Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE
Haiti Earthquake Response

Joint Center for Operational Analysis
15 May 2010
Final Draft

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How to Navigate This Brief

There are multiple layers to this brief that will not be viewed in the proper sequence if the reader uses the traditional slide-by-slide, consecutive manner of moving through the slides. In order to view slides containing supporting data, it is necessary to do the following:

• The first 16 slides of this brief will go to the next slide with a mouse click, by hitting the space bar, or by pressing the “Page Down” or down-arrow keys. Note that slide 14 “Gap of Pain” builds through successive mouse clicks. At slide 15 “Observations and Finding Areas”, each of the areas is hyperlink to its respective main finding slide. Click on the desired area to go there.

• Once in a main finding area slide, it is best to use the buttons exclusively to navigate in and through the finding area. Using the hyperlink buttons (      or      ) allow you to “drill down” into increasingly detailed evidentiary information.

• The reader can return from drill downs by clicking the U-turn arrow button ( )

• An additional special drill-down hyperlink is found in this brief (  ) This button links to specific observations made by the JTF Commander in Haiti that either compliments JCOA’s independent observation, or addresses the subject from a unique perspective

Attempting to go through the brief in a sequential, slide-by-slide manner without using the hyperlinked buttons as described above will generally preclude a full understanding of the material.
Organization of the Briefing

- JCOA Mission and Concept
- Background of the Crisis
- Observations and Finding Areas
  - National Response and Organization
  - COCOM Response and Organization
  - JTF Formation & Organization
  - Contingency Force Projection
  - Coordination, Collaboration & Communication
  - Expeditionary Logistics
  - Medical Observations
- Recommendations
JCOA Mission and Concept

Mission:
On order, JCOA deploys teams to the SOUTHCOM AOR to conduct collection and dissemination of lessons learned on the IHADR response in Haiti in order to assist ongoing efforts and document lessons for future use.

Concept:
Active lessons learned (LL) reach back and analytical support, focused on the specific issues that the JTF and USSOUTHCOM leadership believes are most useful for informing decision makers on emerging issues.

A study on the SOUTHCOM response to this humanitarian crisis oriented on the theater-strategic (COCOM) level, with insights from the strategic and tactical level. The study will:
- Examine organizational structures, horizontal and vertical processes, partnering efforts, and effectiveness of the response effort.
- Identify, capture, and disseminate successes, lessons learned, and the challenges remaining from the operation in order to improve future responses to similar crises.
- Produce a briefing, followed by a case study, for rapid dissemination across the Joint and Interagency community that informs DOTMLPF changes.

Products:
Quick look brief by 2 April, final brief by 1 May, written case study by 1 June
JCOA Timeline and Interviews

Interviews were conducted with these organizations:

- USSOUTHCOM HQ
- JTF- Haiti HQ
- EMB – Haiti
- 2/82 HQ
- JTF-PO
- 3 ESC/JLC HQ
- USNS COMFORT
- USS BATAAN
- 22 MEU
- DHHS/DMAT
- WFP
- USAID
- S/CRS
- DART
- EMEDS
- FEMA
- OCHA
- MSC

An experienced, joint team was used for collection and analysis:

- Senior Mentor: Gen (Ret) Charles Wilhelm, USMC
- O-6 lead; 5 mil and 2 civ with Combat Arms, Log, Med, Comms, and SOF/Intel backgrounds
- Leverage JFCOM JLOTS study team and other Joint, Service, and interagency lessons learned organizations and working groups
- Collaborating with the interagency community (e.g., USAID)

163 Interviews conducted
JCOA Methodology

- JCOA conducted active collection, analysis, and dissemination of best practices through contemporaneous observations and integrated analysis vs. the traditional post mortem after action review

- This study focused on issues relevant to the Warfighter for International Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief Operations and Transition to Recovery
  - Built on previous, earthquake, tsunami, and hurricane lessons learned

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  - Senior Mentor: Gen (Ret) Charles Wilhelm, USMC
  - O-6 lead; 5 mil and 2 civ with Combat Arms, Log, Med, Commo, and SOF / Intel backgrounds
  - Leverage JFCOM JLOTS study team and other Joint, Service, and other governmental agencies’ lessons learned organizations and working groups
  - Collaborating with the interagency community (e.g., USAID)

- This study also looked for implications for the interagency community and the Long War
Haiti’s Strategic Relevance

• Reasons for Haiti’s strategic importance to the United States include:
  – Close proximity and effects of mass migration
  – Frequent and destabilizing violence
  – Multiple ungoverned areas that provide havens for organized criminal activity and illicit trafficking

• The Administration had a strong interest in Haiti prior to the earthquake
  – Haiti Stabilization Initiative (development in Cite Soleil by S/CRS and USAID, with DOD 1207 funding) had been extended to Martissant, Haiti
  – SECSTATE Chief of Staff had taken leadership role
  – Former President Clinton had been appointed UN Special Envoy to Haiti

“The Americas are inextricably linked.”
ADM Stavridis, Mar 2007
History of US Involvement with Haiti

• A long history of USG involvement in Haiti

• The US has intervened six times since 1888:
  1888 – US Show of Force
  1891 – Navassa Island Incident
  1914 – US Intervention
  1915 – US Occupation (until 1934)
  1994 – Restore / Uphold Democracy
  2004 – Secure Tomorrow

• Military interventions have largely been undertaken to achieve our enduring stability goals; However, each has also sought to leverage non-military led stability operations to improve the lives of the Haitian people

“Whether we like it or not, Haiti is clearly a key U.S. security challenge.”
Haiti Stabilization Initiative Design Team Report, 28 Apr 2006
Haiti Pre-earthquake Overview

- Haiti is the poorest nation in the western Hemisphere; development efforts have suffered severe setbacks because of political violence, lawlessness, corruption and natural disasters.
- Prior to the earthquake, the international community was providing extensive development and humanitarian assistance.
- The Haitian government was making progress, with the assistance of the international community, in recent years in many areas of its development including a nascent infrastructure.
- United Nations had already designated Haiti as one of the 50 “least developed countries” in the world, facing a higher risk than other countries of failing to come out of poverty.

**Fact Sheet**

- Population over 9,036,000 people
- 55% of Haitians live on less than $1.25 per day
- Per capita annual income $660
- 40% of the population of under 14 years old
- 50% of the population under 18 years old
- 58% of children under-nourished
- 58% of the population lacked access to clean water
- Devastating hurricanes in 2008 affected 800,000
- Deforestation approx. 98%

“It’s ironic and sad; In the last couple of years Haiti was finally making some progress in areas of their economy and infrastructure and then this [earthquake] hit. It seems it’s always a small step forward and then several steps back.”

Comment by member of SOUTHCOM J7 Directorate
January 2010 Earthquake

**Date:** 12 January 2010  
**Time:** 21:53:10 UTC (16:53:10 EST)  
**Magnitude:** 7.0  
**Epicenter:** 18.457N 72.533W  
(16m W of Port-au-Prince)  
**Depth:** 8.1 miles  
**Fatalities:** ~230,000 deaths
HAITI EARTHQUAKE
230,000 killed
196,595 injured
1,200,000 to 1,290,000 displaced
3,000,000 affected

Sources: OCHA/GoH 02.22.10

*Population movements indicated include only individuals utilizing GoH-provided transportation and do not include people leaving Port-au-Prince utilizing private means of transport.

*All figures are approximate. Commune population figures are as of 2003.

Source: OCHA/GoH 02.22.10

USAID Map – Earthquake Affected Areas and Population Movement in Haiti
Scope of Disaster

- A Magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti at 4:53 pm, Tues, Jan 12, 2010
  - 230,000 Deaths
  - 197,000 Injured
  - 600,000 Internally Displaced Persons
  - 700,000 Displaced within Port-au-Prince
  - 3,000,000 Affected People

- Most damage occurred in Port-au-Prince
  - 60% of government infrastructure destroyed
  - 14 of 16 Ministry Headquarters destroyed
  - 3.5 million people experienced strong-to-extreme shaking including the entire population of 2.8 million in Port-au-Prince
  - An estimated 97,000 dwellings destroyed and 188,000 damaged - 53% of the city
  - UN reports 1,234 schools destroyed
  - 90% of schools in Port-au-Prince

Tremendous Human Toll
Widespread Destruction
Scope of Response

- United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in Haiti since 2004
  - 11,028 Uniformed and Civilian personnel as of 28 FEB 10
- Over 140 countries offered government assistance
- Over 1,000 NGOs, charities and private foundations provided humanitarian relief
- DOD scope of response includes:
  - USS Carl Vinson
  - USNS Comfort
  - 2/82nd BCT
  - BATAAN ESG/22nd MEU
  - NASSAU ESG/24th MEU
  - Numerous Special Operations and Enabling Forces
  - High water mark of 22,000 personnel and 33 ships

"The international community must support Haiti as it leads the recovery process – and this involves not only the government but also civil society organizations and the private sector."

President Bill Clinton, UN Special Envoy for Haiti
Response Timeline

- **17-22 JAN**: Aftershock 20 JAN
- **23-29 JAN**: JLOTS Ordered
  - First Air delivery of HADR supplies
  - 22nd MEU/Bataan arrives 18 JAN
  - USNS Comfort Arrives 20 JAN
  - DJC2 arrives
- **30 JAN-6 FEB**: JLOTS begin arriving 23 Jan
  - 24th MEU/Nassau arrives 24 JAN
  - 3rd ESC begin arriving 24 JAN
  - 7th Sustainment Brigade begin arriving 28 Jan
- **7-13 FEB**: SOUTHCOM and TRANSCOM CDRS visit Haiti 03 FEB
- **14-20 FEB**: WFP Surge continues 16 of 16 DP open
- **19 JAN**: Pres Clinton Haiti
- **20 JAN**: Dutch ship delivers supplies
- **22 JAN**: Cuba opens airspace
- **24 JAN**: DJC2 arrives
- **24 JAN**: Curfew implemented
- **25 JAN**: Police from Spain and Chile arrive 4 FEB
- **31 JAN**: WFP Surge begins 31 JAN 9 of 16 DP open
- **30 JAN**: 7th Sustainment Brigade begins arriving 28 Jan
Response to a Catastrophe
“Gap of Pain”

**Challenges**
- Situational Awareness
- Authorities
- Unity of Effort
- Resources
- Policies

1. Normal host nation responders and aid personnel are available for potential emergency
2. Disaster strikes. The requirement for assistance spikes at the same time the capacity of steady state responders is decreased
3. US decisions are made to declare a disaster and deploy military and civilian assistance
4. DOD begins to flow forces and assistance which rapidly builds
5. In parallel, OFDA sends DART team forward and both US and international assistance gradually builds. DOD assistance is reduced as other capacities are established
6. Additional relief continues to build, closing the requirement gap. DOD reduces assistance as other organizations can take over
7. The challenge is how to reduce the requirement gap at the onset of the disaster. This requires improvements in the areas listed
“...for a disaster of this magnitude, the interagency / international effort up until now is about as good as I've ever seen it. That's not to imply there have been no blemishes. To be sure there have been more than a few, but as a general rule problems have been diagnosed quickly and appropriate remedies applied.”

Gen (Ret) Charles Wilhelm
DOD Senior Mentor / Former Commander, USSOUTHCOM
Observations and Finding Areas

National Response and Organization
COCOM Response and Organization
JTF Haiti (JTF-H) Formation & Organization
Contingency Force Projection
Coordination, Collaboration & Communication
Expeditionary Logistics
Medical Observations
National Response and Organization
Early national commitment provided strategic intent and resources for a speedy response, but longer term implementation was challenged by policy, preparation, and organizational issues.

**Findings:**

- The President’s declaration that Haiti relief was a priority focused the administration and country on the effort.
- The national response structure was established rapidly, and civilian and military resources were pushed in an effort to overwhelm the problem.
- The roles, responsibilities, authorities, and required capabilities of the Lead Federal Agency were not clearly defined, nor was the division of labor with the Department of Defense.
- The integration of many organizations, some not usually involved in overseas relief, raised a number of policy issues that required in-stripe resolution.

“This was not a SOUTHCOM response. This was a whole DOD [WOG] response.”

Brig Gen Fadok, SOUTHCOM J5
National Response and Organization

Finding: The President’s declaration that Haiti relief was a priority focused the administration and country on the effort

Why it Happened:
- The Administration had a strong interest in Haiti prior to the earthquake
- The Administration issued guidance that this was a priority, that it should be a unified (whole of government) effort, and that USAID was the Lead Federal Agent
Pre-earthquake Interest

– The Administration had a strong interest in Haiti prior to the earthquake
  – Haiti Stabilization Initiative had been extended to Martissant
  – SECSTATE Chief of Staff had taken leadership role
  – Former President Clinton had been appointed UN Special Envoy to Haiti

The Washington Post

Former President Clinton Appointed U.N. Special Envoy for Haiti

By Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, May 18, 2009 6:25 PM

UNITED NATIONS, May 17 -- Bill Clinton has been appointed U.N. special envoy for Haiti, a part-time position in which the former U.S. president will aim to attract private and government investment and aid for the poor Caribbean island nation, Clinton’s office and a senior U.N. official said Monday.
I have directed my administration to respond with a swift, coordinated, and aggressive effort to save lives. The people of Haiti will have the full support of the United States in the urgent effort …. I have directed my teams to be as forward-leaning as possible in getting the help on the ground and coordinating with our international partners as well. …Third, given the many different resources that are needed, we are taking steps to ensure that our Government acts in a unified way. My national security team has led an interagency effort overnight. And to ensure that we coordinate our effort going forward, I've designated the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Dr. Raj Shah, to be our Government's unified disaster coordinator.

Remarks on Earthquake Relief Efforts in Haiti
Administration of Barack H. Obama
13 Jan 2010

“The best thing the POTUS and DOD did was open the flood gates.”

General Fraser, SOUTHCOM Commander
Finding: The national response structure was established rapidly and civilian and military resources were pushed in an effort to overwhelm the problem

Why it Happened:

☐ US government immediately established the Response Management Team (RMT) in DC, headed by USAID, to coordinate and facilitate humanitarian assistance
  - The White House embedded a representative at the COCOM and subsequently in the Embassy/JTF
  - USAID was designated the Lead Federal Agent for the relief effort
    - The Office for Response Coordination (ORC) was established in Haiti with Ambassador Lucke as its lead
☐ SOUTHCOM was designated the supported military command and the standup of JTF-H was initiated
  ☐ Staff augmentation from multiple COCOMS were provided to SOUTHCOM and/or JTF-H
Response Management Team (RMT)

RMT Organization Chart

- DoS Task Force 4
- Interagency Task Force
- Joint Staff Team
Response Management Team (RMT)

The structure and composition of the RMT is dependent on the size, complexity, type, and location of the disaster. The OFDA/W RMT performs in five functional areas:

1. **Management** manages overall RMT activities—including liaison with deployed DART(s), other offices within USAID, and cooperating agencies—and serves as point of contact with the media.
2. **Planning** manages the response strategy and planning processes, is responsible for the daily preparation of information products, and serves as the coordinator for the program grant funding and management process.
3. **Logistics** manages the sourcing and transportation of supplies and materiel to the disaster site.
4. **Administration** manages and provides support to RMT administrative/contract activities.
5. **Communications and Records** manages communications, ensuring that proper formats, distribution, filing, and documentation procedures are followed according to standards established in the Communications and Records Procedures.

The number of individuals assigned to the RMT is determined by the skills and qualifications needed to perform the necessary activities to meet the strategy and objectives. The organizational structure is designed to expand or contract depending on the complexity and operational requirements.
The OFDA Director, through the RMT, coordinates the USG response to a disaster from OFDA/W. The RMT serves as the primary liaison between field disaster response and OFDA/W. When the RMT is activated and in place, responsibility for decision making, coordination, and primary point of contact for DART(s) or other resources deployed in the field moves from the Regional Team to the RMT until these responsibilities are returned to the OFDA Director.
The Joint Staff had a pretty robust cell that plugged into the RMT. It included J2, J3, J4, and eventually J5 folks. The senior person and senior loggie was RADM Traaen. He became the advisor/interface between RMT and the Joint Staff. The J4 had as many as 4 O6’s on the team as well as several others. They ran 24hr ops with current and future ops, as well as future plans capability. They also brought on specialty personnel such as mortuary affairs. They set a DCO account up for USAID and the RMT so that folks could get visibility of what DoD was moving and tie into it. Once USAID had visibility, they were able to use the DCO to communicate their priorities. This plug is a best practice and should be planned for in the future. Shortcomings: they had limited connectivity to anything but commercial internet in the RMT. They had to establish expanded SIPR capacity and secure phone comms (STE).

COL Tim Beckert, Joint Staff J4
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>On Site (15 JAN)</th>
<th>Today (15 JAN)</th>
<th>48 HRS (17 JAN)</th>
<th>7 DAYS (22 JAN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maritime</strong></td>
<td>4 x USCG Cutters 1 x USN DDG</td>
<td>6 x USCG Cutters 1 x USN DDG 1 x USN CVN</td>
<td>6 x USCG Cutters 1 x USN DDG 1 x USN CVN 1 x USN TAO 1 x FFG 1 x CG</td>
<td>11 x USCG Cutters 1 x USN DDG 1 x USN CVN 1 x USN TAO 1 x LSD HOSPITAL SHIP: USNS Comfort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total: 370</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air</strong></td>
<td>1 x H-65 6 x H-60s (3 USCG, 3 PRANG) 9 x C-130s (5 USCG, 4 USAF) 1 x HC-144 1 x C-21</td>
<td>1 x H-65 19 x H-60 (3 USCG, 13 USN, 3 PRANG) 6 x MH-53 7 x C-130s (3 USCG, 4 USAF) 1 x HC-144 2 x P-3 AIP 1 x C-21</td>
<td>1 x H-65 23 x H-60s (3 USCG, 17 USN, 3 PRANG) 6 x MH-53 7 x C-130s (3 USCG, 4 USAF) 1 x HC-144 2 x P-3 AIP 1 x C-21</td>
<td>1 x H-65 23 x H-60s (3 USCG, 17 USN, 3 PRANG) 6 x MH-53 7 x C-130s (3 USCG, 4 USAF) 1 x HC-144 2 x P-3 AIP 1 x C-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground</strong></td>
<td>SC SJFHQ – 26 Pax 1-CO 82nd – 114 Pax 1st SOW – 9 Pax PAO-2 Pax NCIS-2 Pax</td>
<td>SCSJFHQ 82nd Airborne – 335 pax 18th ASLT HQ C2 (ACP) 97 pax JPASE NCIS IO</td>
<td>82nd Airborne SC SJFHQ 18th ASLT HQ C2 (ACP) JPASE NCIS IO EMEDS CRE</td>
<td>82nd Airborne SC SJFHQ 18th ASLT HQ C2 (ACP) JPASE NCIS IO EMEDS CRE 2 x CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total: 153 BOG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AOR</strong></td>
<td>Total: 523</td>
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</table>

Movement of military assets designated to support USSOUTHCOM Stand-up of JTF Haiti for Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

As of 0300 15 JAN
Augmentation Push

We would not have been able to perform this mission to the level of success we have achieved if not for the more than 500 augmentees we requested and received from every other geographic combatant command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Transportation Command, the Services, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The General and Flag Officers, Action Officers and civilian personnel we received were immediately value-added and were instrumental in helping us develop well-coordinated planning efforts that translated into unity of effort on the ground.

Gen Fraser, Commander SOUTHCOM

“We made a phone call and they came”

Gen Fraser, SOUTHCOM Commander

“NORTHCOM sent their best…and fast.”

Maj Gen Jones, Acting SOUTHCOM Deputy Military Commander
1) Respond quickly and effectively

- No warning
- Initial response:
  - Search and rescue
  - Medical
  - Water
  - Food
  - Shelter
- Forces and supplies will be ad-hoc, pull what you need
- Must establish logistics flow quickly (air, land, sea)
- GRF – Logistical Capability
- Expeditionary Bases
- Understand joint capabilities
- As mission develops, reassess priorities
National Response and Organization

Finding: The roles, responsibilities, authorities, and required capabilities of the Lead Federal Agency were not clearly defined; nor was the division of labor with the Department of Defense.

Why it Happened:

☐ The designation as Lead Federal Agent gives broad authority to “coordinate” efforts; however, there was no specification of subordinate support relationships, or division of labor.

☐ USAID had few personnel to form and lead the required planning early in the crisis, leaving a gap in capacity.

☐ There was no operational-level organization from DOS for SOUTHCOM to coordinate near and long term planning with.
  – Neither the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS) nor the Interagency Management System (IMS) were used as envisioned.

☐ Although USAID had previously exercised their role as Lead Federal Agent prior to UNIFIED RESPONSE; exercises such as (BLUE ADVANCE) highlighted ambiguities in roles and gaps capabilities.
Sec. 493. Disaster Assistance—Coordination.—The President is authorized to appoint a Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance whose responsibility shall be to promote maximum effectiveness and coordination in responses to foreign disasters by United States agencies and between the United States and other donors. Included among the Special Coordinator’s responsibilities shall be the formulation and updating of contingency plans for providing disaster relief.
The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Support relationships among elements of the United States Government will depend on the particular situation being addressed.

… this Directive is not intended to, and does not: (1) affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense or the command relationships established for the Armed Forces of the United States; (2) affect the DNI's and D/CIA's authorities under title 50 of US Code; (3) affect the authority of the President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance under Section 493 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; ….
For the purposes of this Instruction, stability operations is defined as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. The Department of Defense shall be prepared to:

Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations. In such circumstances, the Department will operate within U.S. Government and, as appropriate, international structures for managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the deployment and utilization of the appropriate civilian capabilities.

DODI 3000.05, 16 Sep 2009
10.1.1: USAID and FEMA should develop training for IMAT, MERS, US&R, and other FEMA-activated personnel on USAID foreign disaster assistance response operations. This training should include training about the UN Cluster System for disaster response and the role of NGOs in foreign responses.

10.1.2: USAID and FEMA should develop a document that delineates the differences between the NRF and USAID foreign disaster response processes.

10.1.3: The NRF should be modified to better address incidents when FEMA is a supporting Federal agency, and support to foreign disasters.

10.2.1: FEMA and USAID should develop a pre-scripted IAA or a pre-incident memorandum of understanding for foreign disaster responses.
We were slow in providing people with skills to provide assurance we were up to the task. We need a better pre-established plan to bring all US Government agencies together.

DART is tied into the transition planning, but there is little depth to do continuously

Director of the Office for Reconstruction Coordination
– Armed Forces and other USG agencies perform in both supported and supporting roles with other commands and agencies.

– One difficulty of coordinating operations among US agencies is determining counterparts among them.

– Another significant difficulty is the determination of the lead federal agency (LFA) for a given interagency activity.

– Organizational differences exist between the military hierarchy and other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, particularly at the operational level.

JP 3-8, Vol 1, 16 Sep 2009
BLUE ADVANCE 08

It may be necessary to create or expand existing doctrine to incorporate the concept of DOD working jointly with non-DOD agencies where DOD may or may not be the lead or supporting agency.

… we found the experience to be extremely successful - … in the evaluating and constant tweaking of how we would and will engage (at our JTF level) DART and ACT.

Roles, authorities, and interrelationships of the IMS components must be better defined. Standard Operating Procedures for the IMS components should be completed, such as internal organizational structures, operational management processes, and templates.

The relationship between the DART (and follow-on USAID capabilities) and the ACT should be clarified and institutionalized.
LTG Keen’s Top 10 Observations from Operation Unified Response

6) Support the lead Federal Agency within clearly defined roles

- Identify lead Federal Agency
- Establish clear roles, responsibilities, and authorities
- Leaders must understand other Federal Agencies
- Reduce duplication by identification of roles agreed upon early in the mission
- DOD strength is ability to surge, plan and make things happen
- DOD skill sets for HADR: medical, engineering, logistics, finance, linguistics, planning, leadership!
National Response and Organization

Finding: The integration of many organizations, some not usually involved in overseas relief, raised a number of policy issues that required in-stride resolution

Why it Happened:
- The scale of the disaster and nexus with CONUS led to a wider than normal level of interagency participation (FEMA, DHS, DHHS, CBP, USDA, etc)
- Some, but not all, of the participating agencies had arrangements with USAID
- The participating agencies operate under different management systems and policies (e.g. Incident Management System vs. Interagency Management System)
- Issues (AMCIT evacuations, MEDEVACs, orphans, and in-country mission boundaries) arose from these seams that revealed policy confusion and required resolution during the response operation
Authorities – Agreements

a. United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has established relationships with several United States Government (USG) agencies and dozens of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). USAID/OFDA currently has agreements with the following:

   b. United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) US Forest Service and the Interior Department's Bureau of Land Management, for emergency managers, logisticians, communicators and firefighting experts.

   c. US Public Health Service and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and Prevention, for health assessment and to provide medical personnel, equipment, and supplies.

   d. US Geological Survey, for notification and assessment of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.

   e. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), for typhoon, hurricane, and cyclone reporting and assessment.

   f. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), for training in disaster management, emergency preparedness, and relief for host-country disaster specialists.

   g. Department of Defense (DOD), for matters concerning defense equipment and personnel provided to the affected country and for arranging DOD transportation.

JP 3-8, Vol II, 16 Sep 2009
“It was a large effort with a large interagency component. Some of the agencies were not familiar with international standards which created some problems.” USAID, Liaison Officer
E-mails show a costly squabble between state and federal governments during the post-earthquake Crisis
By JENNIFER KAY, Associated Press
Mar. 15, 2010

E-mails obtained by The Associated Press show that Florida and the federal government squabbled over where to send injured earthquake survivors while a humanitarian crisis unfolded in Haiti.

Hundreds of injured survivors of the Jan. 12 earthquake were brought to Florida hospitals. State officials say they were not getting enough notice or basic information about some of the patients.

The military abruptly halted the airlifts when Florida officials warned they could not treat any more victims. That provoked a bitter exchange over who was responsible for the delays.

A spokeswoman for the agency leading U.S. relief efforts says the government faced unprecedented challenges in an international disaster.
COCOM Response and Organization
COCOM Response and Organization

The COCOM had to overcome internal organizational obstacles, gain situational awareness, and satisfy an extraordinary demand for information

Findings:

- Functional organization and manning of the COCOM initially left significant gaps in the staff’s ability to provide an effective and sustained response
- Early difficulties in gaining situational awareness clouded the determination of requirements and priorities, greatly complicating the delivery and distribution of manpower and supplies
- The continuous demand from the strategic level for detailed information at the tactical level adversely impacted the ability of SOUTHCOM and the JTF to execute mission essential planning and C2 tasks
- The use of “open” communications and an unclassified information-sharing network successfully allowed for expanded coordination and collaboration with non-DOD entities
COCOM Response and Organization

Finding: Functional organization and manning of the COCOM initially left significant gaps in the staff’s ability to provide an effective and sustained response

Why it Happened: (1 of 2)

□ The SOUTHCOM staff was uniquely organized for theater engagement rather than sustained military contingency operations
  – SOUTHCOM FUNCPLAN for HADR operations (6150-06) tasked “J-codes” with specific responsibilities for execution; Transfer of these responsibilities to “Enterprise” directorates was never codified

□ While the staff had interagency expertise already in place, traditional primary and special staff functions critical to crisis planning were not positioned to provide immediate response
  – The ability to conduct crisis action planning required SOUTHCOM to create current and future operations/logistics cells as well as future plans cells which did not exist under their configuration
  – For the first several days of the crisis, SOUTHCOM HQ was forced to act as the de-facto JTF
STABOPS, at the heart of the USSOUTHCOM focus, prompted an earlier organizational transformation that sought to fully integrate its IA partners, its mission and its organization in pursuit of Theater objectives.
US Southern Command
“Enterprise” Organization

Not a traditional “J code” Organization. Functional alignment with theater realities and greater integration with the IA, NGOs, multinational and private organizations to achieve objectives.
US Southern Command
Pre-Earthquake (Enterprise)

CAG
- J7 Innovation

SJFHQ
- Director: SES
  - Vice: SES
    - J5 (-)
    - Country Insight
- Policy & Strategy Directorate
  - Director: SES
    - Vice: SES
      - J6
      - J4 (-)
      - HEALTH
      - FDO
      - J2 Security
      - HQ CMDT

Mil Deputy to the Commander
- XO

SFS (DOS)
- Civ Deputy to the Commander
- FPA

Chief of Staff
- SJS
- Exec S fields
- Cong Affairs

Security & Intelligence Directorate
- Director: SIO / Vice: Y3
  - SIO: J2 (-)
  - J3 (-)

Partnership Center
- SES
  - J3
  - J2

Partnering Directorate
- Director: SES
  - Vice: SFS (DOS)
    - J9
    - J10
    - Development

Resources & Assessment
- Director: SES
  - Vice: SES
    - J0
    - J1
    - J7 Assess Cell
    - J3 Readiness

Stability Directorate
- Director: SES
  - Vice: YA3
    - J5 TSC
    - J5 CMR
    - J5 HRI
    - J4 HA
    - J7 S&T
    - J7 M&S
    - J2 TSC
    - J3 JTE
    - J3 CA

UNCLASSIFIED
COCOM Response and Organization

Finding: Functional organization and manning of the COCOM initially left significant gaps in the staff’s ability to provide an effective and sustained response

Why it Happened: (2 of 2)

- Five days into the crisis, the SOUTHCOM Commander directed the staff to reorganize into the more traditional “J-Code” structure
  - The staff conducted an in-stride reorganization
  - The J1, J2, J4, and J6 assumed primary staff responsibilities
  - Critical to the HADR response, the J4 stood up a LogOps (JLOC) cell with NORTHCOM / JECC assistance

- External augmentation, especially NORTHCOM SJFHQ, gave the staff critically needed breadth, especially for planning (J33, J35 and J5) and depth to conduct 24 hour ops.
  - The addition of 8 FO/GOs also provided the experience and ability to interface with the various senior-level agencies involved in the operation
  - The more traditional structure facilitated faster integration of, and immediate contribution, by external augmentees
US Southern Command
*In-Stride (began ~17 Jan) Reorganization*
US Southern Command
In-Stride Reorganization

 Combatant Commander
 General Fraser

 Military Deputy Commander
 Maj Gen Jones
 (JTF Haiti Commander)
 LTG Keen

 Civilian Deputy to the Commander
 & Foreign Policy Advisor
 AMB Trivelli

 SJFHQ
 Col Cornett

 Chief of Staff
 BGen Garza
 Brig Gen Kingsley
 Mr. Newman

 J1
 Manpower & Personnel
 Col Toney
 Mr. Breslow

 J2
 Intelligence
 Brig Gen Jamieson
 Brig Gen Quisenberry

 J3
 Operations
 RADM Parker
 Brig Gen Zadalis
 Brig Gen Ployer
 RDML Craig

 J4
 Logistics
 Col Vohr
 Col Davis
 Mr. Fairless
 BG Couch (SDDOC)

 J5
 Plans, Policy & Strategy
 Brig Gen Fadok
 Mr. Wetzel

 J6
 Communications
 COL Churchwell
 CDR Jones-Coleman

 J7
 Training, Exercises & Engagement
 BG Ketchum
 Mr. Johnson
 BG Gothard

 J8
 Resources & Assessments
 Mr. Schafer
 Col Uyehata

 J9
 Partnering
 Mr. Harvey
 Ms. Sampson

 UNCLASSIFIED
Augmentation Push

We would not have been able to perform this mission to the level of success we have achieved if not for the more than 500 augmentees we requested and received from every other geographic combatant command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Transportation Command, the Services, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The General and Flag Officers, Action Officers and civilian personnel we received were immediately value-added and were instrumental in helping us develop well-coordinated planning efforts that translated into unity of effort on the ground.

Gen Fraser, Commander SOUTHCOM

“We made a phone call and they came”

Gen Fraser, SOUTHCOM Commander

“NORTHCOM sent their best…and fast.”

Maj Gen Jones, Acting SOUTHCOM Deputy Military Commander
## Augmentee Support Timeline

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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>on 22 February</th>
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<td><strong>270</strong></td>
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Military Staff Augmentation support provided by both Active and Reserve component fill - includes USCG.

As of: 2/22/2010 18:41 PM
# Senior Leader Augmentee Support

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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>January 2010</th>
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<tr>
<td>Military Deputy Commander</td>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Gen Jones arrived 22 Jan 2010. Depart</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brig Gen Kingsley arrived 15 Jan 2010 and is expected to depart 3 Mar 2010.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Director J2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brig Gen Quissonberry arrived 1 Feb 2010 and is expected to depart 3 Mar 2010.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Director J3</td>
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<td>RDML Craig arrived 24 Jan 2010 and is expected to depart 26 Feb 2010.</td>
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<td>Deputy Director J3</td>
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<td>Brig Gen Zadalis - Arrived 8 Feb</td>
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<td>Deputy Director J3</td>
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<td>Brig Gen Ployer - Arrived 17 Feb</td>
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<tr>
<td>J4</td>
<td></td>
<td>BG Couch arrived 27 Jan 2010. Departure date is T</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy J7</td>
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<td>Brig Gen Gothard - Arrived 21 Jan 2010 and is expected to depart 28 Feb 2010.</td>
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As of: 2/23/2010 19:37 PM
Finding: Early difficulties in gaining situational awareness clouded the determination of requirements and priorities, greatly complicating the delivery and distribution of manpower and supplies

Why it Happened:

- Immediately following the disaster, the extent of the damage was very unclear, requiring bold assumptions for initial planning
- The GoH, HNP, and MINUSTAH suffered significant personnel casualties and infrastructure destruction during the earthquake, leaving them “in shock” for the first week of the crisis
- A portion of the US country team, who might have otherwise assisted in assessing the situation was evacuated with other American citizens
- Decision makers outside of Haiti utilized news outlets, phone communications, and social media to make an initial cursory assessment of the level of destruction and anticipated requirements
- The Command overcame challenges to gaining situational awareness through a combination of traditional ISR and non-traditional tools on commercial internet sites
Situational Awareness

A variety of ISR platforms were allocated in Haiti to survey geographic and hydrographic issues: damaged infrastructure, LOCs, and displaced population dispositions/locations.

Information critical to early SA and decision-making was planned for and provided to the HQ (and later, JTF) daily by photo and/or live feeds (FMV).

“Global Hawk provided high altitude and P-3s were there from day-1.”

BG Jamieson, USSOUTHCOM J2, 05 Feb 2010
Situational Awareness
ISR Coverage – 3 FEB

Commercial overhead images the majority of Haiti every 2-3 days

JTF-H Collection Focus:
• Distribution Sites (primary focus)
• IDPs
• Infrastructure/LOCs

Platform taskings:
• ALL ISR Assets in support if WFD
• P-3: Distribution PTs IVO PaP, Hospitals, Settlements, Route scans
• RC-26: Distribution PTs IVO PaP, 2/82nd ABN support in PaP
• PREDs: Distribution PTs, Settlements IVO PaP; Route scans
• ALIRT: Elevation data collection

ISR Projected Loss dates:
• RC-26: 18 FEB
• P-3: (2x) 19 FEB (one P-3 remains)
• PRED: 1 MAR
• U-2: 1 MAR
Throughout Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, ISR assets have been an invaluable resource. UAVs and other assets have provided outstanding situational awareness and early warning indicators in areas of potential violence, determining status of critical infrastructure, assessing gathering crowds, analyzing internally displaced person (IDP) camps, determining traffic ability of lines of communication, and security at WFP distribution points. ISR assets have had a positive impact on decision making by enabling the efficient use of scarce resources. In particular, the information provided has assisted in placing only the necessary number of USAID and NGO workers at distribution sites, scheduling the movement of supplies and personnel along the most efficient routes, and when and where to deploy security forces.

Gen Fraser, SOUTHCOM Commander, Testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee, 3 Mar 2004

- Traditional military ISR provides invaluable SA and critically needed assessment capabilities to the COCOM and JTF at the onset of a crisis, but are high-demand, low-density assets
- Maximizing non-traditional, commercial ISR (sources and organizations) in an unclassified operation can help mitigate shortfalls
Situational Awareness

– Google satellite imagery was updated so quickly on Google Maps that it became an early unclassified tool to gain limited situational awareness - From Google’s website:

Haiti imagery layer now available
Wednesday, January 13, 2010 at 7:05 PM

We've worked closely with GeoEye throughout the afternoon to make their most recent satellite imagery of Haiti, taken at approximately 10:27am EST today, available as a KML overlay for Google Earth. You can download the KML here and open it in Google Earth, or look at it via the browser plug-in below. As you'll see, the imagery shows a powerful glimpse into the destruction in Haiti. Here are before-and-after screenshots of the Presidential Palace and an area of Port-au-Prince: □

□ Google imagery/maps also provided the basis for innovative development of graphic/interactive COP systems for diverse units/orgs (ie; 2-82 ABN)
Situational Awareness
(U) Google satellite imagery
Wednesday, January 13, 2010 at 10:27 AM
Humanitarian Assistance (HA) COP

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

- Excel Spreadsheet forms the backbone
- Tracked over 1,000 Data Points
- 6 subcategories
- 8-15 data fields per point
- Easily integrated into all graphic products (Falcon View / ARC GIS / CPOF / Google Earth)
- http://Haiti.OneResponse.info
- Accommodates NGOs with minimal digital capabilities
- Easily Printed / E-mailed for maximum distribution
- OCHA and MINUSTAH incorporated data into planning
Finding: The continuous demand from the strategic level for detailed information at the tactical level adversely impacted the ability of SOUTHCOM and the JTF to execute mission planning and C2 tasks

Why it Happened:
- The strategic level demand for tactical information placed great demands on the leadership/staff’s time and energy.
  - For the first several weeks, SOUTHCOM was preparing for and providing three briefings each day, each with different audiences.
  - The demand for information, i.e.; number of bottles of water and MRE’s handed out each day consumed time and resources needed to satisfy operational planning and execution requirements.
- At the onset of the crisis, the SOUTHCOM headquarters had to take on many of the coordinating and reporting functions of the JTF without the benefit of in-country situational awareness.
- The lack of established structures on the ground made obtaining the fidelity demanded of these daily assessments very difficult.
- The media, especially TV news, increasingly became a driver for actions and activities during the first days of the disaster.
Information Demand and Role of the Media

– Within 24 hours, there were more media on the ground than US military
– TV news, in particular, increasingly became a driver for actions and activities during the first few days of the disaster

– The images broadcast out to the world heightened the sense of urgency to respond - in many cases they became a catalyst
– On multiple occasions, senior officials from Washington would call the COCOM, JTF, or US team in Haiti and ask what was being done to respond to the issues they were seeing on TV
COCOM Response and Organization

Finding: The use of “open” communications and an unclassified information-sharing network successfully allowed for expanded coordination and collaboration with non-DOD entities (1 of 2)

Why it Happened:

– Though degraded, the commercial communications infrastructure became part of the de-facto crisis response coordination architecture and a viable alternate means to military communications, addressing needed shortfalls in SA
– If you had a “Blackberry”, you had the mobile comms suite of choice
– The COCOM and JTF Commanders made a decision early on that all planning and work associated with OP UNIFIED RESPONSE would be at the unclassified level: *This decision was pivotal* to expanding coordination and collaboration to widest possible range of stakeholders

“…from the outset of this crisis we at the SC HQs decided to classify our Operations Order as UNCLASSIFIED. This classification gave us ease of transmission across the military, civilian sectors, and with our Partner Nations.”

BrigGen Garza, USSOUTHCOM Chief of Staff, 3 Feb 2010
Finding: The use of “open” communications and an unclassified information-sharing network successfully allowed for expanded coordination and collaboration with non-DOD entities (2 of 2)

Why it Happened:
- Multiple websites, accessible by the interagency, NGOs and PVOs were used by the COCOM and JTF for collaboration and sharing of information
  - All Partners Access Network (APAN) network membership grew to over 1,000 in a week
    - User-Defined Operational Picture (UDOP) developed and linked to APAN
    - Private aid donors effectively linked/matched with aid recipients
  - SharePoint used to organize portals and web pages facilitating broader access and use by the staff and mission partners
- SOUTHCOM Foreign Disclosure early engagement facilitated COCOM and JTF ability to disseminate Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) to NGOs, foreign embassies and military forces requesting updates
  - SOUTHCOM / JTF mission briefs
JTF Formation & Organization
Several factors led to the choice of an element to comprise the core of the JTF; in the interim and throughout, the addition of key enablers provided depth, rapid buildup of command and control, and capacity for non-military coordination.

Findings:

- The SOUTHCOM Military Deputy Commander was in Haiti at the time of the earthquake and had a previous professional relationship with the MINUSTAH commander.

- The nascent JTF co-located with the embassy initially – this provided space, communications, and the proximity to support the initial response and to develop staff relationships.

- The threat of mass migration, plus the readiness and proximity of the XVIII Corps, influenced the decision to use it as the core of the JTF.

- The early insertion of joint enablers (SOUTHCOM SJFHQ, JECC, USAF and USN elements, and LNO’s) provided key planning and communications capacity.

- The JTF overcame initial challenges to establish adequate communications through deployable systems and commercially available systems.
<table>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<td>12 Jan 1653L</td>
<td>Earthquake Hits, LTG Keen in country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jan</td>
<td>LTG Keen meets with US Ambassador Merten &amp; Haitian government</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Jan</td>
<td>DART arrives</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Jan</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM SJFHQ element arrives</td>
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<td>13 Jan</td>
<td>SOCSO ST &amp; SSAT arrive</td>
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<td>13/14 Jan</td>
<td>1st SOW/CCT/PJs arrive</td>
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<td>14 Jan</td>
<td>JTF-H officially stands up</td>
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<td>SOC MIST arrives</td>
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<td>15 Jan</td>
<td>XVIII ABC ACP arrives</td>
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<td>JPASE JIB set up</td>
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<td>15 Jan</td>
<td>CRG arrives</td>
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<td>15 Jan 2000L</td>
<td>JTF-H Initial Operational Capability</td>
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<td>18 Jan</td>
<td>JFCOM JECC planners arrive</td>
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<td>17 Jan</td>
<td>JTF-MIGOPS (ARSOUTH) Deploys</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 Jan</td>
<td>XVIII ABC Closed; JTF-H 208 personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 Jan</td>
<td>JTF-H Assumes Greater MUB role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jan</td>
<td>DJC2 operational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Personal and Professional Relationship

- MINUSTAH, in Haiti by UN Charter since 2004 was responsible for overall security, but suffered significant losses during the earthquake increasing the importance of JTF-H coordination

- LTG Keen’s presence in Haiti at the time of the earthquake, his experience and previous relationships with key leaders made him the logical choice as the JTF Commander

Our JTF Commander and the Brazilian MINUSTAH Commander have had an outstanding personal and professional relationship. This has permeated all levels of interaction and engagement between the two forces, alleviating many of the potential frictions that could arise from two parallel military command structures operating in the same vicinity.

Gen Fraser, SOUTHCOM Commander Testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee, 3 Mar 2004
JTF Formation & Organization

Finding: The threat of mass migration plus the readiness and proximity of the XVIII Corps, influenced the decision to use it as the core of the JTF

Why it Happened:
- JCS directed SOUTHCOM to prepare for mass migrant operations (MIGOPS)
- A phone call between LTG Keen and LTG Helmick resulted in an offer to use XVIII Airborne Corps, Assault Command Post (ACP) as the core of the JTF
- Using XVIII ABC gave SOUTHCOM the flexibility to use ARSOUTH, a certified JTF HQ, to be held in reserve to plan for and lead, if necessary, mass migration operations
- Considerations given for establishing the JTF “afloat” vs. “ashore”
- The quick-establishment of a visible land-based HQ would reassure the population and facilitate coordination with the host nation, Embassy, USAID, UN, and NGOs

“The XVIII ABC was chosen as the core for the JTF because of its ability to rapidly build up command and control and its capacity for non-military coordination.”

LTG Keen, JTF-H Commander
Finding: ARSOUTH, a certified JTF HQ, was held in reserve to plan for and lead, if necessary, mass migration operations.

Why it Happened:
- There was an immediate concern that if the conditions on the ground were not quickly stabilized, the Haitians would begin a mass exodus toward Cuba and the US.
- The precedent for this concern was founded in a history of Haitians migrating by sea to the US to escape economic or political circumstances beginning in the 1970s.
  - 25,000 Haitians arrived in south Florida during the Mariel boatlift.
  - Since 1981, the USCG has interdicted thousands of Haitian migrants with noticeable spikes in 1992 and 1994 over political instability.
- DHS granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Haitians in the United States at the time of the earthquake. Standing CONPLANs were in existence in anticipation of migrant operations with SOUTHCOM and ARSOUTH responsible.
Mass Migration Battle Rhythm

- MIGOPs EXORD published 22 Jan 10.
- Continue to monitor situation daily.
  - Developed a smart book to capture daily situation reports and other key information from J2/UN/OCHA/Open Source/Briefs, etc.
  - Daily communication with USCG D7.
  - Daily contact with engineer assessment team at GTMO for on site preparation.
- Weekly SOUTHCOM OPT meetings with the SC staff and interagency to synchronize efforts and maintain situational awareness.

Commander’s Guidance

- JTF MIGOPs HQ will remain in San Antonio
- USAR SOUTH ENG (10) to flow to GTMO on 23 Jan to conduct engineering assessment, fix drainage issues, and w/personnel on hand prep ground.
- JTF MIGOPs has been authorized to identify supplies for up to 13,000 migrants and BPT submit funding requests.
- BPT purchase and flow construction supplies to GTMO.
LTG Keen’s Top 10 Observations
from Operation Unified Response

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

7) Pull from all available resources to form the Joint Task Force

• Considerations for “core” of JTF:
  • COCOM Component
  • GRF HQ
  • Availability and deployability
  • Scale of mission
  • Expertise needed

• May have to pull key enablers and depth from other organizations (COCOMs, JFCOM, JECC, etc.)

• Tying in to the Country Team and lead Federal Agency is key (consider co-location)

• Phased deployment of communications equipment key to C2
Finding: The early insertion of joint enablers (SOUTHCOM SJFHQ, JECC, USAF and USN elements, and LNO’s) provided key planning and communications capacity

Why it Happened:
- The core of SOUTHCOM’s standing joint force headquarters brought an initial planning and communications capability, but it was limited
- Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) provided additional military planners
- The Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) provided media specialists and production capability
- The Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) smoothed the coordination and flow of air support and airfield management
- Task Force 41 liaison officers assisted coordination with GITMO staging, airspace controls, and mission changes
- Generous use of other LNO’s facilitated information sharing and coordination
JTF Planning Capability

“The military’s planning capability is not the most expensive part, but it is probably the most valuable. The international coordination structure would not have stood up if they weren’t there – we tapped into the JTF planning capacity.”

UN Strategic Plans Officer

Photo below: Planners at work in the JTF-H Joint Ops Center

Left photo: Mr. Niels Scott, Senior UN Representative for OCHA, co-chairs a UN Cluster planning session with BG Matern, (Canadian Army Officer assigned to XVIII ABN Corps) JTF-H, J9 and a planner from the JTF-H, J-35 Plans section (Lt Col Kraft, USMC, an augmentee from JFCOM).
Finding: The JTF overcame initial challenges to establish adequate communications through deployable systems and workarounds.

Why it Happened:
- The initial communications infrastructure was severely degraded and knowledge of Haitian communications systems was limited.
- The use of the Embassy MLO office and LAN as well as Blackberries provided an initial communications and web mail capability.
- XVIII ABC Assault Command Post (ACP), JNN, and Executive Communications set arrived on 17 Jan, but it was not compatible with DJC2.
  - Lack of JNN training and system limitations required workarounds.
  - The JNN system required two C-130 sorties not including generators versus JCSE which required about 1 pallet.
- The DJC2 standup was delayed due to site location and preparation but its inherent capability was stretched to provide about 200 workstations.
  - System only worked with Dell workstations.
- Communications were greatly facilitated by the unclassified environment.
The JTF overcame initial challenges to establish adequate communications through deployable systems and commercially available systems.
Phased Commo Support
January 2010

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

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**Initial Response**
- DJC2 Transport
- DJC2 Site Prep

**Setup**
- Setup

**JTF Transition**
- JTF Transition

**DJC2 Setup**
- DJC2 Setup

**Of Note:**
- DJC2 Core 2 moved to GTMO, but not set up – awaiting Migrant Ops mission prior to establishment

1. JC SE EEP operational at Airport
2. JC SE IEP operational at Embassy
3. Special Ops Wing (SOW) BGAN operational at Airport (small capability for SOC units)
4. 18th ABC JNN operational at Airport (delayed for modem problems with Northwest – in at Gordon)
5. SOW SOF Deployable Node operational at Airport
6. JTF J6 and JNCC operational (delayed due to C2 and org decisions)
7. JNN/CPN at Airport (5 more CPN in support of operation)

A) DJC2 ready for deployment 15-16
B) JTF HQ site identified 19
C) JTF transition planned 24-25
D) Platform ready for set-up 25
E)IOC 25
F) FOC 27
Finding: The nascent JTF co-located with the embassy initially – this provided space, communications, and the proximity to support the initial response and to develop staff relationships

Why it Happened:

- The embassy was among the few buildings that was able to withstand the earthquake
- The embassy local area network was used to provide initial webmail capability
- Proximity to embassy personnel helped JTF-H build relationships with the country team and other US relief personnel
- JTF-H leveraged relationships with the country team to develop connections with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private volunteer organizations
Contingency Force Projection
The rapid deployment of forces and early entry capabilities were critical to success, but ultimately created force and capability management flow problems

Findings:

- Early entry capabilities from 1st SOW/JFSOCC, CRG, AEG and subsequently JTF-PO, quickly opened critical ports for incoming forces, capabilities and supplies

- The forces and C2 necessary to build a JTF for a contingency of this nature are not included in the GRF; therefore, this package had to be built in stride

- The initial “push” of forces and supplies was rapid, but ad-hoc and executed outside of formal planning, sourcing, and tracking procedures
  - The ad-hoc and VOCO nature of the initial deployments hampered in transit visibility contributing to bottlenecks and capability shortfalls

“The best thing POTUS and DOD did was open the flood gates”
Gen Fraser, CDR SOUTHCOM, 11 Feb 2010

“I just got finished speaking with General Pagan who described the situation as .. like trying to push a bowling ball through a garden hose.”
Vice President Biden speaking to news reporters outside SOCSOUTH HQ, Homestead, FL 16 Jan 2010
Contingency Force Projection

Finding: Early entry capabilities from 1st SOW/JFSOCC, CRG, AEG and subsequently, JTF PO quickly opened critical ports for incoming forces, capabilities and supplies

Why it Happened:
- The earthquake on 12 JAN 10 knocked out the control tower at Port-au-Prince airport, the only APOD capable of supporting rapid entry of HADR capabilities and supplies
- The bulk of capabilities and supplies that would ultimately sustain HADR would be delivered by sea and Haiti’s main port was seriously damaged by the earthquake
Contingency Force Projection

Establishing APOD operations was a critical capability for initial throughput of relief supplies and personnel

- Extensive damage to seaport facilities left the Port au Prince international airport as the initial primary entry point for relief supplies
- President Preval formally requested through the US Ambassador Merten to open the airport. As the only major airport that could immediately support relief efforts, its opening and management of air traffic was crucial
- Early and effective control of the airspace and airfield ground ops was critical to maximizing the throughput of immediate life saving capabilities
- 13 JAN, 2100 Hours, 23 STS Combat Control Teams /1st SOW, operating as part of the JFSOCC FWD arrived, conducted airfield surveys and opened the airport


Contingency Force Projection

Establishing APOD operations was a critical capability for initial throughput of relief supplies and personnel

- Started 24/7 air traffic control operations (28 hours after earthquake)
  - Airspace control: Effective progression of USAF/USN capabilities (AFSOC CCT/JTACs, MEU Air Ops, CRG, AEG)
  - Airfield control: USAF established and enforced rules to deconflict and ensure equitable access and safety of arriving aircraft

- Humanitarian assistance could now arrive and injured personnel and evacuees could be transported out.
- In the initial days of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, air operations resembled the Berlin Airlift with aircraft landing every five minutes.
13 JAN, 2100 Hours, 1st SOW opens airport at request of GoH and started 24/7 operations
- Pre-quake average was 13 flights per day
- Reached peak capacity of approx 150 flights per day
- Sustained capacity of 120 flights per day for approx 3 weeks
18 FEB: GoH begins gradual assumption of ATC duties
19 FEB: Resumed commercial flights
2 MAR: Returned to pre-quake airport hours (0600-2200)
15 MAR: GoH resumed full air traffic control of airport
The earthquake seriously damaged the Port of Haiti: As of 13 Jan, it was non-operational.

The bulk of humanitarian assistance supplies that would ultimately sustain the relief effort would have to be delivered by sea. The APOD could not long sustain bulk delivery in the quantities that would be required.

On 22 JAN the port opened with US Military assistance.

JTF-H Initially increased port capacity from 100 to 500 TEU per day.

“Seabees [and other engineers involved in phase I ops] were worth their weight in gold.”

LTG Keen, Commander JTF-H
Contingency Force Projection

Finding: The forces and C2 necessary to build a JTF for a contingency of this nature are not included in the GRF, therefore this package had to be built in stride.

Why it Happened:

- The lack of a designated JTF HQ or joint logistics C2 element within the Global Response Force required deployment planning on short notice, adding to an already challenging force flow situation.
- Many sub-elements required for this JTF were not in a contingency status:
  - No JTF HQ
  - No GRF log elements or joint logistics command
  - No GRF enablers (engineering, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, PA, medical, etc)
  - To achieve the required capability some subordinate commands were forced to call-up in reserve units
  - Units were deployed with suboptimal force packaging and/or movement planning
The lack of a designated JTF HQ or joint logistics C2 element within the Global Response Force required deployment planning on short notice, adding to an already challenging force flow situation.
Contingency Force Projection

- Many sub-elements required for this JTF were not in a contingency status
Finding: The initial “push” of forces and supplies was rapid but ad-hoc, and executed outside of formal planning, sourcing, and tracking procedures

Why it Happened:

- No standing CONOP/OPLAN with TPFDD, built for a similar event, was available to begin force flow planning
  - FOGO phone calls were utilized to request specific forces
- Extensive use of VOCOs in place of RFFs greatly “fast-tracked” DOD’s response enabling greater “Speed of Response”
  - Supporting commands/units leaned forward – alerting, preparing, and in some cases making initial movement ISO the Haiti mission
  - Initial lack of requisite audit trail, due to reliance on verbal orders, deprived supporting and supported commands proper force planning and tracking
- No ownership of RSO&I: Achieving proper balance of inbound forces, equipment, force sustainment and relief supplies greatly improved when the JTF established the “Force Flow Working Group”: An ad hoc cell from the J3 and J4

“LTG Keen said: ‘Just keep sending stuff; I’ll tell you when to stop.’”

MG Dan Allyn, DCDR, JTF-H
No standing CONOP/OPLAN
FUNCPLAN 6150-06 lacked sufficient data for planning

– USSOUTHCOM Theater Campaign Plan (10 Mar 09) Appendix 10 (Humanitarian Assistance) to Annex C (Operations) references:

(U) Earthquake. The Caribbean is a seismically active area with the most recent series of earthquakes having occurred between April and July 1997. The southern Caribbean, particularly Trinidad and Tobago, was affected; hundreds of people were displaced and millions of dollars worth of damage occurred. The largest earthquake in the Eastern Caribbean, felt from St. Kitts to Dominica, occurred over a hundred years ago on 8 Feb 1843. In English Harbour, Antigua, and Point-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe, all masonry was destroyed. The number of deaths associated with the quake totaled more than 5,000 in Guadeloupe, and 30 in Antigua.

Earthquake hazards are as follows.

   a. (U) Structural Collapse. The most direct hazard of earthquakes is the destruction of infrastructure to include roadways, bridges, buildings, utility supply lines, dams, retaining walls, river banks, etc. Associated with structural collapse is the disruption and loss of life.

“There will always be a no-plan situation”
Gen (Ret) Wilhelm, former CDR USSOUTHCOM
Extensive use of VOCOs

- The force grew to its height on 31 JAN including: 2/82nd BCT, BATAAN ESG/22nd MEU, NASSAU ESG/24th MEU, 24 AEG, and the USS CARL VINSON
- Supporting commands did not adequately communicate between each other what forces were being moved on VOCOs to the JOA
- No TPFDD / JOPES used for many deploying units; ad hoc sequencing of units and equipment
- The rapid infusion of manpower and supplies, while creating inefficiencies, was nonetheless, effective in giving the JTF the means to stabilize the situation and save lives

“We had 16 pages of VOCOs regarding force flow. Official RFFs were not required and the bureaucracy was eliminated by this approach. This was the enabler for speed-of-response.”

RADM Parker, SOUTHCOM J-3
<table>
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<th>RFF</th>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>VOCO</th>
<th>SOOB</th>
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Extensive use of VOCS

Extensive use of VOCS in place of RFFs greatly “fast-tracked” DOD’s response enabling greater “Speed of Response”

– 1st SOW (Combat Controllers/JTACS) opened PaP airfield within 28 hrs.
– By 0600 EST 14JAN10, Elements of SJTF HQ, USS Higgins, and 3 x USCG Cutters in JOA (N+2)
– Global Hawk and 3 x P-3s conducting ISR flights and first elements of 2/82 BCT arriving by 1600 EST, 14 JAN 10
– 15 JAN 10 (N+3) USS Carl Vinson on station providing helo-borne relief
– 18 JAN 10 (N+6) 22 MEU arrives and begin stability operation
– 20 JAN 10 (N+8) USNS Comfort arrives
– 22 JAN 10 (N+10) 24 MEU on station
– 25 JAN 10 (N+12) Over 17,000 DOD personnel in JOR including: 1 x BCT, 2 x MEU, 33 rotary-wing, 18 fixed-wing, 16 USN/USNS vessels, 6 USCG Cutters

“We had 16 pages of VOCS of force flow. Official RFFs were not required and the bureaucracy was eliminated by this approach. This was the enabler for speed-of-response.”

RADM Parker, SOUTHCOM J-3
Coordination, Collaboration & Communication
Coordination, Collaboration & Communication

Although early planning and execution was problematic, the JTF achieved unity of effort through extensive coordination, collaboration, and communication of words that matched deeds.

Findings:

- Strategic Communication themes and messages, from strategic to tactical, were well planned, integrated and benefited from an operationally permissive environment.

- The JTF took an early and continuous leadership role in building and refining planning and coordination structures that pulled all entities together.
  - HACC/JOTC/PSC/CSC/PMCC (HA International Assistance Architecture)

- The US military’s ability to execute missions in collaboration with non-DOD entities has been improved by recent COIN experiences.

- The JTF’s early and detailed transition plan was hampered in execution by lack of strategic guidance and ability of the GOH to assume tasks.

“C2 for a JTF involved in a HADR of this magnitude is not about degree of ‘Command and Control’—it is rather, ‘Coordination and Collaboration’.”

LTG Keen, JTF-H Commander, 23 Feb 2010
Coordination, Collaboration, and Communication

Finding: Strategic Communication themes and messages were well planned and integrated and benefited from an operationally permissive environment

Why it Happened:

- At the beginning of the crisis, the White House’ message was clear, giving unambiguous direction to those shaping information
- The Joint Interagency Information Cell (JIIC) stood up and effectively planned and coordinated focused themes and messages
- STRATCOMMs expertly integrated core themes with available capabilities
- Public affairs office integrated messages into their products for the media
- Operationally permissive environment provided freedom of movement throughout Haiti

“Guidance from the White House was clear”

Mr. Quigley, Director of Communications, 4 Mar 2010
White House Message

– The POTUS, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense were clear in their support to Haiti

“I’ve made it clear … that Haiti must be a top priority for their departments and agencies right now.”
President Obama, Remarks by President Obama on Recovery Efforts in Haiti, 14 Jan 2010

“… the United States is fully committed. Our military is fully committed.”
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks on the Situation in Haiti, 13 Jan 2010

““Shortly after the devastating earthquake, [the Defense Department] mobilized to save lives and ease the suffering of the victims.”
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Press Conference, 15 Jan 2010
The Joint Interagency Information Cell (JIIC), a robust Joint DOD/IA team, skillfully and effectively integrated key themes and PA to support and shape critical operational and tactical objectives. Common themes, messages, and talking points ensured all spoke with one voice and USG efforts were viewed as consistent with the message.

“This concept was born in stride”
COL Buckner, JTF-H PAO, 23 Feb 2010

“The establishment of the JIIC worked very well in this HADR situation. All elements… were talking with one voice.”
CDR Loundermon, Chief Media Operations, 23 Feb 2010
The JIIC was a centralized coordination body comprised of USG agencies

Headed up by a JIIC director and assisted by the US Embassy Public Diplomacy Officer

The USG agencies and organizations represented in the JIIC included:

- DoS, USAID, DART
- DoD, JTF-H, Combat Camera, IO
- HHS/CDC,
- DHS (Coast Guard, FEMA, ICE, CBP, TSA)
Communication Integration Framework – Phase 2

Message
The US military will transition its role to other organizations as they increase their ability to provide critical needs, and then remain in the area only as an asset of last resort.

Messengers
- Interagency
- DOD
- SOUTHCOM
- JTFH

Key Audiences
- Haitians, Haitian Leadership, MINUSTAH, NGOs, Regional Governments and Opinion Leaders, American People, Haitian Diaspora, Bloggers, Congress, UN, International Community
- NGOs, International Militaries, American People, Bloggers, Interagency, Congress
- NGOs, Regional Militaries, American People, Haitian Diaspora, Bloggers, AOR Interagency, Congress
- Haitians, Haitian Leadership, MINUSTAH, NGOs, American People, JOA Interagency, Congress

Strategic Message Points
- Security ISO HA/DR
  - 24 MEU Release
  - 2/82 Release
  - BAT ARG/22 MEU Release
  - JTF-H Standdown
- Critical Engineering
  - 2/82 Release
  - BAT ARG/22 MEU Release
- Logistics
  - 24 MEU Release
  - 24 AEG (APOD C2)
  - JTF-PO Standdown
  - BAT ARG/22 MEU Release
  - 3 ESC/377 TSC Release
- Medical
  - USNS Comfort Release
  - BAT ARG/22 MEU Release

Communication Effects
- Key Audiences:
  - Have an accurate understanding of US military relief efforts.
  - Do not perceive the US military as primary HA/DR provider.
  - Awareness that the GoH, MINUSTAH, USAID, NGOs are meeting critical needs.

Desired Narrative
The international community can respond to disaster relief needs in Haiti without US military assistance.

As Of: 13 1900 FEB 10
Complete
UNCLASSIFIED
Force Flow
Base Plan
OPR: SC-OSC
Communication Integration Security ISO HA/DR – Phase 2

Message: US forces are providing security to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and are gradually handing that responsibility over to MINUSTAH and the Government of Haiti as their ability increases.

Communication Capabilities:
- NR = News Release
- NC = News Conference
- MI = Media Interview
- MT = Media Tour
- ME = Media Embed
- AT = Article
- DV = DV Visit
- KE = Key Leader Engagement
- CA = Civil Affairs
- CC = Combat Camera
- PW = PSYOP Written
- PR = PSYOP Radio
- PL = PSYOP Loudspeaker
- BG = Blog
- TW = Twitter
- FB = Facebook
- YT = YouTube
- SM = All Social Media
- HP = Haitian People
- HL = Haitian Leadership
- HD = Haitian Diaspora
- MH = MINUSTAH
- NG = NGO
- RG = Regional Governments
- RP = Regional Publics

Key Audiences:
- RM = Regional Militaries
- AP = American Public
- BL = Bloggers
- CG = Congress
- IA = Interagency
- IC = International Community
- AA = All Audiences

As Of: 13 1900 FEB 10
Communication Integration
Critical Engineering – Phase 2

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

Message: US forces are providing critical engineering support at the airport and seaport so that vital HA/DR can flow into Haiti and will gradually transition from the area as those operations are assumed by more long-term organizations.

UNCLASSIFIED

Key Audiences:
- HP = Haitian People
- HL = Haitian Leadership
- HD = Haitian Diaspora
- MH = MINUSTAH
- NG = NGO
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- BG = Blog
- TW = Twitter
- FB = Facebook
- YT = YouTube
- SM = All Social Media

As Of: 13 1900 FEB 10
Communication Integration Logistics – Phase 2

**Message:** US forces are providing air traffic control, security, and management assistance to the airport and off-load assistance to the port and will gradually hand that responsibility over to the Government of Haiti as their ability increases.

**Communication Capabilities**
- NR = News Release
- NC = News Conference
- MI = Media Interview
- MT = Media Tour
- ME = Media Embed
- AT = Article
- DV = DV Visit
- KE = Key Leader Engagement
- CA = Civil Affairs
- CC = Combat Camera
- PW = PSYOP Written
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- IC = International Community
- AA = All Audiences

**UNCLASSIFIED**
Communication Integration Medical – Phase 2

Message: The GoH, USAID, international organizations and NGOs are quickly restoring medical capabilities and require less support from the U.S. military. The U.S. mil is working ICW the GoH and other organizations to determine when DoD support is no longer needed.

JTF-Med Element

USNS Comfort

E-meds*

Bataan**

ARG/22 MEU

Communication Capabilities

- KE = Key Leader Engagement
- CA = Civil Affairs
- CC = Combat Camera
- PW = PSYOP Written
- PR = PSYOP Radio
- PL = PSYOP Loudspeaker
- TX = Text Message
- BG = Blog
- TW = Twitter
- FB = Facebook
- YT = YouTube
- SM = All Social Media
- HP = Haitian People
- HL = Haitian Leadership
- HD = Haitian Diaspora
- MH = MINUSTAH
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- AP = American Public
- BL = Bloggers
- CG = Congress
- IA = Interagency
- IC = International Community
- AA = All Audiences

As Of: 13 1900 FEB 10

UNCLASSIFIED

OPR: SC-OSC
Today’s USG Topics (Excerpts)

• A newly opened aftercare facility allows for continuity of care. Patients who received treatment and underwent surgeries on board Comfort can continue to receive critical aftercare ashore.

• Round-the-clock operations at the Port have resulted in great partnership with the Haitian Port Authority and significant growth in both the capability and capacity of the pier.

Top Line USG Messages (Excerpts)

• U.S. agencies have come together in coordination with the Government of Haiti, the United Nations, the international community, and voluntary organizations to provide humanitarian assistance following the earthquake. We are here at the invitation of the Haitian government.

• The U.S. Government is making every effort to recover, identify and repatriate the remains of U.S. citizens who perished in the earthquake.

Current USG Communication

• DOS: Media reports, the Special Envoy noted significant progress in food, shelter, and security interventions

DHS:

• HHS:

• Other:

Collecting

Desired Core USG Themes

• Global response to save lives and ease suffering
• Haitians helping Haitians
• Ever-expanding partnerships
• Sustainability – We will stand with Haiti for the long term

Undesired Core USG Themes

• U.S. efforts too slow / not enough / dis-organized
• U.S. keeping inept Haitian government afloat
• U.S. military is an occupying force
• U.S. will rebuild Haiti

As Of: 06 0500 FEB 10
UNCLASSIFIED

STRATCOM

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

Communication Goal: Ensure key audiences understand the United States’ role in this global effort and the U.S. is portrayed as a capable, efficient and effective responder.

UNDESIRED PERCEPTIONS
• U.S. Keeping Inept Haitian Government Afloat
• U.S. Military is an Occupying Force
• U.S. will rebuild Haiti

KEY AUDIENCES
• Haitian People
• Haitian Leadership
• International Community
• American People

CORE THEMES
• Global Response to Save Lives and Ease Suffering
• Haitians Helping Haitians
• Ever-Expanding Partnerships
• Sustainability - We will stand with Haiti for the long term
STRATCOM Capabilities

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

MEN ANPIL CHAY PA LOU
An’n rebati Ayiti Asanm!

Together anything is possible... Let us rebuild Haiti together

- Public Affairs (Inform)
- Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (Reinforce)
- Information Operations (Influence)
- Social Media

JTFHaiti

Postcard from Haiti--the rooftops of Port-au-Prince. Another great photo by one of our photojournalists, Army Spc.... http://bit.ly/6fNw32

A shout out for our teammates at USAID who are doing a lot of hard work here in Haiti. If you’re unfamiliar with...


RT @southcomwatch: We’ve posted Gen. Fraser's prepared opening remarks to the Senate and Posture statement at http://tinyurl.com/yaxplzw

View all
Public Affairs

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

Last 24 Hours
- LTG Keen city circulation with PBS Frontline
- World Food Program Communications Plan RFI Closed Out
- Baby “Theo” born on USS Bataan
- Brig Gen Burke, ACCE CDR, i/v w/Fox News on Predator use in HA/DR ground ops

Projected Events
- 1 Feb, MG Allyn, DCG, i/v w/Al Jazeera
- Press release on departure of USS Carl Vinson
- 2 Feb, TENTATIVE, World Food Program press conference
- 4 Feb 1000, LTG Keen Pentagon Press Corps brief

USG Themes
- Global Response to Save Lives & Ease Suffering
- Haitians helping Haitians
- Sustainability – We will stand with Haiti for the long term

Top Stories
- U.S. to resume medevac flights from Haiti: The U.S. military will resume evacuation flights to the United States for critically injured Haitian earthquake victims within the next 12 hours, the White House said on Sunday. (Reuters, 31 Jan)
  - “We’re welcoming Haitians with open arms and probably done more than any other state and are happy to continue to do so,” said Florida Gov. Charlie Crist (AP, 31 Jan)

Media Embeds
- USN – 9
- USAF – 1
- USA – 20
- USMC – 2

Search: “Haiti HA/DR + US Military”

As of: 01 0100 FEB 10
Permissive Environment

- Ground units met with local mayors and communities for priorities
- JTF Information Operations team was conducting daily assessments and providing information to the JTF commander
- Haitians provided unfettered access to radio station air time to the US military
- Haitian people saw and heard the messages; the words matched deeds
- *Our actions contributed directly to the permissive environment*

USG had significant interaction with the populace

We were kind and friendly

We came to help

We were professional and courteous. We listened

The people of Haiti trusted us and wanted to work with us
LTG Keen’s Top 10 Observations from Operation Unified Response

5) Communicate – Communicate – Communicate

- Must be transparent, approachable, responsive
- Know your audiences...there are many
- Consistent messaging is key
- Get everyone saying the same thing
- Promise nothing...seek to overachieve
- Manage expectations
- Joint Information and Interagency Center (JIIC)
- Two-pager talking points
- Social networking
Finding: The JTF’s early and detailed transition plan was hampered by lack of strategic guidance and ability of the GOH to assume tasks

Why it Happened: (1 of 2)

- SOUTHCOM and the JTF began campaign and transition planning very early after the onset of the crisis
  - USAID focused on the crisis response initially and was limited in capacity to simultaneously conduct longer range planning
  - There was a lack of strategic guidance and an overall strategic plan to nest COCOM and JTF planning
    - This did not impede Phase I and II transition planning, but did impact Phase III transition planning
    - SOUTHCOM established transition target dates within an overall conditions-based strategy which spurred discussion
Phase I & II Objectives / End States

**Disaster Response (IA, IC, and DOD)**

**Phase 1: Emergency Response**
- **Objectives**: Humans facing imminent death rescued; humans suffering/severe injuries treated.
- **End State**: Immediate lifesaving actions and assessments are accomplished.

**Phase 2: Relief**
- **Objectives**: Disrupted essential services are restored IAW an integrated USG response plan ISO GOH.
- **End State**: Lives safeguarded, basic disaster relief needs are met, and measures are taken to mitigate effects of another natural disaster within the JOA.

**Security ISO HA/DR**
- Humans facing imminent death rescued; humans suffering/severe injuries treated.

**Critical Engineering**
- Infrastructure damage assessments assigned to DOD elements completed.
- Emergency response efforts are not disrupted by civil violence and crime.
- Population does not mass migrate from Haiti.
- JTF capability to execute Phase II activities established.

**Logistics**
- Mass migration from Haiti.
- Post-op convalescence facilities established by national / international organizations, and potential for epidemic mitigated.
- Population does not mass migrate from Haiti.

**Medical**
- C2, funding, authorities, and logistics are established to respond to future natural disasters and to conduct follow-on FHA and TSC+ operations, actions, and activities.

**Flash Points**
- Civil Unrest
- Epidemic
- Mass Migration
- Natural Disaster

**Reconstruction & Development**
- Phase II Security ISO HA/DR transitions to MINUSTAH & HNP
- Phase II engineering ISO HA/DR transitions to GOH and UNDP
- Phase II logistics ISO HA/DR transitions to WFP, UNICEF, & GOH
- Phase II medical support to HA/DR transitions to WHO, PAHO, and GOH
- Stand down JTF I transition to TSC+

**National End State**
- Haiti is stable, has a growing economy, and a legitimate, accountable government that is increasingly able to provide key services.

**Campaign Plan End State**
- Lives safeguarded, human suffering alleviated, and GOH, UN/MINUSTAH no longer require significant U.S. military support.

As of 31 January 2010

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Phase I Objectives / End State

Purpose
Enable GoH / UN disaster response to mitigate human suffering and satisfy basic human needs

Critical Tasks

Security/ISO HA/DR
- Provide HA/DR security requested by/through USAID, OFDA for relief operations to complete and equitable distribution of essential services. (OBJ 1, 3, & 4)
- Assist MINUSTAH in providing HA/DR security to prevent civil unrest and mass migration. (OBJ 1, 3, & 5)

Critical Engineering
- Initial assessments and expedient repairs made to critical LOCs to support mobility of HA/DR forces and supplies. (OBJ 2, 4, & 5)
- Critical infrastructure assessments made ISO coordinated USG support to GoH. (OBJ 2 & 4)

Logistics
- Establish C2 architecture for PAP APOD operations and SPOD operations to effectively and efficiently distribute life-saving supplies. (OBJ 4 & 5)
- Transport and distribute HA/DR materials and personnel to ensure life-saving measures can be employed. (OBJ 1 & 4)

Medical
- Provide urgent critical care related to earthquake injuries to prevent death and disability. (OBJ 1 & 4)
- Complete initial determination of epidemic risk. (OBJ 1, 4, & 5)

Objectives

1. Humans facing imminent death rescued; humans suffering/severe injuries treated.
2. Infrastructure damage assessments assigned to DOD elements completed.
3. Emergency response efforts are not disrupted by civil violence and crime.
4. Population does not mass migrate from Haiti.
5. JTF capability to execute Phase II activities established.

Phase I End State
Immediate lifesaving actions and assessments are accomplished.

As of 31 January 2010
Phase II Objectives / End State

PURPOSE
To support GOH / UN disaster response efforts and transition to enduring foreign humanitarian assistance and enhanced theater security cooperation operations.

Critical Tasks

SECURITY ISO HA/DR
- Provide HA/DR security requested by through USAID, OFDA for relief operations to complete and equitable distribution of essential services. (OBJ 3 & 5)
- Assist MINUSTAH in providing HA/DR security to prevent civil unrest and mass migration until it has capacity to fulfill additional HA/DR requirements created by earthquake. (OBJ 3 & 5)

CRITICAL ENGINEERING
- Make expeditionary repairs to essential LOCs ISO HA/DR mobility to facilitate distribution of HA/DR. (OBJ 1 & 2)
- Conduct essential service assessments / repairs as part of an integrated USG response plan in support of GoH. (OBJ 1 & 2)
- Develop transition plan for remaining critical engineering projects as required. (OBJ 1, 2, & 6)

LOGISTICS
- Provide sufficient logistics capacity to support Haitian disaster relief efforts. (OBJ 1, 2, & 4)
- Transfer PAP APOD and SPOD C2 to GOH and UN. (OBJ 1 & 6)
- Coordinate transition of DOD capability support to non-DOD agencies and establish contracts, as necessary, to posture GOH, IA, and IC to continue reconstruction and development and to BPT respond to a potential disaster in Phase III. (OBJ 6)

MEDICAL
- Provide urgent critical care related to earthquake injuries to prevent death and disability. (OBJ 1 & 4)
- Provide preventive medicine necessary to mitigate potential epidemic. (OBJ 4)
- Transition cases to preventative medicine and trauma to non-DoD agencies as required. (OBJ 1 & 6)

Objectives
1. Disrupted essential services are restored IAW an integrated USG response plan ISO GOH.
2. Expedient critical infrastructure repairs conducted to ensure mobility of HA/DR response organizations.
3. HA/DR efforts are not disrupted by civil violence and crime.
4. Immediate surgical and medical needs met, post-op convalescence facilities established by national / international organizations, and potential for epidemic mitigated.
5. Population does not mass migrate from Haiti.
6. C2, funding, authorities, and logistics are established to respond to future natural disasters and to conduct follow-on FHA and TSC+ operations, actions, and activities.

As of 31 January 2010
Finding: The JTF’s early and detailed transition plan was hampered by lack of strategic guidance and ability of the GOH to assume tasks.

Why it Happened: (2 of 2)

- USAID established a Future Planning Cell, with military augmentation, to develop an overall transition strategy and plan (3X USAID, 2X Joint Staff, 1X SOUTHCOM)
- The GoH was limited in governmental capacity, financial resources, and legal issues which slowed implementation of Phase III tasks and military handover
- Strategic uncertainties slowed withdrawal of some JTF forces
Coordination, Collaboration, and Communication

Finding: The US military’s ability to execute missions in collaboration with non-DOD entities has been improved by recent COIN experiences

Why it Happened: (1 of 2)
– Previous lessons and experiences of COIN operations and doctrine positively enabled US military forces to support a HADR operation (22 MEU, 24 MEU, 2-82 ABN, SOF)

“Those skills are transferable”
COL Gibson, Commander 2-82 BCT, Remarks USA Today, 18 Jan 2010

“As corpsmen, our main mission is ensure that Marines are taken care of and healthy, but in this situation, we’re here to also aid the Haitian people anyway we can”
Chief Petty Officer Mathiesen, 22nd MEU, Remarks 22nd MEU Press Release, 28 Jan 2010
Coordination, Collaboration, and Communication

Finding: The US military’s ability to execute missions in collaboration with non-DOD entities has been improved by recent COIN experiences.

Why it Happened: (2 of 2)
- COIN is “population centric” as is HADR; leaders were able to apply COIN skills such as Key Leader Engagement (KLE) which were invaluable for collaboration with a host of diverse actors.
  - Understanding the operational environment
  - Needs of the people
  - Societal leaders
  - Organizational leaders (IA, NGO, PVO)
  - Collaboration and leveraging multiple organizations
  - “Strategic Corporal’s” ability to recognize long-term political and humanitarian objectives/needs
- At the tactical level, units deliberately conducted reconnaissance in their areas of operations, then broadly sharing the results
  - Providing situational awareness
  - Developed the Common Operational Picture
NASARG / 24 MEU Tasks:

- LR reconnaissance in zone to ID likely HA nodes
- Ground survey to confirm scope of need
- Provide HA and water distribution to identified populations in need
- Coordinate w/MINUSTAH, USAID, and NGO’s prior to conducting ground ops.
- Monitor MSR’s for indications of migrant activity
- Coordinate w/HACC to respond to requests for HA
- Form platoon-sized QRF to respond throughout JOA
  -- BPT employ contract vehicles for mobility
  -- BPT perform CASEVAC
  -- BPT initiate air bridge to GITMO
  -- BPT support WFP Surge if required
  (Planning factor: NTE 3 distribution sites and associated security).

-- NASARG 24th MEU Conducts reconnaissance in zone IOT render immediate HA and assess the status of populations centers, key facilities, and medical infrastructure to facilitate follow on relief efforts and mitigate long term suffering.
Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

Past 24 Hours

Last 12: Falcon’s conducted:
- Day 1 of the WFP Surge Support
- Continue to plan and refine Day 2 of WFP Surge Support
- Reconnaissance to identify IDP camps in the OE.
- Continue to provide security of the Hotel Montana.
- Continue the evacuation of Earthquake Casualties to higher level of treatment

Next 24 Hours

Next 24: Falcons will:
- Conduct Day 2 of the WFP Surge Support
- Continue to plan and refine Day 3 of WFP Surge Support
- Continue site security for the Hotel Montana
- Continue to recon the OE to identify and to assess IDP
- Continue site assessments throughout OE
- Continue unit tasking IAW HACC priorities

Operational Metrics

Mission Statistics (301400RJan10-311400RJan10):
- 180 L bottle equiv of water
- 1,142,130 lbs Bulk pounds (8350 x 25kg, 2033 x 50kg) of rations distributed for HA Support
- 123 Patients seen
- 29 Patients Evacuated

To Date:
- 437090 Bottles
- 164,793 Meals 1,792,255 lbs of bulk food
- Medical Supplies: 47,600 lbs
- 4476 Patients Treated/EVAC Treated
Coordination and Collaboration
At the Tactical Level

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

- Initial linkups on the ground
- Share situational awareness of shared sectors (recon patrols)
- Food distribution points
- Link up NGOs with IDP camps (Mayor Cell)
- Rubble removal
- Clear delineation and understanding of roles is critical
LTG Keen’s Top 10 Observations from Operation Unified Response

2) Protect the people always

- COIN tenet – “Protection of the populace”
- Two-fold mission:
  - Save lives
  - Mitigate human suffering
- Three priorities:
  - Provide critical medical aid
  - Distribute water and food
  - Support search and rescue efforts
- Security in support of humanitarian assistance
- Reach out to the people
- Understand the environment
- Provide hope
Coordination, Collaboration, and Communication

Finding: The JTF took an early and continuous leadership role in building and refining planning and coordination structures that pulled all entities together - HACC/JOTC/PSC/CSC/PMCC.*

Why it Happened:

- Infusion of military planning capabilities in several areas contributed significantly to unity of effort across a broad range of organizations

- The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) was a significant nexus that greatly improved info sharing, coordination, and collaboration between all stakeholders.

- The Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC) and a tiered coordination structure provided a nexus for coordinating the decisions and efforts of the international humanitarian assistance community (ie; UN cluster system)

- The Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) process was used to validate and accept some aid requests

- JTF support of the World Food Program (WFP) surge not only improved distribution but also accelerated coordination with the UN and other organizations in other areas

*PSC- Principals Support Committee, CSC- Coordination Support Committee, PMCC- Project Management Coordination Committee
LTG Keen’s Top 10 Observations from Operation Unified Response

9) Work Closely with the UN Humanitarian Community

- UN has much HADR experience
- Understand UN mission mandates and limitations
- NGOs are the scouts/soldiers of the humanitarian effort
- DOD planning, resources and surge capability can play a major role
- The UN Cluster System is not MDMP
- Ultimately work to develop Host Nation capacity
- Coordinate and Collaborate
- Remember diplomacy
- Patience, patience, patience
HACC

- Established on 22 Jan 2010
- Collaboration was the key to tying military, IA, UN and NGO together
- Direct link to the JTF Commander
International Coordination Architecture
For Humanitarian Assistance

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

Political Principals Level

UN

OCHA

PMCC

UN & International Donor Clusters/Sectors/Programs

Emergency Shelter & Non-Food

Food Aid

Nutrition

Health

Water, Sanitation, & Hygiene

Child Protection

Gender-based Violence

Protection

Coordinating Support Committee

JOTC (UN Lead)

HACC FWD (UN LOG Base)

MINUSTAH

Global Partners

GOH

USG

JTF-Haiti

HACC (US Embassy)

UNCLASSIFIED

OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PMCC: Project Management Coordination Cell
JOTC: Joint Operations and Tasking Center
CCCM: Camp Coordination Camp Management
HACC: Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center

UNCLASSIFIED
**HACC Mandate:**

- **a.** Coordinate, synchronize, track and assess HA operations.
- **b.** Create/Maintain Humanitarian Common Operational Picture.
- **c.** Integrate w/ all stakeholders IOT to develop prioritized list of support requirements.
- **d.** Serve as the primary JTF interface with UN, NGO, and Interagency partners.

**Abbreviations:**

- **HACC:** Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center
- **OCHA:** Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
- **OFDA:** Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
- **DART:** Disaster Assistance Response Team
- **MINUSTAH:** UN Mission for Stabilization in Haiti
- **JOTC:** Joint Operations and Tasking Centre
- **HCT:** Humanitarian Country Team
- **JMAC:** Joint Mission Analysis Centre

**Clusters**

- Emergency Shelter & Non-Food
- Food Aid
- Health
- Logistics
- Nutrition
- Water, Sanitation, & Hygiene
**HACC Partnering Concept**

**Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE**

**GOH**

**United Nations**
- 1 x O4 (CA)
- 1 x E7 (25U)
- 1 x E5 (92Y)

**MINUSTAH (JOTC)**
- 1 x O5 (CA)
- 1 x O3 (CA)
- 1 x E8 (AR)
- 1 x E7 (88N)
- 1 x E7 (CA)

**OCHA**
- 1 x O4 (AV)

**“Clusters”**
- Emergency Shelter & Non-Food
- Food Aid
- Health
- Logistics
- Nutrition
- Water, Sanitation, & Hygiene

**Current Footprint**: 12/13/0/0 = 25

**Inbound**: 0/0/0/0 = 0

**TACON CATs**: 3/10/0/0 = 13*

**Total Set**: 12/13/01/0 = 25
LTG Keen’s Top 10 Observations from Operation Unified Response

3) Build partnerships with key players

- Identify the key players
  - Host Nation Government
  - United Nations
  - Other Partner Nations
  - Interagency
  - Non-governmental Organizations
  - Charities and foundations
  - Non-traditional partners

- Include others in planning and information sharing

- Unity of effort reduces duplicated effort and maximizes strengths and capabilities
Task Organization

In support of the Government of Haiti ICW the United Nations

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

As of: 27 1900 Jan 10
Joint Operations Tasking Center

– Joint Operations Tasking Centre (JOTC) established 27 Jan 2010
– Ad hoc organization created specifically to provide the function of better integrating daily response activities
– Established the Request For Assistance (RFA) procedures
JOTC Request for Assistance

– RFA procedure by UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
When someone wants assistance from the US Military

Who’s Asking?

USG Organization
Or Funded Implementing Partner
(NGO, etc.)

Submit RFA or MEDEVAC to DART HQ
Civ-Mil TOC

UN, NGOs, IOs, HN, Private Companies,
Donors, Private Citizens, etc.

Submit an RFA (Req for Assistance) to the UN
Then UN validates, vets and submits to DART

DART Civ-Mil TOC vets, validates and prioritizes
requests then submits via the MITAM process to the
JTF

JTF sources / staffs requests
Informs DART Civ-Mil TOC of Plan
Then Executes

177 Requests as of 24 Feb 10

Informs DART of the plan
A good day, excellent start of the food distribution surge even with only 9 of 16 DPs being opened. Our Paratroopers and Marines were praised by the local populace as well as USAID and NGOs for their calming presence and kindness

LTG Keen, Commander JTF-H, Update to Gen Fraser and ADM Mullen, 31 Jan 2010
WFP Surge Update

HIGHLIGHTS:
- 9 of 16 Distribution Points open 31 Jan 10
- All NGOs had high praise for the efforts of 2/82 BCT.
- Most issues centered around the coupons (counterfeit, recycling, selling, etc.)
- Distribution from the ISB executed without issue.
- Food distribution at all sites complete by 1223 hrs.
- Pregnant and elderly being brought to the front of the line
- HNP pledged support, but were not overtly visible.

FUTURE SCHED:
- 01Feb: 12 DPs scheduled to be open
- 02Feb: 14 DPs scheduled to be open
  First food ship sched to arrive
- 03Feb: All 16 DPs sched to be open
- 13Feb: Last day of surge
END OF PHASE I HIGHLIGHTS:

- 16 distribution points operated
- Families reached: 370,082
- Total beneficiaries: 2,220,492
- Total dry rations distributed: 9,210.55 tons
- World Food Program provided all logistical and distribution required support
- MINUSTAH & JTF-Haiti provided site security
- No significant security issues reported

JTF Communication Themes
- Efficiency - more food, to more people, more quickly
- Reliability - distribution to those in need regardless of location
- Partnership - UN, international community, NGOs w/ Haiti

JTF-H J2 Assessment: There were no significant incidents reported during the 14-day food surge. Conflicts between local officials and NGOs complicated distribution in Port-au-Prince on numerous occasions. Atmospherics from several DPs indicated that males became frustrated by the “female only” rule. Expect WFP relief efforts to continue without significant incident as we transition from “Food Surge” to “Structured Relief” operations.
WFP Surge 1B Update

HIGHLIGHTS:
- 6 of 9 Distribution Points open 14Feb
- First day of Phase IB executed without incident
- Food distribution at all sites complete at 1535

FUTURE SCHEDULE:
- 15Feb: 8 DPs scheduled to be open
- 20Feb: Last day of Phase IB Surge

Families Given Food on 14Feb (by Distribution Point):
As reported by NGOs

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<tr>
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</table>
WFP SURGE STATISTICS:
-- Total families fed: 497,316
  Goal was 350,000
-- Total beneficiaries: 2,983,896
  Goal was 2 million
-- Food distributed: 12,432 metric tons
  Goal was 8,000 metric tons

WFP Food Surge

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

WFP SURGE STATISTICS:
-- Total families fed: 497,316
  Goal was 350,000
-- Total beneficiaries: 2,983,896
  Goal was 2 million
-- Food distributed: 12,432 metric tons
  Goal was 8,000 metric tons

WFP Food Surge

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE
WFP Structured Relief Update

HIGHLIGHTS:
- 7 Distribution Points open 06Mar
- DP21 did not open due to trucking issues
- DP11 forced to cover DP10 & 11 due to trucking issues
- First day of varied commodities including rice, beans, oil, salt, and corn-soy blend
- Distribution expected to improve as TTPs are refined by the WFP and NGOs for the current phase

FUTURE SCHED:
- 07Mar: 10 DPs scheduled to be open
- 31Mar: Last day of "Structured Relief"
LTG Keen’s Top 10 Observations from Operation Unified Response

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

4) Coordinate and Collaborate (C2) to achieve unity of effort

- Understand other key players
  - Decision makers
  - Capabilities
  - Strengths
  - Weaknesses
- Remember who has the lead
- Establish a Common Operating Picture (COP)
- Open, transparent and unclassified info sharing
- Get buy-in up front, then execute together
- Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell (HACC)
Expeditionary Logistics
Expeditionary Logistics

Logistics response was proactive and robust but was marked by incomplete situational awareness and lack of a unified and integrated C2 arrangement

Findings:
- Incomplete information on conditions in Haiti at the onset of the crisis made determination of logistics requirements and priorities exceptionally challenging.
- The early absence of an effective joint logistics C2 element, responsible for integrating the overall logistics effort, led to gaps in the receiving, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) of forces, equipment, and supplies.
- Initial reliance on the single APOD for throughput of relief supplies and personnel required development of a system for validating and prioritizing global international flights into Haiti.
- Exploiting the sea base and establishing the Seaport of Debarkation (SPOD) operations contributed significantly to the relief effort.
Expeditionary Logistics

Finding: Incomplete information on conditions in Haiti at the onset of the crisis made determination of logistics requirements and priorities exceptionally challenging

Why it Happened:
- Requirements for sustainment and HADR undefined early
  - Extremely proactive but disjointed planning process with multiple organizations attempting to gain situational awareness of conditions and requirements on the ground versus remaining port capabilities
    - JSJ4, SOUTHCOM, TRANSCOM, JTF-H, 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command, 7th Sustainment Brigade, and Naval Beach Group 2 all involved early in planning
    - Initial deployment of Logistics C2 elements impacted by poor communications to conduct reach-back to planning staffs
- Unknown port conditions and absence of coordinated Logistics C2 caused an initial heavy push of enablers
- In-transit visibility (ITV): Large amounts of HA cargo arrived into Haiti without documentation and DTS cargo arrived without ITV
Requirements for sustainment and HADR supplies undefined early

- End state footprint for forces ashore not well defined
- HADR requirements were unknown in early stages
  - USAID functioned as a “bottom-up organization”, waiting on requirements from NGO’s… this makes it difficult to get quick and clearly defined requirements
- No definitive JLC commander designated early…multiple requirement valuators (3rd ESC, JTF-PO, JTF-H J4) all played a role

“**The best thing POTUS and DOD did was open the flood gates**”
Gen Fraser, CDR SOUTHCOM, 11 Feb 2010

“**LTG Keen said: ‘Just keep sending stuff; I’ll tell you when to stop.’**”
MG Dan Allyn, DCDR, JTF-H
Unknown port conditions and absence of coordinated Logistics C2 caused an initial heavy push of enablers

- Commercial capabilities unknown, intent was to use commercial as preferred option when available
- Detailed planning took too long, immediate execution was required
- Condition of South Pier unknown until divers completed their inspection
- Unknown port conditions contributed to the decision for heavy JLOTS deployment early
  - JLOTS landing sites needed to be assessed
  - Significant JLOTS capabilities sent but not used (i.e. ELCAS)
- Security and airfield ops were the early priority; TRANSCOM managed to get JLOTS capabilities moving due to self deploying capability
  - (JTF-PO APOD and SPOD, JLOTS enablers) pushed before formally requested
In-Transit Visibility

- In Transit Visibility (ITV) was available in Haiti but not being used by all Logistics command groups
  - Data often not available to level 4 detail (container contents listed as food, not specifically what kind of food)
  - RFID tags used on the majority of containers but limited interrogation capability
- Many containers not properly marked led to problems upstream
  - Container weights missing, leading to overweight containers (>25 tons) that could not be lifted with MHE at the JLOTS beaches
  - Container consignee not marked, unclear if sustainment or HADR cargo
  - Container contents not adequately marked requiring time consuming manual inspection
- JLOTS cargo trans-loaded at Jacksonville, FL from 40’ to 20’ containers. Some ITV was lost during this stage
Expeditionary Logistics

Finding: The early absence of an effective joint logistics C2 element, responsible for integrating the overall logistics effort, led to gaps in the RSOI of forces, equipment and supplies

Why it Happened: (1 of 2)

– The deployment and establishment of the Joint Logistics Command (3rd ESC) was disjointed and out of balance with the flow of “maneuver” forces
  – Tension between response capability and relief supplies: security, forces, food, water, fuel, HADR, etc.
  – Prioritization of response units: C2, maneuver, log, med, etc.
– The lack of a comprehensive logistics concept of operations, tying strategic to tactical and the DOD to the interagency, resulted in ambiguity in C2, roles, responsibilities, available capabilities, and timing

☐ Multiple commands reporting logistics info to the JTF-H HQ increased complexity for the J4 staff for both planning and execution (JTF-PO, JLC/3rd ESC, CTF 41, BATESG/22nd MEU, NASESG/24th MEU)
Expeditionary Logistics

Finding: The early absence of an effective joint logistics C2 element, responsible for integrating the overall logistics effort, led to gaps in the RSOI of forces, equipment and supplies.

Why it Happened: (2 of 2)
- Army / Navy / JTF-PO all using different reports and SITREPS
- No battle rhythm to ensure log commands were synchronized
- Informal communications at lower levels across units/services kept the operation on track
- Daily 0900 port operations meetings provided key leaders opportunity to coordinate efforts
- JLOTS exercises paid large dividends

“COL Maskell (Deputy JLOTS CMDR, 7th SB CMDR) and I have worked together before during a previous JLOTS exercise. That previous experience and relationship has made this operation run that much smoother.

CAPT Saunders, JLOTS CMDR, CMDR NBG 2
PaP SPOD Operations

Port Commander
JTF-PO

JLOTST Commander

APN
USAID
WFP
Construction/Dive

832nd Deployment Distribution Support Team (USTRASNCOM)

Crowley/Titan
Ships Agents
and others

689th Rapid Port Opening Element (USTRANSCOM)

7th Sustainment BDE

ACU-2
NCHB-1
ACB-2

Port Operations Summary
directxpl@yahoo.com
SMS

0900 Coordination Meeting

10th Terminal Trans BN

Harbormaster

JLCC
## Summary Document from 0900 Port Operations Meeting

### The SAUNDERS MATRIX

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UNCLASSIFIED
# Summary Document from 0900 Port Operations Meeting

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Expeditionary Logistics

**Finding:** Initial reliance on the single APOD for throughput of relief supplies and personnel required development of a system for validating and prioritizing global international flights into Haiti

**Why it Happened:**
- International aid flights from all over the world were attempting to get into Haiti in the first days – without airspace and airfield controls, the limited capabilities of the APOD (and thus, relief efforts..) would grind to a halt
  - The COCOM and JTF viewed the APOD as the “Phase I Center of Gravity”
- GOH asked USG to open the airfield and control operations - USAID in consultation with UN and international partners determined aircraft priorities for USAF
  - AFSOUTH/12th AF and DIRMOBFOR initially created a “phone – in” slot tracking system
  - Attempt to validate and deconflict multiple international, governmental and non-governmental flights containing various forms of relief supplies/personnel
  - Manpower and labor intensive manual system – not efficient /subject of some international criticism
- Ultimately, created a web based system for slot tracking, managed by the Haiti Flight Operations Center (HFOC) – a CAOC like structure that became an important capability for throughput of relief efforts
JTF-PO APOD Port-au-Prince Int’l

- Joint Assessment Team
  - < 24 Hours from SOUTHCOM Request
  - Assess PaP plus San Isidro & Maria Montez, DR

- JTF-PO APOD IOC
  - < 48 Hours from SOUTHCOM Request

- Immediate Impact to Logistical Flow
  - AF Element – Aircraft Download
  - Army Element – Clear the Port/ITV

Port au Prince Mission Breakdown

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Total Haiti / DR Airlift

- Pax
- Cargo (tons)
French Groups Criticize Handling of Relief Flights

By DOREEN CARVAJAL

PARIS — Far from Haiti’s battered international airport, relief groups are growing more strident in their complaints about how coveted landing spots are doled out among charity groups and prominent visitors by the U.S. Air Force. Médecins Sans Frontières, the international emergency medical relief group that was founded in France, has seen eight of its planes from Europe diverted, the most recent on Wednesday. “It’s a very confusing situation and difficult to understand,” said Marie-Noëlle Rodrigue, deputy director for operations for Médecins Sans Frontières in Paris. She acknowledged the severe damage to the Port-au-Prince airport, where the control tower was destroyed by the earthquake on Jan. 12 and traffic is directed by the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron of the U.S. Air Force. “What is unacceptable to us is the priorities,” Ms. Rodrigue said in an interview. She and the group’s director of operations, Thierry Durand, called it “shocking” and “crazy” that planes with lifesaving equipment were diverted while, for instance, Edward G. Rendell, the governor of Pennsylvania, was able to land in a private plane in Port-au-Prince on a mission to help transport Haitian orphans to the United States. “We are not playing favorites — it couldn’t be further from the truth,” said Maj. Nathan Miller, an officer with the squadron in Haiti. Major Miller, speaking by telephone from Haiti, noted that traffic had swelled from about 15 flights daily to 150, with military planes now arriving during off-peak night hours to make more room for international aid flights. Some international leaders have purposely stayed away from the traffic jam, but they have also been criticized for not showing up. In response to criticism from members of the European Parliament, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, said at a briefing: “I had nothing to contribute on the ground other than taking up valuable space when planes were unable to land because of the state of the airfield. I am not a doctor, nor a firefighter.” The airport has been transformed into a landing strip where tight space, limited slots, news broadcasts, and wing-to-wing maneuvering has led to some tense geopolitical disputes. Alain Joyandet, the French minister in charge of humanitarian aid, has been widely quoted as saying, “This is about helping Haiti, not about occupying Haiti.” Since then, more senior French officials have played down the tensions, but they have not vanished. The arrival of many government relief aid missions has strained resources at the airport, where conditions are so primitive that military traffic controllers are operating on the grass with a few dirt bikes and all-terrain trucks surrounding them, Major Miller said. The incoming traffic, he said, is now divided in thirds among international government flights, civil organizations and American military flights. Problems have been caused by government flights from different countries, Major Miller said, adding that some had stayed on the ground for as long as eight hours, forcing diversions. That was the case, Major Miller said, with flights from China and France that stayed for eight hours and a Chilean flight that blocked part of the mouth to a single taxiway. At one point, Major Miller said, he sought to mediate a dispute with Mr. Joyandet, who was on the ground waiting for the arrival of a French government plane in holding pattern.
French Groups Criticize Handling of Relief Flights (continued, 2 of 2)

By DOREEN CARVAJAL

At one point, Major Miller said, he sought to mediate a dispute with Mr. Joyandet, who was on the ground waiting for the arrival of a French government plane in holding pattern "The French minister and his interpreter ran across the flight line, out to where the controllers are, demanding to have the plane land," Major Miller said. "I went out with security." Mr. Joyandet insisted on talking to the pilot on the radio about fuel conditions, Major Miller said, adding, "We let him talk to the pilot to calm him down." Bernard Valero, a spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry, dismissed the tensions as minor given the vast destruction in Haiti. "These are questions that have been resolved," Mr. Valero said. "The essential point is to help Haitians. Let's not waste our time between French and Americans to discuss this incident." The authorities from the United States, France and Brazil plan to meet in Montreal on Monday to coordinate aid, Mr. Valero added. Relief groups said they were planning to meet on Friday in Haiti with the U.S. military authorities for "discussions at the highest levels to find a solution for the Port-au-Prince airport congestion," said Philippe Martou, deputy chief of aviation service for the World Food Program, a United Nations agency whose flights had also been diverted. On Thursday, the Dutch branch of Médecins Sans Frontières was able to land a plane from Amsterdam in Haiti and is debating whether to send other planes to the Dominican Republic to transport medical supplies to Haiti. In total, the group’s branches in Netherlands, Belgium and France have been able to land five planes in Haiti while eight others have been diverted, said Ms. Rodrigue, who added that 319 tons of supplies had arrived. One plane from Brussels — loaded with dialysis machines and morphine — was diverted four times after reloading equipment into a smaller plane to win a precious landing spot, according to the group, which finally trucked the load from the Dominican Republic to Haiti. Médecins Sans Frontières, which received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999, has worked in Haiti for 19 years. Three of its hospitals in Port-au-Prince were destroyed in the earthquake and staff members retrieved equipment out of the rubble to tend the wounded, Ms. Rodrigue said. Since the earthquake, the group has treated more than 5,000 patients and performed 900 surgeries with an international staff of 237 people and 600 Haitian staff members. It is because of that long experience that the group remains baffled that so many of their flights were diverted when lives were at stake and their planes had required permission to land. "When you see V.I.P.’s, officials and journalists landing in Port-au-Prince, it is very frustrating," Ms. Rodrigue said. "You have a governor from Pennsylvania landing to take home orphans in front of a huge crowd of journalists. How does he have the right to land?" In an interview with The Philadelphia Inquirer, Mr. Rendell, the Pennsylvania governor, said that he had gone on the private flight — also loaded with more than two tons in medical supplies and carrying a medical team — to help in case his political influence was needed to bring Haitian orphans to the United States. When his plane was at first denied a landing slot, Mr. Rendell was able to press on to the landing strip after intervention from higher officials, Major Miller said. "Yes, he used his contacts," said Gary Tuma, a spokesman for Mr. Rendell in Pennsylvania. "The governor of the sixth-largest state in the country tries to talk to people with departments of the federal government. He can frequently get through." Initially, Mr. Tuma said, Mr. Rendell did not plan to go on the flight but went on the advice of the Haitian ambassador to the United States because "someone with the heft of the governor should be there if they ran into roadblocks."
Expeditionary Logistics

Finding: Exploiting the sea base and establishing the Seaport of Debarkation (SPOD) operations contributed significantly to the relief effort

Why it Happened:
- Extensive damage to seaport facilities in Port Au Prince required detailed assessment, site preparation, and facility repair before flowing HADR supplies
- The immediate deployment and employment of sea based capabilities provided both a demonstration of resolve as well as an exponential increase in delivery capacity
- Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS) provided tremendous capability that worked as designed
- In certain cases, leaders made well considered and effective departures from doctrine in accomplishing the mission
Port au Prince Seaport Damage

Finding: Extensive damage to seaport facilities in Port Au Prince required detailed assessment, site preparation, and facility repair before flowing HADR supplies

Why it Happened:

– Ability to provide sustained, bulk throughput of humanitarian relief supplies, basic supplies for economic subsistence and commercial cargo for a disaster of this magnitude could only be supported through the ports

– PaP seaport suffered severe damage, reducing organic capability to near zero
  – North Quay Wall destroyed – Not repairable
  – South Pier: 30% collapsed, remaining 800’ severe damage to pile caps (connection btwn deck & piles)

– Assessments on commercial ports IVO Port au Prince were also damaged and in need of some repair

– GOH had been rendered incapable of managing, repairing, or operating any of their port facilities in the critical time of need
Port au Prince Seaport Damage

North quay wall completely destroyed

Sections of south pier completely destroyed or unusable

Click inside red boxes for pictures of damage
North Quay Wall Destroyed

Gantry crane fell into water along with quay wall

Foot of quay wall is the only part still above water

Looking east along warehouses just inland of quay wall

Looking west along warehouses just inland of quay wall
South Pier Damage

Head of pier section missing

Divers in water assessing pier structure
Foot of pier sag damage
Seabasing Observations

Finding: The immediate deployment and employment of sea based capabilities provided both a demonstration of resolve as well as an exponential increase in delivery capacity

Why it Happened:

- CVN operations provided helicopter assets to pass supplies to and around the shore
- JFMCC commanded ESG/MEU operation, providing sustainment reach back to GTMO for ships and, Beach Party Group ashore for distribution of cargo
- USNS COMFORT provided tremendous capability and a psychological stabilizing effect to the Haitian people
  - JLOTS provided critical movement of supplies from the sea
CVN Operations

- Medical personnel from the carrier worked closely with other services in Carrefour treating an average of 200 injured Haitians daily
- Carrier helicopters conducted nearly 150 sorties transporting severely injured Haitians back to the carrier, the Comfort and other facilities for treatment
- Enabled JTF to provide needed assistance and relief supplies to Port au Prince and other outlaying towns and villages to mitigate migration from the most heavily effected areas
- Worked with the AFSOC/CRG to coordinate and deconflict congested air traffic for 40 plus HA relief/landing zones scattered throughout Port au Prince and surrounding areas
ESG/MEU Capabilities

- ESG/MEU provides its own unique capabilities for self sustaining operations:
  - Transportation
    - To effected region
    - Movement within effected region – minimally impacted by damaged infrastructure
  - Quick prepositioning of force to various locations within AOR
  - Security force
  - Sea assets for moving forces and supplies ashore
  - Air assets:
    - Reachback for sustainment and relief supplies
    - Forward movement of forces and relief supplies
  - Organic assets for water production
  - Minimal footprint ashore
ESG/MEU Operations

- Navy assets are OPCON to NAVSOUTH and Marine units are OPCON to MARFOR SOUTH: Both made TACON to JTF-H through CTF-41
- Estimated sustained capacity to move 40 TEU from the ISB (GITMO) ashore daily with organic assets (using both ESG/MEUs)
- 22 MEU was augmented with transportation and material handling equipment assets from USNS Lummus
- ESG/MEU HADR throughput
  - Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) established at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GITMO). HADR supplies flown in from CONUS and staged
  - Movement of HADR supplies from GITMO to AOR via amphibious shipping, landing craft, and helicopter
  - CLB-22, established ashore, produced 40,000 gal potable water for distribution
  - Movement of HADR supplies ashore via landing craft and helicopter
  - Expedited helicopter movement of high priority medical supplies from the ISB to USNS Comfort
- 300 TEUs (210 TEUs BATESG/22nd MEU, 90 TEUs NASESG/24th MEU) of HADR supplies transported ashore via ESG/MEU assets
ESG/MEU Operations

UNCLASSIFIED
JTF-H Contributions

Medical Treatment-saving lives

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

- Treated over 19,000 earthquake victims
- Performed 1,025 surgeries
- Filled over 70,000 medical prescriptions
JLOTS Observations

Finding: Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS) provided tremendous capability that worked as designed

Why it Happened:

- JLOTS capabilities initially exceeded the ability of USGOs/NGOs to receive, secure, store, and distribute HADR material and led to stockpiling excess material containers in port holding yards

- Logistics Chain of command structures worked with decentralized execution though coordination meetings
  - Intensive coordination among civil and military port authorities facilitated operations using all available port assets and discharge points
  - Professional relationships amongst JLOTS units (i.e. Army, Navy, and contractor elements) built through working together in previous exercises, led to enhanced ability to hit the ground running and make dynamic adjustments to ongoing operations effortlessly

“During last years exercise, COL Maskell was the JLOTS CMDR and I was the Deputy. Now, even with the roles reversed, this evolution has gone even smoother because of the professional relationship we had developed from working together previously.”

CAPT Saunders, JLOTS CMDR, CMDR NBG 2
JLOTS Capacity Build-up

- BATESG (ESG/MEU)—18 Jan
- Navy LOTS (2 NL)—23 Jan
- 100
- 20
- Haiti Earthquake — 12 Jan
- Army LSV/5 LCU + Navy 2 NL + 3 INLS—30 Jan
- 5 Army LCU + Navy LOTS (2 NL)—25 Jan (JLOTS)
- Navy LOTS (2 NL)—23 Jan
- BATESG (ESG/MEU)—18 Jan

TEU/day = 20 Ft Container Equivalent Unit/Day
SPOD Throughput
Subject to inbound vessel availability

Pre-earthquake average daily port throughput

20 ft container equivalents

UNCLASSIFIED
PaP SPOD Operations

Port Commander
JTF-PO

JLOTS Commander

APN
USAID
WFP
Construction/Dive

832nd Deployment Distribution Support Team (USTRASNCOM)

Crowley/Titan
Ships Agents
and others

689th Rapid Port Opening Element (USTRANSCOM)

JLC

7th Sustainment BDE

ACU-2

NCHB-1

ACB-2

Port Operations Summary
directxpl@yahoo.com
SMS

0900 Coordination Meeting

10th Terminal Trans BN

Harbormaster

JLCC
Departures from Doctrine

Finding: In certain cases, leaders made well considered and effective departures from doctrine in accomplishing the mission

Why it Happened:

- Doctrinal JLOTS is a deliberate, sequential operation, developed to sustain a joint force that follows assault echelon (AE) and maritime pre-positioning force (MPF) Ops and builds on existing AE, MPF C2; in this case, the system flow did not follow that sequence
- JLOTS was one enabler needed to provide port throughput in support of humanitarian relief while port operations were re-established and port cargo throughput capability was rebuilt
- Three separate coordinating logistics commands operating LOTS
- Operations had to start as soon as available forces flowed into JOA
- Offloading commercial vessels with military JLOTS assets
- Focus was on rapidly using available throughput, not on building the entire JLOTS infrastructure prior to operating
Medical Observations
Medical Observations

DOD medical contributions, although modest, saved lives and were positive for the US image in the region; however, medical planning did not receive the emphasis typical of the rest of the planning effort.

Findings:

- DOD medical personnel and resources saved lives, improved medical outcomes, and enhanced the USG and COCOM’s image in the region.
- Collaborative relationships built via regional Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) health engagements and interagency coordination were keys to success.
  - Medical planning and execution was hindered by:
    - Insufficient medical Manning, staff training, and experience for a HADR of this magnitude.
    - Medical staff elements were not well integrated into the planning effort.
Medical Observations

Finding: DOD medical personnel and resources saved lives, improved medical outcomes and enhanced the USG and COCOM’s image in the region

Why it Happened:

- A robust Joint DOD medical response; sea and shore based medical units provided triage, life and limb saving capability, advanced care, and outpatient care
- DOD provided medical support to ~19,000 of ~300,000 total patients
- Collaboration between military health and NGO healthcare providers provided a winning combination during Haiti Relief operations
  - Collaboration with multiple partners; NGOs augmented the Comfort staff, multiplying its surgical and ward capabilities
- DODs impact was more than medical; it also provided a visible strategic communications impact that displayed USGs level of commitment to Haiti and the region
### Units in chronologic order of appearance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units in chronologic order of appearance</th>
<th>Date of first pt encounter</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFSOC/SOC SOUTH</td>
<td>15 Jan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USS Carl Vinson</td>
<td>19 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-B</td>
<td>19 Jan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USS BATAAN</td>
<td>19 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNS Comfort</td>
<td>20 Jan</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/82</td>
<td>22 Jan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USS NASSAU</td>
<td>25 Jan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF EMEDS+10</td>
<td>26 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 MEU</td>
<td>27 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS Gunston Hall</td>
<td>29 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 MEU</td>
<td>29 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF SPEARR (primary FHP mission)</td>
<td>30 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA 7th Sustainment Brigade</td>
<td>19 Feb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Treated over 19,000 earthquake victims
- Performed 1,025 surgeries
- Filled over 70,000 medical prescriptions

"(We) have not had a group of medical specialists like this together in one place since Okinawa [circa WWII]"

CAPT Ware, Commanding Officer, USNS Comfort, 28 Feb 2010
USNS COMFORT

USNS Comfort delivered a level of tertiary care capability during a critical time when the host country could not readily provide; transitioning that level of care when the Haitian medical infrastructure was adequately prepared to resume the capability.
JTF – H Medical Contributions

- Treated over 19,000 of the more than 300,000 earthquake victims
- Performed 1,025 surgeries
- Filled over 70,000 medical prescriptions

### Summary of affected population by department in Haiti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Affected Families</th>
<th>People in Shelters</th>
<th>Displaced people</th>
<th>Houses</th>
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<td>Artibonite</td>
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</table>

According to official statistics from Haiti’s Civil Protection, the 12 January earthquake killed more than 200,000 people, caused approximately 300,000 injuries and displaced more than one million Haitians. At one point, more than 600 organizations were providing humanitarian aid to Haiti, and currently, 274 organizations are conducting health activities in at least 15 communities. Immediately following the quake, the most pressing need was to rescue people buried in the rubble and provide immediate emergency care for trauma patients. Needs have now changed and focus is on post-operative care and follow-up of patients who have already had surgery as well as basic primary health care services, such as maternal child health, rehabilitation services, and chronic diseases including diabetes, heart disease, HIV, and tuberculosis, among others. The Health Cluster liaises with other clusters, as many specialties have implications on the health of the population. Some of the major issues are as follows:

- The World Food Programme (WFP) reports that 16 food distribution sites have been activated across
Collaboration

Collaboration between military health and NGO healthcare providers provided a winning combination during Haiti Relief operations.

Dr. Alex Larsen, Haitian Minister of Health tours the Comfort with CAPT Ware, CO Comfort.

BATAAN physician collaborates with members of Doctors Without Borders.
Medical Surge

DOD Medical surge supported Haiti relief efforts both ashore and at sea providing life saving capabilities to the affected population

Flight Surgeon from Vinson provides medical care in Port Au Prince

USNS Comfort and Red Cross personnel provide specialized care
Medical Commitment

The medical contribution was another ingredient in DOD’s support to the USG’s level of commitment to Haiti and the region, providing the Haitian population confidence that their medical needs would be met.

USNS Comfort, clearly seen from the shore of Haiti, displays the US commitment to Haiti’s relief efforts in the region.
A message of thanks and gratitude

“Good Morning CAPT Ware, I cannot find words to tell you how I am grateful for all you and your majesty crew have done for me... my family say thanks to you all.”

Your artist, Hugues Larose
Finding: Collaborative relationships built via regional Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) health engagements were keys to success

Why it Happened:

☐ SOUTHCOM Partnership Directorate was key in conducting TSC health engagements through annual humanitarian civic assistance operations like “Continuing Promise”
  – Laid the foundation for cooperation and trust throughout the region
  – Enabled better collaboration efforts

☐ SOUTHCOM exercises such as Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX promote cooperation in the region by working through a multinational training exercise for the defense of the Panama Canal

☐ SOUTHCOM sponsored Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs) provide humanitarian assistance and free medical care to the people of the host nation continuing to foster positive relationships within the theater

“Civ-Mil coordination was one of the best stories because of the regional partnerships built through consistent Continuing Promise activities within the whole region”

CAPT Cubano, Surgeon General, SOUTHCOM, 03 Feb 2010
Continuing Promise is a SOUTHCOM annual humanitarian civic assistance operation supported by U.S. and international military medical personnel, U.S. government agencies, regional health ministries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and U.S. academic institutions.
Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX

- SOUTHCOM joint, multinational training exercise that brings together military and civil forces from 19 countries to promote interoperability to counter threats to the Panama Canal.

A mock patient during a mass casualty drill aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Tarawa (LHA 1) while under way in the Panama Canal Zone Aug. 2, 2008. Tarawa is deployed in support of Fuerzas Aliadas Panamax 2008.

U.S. BG Donnelly, deputy commander of the 807th Medical Deployable Support Command, talks with Colombian navy Rear Adm. Roberto Garcia Marquez aboard the amphibious transport dock ship USS Mesa Verde during a Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX 2009.
Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias kicks off in the Dominican Republic

Jan 12, 2010

By U.S. Army South Public Affairs

SANTO DOMINGO, Dominican Republic (Jan. 8, 2010) - The annual exercise Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias (Allied Humanitarian Forces) kicks off next week in the Dominican Republic. Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias, a disaster response planning and coordination exercise which includes civilian officials, military forces and police officers from Central American and Caribbean Nations and the United States as well as representatives of regional and international organizations, will take place Jan. 11-15 in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias is designed to promote partnerships in humanitarian assistance and improve regional cooperation and coordination among military organizations, governments, and non-governmental agencies. As the partnered organizations become familiar with each others’ policies and procedures, they will be better prepared to react to natural and man-made disasters with more effective rescue, recovery, relief and restoration efforts. This particular exercise concentrates on potential disaster threats in the region from earthquakes and volcanoes, and associated effects such as tsunamis.

More than 300 participants will learn more about these regional threats and exchange information on measures to mitigate and alleviate the suffering caused by them. Participating and observing countries include Dominican Republic, Barbados and Panama.

Several important governmental, non-governmental and international organizations will also participate, including the Pan American Health Organization, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the Caribbean Disaster response unit, the Center of Coordination for the Prevention of Natural Disaster in Central America, the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency, the Conference of American Armies Humanitarian Assistance, and the Office of Disaster Management of the Ministry of Foreign Disaster Agency.

The government of Dominican Republic is hosting Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias 10 in its capital, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense, South, U.S. Southern Command's executive agency for the exercise.

Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs)

- MEDRETEs provide units with real deployment and readiness experience, as well as experience operating in austere environments. For the host nation, MEDRETEs provide health education, disease prevention training, and personal and professional exchanges.

Dental care provided during MEDRETE in Guatemala, April 2008

Villagers receive preventive care during MEDRETE in Canita, Panama, Feb 2009
Medical Observations

Finding: Medical planning and execution was hindered by insufficient medical manning, staff training, and experience for a HADR of this magnitude

Why it Happened:
- SOUTHCOM is among the smallest and least staffed COCOMs
- The Medical JMD for the JTF did not reflect the appropriate personnel sourcing for a crisis situation of this magnitude, limiting JTF ability to respond to the level of the requirements
- Lack of personnel experienced in supporting large Joint operations contributed to delays in planning and establishing integrated medical operations
- Little HADR medical participation during annual training

“Any COCOM would have needed augmentation to handle this crisis”
CAPT McCarten, SOUTHCOM Medical Augmentee, BUMED, 05 Feb 2010
• The JTF Medical JMD did not include critical billets such as medical regulating and medical logistics officers
  – An early stated need for rotary wing patient movement regulators for the JTF staff was never filled, initially resulting in patients being moved without being tracked
  – Eventually the patient tracking requirement was met by a TRANSCOM Air Evacuation Team, providing patient tracking capabilities, and patient movement to the appropriate treatment level/facility
  – No medical logistician on JTF JMD, limiting the planning for sources of medical supplies to include; cost, supply chains, labeling and languages, etc
Medical C2 Delays

- The COCOM Surgeon General (SG) staff did not have the requisite operational experience to direct the medical operations in an operation of this magnitude
  - VADM (Ret) Cowan, former Navy SG, was brought in as a senior mentor, his input gave the SC command staff a level of comfort on the medical input to Unified Response (but his participation was limited)
  - Other J-codes were augmented with FOs/GOs
- The JTF was augmented by a medical flag officer to serve as the JTF SG because of the enormity of the task, 15 days after the earthquake - C2 was clarified
- There are no directives within the USG and DOD for this type of international response that establishes chain of command
- Initially the JTF, USAID, and DHHS all worked in parallel with little collaboration

“If DOD is going to continue to respond to international disasters then they need to have a dedicated chain of command for [HADR]… More officers (leadership) need to have this type of expertise, training, and policymaking skill.”

Dr. Waldman, USG lead for Health Response, USAID, 23 Feb 2010
Medical Observations

Finding: Medical staff elements were not well integrated into the planning effort

Why it Happened:
– A DOD rapid disaster response medical capability, including health experts in Interagency (IA) and medical Civil-Military Operations (CMO), integrated with C2 and Base Operating Support (BOS) does not exist
– Lack of a dedicated medical response team delayed the ability to gain a medical COP; this made it more challenging to define appropriate RFFs and allocate resources
  – Initially, the JTF, USAID, and DHHS med teams all worked in parallel instead of being integrated which limited sharing of assessment information
– The COCOM and JTF received multiple “Joint Enablers” to support their mission: (JPASE, JECC, NC SJFHQ, JCSE, etc); however, no Joint/DOD enabler exists for Medical contingencies

“A prototype Humanitarian Assistance Rapid Response Team (HARRT) is an EMEDS combined with a Contingency Response Group (CRG). It was developed in PACAF... Not a mature USAF capability but is being considered”

Col Mansflield, EMEDS CC, SOUTHCOM, 24 Feb 2010
JTF-Haiti Accomplishments

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

**Air Port**
- Reorganized and operated the Airfield
- 3334 JTF-Haiti sorties (as of 5 MAR)
  - Includes 458 StratLift sorties
- 3.1M tons or cargo
- 16K AMCITs evacuated
- 100/117 missing AMCIT cases completed; 45 remains evacuated
- Trained/enabled CAA to resume Haitian control of airspace

**Sea Port**
- Reopened damaged port
- Doubled port capacity
- 8400 TEU off loaded; 10.2M ST
- Enabled APN to assume security, cargo, and scheduling of port operations
- Repair of South pier completed 26 MAR
- Coast Guard installed Nav Aids

**Secure Environment for HA/DR Operations**

**DOD Medical Support**
- 19K+ patients treated
- 1200 admissions; 1,025 surgeries
- 255 MEDEVACS
- 2200 patient transfers
- "Tail Gate Medicine" to Thousands
- 75 tons of medical supplies distributed
- 5 Search and Rescue operations

**HA/DR**
- Sustainable support system confirmed across affected population
- Service Members provided:
  - 4.9M meals
  - 17M pounds of bulk food
  - 2.6M bottles of water

**Shelter**
- Supported distribution of Emergency Shelter for 525K people
  - 163k tarpaulins
  - 23k tents
- Engineering Assessments of 2,043 structures and 283 acres
- 77 blocks of rubble removed in PaP

As of 29 MAR 10
### Historical Comparison – Major Areas of Improvement *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Area</th>
<th>Performance</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speed of Response</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>Push/Pull Tension</td>
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<tr>
<td>Situational Awareness</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>Remains challenging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution Management</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>Opening APOD/SPODs, (+) JLOTS (+), WFP Distribution (+), Logistics C2 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Communications</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>JIIC (+), Social Media Use (+)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning &amp; Organization</td>
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<td>Enablers (+), transition planning (+)</td>
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<td>Coordination</td>
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<td>JOTC/CSC Structure, (+) Information Sharing (+)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Existing Theater Engagement</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>Continued Utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Capabilities</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>Need for HADR Planners</td>
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</table>

*Compared to key areas of success from past JCOA HADR studies (Haiti 2004, Tsunami 2004, Guatemala 2005, Pakistan 2005)
Recommen-dations

National Response and Organization
COCOM Response and Organization
JTF-H Haiti Formation & Organization
Contingency Force Projection
Coordination, Collaboration & Communication
Expeditionary Logistics
Medical Observations
## Recommendations for National Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Response and Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Re-examine role of S/CRS in HADR situations – particularly with regard to strengthening planning capacity and COCOM interface</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review/amend the policies and authorities associated with the repatriation of AMCITs, orphans, remains to CONUS and the associated cross COCOM issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>Examine feasibility of integrating military and civilian assessment teams (ie; DART, HAST, etc) for crisis response contingencies (see NORTHCOM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Codify, as a “Best Practice”, the deployment and support provided by strategic level liaisons (NSC and senior DOD public affairs personnel, etc) to the tactical (JTF) level</td>
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<td>Review policies and procedures for prioritization, labeling, containerizing and shipment of civilian aid donations</td>
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<td>Develop policies and procedures to leverage private industry</td>
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## Recommendations for COCOM Response

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<tr>
<th>COCOM Response and Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Review/amend JSCP to address shortfalls in HADR response plans and responsibilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>As required, develop scalable HADR plans, to include TPFDD data, for multiple possible theater scenarios</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide the funding and augmentation support (both DOD and IA) for COCOMs to exercise HADR response with LFA every 18 months. Exercises should include interagency use of unclassified network</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop a deployable “advise and assist” team with senior mentors and LL reachback to support the commanders and staff during the initial stages of a crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop COCOM and interagency standby agreements, similar to state to state MOUs, to define augmentation arrangements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Codify as a “Best Practice” the use of “unclassified” operations environment for information exchange and collaboration between all stakeholders involved in theater HADR operations</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review and recommend specific unclassified, commercial websites as probable collaborative tools of choice to support HADR operations – BPT designate specific sites at the onset of CAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) procedures with Foreign Disclosure and Intelligence directorates and modify measures as needed</td>
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</table>
# Recommendations for JTF Response

## JTF Haiti Formation & Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Review SJFHQ manning and relationships across COCOMs</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review JTF HQ’s Joint Manning Documents, ensure that the HQ’s are built joint and train joint</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Follow through on the Joint Manpower Exchange Program (JMEP) established in 2005 (CFP)</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reexamine potential deployable C2 systems to support HADR operations and resolve outstanding technical/interoperability issues</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improve military knowledge of country team Emergency Action Plans (EAP), to include key contacts and anticipated actions</td>
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<td>X</td>
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</table>
# Recommendations for Force Projection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contingency Force Projection</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Review the composition of the Global Response Force to include all enablers (CA, PSYOP, C2, LOG, ENG, etc)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review/Refine the force modules defined in (CJCSM) 3150.16B, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Reporting Structure (JOPESREP); then train and exercise with existing force modules within the JOPES processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop a “shopping list” of capabilities needed for potential scenarios (JSCP missions for the COCOM) that staffs can use as a quick reference when building a force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review the role of Reserve Component forces as part of a no-notice contingency deployment</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Codify the JTF Force Flow working group as a “Best Practice” for future use</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deploy trained/equipped personnel (in early-entry packages) to properly follow ITV process guidance within CJCSM 3150.16B (JOPESREP)</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop comprehensive plans for the augmentation of the GFM/JOPES cell with fully-qualified personnel in the event of a crisis (COCOM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Update TPFDD LOI to include specific guidance on ULN and force module structure and use as well as verification and validation methods and procedures</td>
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*Starred item indicates a high priority recommendation.*
Recommendations for Coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordination, Collaboration &amp; Communication</th>
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<tr>
<td>Develop the requirements for a HADR COP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Further explore opportunities to use non-traditional ISR in forming a HADR COP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explore further collaborative efforts with commercial entities, such as Google, to develop COPs and other tools for situational awareness/info sharing</td>
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<td>Review the process / C2 for each step of RSO&amp;I to ensure unity of command throughout</td>
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<tr>
<td>Codify and/or update as required, the use of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) and Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC) interfaces with the NGO, PVO and UN systems, as a “Best Practice” for future use</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deploy a senior (GO/FO) COMAFFOR and/or C/JFACC with authorities and responsibility within the JOA to provide the preponderance of air capabilities to the JTF commander.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Codify use of the Joint Interagency Information Cell (JIIC) as a “Best Practice”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Examine/revise policies and procedures to the extent possible to allow the maximization of unclassified means and mediums for information sharing, to include social media, blogs, websites, etc.</td>
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<td>Add the requirement for a social media expert to the JPASE manning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Continue to involve Foreign Disclosure Expertise early on in the planning process to facilitate sharing of military information to foreign and private entities in a broad-based unclassified environment</td>
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## Recommendations for Logistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expeditionary Logistics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deploy trained/equipped personnel (in early-entry packages) to properly follow ITV</td>
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<tr>
<td>process guidance within CJCSM 3150.16B (JOPESREP)</td>
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<td>Examine the enduring requirement for a tailorable, Joint logistics organization,</td>
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<td>with appropriate C2, as part of the Global Response Force list</td>
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<td>Examine the requirement for the addition of a contract management cell as Joint</td>
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<td>plug during contingency deployments</td>
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<td>Increase education on JLOTS capabilities across all services</td>
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<td>Continue JLOTS annual exercises; potentially plan to exercise with all</td>
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<td>geographical component commanders sequentially</td>
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<td>Examine the feasibility to plan JLOTS exercises to address crisis action scenarios</td>
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<td>predicating discrete/specific use of capabilities, in addition to deliberate sequential</td>
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<td>employment for normal operations</td>
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# Recommendations for Medical

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<tr>
<th>Medical</th>
<th>DOTMPF</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Update COCOM JMD to reflect required HADR medical roles/capabilities</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ensure adequate operational experience resides within the Surgeon’s staff and is prepared to respond to a major HADR mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review the capacity for medical C2 and planning in a crisis response situation</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop specific medical annexes/appendices within HADR CONPLANS that address assessment teams collaboration, coordination and standardized reporting procedures in support of the JTF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enhance coordination/collaboration with component SG Offices to better partner resources and manpower in a constrained environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Designate and Include appropriate medical representation on all COCOM and Component early-entry assessment teams for contingency HADR operations.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Include greater participation of SG staff in COCOM exercises and engagements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish a Senior Mentor program for COCOMs SG and staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish a rapid, deployable Joint expeditionary medical capability that is self sustaining with organic C2, communications, and base operating systems. Primarily functions as the DOD medical response and conduit within the JTF to coordinate all separate component medical assessments and advise the COCOM and JTF Commanders on medical requirements and options. (consider Air Force HARRT as model)</td>
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Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE
Haiti Earthquake Response

QUESTIONS?

Joint Center for Operational Analysis
27 April 2010

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Drill Downs
LTG Keen’s Observations
LTG Keen’s Top 10 Observations from Operation Unified Response

1) Respond quickly and effectively
2) Protect the people always
3) Build partnerships with key players
4) Coordinate and Collaborate (C2) to achieve unity of effort
5) Communicate – Communicate – Communicate
6) Support the lead Federal Agency within clearly defined roles
7) Pull from all available resources to form the Joint Task Force
8) Include the Host Nation Government as much as possible
9) Work Closely with the UN Humanitarian Community
10) Anticipate challenges with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
LTG Keen’s Top 10 Observations from Operation Unified Response

8) Include the Host Nation Government as much as possible

- Must respect sovereignty of Host Nation and act at their request
- Everything we do should have a Host Nation face on it
- By, with, and through the Host Nation legitimizes the government in the eyes of the people
- After the initial response, our actions should support long-term Host Nation goals
- Understand culture
- Coach, teach, mentor, train
- Patience, patience, patience
LTG Keen’s Top 10 Observations from Operation Unified Response

10) Anticipate challenges with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

- Natural disasters often cause IDPs
- The IDP situation changes as the environment develops
- The sooner you look at the IDP issue long term, the better
- Start by developing a Host Nation IDP strategy and implementing policy
- Chasing shiny objects can create other problems further down the line
- Without a comprehensive plan clearly understood by all, it is difficult to achieve unity of effort
I am a believer in the SJFHQ concept – we used two, including leveraging NORTHCOM’s, and Chile was a potential third one.

Adm Thomas was great, but there was too much discovery learning on logistic capacities of all of the services.

S/CRS did not play – they could have helped USAID immensely.

There are only about 40 USAID people on the ground – they can’t get out of the tactical fight. USAID is under resourced, especially in planning capability.

There need to be the resources to exercise to the point the COCOM is stressed, at least every other year.

The best C2 in the early days was Blackberries.

*Gen Fraser, SOUTHCOM Commander*
Conclusions (1 of 2)

- The role, responsibilities, authorities, and required capabilities of the Lead Federal Agency were not clearly defined; nor was the division of labor with the Department of Defense.
- Early re-organization of the SOUTHCOM staff coupled with augmentation from the COCOMs and Joint Staff were essential in building much-needed C2 capacity and capability for sustained operations within the COCOM
- Early difficulties in gaining situational awareness clouded the determination of requirements and priorities, greatly complicating the delivery and distribution of manpower and supplies
- Use of open-source means to share information allowed a broad range of players to collaborate and to contribute; cell phones, hand-held messaging devices, websites, and use of social media were key tools
- The decision to publish an OPORD and conduct the entire operation at the UNCLASSIFIED level was pivotal to successful collaboration and information sharing with all stakeholders
- Both SOUTHCOM and the JTF took a very proactive and comprehensive approach to strategic communications and thereby kept perceptions in balance with reality
Conclusions (2 of 2)

- The early insertion of joint enablers (JECC, JPASE, service expertise, etc) into the JTF headquarters accelerated its transformation to jointness.
- The lack of a designated JTF HQ or joint logistics C2 element *within the Global Response Force* required the deployment planning for both on short notice, adding to an already challenging force flow situation.
- The immediate deployment and employment of sea based capabilities provided both a demonstration of resolve as well as an exponential increase in delivery capacity.
- The initial “push” of forces and supplies was rapid via VOCO authorities but ad-hoc and largely executed outside of formal planning, sourcing, and tracking procedures, causing an early loss of in-transit visibility and efficiency in delivery.
- The rapid infusion of manpower and supplies, while creating inefficiencies, was nonetheless very effective in giving the JTF and the LFA the means to stabilize the situation and save lives.