



Retired PLA Lieutenant General Outlines Scenario in which China Could Take Taiwan by Force in Three Days

OE Watch Commentary: Cross-strait relations between Mainland China and Taiwan have gone through many ebbs and flows. Each side disagrees on the status of Taiwan and the One-China policy. A new push for democracy and independence by Taiwan has prompted one hardline retired PLA Lieutenant General to outline a process that he says would allow the People's Republic of China (PRC) to take Taiwan by force within three days. Retired Chinese Lieutenant General Wang Hongguang outlines his proposed strategy to take Taiwan back by force in the three accompanying excerpted articles.

In the first part of the series, Wang describes six types of military offensive operations to take Taiwan by force with “firepower operations” making up the first type. Wang projects that during “the firepower preparation phase,” three waves of firepower assault using artillery and missiles, plus three waves of additional firepower assault by aviation troops, will destroy one-third of Taiwan’s major targets, all according to computer simulations. He adds that superior firepower from shore-based long-range rockets, tactical aviation forces, army aviation forces, and/or naval artilleries and missiles can be summoned to destroy any counterattacks. Wang proposes using the U.S. military’s “van Fleet’s load concept,” which he describes as using munitions liberally so that dense and intense firepower can kill rival forces to the greatest extent and reduce the loss of friendly troops. The second type of military operations is “targeted operations” (or “death point strikes”). Wang explains that, according to their nature, targets can be categorized as either those that should be destroyed, suppressed, overtaken, monitored, or retained. He argues that Taiwan is vulnerable because of the exposure and the concentration, within short distances, of areas that could be potential military targets. The third type of military operations is “full-spectrum operations,” in which the enemy’s situation and terrain should be considered in determining what type of operations to pursue. The fourth type is “informatized,” including electromagnetic and cyberspace, in which China would protect its own information systems, while attacking and destroying Taiwan’s. The fifth and sixth types of operations are “special operations” and “psychological (including legal and public opinion) operations,” respectively.

In the second of Wang’s three part series, he explains that strategic thinkers in the past have wondered how long it would take China to capture Taiwan. Answers have varied, ranging from a few days to several weeks, depending on the scenario and the variables. Examples of variables included how long supporting forces might take to respond. Wang envisions a scenario in which it would only take a few days for China to take Taiwan and then goes into detail explaining why, discussing variables such as the cut in Taiwan’s military troop’s numbers. He goes on to outline a hypothetical comprehensive battle scenario and concludes, if outside forces do not arrive to assist within three days, perhaps because they have been blocked by China’s DF-21D missiles, naval and air forces, and firepower, then China would “never have to worry about making the trip again.”

Finally, Wang dedicates the third article to the capture of Taiwan’s leaders. First, he describes seven ways in which Taiwan’s military would likely assist President Tsai Ing-wen to escape. In response, he describes how China might counter Taiwan’s efforts. For example, anticipating that Chinese forces would take assault boats to advance toward the presidential office along a freshwater river located not far from Taiwan’s presidential office, Wang explains that Taiwan’s strategy would therefore be to deploy large numbers of troops at the entrances of the freshwater rivers and along the rivers to guard them closely. As a result, rather than sending assault boats, Wang suggests using helicopters instead to directly assault the presidential office.

The current Taiwanese administration’s push for independence has incensed many in China. The three-part series is lengthy, detailed and could very well be the ramblings of a disgruntled retired military officer. Or, being that it was published in official Chinese media, it could even be an attempt to instill fear and uncertainty in the Taiwanese population in hopes that the people might pressure the government to reverse its rhetoric and stop pushing for independence. Whatever it is, originating from a former high-ranking deputy commander of China’s former Nanjing Military Region, it is worth noting. **End OE Watch Commentary (Hurst)**

“During the firepower preparation phase, three waves of firepower assault based on artilleries and missiles plus three waves of additional firepower assault by aviation troops will destroy one-third of major Taiwanese targets according to computer simulations.”

Source: Wang Hongguang, “武统台湾怎么打？解放军中将：六种战法三天拿下 (How Will China Take Taiwan by Force? PLA Lieutenant General: Six Types of Military Operations to take it in Three Days!)” *Sina News*, 27 March 2018. <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2018-03-27/doc-ifysrftk9948065.shtml>

During the firepower preparation phase, three waves of firepower assault based on artilleries and missiles plus three waves of additional firepower assault by aviation troops will destroy one-third of major Taiwanese targets according to computer simulations. Other important and general targets will also be suppressed, resulting in the loss of functionality for 48 hours. Afterwards, unmanned combat aerial vehicles will conduct aerial surveillance and eliminate any sporadic firepower.

During the offensive stage, there will be no need to storm the enemy in the event of counterattacks by the Taiwanese military or summoned to destroy them. The “superior firepower” can be shore-based long-range rockets, tactical aviation tough resistance at defensive or support points. Instead, the superior firepower will be forces, army aviation forces, or naval artilleries and missiles. The particularly strong underground facilities will be repeatedly attacked with missiles (earth penetrating munitions). Therefore, in an assault group with a combined arms battalion as the backbone, there will be an artillery forward observation station, an Air Force target guidance team, an Army aviation command team, and naval firepower guidance personnel...

There are two characteristics about Taiwan’s military objectives that make them easily beaten. The first is being concentrated... The second is being exposed.

(continued)



Continued: Retired PLA Lieutenant General Outlines Scenario in which China Could Take Taiwan by Force in Three Days

Source: Wang Hongguang, “为什么统一的炮声一响，“台独”顶多撑三天!” (Why when the Unification Cannons Sound, ‘Taiwan Independence’ would Only Last Three Days),” *Huanqiu.com*, 29 March 2018. <http://mil.huanqiu.com/world/2018-03/11710139.html>

“How long could the Taiwan army [guo jun] resist the communist army” has actually been an enduring topic in Taiwan and a lasting “pain” in the hearts of the military and the people, for which successive “Ministers of Defense” have had their own answers...

If we start counting from the first artillery shells falling on Taiwan with the landing coming 24 hours later, then that would be “D-24h” plus “D+48h” for a total of 72 hours. We would take Taiwan in three days.

... only give the outside forces assisting Taiwan like the United States and Japan three days at most. If those assisting armies do not arrive within three days or if those forces cannot approach Taiwan because they are blocked by our DF-21D missiles, naval and air forces, and firepower, then we would not ever need to worry about making the trip again.

Source: Wang Hongguang, “解放军“驾临台湾”日，蔡英文能往哪里跑？(When the PLA “Rides to Taiwan” where will Tsai Ing-wen be able to Run?),” *Huanqiu Wang*, 30 March 2018. <http://mil.huanqiu.com/world/2018-03/11720942.html>

In the less than two years that Tsai Ing-wen has been in office, they have conducted six “anti-decapitation” drills. In order to ensure that Tsai Ing-wen is not “decapitated,” Taiwan’s “Ministry of National Defense” recently expanded the “military police security platoon” into the “military police rapid response company” to become Tsai’s palace guards or perhaps her personal bodyguards...

Following the thinking behind the Taiwan military helping Tsai Ing-wen escape and looking at how she might escape from a military perspective, there are roughly seven options.



Flags of the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China.

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