



Operational Environment Enterprise

US TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity

Red Diamond

Complex Operational Environment
and Threat Integration Directorate

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INSIDETHIS ISSUE

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Operational Environment and Army Learning

TC 7-102 Coming Soon!



by Jon H. Moilanen, CTID Operations (BMA Ctr)

Training Circular (TC) 7-102, *Operational Environment and Army Learning*, when published in summer 2014, will be a practical guide on how to integrate the conditions of an operational environment (OE) into US Army training, professional education, and leader development experiences. Applications include concepts and capabilities developmental initiatives. TC 7-102 complements critical design principles in [TC 7-101, Exercise Design](#), and presents techniques that support the fundamental concepts of a continuously adaptive learner-centric model—the Army Learning Model (ALM)—in the operational and institutional domains of the US Army. (Continued at p. 4)

US Army Learning Model Implication

The implication for the Army is to create an efficient, versatile, integrated, and effective unit-training construct that is adaptive, to [an] OE and responsive to commanders, leaders, and trainers as they develop unit training to meet AFFORGEN readiness objectives. The construct must be scalable, tailorable, and dynamic to allow commanders to train units at different levels of fidelity...the lines between the institutional domain and the operational domain must [blend].

The U.S. Army Training Concept 2012-2020 (2011)



RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST

by Jon H. Moilanen, CTID Operations and Chief, *Red Diamond* Newsletter (BMA Ctr)

This issue of the *Red Diamond* newsletter spotlights TC 7-102, *Operational Environment and Army Learning*. TC 7-102 presents concise guidance on how to integrate the variables of an operational environment (OE) and G2 OEE resources in support of Army readiness.

The “Subterranean Environment” article notes the adaptive use of this type of environment, and Hezbollah is cited as a case of cache sites, command facilities, and defensive positions. The purpose of “Hybrid Threat Mortar Tactics” is insight on various tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

The article on Operation ATROPIA COVENANT, DATE Rotation 14-05 at the Joint Readiness Training Center Ft. Polk included elements from the Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment-Africa (RAFTE-Africa). The RTU commander’s focus was on movement to contact and attack.

Precision guided munitions (PGMs) in a hybrid threat such as Special Purpose Forces (SPF) and insurgents are a case in “Advanced Mortar Munitions in a Complex Environment,” which provides a vignette for training, and OE awareness of significant enemy capabilities.

The bombing of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut on 19 November 2013 demonstrates a complex OE, and is the first time an anti-Assad group on Lebanese soil mounted an attack against an Iranian target.

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Director's Corner: Thoughts for Training Readiness



by Jon Cleaves, Director, Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (TRISA-CTID)

A recurring topic of interest that comes to CTID is, “What are threat *functional tactics* and *functional analysis*?” The rationale is stated in the US Army’s [Training Circular \(TC\) 7-100 series](#). These publications describe the threat that exists for the purpose of training US forces for potential or known missions in complex operational environments (OEs).

Functional *tactics* is the idea that threat tactical action — really anyone’s tactical action – is best understood and described by the functions each actor or sub-element performs in order to bring about mission accomplishment. For many years we attempted to describe threat tactical action according to relative geometry. Units and formations were presented as being a part of a certain echelon and portrayed according to their position relative to another unit or a control measure: “The RAG is 4-6 kilometers from the FLOT.” Functional tactics describes tactical action according to the role each actor and element has in bringing about success and does so using a common language and necessary and sufficient battlefield functions. This idea permits us to understand conceptually how any enemy will fight, reducing the problem to determining which means a particular enemy uses to execute already understood functions.

Functional *analysis* is an intelligence analysis methodology that uses the concepts of functional tactics to predict enemy courses of action. It is designed to result in a graphic depiction of how an adversary or enemy might or is likely to conduct its operations in capabilities, dispositions, and actions to accomplish a particular type of mission.

We teach functional tactics as part of our biannual 5-day seminar. We intend to expand this to more rigorous and specific courses about tactics, and not simply a component of a more general course.

We are partnering with the Intelligence Center of Excellence to instantiate functional analysis into doctrine and instruction.

JON

RED DIAMOND SURVEY

I invite you to tell us what you need to support your training, professional education, and leader development. This user survey at the URL (below) is a simple five-minute questionnaire. This is your opportunity to focus our research and analysis resources to best serve your requirements.

<https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/KV9ZKKX>

Red Diamond Customer Feedback

1. What article topics are the most useful to you?

- ◆ Additional questions in the survey can lead to improved training, education, leader development, and **READINESS**.
- ◆ CTID assessment of survey input and a way ahead will be addressed in a future issue of the **OEE Red Diamond**.

The TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff G2 (Intelligence) is responsible to develop, deliver, and validate OE products and services to enable Army training, leader development, education, and concepts and capabilities development. The TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) and its Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) serve as the Army lead for designing, documenting, and integrating threat and opposing forces (OPFOR) and OE conditions. TRISA and CTID support doctrinal development of OE and OPFOR through the review, edit, development, and publication of TCs, and other products for use of the operational environment concept.

What is in *Operational Environment and Army Learning*?

TC 7-102 presents concise and enduring doctrine-based guidance on how to integrate the variables of an operational environment (OE) in support of Army missions. Learning venues include the individual responsibility for professional self-development, and the institutional and operational responsibility and accountability to provide easily accessible resources to a comprehensive range of progressive training, education, leader development, and concepts and capabilities requirements.

The primary audience for TC 7-102 is the training and curriculum developer and the commander or leader responsible and accountable for developing and instituting an Army learning continuum of timely, credible, and relevant experiences. The aim of deliberate experiences is learning and achievement of professional expertise ranging individual Soldier skills to effective conduct of leadership at tactical, operational, and strategic levels of organizational mission.

21st Century Strategic Environment

The Army training and curriculum developer understand the training and education charter to develop and implement the best possible institutional experiences, within available resources, to improve and sustain the competence, confidence, and capabilities of Soldiers, leaders, Department of the Army Civilians (DAC), and units or organizations for decisive action in the 21st century.

Army training and education must embed *mission command* principles and the effective conduct of *warfighting functions* in its training, education, and self-development. A developer uses these primary concepts, grounded in approved Army doctrine, to ensure the quality of adaptive and timely training and education to the Army.

Mission Command (Philosophy)

The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.

Army Mission Command Strategy (2013)

Mission Command Warfighting Function

The mission command warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions.

Army Mission Command Strategy (2013)

The training developer defines the audience that the training or education conditions of an OE are to affect. A desired learning level complements this shaping of how complex or simple the conditions must be in order to accomplish the identified task/action standard. The training and curriculum developer must determine the conditions that address current OEs and also prepare for future contingencies of a globally-engaged Army. The philosophy and principles of

mission command guide the training developer in how to perceive and understand these OEs and training and education requirements.

The framework of OE analysis provides the training and curriculum developer with a holistic, scalable, and flexible method with which to generate an *understanding* of an OE. The framework applies eight operational variables to a specific operational environment, a group of operational environments, or the strategic environment. In understanding an OE, training and curriculum developers focus on defining, analyzing, and synthesizing the characteristics of each of the *operational variables* as it relates to an environment under review. Each OE is dynamic. This characteristic is primarily the result of the ever-changing nature of operational variables, their interactions, and the resulting cascading implications of such interactions. The interactions among the variables determine the nature of a particular operational environment.

The ADDIE Process of Instructional Design

The ADDIE process is a flexible instructional design model used by TRADOC that enacts a system of continual learning development, conduct, and review for improved performance to standards. The analysis, design, development, implementation, and evaluation (ADDIE) process takes the training and curriculum developer from the initial determination of a requirement or need through analysis, design, and development phases; to implementation of a learning experience; and continues a learning continuum with formative and summative evaluation improvements to training or education products, processes, and programs. See figure 1 for a simplified illustration of an ADDIE process. Each of the five phases has highlighted key points for training and curriculum developer collaboration.




Figure 1. ADDIE process considerations in the Army learning model (ALM)

As training and curriculum developers identify information and resources to best support identified requirements, the value of the G2 Operational Environment Enterprise (OEE) is most evident in the analysis, design, and development phases of the ADDIE process. Nonetheless, OEE considerations affect all five phases of the ADDIE process through the

formative evaluations of each phase and the summative evaluation. Concise vignettes in TC 7-102 use cyber issues to exemplify how the developer and OEE can optimize learning objectives in each phase. Each ADDIE phase has an illustration of OE considerations and how to apply OEE capabilities.

The ways and means for the developer and G2 OEE support are amplified by how leaders, trainers, and educators administer the training, education, or leader development venues. Core competencies for Soldier and leader proficiency are criteria to assess and evaluate particular learning experiences. Although comprehensive evaluation of competencies may not be appropriate in every learning experience, one or more competency is integral to any Army learning experience. See figure 2 for some competencies and attributes to be considered by the training and curriculum developer.



Figure 2. Competency and attribute considerations in Army learning outcomes

The training and curriculum developer determines the combination of variables to focus a particular learning event. Selected *subvariables* further define a learning environment and provide considerations for how conditions can be applied to a task or action. A Threat Manager or OE subject matter expert assists in the review and validation process for credible and robust OE conditions.

Training and curriculum developers overlap elements of analysis, design, and development to improve effectiveness and efficiencies in learning. For example, information gathered during task and topic development in the analysis phase overlaps learning objective development in the design phase. Completed and approved elements from the design phase may proceed to aspects of development prior to all elements being formally approved for integration. Implementation is a dynamic action of conduct and concurrent review. Evaluation overlaps every ADDIE phase. Formative evaluation must be conducted throughout the ADDIE process to ensure quality products, effective instruction, and credible use of available resources. The positive spiral development and improvement are an iterative continuum of updating and adjusting training and education experiences based on formative and summative evaluation data, other guidance from the leadership levels accountable and responsible for Army readiness, and the changing nature of an OE.

TRADOC G2 Operational Environment Enterprise (OEE)

The TRADOC G2 OEE is an integrated training environment (ITE) resource that leverages technology-enabled presentations and other information in support of individual and collective learning experiences. The G2 OEE is TRADOC's principal means to deliver OE products, services, and support to TRADOC's supported stakeholders. The G2 OEE resides in the institutional training domain, that is, the Army's institutional training and education systems.

Operational Environment
A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2014)

As TRADOC improves its available live, virtual, constructive, and gaming (LVCG) collaboration of observations, lessons learned, and capabilities development and experimentation venues for Army readiness, the G2 OEE becomes an expanding resource for OE conditions in support of the *TRADOC Strategic Plan (TSP)* and the Army mission. The TRADOC G2, Deputy Chief of Staff (Intelligence) is the TRADOC executive manager of G2 OEE activities.

OEE Support

The OEE enhances individual and collective learning experiences with robust, realistic, and relevant OE conditions. The G2 OEE builds, validates, maintains, and delivers OE context and complexity to Army operational and institutional forces, and other capability stakeholders.

The G2 OEE provides OE resources that support the Army in forums such as institutional learning, home station training (HST), combat training centers (CTCs), training by deployed units and activities, and other operational force missions. These products, services, and support are integral to the institutional curriculum development process (ADDIE) and exercise design planning and execution. See figure 3 for a G2 OEE concept of collaboration and emergent support capabilities to the Army Learning Model.




Figure 3. G3 Operational environment enterprise (OEE) support and services concept

Considerations for OE Application

The TRADOC G2 OEE continues to incorporate operational environment conditions into the Army Learning Model (ALM) for the Soldier and leader in ways that make G2 OEE outputs readily available, accessible, tailored, and useful to specific needs. The G2 OEE architecture-supported tools and enablers are expanding in resource capabilities and accessibility online. As these OEE initiatives attain a useable state, OEE capabilities and resources will be identified in updates to this training circular or announced in an appropriate training and education development guidance.

OE Integration Job Aid for Army Learning Model

The *U.S. Army Training Concept 2012-2020* and *The U.S. Army Learning Concept 2015* describe a continuum of learning focused on creating adaptive leaders across a career span that is learner-centric and enabled by technology. These concepts are merging for Army training and education with projections into the coming decades. In Appendix A of TC 7-

102, a job aid of statements and questions supports the training or curriculum developer with the ADDIE process for effective and efficient use of ALM and G2 OEE.

Exercise Design Checklist

An exercise design checklist in Appendix B of TC 7-102 is a summarized list of key exercise design tasks and associated events. This list states required actions with supporting notes for the four phases of exercise design as presented in Chapter 2 of [TC 7-101, Exercise Design](#). These include—

- Initial planning and exercise objectives-parameters such as live, virtual, constructive, gaming (LVCG), or a combination of venues.
- Task and countertask development for threat opposing forces (OPFOR).
- OE development of variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and physical environmental conditions and time (PMESII-PT).
- Orders, plans, and instruction development.

This checklist is not intended to be all-inclusive but rather to provide a sampling of critical tasks that must be accomplished within the exercise design process. Opposing forces (OPFOR) for training are often a hybrid threat.

Opposing Forces

A plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force for training and developing U.S. forces.

Army Regulation 350-2, *Opposing Force (OPFOR) Program*

Hybrid Threat

The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.

ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*

OPFOR Tactical Task List


The OPFOR tactical task list presents tactical tasks that are specific to the OPFOR and portrayal of a threat or hybrid threat. OPFOR tactical organizations and individuals perform these tasks instead of the comparable tasks in the *Army Universal Task List* (AUTL), Field Manual 7-15 with changes. OPFOR organizations and individuals perform tactical tasks in order to provide challenging conditions for the execution of mission essential and critical tasks by US Army units and activities. An example of an OPFOR tactical task is provided in Appendix C of TC 7-102 with components of task, subtasks, and measures of performance criteria.

Supplemental Support

The glossary includes an expanded list of acronyms and terms useful for the developer and OEE support team. Key training, education, and leader development sources list title or e-links. References list required and related publications useful to the developer and OEE that are fundamental sources for the trainer, educator, leader, and supporting staffs and activities.

Implications for Army Readiness

TC 7-102 will be a guide of how to integrate operational environment (OE) variables in support of Army missions. Learning venues include the individual responsibility for professional self-development, and the institutional and operational responsibility and accountability to provide easily accessible resources to a comprehensive range of progressive training, education, leader development, and concepts and capabilities requirements.



TC 7-102 will be a companion to the critical design principles in TC 7-101, *Exercise Design*. An adaptive learner-centric model—the Army Learning Model—in the operational and institutional domains of the US Army is a fundamental requirement for continued and sustained Army readiness. Although the focus of the training circular is to assist the training and curriculum developer, all leaders are responsible and accountable to employ robust, realistic, and relevant conditions in learning experiences that result in functional expertise and readiness to achieve assigned Army missions.

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by Jennifer Dunn, Threat Assessment Team (DAC)

The subterranean environment, meaning a system of tunnels used for multiple purposes, represents a potential area of vulnerability for US forces. When this environment is properly exploited by the threat it can act as an effective countermeasure against US weapons systems and intelligence collection assets. The subterranean environment is discussed as a component of the operational environment (OE) infrastructure variable (as part of the PMESSI-PT construct of describing the OE). Over time, adversaries of the US and its allies have repeatedly shown that they are extremely adept at their use of this type of environment which consequently presents a situation in which, despite the US's technological superiorities, a threat could potentially gain an advantage over the US and achieve victory.

When viewed through the hybrid threat construct of *regular forces*, *irregular forces*, and *criminal elements*, historical examples of threats exploiting the subterranean environment to their advantage abound, from the Vietnam War (*regular* and *irregular forces*) to modern day Korea (*regular force*), Afghanistan (*irregular forces*), and the US/Mexican border (*criminal elements*). Time and again, adversaries typically seen as technologically inferior have secured tactical, operational, and even strategic victories over the US through their proficient use of the subterranean environment.

The April 2014 Threat Report, *Subterranean Environment: Tunnel to Victory, the 2006 Lebanon War*, is a case study on a recent example of the proficient use of the subterranean environment in armed conflict. In 2006, Hezbollah, an irregular element of the hybrid threat construct, used a complex integrated network of underground tunnels and bunkers throughout southern Lebanon as a key component of its *planned defense* and was able to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic victory over Israel through its skillful exploitation of the subterranean environment. Simply glancing at this map of southern Lebanon gives an understanding of the depth of Hezbollah's defenses and provides insight into the challenges faced by Israel during the war. See figure 1.




Figure 1. Hezbollah defenses in southern Lebanon

Hezbollah's use of the subterranean environment could be broken up into three main functions: cache sites, command and control (C2) facilities, and defensive positions. While these functions are separate and distinct, it is important to note that Hezbollah's underground facility (UGF) system was integrated, with one facility sometimes providing all of the functions; many defensive positions acted as a cache site and many C2 nodes were located alongside caches and in defensive positions.

[Subterranean Environment: Tunnel to Victory, the 2006 Lebanon War](#) presents several unique training implications. First and foremost, US forces will likely have to conduct operations in regions that contain subterranean environments. Recognizing this, it is important to know that the hybrid threat will likely employ the subterranean environment as a countermeasure to overcome any technological superiority enjoyed by US forces. Additionally, correctly emplaced and exploited subterranean environments (such as bunkers and tunnels) have a long history of creating problems for scores of militaries throughout history, and need to be a consideration while conducting planning for unit training.

To further assist the training community with the difficult task of incorporating the subterranean environment into training, this article will conclude with a *new Event* (below), designed for use in DATE compliant exercises. Please note, this event is simply an *example*, and is by no means the only mechanism for incorporating the subterranean environment into training exercises. See the sample event table with variable conditions, related activities, and possible METL tasks.

Event	Insurgents build and operate in a complex subterranean tunnel/bunker system	
1. Related Activity	➤ Destruction of critical infrastructure as a result from an attack.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Political ○ Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Host nation appears incapable of controlling the insurgency. ➤ Irreplaceable infrastructure unavailable.
2. Related Activity	➤ Fear of insurgent forces increased mobility causes civilian population to panic.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Political ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Population movement renders roads impassable. ➤ Government appears incapable of handling the situation. ➤ Support of the government by the population decreases as a result of the belief that the government cannot provide adequate protection against the insurgents.
3. Related Activity	➤ Enemy tunnels under border and places chemical or nuclear device under host nation government building	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Economic ○ Political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ US Forces required for remediation. ➤ Population movement renders critical industries inoperative. ➤ Host nation forced to evacuate government buildings effectively shutting down the government until the device is cleared.
4. Related Activity	➤ Insurgent tunneling activities weaken the ground causing roads to collapse.	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Infrastructure ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Manmade sinkholes render roads impassable. ➤ Insurgents appear to have complete freedom of movement through the use of their tunnel system.
5. Related Activity	➤ Host nation discovers cache site in underground bunker full of ATGMs hidden by insurgents	
➤ Possible Variable Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Military ○ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Host Nation begins systematically searching for UGFs. ➤ News of the highly advanced weaponry available to the insurgent force gets out and causes fear with the population.
Possible Related METL Tasks	<p>Conduct CBRN Operations (ART 6.9)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct WMD Interdiction Operations (ART 6.9.6) ➤ Support WMD Offensive Operations (ART 6.9.2) ➤ Conduct WMD Elimination Operations (ART 6.9.7) <p>Provide Theater Aerospace and Missile defense (Joint ST 6.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Organize and Coordinate Theater Air Defense (Joint ST 6.1.4) ➤ Organize and Coordinate Theater Missile Defense (Joint ST 6.1.5) ➤ Conduct Ballistic Missile Defense Operations (Joint ST 6.1.7) <p>Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Provide Essential Civil Service (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.3.1) ➤ Coordinate Public Order and Safety (Immediate Response) (ART 7.3.2.1) <p>Provide Area Security (ART 6.5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Conduct Area and Base Security Operations (ART 6.5.1) ➤ Conduct Critical Installations and Facilities Security (ART 6.5.2) 	

“Dangerous Turning Point”

Beirut’s Iranian Embassy Bombing

“Dangerous Turning Point:” Beirut’s Iranian Embassy Bombing¹
by Jim Bird, OE Assessment Team (Overwatch Ctr)

Tuesday, 19 November 2013, marked a somber milestone in Lebanon’s troubled history. On that day in Beirut, 23 people lost their lives and over 140 others suffered injuries in one of the worst IED attacks witnessed in that country since the beginning of the Syrian civil war. Throughout the previous year, the city’s residents had become all too familiar with the cycle of tit-for-tat violence that pitted Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah militias against Sunni counterparts fighting (both inside and outside of Syria) to topple the regime of Syrian president Bashar al Assad.



Figure 1. Regional map: Beirut, Lebanon, and regional countries. As adapted utexas.edu/maps

A year earlier, in June 2012, a shadowy figure named Majid bin Muhammed Majid first appeared on the world stage, and issued a statement calling on Syrians to join in the fight to take down their country’s leader. The organization Majid claimed to represent was the Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB), designated by the US State Department just a month earlier (May 2012) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The 19 November 2013 twin bombings at the Iranian embassy stood out among other IED incidents as the first time an anti-Assad group operating on Lebanese soil mounted an attack against an Iranian target. A few hours after the bombings, a soccer game between Iranian and Lebanese teams went on as scheduled, but without spectators, and Iranian team members wore black ribbons on their jerseys in symbolic mourning for two fellow countrymen—a cultural attaché and a civilian bystander—who were killed in the attack.²



Figure 2. Abdullah Azzam Brigades, OE Watch, February 2014

Details of the Attack

As with many such terrorist attacks, the overwhelming majority of victims were innocent local residents, in this case peaceful Lebanese citizens going about their normal morning routines on a typical workday. The incident unfolded as a twin suicide bombing involving two or more terrorists using separate vehicles. Near 1000 hours, local time, the first

perpetrator (probably on a motorcycle, according to most sources) detonated a small charge weighing approximately 11 pounds at an entry checkpoint adjacent to the Iranian embassy compound in Beirut's Bir Hasan neighborhood.³




Figure 3. Illustration of complex improvised explosive devices attack

The first blast inflicted only a few casualties and served mainly as a diversion, drawing large numbers of onlookers and nearby residents onto the street or their apartment balconies. They emerged just in time to receive the full force of a second, far more lethal blast, caused by approximately 110 pounds of explosives packed inside a four-wheel drive vehicle. A furniture store manager who operated a business only a short distance from the blast sites said, "The glass just surrounded me. I saw some people falling down from their balconies because when they heard the first bomb, they went out. . . . There were a lot of dead people, black from the fire."⁴ A housemaid probably saved the life of a 23-year-old student named Hiba, by cautioning her against going out on her balcony to investigate the first explosion; the second, more powerful detonation hurled shattered glass throughout the living room of her apartment. *Voice of America News* described the scene just outside the Iranian embassy as "a tangle of bodies, blood, and burned-out cars in the street."⁵

Diplomatic and Popular Repercussions

An IED attack against a country's embassy, besides presenting a relatively soft and high visibility target to terrorists, also offers the added propaganda value of creating an international incident. Iran's ambassador to Lebanon, Ghazanfar Rokn-Abadi, narrowly escaped the bombings. His colleague, cultural adviser Ibrahim Ansari, was less fortunate, and numbered among those who died from the first blast near the embassy entrance. The fact that both men were on their way to meet with Lebanon's culture minister when the bombs detonated fueled speculation that the perpetrators may have had advance knowledge of this meeting, and formulated their plans accordingly.⁶

Because the terrorists targeted a facility within a Shiite neighborhood with a reputation for supplying Hezbollah with recruits, and also well-known for its longstanding tradition of sympathizing with the Assad regime, locals were unsure of whom to blame for the attack— indigenous Lebanese Sunnis, or agents of some foreign power who had managed to infiltrate the country's porous border with Syria. Lebanon has a large Sunni population as well as a large Shiite

population, although both of these communities are somewhat geographically dispersed throughout the country. Inside the capital city, the Bir Hasan area of southern Beirut, besides being a Shiite stronghold, also hosts a sizeable and economically affluent diplomatic community. Shiite enclaves in Lebanon have suffered occasional rocket and IED attacks since May 2013 when Hezbollah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah announced a decision to fight against the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war. More recently, during the week prior to the bombing, Nasrallah made another appearance and reiterated Hezbollah's intention to stay the course in Syria for as long as necessary. Prior to the upheavals that accompanied the Arab Spring of 2011, both Iran and Assad's Syrian regime actively supported Lebanon's Hezbollah militias for a number of years, consistently branding Israel as the common enemy of the Arab world.⁷

Despite a scorn typical among Arabs throughout the region for what many of them prefer to call the Zionist entity, some observers—analysts and laymen alike—sensed additional variables in play when, for the first time, the 19 November bombing incident revealed an obvious determination by terrorists to specifically strike an Iranian target. The Lebanese government had collapsed eight months earlier, in March 2013, when elections had to be postponed because feuding political factions failed to reach a consensus on electoral laws. The collapse of government also dealt a severe blow to the country's forlorn official efforts to thread a neutral course through the several belligerent factions fighting in neighboring Syria. Within hours following the attack on its embassy, the Iranian government pointed the finger of blame at Israel and the West. According to a statement issued by the Iranian foreign ministry, the attacks were “an inhuman crime and spiteful act done by Zionists and their mercenaries.”⁸ Observers in Russia suggested that the twin bombings were an attempt to place pressure on Iran on the eve of scheduled talks to consider imposing limitations on its controversial nuclear program.⁹



Figure 4. Aftermath of the embassy attack (BBC)

People in the street could only be certain that the situation was out of control, sense a vague linkage between the bombings and the Syrian civil war, and resent an obvious affront to their country's sovereignty. One local resident, convinced that his homeland was under attack, blamed virtually everyone, declaring, “Lebanon is a country that resists and our enemies do not want it to resist, the Gulf countries, the United States and Israel our main enemy.”¹⁰ The day following the attack, a grim combination of grief, defiance, and national pride infused a crowd numbering in the thousands that accompanied pallbearers carrying the remains of the four slain embassy guards (all Lebanese nationals, their coffins draped with yellow Hezbollah flags). A father of one victim joined the funeral procession as it made its way to his son's final resting place. He denied that his son's death was a tragedy, viewing it instead as a vehicle for martyrdom. Hezbollah militia, meanwhile, patrolled neighborhood streets in an effort to maintain a semblance of public order.¹¹

The Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB)

The day of the attack, an afternoon Twitter announcement by an al-Qaeda-linked group cleared up some of the initial confusion that prevailed immediately after the bombings. Sheik Sirajeddine Zuraiqat, a Sunni cleric and spokesman for the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, stated that “the attack on the Iranian Embassy in Beirut was a twin martyrdom operation by two heroes of the Sunni in Lebanon.”¹² Zuraiqat went on to vow that more attacks would follow in the future unless two demands were met. “First: [that] all the elements of the party of Iran [Hezbollah] must withdraw from Syria,” and second, that responsible authorities “release our prisoners from the prisons of injustice in Lebanon.”¹³

The Abdullah Azzam Brigades first surfaced in 2004 when a group calling itself by that name claimed responsibility for several attacks against tourist resort areas in the Sinai Peninsula. The organization's namesake was a 1980s-era Islamist scholar and former mentor of Osama bin Laden who advocated pan-Muslim commitment to defeat the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The “brigade's” components consist of several battalions that appear to operate more or less independently, each within a designated geographical area of responsibility. The Yusuf al Uyayri Battalion, for example, operates on the Arabian Peninsula, and in July 2010 claimed responsibility for an attack on the M Star, a Japanese oil

tanker traveling off the coast of Oman en route to Japan. According to the US State Department, the AAB also periodically launches rockets against Israel. Another group calling itself the Abdullah Azzam Brigade claimed responsibility for a June 2009 suicide attack against the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar, Pakistan.¹⁴

Although the extent to which these groups are linked remains unclear, Saleh al Qarawi, one of AAB's founders and "field commanders," claims a connection: "[The Abdullah Azzam Brigades] are not confined to Lebanon but there are targets that our fires will reach . . . in the near future. . . the Brigades are formed of a number of groups in numerous places [including Lebanon] . . . and we rushed to create these groups and announced them because of the urgency of the battle with the Jews and the priority of the initiative at the time and the place, but the rest of the groups are outside Lebanon."¹⁵



Figure 5. Majid bin Muhammed Majid, *OE Watch*, February 2014

Regardless of alleged AAB connections outside Lebanon, a contingent called the Ziad al Jarrah Battalion allegedly perpetrated the twin suicide bombings of the Iranian embassy in Beirut. This group takes its name from a Lebanese terrorist infamous for his role in bringing down Flight 93, which crashed into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, after passengers unsuccessfully attempted to wrest control of the aircraft from terrorist hijackers. The AAB later sent cadres into Syria, where they garnered considerable combat experience in that country's ongoing civil war. Until recently the group maintained a relatively low profile in Lebanon, except for waging an ongoing propaganda campaign advocating destruction of Assad's regime in Syria, overthrow of the Saudi Arabian monarchy, and a Sunni uprising in Lebanon. Predictably, the group also released a statement in May 2011 idolizing its fallen "martyr," Osama bin Laden.¹⁶

Strange Aftermath: Majid bin Muhammed Majid

In late November 2013, Ahmed S. Hashim, an academic on the faculty of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Singapore's Nanyang Technological Institute, forecasted some developments that subsequent events seem to validate. Hashim suggested on the one hand, that Iran would avoid lashing out blindly in retaliation to the AAB attack on its embassy in Beirut; but that on the other, it would not let the transgression go unpunished. Instead, Hashim predicted a covert, measured, and low-key response by the Iranians.¹⁷

During the last week of December 2013, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) apprehended Majid bin Muhammed Majid, who led the AAB organization that claimed responsibility for attacking the Iranian embassy. Majid, incidentally, was born in Saudi Arabia, and also happened to be in very poor health at the time of his arrest. Chief among his alleged ailments was an acute kidney condition that required dialysis treatments on a daily basis. Upon learning of Majid's incarceration, intelligence agencies from both Saudi Arabia and Iran clamored to interrogate the prisoner, despite the fact that neither of these mutually hostile countries (on opposite sides of the Sunni/Shia religious divide) currently have extradition treaties in effect with Lebanon.¹⁸



Figure 6. Ambulance that transported Majid's remains, *OE Watch*, February 2014

On 5 January 2014 the LAF announced that Majid had died at a Beirut military hospital while still in custody. According to Lebanese authorities, his interrogation had been delayed because of the prisoner's acute and rapidly deteriorating medical condition. Immediately following Majid's death, a military judge directed that an autopsy be performed on the deceased. DNA testing confirmed the remains to be those of Majid bin Muhammed Majid. The leader of the Abdullah Azzam Brigade in Lebanon was no more. His untimely demise after only a short time in Lebanese custody lends credence to the prediction made by Professor Hashim.¹⁹

Although Majid bin Mohammed Majid met his end in a Beirut military hospital, the organization he formerly led still retains the capacity to strike Iranian targets deep inside Lebanon. News headlines published on 19 February 2014—three months to the day following the Iranian embassy attack—heralded a second AAB suicide bombing, this one against the Iranian cultural center in Beirut. This most recent bombing killed five people and injured over a dozen others, including several children. Once again, an AAB spokesman characterized the attack as a “double martyrdom-seeking operation,” and threatened more attacks against “Iran and its party in Lebanon [Hezbollah]” unless they ceased efforts in support of Bashar al Assad’s Syrian regime and released Sunni Jihadists currently incarcerated in Lebanese prisons.²⁰

Strategic & Operational Relevance and Training Implications

From a strategic and regional viewpoint, the 19 November AAB attack on the Iranian embassy in Beirut illustrates a point recently made by James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, in his statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He classified the ongoing situation in Syria as one of the “persistent threats to US interests overseas.” “Hostilities between Sunni and Shia,” said Clapper, “are . . . intensifying in Syria and spilling into neighboring countries, which is increasing the likelihood of a protracted conflict.”²¹ The potential danger to US interests presented by Balkanization of the conflict lies in the increased risk that world powers outside the Middle East could be drawn into the vortex of a burgeoning Sunni-Shia religious war that could plausibly drag on for decades. An expanding circle of world power involvement also inherently risks an escalation in the conflict’s scale and level of violence.

In February 2014, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) published guidance calling for “a regionally engaged army” manned by Soldiers and leaders who possess “deep regional understanding . . . to sharpen tactical, operational, and strategic planning and operations.” He also encouraged Army leaders to “educate and develop all Soldiers and civilians to grow the intellectual capacity to understand the complex contemporary security environment to better lead Army, Joint, Interagency, and Multinational task forces and teams.”²² The potential for spillover of the Syrian civil war warrants just the sort of deep regional understanding addressed by the CSA. A recently-published TRADOC Pamphlet, TP 528-8-5—[U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement](#)—captures the spirit of CSA guidance on this subject. At the tactical level, the AAB terrorist attack offers trainers and scenario writers an opportunity to replicate a real-world event in a variety of environments, including home station training, where constrained personnel and materiel resources are likely to remain the norm for the foreseeable future.

Notes

¹Rita Daou, “[Lebanon Blasts Expose Iran and Qaeda Face-off Over Syria](#).” Agence France Presse. 20 November 2013. Hilal al Khasham, a political science professor at the American University of Beirut, called the 19 November 2013 bombing of the Iranian embassy in Beirut a “dangerous turning point;” “[Iran Ambassador Barely Escaped Beirut Blasts](#).” Agence France Presse. 20 November 2013.

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¹⁰“[Beirut Probes Iranian Embassy Bomb Attack](#),” Euronews, 20 November 2013.

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¹²Thomas Joscelyn, “[Abdullah Azzam Brigades Claims Credit for Attack on Iranian Embassy](#),” Long War Journal, 19 November 2013.

¹³Thomas Joscelyn, “[Abdullah Azzam Brigades Claims Credit for Attack on Iranian Embassy](#),” Long War Journal, 19 November 2013.

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¹⁵Bill Roggio, “[Abdullah Azzam Brigades Names Leader, Advises Against Attacks in Syria’s Cities](#),” Long War Journal, 27 June 2012.

¹⁶Bill Roggio, “[Abdullah Azzam Brigades Names Leader, Advises Against Attacks in Syria’s Cities](#),” Long War Journal, 27 June 2012; Ahmed Salah Hashim, “[Attack on Iran’s Embassy: Who Are The Abdullah Azzam Brigades?](#)” Eurasia Review, 27 November 2013.

¹⁷Ahmed Salah Hashim, “[Attack on Iran’s Embassy: Who Are The Abdullah Azzam Brigades?](#)” Eurasia Review, 27 November 2013.

¹⁸“[The Curious Case of Majed al-Majed](#),” OE Watch, Fort Leavenworth Foreign Military Studies office, February 2014.

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²⁰ Bill Roggio, [“Abdullah Azzam Brigades Launches Double Suicide Attack on Iranian Cultural Center in Beirut,”](#) Long War Journal, 19 February 2014; [“Suicide Bombers Target Iranian Centre in Beirut,”](#) New York Times, 19 February 2014.

²¹ R. Clapper, [“Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the National Intelligence Community,”](#) Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 29 January 2014.

²² [“CSA Strategic Priorities,”](#) www.army.mil, February 2014.



by Kristin Lechowicz, Threat Assessment Team (DAC)

The subject of threat precision guided munitions (PGMs) has not had a significant impact within the training arena in the last 10 years or longer. With the US Army’s refocused efforts on decisive action operations and the redeployment of troops out of Iraq and the same potential course of action for Afghanistan, the training community may be faced with niche capabilities such as PGMs.

This article provides a basic overview of PGMs, an example of a hybrid threat (a dynamic task organization between insurgent and SPF) vignette focused on laser guided mortar munitions, and an attack on a US forward operating base (FOB) to assassinate high payoff targets. This example addresses one possible threat scenario to ground forces even though the subject of PGMs is a threat that spans all branches of the US military (though this article will remain focused on ground forces at a tactical level). The equation of PGMs in the correct hybrid threat organizational structure (such as SPF and insurgent combination) can have serious consequences for US troops in the near future.

PGMs Overview

The Joint Publication 3-03 defines PGM as “a guided weapon intended to destroy a point target and minimize collateral damage.”¹ Even though most times the threat has little concern over collateral damage, the definition works for the threat. PGMs are projectiles that can actively course correct to hone in on a target, which greatly increases first-time hit/kill probability.

The types of PGMs are extensive and cover numerous weapons systems including: cruise missiles, unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs), artillery, and mortars. The importance of the subject of PGMs has been raised as a concern at different levels of the US government.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) produced a report in 2012, *Proliferation on Precision Strike*, that addressed the issues of PGMs. The report stated that proliferation of PGMs could lead to the following possible scenarios:

- US ground forces having to fight without the inherent safety of air superiority/supremacy, leaving them vulnerable to attack by enemy air forces for the first time in 70 years.

- US naval forces being restricted from protecting the world’s waterways by anti-access/area denial measures, such as those under development in China, which could directly affect the US’s ability to support key allies and greatly affects international trade and commerce.
- Use of guided rockets, artillery, mortars, and other missiles (G-RAMM) against a US expeditionary force’s FOBs.²

The advancement of technology and the impact on availability and proliferation of PGMs is going to become more of a threat for US forces in the near future. The CRS report indicated that in a timeline of 2020-2040 most countries worldwide would have some sort of capability to develop or purchase precision strike weapons, making the courses of action even more viable. The following vignette is based on the third bullet of the CRS findings – precision attack on an expeditionary force’s FOB—within the framework of the [Decisive Action Training Environment \(DATE\)](#).

PGM Mortar Vignette

The Situation. At the request of the Atropian government, US and Atropian forces have established a number of FOBs in a contested area within Atropia. The mission is to support shaping operations for decisive action and to deny the enemy key terrain (safe haven). The majority of the FOBs are comprised primarily of tents and temporary buildings.

The insurgents and SPF elements have gained information that an important meeting is going to take place with key personalities of high ranking coalition and US forces at FOB McCausland. The threat elements begin to synchronize planning and task organize in order to assassinate the task force commander and other key personnel at the meeting taking place at FOB McCausland.




Figure 1. Insurgent and SPF indirect fire tailored mortar cell organization

Threat Task Organized Elements

The direct action insurgent cell with the assistance from Arianian Special Purpose Forces (SPF) task-organizes into six small cells with 19 individuals total. SPF (advisors) are embedded in key cells to ensure that the high payoff target is verified and that munitions are correctly used to engage the target. The insurgent/SPF cells include a team leader with 2X two man observations teams, 2x four man 120 mortar cell, 2x three individual security element (with light machinegunner, and a sniper team). The insurgent organization allocates two insurgent-videographers from its information warfare (INFOWAR) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection.

Movement and Positioning for the Raid

The insurgent intelligence cell uses human intelligence (HUMINT) to gain information on the key targets’ estimated arrival time at the FOB. The insurgent/SPF cell moves into preplanned positions as raiding team, support team, and security elements. The support team sets up in its overwatch support position, and security elements monitor possible avenues of approaches into the area. Observers with SIGINT INFOWAR elements “get eyes on” and confirm that the target has arrived at the location and kill zone. A videographer captures the following elements of the raid—

- An observer confirms key targets and laser designates the target meeting location (temporary building 101) and informs mortar crews to fire mortars.
- Mortar crews fire PGM from preplanned position.
- Observers use a laser to guide PGM into target.
- Observers confirm the successful strike on the target and conduct battle damage assessment (BDA).
- All elements exfiltrate on preplanned routes and blend into the population and collect information about the attack.
- Within six hours, most major news networks are publicizing the story with the “raid video.” INFOWAR exploitation uses cyberspace with 560,000 hits.




Figure 2. Laser guided munitions with 120-mm mortar attack (example)

The combination of the PGM, hybrid threat task organization, and the ability to exploit intelligence/INFOWAR capabilities makes this raid scenario successful. The PGM used within the vignette could have been similar to the GRAN (see below).

GRAN Guided Weapon System (120-mm Mortars) Overview

The GRAN is a laser-guided munition and part of a weapon system that can engage stationary or moving targets. The GRAN can be used with smoothbore or rifled mortar system.

The system consists of the following elements:

- 120-mm guided high explosive projectile (and propellant).
- Fire control system (FCS) that includes a laser designator ranger (LDR) and commander's panel with communication equipment.



NAME	COUNTRY (Developed)	CALIBER	WEIGHT (kg)	LENGTH (mm)	TYPE WARHEAD	GUIDANCE SYSTEM	TARGET DESIGNATION RANGE (km) ⁽¹⁾	RANGE (km)	
								MIN	MAX
Gran	Russia	120-mm mortar	27	INA	Fragmentation HE	SAL (1.06u)	3-5	1.5	9.0

Figure 3. 120-mm laser-guided projectile (HE-Frag W/H)

What Makes This a Raid? Discussion of Threat Doctrine

[TC 7-100.2, *Opposing Force Tactics*](#), states the following about a raid—

- A *raid* is an attack against a stationary target for the purpose of its capture or destruction that culminates in the withdrawal of the raiding force to safe territory.
- The keys to the successful accomplishment of any raid are surprise, firepower, and violence.
- The raid ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.

The raiding element executes the major task, ensuring the success of the raid. It is charged with the actual destruction or seizure of the target of the raid. The primary threat to all elements of a raiding force is being discovered and defeated by enemy security forces prior to execution of the raid. The security element provides early warning to threat elements and prevents enemy elements from responding to the raid before the main direct action is accomplished. The support element serves as an enabling function and assists in setting the conditions for the success of the raid. In this example, the support element gained intelligence, provided command and control, provided laser support to the PGMs, and provided INFOWAR video recording capability.

Training Implications

- Reintroduce the use of threat PGMs in training.
- Threat use of intelligence collection (SIGINT/HUMINT) and reconnaissance to identify key target in order to improve effective indirect fires that destroys target.
- Provide task organization on insurgents, SPF, and designated weapons systems for mission.
- Train and empower threat tactical leaders to act with initiative in support of a higher leader's mission and intent.
- Use physical and human terrain to mask movement and conduct reconnaissance.
- The use of simultaneous attacks from two different directions with PGM weapons systems.
- Define and identify the key targets for a tactical-level engagement with strategic implications.
- Distribute near real-time video-coverage of enemy combat losses to the Internet and media outlets. Threat INFOWAR acts as a combat multiplier.

Notes

¹ Joint Publication 3-03, *Joint Interdiction*, 2011.

² Congressional Research Service, *Proliferation on Precision Strike*, 2012.

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JRTC DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT: OPERATION ATROPIA COVENANT

JRTC DATE Rotation 14-05: Operation Atropia Covenant

by Mike Spight, Training, Education, and Leader Development Team (CGI Ctr)

DATE Rotation 14-05 was conducted at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Ft. Polk, Louisiana 7-30 March 2014, with the Force-on-Force phase running from 13-24 March. This DATE rotation was also designed to include a scenario that featured elements from the [Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment-Africa \(RAFTE-Africa\)](#) which would supplement the scenario's build from the [DATE](#) version 2.0. This was to ensure that the Rotational Training Unit (RTU), 4th Armor Brigade Combat Team/1st Infantry Division, would have the opportunity to incorporate some of AFRICOM's training guidance and objectives along with the RTU commander's training objectives. Figure 1 depicts the overall concept behind scenario development for this DATE rotation:



1. **Based on: Decisive Action Training Environment 2.0**
2. **Interdependence operations: RAF, SOF, and BCT cooperation and transition between Title 10 and 22 throughout conflict prevention phase**
3. **Forcible Entry COAs:**
 - a. **BCT(-) air assault / GAC from ISB**
4. **NEO & IDP; Secure FLS and US Consulate**
5. **Series of CO/BN-size offensive operations to seize key terrain/infrastructure and assist RoA Security Forces with defeating/ neutralizing the Arianan Army**
6. **CO (+) OOS Air Assault**

Figure 1. ATROPIA COVENANT scenario design

This DATE rotation was observed by a Combat Training Center (CTC) Accreditation Team that was comprised of personnel from TRADOC G2 Training Directorate, TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate, and the Combined Arms Center's Combat Training Center Directorate.

This eight-person team utilized the TRADOC G2 Accreditation Standards Guide as the basis for this accreditation visit. Note that in general, CTCs and the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) receive an accreditation from TRADOC G2 Training once every year. The accreditation focuses on specific areas such as: equipping, manning and training of the opposing force (OPFOR); replication of the operational environment (OE); replication of the PMESII-PT variables; how well the overall DATE scenario and hybrid threat (HT) are replicated and OPFOR doctrine and tactics planned and executed; and how well is the informational environment replicated at the CTC and within the framework of the exercise.

This was a unique DATE rotation as the RTU commander's primary focus was on *movement to contact* and conducting an *attack*. The RTU did not plan or conduct a *deliberate defense* during the course of this DATE rotation. Figure 2, below, provides details of the RTU commander's training objectives.

14-05 Laydown **Brigade Training Objective Highlights**

❖ **Movement and Maneuver:**

- Combined Arms Maneuver focused on Movement to Contact (Search and Attack) -> Hasty Attack against a hybrid threat
- Conduct forced entry utilizing air assault
- JIIM and SOF integration
- Conduct company level STX and LFXs

❖ **Fires**

- Integrate and Synchronize fires and effects
- Air to Ground Integration

❖ **Intel**

- Focus on R&S planning and execution to shape environment for hasty attack

❖ **Protection**

- Wide Area Security

❖ **Sustainment**

- Sustainment Operations within decisive action environment; no fixed sites

❖ **Mission Command**

- Stress Brigade and Battalion Mission Command
- Information and Knowledge Management
- Conduct Brigade CPX

Figure 2. ATROPIA COVENANT brigade training objective highlights

Due to the RTU commander's desire to focus on movement to contact/attack, the OPFOR commander and his staff worked through the countertask analysis process to develop a plan focused on their conduct of a defense. But in order to rigorously challenge the BLUFOR, a decision whether or not to conduct a maneuver or area defense would have to be made. In the end, the OPFOR developed a plan which focused on an area defense set out in front of simple battle positions that were concentrated on three of the maneuver area's towns (complex terrain). Although the argument could have been made that these were complex battle positions, their relatively small size and the fact that they were oriented on likely BLUFOR avenues of approach into the OPFOR's support zone made simple battle positions a more logical choice. Plus, these battle positions were designed to fight from, if the OPFOR were forced to do so.

In its disruption zone, the OPFOR established a series of kill zones built around mine fields and extensive obstacle construction. Those kill zones would be under observation from OPFOR security elements who would attempt to engage any BLUFOR units with direct and indirect fires in order to disrupt the tempo of the BLUFOR attack, and to fix them in place. Note that at the point where the OPFOR security elements engaged the BLUFOR, they then become disruption and/or fixing elements. The HT is very flexible as it transitions from one function to another during either the defense or offense. Preplanned target reference points were plotted throughout kill zones, and routes of ingress/egress, and

OPFOR close air support (CAS) would also be called upon as necessary. OPFOR elements could then be directed to assault remaining BLUFOR units in the disruption zone, but as the OPFOR is not specifically focused on rendering the BLUFOR “Black,” that is seldom what is required.

The OPFOR placed heavy emphasis on effective use of SAPA, SPF, and criminal and terrorist organizations throughout the BLUFOR rear area. SAPA Teams led by SPF advisers were extremely effective in conducting reconnaissance to locate critical BLUFOR nodes and assets, calling for indirect fires, and for conducting ambushes and other attacks when the opportunity presented itself.

Regarding how the BLUFOR was organized, the 4th ABCT/1st ID, the BLUFOR also consisted of a 4th Bn (-) 1st Special Forces Group and other units (engineer, support, civil affair and military support operations). The basic organization of the BLUFOR Task Force (TF21) is Figure 3, below:




Figure 3. TF 21 ATROPIA COVENANT task organization

Although not depicted in Figure 3, civil affairs and military information support operations units were rolled into a Joint Information Support Task Force linked to the Special Operations Task Force (4th Bn/1st SFG).

Due to the limited manning available to the OPFOR (1st Bn/503rd PIR), it was heavily augmented by both Regular Army and Louisiana National Guard Units so that it could adequately replicate 1st Bn/302nd BTG, Arianian Army, SPF, SAPA, and Criminal and Terrorist Organizations. Specifically, two Mechanized Infantry Companies from 1st ABCT, 1st ID, one Engineer Company, and one Artillery Battery from the Louisiana National Guard were attached to the OPFOR. Note that an augmentee Cavalry Troop was used to replicate Atropian Army assets. A standard DATE scenario OPFOR set is depicted in Figure 4, below:



OPFOR/FSF STANDARD SET (DATE SCENARIO)




Figure 4. JRTC OPFOR/FSF standard set (DATE scenario)

This level of augmentation is required for every DATE rotation JRTC conducts, and all augmentees undergo a two to three day OPFOR train-up focused on safety and JRTC rules of engagement. Clearly, without extensive augmentation, it would be extremely difficult for JRTC to adequately replicate a viable, vigorous OPFOR to support RTU training objectives.

Although all but two members of the Accreditation Team (including the author of this article) had to depart on 19 March, prior to the end of the Force-on-Force throughout the exercise, this DATE rotation was very impressive in both its planning and execution, and the resultant level of difficulty provided to the RTU. In spite of the challenges presented by an OPFOR that is under strength, and the necessity for a significant level of military augmentation, both JRTC and 1st Bn/503rd PIR did a superb job in planning and executing this DATE rotation.





by Walter L. Williams, Training, Education, & Leader Development Team Leader (DAC)

This article will provide insight on the various conventional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by a hybrid threat or opposing force (OPFOR) mortar battery. The hybrid threat doctrine is a composite of real world TTP observed, used, and documented throughout time. Thus, TTP discussed in this article are composite in nature and affect the baseline times for OPFOR mortar battery emplacement/displacement.

OPFOR indirect fire support weapons consist of mortars (to include combination guns), cannon systems, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). These systems can be either towed or self propelled (SP). All OPFOR infantry, motorized infantry, and mechanized infantry battalions contain constituent 120-mm mortars. Smaller mortars are also available. Guerrilla and other organizations may have them as well. Each hybrid threat or OPFOR mortar battery is designed to conduct decentralized, dispersed, and autonomous system indirect fire support operations. For additional information on mortars in OPFOR organizations, see FM 7-100.4, [Opposing Force Organization Guide](#), May 2007. For additional parametric and performance information on mortars and other indirect fire support weapons and available ammunition types, see the [Worldwide Equipment Guide](#).

SP mortars and towed mortars discussed within this article include combination gun systems. Combination guns or gun mortars are breech loaded systems that can fire fin-stabilized and rifled mortar projectiles, as well as specially designed howitzer projectiles. Some combination gun systems can fire projectiles in a direct fire mode. These are also referred to as howitzers, gun-mortars, and cannon. They usually fire more mortar rounds than cannon rounds, due to the large inventories of mortar projectiles available, and the wider variety of mortar rounds for different roles.

Battery Deployment Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

The OPFOR employs indirect fire support tactical concepts that include a variety of battery TTP for effectiveness and survivability. The plans for the employment of the battery are thorough and as a minimum cover the following—

- Mission.
- Location of firing positions.
- Method of fire.
- Number of rounds to be fired from each position.
- Movement schedule of the battery.
- Duration of the battery mission.

The TTP are applicable to all indirect fire units. These techniques also provide the battery commander with more flexibility to conduct multiple fire missions simultaneously, since the battery can organize into more than one distinct firing unit. The techniques include—

- Fire from varied formations.
- Fire from dispersed locations.

- Fire from fixed locations.
- Fire and decoy.
- Shoot and move.
- Autonomous weapon attack.

Please refer to TC 7-100.2, [Opposing Force Tactics](#), 9 December 2011 (pages 9-22—9-24) for further discussion of each of the above techniques.

Mortar Battery Firing Positions

Mortar battery firing positions may be primary, alternate, or temporary. In the offense, a mortar battery can use any or all of those, and possibly create deception firing positions. The defense can require primary, alternate, temporary, and deception positions. The functions of primary and alternate firing positions are much the same as for battalion firing position areas.

Primary – The primary firing position area is designated for carrying out the primary fire missions in all types of battle. Its distance from the battle line of friendly units depends on—

- The battery’s place in the supported unit’s formation.
- The range of mortar in consonance with other indirect fire systems.
- The nature of the terrain.
- Other conditions.

Within the battery firing position area, each platoon has a primary firing position and possibly one or two alternate positions.

Alternate – An alternate firing position area is usually designated in a defensive situation for battery maneuver and to carry out fire missions during an intentional or forced abandonment of the primary firing position area. A battalion usually has one or two alternate firing position areas to the flanks of the primary area or in the depth of the defense. An alternate area can be several kilometers from the original location.

Temporary – A temporary firing position area can be designated for carrying out individual fire missions. It can allow a battery to accomplish special, short-term, or emergency missions. In the defense, a battery can use a temporary firing position near the battle line or forward of the battle zone to support maneuver units defending in the disruption zone or to fire on a distant target. A temporary position can also be for use by a roving platoon or section. Other missions could include supporting the commitment of an exploitation force or commitment of a reserve to a spoiling attack or counterattack. Although temporary, these firing positions can be prepared and camouflaged.

Deception – A battery may prepare deception firing positions and command observation post sites on its own or as part of the senior maneuver commander’s deception plan. Their purpose is to mislead the enemy as to the actual deployment of indirect fire support units such as mortars. Their preparation and camouflage must not differ sharply from that of actual positions and sites. A roving unit may periodically deliver fire from the deception firing position.

Emplacement/Displacement Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

The specific technique used during the occupation of a firing position will vary based upon whether or not the occupation is conducted in a previously reconnoitered position. Generally, the OPFOR attempts to occupy positions that have been prepared for occupation. The indirect fire reconnaissance patrol is responsible for determining the coordinates of the battery center and the directions for several distant aiming points. They are also responsible for conducting a security sweep (check for mines, enemy observers, ground emplaced reconnaissance detection devices, etc.) of the position and for marking the positions for each of the vehicles (firing and support).

The requirements for the firing position are relatively simple. They should be covered positions so that the battery may safely occupy them without risking direct observation by the enemy. When practical, there should be covered routes into and out of the firing position. The mortar position area should be generally level. The deputy commander normally locates his vehicle in a position advantageous for controlling the entire battery. The desired location is one centrally located within the battery. The positioning between mortars is based upon the firing position, the mission, and the

method of fire. The communications within the battery may be by voice, radio, or wire depending on visibility, time, and the threat.

Resupply and other support vehicles (maintenance, cargo, etc.) are positioned in a covered and concealed position to the rear of the mortars. This position is terrain dependent. Additionally, the support vehicles are positioned far enough away that the destruction of either the mortars or the support vehicles will not be a hazard to other battery elements.

Planned Occupations – This is a laborious process that the OPFOR mortar battery commander chooses to use when time permits. For example, this process may be used for an initial firing position or a position that is planned for nighttime occupation.

The process begins with the battery deputy commander sending a battery indirect fire reconnaissance patrol forward to lay out and secure the firing position. The position of each mortar and the fire direction center (FDC) will be marked (in accordance with the unit SOP) and the indirect fire reconnaissance patrol vehicles will proceed to their assigned positions during the occupation. For example, a guide stake may be emplaced at each mortar position for the driver (prime mover driver for towed mortar systems) to use when roughly aligning the mortar on the azimuth of fire. SP mortars may have luminous tape or paint (inside the commander's/gunner's hatch) for easy identification during periods of limited visibility. Towed mortars may have luminous tape or paint on the baseplate for easy identification during periods of limited visibility. The mortars may have luminous tape or paint on the vehicle body for easy identification during periods of limited visibility.

Once the base piece has halted, the deputy commander uses his artillery command and reconnaissance vehicle (ACRV) onboard periscopic aiming circle to lay the mortar for direction. Depending on the situation and time available, the remaining mortars are either laid from the deputy commander's ACRV or reciprocally from the base mortar. The deputy commander measures the azimuth and distance from his location to each of the mortars and uses the data to compute individual locations and piece corrections based upon the disposition of the mortars.

Unplanned Occupations – In the event the unit is required to occupy an unplanned position, the battery indirect fire reconnaissance patrol members will conduct a security sweep prior to the deputy commanders' ACRV occupying the position. The deputy commander positions his vehicle at the selected battery center oriented in the direction of the azimuth of fire (determined from the onboard land navigation system). The leading mortar pulls in beside the deputy commander's ACRV, and the other mortars pull on-line alternating sides. Once the base piece has halted, the deputy commander repositions his vehicle at the left rear of the battery firing position and lays the mortar for direction. The remaining mortars are either reciprocally laid from the base mortar or the deputy commander's ACRV.

Battery Emplacement Using Global Positioning System (GPS) and an ACRV – The survey team determines the battery center using GPS and the data to one of the mortars to be used as an adjusting piece. The members of the battery's indirect fire reconnaissance patrol mark each mortar position with a guide stake, camouflage net pole, etc. using GPS, and record the data for future reference. The mortars are guided (by their ground guides) to their respective positions (predetermined by GPS) using a compass for orientation. Once the base mortar has halted, the deputy commander uses his onboard periscopic aiming circle to lay the mortar for direction. The remaining mortars are either reciprocally laid from the base mortar or the deputy commander's ACRV.

Battery Emplacement Using GPS and a Ground-Mounted Aiming Circle – The survey team, indirect fire reconnaissance patrol members, and platoon sergeants follow the initial procedures for the vehicle-mounted aiming circle. The platoon sergeants set up the two aiming circles. Each aiming circle is marked with a different color of luminous paint or light for identification during periods of limited visibility. The first aiming circle is set up magnetically, and the second aiming circle is laid off of the first. The mortars are guided (by their ground guides) to their respective positions (predetermined by GPS) using a compass for orientation. A communications link is established between the mortars, FDC, and aiming circles using wire (preferred method) or short-range radios. The battery deputy commander sets up and magnetically orients a safety circle over the orienting station grid established by GPS. The safety circle is checked against the first aiming circle, and a simultaneous observation is conducted with the battalion's surveyed point or one of the other batteries. Once the simultaneous observation is complete, the battery commander compares the survey azimuth to the magnetic azimuth in the battery computer. Immediately after being laid, each mortar obtains a referred deflection to the safety circle and verifies the information to be checked out as safe.

Battery Displacement

The battery commander determines a battery rally point at least 300 meters away from the occupied position. The OPFOR bases this distance for displacement on the probable target location error of enemy countermortar/counterbattery radar, the dispersion pattern of various enemy indirect fire submunitions, and possible projectile delivery errors. The rally point location is given to each mortar crew chief, crew member, the FDC, and the ammunition transport section chief. During displacement, each mortar crew proceeds in the most expeditious manner to the rally point. The mortar crew may travel to the rally point by foot, vehicle, or animal. Upon arrival at the rally point, the mortar section chief will ensure a check of all equipment and personnel is conducted prior to movement to the battery's next firing position (alternate, temporary, or deception). The rally point is generally occupied no longer than 3-5 minutes. The gun crew remains vigilant in providing local security throughout the displacement process as they are vulnerable to observation and attack by enemy ground and air units.

Tactical Movement

Movement is particularly important during offensive actions, when any indirect fire support unit must keep pace with the advance of their supported maneuver units. OPFOR fire support planners strive to maintain continuous support from the initiation of preparatory fires until the accomplishment of the offensive mission, including the commitment of an exploitation force. As indirect fires shift successively deeper into the enemy defenses, displacement of indirect fire support units becomes necessary. Thus, after the initial fires in support of the attack, indirect fire support units supporting or subordinate to fixing and assault forces begin to displace. This displacement is preplanned to accommodate the advance of the attacking maneuver forces. Thus, it is critical for a mortar battery to continuously move to remain in position to provide the maneuver with effective mortar fires.

The movement of a mortar battery can follow several different patterns depending on such factors as enemy situation, mission, terrain, weather, and visibility. Once the battery has reached the assembly area and completed its organization for combat, it may move by battery or by platoon.

Movement by battery is possible only when the battery has not been committed to battle or when there are other units available to perform any required fire missions while the battery is moving. This includes the situation or condition referred to as an *emergency displacement*. An emergency displacement is a condition where the entire battery comes under enemy counterfire/counterbattery fire, or a determination has been made that the position has been compromised by enemy reconnaissance assets. All elements of the battery displace at the same time (either based on a movement schedule or an emergency displacement) and are typically expected to be in their new positions generally at the same time.

Whether in the offense or defense, the most common movement technique for a mortar battery is to move by platoon. The battery moves its platoons individually by bounds. Depending on the route and the pace of combat, there may be a temporary halt to rearm and refuel during the movement. Once a platoon is in its new position and ready to fire, the next platoon starts to displace. Typically, the battery fire control post displaces with the first displacing platoon.

Opposing forces conducting operations at Combat Training Centers provide a rotational training unit (RTU) various operational and tactical problem sets that a unit may face during future military operations. Additionally, over time, CTC OPFORs refine or adapt TTP discussed throughout this article to continuously challenge each RTU and their leadership as to reasonable, plausible, and feasible tactical methods that could be employed within any operational environment. Future Red Diamond articles will focus on other fire support topics such as fire support logistics, ammunition trends, and emerging technologies. So, remember the maxim: "Bad OPFOR, Bad Army. Good OPFOR, Good Army."

Hybrid Threat

The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.

Unified Land Operations, ADRP 3-0

CTID DAILY UPDATE: MONTHLY RECAP

by LTC Shane Lee and CPT Ari Fisher, Training, Education, & Leader Development Team

CTID analysts produce a *CTID Daily Update* to assist our readers' focus on key current events and developments across the Army training community. Each *CTID Daily Update* is organized topically across the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). This list highlights key updates during the current month. An article's inclusion in the *Update* does not reflect an official US government position on the topic. CTID does not assume responsibility for the accuracy of each article.

US Army TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity



April 2014 Sampler

◆ 2 April 2014:

South Korea: [Drone crashes on border island](#)

Yemen: [US drone strike hits AQAP training camp in southern Yemen](#)

◆ 7 April 2014:

Columbia: [Fighting between FARC and army causing 'humanitarian crisis' in southwest Colombia](#)

Ukraine: [Eastern Ukraine region declared independent by pro-Russian separatists](#)

[Ukraine fears 'Crimea scenario' in east](#)

◆ 11 April 2014:

Iran: [Pakistani, Iranian Navies Conduct Joint Exercises](#)

Israel: [Israeli launches spy satellite after US refusal to push for Iran's weapons program's dismantlement](#)

◆ 16 April 2014:

Russia: [Russian Missile System Masquerading as Innocent Cargo Container](#)

Ukraine: [Pro-Russian separatists have seized Ukrainian army armored personnel carriers and a tank.](#)

◆ 18 April 2014:

Jordan: [Jordanian air strike destroyed Al Qaeda raider force heading for US military base](#)

US: [Analysis: Sinaloa cartel losing power in Juárez](#)

◆ 21 April 2014:


Iran: [Salehi's Arak "deal" – cover-up for 1,300 kg enriched uranium smuggled to Parchin for secret upgrade](#)

Pakistan: [Taliban talks losing steam](#)

Syria: [New Syrian-Iranian chlorine bombs make mockery of US-Russian chemical accord and UN monitors](#)

PRODUCTS SAMPLER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

by CTID Operations



Sampler of Products:
 TC 7-100 *Hybrid Threat*
 TC 7-101 *Exercise Design*
 TC 7-100.2 *Opposing Force Tactics*
Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG)
 (2013)
 TC 7-100.3 *Irregular Opposing Forces*
 (2014)
 DATE v. 2.1 (2014)
Decisive Action Training Environment

COMING spring-mid 2014!

RAFTE-North Korea
Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment

RAFTE-Pacific
Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment

CTID Threat Reports (TBD)

In Review: Army 2Q/FY14 Antiterrorism Awareness Theme

The Evolving Threat

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command G2

TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity
Antiterrorism - Counterterrorism

Terrorism

Threats Terrorism Team (T3)
T3 Advisory

Evolving Cyber-Threats

Identify and Report
SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOR
Know the Threat

Behavior—**Look SUSPICIOUS?**

JAN

Access <https://atn.army.mil>
Click "OTID Operational Environment Page"
Click "Terrorism Handbooks"
Also see: *Irregular Opposing Forces*
<https://atn.army.mil/medialib/forces/>

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command G2

TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity
Antiterrorism - Counterterrorism

Terrorism

Threats Terrorism Team (T3)
T3 Advisory

Lone Actor—The Evolving Threat

Behavior—**Look SUSPICIOUS?**
Be Proactive.

FEB

Access <https://atn.army.mil>
Click "OTID Operational Environment Page"
Click "Terrorism Handbooks"
Also see: *Irregular Opposing Forces*
<https://atn.army.mil/medialib/forces/>

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command G2

TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity
Antiterrorism - Counterterrorism

Terrorism

Threats Terrorism Team (T3)
T3 Advisory

The Evolving Threat—Probing the Perimeter

Behavior—**Look SUSPICIOUS?**
Identification can be Falsified!

MAR

Emerging Threat:
Homegrown Violent Extremists
and Active Shooters

Access <https://atn.army.mil>
Click "OTID Operational Environment Page"
Click "Terrorism Handbooks"
Also see: *Irregular Opposing Forces*
<https://atn.army.mil/medialib/forces/>

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CTID Mission

CTID is the TRADOC G2 lead to study, design, document, validate, and apply hybrid threat in complex operational environment CONDITIONS that support all US Army and joint training and leader development programs.

What We Do for YOU

- Determine threat and OE conditions.
- Develop and publish threat methods.
- Develop and maintain threat doctrine.
- Assess hybrid threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
- Develop and maintain the *Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE)*.
- Develop and maintain the *Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment (RAFTE)* products.
- Support terrorism-antiterrorism awareness.
- Publish OE Assessments (OEA).
- Support threat exercise design.
- Support Combat Training Center (CTC) threat accreditation.
- Conduct “Advanced Hybrid Threat Tactics” Train the Trainer course.
- Conduct hybrid threat resident and MTT COE train the trainer course.
- Provide distance learning (DL) COE Train the Trainer course.
- Respond to requests for information (RFIs) on threats and threat issues.

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With AKO access--CTID products at:
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