Crimea Crisis: February-March 2014

TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID)
Purpose

- To give a historical/strategic overview of the tensions between Ukraine and Russia.
- To attempt to explain the language difference between eastern Ukraine and the rest of the nation and the schism it may cause within the country.
- To give details of the strong position that Russia holds over Ukraine and many other Western European countries due to their reliance on Russian hydrocarbon products for energy.
- To report to the Army training community the major activities the Russians performed to take total control of Crimea in less than four weeks.
- To provide an operational overview of which military and civilian facilities the Russians targeted and in what order.
- To detail tactics the Russians used to capture the last Ukrainian ship in the Sevastopol Naval Base.
- To provide a timeline of Ukraine-Russia relations from historical times to August 2014.

Executive Summary

- Ukraine and Russia, despite relatively good relations during their mutual communist era, have had high-level political disagreements over energy and Ukraine’s flirtations with the West.
- Ukraine is heavily dependent upon Russia for natural gas and Russia historically attempts to leverage that dependency to force political concessions. Much of the Russian natural gas consumed by Western Europe flows through pipelines that pass through Ukraine. Any economic sanctions placed on Russia by the West may boomerang if Russia chooses to stop the export of fossil fuels to Western Europe.
- Language plays a major role in the cultural identity of a group of people. More students in eastern Ukraine receive classroom instruction in the Russian language than those in the western two-thirds of the country, who primarily learn in the Ukrainian language.
- A combination of previously stationed Russian troops, highly trained airborne units, naval infantry and Spetsnaz (Russian special forces) personnel from the Central and Western Military Districts, along with pro-Russian local defense forces took control of Crimea in less than a month.
- The Russian/local self-defense forces captured a Ukrainian ship using a combination of information warfare, psychological operations, and military action.

Cover Photo: Armed soldiers without any identifiable unit markings provide security outside the Crimean parliament building in Simferopol, 1 March 2014. Photo by by Sebastian Meyer, Voice of America website via Wikipedia Commons.
Introduction

In less than a week after the pro-European protesters forced the resignation of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych on 21 February 2014, and his subsequent hasty exodus to eastern Ukraine or Russia the following day, a large number of then-unidentified military personnel with support from local “self-defense” groups began to take control of strategic civilian and military facilities in the Crimean Peninsula. In early March 2014, multiple media sources reported these unidentified soldiers—most likely Russian troops—had taken control of Crimea. Over the next three weeks these organized units, with local militia assistance, took control of 189 Ukrainian military facilities and most of the Ukrainian naval fleet, and forced the Ukrainian military to leave Crimea for the mainland. Even more dramatically, the Russians did it with a slightly fewer military personnel on the peninsula than the Ukrainians had stationed there and with low casualty figures on both sides. The Russians used a combination of psychological operations, information warfare, coercion, bribery, naval and land blockades, and a limited amount of overwhelming force.\(^1\)

This report will examine the events in Crimea from late February to early March 2014 in three respects. The first is the historical/strategic level, which will examine occasional strained relations between Russia and Ukraine along with the importance of Russian natural gas for Ukraine and other Western European countries. The second section will deal with the actions taken by the invading forces that targeted specific civilian and military facilities in order to achieve rapid success. The final section focuses on how the attackers seized the last remaining Ukrainian warship in the Sevastopol Naval Base with only limited casualties on both sides.
Historical/Strategic Overview

Historically, Russia has often attempted to dominate Ukraine and the two countries have usually found themselves at odds with each other. In 1667, the Ukrainians found their traditional homeland divided between Poland and Russia. In 1793 during the second partition of Poland by Prussia and Russia, most of modern-day Ukraine became part of the Russian Empire. With the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, the Central Rada (Council) declared Ukraine’s independence in Kyiv. Over the next four years, various political blocs fought a civil war in Ukraine for control of the country. In 1921, the communist forces with support from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) took control of the eastern two-thirds of the country and proclaimed that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic now belonged to the USSR. In 1941, when Hitler decided to attack the USSR, many Ukrainians cheered because the people believed the Germans would be Ukraine’s liberators. The native population, however, soon found the Nazis just as unpalatable as the Soviets, and about five million Ukrainians died fighting the Germans. When Soviet troops liberated Kyiv from the Nazis in November 1943, Stalin then attempted to “Russify” the country by eliminating use of the Ukrainian language in schools, the courts, and government. The communists thought that one culture—Russian—would better serve to unify the USSR. In 1945, the Soviet Union
formally re-assimilated the western part of Ukraine. In a surprising move less than a decade later, however, Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev “gave” Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR.³

While the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was thought of as an administrative move as the Soviet Union never foresaw its own demise, Crimea was always part of Russia dating back several hundred years. From the Russian perspective, the transfer of the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine was a mistake of Khrushchev, communism, or just history. Crimea is much different than the rest of Ukraine as many Russian retirees, especially from the Russian Navy, live in Crimea.

On 6 July 1990, with the end of the Soviet Union, Ukraine proclaimed its independence. On 1 December 1991, over 93% of Ukrainian citizens voted for independence and chose former communist Leonid Krawchuk as their first president. On 10 July 1994, Leonid Kuchma—former director of a Soviet rocket factory—defeated the incumbent to become Ukraine’s second president. During Kuchma’s decade in power, the Ukrainian air force accidentally shot down a Russian civilian airplane over the Black Sea during a joint Russian-Ukrainian air defense exercise in October 2001, killing all 78 people on board. The responsibility for this accident is still undetermined. On 26 December 2004, the West-leaning Viktor Yushchenko defeated the Russian-backed challenger, Viktor Yanukovych, to become the third Ukrainian president. Yanukovych served twice as Ukraine’s Prime Minister before winning election on 25 February 2010 to become the country’s fourth president. Political alliances cemented during Yanukovych’s previous tenure as Donetsk’s provincial governor helped him garner Russian backing; in return, he frequently supported Russian political positions in parliament.⁴

Language Barrier between Eastern and Western Ukraine

The Soviet policy of eliminating the local language negatively affected Ukraine, especially in the eastern part of the country. The farther west one travels in Ukraine, the more Ukrainian is spoken. Ukrainian is the language taught in western Ukrainian schools, as well as the native tongue spoken by most locals. A quick glance at Figure 3 on the next page demonstrates that Ukraine is a country divided by its language, a reality that fuels cultural divisions as well. Except for Zakarpattia province in the far southwestern corner of the country and Odessa in the south-central region, at least
90% all people in the provinces in the western two-thirds of the country use Ukrainian as the primary instructional language in their schools (percentages in green text in Figure 3). In six provinces, including the two already mentioned, approximately 70% to 84% of the students are taught in the Ukrainian language, while the others prefer Russian as their primary language of choice (percentages in orange text). In the Crimea, the province that recently voted in favor of assimilation by Russia, only 8% of the students study school subjects in the Ukrainian vernacular (percentages in red text). Most of the remaining students use Russian as their native tongue, except for possibly the 15% of Crimean residents who are ethnic Tatars. For the most part, Crimea is culturally more Russian than Ukrainian. In Donetsk and Lunhansk, the two main provinces where pro-Russian separatists are now arrayed against military forces of the Ukrainian government, Russian is used in most of the public schools.5

Russian Hydrocarbon Resources

Among the major strategic issues exacerbating the Russia-Ukraine confrontation is Ukraine’s reliance on Russian natural gas, as well as the pressing need of many other European countries to import Russian hydrocarbon resources. Over 50% of all natural gas that Russia ships to Europe must first pass through

Figure 4. Russian natural gas exports to European countries; European countries that are not listed import no natural gas from Russia
Ukraine. European countries that rely on Russia for the bulk of their natural gas energy must weigh any of their sanctions’ effects against Russia’s ability to retaliate through GazProm, the Russian natural gas company. These energy-dependent European countries must walk a fine line because economic sanctions intended to punish Russia could backfire if Russia stopped selling hydrocarbon products to Europe. It is difficult to determine which side is more dependent on the other. Are Western Europe’s needs for Russian natural gas greater than Russia’s need to export its hydrocarbon resources? It remains to be seen which side is negotiating from the stronger bargaining position, especially when winter arrives and natural gas use increases.

Those European countries that receive little or no natural gas from Russia have little to fear if GazProm turned off the natural gas that currently flows through Ukrainian pipelines. The other countries, however, are totally dependent on Russia for all their natural gas as they produce very little natural gas themselves. Figure 4 breaks out the amount of natural gas received by each country from Russia as a percentage of total natural gas usage. Eight European countries—Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom—receive no natural gas from Russia, and therefore are not shown. Occupying the opposite end of the spectrum are Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania, who receive 100% of their natural gas from Russia. Belarus and Slovakia also receive over 90% of their natural gas from Russia. Other European countries that rely on Russia for at least 50% of their natural gas imports include Austria, Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine. Approximately two-thirds of Ukraine’s natural gas comes from Russia. While there may be other sources of natural gas in the world, the logistics entailed in shipping it to Europe may be quite costly. If Russia decided to turn off its natural gas pipeline to Europe due to political decisions made by the government in Moscow, the EU countries would need to find a replacement for about 25% of their natural gas requirements. While many countries are looking for other natural gas resources than Russia, Russia will still be one of the biggest natural gas suppliers to Western Europe for the immediate future. Germany’s unique relationship with Russia may make the Berlin government a key player in the negotiations for hydrocarbon resources from Russia.

Russia also possesses leverage over several European countries when it comes to coal and petroleum resources. Russia supplies Poland with 50% of its coal and 83.7% of its petroleum, and Finland with 41.5% of its coal and 68.5% of its petroleum. Slovakia receives 71.6% of its petroleum from Russia, but only 19.5% of its coal requirements. Hungary imports 78.6% of petroleum, but only 1.9% of its coal from Russia. Some countries that receive little to no natural gas from Russia still rely on it for major amounts of coal. These countries include the United Kingdom at 34.8%, Belgium at 22%, and Spain at 13.4% of their respective coal imports. In taking a stand against most Western European countries, Russia may occupy the stronger position when it comes to playing a geopolitical game of chicken involving economic sanctions. It could be possible that Russia could sell its hydrocarbon products to one country who in turn could resell it to another. While this would keep the energy flowing to countries on the outs with Russia, it would drive up the price of the coal, petroleum, or natural gas.

More Recent Developments (2002 to the Present)

Depending on which president was in power, the political and economic relationship between Ukraine and Russia has swung like a pendulum since the former’s independence in the early 1990s. In May 2002, the Ukrainian political leadership announced that their country would seek to join NATO—a move
loathed by the Russians and maybe more than half of the Ukrainian population. This gravitation toward the Western military alliance continued until 25 February 2010, when Viktor Yanukovych began his term as Ukraine’s president. In April 2010, Ukraine signed a deal with Moscow that would allow the Black Sea Fleet to be stationed in Crimea until 2042 with an option providing for renewal of the agreement for five additional years. In return, Russia cut the price of natural gas sold by GazProm to Ukraine by 30%. Two months after ratifying the Black Sea Fleet deal, the Ukrainian parliament voted to stop its country’s plans to join NATO—a decision that significantly increased Russia’s geopolitical influence over Ukraine. In November 2013, Yanukovych’s government chose to reject a trade agreement with the European Union (EU), looking instead for a closer economic relationship with Russia.9

Parliament’s decision to turn its back on the West led Ukrainian nationalists to begin small protests all over the country, which increased in size until 100,000 Ukrainians marched in Kyiv and occupied its city hall. Russia responded to Yanukovych’s tenuous situation by writing off $15 billion of Ukrainian debt and approving a one-third price reduction on natural gas shipments to Ukraine. While possibly not connected, the Ukrainian government released all 234 demonstrators taken into custody since December 2013 just a few days after Ukrainian security forces allegedly killed 77 protesters in Kyiv. Despite this conciliatory move by the authorities, violent protests continued throughout Kyiv until Yanukovych signed an agreement with opposition leaders that committed him to governing consistent with parameters codified in the 2004 constitution. Shortly thereafter, Yanukovych fled to either eastern Ukraine or Russia due to fears for his personal safety. On 23 February 2014, the Ukrainian parliament appointed its speaker, Oleksander Turchynov, as interim president, and the new government later issued an arrest warrant for Yanukovych due to his impeachment and flight from prosecution. Russia’s loss of its leading supporter in Kyiv made it seem to Putin and the other Russian leaders that Ukraine would not remain within the Russian sphere of influence, but even more importantly was how the change in administrations would affect the Russian Black Sea Fleet. On 31 March 2014, GazProm eliminated the “discount” of natural gas sold to Ukraine and increased the price by over 40% to $385.50 per thousand cubic meters (tcm). Less than a week later, on 3 April 2014, GazProm raised the price of natural gas sold to Ukraine to $485 per tcm. Negotiations continued throughout the summer, but the two sides have yet to reach an agreement. Russia eventually chose to stop all natural gas sales to Ukraine until that country paid off its past gas debt of over $2 billion, and further stipulated that all future sales must be prepaid before GazProm ships the natural gas through its pipeline.10

Historical Russian Military Presence in Crimea

Since its founding in 1783 by Russian prince Grigory Potemkin after the territory was taken from the Ottoman Empire, Sevastopol has always served as a strategic seaport for the Russian or Soviet Black Sea Fleet due to its warm water access. Even after Khrushchev gave Crimea to the Ukraine SSR in 1954, Sevastopol continued to serve as the headquarters for the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. After the dissolution of the USSR, Russia and Ukraine eventually reached a deal in 1997 that allowed Russia to remain in control of 81.7% of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. As part of this deal, Russia would keep its fleet in Crimea until 2017. Many of the naval officers and personnel on the ships assigned to Crimean military installations chose to defect to the Russian navy, the true successor to the Soviet Black Sea Fleet.11
TRISA-CTID Threat Report

2010 Naval Base Agreement

The Yanukovych-led Ukrainian government agreed in April 2010 to allow the Russian Black Sea Fleet to remain based in Crimea for an additional 25 years, with a five-year extension option. With the current deal not set to expire until 2017, this gave Russia the ability to base troops in Crimea until 2042 with an option for five additional years. In return for the extension, Ukraine would receive a $100 discount per thousand cubic meters (tcm) of natural gas if the price was over $330 per tcm, or a 30% discount if the regular price was below the $330 threshold. The deal would allow Ukraine to purchase up to 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 2010 and up to 40 billion cubic meters annually in the following years. Basically, Ukraine traded the right for Russia to station military troops in Crimea for a promise by Russia to supply Ukraine’s energy requirements throughout the length of the agreement.12

Russian Crimean Military Authorizations

The deal between Ukraine and Russia allowed Russian naval forces to be stationed in Crimea. The maximum strength limits for the Russian armed forces included 25,000 personnel, 24 artillery systems with calibers less than 100-mm, 132 armored vehicles, and 22 airplanes. Most of the Russian naval units were stationed in the Sevastopol area, but there were a few exceptions. The primary Russian naval airbase is in Kacha, a few miles north of Sevastopol, and the 61st Support Group in Feodosia in the eastern part of the province. At the time of this year’s crisis, Russia had only about 16,000 troops stationed in Crimea; of these, most were naval personnel used mainly for sailing ships, rather than soldiers trained for ground warfare. One source stated that 10,000 combat soldiers, possibly infiltrated into Crimea, took part in the capture of the Ukrainian military bases in Crimea, but no other open source confirmed a number that high. Two major exceptions to the mainly naval Russian presence in Ukraine included the 1096th Separate Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment and 2,000 marines in the 810th Marine Brigade. At the onset of the 2014 crisis, additional Russian airborne soldiers and specialized troops were flown in to Crimean airports, ferried in, or brought into the country by hovercraft. The following chart shows the Russian naval units assigned to Crimea in late February/early March 2014 before the influx of any additional forces.13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit (Size if known)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Personnel/Equipment/Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea Fleet Headquarters (Flag Ship-Missile Cruiser Moskva)</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
<td>Payment by Russia to lease facilities and for environmental impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>854 Coastal Missile Regiment</td>
<td>Chersonese (Sevastopol)</td>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1096 Air Defense Regiment</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
<td>Artillery (less than 100-mm in size)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89 Independent Communications Regiment</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
<td>Armored Vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130 Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) Center (Osnaz)</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
<td>Military Planes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>810 Independent Marine Brigade (2,000 personnel)</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
<td>Kachka Air Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Surface Ships Division (Ships-Kerch, Ochakov, Smetlivy, Ladny, &amp; Pytlivy)</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
<td>Gvardeysky Air Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Surface Ships Brigade</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
<td>Unit Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ukrainian Forces

Ukraine actually fielded more personnel—about 25,000 military personnel to 16,000 Russian sailors and soldiers—in Crimea in late February 2014. Most of the Ukrainian military personnel, however, were sailors and not ground forces. The one major exception was the combined forces of approximately 750 personnel of the Ukrainian 1st (stationed in Feodesia) and the 501st Marine Battalions in the eastern part of Crimea. If Russian infiltrated 10,000 additional ground forces into Crimea, the forces were then almost equal in terms of personnel during the crisis. There were some non-military forces in Crimea that Russia felt more important than the naval personnel. These included Ukrainian Border Troops and Minister of Interior internal defense units. The chart below shows the major Ukrainian military weapon systems as of April 2013, not just the equipment located in Crimea.15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>197 LST Brigade (7 amphibious ships)</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>247 Independent Submarine Division (Diesel Subs B-871 Alrosa &amp; B-380 Syvatoy Knyaz Georgy)</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68 Coast Guard Ships Brigade (Harbor Defense Ship Brigade)</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 Anti-Submarine Ships Division (4 ships)</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>418 MSM (Minesweeper) Division (4 ships)</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102 Independent Anti-Diver Battalion</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 Missile Ships Brigade</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166 Missile Ships Division (Fast Attack Craft-Bora &amp; Samum hovercrafts, Mirazh &amp; Shtil)</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>295 Missile Boat Division</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63 Repair Ships Brigade</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>519 Independent ELINT Ships Division</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Ships Department</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VM-1020 (Support Ships)</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58 Group (Support)</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 Group (Support)</td>
<td>Feodosia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Support Ships Brigade</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>472 Support Ships Brigade</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57 Support Ships Division</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Support Ships Division</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 Rescue Brigade</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138 Rescue Ships Division</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162 Support Rescue Ships Division</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrographic Department</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>422 Separate Hydrographic Ship Division (includes Cheleken, Stvor, Donuzlav, &amp; GS-402)</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176 Hydrographic Division</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47 Hydrographic District</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7057 Naval Air Force Brigade</td>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Ukrainian Army (As of April 2013)\(^6\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armored Equipment in Service</th>
<th>Artillery in Service</th>
<th>Missile/AD/AT/AVN in Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-80UD/T-90 Main Battle Tank</td>
<td>167 152-mm, 2A36 Giatsint-B, Towed Gun</td>
<td>287 100-mm, MT-12, Towed Anti-Tank Gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-72A Main Battle Tank</td>
<td>600 152-mm, 2A65 MSTA-B Towed Gun/Howitzer</td>
<td>185 30-mm, 2S6M Tunguska, SP AA Gun (w/SA-19 Grison SAM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-64B Main Battle Tank</td>
<td>1100 152-mm, D-20 Towed Gun/Howitzer</td>
<td>215 57-mm, S-60, Towed AA Gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-64BM Bulat</td>
<td>47 152-mm, M-1937 (ML-20), Towed Gun/Howitzer</td>
<td>7 SS-1C Scud SRBM, Surface to Surface Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-54/55 Medium Tank</td>
<td>UNK (&lt;112) 203-mm, 2S7 Pion, SP Howitzer</td>
<td>99 9K-21 Luna, Free Rocket Over Ground (FROG)-7, Surface to Surface Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-84/U/Oplot Main Battle Tank (In Trials)</td>
<td>10 152-mm, 2S3 Akatsiya, SP Howitzer</td>
<td>463 9K-79 Tochka, SS-21 Scarab, Surface to Surface Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRDM-1/BRDM-2 Armored Recon Vehicle</td>
<td>UNK (600 in 2012) 152-mm, 2S5 Giatsint, SP Howitzer</td>
<td>24 Surface to Air (SA)-4 Ganef (2K-11 Krug)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMP-1 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)</td>
<td>994 152-mm, 2S19 MSTA-S, SP Howitzer</td>
<td>40 SA-8 Gecko (Osa-AK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRM-1K IFV</td>
<td>458 122-mm, 2S1 Gvozdika, SP Howitzer</td>
<td>600 SA-11 Gadfly (9K-37, Buk-1M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMP-2 IFV</td>
<td>1434 122-mm, D-30A, Towed Howitzer</td>
<td>369 SA-13 Gopher (9K-35, Strela-10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMP-3 IFV</td>
<td>4 122-mm, M-30, Towed Howitzer</td>
<td>2 SA-18 Grouse (9K-38, Igla 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMD-1 IFV</td>
<td>60 120-mm PM-38, Towed Mortar</td>
<td>119 Anti-Tank (AT)-6 Spiral (9K-114 Shturm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMD-2 IFV</td>
<td>78 120-mm, 2S9-1 NONA-S, SP Mortar</td>
<td>67 AT-5 Spandrel (9K-113 Konkurs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-80 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC)</td>
<td>395 120-mm, 2B16, SP Mortar</td>
<td>2 AT-4 Spigot (9K-111 Lagot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-70 APC</td>
<td>857 120-mm, 2S12, Towed Mortar</td>
<td>318 Helicopter, Mi-24 Hind Gunship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-60PB APC</td>
<td>136 300-mm, 9A52 Smerch, SP MRLS (12-round)</td>
<td>80 Helicopter, Mi-8 Hip, Utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-D APC</td>
<td>44 220-mm, 9P140 Uragan, SP MRLS (16-round)</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>132-mm, BM-13, Truck Mounted MRLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>122-mm, BM-21 Grad, SP MRLS (40-round)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>122-mm, 9P138, Truck Mounted MRLS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Ukrainian Air Force (As of April 2013)\(^7\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed Wing Aircraft in Service</th>
<th>Rotary Wing Aircraft in Service</th>
<th>Air Defense Weapons in Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MiG-29 Fulcrum/A/C, Fighter (16 in storage)</td>
<td>140+ Mi-2 Hoplite, Transport</td>
<td>3 AA-7 Apex (Air-to-Air Missile, K-23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-23 Flogger</td>
<td>120 Mi-8 Hip, Transport (31 in storage)</td>
<td>AA-8 Aphid (K-60)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Fighter/Ground Attack January 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Other Details</th>
<th>Weapon System</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MiG-25 Foxbat, Fighter</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Mi-9 Hip-G, Transport (4 in January 2012)</td>
<td>AA-9 Amos (K-100)</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-27 Flanker, Fighter</td>
<td>50+</td>
<td>Mi-24 Hind, Attack</td>
<td>AA-10 Alamo (R-27)</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-24 Fencer D, Fighter (Strike)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Mi-26 Halo, Transport</td>
<td>AS-9 Kyle (Air-to-Surface Missile, Kh28)</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-25 Frogfoot-A Fighter, Ground Attack</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td>AS-10 Karen (Kh-25)</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-24 MR Fencer-E, Reconnaissance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>AS-11 Kilter (Kh-58)</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-24MP Fencer F, Electronic Warfare (EW)</td>
<td>140+</td>
<td></td>
<td>AS-12 Kegler (Kh-25MP)</td>
<td>UNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL-76 Candid, Transportation</td>
<td>160</td>
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<td>AS-14 Kedge (Kh-29, some in January 2012)</td>
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<td>SA-5 Gammon (S-200 in fixed positions)</td>
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<td>SA-6 Gainful (2K12 Kub, some in January 2012)</td>
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### Ukrainian Navy (As of April 2013)

#### Vessels

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#### Aircraft

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Crimean Takeover: Operational Overview

Crimea has long sought its independence from Ukraine because of its long association with Russia and the people’s desire to rejoin the Russian Federation. Crimea had become the home to a large ethnic Russian population, many of which had served in the Soviet/Russian military. As far back as February 1994, Crimean politicians would make speeches declaring the Crimeans not only sought separation from Ukraine, but also a unification of Crimea with Russia. When Yuriy Meshkov won the first and only independent Crimean presidential election in 1994 with 73% of the votes, he stated, “In spirit, the Crimean people have been and remain part of Russia.” During the next couple of years, Ukrainian marines took possession of a number of naval facilities on Crimea, evicted the pro-Russian political leaders in Crimea, and ended the short-lived independent Crimea on 17 March 1995. With protests from Moscow, this eventually led to the 1997 treaty that divided the Russian naval facilities between the two countries and allowed for the Russians to maintain a military presence in Crimea, primarily to support the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet. One of the most overlooked clauses in the agreement — allowed the February/March 2014 events to take place — was the section that allowed Russian forces to implement not only security measures at their own permanent bases in Crimea, but to provide security for their own forces during deployment and redeployment movements to and from Russia. In the early stages of the crisis in late February 2014, this very minor clause in the treaty allowed the Russian military to move initially around Crimea without interference by any Ukrainian military personnel under the guise of the movement authorized by the military agreement between the two countries.

The Russian military launched their operation in Crimea less than a week after Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych signed an agreement with the opposition political leaders on 21 February 2014 that confirmed early presidential elections would take place by the end of the year, ensured a national unity government would be created before within a month, and guaranteed Ukraine would return to its 2004 constitution. Yanukovych then fled Kyiv within 24 hours, however, instead of remaining in Ukraine to abide by the agreement. The timing also coincided with the scheduled military maneuvers in the Russian Central and Western Military Districts that obscured the Russian troop movements into the peninsula. The map in Figure 5 indicates the various activities from unclassified sources that took place in Crimea between the night of 27-28 February 2014 and 25 March 2014, when the Ukrainian government pulled its military forces from Crimea and ceded control of the peninsula to the Crimean “defense forces” backed by Russian military forces. This is not a complete list, but examples of activities from open sources that took place and the dates on which the events occurred. The numbering of the paragraphs matches the map in Figure 5 below.

1: Government Buildings

Less than a company of well-armed troops took control of the Crimean parliament building and cabinet of ministers’ buildings in Simferopol, Crimea’s capital city, on 27 February 2014. The 120 military personnel, armed primarily with machine guns and grenades, quickly seized the government buildings and hoisted the Russian flag at both locations. Ukraine, especially over the last 20 years, has shown a history of protesters taking control of public buildings, especially city halls. The control of public space is symbolic for the usurpers as it provides a visual picture suggesting that the government cannot defend itself.
2 and 3: Transportation Hubs

On the night of 27-28 February 2014, several hundred unidentified armed personnel, likely mostly Russian military, seized the Simferopol civilian airport and the Sevastopol military airport. Approximately two Russian airborne battalions and some Spetsnaz forces then flew into Crimea under the pretext of protecting Crimea’s Russian-speaking population. The control of these transportation hubs allowed Russia to regulate what forces could be brought into Crimea by air.\textsuperscript{22}

4: Communications Network

During the day of 28 February 2014, armed personnel in uniforms who were supported by local militia took control of the Krym State Television Company and several Ukrtelecom facilities throughout Crimea. Ukrtelecom is the primary telephone and Internet communications provider in the region, and control of these communications facilities allowed the attackers to not just transmit, but shape their message to those living on the peninsula.\textsuperscript{23}

5: Naval Blockade

Dropping the pretense of posing as local forces or claiming themselves to be self-defense forces, as they did just two days earlier, the Russian navy sank a ship at the entrance to Donuzlav Lake on 6 March
2014. This was done under the guise of protecting ethnic Russians, but was really to prevent the Ukrainian naval fleet from leaving its base in Novoozerne harbor. Previously, on 1 March 2014, the Russian parliament had approved Putin’s request to use force in Ukraine to protect Russian interests. With the Ukrainian navy closed off from open water, their ships were powerless to confront any of the Russian ships at Sevastopol.24

6: Information Warfare (INFOWAR)

In Simferopol on 6 March 2014, armed men took control of all Ukrainian media stations still in operation in the city. Under the new “management,” the stations replaced their regularly scheduled broadcasts with the Russian news channel Rossiya 24. The Russians continued their INFOWAR campaign by increasing their control of the messages transmitted through local media to the Crimeans.25

7: Block International Observers

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observation teams attempting to enter Crimea for the third time on 8 March 2014 were turned back by warning shots fired by uniformed personnel who prevented them from crossing the Crimean provincial border. Keeping third-party observers to a minimum enabled Russian and pro-Russian self-defense forces to act with impunity, and afforded them control of message traffic transmitted from Crimea to external audiences.26

8: Targets of Opportunity

Once the major military bases were under Russian control or the Ukrainian military forces barricaded in, the Russian forces continued the campaign against other lesser military targets. On 10 March 2014, armed men occupied the Simferopol military hospital. This fully-equipped hospital would be useful in treating Russian and pro-Russian personnel, while denying the same medical assets to the Ukrainian military.27

9: Internet Control

On 13 March 2014, Russia blocked the web pages of thirteen sites known for their pro-Ukrainian or anti-Russian/Putin sympathies. These included Vkontakte, Russia’s leading social media website, which was also used by many Ukrainians. The social media groups, some with as many as 500,000 members, could not access the websites dedicated to their causes. In a very short time, the amount of negative Internet activity against Russia and Putin dropped considerably. The closure of the websites was an attempt to silence those who supported Ukrainian as opposed to Russian interests, and also to limit their activities in Crimea.28
10: Strategic Chokepoint

One natural gas pipeline provides most of the energy for the entire Crimean peninsula, and that pipeline flows from Russia through Ukraine to Crimea. Once Crimea proclaimed independence and later joined the Russian Federation, controlling the natural gas pipeline became crucial to both sides. For whatever reason, the Ukrainian military failed to protect it, but Russian forces waited for two weeks before taking this strategic infrastructure node. On 15 March 2014, a small company of Russian soldiers took the natural gas distribution center near Strilkove, a thin strip of land between the Ukrainian mainland and the Crimean Peninsula. Only 60-20 troops, supported by armored vehicles and helicopter gunships, were needed to take possession of the distribution center. With the control of natural gas in pro-Russian hands, the Ukrainians were unable to turn off power to Crimea at this critical chokepoint. In response to this hostile action on Ukrainian soil, the Ukrainian military finally responded by preparing defensive positions along the Ukrainian/Crimean border.29

11: Overwhelming Force

After days of little resistance by the Ukrainian forces located in Crimea, two Ukrainian supporters—one military and one militiaman—died defending their base in Simferopol on 18 March 2014. Despite all the military activity and confrontation by Ukrainian and Russian military forces in Crimea over the past three weeks, these were the first deaths of Ukrainian military personnel. Reacting to the death of the Ukrainian soldier, the Ukrainian Minister of Defense (MOD) revoked a previous order to exercise restraint, and authorized Ukrainian military personnel to use deadly force to protect themselves. On the following day, the MOD announced that Ukraine would withdraw all 25,000 of its military personnel from Crimea and relocate them to other bases in Ukraine. A couple of deaths and the appearance of a well-armed superior enemy convinced the Ukrainian military to stop resisting and to relinquish control of its former bases to the Russian force and local pro-Russian self-defense forces.30

12: Intimidate

Russian military forces, assisted by some native defense forces to give it a local flavor, continued to seize Ukrainian military sites. They captured two naval posts, including the major Ukrainian base in Sevastopol, on 19 March 2014. While these actions were underway, Admiral Serhly Hayduk, the Ukrainian navy commander, was taken prisoner by pro-Russian forces. The militia forces unceremoniously dropped off the admiral at a new checkpoint recently erected on the Ukrainian/Crimean border. The local self-defense forces usually raised the Russian flag on any bases they captured. While Crimes vocally expressed a desire for independence to the international community, the pro-Russian groups’ actions almost always indicated their determination to become part of the Russian federation.31

13: Eliminate Crucial Weapons

On 21 March 2014, Russian-led forces overran the 174th Air Defense Regiment base located at Fiolent, a suburb of Sevastopol. The Crimean forces captured the unit’s S-300 surface-to-air missile inventory before it could be destroyed. The Russian/militia forces also demanded the surrender of the defending Ukrainian unit; it complied, singing the “Hymn of Ukraine” as soldiers marched away from their base. The Ukrainian personnel system also worked to support the Russian intervention as conscripts and
officers usually served in their home districts. This meant that most of the Ukrainians serving in Crimea were of Russian descent. It seemed that the Ukrainian soldiers preferred surrender and their life to death in a futile effort to keep Crimea as part of a country of a different ethnic heritage. The military forces that now occupy Crimea are very familiar with the Russian S-300 (NATO designation: SA-10 Grumble). Any operational S-300s can quickly become part of the Russian military arsenal with little difficulty once missile experts complete safety inspections to ensure these weapons are in proper working order.32

14: Limit Opposition Successes
After sitting bottled up in Donuzlav Lake for almost two weeks, a Ukrainian Natya-class minesweeper tried to escape on 21 March 2014 by evading the blockade set up by the Russian Navy. Other ships refused to assist Cherkasy in moving the sunken ships out of the way so the minesweeper was forced to return to a defensive position in Donuzlav Lake. The Cherkasy's captain, however, still refused to follow the example of his fellow naval commanders who surrendered their vessels to Russian naval forces. With no coordination among ships and no assistance from what remained of the Ukrainian Navy in Crimea, there was probably no hope that one ship could do much against the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet. Eventually, the Russians forced the Cherkasy to surrender.33

15. Leave Difficult—but Not Strategic—Targets for Last
The Ukrainian military personnel at the Belbek Airbase attempted to defend their position from a follow-on attack by the Russians on 22 March 2014. The Russians had already taken over part of the airbase earlier in the conflict, but a portion of it remained under Ukrainian control. Facing Russian armored personnel carriers, the Ukrainian defense quickly faded, taking minimal casualties as only one Ukrainian officer was injured in the attack; Russian forces suffered no casualties. While some Ukrainian units or leaders attempted to defend their posts, the inability or lack of resolve displayed by neighboring Ukrainian units/leaders often proved contagious, causing comrades-in-arms to ponder whether their own deaths would be worth the cost, especially to any ethnic Russians in the Ukrainian military units.34

16. Barricade Forces inside Camps
Located on the eastern side of Crimea and geographically distant from most of the action that took place throughout the previous week, the Ukrainian 1st Marine Battalion was a formidable force in Feodesia. The marines, however, refused to fight and eventually surrendered on 24 March 2014. For several days, the 1st Marine Battalion’s leaders had been negotiating with the Russian/militia forces surrounding the base. At some point negotiating parties apparently neared agreement on a settlement that would have allowed the marines to retain their weapons and depart the base en route to the Ukraine in a vehicle convoy. Ultimately, however, the negotiations failed and the marines surrendered
unconditionally; several were then arrested. This occurred on the same day that all the other Ukrainian military personnel left Crimea on interim President’s Oleksander Turchynov’s orders.\textsuperscript{35}

**Operational Summary**

In less than four weeks, the Russians, with support from local Crimean militia, captured approximately 189 Ukrainian military sites, often without firing a shot. Ukraine lost Crimea as much by its inaction on the peninsula as by the Russians’ actions. The Russians used no tanks, and the most advanced armored personnel carriers (APCs) used in these operations were BTR-80s. (See \textit{The BTR Handbook–The Universal APC Threat Report} for details on this APC’s capabilities.) The Russians and their Crimean supporters used a combination of naval blockades, barricades to prevent soldiers leaving their bases, psychological warfare, intimidation, and bribery to convince most Ukrainian units to surrender without offering resistance. In units whose commanders initially refused to surrender, a few well-placed shots and a couple of resulting casualties typically sufficed to quickly change the resistors’ minds. The abundance of ethnic Russians in the military units in Crimea who refused to fight for Ukraine and the lack of substantial action by the government in Kyiv, gave the Russians a relatively easy military victory under
the guise of protecting ethnic Russians. On 17 April 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin finally revealed the worst-kept secret of the entire operation: those Russian troops were present in Crimea.36

The “Storming” of U-510 Slavutych

When the Russians and the local defense forces took over the Ukrainian naval vessels, the last ship to hold out in the Sevastopol harbor was the U-510, Slavutych, the Ukrainian navy’s command ship. When the USSR laid the keel for the Slavutych, it was originally intended to serve as an intelligence ship, a sister ship to the Russian Kamchatka. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the vessel was completed as a communications/command ship in 1992. The Slavutych bears the name of a town constructed by the Soviets for the families evacuated from Chernobyl after the 1986 nuclear accident. Both Russia and Ukraine wanted to possess the ship, but the final decision to divide the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet placed the Slavutych in the Ukrainian navy.37

On 3 March 2014, five Russian tugboats prevented all Ukrainian ships from leaving their docks in Sevastopol. Armed personnel quickly seized the Ukrainian corvette, Ternopil, through the use of stun grenades and machine guns. Moored next to the Ternopil, the Slavutych moved away from the pier and anchored itself 10 meters away to prevent any shore-based boarding parties from reaching the ship. When divers attempted to board it the same day, the Slavutych used water cannons to drive them away. Armed personnel tried to board the Slavutych the following day, but the ship’s crew again repelled the attackers.38

Two small Russian warships eventually replaced the tugboats and positioned themselves about 50 meters seaward from the Slavutych. Over the next three weeks, naval and ground forces kept a 24-hour watch on the Ukrainian command ship. After the Russian Black Sea Fleet commander boarded the Ternopil for an inspection of the captured vessel, the Russians gave the Slavutych and the rest of the Ukrainian navy bottled up at Donuzlav Lake until Friday, 21 March 2014, to surrender or decide to join the Russian Navy. Using various psychological techniques that included urging mothers of the sailors on board the Slavutych to call their sons on cell phones, up to 40% of the crew eventually deserted the ship.
On the day of the boarding, fathers also called, urging sons to stay in their cabins, unlock their doors, and leave them open, since the attackers would probably break down the doors anyway. Many of those on board were from Crimea and felt little allegiance to Ukraine. Some of the sailors were not technically members of the Ukrainian military, but working as civilian contractors; several just jumped overboard to escape. Their mothers came, fished them out of the water, and took them home. Many sailors chose to join the Russian navy, fearing that Ukrainian sailors who offered no resistance would be treated as deserters once they returned home. This was due to the scuttlebutt that some sailors who abandoned other ships had been arrested and were facing trial and possible prison sentences ranging from five to seven years. Other sailors simply chose to join the Russian Navy because they were native Crimeans, ethnic Russians, or married to local Crimean women; for them loyalty to family, heritage, or ship trumped national allegiance.39

Despite all the psychological and family pressure, the Slavutych’s captain and some of the crew refused to surrender their ship and remained loyal to the Ukrainian government in Kyiv. It soon became common knowledge that the local defense forces would attack the Slavutych on Saturday, 22 March 2014. During the afternoon, several of the ship’s crew—some in uniform and some in civilian clothes—
left the Slavutych carrying their possessions in black plastic. At approximately 1730 hours local time, a tugboat with a few dozen men approached the Ukrainian ship while bystanders watched from the pier. While it appeared that the attackers were part of the self-defense forces, at least one witness alleged that the tugboat carried Russian special operations personnel. Sailors aboard the Slavutych used their loudspeaker system to warn the approaching vessel against illegally boarding the ship, but to no avail. The Ukrainian ship then began to play the patriotic song Varyag, a heroic composition dating back to the Russo-Japanese War.40

The attackers on the tugboat reached the Slavutych, and then boarded it. By that time, almost everyone had surrendered except for the ship’s captain, who had locked himself in his cabin. The attackers first tried to use a sledgehammer to break the door down. When that failed, they resorted to grenades. A few gunshots rang out after the sledgehammer echoes faded and the grenades exploded, but soon the Ukrainian flag came down from the mast and the boarders raised a Russian flag in its place. The storming of the Slavutych was over in just mere minutes.41

The capture of the Slavutych is a perfect example of an attack to gain control of equipment as described in Training Circular (TC) 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics. The only difference is that the attack occurred on water instead of land. While the Russians may call the units that took part in the attack different names, the groups consisted of raiding, security, and support elements.42

**Analyst Assessment**

Russian intelligence operatives in Kyiv knew the direction that Ukraine was headed so they were able to begin contingency planning before Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych sought asylum in Russia. When the Russian-leaning Yanukovych lost power on 21 February 2014, Russia likely decided to convert its contingency plan into a real-world operation and take the Crimean peninsula away from Ukraine.

Since most of the Ukrainian military personnel stationed in Crimea were sailormen as opposed to ground combat troops, there were few elite Ukrainian ground forces available to meet the military challenge posed by Russia and the local self-defense units. Although most of the Russian military personnel originally stationed in Crimea were also sailormen, sufficient ground forces entered Crimea by air and sea to convince most Ukrainian military personnel to surrender without a fight. Once the pro-Russian forces seized selected strategic targets, the combination of Russian military and local self-defense forces systematically took control of the remaining military installations in Crimea. The Russians deployed soldiers in uniforms that bore no identifiable markings in an attempt to afford themselves plausible deniability, but almost immediately observers external to the Crimea discerned the true nationality of the well-trained and well-armed invaders. The Russians sent advisors to accompany the local militia to lend an indigenous flavor to operations intended to seize many of the softer targets. For the more difficult or important objectives, the disguised Russian forces either took the objectives themselves or heavily “advised” the local self-defense forces.

The actions in February and March 2014 in Crimea decimated the Ukrainian Navy. Ukraine lost 12 of its 17 major warships, including its only submarine, and almost 40 smaller vessels; this amounted to most of its naval personnel and some of its naval aviation assets. Ukraine’s five remaining warships now must operate out of the port of Odessa. At the start of the crisis, just less than 80% (about 12,000) of the Ukraine’s naval personnel were stationed in Crimea. During March, most of these Ukrainian sailors
opted for defection to the Russian Navy. In many cases, sailors who did not defect to the Russians drove their privately-owned civilian vehicles out of Crimea to the Ukrainian mainland. Several Ukrainian naval airplanes and helicopters managed to take off and fly to safe bases, but over a dozen aircraft grounded for repairs, scheduled maintenance, or otherwise unable to fly ultimately fell into Russian hands. Other Ukrainian military personnel who managed to escape from Crimea often left without their weapons or vehicles.\textsuperscript{43}

Petro Poroshenko, newly elected to the Ukrainian presidency in May 2014, insisted that Ukraine had not given up on Crimea, though it will be almost impossible for the country to recover its lost province. Ukraine may apply to the International Court of Arbitration in Stockholm, Sweden, to resolve the issue, but Russia now physically possesses Crimea. With an ongoing civil war in the Ukraine becoming the new normal, the Crimean crisis may take a backseat to deciding the issue of which side will ultimately control the Crimea.

Ukraine’s reliance on Russia for hydrocarbon resources is a component of the larger issues of national allegiances, access, and sovereignty. The most likely source of a Russian gas disruption to Ukraine is the Ukrainian inability to pay their gas debt—one of the triggers for the gas disputes between the two countries in 2006 and 2009. In order to maintain the status quo, Russia may attempt to use the carrot of reduced prices for natural gas or the stick of turning off the pipelines to force Ukraine to accept the Crimea \textit{fait accompli}. The current Ukrainian government may decide that keeping their citizens’ homes heated in the winter may be more conducive to remaining in power than possession of the Crimean peninsula. If the Ukrainian government acknowledges the loss of Crimea, Kyiv might face protests in western Ukraine—a situation the current government would prefer to avoid. The Russian government is debating whether to build a $1.5 billion Kerch Bridge to connect the Crimean peninsula to the Russian mainland. Debate revolves around whether the Russian government will pay the entire cost or to charge a toll to use the bridge. If the land bridge between Russia and the peninsula is not built, however, Putin could decide that successfully supporting an exclave separated from Russia’s contiguous territory is problematic. Russia might exact an even more exorbitant price from Ukraine in return for allowing the Crimea to return to Ukrainian control; this could entail forcing Ukraine to turn its back on Western Europe and the country’s return to Russia’s sphere of influence. Until a final outcome is decided in eastern Ukraine, the recovery of Crimea will likely remain a second-tier issue for the Ukrainian government—important, but not an essential prerequisite for maintaining Ukraine’s national existence.\textsuperscript{44}

Training Implications

- Large military land forces are not always necessary to achieve quick results across a fairly large area. Small groups of well-trained soldiers can sometimes be just as effective.
- Lack of knowledge by the central government creates inaction by military forces that may be able to make a difference in the outcome of the action.
- Native personnel are often used to make it appear that locals are the ones making the attacks instead of an entity from outside the country.
Countries will often have attack plans on file in case of certain scenarios. It appears that Russia already had contingency plans in place for taking Crimea, as less than a week passed between the pro-Russian leader losing power in Kyiv and the action in the peninsula.

Priority targets include media stations and computer servers in order to shape the INFOWAR environment.

Isolating opposing ships and military personnel in their bases precludes deployment of their weapons systems.

Major units that are not strategic targets can be cordoned off and neutralized later.

Military units afflicted with low morale will often give up because individual members regard their cause as less important than personal survival. Psychological collapse often precedes physical collapse.

Ukraine and Crimea Timeline

14th Century: Poland and Lithuania annexed most of what is now Ukraine.

1667: Poland and Russia partitioned Ukraine.

1783: Russian Prince Grigory Potemkin founded the port city of Sevastopol in Crimea after taking the peninsula from the Ottoman Empire.

1793: Poland was partitioned and most of the Ukrainian region became part of the Russian Empire.

1921. USSR conquered two-thirds of Ukraine and established the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

1932. Approximately seven million Ukrainian peasants died due to Stalin’s collectivization plan.

1941. Germany occupied Ukraine and five million Ukrainians died fighting the Nazis. Some Ukrainians joined the Nazis to fight the Soviets.

1944: Before Germany left the Ukraine, they exterminated 1.5 million Jews. Stalin deported 200,000 Crimean Tatars to Siberia for collaboration with the Nazis.

1945: The Soviet Union annexed Western Ukraine.

1954: Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev gave Crimea to Ukraine.

17 October 1990: Student protests and hunger strikes caused the Ukrainian Head of the Council Ministers (Prime Minister) to resign and his government collapsed.

August 1991: The Ukrainian Parliament declared its independence from the USSR.

19 July 1994: Leonid Kuchma became Ukraine’s second president and served for over a decade.

1997: Ukraine and Russia signed a deal in which Russia paid the Ukraine $526.5 million to receive 81.7% of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, which it could keep in Crimea until 2017.

October 2001: The Ukrainian Air Force accidently shot down a Russian civilian plane over the Black Sea that killed 78 people.
May 2002: The Ukrainian government announced the country would seek to join NATO.

November 2004: The Orange Revolution began with opposition candidates highlighting the corruption in the government.

January 2006: Russia stopped the natural gas flow to Ukraine, claiming economic reasons, while Ukraine said it was a ploy to pressure the country into accepting Russia’s political demands.

March 2008: GazProm, the Russian Natural Gas Company, and Ukraine agreed to a new natural gas contract that included direct supplies to Ukraine’s largest industries.

24 August 2008: Russia accused the Ukraine of deploying military personnel and encouraging paramilitary personnel to fight with Georgia in the Russo-Georgian War.

January 2009: GazProm stopped sending natural gas to the Ukraine due to unpaid bills. Within a week, the two countries came to a new 10-year deal and Russia began to export gas again to Ukraine.

25 February 2010: Viktor Yanukovych, a former governor of Donetsk in eastern Ukraine and Prime Minister, took office as Ukraine’s fourth president.

April 2010: Russia and Ukraine sign a deal that extended the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea until at least 2042. GazProm responded by granting Ukraine a 30% discount on natural gas.

June 2010: The Ukrainian Parliament voted to stop its campaign to join NATO.

21 November 2013: Yanukovych and his cabinet decided not to sign a trade agreement with the European Union (EU) and to seek a closer economic relationship with Russia instead.

Late November 2013: Protests against the “pro-Russian” government occurred throughout Ukraine and culminated with 100,000 protestors in Kyiv who eventually occupied the city hall.

17 December 2013: Russia agreed to buy $15 billion of Ukrainian debt and GazProm further reduced the price of its natural gas to Ukraine by about one-third.

Early February 2014: Ukrainian security personnel killed at least 77 protesters in Kyiv.

14-16 February 2014: Under pressure, the Ukrainian government released all 234 protesters arrested since December. Protesters responded by vacating the Kyiv City Hall and other public buildings across the country.

21 February 2014: Yanukovych signed an agreement with the opposition for a return to the 2004 Constitution. Yanukovych immediately fled to either eastern Ukraine or Russia.

23 February 2014: The Ukrainian Parliament appointed Oleksander Turchynov, the parliament speaker, as interim president. Russia responded by recalling its ambassador to Ukraine.

27-28 February 2014: Russian military personnel took control of strategic facilities in Crimea while the Crimean Parliament expressed no confidence in the government in Kyiv and formed its own Council of Ministers.

1 March 2014: The Russian Parliament approved President Vladimir Putin’s request to use force in Ukraine to protect Russian interests as pro-Russian rallies occurred in eastern Ukrainian cities.
2 March 2014: The US Government stated that Russia now controlled Crimea.

6 March 2014: The Crimean Parliament voted to secede from Ukraine and join Russia as armed men seized Ukrainian warships in Crimea. Putin denied any Russian involvement.

7 March 2014: GazProm stated that Ukraine must pay its outstanding natural gas bill of $1.89 billion, and in the future, all payments must be made before the delivery of the natural gas.

16 March 2014: Ukraine mobilized 20,000 national guard volunteers.

17 March 2014: The Crimean Electoral Commission stated that 96.85% of all voters in Crimea wanted their country to join with Russia.

18 March 2014: Russia and Crimea signed documents making Crimea part of Russia.

24 March 2014: The Russians announced that 189 Ukrainian military installations in Crimea were under control of the local government and no longer under Kyiv’s command.

26 March 2014: Over 30,000 Russian troops began conducting exercises on the Ukrainian border.

3 April 2014: GazProm announced that the natural gas sold to Ukraine would be $485 per tcm, an 80% price increase in a very short period of time.

17 April 2014: Putin finally publicly admitted that Russian troops had been present in Crimea during the February/March crisis.

1 May 2014: The Ukrainian government reinstated the draft for all men 18-25 years of age unless they were granted an exemption or deferment.

7 May 2014: Russia announced it had terminated its 2010 lease deal with Ukraine to station the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea since Crimea was now part of Russia.

25 May 2014: Petro Poroshenko won the presidential election with 54.7% of the vote.

11 June 2014: Ukraine rejected GazProm’s offer to cut the natural gas price from $485 per tcm to $385 per tcm and an extension on the 16 June 2014 deadline for Ukraine to pay off its gas debt. Ukraine countered with an offer of $268 per tcm. Russia threatened to cut off all natural gas to the country if Ukraine did not pay its gas debt.

16 June 2014: Russia halted all natural gas deliveries to Ukraine and stated all future deliveries must be prepaid. Ukraine supposedly had enough natural gas to last until December 2014.

27 June 2014: Ukraine signed an economic association agreement with the EU.

14 July 2014: A missile shot down an An-26 Transport plane at 21,000 feet—too high for a MANPAD to reach.

17 July 2014: Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 was shot down over Ukraine, killing all 280 passengers and 15 crew members. Both sides claimed the other shot down the airplane, but it appeared it may have been pro-Russian separatist forces using a Russian supplied BUK-M1 SAM.
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**Figure Credits**

Figure 1. Ukraine in relationship to the rest of Europe. Crimea is the small peninsula south of the Ukraine mainland, CIA World Factbook, 31 July 2014.

Figure 2. Ukraine with its major cities. CIA World Factbook, 31 July 2014.

Figure 3. Percent of Ukrainians that use Ukrainian as the primary language at school. US Embassy Map modified by CTID, 31 July 2014. Data from TargetMap.com, “Ukrainian Language at Schools,” 2011.

Figure 4. Russian natural gas exports to European countries. European countries that are not listed import no natural gas from Russia. Chart generated by CTID OEA Team, 31 July 2014, using various sources.

Figure 5. Russian operational actions in Crimea-February/March 2014. Original map from Wikipedia with changes by CTID, 4 August 2014.

Figure 6. Ship sunk by the Russian navy to block the entrance to Donuzlav Lake. Photo authorized for noncommercial use.

Figure 7. S-300 Anti-Aircraft Missile.

Figure 8. Russian soldiers keep Ukrainian military personnel confined to their compound.

Figure 9. U-510 Slavutych, Ukrainian Command Ship.

Figure 10. Graphical portrayal of how the Russians and local self-defense groups took over the Slavutych on Saturday, 22 March 2014. Created by CTID, 15 August 2014.

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**End Notes**


5 TargetMap.com, “Ukrainian Language at Schools,” 2011.

6 Australian Uranium, “Europe’s Dependence on Russian Gas,” 2005; Business Insider, “% of Gas Coming From Russia,” 20 July 2014; Columbia Management, “Ukraine Crisis – Can The U.S. Make Europe Less Dependent On Russian Gas?,” Value Walk, 29 July 2014.; Moody’s Analytics, “How Much Does Europe Depend on Russian Gas?,” 3 April 2014; The Telegraph, “Europe Scrambles To Break Gas Dependence on Russia,” 2014. Sources varied on percents for each country so the information is the latest year available (usually 2012) or the ones that conflicted the least between the sources.

7 Australian Uranium, “Europe’s Dependence on Russian Gas,” 2005; Business Insider, “% of Gas Coming From Russia,” 20 July 2014; Columbia Management, “Ukraine Crisis – Can The U.S. Make Europe Less Dependent On Russian Gas?,” Value Walk, 29 July 2014.; Moody’s Analytics, “How Much Does Europe Depend on Russian Gas?,” 3 April 2014; The Telegraph, “Europe Scrambles To Break Gas Dependence on Russia,” 2014. Sources varied on percents for each country so the information is the latest year available (usually 2012) or the ones that conflicted the least between the sources.

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42 Department of the Army, “TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics,” December 2011. See paragraph 3-7 for a definition of an attack to gain control of key equipment; paragraph 3-44 for raiding element activities; paragraph 3-174 for the definition of a raid; paragraph 3-177 for the raiding element definition, and paragraph 3-176 for the three elements used in an attack.