NOTICE: A digital copy can be obtained through
https://cs3.eis.af.mil/sites/AE-OP-00-60/

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This change incorporates new terminology and updates from newly published doctrine documents. Significantly, Air Force doctrine has been restructured, streamlined and is accessible to anyone with an e-reader, smartphone or tablet. Dubbed "Doctrine Next," doctrine development processes have been overhauled to better reflect Air Force and Joint "best practices" in a much timelier manner while reducing subject matter redundancy and repetitive content (dramatically reduced total page count and aligned the doctrine into five unifying volumes and 28 supporting annexes). It has improved the alignment, currency, accessibility, readability and ultimately the relevance of our Air Force Doctrine – our Service's best practices (available at https://doctrine.af.mil/).

OPR: LeMay Center/DDS (Lemayctr.DD.WKFLW@us.af.mil)
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FOREWORD

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM the Air Force fielded several joint air component coordination element (JACCE) teams (formerly ACCE) and they proved themselves in a trial by fire. These teams were the personal representatives of the joint force air component commander (JFACC) to the staffs of the joint force commander and his other component commanders. They helped forge tremendous working relationships among the staffs. All of the teams were invaluable in facilitating coordination and application of airpower (between the JFACC and the other commanders).

This handbook is a product of all our successful real-world operations and exercises using the JACCE teams. As with doctrine, it’s authoritative but not directive. However, we’re confident that if you’re assigned to a JACCE, this handbook will help to make the JACCE a valuable member of the COMAFFOR’s and JFACC’s team.

We also ask you to provide feedback to our doctrine development directorate so we can continually improve it.

STEVEN L. KWAST
Major General, USAF
Commander
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CHAPTER ONE
JOINT AIR COMPONENT COORDINATION ELEMENT (JACCE)
ROLE, AUTHORITY, FUNCTIONS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. General

a. If Air Force forces are assigned and attached to a joint force, doctrinally they will be organized as a service component commanded by the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR). If the joint force commander (JFC) chooses, he may designate one of his service component commanders as the joint force air component commander (JFACC), a functional component commander.

(1) For purposes of this handbook, it is assumed the COMAFFOR has been designated the JFACC. In the early history of the JACCE (formally ACCE) it was designated as the liaison team from the JFACC. From practical experience the JACCE team functioned as a liaison for both the COMAFFOR and JFACC. Understand that while JP 3-30 is restricted to a discussion of JFACC and does not mention service component commanders, experience tells us that JACCE teams will function as a liaison for both the COMAFFOR and JFACC.  

(2) This is not a stand-alone publication, it complements existing doctrine documents and the JFACC and COMAFFOR handbooks. A companion document that should also be referenced is joint publication (JP) 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

b. JACCE role/function:
A component level liaison appointed by the COMAFFOR and JFACC to better integrate air component operations within the overall joint force. When established, this element acts as the COMAFFOR’s and JFACC’s primary representative to the respective commander and facilitates interaction among the respective staffs.

c. When to name a JACCE?
If the COMAFFOR and JFACC are not collocated with the joint force or joint task force (JTF) commander or with the commanders of the other components (land, maritime, and special operations), the

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1 There are occasions where the USAF air component commander will send liaisons to other headquarters that are not joint, they would more appropriately be labeled as an air component coordination element (ACCE).
JACCE helps bridge that physical separation. A JACCE is more commonly employed as a liaison to those joint forces that do not have an attached Air Force component, as in the case of a theater COMAFFOR/JFACC supporting multiple subordinate JTFs. Note: Throughout the remainder of the document references to these will collectively be referred to as ‘other HQ commander(s).’

d. Liaison function: The JACCE facilitates integration by exchanging operational data and support requirements; and by coordinating the integration of JFACC requirements for airspace coordinating measures, joint fire support coordinating measures, close air support, air mobility, and space requirements— and COMAFFOR requirements of force protection, logistics, sustainment, and personnel.
(1) As such, the JACCE is a liaison element, not a C2 node, nor is the JACCE director a commander (unless designated); thus, the JACCE normally has no authority to direct or employ forces.
(2) The make-up of the JACCE is dependent on the scope of the operation and the size of the staff they liaise with. Element expertise may include plans, operations, intelligence, airspace management, logistics, space, sustainment, communications, and air mobility, as needed.
(3) The JACCE also communicates the supported JFC’s or component commander’s decisions and equities back to the COMAFFOR and JFACC. However, the JACCE should not replace, replicate, or circumvent normal request mechanisms already in place in the component/JTF staffs, nor supplant normal planning performed by the joint air operations center (JAOC) and AFFOR staff.
(4) The JACCE director is the COMAFFOR’s and JFACC’s personal and official representative, and as such should have sufficient rank to effectively work with the component or JTF commander to which he or she is attached.
(5) To maintain proper perspective and focus, the JACCE director should not normally be dual-hatted as the commander of a tactical unit.

e. Normally, the JACCE should:
   • Ensure the COMAFFOR and JFACC is aware of each commander’s priorities and plans.
• Ensure the AFFOR staff and JAOC coordinates within their surface component/JTF headquarters counterparts to work issues.
• Ensure appropriate commanders are aware of the COMAFFOR and JFACC’s capabilities and limitations (constraints, restraints, and restrictions).
• Ensure appropriate commanders are aware of the COMAFFOR and JFACC’s plan to support the surface commander’s scheme of maneuver and the JFC’s intent and objectives.
• Facilitate AFFOR staff and JAOC processes with the surface/JTF commanders. Provide oversight of other COMAFFOR and JFACC liaisons to component/JTF headquarters staffs, if directed.
• Ensure information flows properly between the AOC (in whatever form—JAOC or CAOC), sister components, and JFC.2

f. Joint/Coalition Operations:
The US can conduct unilateral operations with a combatant commander (CCDR) creating a JTF with a COMAFFOR designated as a JFACC or the US may be part of a coalition with a combined task force (CTF) and a COMAFFOR designated as a combined forces air component commander (CFACC). Within this handbook references will be made to the joint construct but if US forces are operating in a CTF then substitute CFACC for JFACC.

2. Predeployment

a. Move JACCE personnel into the host command as early as practical.

(1) Be in place for either the final planning cycle of an operation or the last major exercise prior to initiation of the operation.
(2) This will facilitate integration and coherent function between the host component and the JACCE.

b. Activate the JACCE in time for personnel to establish relationships in host component headquarters prior to combat operations.

c. Coordinate with the COMAFFOR and JFACC on arrival time and any meetings with the AFFOR staff and JAOC before deploying to the

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2 Volume 1, Basic Doctrine, https://doctrine.af.mil/
supported commander’s HQ.

d. Organize the JACCE fund cite and equipment prior to deployment.

e. Determine requirements prior to departure—bring the right equipment (shortages for the combined forces land component command (CFLCC) JACCE during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) included chemical gear, cots, body armor, computers, standard telephone equipment phones, and back packs).

f. Consider the following actions for JACCE staff pre-deployment processing which may present significant challenges given the limited notice and the fact that JACCE organizational structure is still in the formative stages.
   (1) Obtain orders for people to facilitate travel and processing/preparation.
   (2) Source, notify, train, and certify members at base level (potentially challenging with short-notice deployments).
   (3) Contact the USAF Expeditionary Center to prioritize JACCE team deployment processing.
   (4) Ensure deploying personnel have specific annotations on orders to cover issuance of weapons, body armor, atropine, and other specialized equipment (difficult supplies to obtain without specifically being on orders).
   (5) Ensure personnel obtain passports for commercial travel in theater.
   (6) Send clearances forward at the earliest possible date—confirm receipt at deployed location. Strongly recommend top secret/sensitive compartmented information (for special operations forces reliant on special technical operations).

  g. Assign one JACCE member, immediately upon notification, the task of overseeing a checklist and monitoring status of deployments.
      (1) This is essential to facilitate out processing and marshaling of equipment.
      (2) Issues such as specific equipment procurement/issue and travel may require O-6 or GO-level attention.
h. Facilitate team building prior to deployment. Establish a JACCE “identity”—prepare, process, and deploy as a group to the maximum extent possible to maintain unit integrity.

i. Include security forces personnel with the team if force protection condition or situation warrants.

j. Include information management/administrative support in the first deployment increment if possible—without dedicated administrative support, the OIF CFLCC-JACCE had to rely on other Air Force assets in theater to obtain administrative, billeting, bedding, and financial support.

k. Check travel restrictions upon receipt of a warning order to activate a JACCE—especially for flag/general officers.

l. Make knowledge base development a team priority during preparation and the initial states of deployment.

   (1) Define information requirements at team meetings before deployment and aggressively develop information sources (e.g., theater and other phone directories, e-mail global address lists, information sources, documents, and uniform resource locators of key web sites.

   (2) Immediately upon arrival, build and maintain a contact list for the AFFOR staff and JAOC, host component headquarters, and other air component coordination elements.

m. Coordinate with host component for allocation of sufficient workspace for JACCE personnel.

n. Support for the JACCE should come from the closest, practical air component installation—this should be formally tasked, and specified administrative control (ADCON) should be established in orders, as part of the activation process.

3. Deployment

   a. Ensure that JACCE staff members working on the host component joint operations center (JOC) floor are familiar with the AFFOR staff and JAOC and the component/combatant command they support.
b. Ensure JACCE personnel:
   (1) Are well informed as to the proper doctrinal channels for information flow.
   (2) Are prepared to assist/guide the host staff in above flow.
   (3) Rapidly learn the internal workings of the host component operations center in order to understand unique terms of reference.
   (4) Are familiar with internal processes.

c. Conduct spin-up briefings and training. Familiarize members with doctrine on commanding, organizing, and presentation of Air Force forces in Volume 1, and Annexes 3-0, and 3-30. Team members must:
   (1) Review the JFACC’s joint air operations plan (JAOP).
   (2) Review the COMAFFOR’s OPORD and FRAGOs.
   (3) Review the appropriate component’s combat plan.
   (4) Be “read in” on appropriate programs prior to deployment.
   (5) Interface with key members in the JAOC divisions.
   (6) Interface with key members in the AFFOR staff directorates.
   (7) Interface with key counterparts at the lead major command.
      (a) Spin up on issues.
      (b) Meet counterparts face to face—discuss JACCE role and lanes.
   (8) Ensure AFFOR Staff and JAOC action officers are familiar with the JACCE mission (this will reap huge dividends in the heat of high-tempo operations).

d. Build and maintain a single-source directory for SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) web sites containing information critical to JACCE employment.

e. Prepare for both pre-operation preparation periods and 24/7 operations once the operation begins.
   (1) When the operation begins plan for an immediate demand for 24-hour operations.
   (2) Need immediate availability for general officers in the commanding general’s operations center (In OIF, the CFLCC-JACCE went from one person manning the CFLCC Ops Center floor to two or three people during combat operations).
f. Understand AFFOR staff and JAOC operations, decision-making processes, and flow of information to directorates—AFFOR staff and JAOC perspective will enable the JACCE to facilitate component-to-component assessment and coordination.

g. Ensure that JACCE members know where and how to access AFFOR Staff and JAOC web-based information sources—need latest COMAFFOR and JFACC direction on a daily basis. These products include but are not limited to:
   (1) Theater battle management core system
   (2) Air tasking order (ATO)/airspace control order (ACO)
   (3) Web based targeting list
   (4) Master air attack plan (MAAP)
   (5) Target effects team
   (6) Mission report data
   (7) AFFOR maintenance and sustainment data
   (8) AFFOR base and unit status
   (9) AFFOR TPFDD data
   (10) Daily COMAFFOR and JFACC guidance products.

h. Facilitate proper routing/handling of JACCE queries: A JACCE director may need a single point-of-contact help desk in the AFFOR staff and JAOC to handle requests for information and hot issues. (e.g., Following a JACCE conference in early March 2003, the OIF CFACC established a JACCE help desk at the Prince Sultan Air Base combined air operations center (CAOC) that considerably reduced CFLCC-JACCE workload while increasing productivity).

i. Identify key lash-ups with host component. Examples of key OIF JACCE/CFLCC lash-ups included:
   (1) Plans – C5
   (2) Future Ops—C35
   (3) Deep Ops Coordination Cell– C33—Cross-flow of information between future ops and deep ops cells is critical in order to ensure synchronization between CFLCC and COMAFFOR and JFACC planning.
   (4) Fire Support Element – Operations floor current operations section.
   (5) Space and Information Operations
(6) Intelligence – C2 (planned for but not filled)
(7) Logistics – C4 (planned for but not filled).

j. Begin deactivation planning, including stand-down triggers, equipment disposition, and personnel issues as early as possible—exit strategy should be pre-defined, coordinated, and approved.

4. COMAFFOR and JFACC Considerations
There are several factors the COMAFFOR/JFACC should consider when creating a JACCE. A face-to-face briefing of the JACCE director by the COMAFFOR and JFACC is strongly encouraged prior to the JACCE director assuming duty.

a. JACCE director’s rank should be sufficient to effectively work with the JTF or component commander whom he/she is supporting (consider the rank of the commander’s C/J/G/N-3 and Chief of Staff).

b. Size of the JACCE staff should reflect the breadth of the operation and normally includes plans, operations, intelligence, airspace management, space, and air mobility. Additionally, administration and communications support may be needed.

c. Composition of the JACCE staff should be representative of the AFFOR staff and JAOC (Air Force, Army, Marine, and Navy; and coalition if applicable).

d. Expertise of the JACCE staff should be tailored in expertise to the supported/supporting HQ. For example, a JACCE to a joint force land component commander (JFLCC) with a very large land force involved in armed conflict could be relatively large and the JACCE should have requisite experience in supporting land operations with airpower and should also understand how land forces can support the air scheme of maneuver. This JACCE would be very different from one deployed to a JTF HQ involved in a humanitarian relief operation.

Volume 1 presents airpower as a unitary construct; this is a change from previous basic doctrine which talked to “air and space power.”
e. Authority and responsibility of the JACCE should be tailored to the needs of the COMAFFOR and JFACC. In some situations the COMAFFOR and JFACC may give the JACCE significant latitude in his/her authority to represent the COMAFFOR and JFACC, in other cases the COMAFFOR and JFACC may be more restrictive.

f. The COMAFFOR and JFACC should introduce the JACCE director to the designated host component commander to establish the working relationships the COMAFFOR/JFACC wants the JACCE director to have with the other commander.

5. JACCE Authority and Command Relations
The JACCE director derives all of his/her authority from the COMAFFOR and JFACC. This authority can change over time because of the dynamic nature of the operation. ADCON (or specified ADCON) of US individuals in the JACCE resides with the corresponding Service component commander.

6. JACCE Functions/Responsibilities
As a liaison, the JACCE communicates, facilitates, advises, coordinates, and supports the effective interaction between the COMAFFOR and JFACC and the other HQ component. The JACCE:

a. Helps communicate the other HQ commander’s decisions and interests to the COMAFFOR and JFACC.

b. Director does not normally exercise operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) authorities.

c. Should not replace, replicate, or circumvent normal request or coordination mechanisms already in place in the other component/JTF staffs, nor supplant normal planning performed by the JAOC and AFFOR staff.

d. Director should not normally be dual-hatted as a commander of a tactical unit.4

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4 Volume 1, p 99
e. Helps communicate the COMAFFOR and JFACC’s intent and component perspective to the other HQ commander.

f. Helps ensure other component HQ commanders are aware of COMAFFOR and JFACC support requirements.

g. Helps ensure the COMAFFOR and JFACC is aware of other HQ commanders’ priorities and plans.

h. Helps ensure the AFFOR staff and JAOC coordinates with their component/JTF HQ counterparts to work issues.

i. Helps ensure the other HQ commanders are aware of the COMAFFOR and JFACC’s capabilities and restraints.

j. Helps ensure appropriate commanders are aware of the COMAFFOR and JFACC’s plan to support their commander’s intent.

k. Facilitates staff process for both the COMAFFOR and JFACC and the other HQ commanders.

l. Helps ensure information flows properly between the AFFOR staff and JAOC and the other commander’s operations center. Supports component and/or JTF staff analyses by:

   (1) Helping communicate COMAFFOR and JFACC’s “intent” and perspective.
   (2) Facilitating integration of air and space operations.

m. Enhances coordination, but is not a substitute for normal communication channels between the AFFOR staff and JAOC and the other HQ commander’s staff. A single point of contact within the AFFOR Staff and JAOC may best support the JACCE need for information and communication and the JACCE staff may also need authority to communicate directly with their counterparts in the AFFOR Staff and JAOC.

   (1) JACCE staff coordination with their counterparts in the AFFOR staff and JAOC may be most productive if the JACCE is aligned much like the directorates and divisions within the AFFOR staff and JAOC. The JACCE should have part of its staff identified as
strategy and plans. The JACCE staff coordination with the AFFOR staff directorates and JAOC divisions helps keep COMAFFOR and JFACC liaisons and AFFOR staff and JAOC linked and seamless in understanding COMAFFOR and JFACC mission, roles, guidance, and combat capabilities.

(2) The JACCE should also coordinate with the air support operations center (ASOC) to determine whether guidance and execution of air is achieving the objectives of the air operation directives. This is much like the relationships the strategy and combat plans divisions have with combat operations division in the JAOC.

n. May get directly involved in the planning process as directed by the COMAFFOR and JFACC.

A Joint Force with Sub-theater AETFs

As OEF and OIF evolved, the Air Force established a sub-theater AETF, in support of a subordinate JTF which obviated the need for a JACCE. (The sub-theater AETF/CC can perform all the functions performed by a JACCE.)

This arrangement provides unity of command and improved span of control in complex theaters with multiple joint operating areas (JOA). The theater COMAFFOR and JFACC may choose to establish one or more subordinate AETFs in direct support to the JOA JFCs. For example, under this arrangement, two or more AEWs located within the JOA are formed into a single Air Force unit with a designated Air Force commander. The theater COMAFFOR and JFACC delegates appropriate elements of authority in the operational and administrative branches to the AETF commander but retains the authority to reclaim the forces as necessary to accomplish CCDR AOR-wide priorities. The common superior joint commander would then place the AETF/CC in support of the appropriate JTF commander.

- PROs for this arrangement:
  -- Focused JOA level resources while retaining flexibility at COMAFFOR level
-- Perception of “one team, one fight” – Air Force is all in at the JTF level
-- Less duplication of C2 assets at multiple levels
- CONs for this arrangement:
  -- Potential confusion of chain of command over different level Air Force forces
  -- Prioritization of Air Force forces between supported JTFs
- Those Air Force forces that are not attached as part of the AETF are retained by the theater COMAFFOR/JFACC for AOR wide taskings and as potential swing forces between the JTFs IAW CCDR priorities.
CHAPTER TWO
JACCE ORGANIZATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Task Organized
The JACCE is task organized to best serve the COMAFFOR and JFACC’s spectrum of operations. The JACCE director is the COMAFFOR’s and JFACC’s personal representative to the supported/supporting HQ commander. The JACCE staff communicates, facilitates, advises, coordinates, plans, and supports the effective interplay between the personnel in the AFFOR staff and JAOC and their counterparts in the supported/supporting HQ staff. The key to the lines of coordination for the JACCE is that they are whatever the COMAFFOR and JFACC wants them to be. The COMAFFOR and JFACC set the relationship of the JACCE to the AFFOR staff and JAOC and to the other commander’s headquarters. The COMAFFOR and JFACC sets the limits to the JACCE’s authority and responsibility based on the situation. Once that is set and given to the JACCE director then it should be periodically reviewed to ensure the needs of the COMAFFOR and JFACC and the other HQ commander are being met.

2. Tailored to the Operation
The JACCE should be tailored to the operations of the COMAFFOR and JFACC and the other HQ. This can range from humanitarian operations to armed conflict. It should also be tailored to support the operations/battle rhythm of both the COMAFFOR and JFACC and the supported HQ commander.

Generally the JACCE should include functional areas such as operations, plans, logistics, sustainment, force status, and intelligence and, depending on the operation, may also include a personnel, base and facility status, mobility, space, or cyberspace functional area. For large armed conflict operations with a battle rhythm that includes 24-hour operations, the JACCE should have sufficient personnel to work each of the duty shifts. For smaller operations, such as some humanitarian relief efforts, the JACCE may only have one person performing both the operations and plans functions and only one person performing the intelligence function.

The following was the actual starting point for the composition of the JACCE elements for the CFACC of OIF:
a. JACCE to JFC:
(1) Director – O-7 grade, TS/SCI clearance
(2) Deputy Director – O-6, TS/SCI
(3) Section Chief – O-3, SECRET
(4) Operations/Plans Section Chief – O-5, TS/SCI
(5) Space/IO/STO Planner – O-5, TS/SCI
(6) Logistics Plans Officer – O-4, TS/SCI
(7) Long Range Plans Officer – O-4, TS/SCI
(8) Operations Planner – O-4, TS/SCI
(9) Airlift Planner – O-4, TS/SCI
(10) Operational Assessment Officer – O-4, TS/SCI
(11) Joint Operations Center Specialist – 2x O-4s, TS/SCI
(12) Intelligence Section Chief – O-6, TS/SCI
(13) Targets Specialist – O-4, TS/SCI
(14) Collections Specialist – O-4, TS/SCI
(15) Intelligence Analyst – O-3, TS/SCI

b. JACCE to combined forces land component commander (CFLCC):
(1) Director – O-8
(2) Deputy Director – O-6
(3) Chief of staff – O-5
(4) Executive Officer – O-4/5
(5) JAOC functionality expertise – O-4/5
(6) Tactical air ops expertise tailored to situation – O-4/5 mix:
   (a) Airlift
   (b) Multi-role fighter/bomber
   (c) ISR
   (d) Space/information operations
(7) Information Systems Officer – Warfighting Integration or Aerospace Command and Control & Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Center expert in common operational/tactical picture COP/CTP management and function. Also Nellis AFB JAOC or Hurlburt AFB 505 CCW candidates – O-3/5
(8) Comm/Computer – E-5/O-3
(9) Intelligence Officer and NCO – O-5/E-6
(10) Personal security officer detail for director (available to use for “other” team travel requirements)
(11) Administration – E-6
c. JACCE to combined forces special operations component commander (CFSOCC):
(1) Director – O-7
(2) Deputy Director – O-6
(3) JOC director – O-5
(4) Ops Strategist – O-4/5
(5) 226 Planner – O-4
(6) Ops Airlift – O-4
(7) Intel director – O-5
(8) Intel Targeteer – O-4
(9) Intel Collections – O-4
(10) Intel Analysis – O-3/4
(11) Exec Officer – O-3/4
(12) Comm – E-6
(13) Admin – E-6

d. JACCE to combined forces maritime component commander (CFMCC):
(1) Director – O-7
(2) Deputy Director – O-6
(3) Director of Ops – O-5/6
(4) Executive Officer – O-3/4
(5) JAOC functionality expertise – O-4/5
(6) At a minimum include at least two members with JAOC experience to provide team understanding/insight into flying operations and interaction with the JAOC
(7) Tactical air ops expertise tailored to situation – airlift, fighter, bomber, ISR, space – O-4/5 mix
(8) Comm/Computer – E-5/O-3
(9) Intelligence Officers – O-3/5
(10) Administration – E-5/6

Following are examples of other JACCE configurations:
a. JACCE to Joint Task Force—Haiti:
(1) Director – O-6
(2) Deputy Director – O-5
(3) Information operations
(4) Admin
(5) Air mobility
(6) Intel Support
b. JACCE to the JTF, USNORTHCOM exercise Unified Defense ’04:
   (1) Director – O-6
   (2) Deputy Director – O-5
   (3) Air Operations – O-4
   (4) Airspace control – O-3
   (5) Medical Planner – O-5
   (6) Logistics – O-5/O-2

Depending on the operation there could be more or fewer staff members of a particular specialty. For some situations there will be a greater need for expertise in, for example, mobility or space operations.

3. Communications

   a. A key to success for the JACCE is its ability to communicate and gather information. The better the communication is, the better the information can be and thus the better the JACCE is able to advise.

   b. Some of the communication equipment to consider:
      (1) Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network laptops
      (2) SIPRNET laptops
      (3) COP/CTP software (web based) or equivalent for air and ground picture
      (4) Cell phones
      (5) KY encryption equipment
      (6) Secure Iridium cell phones or equivalent
      (7) Capability to access the ATO and ACO
      (8) Capability to access weather information
      (9) Chat capability such as NetMeeting

   c. Some JACCEs may deploy to a location where the other HQ cannot supply the needed equipment to function, in which case the JACCE may have to bring its own equipment. In any case, the JACCE needs to determine what equipment is being supplied and what equipment it needs to bring.

   d. In addition, some members of the JACCE will require access to special access programs or compartmentalized information and they should deploy with the requisite clearances.
CHAPTER THREE
PRESENTATION AND C2 RELATIONSHIPS

4. General
   a. Ideally, every JTF would have its own attached Air Force component with a COMAFFOR/JFACC. The COMAFFOR and JFACC and the other HQ commander(s) could work side-by-side and talk face-to-face to integrate joint forces.
   b. When HQs are often not collocated (and separate Air Force components are not attached), a JACCE may then represent the COMAFFOR and JFACC and support the other HQ commanders. The COMAFFOR and JFACC normally have a supporting/supported relationship with the HQ commander to whom the JACCE is detailed.
   c. The COMAFFOR retains OPCON of the JACCE and the Service components retain specified ADCON of their personnel in the JACCE. There are two general models for JACCE presentation:
      (1) COMAFFOR and JFACC internal to a JTF.
      (2) COMAFFOR and JFACC external to a JTF.

5. Presentation with COMAFFOR and JFACC internal to a JTF
   a. In this model, the CCDR has established a JTF, the COMAFFOR and JFACC are subordinate to the JFC and JACCEs are presented as needed laterally to other functional component commanders, and upward to the JTF commander.

![Diagram of JACCE structure for COMAFFOR/JFACC internal to a JTF](image)

**Figure 3-1. JACCE structure for COMAFFOR/JFACC internal to a JTF**
b. Although a joint special operations component command (JFSOCC) normally includes a joint special operations air component commander, their focus is on SOF aviation employment. A JACCE may be required if “conventional” aviation provided by the COMAFFOR and JFACC is to be integrated with SOF to provide such non-SOF capabilities as CAS and interdiction, or if SOF aviation may be available to the COMAFFOR and JFACC.

6. Presentation with COMAFFOR/JFACC external to a JTF

a. In this model there is a mix of several JTFs within a theater, but only one fully capable AFFOR staff and JAOC to service all forces. In such instances, there is usually one COMAFFOR and JFACC reporting to the geographic CCDR (referred to as the “theater COMAFFOR and JFACC”). The COMAFFOR and JFACC provide centralized control of all airpower across the theater and support the multiple JTFs based on the priorities of the CCDR (the common superior commander). This arrangement usually occurs because there are insufficient air and space assets to supply each JTF with adequate Air Force representation and thus there is no separate air component within the JTFs.

b. Example: CENTAF commander, while acting as the COMAFFOR and JFACC for CDRUSCENTCOM, simultaneously provided support to separate JTFs and TFs in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa.

c. Example: AFNORTH/1AF commander, acting as the COMAFFOR and JFACC for Operation NOBLE EAGLE in the CONUS, may also support separate JTFs or TFs responding to separate disasters in the CONUS.

7. Presentation to Service components

In those rare cases when a JFC elects not to designate functional component commanders, the COMAFFOR may provide JACCEs to the other Service component commanders and the JFC as necessary. Duties and relationships remain as stated.

8. Presentation to combined organizations

In combined organizations, such as NATO or coalitions, JACCEs may be presented by the COMAFFOR/CFACC to the combined components
(CFLCC, CFMCC, CFSOCC, and commander, joint task force [CJTF]) as necessary. The model should be similar to that depicted in Figure 3-1 above.

9. **Joint component presentation to the COMAFFOR and JFACC**
   a. Each component normally also provides liaison elements to the COMAFFOR and JFACC that work within the AFFOR Staff and JAOC. These liaisons may provide assistance to JACCEs in answering questions and collecting information. Component liaisons work for their respective component commanders and with the COMAFFOR/JFACC, AFFOR staff, and the JAOC. They consist of experienced specialists who provide component planning and tasking expertise and coordination capabilities. They help integrate and coordinate their component’s participation in joint air and space operations. The COMAFFOR and JFACC may require other liaison augmentation to support AFFOR staff and JAOC functions such as Coast Guard, space forces, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Air Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and Federal Aviation Administration in various operational and support areas.

   b. These liaisons work for their respective component commanders and facilitate coordination between their HQ staff and the COMAFFOR/JFACC, AFFOR staff, and AOC/JAOC. In these cases, it is important to understand which liaison is responsible for facilitating which pieces of information flow so there is not a case of the JACCEs and the other component liaisons providing duplicate information and causing confusion.

   (1) Unless the home organizations also provide liaisons to the AFFOR staff, the liaisons in the JAOC may be requested to also serve as liaison elements to the AFFOR staff, as required.

   (2) **Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD).** The BCD supports integration of air and space operations with ground maneuver. BCD personnel are integrated into JAOC divisions (and possibly AFFOR Staff directorates) to support planning, operations, air defense, intelligence, airlift/logistics, airspace control, and communications. In particular, the BCD coordinates ground force priorities, requests, and items of interest. One of the BCD’s most
important functions is to coordinate boundary line and fire support coordination line (FSCL) changes and timing. The BCD brings ground order of battle (both friendly and enemy) situational awareness and expertise into the JAOC and will normally brief the ground situation/intelligence update. The BCD may also provide current ground situation inputs to JAOC teams for incorporation into daily briefings and intelligence summaries.

(3) Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element (NALE). The NALE personnel from the maritime components support the JAOC (and possibly the AFFOR staff) in integrating naval air, naval fires, and amphibious operations into theater air operations as well as monitor and interpret the maritime battle situation for the JAOC.

(4) Marine Liaison Element (MARLE). MARLEs are representatives of the commander, Marine Corps forces and his associated aviation combat element commander. The MARLEs support the COMAFFOR and JFACC in integrating Marine air-ground task force fires, maneuver, and Marine air into the theater campaign and supporting JAOP. This team will be well versed in the Marine air-ground task force commander’s guidance, intentions, schemes of maneuver, and direct support aviation plan.

(5) Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE). US Special Operations Command theater special operations component command provides a SOLE to the COMAFFOR and JFACC to coordinate and integrate all SOF activities in the entire battlespace. This joint SOLE is comprised of representatives from SOF aviation, intelligence, airspace, logistics, Air Force special tactics teams, Army Special Forces, and Navy Sea-Air-Land Teams. SOLE personnel work within the various JAOC functional areas to ensure that all SOF targets, SOF teams, and SOF air taskings/missions are deconflicted, properly integrated, and coordinated during all planning and execution phases. The prevention of fratricide is a critical function of the SOLE.

(6) Coalition/Allied Liaison Officers (LNOs). LNOs representing coalition/allied forces may improve CAOC situational awareness regarding the disposition of friendly forces, especially when those forces do not have a mature theater air control system. They are
also essential for unity of effort for coalition air defense operations and airspace deconfliction. When teamed with linguists, they can help overcome language barriers with remote allied/coalition forces. In force projection scenarios into an immature theater, CAOC directors should anticipate the need for LNOs and actively seek them out via the CJTF staff, in-country military group, staff country team, or direct contact with coalition forces, if necessary.

(7) Air Support Operations Center (ASOC)

The ASOC is responsible for planning, coordination, control, and execution of air operations that directly support tactical level ground combat forces. The ASOC is normally located at corps level. The COMAFFOR exercises OPCON of the ASOC through the JAOC. The JACCE may have interaction with the ASOC but the JACCE it is not in the chain of command between the COMAFFOR and JFACC and the ASOC. Duties of the ASOC include:

(a) Providing Air Force expertise to senior Army tactical echelons.
(b) Providing control of air support allocated by JAOC.
(c) Acting as corps air liaison officer’s conduit for CAS requests by controlling and maintaining the Air Force air request net.
(d) Forwarding requests for EW support (airborne or ground).
(e) Exercising command and control over subordinate tactical air control parties (TACPs)—TACPs are subordinate to the ASOC and are the single points of direct Air Force interaction with supported ground combat units.
CHAPTER FOUR
OPERATIONS EXECUTION

1. Battle Rhythm
   a. The COMAFFOR/JFACC and each of the other HQ commanders have a battle rhythm. It is up to the JACCE director to understand and adapt to the different battle rhythm. Generally there are regularly scheduled meetings that the JACCE director or staff attends. Some meetings to consider attending (if possible) are:

   - Component Commander’s VTC
   - J2 Intel Update Meetings (AM and PM)
   - Operational Planning Element Meeting (AM and PM)
   - Joint Targeting Working Group Meeting
   - Joint Operations Assessment Board Meeting
   - J2 and Component Coordination VTC
   - Joint Targeting Coordination Board VTC
   - Analyst Roundtable Meetings
   - J2 Operational Plans Meeting and VTC
   - Joint Collection Management Board VTC
   - J2 Targets Vetting with Intelligence Community
   - Ops/Intel Key Reads VTC
   - Information Operations VTC
   - J4 Logistics Operations Meeting
   - J4 Beddown Meetings
   - Joint Operations Center Operations/Intelligence Updates (AM and PM)

   b. A JACCE should focus the host component on desired effects and needed capabilities, not on platforms. There is a natural tendency for the host component to make platform-based support requests rather than requesting creation of specific effects.

   c. Recommend adjustment of the COMAFFOR and JFACC battle rhythm to receive the joint integrated prioritized target list at JFC HQs prior to the joint targeting coordination board. This will ensure a more effective targeting process.

   d. The JACCE should understand the plans of both headquarters to optimum liaison success.
2. Staff Interaction

The JACCE should establish a staff interaction and communication methodology. A key to success in the JACCE is effective interaction with the AFFOR staff and JAOC and with the other HQ commander’s staff. Working with the other commander’s HQ staff means getting involved in meetings and other venues. As information is shared between staffs the JACCE members can advise on the best way to employ air and space forces. Sometimes it is only a matter of clarifying misconceptions about air and space forces and other times it is suggesting ways or initial plans on how the COMAFFOR and JFACC and the other HQ commander can support each other.

a. The JACCE should continually assess ongoing operations in order to support the COMAFFOR and JFACC and the other HQ commander.

b. The JACCE should establish an administrative means to capture and track key decisions and action items.

3. Communication

Because information and situational awareness are so important to the success of the JACCE it becomes critical for the JACCE to establish good lines of communication with both headquarters.

a. The JACCE director should establish a means of communicating regularly with the COMAFFOR and JFACC to ensure the COMAFFOR and JFACC’s needs are being met and that the COMAFFOR and JFACC are being properly represented.

b. The same holds true for the other HQ commanders to ensure their needs are being met.

4. Tracking Action Items

Internal to the JACCE, a tracking mechanism should be created to track incoming questions and taskings. The JACCE is not expected to have all the answers all the time but is expected to be able to find the answer; therefore open questions must be tracked. A log should be kept to maintain situational awareness and the JACCE should have periodic staff meetings to ensure all JACCE members are kept in the know.
5. Other Considerations

a. Lead-turn employment and execution issues

(1) If the JACCE is attached to a CFLCC conducting combat operations, coordinate with the host component to use a common reference system for fire support coordination measure delineation (both in exercises and combat operations).

(a) In OIF, CFLCC-JACCE presence during planning was essential to CFLCC acceptance of this methodology. Continue the use of common grid reference system (CGRS) cells short of the FSCL as a means to employ airpower (reference Air, Land, Sea Application Center Dynamic Targeting and Killbox multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures).

(b) The JACCE must also understand and communicate JFACC area air defense commander and airspace control authority responsibilities.

(2) Joint intelligence preparation

(a) Need to ensure that a single standard for accomplishing tasks is established for use by all components and J2 (or equivalent).

(b) Order of battle production ownership must be established early and not changed during wartime.

(3) TST processes and procedures. The JFC should clearly specify the definitions and tactics, techniques, and procedures for TSTs prior to conflict—train to these procedures and practice using the appropriate terminology and procedures.

(4) Weapons systems video (WSV) processes and procedures. WSV should be simultaneously disseminated to all users, in order to reduce access and exploitation time.

(5) The JACCE should understand the placement of the FSCL and the forward boundary of the surface commander’s AO. Placing the FSCL too far forward may create a sanctuary for enemy forces
beyond the effective range of ground forces, but within which the COMAFFOR and JFACC may be hindered from attacking.

(6)

(7) The JACCE should understand and be able to communicate with the surface commander the use of CAS procedures. CAS procedures should not be used beyond the close proximity/detailed integration depth – such are really air interdiction targets.

(8) If an airfield plan (including seizure) has to be developed in concert with the ground scheme of maneuver:

(a) The plan should be described in sequential order and identify the senior airfield authority for operating the airfield.

(b) Ensure there is “buy-in” from the subordinate commands to ensure all commands understand the plan.

(c) Once the airfield seizure plan execution begins, a pre-organized team of J3/J4/J7/JACCE representation should monitor the progress of the plan and address required changes.

b. JACCE and Intelligence function(s)

(1) The JACCE needs access to component compartmental plans to assess COMAFFOR and JFACC requirements.

(2) AFFOR staff should provide written guidance for requesting of ISR assets.

(3) Standardize battle damage assessment tracking, highlighting targets nominated, “MAAP-ed”, and executed—results should indicate the degree of damage, whether pending or unavailable.

(4) To ensure success of intelligence database management, one common targeting tool should be developed and implemented providing necessary flexibility and interoperability.
CHAPTER FIVE
HOMELAND OPERATIONS: 1st AIR FORCE (AIR FORCES NORTHERN) JACCE

1. Background:
   a. Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command/US Northern Command (NORAD/USNORTHCOM) has designated his COMAFFOR, the commander, 1st Air Force (Air Forces Northern), as the CFACC for the continental United States, US Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico area of operations within the NORAD and USNORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR).
   b. Commander, 1 AF (AFNORTH) is also the theater COMAFFOR for the USNORTHCOM AOR (with the exception of the JTF-Alaska joint operations area).
   c. Efficient planning, coordination, and execution of air support to JFC/component operations are essential to overall success of the USNORTHCOM mission.
   d. To expedite these processes, the COMAFFOR and JFACC establish a JACCE in both the JTF headquarters and the CFLCC headquarters when necessary.
   e. COMAFFOR and JFACC may also be required to establish a JACCE capability in support of federal or state civilian authorities, in addition to or in lieu of a JACCE at a JTF/CFLCC, when requested.

2. Aspects of the 1 AF (AFNORTH) JACCE:
   a. The COMAFFOR and JFACC may delegate decision-making authority for specific events or situations to the JACCE director.
   b. The JACCE is responsible for proposing airpower solutions to the problems faced by the JFC/component commander or lead/supported civil authority. The JACCE is neither designed nor intended to supplant or replace Air Force expertise embedded in the JTF staff, however JACCE members are more likely to understand Air Force capabilities useful for homeland defense or civil support operations.
c. In some cases the JACCE director may be the senior US Air Force officer deployed into an area of operations in support of a JTF/component/civil operation.

(1) In extremis, the JACCE director may be designated by the Commander, 1 AF (AFNORTH) as the AETF/CC of US Air Force units/elements deployed in support of a JTF/component/civil operation within the forward operational area.

(2) The 1 AF (AFNORTH) JACCE will normally not execute command authorities except in extremis. Should the commander designate an AETF/CC, the AETF/CC staff should be augmented as necessary to ensure they will be able to execute appropriate span of control over deployed forces.
APPENDICES

Appendix A
Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCE</td>
<td>air component coordination element</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>airspace control order</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADCON</td>
<td>administrative control</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFFOR</td>
<td>Air Force forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFNORTH</td>
<td>Air Forces Northern</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASOC</td>
<td>air support operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATO</td>
<td>air tasking order</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAOC</td>
<td>combined air operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>close air support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFACC</td>
<td>combined force air component commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFLCC</td>
<td>combined force land component commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>commander, joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMAFFOR</td>
<td>commander, Air Force forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>combined task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>common tactical picture</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSCL</td>
<td>fire support coordination line</td>
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<td>JACCE</td>
<td>joint air component coordination element</td>
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<td>JAOC</td>
<td>joint air operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAOP</td>
<td>joint air operations plan</td>
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<td>JFACC</td>
<td>joint force air component commander</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<td>JFLCC</td>
<td>joint force land component commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFMCC</td>
<td>joint force maritime component commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFSOCC</td>
<td>joint force special operations component commander</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>joint operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAP</td>
<td>master air attack plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARLE</td>
<td>Marine liaison element</td>
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<tr>
<td>NALE</td>
<td>naval and amphibious liaison element</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation IRAQI FREEDOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCI</td>
<td>sensitive compartmented information</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPRNET</td>
<td>SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOLE</td>
<td>special operations liaison element</td>
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<tr>
<td>STO</td>
<td>special technical operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACP</td>
<td>tactical air control party</td>
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<tr>
<td>TST</td>
<td>time-sensitive target</td>
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Appendix B: Thoughts on the JACCE

THOUGHTS ON THE JACCE (4 April 2011)

By

J.T. Winters, Maj Gen, USAFR
7th AF CC/MA

JACCE team members need to be motivated, self-starters with Fighter, ISR, and AMD backgrounds as a minimum. The JACCE director needs to be at a rank that matches the primary players on the staff of the component being served; usually O-8 and in some cases O-7. In most cases, any lower rank will be marginalized. O-5s and O-4s are preferable for the rest of the team. The JACCE director needs two O-6 deputies, one to be the overall director of operations/deputy JACCE director and run things while the JACCE director goes from meeting to meeting, and one to run the night shift/serve as night director. Having been involved with JACCE stuff for a while, I am a big believer in having a director of ops to handle all of the meeting schedules, RFIs, JFACC “go dos” etc.--all the things that you would associate with an Ops officer/Chief of Staff. The team size will depend on the size of the total operation but you need one of each discipline for each shift. In my latest exercise we survived with six, counting the JACCE director, on days and three on nights (counting a comm person on each shift--absolutely needed). Good exercise numbers, but light for a sustained operation. A patchwearer, somewhere in the mix, is a big help and if I was building a team, I would strongly advocate for one.

You need to get organized quickly! If at all possible, the team must meet and talk with both the JAOC directors and the principles in each division. If you can draw a few members from the actual JAOC that know the fight--life is easier. Having a JACCE director intimately familiar with the plan and JFACC intentions paid great dividends. The process between components may or may not be very connected--The JACCE MUST BE. It is all about first impressions and if you can get to the right people early, it will pay off. Spend the time to sit down and call every important number on your roster and see who really picks up the phone. There has been a lot of talk about one stop shopping at the JAOC and AFFOR for the JACCE team. It is nice if you can swing it but hard to set up in practice. You must have classified voice capabilities--STE and VOIP if able. Soonest you can get up in the classified realm, the better.
In the beginning, it is all about getting access. The first step is that all team members must have the highest security clearances. Then it helps if the JFACC has personally talked to the CG and the J-3 about his JACCE team and how the process will be helped by giving them access. Our worldwide exercises have done a fairly good job of introducing the JACCE concept, so this is not the road block that it once was BUT--relationships must still be built and the trust factor worked through.

The goal of the JACCE team is not to become the process but to "assist and facilitate" the process. Make it smoother and faster unless there is a 911 situation that requires immediate intervention to save lives or to keep the train from coming off the tracks. They should not become the regular "shell answer man."

Wherever you are, make the staff look brilliant. Let them always get the credit. Try to always be in the background and not embarrass them by having the answer when they don't. For example, in a large meeting if you know the answer to something but it is not absolutely time critical--sit on it and get with the appropriate action officer afterwards and give them the scoop and/or help them totally flesh out the answer by connecting to the right counterparts. If asked a question straight out, by someone of importance--answer with something along the lines of "I think we have the answers to that at the JAOC and I will get with Maj Smith right after this and help get it sorted out." Obviously if the O-6 digs further for an answer and you have it--you answer! You don't make friends on the staff by having answers that they do not--makes them look bad in front of their boss. Natural tendency is to prove your worth by having the answers. You will better gain their respect and trust with the approach outlined here. Both are crucial to a working relationship and overall success.

Make quick/fast friends with the Air Force folks that are on the staff. They often are expected to have Air Force answers and if you can help them with that, the total answer/project will be better. This also goes for the Air Force representative on the JOC floor. (Mostly for the team at the JFC) There are normally one to two Air Force people on the floor at the JFC and they get a lot of Air Force questions direct. Get them in the fold early and you can keep the info and RFIs to the JAOC or AFFOR somewhat controlled and ultimately the answers and products consistent with the message that the JFACC wants projected. Try to continue to feed the staff and hook them up to their "real" counterparts in the JAOC/AFFOR. If you
are out of a job in a week or two--you have done your job--but it never happens that way.

There must be business rules set up between the JACCE Director, his director of ops, and the team, with respect to who can call who, and at what level in the JAOC or AFFOR staff. You don't want multiple RFIs going to the JAOC/AFFOR staff without regard for priority etc. It depends on the set up but it is reasonable for the JACCE members working with J33 and J35 to go directly to the JAOC for help as they get the staffs hooked up but you must always remember that the hottest thing at staff X may not be the hottest thing that the JFACC and his staffs are working, so there must be caution in throwing a wrench in the works with a "the CG wants this right now." You need to let the JACCE director make those calls which will probably be a phone call between himself and the JFACC. A note here--The deputy JACCE director/Director of Ops has to have both the JACCE director's and JFACC's confidence to get on the phone and either make direct reports to the JFACC or more likely--take verbal direction from the JFACC. Often the JACCE director is mixed up with the CG or his staff and their battle rhythm when the JFACC wants to talk to the JACCE team.

The JACCE team must be careful when relaying info to the JAOC or AFFOR--just because you just heard it in a meeting does not mean that the J-3 or CG have decided on that course of action. I have seen many instances of the JAOC getting spun up on "rumor" and that is all it is until a decision is made. Some of this is inevitable as the Staff tries to stay ahead, but it can be detrimental--so caution is the word--especially on changes of ROE and other critical areas. The only verbals I take for guidance is directly from the CG or the J-3 on his behalf.

The thing that always happens is that the JACCE team becomes the "easy" route. It happened in OIF and has happened in every exercise that I have been a director. It is the natural progression--as trust increases and the great work of the JACCE team becomes apparent--the line at the JACCE office is long with action officers looking for the JACCE team to do their work for them. They don't look at it like that because they just want fast results, but that is what it is. ALSO, THE JACCE MEMBERS LIKE IT BECAUSE THEY FEEL EMPOWERED and INVOLVED and DEEP DOWN WANT TO BE ACTION OFFICERS. Many problems with this one--the JACCE is not manned to solve every action officer's problem or to research their answers. So it becomes the JACCE team's job once again to
connect the AOs together, not make the phone calls and gather the info. It comes down to the old line -- in the beginning you need to feed them fish, but very quickly you must teach them to fish on their own. You can still be there in a crunch and you can still help, but the proper people in the JAOC need to have visibility to include the SOLE, BCD, NALE, MARLO as appropriate to the organization that you are the JACCE for; and in a big operation, it is the only way that you will survive without getting buried. Keep in mind though- IF THERE IS A TIME CRITICAL SITUATION AND IT IS GOING TO FALL APART WITHOUT YOUR INTERVENTION--JUMP IN AND FIX IT IF YOU HAVE THE ABILITY!

Finally, you need to fight the "Stockholm Syndrome." There will be a time when you will fall in with the staff and feel the need to choose sides and bad mouth the JAOC/AFFOR. "They are the holdup...they are the problem." You get so entrenched with the staff that you are working with, (good thing) that you start looking at EVERYTHING through their lens. While it is critical that you see things their way (that is one of the reasons why you are there)--you have to stay above it all--understand the strains that both sides are under and look for where you can smooth it out. Where you can, fix the perception that the JAOC isn't responsive to the needs of "fill in the blank" component. REMEMBER--YOU WORK FOR THE JFACC!

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5 A psychological phenomenon in which hostages express empathy and have positive feelings towards their captors, sometimes to the point of defending them (i.e., "going native").