of information categories or database fields, this technique can aid in visualizing the entire set of categories that might be needed in a research effort. Often analysts realize only too late that

some additional information categories will be needed and then must go back and review all previous files and recode the data. With a modest amount of effort, “Outside-in Thinking” can reduce the risk of missing important variables early in the analytic process.

Value Added

Most analysts spend their time concentrating on familiar factors within their field or analytic issue. That is, they think from the “inside”—namely, what they control—out to the broader world. Conversely, “thinking from the outside-in” begins by considering the external changes that might, over time, profoundly affect the analysts’ own field or issue. This technique encourages analysts to get away from their immediate analytic tasks (the so-called “inbox”) and think about their issues in a wider conceptual and contextual framework. By recasting the problem in much broader and fundamental terms, analysts are more likely to uncover additional factors, an important dynamic, or a relevant alternative hypothesis.

The Method

Develop a generic description of the problem or the phenomenon under study. Then:

- List all the key forces (social, technological, economic, environmental, and political) that could have an impact on the topic, but over which one can exert little influence (e.g., globalization, social stress, the Internet, or the global economy).
- Focus next on key factors over which an actor or policymaker can exert some influence. In the business world this might be the market size, customers, the competition, suppliers or partners; in the government domain it might include the policy actions or the behavior of allies or adversaries.
- Assess how each of these forces could affect the analytic problem.
- Determine whether these forces actually do have an impact on the particular issue based on the available evidence.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ Red Team Handbook April 2012, University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, pages 198 -199.

Diagnostic Tools

Pre-mortem Analysis

Dr. Gary Klein developed the concept of the pre-mortem analysis. This is a powerful analytical tool as it is 1] simple to use, 2] simple to understand, 3] and when used during the decision-making process will empower the members of the larger plans team to question the premise of a proposed course of action, assumptions, or specified tasks.

When to Use

The ideal time to use a pre-mortem analysis is just before the war gaming step in the decision making process, either the war game that analyzes proposed COAs or the war game that refines the selected COA into the concept of the operation.

Value Added

The use of a pre-mortem analysis will break the ownership of a particular course of action by a thorough, if rapid, session of answering the question, what would cause this course of action to fail if it is the basis for the operations plan?

The Method

Pre-mortem analysis is an application of mental simulation. The premise for pre-mortem analysis is that people may feel too confident once they have arrived at a plan, especially if they are not highly experienced. The pre-mortem analysis requires one person to act as the scribe and must be limited in duration to no more than 30 minutes, ideally 20.

Step 1 – Preparation.

Team members should already be familiar with the plan.

Step 2 – Imagine a fiasco.

Imagine that the plan has failed, and is a total, embarrassing failure. Ask; what could have caused this?

Step 3 – Generate the reasons for failure.

Team members individually spend several minutes writing down all of the possible reasons why the plan could have failed catastrophically. It is important to do this individually first, so that the intuition and experience of each Team member is brought to bear. Otherwise, the group may overlook some of the good ideas.

Step 4 – Consolidate the lists.

Once all Team members developed reasons for failure, go around the room and discuss them, one at a time, and record all ideas. By the end of this step, the group should have a comprehensive list of concerns with the plan.

Step 5 – Revisit the plan.

Based on the comprehensive list of concerns, revisit the plan to determine what to mitigate. Develop concepts for potential branch plans, for instance.

Step 6 – Periodically review the list.

Do this for the duration of the planning process and during execution. This helps keep the possibility of different types of failure fresh in everyone's mind. That is all. The object of the exercise is to explain why the plan would fail. There must be a recorder for the session.¹²¹

Gary Klein, *Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions*, Cambridge, Mass. The MIT Press, 1998, p3.

ADSO “String of Pearls” Analysis Tool

The Army Directed Studies Office developed the string of pearls concept as a technique of linking a rigorous analysis of assumptions. If assumptions fail to become fact, they affect the specified tasks articulated within the plan. This is a time consuming analysis best suited for the product of a structured planning process. If time constrained, the team can use it to focus on the basis of assumptions. Use of the tool helps provide a sensitivity analysis on a friendly plan or order. A sensitivity analysis may show how vulnerable the plan is to faulty assumptions during planning; dependencies that are not in place before plan execution; or unmitigated, potential 2nd and 3rd order effects. The concept analysis may help identify a critical vulnerability or vulnerabilities in the plan. This allows the planners to reinforce or mitigate these critical vulnerabilities. At a minimum, it informs the commander that there is a risk associated with a particular area in the plan.

There are an infinite number of 2nd and 3rd order effects for any action. This technique will help identify those that are most likely to occur and most likely to generate effects which may need to be mitigated by planning branches to the plan. This analysis of the plan can stand alone or be used in a comparison with an emulative analysis of an enemy plan in order to see where differing strategies match up. The staff may identify an enemy strategy that is “unanswered” by a friendly course of action.

When to Use

String of Pearls is a time consuming process. It is best used when the team is asked to do an independent assessment of an existing plan. Teams can also use the method in a focused manner for analyzing and challenging assumptions associated with a plan, as well as showing the effect of a failed assumption on the entire plan.

Value Added

The methodology is a rigorous process of analyzing assumptions. The methodology will:

- help prevent “assuming away the problem”
- identify weaknesses in a plan
- highlight the need for focused branch plans.

The Method

There are four basic steps to conducting a concept analysis.

Step one is to identify all the major tasks in the plan.

Step two is to take each task that you’ve identified and identify three elements of each task:

¹²¹ Red Team Handbook April 2012, University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, pages 163-165.

- Identify challengeable stated and implied assumptions for each task
- Identify key dependencies for each task
- Identify possible 2nd and 3rd orders of effects for each task

Step three is to depict how the combined assumptions, key dependencies, and possible 2nd and 3rd orders of effects for each task accumulate across the entire plan.

Step four is to analyze how the cumulative effect you have depicted above might indicate any gaps or weaknesses in the plan.¹²²

Quality of Information Check

Evaluates completeness and soundness of available information sources.

When to Use

Weighing the validity of sources is a key feature of any critical thinking. Moreover, establishing how much confidence one puts in analytic judgments should ultimately rest on how accurate and reliable the information base is. Hence, checking the quality of information used in intelligence analysis is an ongoing, continuous process. Having multiple sources on an issue is not a substitute for having good information that has been thoroughly examined. Analysts should perform periodic checks of the information base for their analytic judgments. Otherwise, important analytic judgments can become anchored to weak information, and any “caveats” attached to those judgments in the past can be forgotten or ignored over time.

Value Added

A thorough review of information sources provides analysts with an accurate assessment of “what we know” and “what we do not know.” It is also an opportunity to confirm that sources have been cited accurately. In the case of HUMINT, this will require extensive review of the sources’ background information and access as well as his or her motivation for providing the information. Similarly, reviewing technical sourcing can sometimes reveal inadvertent errors in processing, translation, or interpretation that otherwise might have gone unnoticed. In addition, a quality of information check can be valuable to both collectors and policymakers:

- It can help to detect possible deception and denial strategies by an adversary.
- It can identify key intelligence gaps and new requirements for collectors.
- It can assist policymakers in understanding how much confidence analysts are placing on analytic judgments.

The Method

An analyst or a team might begin a quality of information check by developing a database in which information is stored according to source type and date, with additional notations indicating strengths or weaknesses in those sources. Ideally, analysts would have retrieval and search capability on the database, so that periodic reviews are less labor intensive and result in a more complete review of all sources used in past analysis. For the information review to be fully effective, analysts will need as much background information on sources as is feasible. Knowing

¹²² Red Team Handbook April 2012, University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, pages 165-167.

the circumstances in which reporting was obtained is often critical to understanding its validity. With the data in hand, analysts can then:

- Review systematically all sources for accuracy.
- Identify information sources that appear most critical or compelling.
- Check for sufficient and strong corroboration of critical reporting.
- Reexamine previously dismissed information in light of new facts or circumstances that cast it in a different light.
- Ensure that any recalled reporting is identified and properly flagged for other analysts; analysis based on recalled reporting should also be reviewed to determine if the reporting was essential to the judgments made.
- Consider whether ambiguous information has been interpreted and caveated properly.
- Indicate a level of confidence that analysts can place in sources, which are likely to figure in future analytic assessments.¹²³

Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH)

Identification of alternative explanations (hypotheses) and evaluation of all evidence that will disconfirm rather than confirm hypotheses.

When to Use

A highly effective technique when there is a large amount of data to absorb and evaluate. While a single analyst can use ACH, it is most effective with a small team that can challenge each other's evaluation of the evidence. Developing a matrix of hypotheses and loading already collected information into the matrix can be accomplished in a day or less. If the data must be reassembled, the initial phases of the ACH process may require additional time. Sometimes a facilitator or someone familiar with the technique can lead new analysts through this process for the first time. ACH is particularly appropriate for controversial issues when analysts want to develop a clear record that shows what theories they have considered and how they arrived at their judgments. Developing the ACH matrix allows other analysts (or even policymakers) to review their analysis and identify areas of agreement and disagreement. Evidence can also be examined more systematically, and analysts have found that this makes the technique ideal for considering the possibility of deception and denial.

Value Added

ACH helps analysts overcome three common mistakes that can lead to inaccurate forecasts:

- Analysts often are susceptible to being unduly influenced by a first impression, based on incomplete data, an existing analytic line, or a single explanation that seems to fit well enough.
- Analysts seldom generate a full set of explanations or hypotheses at the outset of a project.
- Analysts often rely on evidence to support their preferred hypothesis, but which also is consistent with other explanations. In essence, ACH helps analysts to avoid picking the

¹²³ Red Team Handbook April 2012, University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, pages 178-180.

first solution that seems satisfactory instead of going through all the possibilities to arrive at the very best solution.

The Method

Explicitly identify all the reasonable alternative hypotheses, then array the evidence against each hypothesis—rather than evaluating the plausibility of each hypothesis one at a time. To create a level playing field, the process must:

- Ensure that all the information and argumentation is evaluated and given equal treatment or weight when considering each hypothesis.
- Prevent the analyst from premature closure on a particular explanation or hypothesis.
- Protect the analyst against innate tendencies to ignore or discount
- Information that does not fit comfortably with the preferred explanation at the time.
- To accomplish this, the process should follow these steps:
- Brainstorm among analysts with different perspectives to identify all possible hypotheses.
- List all significant evidence and arguments relevant to all the hypotheses.
- Prepare a matrix with hypotheses across the top and each piece of evidence on the side. Determine whether each piece of evidence is consistent, inconsistent, or not applicable to each hypothesis.
- Refine the matrix and reconsider the hypotheses—in some cases, analysts will need to add new hypotheses and re-examine the information available.
- Focus on disproving hypotheses rather than proving one. Tally the pieces of evidence that are inconsistent and consistent with each hypothesis to see which explanations are the weakest and strongest.
- Analyze how sensitive the ACH results are to a few critical items of evidence; should those pieces prove to be wrong, misleading, or subject to deception, how would it impact an explanation's validity?
- Ask what evidence is not being seen but would be expected for a given hypothesis to be true. Is denial and deception a possibility?
- Report all the conclusions, including the weaker hypotheses that should still be monitored as new information becomes available.
- Establish the relative likelihood for the hypotheses and report all the conclusions, including the weaker hypotheses that should still be monitored as new information becomes available.
- Identify and monitor indicators that would be both consistent and inconsistent with the full set of hypotheses. In the latter case, explore what could account for inconsistent data.¹²⁴

¹²⁴ Red Team Handbook April 2012, University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, pages 184-186.

Information Sharing / Groupthink Mitigation Tools

Weighted Anonymous Feedback

When to use:

This is a method to tap into the wisdom of the crowd. This is not recommended to make a decision. It is a way to get feedback you might not otherwise get from your staff.

Value Added:

Allows for ideas to come from all members of a group without the bias of knowing who the ideas are presented by in addition members create initial buy in by having to defend or sell another members ideas.

The Method:

Distribute file cards to everyone. Pose a question: E.g., What is the single greatest obstacle to implementation of plan/concept/policy X?

Ask the participants to think about it and write their best idea as clearly and in as few words as possible on the card – a bullet, not an explanation.

When everyone has completed their card, invite the participants to stand up, mill around, and pass the card to someone new. Repeat the process until told to stop, then each participant reads the card they hold to one another in a way that might “sell” them on the idea. Trade cards. On the back, rate the idea you were just “sold” from 1 to 5; 5 is brilliant, 1, not so much. Once you grade the card, repeat the process. No one should grade their own card. Emphasize the participants must read the reply without turning the card over and viewing previous scores so they are not influenced. Repeat the process five times, in five rounds. By round five, each card should have five ratings on the back of the card. Add them up. Ask “Does anyone have a card with a score of 25...24...23...until you get a “yes.” Ask that person to read the card aloud and record the reply on a piece of butcher paper. Continue with the countdown until you get at least the top five replies.¹²⁵

Dot Voting

When to use:

Frequently planning teams must prioritize their efforts as there is simply not enough time to address all legitimate issues. Dot voting is a method designed to anonymously collect the groups’ perspective on what the most urgent issues are that need to be addressed.

The Method:

- Identify the largest possible universe of issues using divergent thinking and collect them in a macro list
- Group the input in the broadest possible way so that no two topics remaining on the list overlap with each other - i.e each topic is distinguishable from each other

¹²⁵ Red Team and Army Logistics University Handbook August 2014, Army Logistics University, page 11.

- Number the remaining distinguishable issues (for the sake of this illustration let's assume there are 12 different and legitimate issues worthy of the groups energy and attention)
- Each member writes a list of the numbers 1-12 in a column on a 3x 5 card
- Each member then 'dot votes' 7 times (place a dot next to the number of the topic that s/he wants to vote for. All 7 votes can be given to a single topic, 7 topics one vote each, or divided 3 and 4, 1 and 6, 2 and 5, etc.
- Collect the 5x8 cards and total the number of votes for each idea or issue

The value Added:

- forces each person to prioritize by having a little more than 50% votes of the total number of issues (7 of 12) but also gives them the opportunity to vote for more than one compelling issue
- gives some indication of the weight of each idea with respect to each other (a group score of 40 is significantly higher than a group score of 20 even though 20 may be the second highest score). This can be used to develop what the weighted/ priority factors for a COA should be

Note - for this to work properly it is absolutely critical that ideas don't compete against each other during dot voting so creating distinguishable issues is a key part of the process.¹²⁶

Circle of Voices

When to use:

Circle of Voices is a simple facilitation practice designed to equalize participation and teach students that listening, appreciating, and synthesizing are just as crucial to good discussion as is making brilliant original contributions.

The Method:

Participants form small groups of five to six seated in a circle. They are given a minute or so in silence to think about what they have to say about an assigned topic. The discussion opens with one person having a period of uninterrupted “airtime” of no more than one minute. During this time the speaker may say whatever they wish about the topic at hand. While the person is speaking no interruptions are allowed. People take their turn to speak by going around the circle in order. This eliminates the stress of other participants having to decide when or whether to jump in, or for the speaker to worry about interruption before they can finish their thoughts.

After the initial “circle of voices” is complete, discussion opens for anyone to speak. The only restriction on this period of discussion is that participants are only allowed to discuss other person’s ideas that have already been expressed. Participants may not expand on their own ideas, only about their reaction to something already said. This prevents a tendency toward “grandstanding.”

¹²⁶ Red Team and Army Logistics University Handbook August 2014, Army Logistics University, page 15.

Facilitation principles:

- Pre-commitment
- Everyone speaks once before anyone speaks twice.
- Active listening.
- Respectful engagement.¹²⁷

Group Think Mitigation Tips

- The leader should refrain from stating up front any preferences or expectations.
- Establish an *expectation of conflict* in deliberation—but focused on the issues, not between personalities. Conflict can foster creativity and learning.
- Prior to beginning, have all individual “pre-commit” by writing down their initial answers to the issue being discussed—this helps establish ideas prior to deliberation and mitigate a pull toward conformity. Demand several options from each member.
- Each member of a decision-making group should have the *responsibility* to air objections and doubts, and be reinforced by the leader’s acceptance of criticism from the group at large.
- *Leverage anonymity of ideas and responses* where possible.
- The group should consciously construct alternative perspectives of the situation. Alternative perspectives force the group to form options in the case they occur.
- The group should set up several independent sub-groups to work on the same issues. *Seek diversity in assembling these groups.*
- The group should assign individuals to act as a devil’s advocate vis-à-vis options, policies, etc., that the group is assembling.
- The group’s individuals should seek outside expertise and input on the question(s) at hand.
- The group should bring in expertise to challenge the views being developed by the group itself.
- Once the group has reached a conclusion on the best option, a “second chance” meeting should be held at which every member restates any and all reservations he/she may have concerning the chosen option.¹²⁸

From Janis, Irving, *Groupthink*, pages 262-271; and Russo, J. Edward and Schoemaker, Paul J.H., *Winning Decisions: Getting It Right The First Time*, Chapter 7.

¹²⁷ Red Team and Army Logistics University Handbook August 2014, Army Logistics University, page 8.

¹²⁸ Red Team and Army Logistics University Handbook August 2014, Army Logistics University, page 6.

APPENDIX D AUTHORITIES AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS REFERENCES

Reference: FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, 22 Jan 2013 (INCL CHANGE 1), Chapter 2 Legal Considerations.

Significance: This appendix is relevant to SOF commanders and staff because, legal aspects of security cooperation and the human domain must be taken in account when designing SOF campaigns, major operations, and engagements.

Legal Considerations

This appendix first discusses the general legal foundation and authorities for security cooperation. It then discusses host-country law and status-of-forces agreements. Finally, it presents legal constraints commanders need to consider when conducting security cooperation activities.

GENERAL LEGAL FOUNDATION FOR MILITARY ACTIONS

2-1. Law and policy govern the actions of U.S. forces in all military operations, including security cooperation. For U.S. forces to conduct operations, a legal basis must exist. This legal basis profoundly influences many aspects of an operation. It affects the rules of engagement (ROE), how U.S. forces organize and train foreign forces, the authority to spend funds to benefit the host nation, and the authority of U.S. forces to detain and interrogate. Under the Constitution of the United States, the President is the Commander in Chief of U.S. forces. Therefore, orders issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense to a combatant commander provide the starting point in determining the legal basis. Laws are legislation passed by Congress and signed into law by the President and treaties to which the United States is party. Policies are executive orders, departmental directives and regulations, and other authoritative statements issued by government officials. Following is a summary of key laws and policies that bear upon U.S. military operations in support of security cooperation. This summary does not replace a consultation with the unit's supporting staff judge advocate.

LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR SECURITY COOPERATION

2-2. U.S. forces participate in security cooperation according to a number of legal authorities, most of which are codified in Titles 10 and 22, United States Code (USC) and in provisions of the annual National Defense Authorization Acts. All security cooperation activities must be conducted according to and comply with these authorities, and the chief of mission must approve all security cooperation activities conducted in a foreign country.

2-3. Title 10, USC, authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of humanitarian and civic assistance in coordination with the U.S. ambassador to the host nation. In such situations, U.S. forces may be granted status as administrative and technical personnel based on a formal agreement or an exchange of diplomatic letters with the host nation. This cooperation and assistance is limited to liaison, contacts, training, equipping, and providing defense articles and services. It does not include direct involvement in operations. Assistance provided to police by U.S. forces is permitted but, generally, Department of Defense (DOD) does not serve as the lead government department. Without receiving a deployment or execution order from the President or Secretary of Defense, U.S. forces may be authorized to make only limited contributions during operations that involve security assistance.

HOST-COUNTRY LAW AND STATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENTS

2-4. After considering the type of baseline protections represented by fundamental human rights law, the military leader must be advised in regard to the other bodies of law that leader should integrate into planning and execution. This includes consideration of host-nation law. Because of the nature of most international missions not involving armed conflict, commanders and staffs must understand the technical and pragmatic significance of host-nation law within the area of operations.

2-5. Status-of-forces agreements and other forms of agreements frequently exist. They are essentially contractual agreements or treaties between two or more nations that establish the legal status of military personnel in foreign countries. Topics usually covered in a status-of-forces agreement include criminal and civil jurisdiction, taxation, and claims for damages and injuries. In the absence of an agreement or some other arrangement with the host country, DOD personnel in foreign countries may be subject to the host country's laws. Commanders ensure that all personnel understand the status of U.S. forces in the area of operations and are trained accordingly.

LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON MISSIONS

2-6. U.S. law and regulation play a key role in establishing the parameters by which military forces may conduct missions. These parameters tend to constitute constraints on the activities of military units. They range from the ROE in combat situations to the authority to spend government funds in furtherance of a training or support mission.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

2-7. Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered (JP 1-04). Often these directives are specific to the operation. If there are no operation-specific ROE, U.S. forces apply standing rules of engagement. When operating with a multinational force, commanders must coordinate the ROE thoroughly and consider the laws of the host country.

2-8. ROE are a critically important aspect of military operations overseas. ROE contribute directly to mission accomplishment, enhance protection, and help ensure compliance with law and policy. While ROE are ultimately commanders' rules to regulate the use of force, judge advocate general personnel nonetheless remain involved in ROE drafting, dissemination, interpretation, and training. (See FM 1-04 for further discussion on ROE.)

AUTHORITY FOR SECURITY COOPERATION AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE

2-9. DOS has the primary responsibility, authority, and funding to conduct foreign assistance on behalf of the United States Government. Foreign assistance encompasses any and all assistance to a foreign nation, including security assistance (assistance to the internal police forces and military forces of the foreign nation), development assistance (assistance to the foreign government in projects that will assist the development of the foreign economy or their political institutions), and humanitarian assistance (direct assistance to the population of a foreign nation). The legal authority for DOS to conduct foreign assistance is found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-195).

2-10. All training and equipping of foreign security forces (FSF) must be specifically authorized. Military and civilian personnel, operations, and maintenance appropriations should typically provide only an incidental benefit to those security forces. All other weapons, training, equipment, logistic support, supplies, and services provided to foreign forces must be paid for with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. Examples include the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghan Security Forces Fund. Moreover, the President must give specific authority to DOD for its role in training and equipping FSF. For example, in 2004, the President signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36 (note—this publication is referenced strictly for historical context). This made the Commander of United States Central Command—under policy guidance from the chief of mission—responsible for coordinating U.S. government efforts to organize, train, and equip Iraqi Security Forces, including police. Absent such a directive, DOD lacks authority to take the lead in assisting a host nation to train and equip its security forces.

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2-11. Title 10, USC, funds may be appropriated to DOD by Congress and managed by combatant commands to conduct military-to-military exchanges and traditional commander’s activities. This does not provide the authorities for U.S. forces to train or equip partner nation militaries. These programs support cooperative military engagement, and fund material support for the following:

- Humanitarian and civic assistance projects
- Participation in exercises
- Traditional commander activities, such as conferences, seminars or military to military exchanges

2-12. Operations and maintenance funds are provided by the combatant command for support of the DOD or combatant command security cooperation programs other than security assistance in the country. These are DOD funds traditionally provided for the purpose of operating and maintaining U.S. forces such as salaries, exercises, training, operations, and overhead costs.

GENERAL PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO POLICE

2-13. Historically, DOD is not the lead government department for assisting foreign governments. DOS is the lead when U.S. forces provide security assistance—military training, equipment, and defense articles and services—to host-nation governments. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 specifically prohibits assistance to foreign police forces except within specific exceptions and under a Presidential directive.

When providing assistance to training, DOS provides the lead role in police assistance through its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The President, however, may delegate this role to other agencies, such as when NSPD 36 granted the Commander of United States Central Command authority to train and equip Iraqi police. (For more information on police assistance, see ATTP 3-39.10.)

AUTHORITY FOR TRAINING AND EQUIPPING FOREIGN FORCES

2-14. Title 22, USC, authorizes the transfer of defense articles and services (including training) by the United States Government to friendly foreign countries in furtherance of the security objectives of the United States and in consonance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. All training and equipping of FSF is specifically authorized. U.S. laws require Congress to authorize expenditures for training and equipping foreign forces. The laws of the United States also require the DOS to verify that the host nation receiving the assistance is not in violation of human rights. Usually, DOD involvement is limited to a precise level of man-hours and materiel requested from the DOS under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

2-15. Defense articles and services shall be furnished or sold solely for internal security; legitimate

self-defense; preventing or hindering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering such weapons; permitting the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements consistent with the Charter of the United Nations; or supporting economic and social development activities by foreign military forces in less developed countries. As such, all training and equipping of FSF must be specifically authorized. The President may authorize deployed U.S. forces to train or advise host-nation security forces as part of the mission in accordance with the provisions of the

War Powers Act and other U.S. law. Consultation with a staff judge advocate or legal advisor early in the mission planning process will help commanders ensure that any planned effort to train or and equip foreign forces are funded and executed in a manner consistent with the law.

AUTHORITY FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

2-16. Without receiving a deployment or execution order from the President or Secretary of Defense, U.S. forces may be authorized to make only limited contributions during operations that involve foreign internal defense. If the Secretary of State requests and the Secretary of Defense approves, U.S. forces can participate in foreign internal defense. The request and approval go through standing statutory authorities in Title 22, USC. Title 22 contains the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and other laws.

It authorizes security assistance, developmental assistance, and other forms of bilateral aid. The request and approval might also occur under various provisions in Title 10, USC.

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2-17. Title 10 authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of humanitarian and civic assistance in coordination with the U.S. ambassador to the host nation. In such situations, U.S. forces work as administrative and technical personnel as part of the U.S. diplomatic mission pursuant to a status-of-forces agreement or pursuant to an exchange of letters with the host nation.

This cooperation and assistance is limited to liaison, contacts, training, equipping, and providing defense articles and services. It does not include direct involvement in operations. Assistance to foreign police forces by U.S. forces is permitted but not with the DOD as the lead government department.

2-18. Foreign internal defense is a legislatively directed operation attributable to the Goldwater-Nichols

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433), Section 212, Initial Review of

Combatant Commands.

FUNDING CONSTRAINTS AND PROGRAMS

2-19. Commanders and staffs planning any security cooperation mission must consult a staff judge advocate. Security cooperation programs are governed by U.S. statute and require knowledge of the USC. With limited exceptions, DOD may not train FSF under Title 10. All training and equipping of FSF must be specifically authorized. DOD has limited ability to build the capacity of security forces not part of the ministry of defense. The primary laws of concern are the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and various sections of Titles 10 and 22, USC.

2-20. The Leahy Amendments prohibit the United States Government from providing funds to a unit of the security forces of a foreign country if DOS has credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. The provisions restrict funding until the Secretary of State determines and reports that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice. In the event the security forces include members suspected of human rights violations, the law restricts funding until the Secretary of State determines and reports that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.

2-21. Congress specifically appropriates funds for foreign assistance. U.S. funds used for weapons, training, equipment, logistic support, supplies, and services provided to foreign forces must be paid for with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) expends such funds under the legal authorities in Title 22. Provisions of Title 10 may also authorize amounts of money for these purposes. Standing funding authorities are narrowly defined and generally require advance coordination within DOD and DOS.

2-22. Effective foreign forces need training and equipment. U.S. laws require Congress to authorize such expenditures. U.S. laws also require DOS to verify that the host nation receiving the assistance is not in violation of human rights.

Key Security Cooperation Funding Programs

2-23. There are numerous funding sources and authorities for security cooperation. Programs funded under Title 10 that build partner capacity include but are not limited to—

- Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund.
- Joint combined exchange training.
- Humanitarian and civic assistance.
- The Developing Country Combined Exercise Program.
- Traditional commander activities.
- Multinational support funds.
- National Guard State Partnership Program.

- Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies.
- Senior Service colleges and professional military education.
- Military academy student exchanges.
- United States Army Sergeants Major Academy.

2-24. The Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund (known as CCIF) authorizes the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to provide select levels of funding to combatant commanders for combined exercises, select equipment, military education and training of foreign military and related defense civilians, and the personnel expenses of defense personnel for bilateral or regional cooperation programs.

2-25. The joint combined exchange training (known as JCET) program (Section 2010 of Title 10, USC) is conducted overseas to fulfill U.S. forces training requirements and at the same time exchange the sharing of skills between U.S. forces and host-nation counterparts. Joint combined exchange training includes the deployment by U.S. special operations forces with the dual purpose of training themselves and foreign counterparts. This funding can be used for the training of the foreign counterpart, expenses for the U.S. deployment, and, for developing countries, the incremental expenses incurred by the country for the training. Joint combined exchange training is carefully followed by Congress because of concerns about inadequate civilian oversight and fears that such training might benefit units or individuals who have committed human rights violations.

2-26. Humanitarian and civic assistance (known as HCA), during military operations, authorizes military forces to carry out humanitarian and civic assistance projects and activities in conjunction with military operations. The primary purpose of the program must be to train U.S. armed forces and it should complement other forms of social or economic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Section 401 of Title 10, USC, and funded under separate authorities.

2-27. The Developing Country Combined Exercise Program (known as DCCEP) (Section 2010 of Title 10,

USC) authorizes the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with DOS, to pay for incremental expenses by a developing country as a direct result of participation in combined exercises.

2-28. Traditional commander activities (known as TCA) are typically referred to as military-to-military contacts. Traditional commander activities authorize the combatant commander and theater army commander to conduct military-to-military contacts and comparable activities that encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of partner countries. In the course of this authorization, the geographic combatant command can designate traveling contact teams, military liaison teams, exchange of military and civilian personnel, seminars, and conferences within the geographic combatant command's area of responsibility (AOR). Funding for the traditional commander activities is provided by the Military Departments that serve as executive agents.

2-29. Multinational support funds are used to reimburse countries for logistical, military, and other expenses incurred while supporting U.S. operations.

2-30. The National Guard State Partnership Program (known as SPP) links states with partner countries for supporting the objectives and goals of the geographic combatant command and the U.S. ambassador. The state partnership program actively participates in training events, emergency management, environmental remediation exercises, fellowship-style internships, educational exchanges, and civic leader visits.

2-31. International military education and training programs support theater campaign plan objectives by—

- Fostering mutual understanding and relationships between forces.
- Familiarizing each force with the organization, administration, and operations of the other.
- Enhancing cultural awareness.

These programs may have long-term implications for strengthening democratic ideals and respect for human rights among supported governments. They help strengthen foreign defense establishments through U.S. military education with exposure to democratic values necessary for the functioning of a civilian controlled, apolitical, professional military. The desired strategic effect of these programs is to improve security cooperation and interoperability between the United States and other nations. Examples include programs conducted by DOD regional centers for security studies, senior Service colleges, and military academy student exchanges.

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2-32. Five DOD regional centers for security studies help communicate U.S. foreign and defense policies to international students. They provide a means for countries to give feedback and communicate their policies to the United States. The regional centers' activities include education, research, and outreach.

2-33. Senior Service colleges and professional military education include the United States Army War College and the United States Army Command and General Staff College. These institutions host senior and field grade foreign officers for academic study.

2-34. By international agreement, the military department secretaries each may authorize up to twenty-four students annually to participate in the reciprocal exchange of cadets to attend the appropriate military academies. The United States Army Sergeants Major Academy also host foreign cadets at each academy class.

2-35. Security assistance programs that build partner capacity, funded under Title 22, include but are not limited to—

- Foreign military financing program.
- Foreign military sales.
- International military education and training.
- Economic support fund.

- Peacekeeping operations.
- Excess defense articles.
- Drawdowns.

2-36. The foreign military financing program (known as FMFP) authorizes the President to furnish grant Non-reimbursable military assistance to friendly foreign countries or international organizations for the purchase of defense articles or services through either foreign military sales or direct commercial sales.

2-37. Foreign military sales (known as FMS) programs allow eligible foreign governments to purchase defense articles, services, and training from the United States Government, administered by Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

2-38. International military education and training authorizes the President to furnish military education and training on a reimbursable basis to military and civilian personnel of foreign countries. The education and training may be paid for with partner nation funds or U.S. grant assistance.

2-39. The Economic Support Fund (known as ESF) program advances U.S. interests by helping countries meet short- and long-term political, economic, and security needs. In other words, the primary function is to build the governance capacity of a foreign country.

2-40. Peacekeeping operations (known as PKO) authorize assistance to friendly countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, for peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in furtherance of the national security interests of the United States.

2-41. The excess defense articles (known as EDA) program authorizes the President to transfer certain defense articles designated as excess to U.S. government requirements to eligible countries on a grant basis.

This program was used during Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and Enduring Freedom. EDAs are sold in “as is, where is” condition.

2-42. Presidential drawdowns authorize the President to provide U.S. defense articles, services, and training (up to a specified threshold) to friendly foreign countries and international organizations at no cost during times of crisis. Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act authorizes the president to provide U.S. government articles, services, and training to friendly countries and international organizations at no cost, to include free transportation. This program was used during Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn and Enduring Freedom. Drawdowns are grants executed without a letter of acceptance.

Special Foreign Assistance Authorities

2-43. In addition to the aforementioned authorities, Congress has passed a number of special foreign assistance authorities through the National Defense Authorization Act that are not made permanent law within the USC, but rather are stand-alone authorities contained in annual authorization and appropriation

Legal Considerations

22 January 2013 FM 3-22 2-7 acts. These special authorities often contain “dual-key” or co-approval provisions that grant a certain foreign assistance authority to Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of Secretary of State (or in some cases, with the concurrence of the appropriate chief of mission). Examples include—

- Section 1206, also known as Global Train and Equip and Building Partner Capacity of Foreign
- Militaries.
- Global Security Contingency Fund.
- Special Operations Forces Support.
- Commander’s Emergency Response Program.

2-44. The Global Train and Equip and Building Partner Capacity of Foreign Militaries was initially authorized by National Defense Authorization Act, FY (fiscal year) 2006, Section 1206. Section 1206 authorized the Secretary of Defense (with the concurrence of the Secretary of State) to build the capacity of a foreign country’s national military forces. The purposes are for that country to conduct counterterrorism operations or participate in or support military and stability operations in which U.S. forces are participating. It is also to build the capacity of a foreign country’s maritime security forces to conduct counterterrorism operations.

2-45. Global Security Contingency Fund (known as GSCF) is a pilot program that will operate for three years (starting in fiscal year 2012) to deliver security sector assistance to contingency countries through a process jointly managed by DOS and DOD. The Fund will explore how to approach building a security sector from a holistic perspective. It will approach the entire system rather than using specific authorities to target separately the system’s components. It will be applied in cases where emergent challenges or opportunities arise that cannot be adequately met through existing resources. This approach will take immense coordination and cooperation, primarily between DOS, USAID, and DOD. Coordination and cooperation also must include other U.S. government agencies, combatant commands, and country teams, as well as other contributing nations and multilateral organizations. As a pilot, the program will focus on national-level priorities to prove the concept of a pooled fund and to develop the new business practices that reflect the principles of joint formulation and shared responsibility. The Fund will be available to the combatant command and country teams to develop and deliver security sector assistance in a coordinated fashion. The Fund will focus on national-level priorities and draw on expertise at agencies, combatant commands, and country teams to develop comprehensive plans that span military, security, and justice sectors.

2-46. Special operations forces support, originally Section 1208, is often referred to as “Section 1208 funds.” This authorization is the special operations forces equivalent of “Section 1206.” Its purpose is to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing operations by United States special operations forces to combat terrorism.

2-47. The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (known as CERP) authorizes U.S. military commanders to carry out small-scale projects designed to meet urgent humanitarian relief requirements or urgent reconstruction requirements within their AORs.

2-48. Many different funding sources may be required for small segments of any activity, such as transportation or lodging for participants. Determining which funding sources should be used for various activities is challenging. Army units can avoid funding problems through early identification of and application to funding sources for specific activities. This is essential for planning, programming, budgeting, and execution. (See AR 11-31 for Army policy on security cooperation. In addition, visit the

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management's Web site at <http://www.disam.dsca.mil>, and click the publications link for the Institute's textbook, *The Management of Security Cooperation* [known as the Green Book].)

APPENDIX E - REFERENCES AND RESOURCES

"I have an unshaken conviction that democracy can never be undermined if we maintain our library resources and a national intelligence capable of utilizing them."

- Franklin D. Roosevelt

Army Publications

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online:

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NDU – National Defense University, <http://www.ndu.edu/>
NPS – Naval Post Graduate School, <http://www.nps.edu/>
SAMS – School of Advanced Military Studies, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/sams/>
SWC – Special Warfare Center, <http://www.soc.mil/swcs/>

APPENDIX F – GLOSSARY
PART I – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Acronym	Definition
ADM	army design methodology
ADP	Army doctrine publication
ADRP	Army doctrine reference publication
AOR	area of responsibility
AQ	al-Qa'ida
AQAP	al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
ASCOPE	Area Structures Capabilities Organizations People and Events
ASD	(SO/LIC & IC) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities)
BPC	building partner nation capacity
CACD	Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design
CCDR	combatant commander
CCMD	combatant command
CGSC	Command General Staff College
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
COA	course of action
CENTCOM	Central Command
CF	conventional forces
CIRA	Continuity Irish Republican Army
CMO	civil-military operations
CNT	counternarcotics training
COIN	counterinsurgency
COM	chief of mission
CONOP	concept plan
CONUS	continental United States
COP	common operational picture
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
CSC	Component Service Command
CSU	Component Service Unit
CT	counterterrorism
CVEI	counter violent extremist ideology
DA	direct action
DC	dislocated civilian
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIME	diplomatic, informational, military, economic
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FID	foreign internal defense

FM	field manual
FMI	field manual-interim
FOE	future operating environment
FPA	foreign policy advisor
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
HN	host nation
IA	Interagency
ICAF	Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
ICAT	Interagency Conflict Assessment Team
IDP	Internally displaced persons
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IO	information operations
IPI	indigenous populations and institutions
IRA	Irish Republican Army
JCET	joint combined exchange training
JFC	joint force commander
JIIM	joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
JOPP	Joint Operations Planning Process
JP	point publication
JPG	joint planning group
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
LH	Lebanese Hezbollah
LOE	line of effort
LOO	line of operation
MCWP	Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
MDMP	military decision making process
MEF	Marine expeditionary force
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, civil considerations
MNF	multinational force
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MSRP	Mission Strategic Resource Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NSC	National Security Council
NSPD	national security Presidential directive
OFDA	Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
OAA	operations, actions, and activities
OGA	other government agency
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPT	operational planning team
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PE	preparation of the environment

PERT	program evaluation and review technique
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PME	professional military education
PMESII	political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure
POLAD	political advisor
POLMIL	political-military
RIRA	Real Irish Republican Army
R&S	reconstruction and stabilization
SAMS	School of Advanced Military Studies
S/CRS	Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SCA	support to civil administration
SCP	security cooperation plan
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SH	stakeholders
SME	subject matter expert
SMM	Southern Mobility Movement
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOD	systemic operational design
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOJTF	Special Operations Joint Task Force
SSTR	stability, security, transition, and reconstruction
TLP	troop leading procedures
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TSOC	theater special operations command
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNDPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDAO	United States defense attaché office
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USAJFKSWCS	United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USASOC	United States Special Operations Command
USG	United States Government
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	unconventional warfare
VEO	violent extremist organization
WARNO	warning order
WHO	World Health Organization (UN)
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

For the most current doctrinal definitions, reference http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/

*Introduced / Defined in this Handbook

***action learning.** Action learning is an individual and collaborative approach to facing novel, problematic situations for which ambiguous and emergent tasks become the vehicle for learning. This is an important concept in irregular campaigns that cannot rely on mission analysis to produce up-front essential tasks as is the object of regular campaign planning. Small SOF teams of highly qualified personnel are routinely sent out to do engagement-types of operations wherein influence, building rapport and trust, maintaining a persistent presence, and making sense of the situation are ongoing activities that require learning-in-action. See incremental approach.

***aggregated operations.** Those essential tasks that must be closely synchronized into ways and means to achieve the desired military campaign end state. This form of operating is highly dependent upon clear direction from one's higher authorities. The definition of the problem and commander's intent are clearly stated up front as are the selection of a preferred course of action to pursue. The integration of activities accomplished by explicitly and predetermined capabilities is essential. Planning methods are more associated with centralized or horizontal (top-down) decision making and command and control.

air land operation. An operation involving movement by air with a designated destination for further ground deployment of units and personnel and/or further ground distribution of supplies. (JP 3-17)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called **AO**. (JP 3-0)

area of responsibility (AOR). The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called **AOR**. See also **combatant command**. (JP 1)

army design methodology (ADM). A methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them. (ADP 5-0)

Army Special Operations Forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. (ADRP 3-05), also called ARSOF. (JP 3-05)

assessment. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

branch. 1. A subdivision of any organization. 2. A geographically separate unit of an activity, which performs all or part of the primary functions of the parent activity on a smaller scale. Unlike an annex, a branch is not merely an overflow addition. 3. An arm or service of the Army. 4. The contingency options built into the base plan. A branch is used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on

anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

campaign. A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

campaign plan. A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space.(JP 5-0)

center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called **COG**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

***Center of Gravity / Decisive Point Analysis.** Center of Gravity is defined as the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, behavior or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success¹²⁹. SOF Planners must account not only for the possibility that there may be a multiple COGs (due to the complexity of the operational environment and as a result of stakeholder perspectives and actions), but also that some COGs may not present themselves during the planning process and may not appear until much later in the campaign. Complexity often requires the application of a comprehensive approach and creates the potential that an identified COG may shift once stakeholders (to include SOF) begin acting in the environment; this drives the constant cycle of reframing. In SOF Operational Design, the complex operational environment can be characterized by periodic shifts of COGs and decisive points, often occurring in rapid succession, necessitating a flexible approach and continual re-assessment.

civil-military operations (CMO). The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called **CMO**. See also **civil affairs; operation**. (JP 3-57)

civil considerations. The influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. (ADRP 5-0)

civil requirements. The necessary production and distribution of all types of services, supplies, and equipment during periods of armed conflict or occupation to ensure the productive efficiency of the civilian economy and to provide to civilians the treatment and protection to which they are entitled under customary and conventional international law.

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) An arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 5-0)

¹²⁹ Base definition extracted from JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, August 2011; expanded to encompass complex FOE and population-centric considerations.

***Collaboration Model.** The collaboration model identifies the intersection of objectives and end states and establishes a process for cooperation and information sharing between multiple partners and stakeholders. Resources, priorities, and support for sustainability are placed against mutual stakeholder objectives to achieve results and prevent the unintended duplication of effort while maximizing the efficient use of resources. When working in the collaborative environment, SOF Planners must appreciate the capabilities of stakeholders, account for competing priorities, as well as capitalize on commonalities in end states. Close collaboration through appropriate venues (e.g., boards, bureaus, centers, cells, working groups, and forums) is essential to ensure interoperability and develop an appreciation of differing approaches and priorities. In SOF Operational Design, the pursuit of competing priorities by multiple stakeholders requires a model and method for collaboration to achieve unity of effort.

collaborative planning. Commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and other partners sharing information, knowledge, perceptions, ideas, and concepts regardless of physical location throughout the planning process. (ADRP 5-0)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. Also called **CCMD**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called **CCDR**. See also combatant command. (JP 1-02)

commander's intent. A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander's desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. (JP 3-0)

commander's visualization. The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state. (ADP 5-0)

concept of operations. (Army) A statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state. (ADRP 5-0)

concept plan. In the context of joint operation planning level 3 planning detail, an operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete operation plan or operation order. Also called **CONPLAN**. (JP 5-0)

continental United States — United States territory, including the adjacent territorial waters, located within North America between Canada and Mexico. Also called **CONUS**. (JP 1)

Counterinsurgency. Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-24)

Counterterrorism. Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

country team. The senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. Also called **CT.** (JP 3-07.4)

***Culmination.** Culmination is defined as the point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations. It is that point in time and/or space at which the operation can no longer maintain momentum.¹³⁰ In SOF Operational Design, culmination is the point at which a particular line of effort (LOE) is no longer having a net positive impact on the environmental or human factors upon which it is focused. In complex environments, actions taken by any key actor and even environmental factors can have a significant impact on conditions and desired end states, as every element in a complex system affects another. SOF Planners must anticipate and monitor these variables, particularly impacts of their efforts in addition to those of stakeholders, which may or may not have been integrated into the campaign plan. This is accomplished through the continuous cycle of reframing the environment. During reframing, SOF Planners should ensure that operations, though achieving desired conditions, are not also creating unintended undesirable conditions which may lead to premature culmination if not properly addressed. Premature culmination presents a strategic risk that the SOF Planners must mitigate. In SOF Operational Design, it is paramount to understand the limit of the effectiveness of one's operations in time and space, as well as the ability to achieve intended effects and avoid unintended effects.

***Culture.** For the purpose of the SOF Operational Design, the planning factor of "Culture" includes all aspects of the human population in the operational environment and those of stakeholders, their institutions, and organizations. It encompasses: language, religion, cuisine, aesthetics, values, social conventions, gender roles, recreational activities, and social structure as observed firsthand and also understood through a deliberate and comprehensive analysis of collected sociocultural, anthropologic, and ethnographic data that results from organic and external relationships. Contemporary cultural analysis includes social media mapping, digital collection, and online sentiment analysis. In SOF Operational

data. (Army) Unprocessed signals communicated between any nodes in an information system, or sensing from the environment detected by a collector of any kind (human, mechanical, or electronic). (ADRP 6-0)

deliberate planning. The Adaptive Planning and Execution System planning activities that routinely occur in non-crisis situations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

direct action. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

decision point. (Joint) A point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action. (JP 5-0) A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 3-0)

¹³⁰ Ibid; definition expanded to include dynamics and interrelationships in the complex operating environment; reframing concept is illustrated in Figure x, "The Flow" below.

decision support matrix. A written record of a war-gamed course of action that describes decision points and associated actions at those decision points. (ADRP 5-0)

decision support template. A combined intelligence and operations graphic based on the results of wargaming. The decision support template depicts decision points, timelines associated with movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information required to execute a specific friendly course of action. (JP 2-01.3)

design (noun). The artifacts (drawings and narratives) produced through the act of designing. See also design (verb). (SAMS, Art of Design Student Text, 2010)

design (verb). A "method of critical and creative thinking for understanding, visualizing, and describing complex problems and the approaches to resolve them." (FM 5-0; SAMS Art of Design Student Text, 2010)

***disaggregated operations.** Describes how SOF may act with relative autonomy in irregular campaigns with decentralized planning and relatively independent of the conventional force, not requiring traditional forms of command and control.

end state. The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

evaluating. Using criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists. (ADRP 5-0)

execution. Putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission. (ADP 5-0)

execution matrix. a visual and sequential representation of the critical tasks and responsible organizations by time. (ADRP 5-0)

foreign internal defense (FID). Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-22)

future operating environment (FOE). Arena in which operations will be conducted with specific conditions, challenges, and opportunities. A complex, dynamic, and adaptive operating environment characterized by uncertainty, an irregular balance of power between both state and non-state actors, and shift in the nation's tolerance away from large scale joint operations create a gap between action and inaction that results in greater adversary freedom of action and increased instability. This changing paradigm requires the exploration of new strategic options.

Human Domain. the totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that influence human behavior to the extent that success of any military strategy, operation, or tactical action depends on the application of unique capabilities that are designed to fight and win population-centric conflicts. (SOCOM 2020)

***incremental approach.** Employing successive limited comparisons to assess relative advantage as the situation unfolds in unpredictable ways. The idea is to keep options open and constantly improvising-while-acting, mostly associated with disaggregated operations. See action learning.

indicator. (Army) In the context of assessment, an item of information that provides insight into a measure of effectiveness or measure of performance. (ADRP 5-0)

information collection. An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in direct support of current and future operations. (FM 3-55)

inform and influence activities. The integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform United States and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decision making. (ADRP 3-0)

instruments of national power. All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)

integration. 1. In force projection, the synchronized transfer of units into an operational commander's force prior to mission execution. 2. The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole. 3. In photography, a process by which the average radar picture seen on several scans of the time base may be obtained on a print, or the process by which several photographic images are combined into a single image. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)

interagency. United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

irregular warfare (IW). A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). (JP 1)

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)

joint combined exchange training. A program conducted overseas to fulfill U.S. forces training requirements and at the same time exchange the sharing of skills between U.S. forces and host nation counterparts. Also called **JCET**. (JP 3-05)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

joint interagency coordination group. An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of U.S. Government civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other U.S. Government civilian agencies and departments. Also called **JIACG**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08)

joint operation planning. Planning activities associated joint military operations by combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders in response to contingencies and crises. Joint operation planning includes planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

joint operation planning process. An orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps to analyze a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action against criteria of success and each other; select the best course of action; and produce a joint operation plan or order. Also called **JOPP** (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

joint operations. A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

key tasks. Those activities the force must perform as a whole to achieve the desired end state. (ADRP 5-0)

knowledge management. The process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making. (ADRP 6-0)

line of effort. (Army) A line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. (ADRP 3-0)

line of operations. (Army) A line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and that links the force with its base of operations and objectives. (ADRP 3-0)

major operation. 1. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. 2. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation. See also **operation**. (JP 3-0)

military decision making process (MDMP). An iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order. (ADP 5-0)

military deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. (JP 3-13.4)

mission. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. (JP 3-0)

mission command. (Army) The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (ADP 6-0)

mission command warfighting function. The related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions. (ADRP 3-0)

mission orders. Directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them. (ADP 6-0)

mission strategic resource plan. The MSRP is a Department of State document that provides the Ambassador's goals, the relationships between Mission goals and broader USG regional goals, as well as a discussion of the current operating environment, and informs the DOS budget submission (FY+2). (DoS Theater Campaign Planning, Planner's Handbook, February 2012, version 1.0)

monitoring. Continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation. (ADRP 5-0)

nested concepts. A planning technique to achieve unity of purpose whereby each succeeding echelon's concept of operations is aligned by purpose with the higher echelons' concept of operations.

***Nesting End States.** Nesting Ends States is the process or art of integrating and synchronizing the Higher Headquarter and adjacent Unit's plans and policies in order to maximize efforts and effectively manage resources. It is necessary to not only compliment national strategic and military plans but also the policies and plans of stakeholders. Analysis must be conducted on applicable partner's approach and objectives within the context of the environment to; identify commonalities in end states, nest when possible, deconflict as necessary, and facilitate stakeholder development. In SOF Operational Design, nesting of end states is central to developing a SOF/CF/JIIM/SH approach. i. National Strategic. ii. Interagency. iii. Military. iv. Partners.

Objective. 1. (Joint) The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. (JP 5-0) 2. (Army) a location on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide for unity of effort. (FM 3-90)

*** Objectives / LOO / LOE.** Objective is a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every approach should be directed. Once the end state is understood and termination criteria established, SOF operational design continues with an analysis of strategic and operational stakeholder objectives. SOF planning integrates military OAAs and capabilities with those of other stakeholder capabilities in time, space, and purpose to ensure actions are unified toward the achievement of individual and collective objectives. Objectives and their supporting effects provide the basis for identifying tasks to be accomplished. In SOF Operational Design, SOF Planners must often assess, apply, and synchronize a broad range of stakeholder capabilities; LOE provides a framework in which to streamline and simplify capabilities assessment, application, and synchronization. LOE is also a method to link diverse capabilities, tasks, effects, conditions, and desired end states and in addition it is an important tool used to achieve unity of effort in operations¹³¹ involving stakeholders.

operation. 1. A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0).

operational approach. A description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state. (JP 5-0)

¹³¹ Definition extracted from JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, August 2011; expanded to include collaboration and SH considerations.

operational art. The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment — to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0)

operational design. The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. See also **campaign; major operation.** (JP 5-0)

Operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 1-02)

***Operational Time.** Operational time is the temporal measurement of an operational approach, ranging between an event found in a current condition and the achievement of acceptable conditions relative to a particular campaign or major operation. Operational time may be measured as a mathematical representation of a chronological interval; however, in SOF Operational Environments, different cultural considerations of time are a potential risk factor that must be accounted for because stakeholder, adversary and / or populous understanding of time may not be congruent with one's own understanding of time. As a planning factor, Operational Time can impact termination criteria, as strategic end states are often tied to political will. In the contemporary operational environment, the application of large scale force may erode political will thus compressing time available to complete a Campaign. In SOF Operational Design, Operational Time is a major planning factor that incorporates potential shifts in national or political will on strategic end states and also considers how other stakeholders in the operational environment view time as a resource. For SOF operational planners, judicious application of force or capability and an expanded reliance on an operationalized CONUS base mitigates the risk of fluctuating or extended operational timelines as well as conserves resources.

operations process. The major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. (ADP 5-0)

parallel planning. Is two or more echelons planning for the same operation sharing information sequentially through warning orders from the higher headquarters prior to the headquarters publishing their operation plan or operation order. (ADRP 5-0)

phase. (Army) A planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. (ADRP 3-0)

planning. The art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about. (ADP 5-0)

planning horizon. A point in time commanders use to focus the organization's planning efforts to shape future events. (ADRP 5-0).

preparation. Those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation. (ADP 5-0)

preparation of the environment. An umbrella term for operations and activities conducted by selectively trained special operations forces to develop an environment for potential future special operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

***Problem Characterization.** Problem characterization is the development of an appreciation for the true nature and scope of the problem and its relationship with the environment within the operational context; this allows for the identification of available information sources and

existing gaps in understanding as well as the risk associated with limited understanding. The range of potential planning efforts and solutions is impacted significantly within complex environments by how a problem is defined, how it is explored through planning elements, and how it is framed. Additionally, problem characterization must take into account stakeholder perspectives that may not completely align with those of the SOF Commander. Lastly, complex problems may present no immediate or single definitive solution; rather, they might be best resolved through the modification of conditions using a range of multidisciplinary approaches. In SOF Operational Design, defining the problem is a critical early step and a key element, foundational to the planning process.

running estimate. The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable. (ADP 5-0)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Also called **SA**. See also **security cooperation**. (JP 3-22)

security force assistance. The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of legitimate authority. (FM 3-07)

security operations. Security operations are those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force. (FM 3-90)

SILENT QUEST. An exercise program set within the USASOC Campaign of Learning that builds on Future Environment (FOE) based concepts, consisting of two capstone exercises a year (Putting ARSOF 2022 into Action)

situational understanding. The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking. (ADP 5-0)

Special Forces. U.S. Army forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare capabilities. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

***SOF Campaigns.** A series of special warfare and surgical strike operations nested with our partners in operational time, the operational environment and toward a coherent purpose to achieve the national strategic end state. SOF campaigns recognize the base assumptions of the Future Operating Environment of 2022 and beyond - specifically - the trends within the global environment / available fiscal resources / waning political will for large scale deployments and the continued march of technology and interconnectivity - and how these macro assumptions inform comprehensive SOF campaigns.

***SOF/CF/JIIM/SH Approach.** The manner in which stakeholders contend with a COG by employing capabilities and resources to positively affect LOOs and LOEs that support the achievement of desired conditions at end state. In SOF Operational Design, approach should

also account for efforts of stakeholders and their desired end states. Additionally, SOF campaigns often incorporate the less traditional, population-centric, and environmentally-focused approaches; these approaches often include the application of a full range of stakeholder capabilities as well as potential strike or decisive operations.

***SOF Operational Approach.** A description of the comprehensive coherent SOF/CF/JIIM and stakeholder actions, with an assessment of the aggregated risk, to transform current conditions in the operational environment to those conditions desired at end state. This approach capitalizes on stakeholder interdependence and synergy to maximize campaign outcomes for the national strategic end state.

***SOF Operational Art.** The continuous cognitive approach by commanders and staffs, anchored in process of critical thinking, to develop strategies that organizes / integrates and employs stakeholder capabilities and expertise to Shape, Prevent and Win campaigns for our Nation.

***SOF Operational Environment.** A composite of the domains, circumstances, relationships and the cognitive and the physical influences - aggregated to form the environmental conditions - that both positively and negatively affect U.S. strategic interests within a given operational area - which increasingly in the FOE - will require the enduring employment of SOF capabilities and other military capabilities - in concert with stakeholder capabilities - to continually shape desired environmental conditions in support of the national strategic end state. This complex operational environment - with varying levels of stability, security, governance, intractability and problem clarity - demands purposeful collaboration and nesting of stakeholder plans and capabilities to maximize desired conditions for U.S. interests.

***SOF Operational Design.** A planning model, anchored with contemporary design elements that holistically frame the operational environment and characterize the problem or opportunity, that employs a SOF framework for a campaign or major operational plan and its execution. This planning model maximizes interagency relationships and partnerships to better inform the military portion of the national strategic end state.

special operations. Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

Special Operations Command (SOCOM). A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations within the joint force commander's assigned operational area. See also special operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

Special Operations Forces (SOF). Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

special warfare. The execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.

Stability operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

Stakeholder. "A person, organization or group with an interest in or concern about something." In design, key stakeholders have both high interest and high impact on the problem situation. (King, *Thinking Skills Resources*, 4; SAMS, *Art of Design Student Text*, 2010)

Strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 1-02)

Surgical Strike Operations. The execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations forces in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence threats. (ADP 3-05)

Synchronization. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. (JP 2-0)

system. A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

***systems thinking.** Also known as holistic thinking, systems thinking involves an ecological or open-systems approach to design, best described in contrast to reductionism and associated methods of analysis (i.e. breaking things down into parts).

Title 10. Common short title for "Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces" this law outlines the role of armed forces in the United States Code and general authorities of the Department of Defense. (All U.S.C. documents can be accessed via <http://uscode.house.gov>).

Title 22. Common short title for "Title 22, United States Code, Foreign Relations and Intercourse" this law outlines the role Foreign Relations in the United States Code and general authorities of the Department of State. (All U.S.C. documents can be accessed via <http://uscode.house.gov>).

Title 50. Common short title for "Title 50, United States Code, War and National Defense" this law outlines the role of War and National Defense in the in Unites States Code and general authorities of Departments of Defense, State, and Intelligence activities in the conduct of War and National Defense. (All U.S.C. documents can be accessed via <http://uscode.house.gov>).

***Termination Criteria.** Termination criteria are the standards that must be met in order to determine if a problem is resolved or to justify the conclusion of an operation – the point at which the conditions are met to achieve U.S. National Strategic objectives. After successfully meeting the termination criteria, reframing should take place to identify any new or emerging changes in the environment. In SOF Operational Design, there is often not a single definitive solution to the complex problem set faced by the SOF Planner, and therefore, termination criteria can be diverse and multidisciplinary. If acceptable conditions are met and can be maintained without the application of a collaborative approach, termination criteria can be defined as SOF transitioning the effort to partners. Thus, SOF Planners must carefully consider their capabilities

or what specific conditions they are attempting to create in the operational environment or capabilities before defining termination criteria and employing assets.

Theater special operations command (TSOC). A subordinate unified command established by a combatant commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

theater strategy. An overarching construct outlining a combatant commander's vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other instruments of national power in order to achieve national strategic objectives. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

Unconventional Warfare (UW). Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

unified action. The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

unified action partners. Those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. (ADRP 3-0)

unified land operations. How the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. (ADP 3-0)

UNIFIED QUEST. The Army Chief of Staff's annual Title 10 Future Study Plan or FSP designed to examine issues critical to current and future force development. It is the Army's primary mechanism for exploring enduring strategic and operational challenges and operations in the future environment. The annual study integrates issues and insights into concept and capability development programs through seminars, workshops, symposia, and wargames. Outcomes inform the Army, the Training and Doctrine Command, and Army Capabilities Integration Center campaign plans, the Army Strategic Planning Guidance, and CSA initiatives. In addition, the FSP develops regular input to Army Warfighting Challenges. (UNIFIED QUEST - Fact Sheet)

unity of effort. The coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

warfighting function. A group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. (ADRP 3-0)

