


OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT WATCH



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For over 25 years, the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has conducted open source research on foreign perspectives of defense and security issues, emphasizing those topics that are understudied or unconsidered.

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3 Clashes from Syria Spill into Turkey; Fury over Border Violation

Sınırlarımız İhlal Edildi, Gereğini Yapacağız (Our Border has been Violated, we will Take Necessary Action)," Islahhaber.com, 10 April 2012

"What should Turkey do if there is a border violation? Whatever other countries would do in such circumstances, in accordance with international politics and international law. That is what Turkey will eventually do. International laws grant us this right."



9 Afghans Highlight Iranian Interference

Aval Hamsaye-ha gharamit bipurdazand." ("First the Neighbors Should Pay Compensation" Hasht-e Sobh (8 a.m.). 28 March 2012

Rather than work constructively to help secure Afghanistan's future, Afghans resented how Iran's firebrand president seemed intent to use Afghanistan as a chess piece in his proxy battle with the United States



19 Libya: Weak State, Weak Government or Both?

Libya: Fall Comes Early," al-Ahram (Egypt). & Libya and the Army's Dilemma," al-Bayan (UAE)

The Tibu, who were marginalized and oppressed under Qaddafi, claim they are being targeted in the new Libya despite having sided with the uprising. Those fighting them claim they are backed by fighters from neighboring countries



23 Even if al Shabaab Is Eventually Defeated, Can Somalia Govern Itself?

Somalia's 'Newly Liberated Areas' – What Comes Next?" African Arguments (hosted by the Royal African Society and the Social Science Research Council) 11 Apr 2012

Filling the power vacuum left behind by al Shabaab unearths a new set of problems underscored by one key factor – a willing, capable and legitimate alternative remains elusive



32 Recruitment of Youths by Mexican Drug Cartels

Recluta narco a adolescents [Recruitment of Youths by Mexican Drug Cartels]", Reforma

The immediate response [to Drug trafficking] has been implemented, but this immediate response has failed to encompass the new and growing problem regarding an expanding cartel work force and a new generation of drug abusers



50 Kyrgyz Military Housing and the Manas Transit Center

China to build two 9-storey houses for officers of Kyrgyz Defense Ministry, AKI Press (Kyrgyzstan), 05 April 2012

Discussions of military reform typically revolve around the issues of technology, doctrine, and force structure, but in the post-Soviet Union armed forces one of the most important, and unglamorous, military reform issues is the availability of military housing for troops and their families

FMSO Commentary: *With the ongoing crisis in Syria, the number of Syrians seeking shelter in the refugee camps on the Turkish side of the border has reached 25,000. Until now, clashes between Syrian Army forces and opposition groups had stopped short of reaching the Turkish border.*

On April 9th Syrian forces attacked a refugee camp on the Turkish side of the border, killing two Syrian refugees and wounding two Turks. In another incident two Syrian refugees and a Turkish interpreter were wounded inside a refugee camp after being hit by stray bullets from clashes between Syrian rebels and troops. So far the border violation incidents appear to be accidental. However, it has heightened realization in Turkey of how easily the humanitarian crisis in Syria may turn into a national security crisis for Turkey. The Turkish Prime Minister has even brought up invoking the collective self-defense article (Article 5) of the NATO alliance, which says that an attack on one member shall be considered an attack on all.

*The Prime Minister has so far made vague statements such as 'taking necessary steps' and 'tough measures' to respond to a border violation, leaving it unclear whether that would mean military action, a buffer zone or a humanitarian corridor. But he has also claimed that Turkey does not want to take military action in Syria. Turkey's main message to the international community appears to be that it is working for a peaceful solution; that it will act if the situation threatens its national security and would like international backing. It also expresses the possibility that the number of refugees (and the cost to host them) may go up significantly, and claims that the international community should share the burden. The article below details Prime Minister Erdoğan's stance on the issue. **End FMSO Commentary (Kaya)***

Clashes from Syria Spill into Turkey; Fury over Border Violation

Source: "Sınırımız İhlal Edildi, Gereğini Yapacağız (Our Border has been Violated, we will Take Necessary Action)," *Islahhaber.com*, 10 April 2012, <http://www.islahhaber.com/lookat.php?No=15971>

10 April 2012



The Kilis refugee camp where the clashes spilled into Turkey, via Worldbulletin.net

Sınırımız İhlal Edildi, Gereğini Yapacağız **(Our Border has been Violated, we will Take Necessary Action)**

Speaking at a press conference in Beijing, Prime Minister Erdoğan sent harsh messages to Syria regarding events taking place in Syria and at the Syrian border. Prime Minister Erdoğan claimed that the actions that Turkey will take against Syria are very important and said, "What should Turkey do if there is a border violation? Whatever other countries would do in such circumstances, in accordance with international politics and international law. That is what Turkey will eventually do. International laws grant us this right."

A journalist asked, "There is concern that Turkey is being pushed in a certain direction on the issue of Syria. With the most recent development of your border being violated, do you have such a concern?" In response, Erdoğan said the following: "Should we think of this as Turkey is being pushed in a certain direction; or fulfilling a humanitarian duty that Turkey has, due to the events at its border? Sometimes unexpected things happen, they are not planned, they are handed to you and you still have to deal with them. This is how I view the issue of Syria; not in the way that you framed it."

"TURKEY WILL FULFILL ITS DUTY"

"What are the primary and secondary things that Turkey needs to do right now? We will do whatever other countries would do in such a situation, according to international laws and relations. This is our right. Until now, we have opened our doors to 25,000 refugees,

Continued: Our Border has been Violated, we will Take Necessary Action

and we continue to accept more. What levels is this number going to reach- it can go up to 100,000 or more, we cannot close our doors. We see how these people are escaping from Syria in various news channels. These people aren't escaping for nothing- they are trying to escape death. You cannot close your doors to these people. If you close your doors, you basically leave them to their death. It is out of the question."

"THEY ARE SHOOTING THE REFUGEES FROM BEHIND"

Erdoğan continued: "They are shooting these people from behind. They are not even differentiating between women, children, they are just brutally killing them. He promised Mr. Annan, but since then, he has continued to shoot 60, 70, 80, 100 people every day. This is the situation. There is also a very clear border violation. We will make our final assessments based on this border violation. The Foreign Ministry and I are holding diplomatic talks with neighboring countries and will take the necessary steps after that."

"WE CANNOT IGNORE THE CALLS FOR HELP"

Regarding his comments on using all the rights that international law grants to countries, a journalist asked, "Does this mean a buffer zone with Syria?" Erdoğan said that he could not make any definite statements at the moment. He said the following:

"We will discuss the option. We will take the most proper steps. We don't want to think about the option of going [into Syria]. The only one who will force us into this is the Syrian regime. They should be the ones who take the steps that will not force us into this. We are now talking to Russia and telling them, "Here is the situation... These are the circumstances... Right now I am hosting 25,000 people in my country. They have cost us \$150 million so far. We are continuing to take steps and are considering what to do if this number [of refugees] reaches 100,000. We can't wait until they get here to build their container cities. We have to be prepared ahead of time so that they have shelter when they arrive. These people are looking at us as saviors. We cannot ignore their situation. This is in our civilization, it's in our culture. We have to take charge of these people."

"THEY CALL THE SYRIAN PEOPLE TERRORISTS"

Erdoğan said that some of these people are being called terrorists by the Syrian government and said, "When you go and see these people, you can see that they are just innocent, sincere Syrian people. They are children and women. There are children that are playing with their toys. Can you call these people terrorists?"



The RED DIAMOND is the Army's leading e-journal highlighting current threats in the Operational Environment.

It is produced by the Threats Intelligence Support Activity (U.S. Army TRADOC G-2) and posted at <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/25364306>.

FMSO Commentary: *In an effort to reduce dependence on foreign weapons and become more self-sufficient and more competitive in the defense industry, the Turkish Undersecretary for the Defense Industry has been promoting strategies that would allow Turkey to design and develop its own weapons. There have been great strides to this end, particularly in the last five years. These domestic weapons are meant to be up to international standards, and will be focused solely on fulfilling the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces. The goal of becoming more self-sufficient in this field is meant both as a deterrent and a way to reduce dependence on foreign companies. In addition to serving the Turkish Armed Forces, the goal is also to create more opportunities for export and technology transfer.*

On March 26, the Turkish Undersecretary for the Defense Industry published its Strategic Plan for the next five years. This newly unveiled plan reveals an ambitious range of projects intended to revolutionize Turkey's Armed Forces. The five-year plan places a heavy emphasis on satisfying the needs of the Armed Forces with indigenous development, increasing efficiency, and increasing cooperation with small and mid-sized businesses.

*Some important items include deadlines for completion of projects such as the national tank, the national combat ship, the national helicopter and unmanned aerial vehicle. According to the plan, there are currently 280 projects in the works. Turkey hopes to join the ranks of the top ten countries in the defense industry in the next five years. The article below from the mainstream daily Sabah (Morning) newspaper details the plans and deadlines specified in the report. **End FMSO Commentary (Kaya)***

Defense Industrial Strategic Plan Unveils Ambitious Range of Projects

26 March 2012

Source: "Yerli Savunma Sanayinin Takvimi! (Domestic Defense Industry Calendar!)," Sabah.com, 26 March 2012, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Ekonomi/2012/03/26/yerli-savunma-sanayinin-takvimi>



Turkish ATAK Helicopter (T-129) via Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc. <http://www.tai.com.tr/>

Yerli Savunma Sanayinin Takvimi! (Domestic Defense Industry Calendar!)

Completion dates have been determined for projects that will magnify our military's power in fighting terror and increase Turkey's leadership position in the region.

According to the new strategic report prepared by the Office of the Undersecretary of the Defense Industry, the first prototype of the national tank 'Altay' will be complete at the end of 2015. The first ship under the combat ship 'MILGEM-S' project will be ready in 2016, the ATAK helicopter will be ready in 2013; and the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) ANKA will be ready in 2014.

The Turkish defense industry has initiated many successful projects and has grown by leaps and bounds in the last few years. Projects such as the national tank, national aerial vehicle, national satellite, and the national helicopter, which will carry Turkey to the top level in the defense field, are moving at full speed.

According to the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan issued by the Office of the Undersecretary of the Defense Industry to outline the next 5 year plan, there are currently 280 projects in the works. There were \$27,5 billion worth of projects initiated last year. According to the Strategic Plan, within 5 years, Turkey will join the ranks of the top 10 countries in the world in the defense industry.

Defense Industry Communication Offices will be established in 5 different regions

Within the next 5 years, there will be new offices in the Middle East, Far East, the U.S., the Caucasus-Central Asia, and Europe-NATO regions, to coordinate export and marketing activities.

Turkey's first combat ship (as part of its MILGEM-S serial production project) will join the Navy Fleet by the end of 2016. There is also a feasibility study that is being done, involving special submarines, and that will be done in 2015. The ATAK helicopter will be

Continued: Domestic Defense industry Calendar!

done by the end of 2013; domestic general helicopters will be done by 2016. The design of the special light general helicopters will be complete in 5 years. Serial production of the national infantry gun, which Turkish engineers have been working on for 5 years, will start in July of this year.

Our jet plane's design will be done in 2 years

The design of our Jet Training Plane and the Combat Plane concept will be complete by the end of 2014. The training plane 'Hürkuş' (English translation is 'freebird') designed by TUSAŞ will join the inventory by the end of 2015. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) ANKA and the tactical unmanned vehicle will be done by 2014.

The long range anti-tank missile system will be done by end of 2012; and the mid-range anti-tank weapons system will be complete by the end of 2013. Turkey's active laser initiated missile called 'CİRİT' (means javelin), which is hailed as an important step in Turkey's missile technology, will be produced and integrated into the ATAK helicopter by the end of 2013. Low and mid-altitude air

defense missile systems will be designed by the end of 2016.

The Turkish-made radar observation satellite will be launched in 5 years

According to the Strategic Plan, a radar observation satellite will be developed and will be ready for launch by the end of 2016. Turkey will produce the prototype for its own jet engine by the end of 2016. Meanwhile, domestic regional passenger planes will also be developed and supported.

Test centers will be established

The infrastructure for the testing and certification to support the activities of design and development will be planned by the end of 2016. The test infrastructure will be up to international standards and accreditation, and will fulfill civilian and international request as much as possible. To this end, the following test centers will be established: army vehicles test center; Fast Wind Tunnel; aerial vehicles flight test area, missile systems test area; satellite assembly area and integration test centers.



Tim Thomas's *The Dragon's Quantum Leap* peels back the transformation process and uncovers the digital-age impacts of new modes of Chinese military thinking.

The Dragon's Quantum Leap expands the scope of Tim Thomas's two previous works on Chinese information warfare concepts. As with his previous work, Tim Thomas primarily uses all-Chinese source material.

FMSO Commentary: Until about a year ago Iran and Turkey had friendly relations, and Turkey was trying to play the role of mediator between the P5+1 (US, Russia, France, the UK, China; and Germany) and Iran regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions. Turkey claimed that it was in the unique position of having good relations with both sides. The argument went that it was best suited to host talks because it could provide Iran with a dignified disengagement plan, because if Iran was to make any concessions, it would more likely make them to a fellow-Muslim country with which it had long and friendly relations. Istanbul was chosen as the location to hold the talks that were scheduled for April 13-14, 2012.

The good relations between Turkey and Iran changed with the Arab Spring, Turkey's position on Syria - Iran's only ally in the region - and Turkey's decision to host NATO's defense missile shield radar. As tensions increased Iranian officials started voicing their objections to having the talks take place in Turkey. As recently as early April, some were demanding that the talks take place in Baghdad, Damascus, or Beijing – all cities within countries that are allies with Iran - instead of Istanbul. Thus, Tehran was signaling its desire to hold the negotiations on its own terms, and that it no longer saw Turkey as an objective mediator.

Despite these last-minute objections, the talks, the first in 15 months, were held in Istanbul on April 13-14. Statements made after the meeting revealed guarded optimism, but indicated that there was still a long way to go. However, Iran did secure Baghdad as the location for the next round of meetings to take place on May 23rd. The article below from the Turkish mainstream daily Radikal discusses the outcomes of the meeting.

End FMSO Commentary (Kaya)

Critical Iran Nuclear Meeting in Istanbul

Source: "Nükleer Zirvede Mekik Diplomasisi (Shuttle Diplomacy at the Nuclear Summit)" Radikal.com, 14 April 2012; <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1084922&CategoryID=81>

14 April 2012



The P5+1 includes the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany. Image via Islamic Republic News Agency (irna.ir)

Nükleer Zirvede Mekik Diplomasisi (Shuttle Diplomacy at the Nuclear Summit)

The meeting between the P5+1 and Iran, which took place in Istanbul has ended. During the meeting, it was decided that the next meeting will be in Baghdad on May 23rd.

Today, the P5+1, which comprises the US, Russia, China, the UK, France and Germany [the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany]; and Iran, sat down at the negotiating table to negotiate nuclear matters. Following the meeting, the European Union (EU)'s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton held a press conference. Ashton said that the nuclear talks with Iran were 'constructive and useful,' and consistent with the spirit of the exchange of letters that took place with Iran. She said that the sides will meet again in Baghdad on May 23rd.

Officials from the [Turkish] Ministry of Foreign Relations said, 'It is clear that the positive atmosphere that we have created is still there.' Russia also made a statement saying that the talks had taken place in a positive spirit. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavros' assistant said that, 'negotiations in Istanbul are going well.'

Catherine Ashton's spokesperson Michael Mann said that this was aimed at establishing a base from which to start a process; and that now was not the time to say anything conclusive. He did say that the meeting was held in a positive atmosphere. The P5+1 countries want Iran to limit its uranium enrichment to a fissile purity of 20 percent. They

Continued: Shuttle Diplomacy at the Nuclear Summit

also want some of the military facilities that are suspected to be conducting nuclear activities to be opened up for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.


The P5+1 countries are being represented by Catherine Ashton; while Iran is being represented by Iran's Chief Nuclear Negotiator Said Celili. The meetings also include high level bureaucrats from other countries. Iran started its nuclear activities 55 years ago with the support of the US; and continued after the 1990's with Russia's support. However, starting in the early 2000's, the western world suspected that Iran was building an atomic bomb and started enforcing sanctions and using political pressure. 55 years ago, Iran also received help from West Germany and France. After the 1979 Revolution, it continued its cooperation with European countries. But due to US pressure and the war in Iraq, it could not make a lot of headway. So it started working with Russia in the early 1990's.

The West's suspicions regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions increased steadily after the early 2000's. The lack of an agreement between Iran and the western powers created tension. In this period, Turkey tried to play the role of 'facilitator' and stepped up

its diplomatic efforts. With increasing tension, talks of military intervention and signs that the issue was turning into a crisis, Turkey made even more of an effort in trying to mediate. Ankara led the Turkey-Iran-Brazil talks and took the role of 'mediator'. Today, there is still an effort to find a solution through different platforms amid growing pressure on Iran.

'Nuclear Weapons' Fatwa

The Iranian regime denies claims of trying to develop nuclear weapons and says that its goal is to reach a high level of technology and produce nuclear energy. Iranian spiritual leader Ali Khamenei had earlier issued a 'fatwa' [a religious law] saying that producing, storing and using nuclear weapons were a sin according to Islam. According to a decision by the EU, all EU countries will stop purchasing oil from Iran as of July 1st. There is concern that the Iranian regime will counter this move and increase tensions even more. In addition, the US leadership and Israel are still keeping the military option on the table. This is why the negotiations that took place in Istanbul today between the P5+1 and Iran are extremely important.



In resurrecting General Sir Andrew Skeen's *Passing It On*, the Foreign Military Studies Office and the Maneuver Center of Excellence, have provided a detailed look from 1932 that holds valuable lessons and understanding of the Operational Environment in the Af-Pak Theater of today.

FMSO Commentary: February and March were bad months for the Western presence in Afghanistan. First the accidental burning of the Quran and then a lone soldier's massacre of Afghan civilians undercut U.S. efforts to win Afghan hearts and minds. According to some polls, support among Americans for the mission in Afghanistan fell sharply to less than 25 percent.

While television cameras do not lie, they seldom give the full perspective. While many Afghans came out to protest, the vast majority did not. Kabul is a city of five million people, yet few protests topped 1,000 people. As much as the American press focuses on U.S.-Afghan relations as if the dance between the two was solitary, the Afghan perspective is broader and is less willing than many Americans to demonize the U.S. presence.

From the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, American diplomats and military officials have remained frustrated at Pakistan's subversive role in Afghanistan. Pakistanis and Americans both consider former Inter-Service Intelligence Chief Hamid Gul to be the "Father of the Taliban." Any doubt that at least some elements in Pakistan supported Al Qaeda ended with Usama Bin Laden's death in Abbottabad, a town near the Pakistani military's elite academy. Yet, as much as Western analysts focus on Pakistani influence in Afghanistan, over the past two years conversations on the streets of not only an Afghan city like Herat—traditionally close to Iran both in terms of geography and culture—but also Kabul and Kandahar have focused instead on growing Iranian interference.

Iran's December 2010 oil blockade, which sent food prices skyrocketing in Kabul, and the 18 January 2011 acid attack on a Kabul journalist critically eroded the little goodwill many Afghans have toward their overbearing

Afghans Highlight Iranian Interference

28 March 2012

Source: "Aval Hamsaye-ha gharamit bipurdazand." ("First the Neighbors Should Pay Compensation" Hasht-e Sobh (8 a.m.). 28 March 2012 http://www.8am.af/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24733:1391-01-08-15-59-11&catid=3:2008-10-31-09-37-07&Itemid=554



Afghan-Iran Strife based on Flag of Afghanistan & Flag of Iran [CC-BY-3.0-br (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/br/deed.en>)], via Wikimedia Commons

اول همسایه‌ها غرامت بپردازند (First the Neighbors Should Pay Compensation)

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad yet one more time appeared as the guardian of the people and government of Afghanistan. Speaking in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, he said that foreign forces should leave Afghanistan as soon as possible and that terrorism and the flow of illegal drugs will cease once foreign forces withdraw from Afghanistan. This is not the first time Ahmadinejad gives himself the right to speak on behalf of the people and government of Afghanistan and demand that foreign forces withdraw. It seems he thinks that the people of Afghanistan are members of the Basij militia and supporters of the Iranian regime. He thinks they need a guardian and are politically immature.

Iranian regime officials take every opportunity and platform to degrade the ongoing political process in Afghanistan. Their aim is to call into question the legitimacy of international efforts which seek to strengthen Afghanistan's state institutions and democratization in Afghanistan. Iranian officials do not see democratization or the international community's help in building state institutions as in their interests. Iranian regime officials dislike the world's commitment to help Afghanistan for another 10 years and conversations between America and Afghanistan about a security agreement, which will reinforce America's commitment to Afghanistan.

Iranian officials think that the failure of democratization and government capacity building in Afghanistan will enable their regime to expand influence effortlessly throughout

Continued: First the Neighbors Should Pay Compensation

neighbor. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's antics during a three-day visit to Tajikistan in March 2012 was the icing on the cake for many Afghans. Afghans resented how Iran's firebrand president seemed intent to use Afghanistan as a chess piece in his proxy battle with the United States, rather than working constructively to help secure Afghanistan's future. At a time when Afghans needed their neighbors to cooperate to bolster security, Ahmadinejad did the opposite.

*Hasht-e Sobh, from which this selection is drawn, is Afghanistan's newspaper of record. Its analysis is bold and independent, and tends to reflect the opinions of the more educated elite. In a series of articles in late March it examined the deleterious role Iran is increasingly playing in Afghan society, and used Ahmadinejad's Dushanbe speech to drive home the point that Afghanistan's problems derive much more from their neighbors than from Western occupation. At the same time the article reflects the growing Afghan concern that an early Western withdrawal might lead Iran and Pakistan to reignite the civil war which so destabilized Afghanistan in the early 1990s and ultimately enabled the Taliban to come to power in the first place. **End FMSO Commentary (Rubin)***

Afghanistan. The [Iranian] regime also tries to blackmail Western countries by supporting the Taliban and giving them arms and money. The regime believes that by creating trouble for Western countries—especially American—in Afghanistan, it can gain concessions and further secure its position. The Iranian regime makes instrumental use of Afghanistan and thinks that continuation of war and bloodshed in Afghanistan will ensure the regime's security. Yet, this regime should know that continued war and bloodshed in Afghanistan will not fulfill Iran's long-term interests.

If we carefully assess the situation of Afghanistan during the past two decades, we will see that Iranian regime's policy of preserving the crisis in Afghanistan has not served the interests of the Iranian regime. Indeed, it was the Iranian regime's policy that was one of the reasons why foreign forces are based in Afghanistan in the first place. At the beginning of the 1990s, Iran and Pakistan supported the continuation of war and violence in Afghanistan. The Iranian regime was happy to see the Afghan state fragment and believed it could extend its influence to Afghanistan through its proxy groups. The Iranian regime thought it could use Afghanistan like Lebanon as a base for support. It therefore supported the continuation of bloodshed and factional fighting in Afghanistan. It kept supporting one group or another which ultimately resulted in the rise of the Taliban and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan by foreign forces. Had Iran and Pakistan worked for security in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, the Taliban would not have emerged and there would have been no need for international forces.

The Taliban during the time of their government created huge headaches for the Iranian regime. They gave refuge to Iranian opposition figures and killed Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e Sharif. Iran did not learn from the past and its two-faced policy in Afghanistan continues. On the one hand, it supported the Taliban and on the other hand, it has supported the Afghan government. Iran thinks by pursuing this policy, it can bring the West to their knees in Afghanistan and extract concessions from them. This regime has now forgotten the problems it had with the Taliban and it thinks that if it can use the Taliban as a tool, the Iranian regime will not be damaged.

The leaders of the Iranian regime should know that contrary to Ahmadinejad's comments, terrorism and drugs will not cease to exist when foreign forces leave Afghanistan. On the contrary, terrorists will become more confident and destabilize the entire region including Iran. Therefore, support for the Taliban and undermining the current process in Afghanistan cannot serve long-term interests of leaders in Tehran. Iranian leaders should know that they can never use Afghanistan like Lebanon to create a support base for themselves even if foreign forces withdraw from Afghanistan.

In view of the intentions of the Iranian regime and Pakistan's policies, the government of Afghanistan must strengthen its relations with its Western allies. Both Iran and Pakistan do not see the institution-building and democratization process in Afghanistan as being in their interests. The government of Afghanistan should try to finalize the strategic and security cooperation pact with the United States. The Iranian regime and the Pakistani military will not stop interfering in Afghanistan and undermining it unless they are forced to do so. If Iranian regime leaders really want peace in the region and in Afghanistan and if they do not have ambitious objectives, why do they not stop supporting the Taliban and instead engage honestly with the Afghan government?

The Afghan government should not allow itself to be held captive by neighboring countries. It should adapt its position to realities and make decisions in the light of realities. Afghan officials should put an end to the comments by Iranian leaders about the future

Continued: First the Neighbors Should Pay Compensation

of Afghanistan and foreign forced based in this country. The Afghan government has remained silent in the face of Iranian statements and so has emboldened Iranian leaders to make more irresponsible comments about Afghanistan and its relations with the international community. The Foreign Ministry of Afghanistan showed a very mild reaction to the interfering comments of Sayyed Masoud Jazayeri, deputy chief of the general staff. Had a pounding response been given then, Ahmadinejad would not dare speak as if he was Afghanistan's guardian.

Unfortunately, the reactions of Afghanistan to the comments made by the Iranian officials are too soft. We need to take a strong and pounding position against the Iranian regime. We should not be humiliated so much that we fail to defend our rights. There is no justification for the policy of silence on the irresponsible comments of the Iranian regime. Ahmadinejad has demanded that NATO countries pay compensation to Afghanistan as if he is the guardian of the people of Afghanistan. The people and government of Afghanistan know how to deal with their international allies.

But Ahmadinejad must understand that the harm done to Afghanistan by its neighbors is no less than the harm done by countries far and away. It was Afghanistan's neighbors who triggered religious and ethnic wars in Afghanistan. It was Afghanistan's neighbors who paralyzed Afghanistan's state institutions. It is the neighbors who are stealing Afghanistan's natural resources and antiquities and it is Afghanistan's neighbors who are supporting continued war and bloodshed in Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan want neighbors to pay reparations first.

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FMSO Commentary: When President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad emerged from seemingly nowhere to capture the Iranian presidency in 2005, American officials were dumbfounded. Whereas his predecessor, Mohammad Khatami, sought to assuage the West with talk of 'dialogue of civilizations', Ahmadinejad was crude and coarse. He called the Holocaust a fiction, promised Israel's annihilation, and spoke about hastening the return of the Hidden Imam, Shi'ite Islam's messianic figure. Nevertheless, at least initially, Ahmadinejad enjoyed remarkable popularity at home. He exploited long-simmering resentment about the aghazadehs (sons of important people) who catapulted their fathers' political connections into wealth and power. What many Americans simply called hardliners, Iranians called usulgarayan (principalists), meaning those who reclaimed the social justice roots of the Islamic Revolution. To the poor and working class, Ahmadinejad was an attractive figure. While former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is a billionaire and Khatami and many reformists enjoyed lives of luxury, Ahmadinejad led an ascetic lifestyle. Television broadcast images of him at home, sitting and eating on a bare floor. He spoke often of social justice and empowering the dispossessed. He painted himself as a man of the people, undertaking an extensive tour of provinces and districts, during which he would hold open town halls and dramatically hand over suitcases filled with cash to local governors to address the problems about which he had heard.

Over the years, however, the Iranian public has become increasingly cynical about how few of Ahmadinejad's promises he actually fulfills. Even within his own hardline camp his supporters are often at wit's end. It is in this context that the hardline daily Jahan News' "Promises of a Harvest" is so interesting. The author recalls 12 promises

Ahmadinejad's Empty Promises

17 March 2012

Source: "Va' dehha-ye sarkharmin." ("Promises of a Harvest,") Jahan News (World News). 17 March 2012 <http://jahannews.com/vdcgtw9xnak9qt4.rpra.html>

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by José Cruz [CC-BY-3.0-br (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/br/deed.en)], via Wikimedia Commons



های سر خرمن وعده (Promises of a Harvest)

- (1) After the Asian Paralympics Games in Guangzhou, [Ahmadinejad] said he would talk to sporting officials about equalizing the prizes for the regular Asian Games and the Paralympics. The promises were not only unfulfilled, but no bonuses have been given to the disabled athletes.
- (2) An important part of [Ahmadinejad's] subsidy scheme was the implementation of support packages for producers. Mehdi Ghazanfari, minister of industries, mines, and trade, said on the first anniversary of the implementation of the subsidy reform law, "With the president's backing, none of the support packages for the manufacturing sector will remain undelivered."
- (3) One of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's most important promises for 2011-2012 was to reduce prices during the year. This promise has not been fulfilled these days when especially we face a wave of housing price increases.
- (4) Morteza Tamaddon, the governor of Tehran province, in a Farvardin [March-April] speech, "air pollution in the coming year will be minimized. To help reduce air pollution, he said Tehran would accelerate modernizing old cars and would restrict polluting factories." According to Donya-ye Eqtesad (World Economy), none of that has been achieved.

*Ahmadinejad made over the course of the previous year and notes that on issues great and small Ahmadinejad's administration has simply failed to deliver. At the same time the list provides insight into the troubles which consume ordinary Iranians beyond the contentious international issues of terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Inflation is taking its toll as the currency plummets; factory workers remain unpaid; a house with a garden remains a distant dream for many Iranian families; and air pollution makes the quality of life for those stuck in cramped Tehran apartments even worse. Almost every ex-Iranian president has remained active in politics following the end of his term, and few have left office with such a negative legacy on domestic issues as Ahmadinejad. **End FMSO Commentary (Rubin)***

Continued: Promises of a Harvest

(5) Hamid Reza Sarami, the assistant director of municipalities and villages, in a Tir [June-July] speech said, according to the Mehr News Agency, "After this increase, transport fares would not increase for another summer." But on the final day of Bahram [February 19], the price again increased.

(6) Abdolreza Sheikholeslami, the minister of cooperatives, labor, and welfare, in a Tir speech, said, "The chance of achieving the government's goal to create 2.5 million jobs in the coming year is high." The newspaper Bazaar-i Kar (Job Market) said Mr. Sheikholeslami based the 2.5 million figure on Mahmoud Ahmadinejad... The promised figure this year has not been achieved.

(7) President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in a Tir [June-July] speech celebrating housing cooperatives across the country, said according to the Mehr News Agency, "1,000 [square] meters of land will be given to each Iranian family to build houses and plant gardens." These days, this problem has been quite forgotten.

(8) Mohammad Attardian, a member of the Supreme Council for Employment, in a Mordad [July-August] speech, according to the newspaper Mardomsalari (Democracy), said, "The president promised in a meeting that employment had been reviewed and that the Central Bank would allocate 58 billion tomans to create jobs. A few months later, Mahmoud Bahmani, chairman of the Central Bank, said the council-approved employment was against the banking regulations and Abdolreza Sheikholeslami, minister of cooperatives, labor, and social welfare, also said this was a major violation and refused to pay.

(9) President Ahmadinejad in Mordad [July-August] speech for the 28th Meetings of the country's Education chiefs, said: "God willing, [schools] will be closed on Thursdays as well, and I believe we should change the name of this day off to something like "Family Day." It seems this promise has yet to be fulfilled...

(10) During the months of Dey [December-January] and Bahman [January-February], Central Bank Director Mahmoud Bahmani promised to increase the value of the currency and decrease the exchange rate, but this did not work and it is now possible that the exchange rate will be 20,000 rials [to the dollar].

(11) Esfandiar Rahim-Shahriar, in a Dey [December-January] speech commemorating [19th century prime minister] Amir Kabir that, according to Fars News, he would create an Amir Kabir gold medal for competent public managers. This promise has yet to be fulfilled.

(12) In a Bahman [January-February] meeting with autoworkers, First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi promised would be overcome and workers salaries would be paid. Mohammad Reza Najafi-Manesh, a member of the board of manufacturers, said the government has yet to fulfill its promise to assist manufacturers overcome their liquidity problems.

FMSO Commentary: For more than three decades successive American administrations have reached out to the Islamic Republic. While the 1979 hostage crisis inaugurated the diplomatic standoff which continues to the present day, the fact that the United States had an embassy in Tehran nine months into the Islamic Republic is a testament to the Carter administration's desire to continue relations. President Reagan also tried to reach out to Iran. The Iran-Contra scandal may be remembered mostly for the illegalities of bypassing Congress to fund the Nicaraguan contras, but at its genesis it was an attempt to establish relations with regime pragmatists in Iran in order to develop leverage to affect the eventual succession to Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini. President George H.W. Bush used his inaugural address, in part, to propose rapprochement with the Islamic Republic, and President Clinton pushed aside debate about Iran's culpability in the Khobar Towers bombing in order to seize an opening provided by Iranian president Mohammad Khatami's 'dialogue of civilizations.' Finally, beyond the harsh rhetoric of the 'Axis of Evil,' the George W. Bush administration authorized more senior meetings with Iranian officials than any predecessor since Carter. President Obama pushed rapprochement with Iran to the front of his diplomatic agenda when he offered an outstretched hand.

It takes two to tango, however. While American officials debate outreach, seldom do they consider the corollary Iranian discussion. Debate regarding engagement with the United States is a recurrent political football inside Iran. Former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's suggestion this month that the Islamic Republic need not be in permanent enmity to the United States reignited controversy as Iranian hardliners fell over themselves to condemn and discredit his remarks. It

Iran Debates, Rejects Talks with U.S.



7 April 2012

Source: "Ida'ha-ye Hashemi ba Haqayeq-i tarikhi kamalan tanaqez darad," ("Hashemi's Claims are Completely Inconsistent with Historical Fact," Alef (A, the first letter of the Persian Alphabet). 7 April 2012. <http://alef.ir/vdcir3az5t1a5z2.cbct.html?149124>

Former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani by Mesgary (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0) or GFDL (www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html)], via Wikimedia Commons

ادعاهای هاشمی با حقایق تاریخی کاملاً تناقض دارد (Hashemi's Claims are Completely Inconsistent with Historical Fact)

Note: The recent statements of Mr. Hashemi in a journal editorial board brought a wave of reactions. For this reason, Abbas Salimi-Namin, director of the Office for Iranian Contemporary Historical Studies, answers questions posed by an Alef reporter...

Mr. Salimi, how do you analyze Mr. Hashemi's new and controversial remarks regarding today's situation?

He considers Ahmadinejad his rival?

It is a pity that he is trying to go beyond that of the current government in international affairs. The Ahmadinejad government has over the past years sent some signals to the Americans for negotiations. By taking this position on relations with the United States, Mr. Rafsanjani is trying to say, "I'm more experienced than Ahmadinejad in this regard, and I felt the need to establish relations with the United States much earlier than Ahmadinejad." What is sacrificed in this matter is the national interest... He is degrading himself to the level of competing with [Ahmadinejad's brother-in-law Esfandiar Rahim] Mashaei. There was a time when Mr. Mashaei said "the people of Israel," and now he [Rafsanjani] talks about "the Israeli state"! This happens even though from the viewpoint of our regime, there is one country, Palestine, which is occupied by radical, racist Zionists. And more importantly, we do not recognize the name Israel or the Israeli people.

Do we really not have political prisoners?

The rivalry [between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad] is apparent in such statements, [such as,] for example, [Rafsanjani's claim that] "We now have political prisoners, but there were none during my tenure." Our historical memory does not allow us to accept Rafsanjani's claim. His behavior was similar towards his own critics such as [Ezzatollah] Sahabi, [Abbas] Abdi and [Akbar] Ganji. By coincidence, this judge [Said] Mortazavi, who today is

Continued: Hashemi's Claims are Completely Inconsistent with Historical Fact

is in this context that Alef's interview with Abbas Salimi-Namin, director of the Office for Iranian Contemporary Historical Studies and a prolific columnist, is important. Salimi's pedigree among hardliners is unquestioned, and even if current Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is on the outs with regime conservatives, Salimi remains an ally of the Supreme Leader.

His interview suggests that hardliners surrounding Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei see Iranian acceptance of American outreach as a non-starter. That the tone of the interview is full of vitriol for Rafsanjani suggests that, even if the former president's position of the Assembly of Experts has been restored, he remains a near-pariah within the regime's most powerful circles.

Salimi's interpretation of details is also important. Just as American jurists debate the intent of the Founding Fathers, Iranian regime officials argue about Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's intent. Rafsanjani suggested Khomeini was amenable to U.S. relations; Salimi's ridicule of the notion suggests that no matter what olive branch the United States offers, the current Iranian leadership believes continued enmity is in their ideological interest.

Close followers of Iranian politics will also find Salimi's treatment of details instructive. He rewrites the history of the Mykonos trial, in which a German court found direct Iranian culpability at the highest levels for the assassination of Kurdish dissidents in Berlin. The German court concluded that a special committee composed of the Supreme Leader, Minister of Intelligence, Foreign Minister, and President had met to order the assassinations shortly after German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel offered Iran an olive branch. If, however, Salimi and those whose views he represents believe that the West had let Iran off-the-hook for lack of evidence, then this suggests that the Iranian leadership does not understand that terrorism directed at Western capitals is a redline they should not cross.

Likewise, the unapologetic discussion of the Iranian leaking, which undermined U.S. outreach in the 1980s, serves as a warning for those who would engage in secret talks with Iran today. Simply put, so long as the Iranian regime remains volatile, American diplomatic outreach is more likely to backfire than ameliorate.

*Lastly, Salimi's condemnation of Rafsanjani's desire to use Hezbollah as a means to an end and then dispose of the group, coupled with his assessment of Hezbollah power today, suggests that the Iranian regime is unprepared to cut off assistance to any proxy group for the sake of better relations with the West. **END FMSO Commentary (Rubin)***

Ahmadinejad's favorite, was Rafsanjani's man in the dealings with them [critics] back then.”

Mr. Salimi, during the course of his discussion, Mr. Hashemi spoke about the relationship with America. What is your opinion about the argument that having relations with America should be no different than having relations with China and Russia?

...Contrary to his claim, Mr. Hashemi would not dare to talk about relations with America during the time of Imam [Khomeini], and engaged in talks secretly. For example, what happened during the [Robert] McFarlane affair, where Rafsanjani attempted to negotiate while hiding the truth from the Imam? That affair was, of course, leaked.

Are relations with China and America really the same thing?

He [Rafsanjani] asked why we negotiate with China and Russia and have relations with them, but do not have relations with the United States...? Do China and Russia have preconditions which nullify the independence of the Iranian nation and humiliate it? Mr. Hashemi ignores such things in order not to lose the ground to Ahmadinejad and his followers.”

Mr. Hashemi, in a handwritten letter, has said that he had spoken to Imam [Khomeini] before his death [about relations with the United States]. Is it possible to cite this to prove his claims?

In his memoirs covering the era of the Imam, Mr. Hashemi has not mentioned this letter [to Khomeini in which Rafsanjani called for establishment of relations with the United States]. This is very strange....

What about the Mykonos Affair? The West wasn't able to hold the Iranian government accountable, but they withdrew their ambassadors from Iran. But Mr. Hashemi said a few insiders' excessive force was responsible.

“This issue [the Mykonos Restaurant assassinations] happened during Mr. [Ali] Fallahian's tenure as intelligence minister and everyone knows how close Mr. Fallahian is to Mr. Hashemi. If his [Rafsanjani's] claim is correct that this [assassinations] were the work of rogue elements, he should have dismissed him Fallahian regardless of whether or not Mr. Fallahian was aware of this matter. More importantly, given that the West did not manage to present acceptable documentation in this regard, what goal is he pursuing by initiating this discussion? I believe he is trying to say: 'If actions were taken against the West during my government, they were not my work but the work of some rogue elements.' This does not suit him. Does the West accept his explanations? Raising this discussion is like sending a message to the West and seeking Western interest in his rivalry with

Continued: Hashemi's Claims are Completely Inconsistent with Historical Fact

Ahmadinejad. Of course, I do not desire to talk about issues which took place in the Mr. Fallahian-led Intelligence Ministry during the Rafsanjani era, which would prolong the conversation and would lead to other issues which would not be in Rafsanjani's] interest.

What about our relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt? What about the importing of explosives into Saudi Arabia?

He [Rafsanjani] has pointed out that during his government, 'Some people brought explosives to Saudi Arabia and desired to undercut our relations.' In response, I must say that the executed Mr. Mehdi Hashemi, who was the brother of Mr. [Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali] Montazeri's son-in-law, smuggled explosives to Saudi Arabia during hajj when Saudi security enforces the strictest control. Mr. [Mehdi] Hashemi was directly supported by Mr. Montazeri and Mr. Hashemi [Rafsanjani] also had engagements with him. Even after the sabotage, he [Rafsanjani] suggested that Mehdi Hashemi should be ambassador to Saudi Arabia, which was strongly opposed by Imam [Khomeini] who demanded a harsh trial for Mehdi Hashemi... What I meant to say was that during his [Rafsanjani's] time, those who were generating Iranphobia, such as Mehdi Hashemi, were supported by Rafsanjani. By discussing things such as rogue elements, Rafsanjani exposes his involvement in those affairs.

He said that I have made use of Hezbollah and the Lebanese opposition...

About the issue of Hezbollah, Rafsanjani knows better than anyone who was inclined to use Hezbollah, but was prevented from doing so. The need for a cover-up and an excuse in the McFarlane affair and relations with the United States led to Rafsanjani's use of Hezbollah. In the case of Hezbollah's hostage taking in Lebanon, Rafsanjani used Hezbollah as an instrument after which he offered himself as a mediator so that he could establish direct relations with the Americans, but of course, the McFarlane issue was leaked. At any rate, today Hezbollah is acting independently and is trusted by the people of Lebanon and the current of resistance in the region. Had the policy which Mr. Hashemi today calls pragmatism continued, we would not have witnessed Hezbollah's power today.

Radical Islam's Western Foothold:

Hugo Chavez and Hezbollah

By Sam Pickell

“This points to a particularly worrisome possibility: that Hezbollah will move beyond financing and support in Latin America to pursue operational objectives within the Western Hemisphere.”

<http://FMSO.leavenworth.army.mil/universities.html>



FMSO Commentary: Egypt's political scene went into overdrive in early April when several high-profile presidential candidates were excluded by the Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission (SPEC). The candidates will be able to appeal this decision and the final list of candidates will be released at the end of this month. Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has said it will step down once the new president is elected this summer. With Egypt's public sphere growing increasingly politicized, SCAF will have to work hard to remain above the fray.

For instance, Egypt's parliament recently passed a disenfranchisement or exclusion law that is to ban Mubarak-era government officials from political activity for several years. It is now up to the SCAF to decide whether or not to enact this law; the Egyptian street is likely to interpret this and other decisions in the run-up to the presidential elections through a highly political lens. Whether they like it or not, Egypt's ruling generals will involuntarily continue to be sucked more deeply into the political morass.

*Deteriorating economic conditions and growing political polarization will make it all the more difficult for SCAF to remain above the fray. The job of governing Egypt is unlikely to get any easier. The following article, from the traditional official newspaper al-Ahram, details statements by Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, Commander-in-Chief and Head of SCAF, regarding SCAF's attempt to remain neutral in the country's increasingly heated politics. **End FMSO Commentary (Winter).***

SCAF Tries to Stay out of Politics

13 April 2012



Source: "Field Marshal Tantawi: Everyone Must Safeguard National Unity and Stability... The Armed Forces are not a Party in the Political Debate and do not Favor any Side," al-Ahram. <http://www.ahram.org.eg/The-First/News/143050.aspx>

Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi by Helene C. Stikkel [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

المشير طنطاوي : علي الجميع المحافظة علي وحدة الوطن واستقراره .. القوات المسلحة ليست طرفا في الجدل السياسي ولا تتحاز لأحد

(Field Marshal Tantawi: Everyone Must Safeguard National Unity and Stability... The Armed Forces are not a Party in the Political Debate and do not Favor any Side)

Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, the commander in chief and head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), said that the armed forces would put the country's higher interests above all else and that present circumstances in Egypt require everyone to protect national unity and stability.

He added that the armed forces do not aim to achieve any private goals, do not favor any side or candidate for the presidency and are not a party in the political debate over power. While attending a military inspection of an air defense battalion, Tantawi indicated that the armed forces aim to achieve consensus among all. He expressed his confidence in the ability of the Egyptian people to choose their future and build the free, democratic state that all aspire to.


Tantawi praised the role of the members of the armed forces in securing the home front and protecting Egypt's borders. The inspection that Field Marshal Tantawi observed is part of an annual training that also includes the live-ammunition tactical maneuvers by the second and third field armies and the western military zone, as part of the anniversary of Egypt's liberation of the Suez.

Continued: Field Marshal Tantawi: Everyone Must Safeguard National Unity and Stability...

Field Marshal Tantawi also listened to a report on combat efficiency, including the technical and administrative systems and equipment of the air defense forces. Participating commanders and officers discussed how to carry out their new duties and how to make decisions in the face of unexpected changes during operations management. The field marshal tasked several sub-units with unplanned tasks, to confirm the speed of response and the ability to carry out different combat duties at high levels.

The inspection was also attended by General Sami Anan, the chief of staff of the armed forces, in addition to heads of the main branches and senior commanders in the armed forces. General Abdel Aziz Saif, the head of the air defense forces, confirmed that the air defense forces' trainings for this year have all taken place on schedule and without affecting the air defense's vital duties. This is the case despite the additional duties that have been put on the military's shoulders, whether in securing the streets of Egypt, the parliamentary elections, or the preparations for the presidential elections.

He said that there is no area in Egypt without a unit or members of the air defense forces, and that they cover all of Egypt's territory. He emphasized that the Egyptian sky and its borders are fully secure, pointing to the particularities of Egyptian air defense, which does not rely on a single weapons source nor does it adhere to a single combat doctrine.



Dragon Bytes by Tim Thomas examines China's information-war (IW) theory and practice from 1995-2003. Some specialists may be surprised that the Chinese openly discuss not only computer network attacks and electronic preemption but also the development of IW units and an "integrated network-electronic warfare" theory (which closely approximates the US theory of "network-centric warfare"). The Chinese development of an IW theory is representative of their country's philosophy and culture. By creating an "IW theory with Chinese characteristics" the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has offered an alternate way of viewing the application of IW than in the West.


FMSO Commentary: *Libya's Tibu (also transliterated Tobu, Toubou, etc.), an ethno-linguistic group found in southern Libya, as well as Chad and Niger, are once again in the spotlight. After heavy fighting between them and local tribes in Kufra killed over one hundred people, similar violence has erupted in the southern oasis city of Sabha. The Tibu, who were marginalized and oppressed under Qaddafi, claim they are being targeted in the new Libya, despite having sided with the uprising. Those fighting them claim the Tibu are backed by fighters from neighboring countries. The first article below, taken from Egypt's al-Ahram newspaper, provides a summary of the situation.*

The violence in the south is proving challenging for Libya's transitional government. Although the vast distances separating Libya's southern oases from the Mediterranean population centers keeps the violence contained, it also makes state intervention more difficult. With this in mind, the head of Libya's ruling National Transitional Council (NTC) has named a "military governor" for Sabha district.

*Continued violence will likely mean growing criticism of the government and the call for a stronger army and security services, as is the case with the second article below, taken from the editorial pages of a well-known Emirati newspaper. Others, though, are likely to argue that the problem lies not with the government but rather with the nature of the country, which Qaddafi was able to unify only through an iron fist. Libya's Tibu leader Issa Abdel Majid recently hinted that his people may seek autonomy. He is not the first politician to advocate regional autonomy, nor is he likely to be the last. **End FMSO Commentary (Winter).***

Libya: Weak State, Weak Government or Both?

7 April 2012



Source: (1) "Libya: Fall Comes Early," al-Ahram (Egypt). <http://www.ahram.org.eg/Arab-world/News/141844.aspx>
 (2) "Libya and the Army's Dilemma," al-Bayan (UAE). <http://www.albayan.ae/opinions/our-opinion/2012-04-07-1.1625925>

Map of Libya ethnic groups via mapsorama.com

ليبيا.. الخريف يأتي مبكرا (Libya: Fall Comes Early)

Analysts wonder whether it is a tribal conflict, whether within or beyond Libyan territory, and whether it might escalate, especially after the decree by Mustafa Abdel Jalil, head of the National Transitional Council, announcing that southern Libya is a military zone and appointing a military ruler there.

The background of the growing current conflict in Sabha comes after gunmen from the Tibu, a group originally from neighboring Chad, launched an armed attack on the city. This occurred after its leader, Issa Abdel Majid, accused tribes from Sabha of targeting an electrical power station that provided several southern areas with electricity, including Qatrun and Murzuq, considered Tibu strongholds.

The residents of the Saharan oasis of Sabha, though, stepped forward to defend it with all the weapons they have and were able to halt this attack and keep them from entering the city. The battle has killed 150 and injured 400 until now. Even though the situation following this battle seems to have calmed, it seems like the calm before the storm, especially in view of the festering situation between the tribes and the collapse of the ceasefire before 24 hours had passed. This is in addition to a number of attacks and counterattacks, mutual accusations between the parties to the conflict, and their full rejection of a ceasefire. The scene appears a bit ambiguous as the situation on the ground threatens to escalate dangerously. Abdel Rahim al-Keeb, the interim prime minister, says that the situation is calm and semi-stable and that a delegation including the ministers of defense, interior and health are currently in the heart of Sabha to assess the situation on the ground. The government stated that it will not permit any security breaches or violations that threaten Libyan land.

General Yousef Mangoush, the chief of staff of the Libyan Armed Forces, confirmed that the situation is indeed calm now, and that the military is securing all the areas and vital facilities, but it is now clear that declarations by Libyan officials have either over- or under-stated the situation. The crisis in Sabha is still smoldering under the ashes and attacks continue, as do the accusations, with each party holding the other responsible for what is going on. What is most dangerous is that this is not the first crisis in Libya since the overthrow and killing of Qaddafi and the successful end to the revolution. There are still the so-called Qaddafi holdovers, who are ready to exploit these types of tribal conflicts in order to weaken state authority and create conflict.

ليبيا ومعضلة الجيش

Libya and the Army's Dilemma

The truce in Libya's Sabha is a strong indication that the situation is stabilizing. The problem, though, is that Sabha is not the only one to experience disturbances. It was preceded by Kufra, and before that by Misrata, not to mention the demand for federalism in Cyrenaica. In accordance with what is happening in Libya the conflict will continue and chaos will continue, possibly for a long time, increasing the suffering of Libyans, unless the Libyan government rectifies the situation.

Violence buries revolutions, the sound of gunfire everywhere reminds us that the army is absent and bullets are plentiful. The people do not want to listen to gunfire during times of peace. There is no alternative other than speeding up the formation of a professional army distanced from politics, and there is no civilian faction or armed battalion that can take the place of the Libyan army. There is no tribe or important city that can fill the vacuum resulting from the delay in forming the Libyan army.

Most Libyans agree that the current performance of the transitional governments is inadequate given the magnitude of the challenges faced by the state in such a critical period of the country's history. The armed confrontations in Sabha, in southern Libya, do not point to the disintegration of the Libyan state, but rather to the weakness of the government and its inability to contain the bloody conflict, which is acquiring tribal and political dimensions. Libya has a government that is first and foremost responsible for dealing seriously with these incidents and proving that the Libyan people, as they plunge into their democratic project, are able to deal seriously with issues of this magnitude.

The government must be able to impose its sovereignty, so that all Libyans know that it is tasked with resolving these issues. During the liberation stage we spoke of rebels fighting the brigades of the former regime. Today there should be no more rebels in any cities, and instead the government should control them, so all can know that the Libyan state, represented by the ministries of interior and defense, is in charge.

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO.leavenworth.army.mil)

International Research Collaboration Program

FMSO's goal with both U.S. and foreign institution partnerships is to provide an opportunity for quality researchers outside of the U.S. government to express new ideas that will help define the current and future defense and security environment from understudied and unconsidered perspectives.

FMSO collaboration includes authors from The Baltic Defense College, The Eastern Europe Studies Centre, the Jamestown Foundation, Sri Lankan 4th Armoured Regiment, and China. These authors provide a unique view of the operational environment from a foreign perspective.



FMSO Commentary: *The main political challenge in post-Saleh Yemen will be the restructuring of the army and security services. Interim president Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi recently took the first step by dismissing several of the former president's allies and relatives from top command posts. The result was a temporary siege of Sanaa International Airport by pro-Saleh troops.*

Military and security restructuring is particularly delicate, given the challenge the Yemeni state is facing from al-Qaeda militants in Abyan province and other areas. Having already lost de facto control of the country's north to the Huthi group and its allies, the state is attempting to prevent further territorial losses. This makes the restructuring all the more difficult.

Yemen's military remains divided, with one group led by Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar and the other by former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and his relatives. Ideally, the restructuring process led by President Hadi will help reunify the two factions. Many, though, believe that what is seen as needed purges of Saleh loyalists, especially his son Ahmed (head of the Republican Guard) and nephew Yahya (head of the Central Security Forces), would force a confrontation between the two armies.

*While Yemen's gradual transition has thus far avoided state collapse, growing security concerns and deteriorating humanitarian conditions may soon make it unsustainable. The following article comes from al-Jazeera's Arabic-language website and includes the view of three prominent Yemeni political analysts. **End FMSO Commentary (Winter).***

Restructuring Yemen's Military: Mission Impossible?

10 April 2012

Source: "Mansour Hadi and the Post-Saleh Challenges," al-Jazeera. <http://aljazeera.net/news/pages/acbc43f7-3b6e-4599-90e7-d563032d29e3>

Field Marshall Abdu Rabu Mansour HADI.
President of the Republic of Yemen, via
yemenembassy.org



منصور هادي وتحديات ما بعد صالح (Mansour Hadi and the Post-Saleh Challenges)

Political analysts see Yemeni President Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi's dismissal of many relatives of deposed president Ali Abdullah Saleh from their military positions as "a bold and strong step" that lays the foundation for his true leadership over the country and ending the power centers of the former regime.

Hadi issued a decree described as "revolutionary" ordering the dismissal of Saleh's half-brother, Maj. Gen. Mohammed Saleh al-Ahmar, as head of the Air Force. He also dismissed Brigadier Tariq Mohammed Saleh, Saleh's son, from command of the Special Presidential Guard. Additionally, a new leader was named to the Republican Guard's Third Infantry Mountain Division, which had been headed by Khaled Ali Abdullah Saleh, Saleh's youngest son.

Hadi's decree extended to prominent military leaders and governors that had remained loyal to Saleh, including the commander of the navy Maj. Gen. Ruwais Abdullah Ali Mujawar, Taiz governor Hamoud al-Sufi, Abyan governor Maj. Gen. Saleh al-Zawaari and Marib governor Naji al-Zayidi.

Various defected military leaders who supported the peaceful revolution calling for Saleh's overthrow were also included in Hadi's decree, including Northwest Division Commander, Staff General Mohammed Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, Middle Division Commander Brig. Gen. Mohammed Ali Ahmed al-Maqdashi and the commander of the air force base in Hodaida, in the country's west, Brig. Ali al-Sinhani.

Mohammed al-Dhahiri, a professor of political science at Sanaa University, believes that "President Hadi gave signals to the Yemenis that he has begun to take off his predecessor's robes and has the power to make independent decisions. He has been strengthened by the people who elected him and placed trust and legitimacy in him alongside the international

Continued: Mansour Hadi and the Post-Saleh Challenges

and regional communities standing behind his decision.”

Al-Dhahiri hopes that president Hadi will continue purging relatives and supporters of Saleh from the Yemeni scene, in accordance with popular will and in loyalty to the young martyrs of the peaceful revolution, confirming that his decrees are not subject to being refused and rebelled against.

The commander of the Air Force Maj. Gen Mohammed Saleh al-Ahmar, Saleh’s half-brother, announced his rejection of his dismissal last Saturday and controlled Sanaa International Airport and bombed the control tower while military forces and civilian gunmen surrounded the airport area, threatening to target any airplane taking off or approaching the airport.

The closing of Sanaa airport caused international and regional concern, with the United States, Europe and the Gulf States expressing their support for the president’s decree, confirming that it reflects the GCC initiative.

Al-Dhahiri believes that al-Ahmar’s rebellion and the closing of the airport is a message from the Saleh family to president Hadi, saying it will not surrender. By using its military power, they are warning Hadi to stay away from the rest of the sons and relatives of Saleh that hold important leadership positions in the army, security forces and intelligence services.

The president of the Forum for Political Development in Sanaa, Ali Saif Hassan, told aljazeera.net that president Hadi is exercising his constitutional powers as legitimate president supported by the Yemeni people and internationally, and he has the right to take whatever decision he thinks is in Yemen’s best interest.

Hassan sees the rejection of the decree by the commander of the Air Force and the rebellion against Hadi as “a reckless act.” He added that the General People’s Congress (GPC) had provided political cover for al-Ahmar’s rebellion as a “major political miscalculation.”

He warned against Mohammed al-Ahmar’s rebellion becoming a precedent for other commanders, alluding to the expected dismissal of Ahmed, Saleh’s son, from command of the Republican Guard and of his nephews Yahya and Ammar Saleh from leadership of the Central Security Forces and the National Security Bureau.

The head of the Future Studies Center Fares al-Saqqaf speculates that Mohammed Saleh al-Ahmar could be put on trial given that he rebelled against a presidential decree dismissing him. He indicated that president Hadi, with his decree, “laid the foundations for a new legitimacy and for his presidency, following his election last February. Saleh’s relatives don’t have the legitimacy and through their rebellion are violating the law, even though they control the reins of military power in Yemen.”

He added, “if the situation in the country remains deadlocked

without approaching the sons and relatives of the deposed Saleh and dismissing them, the situation will move toward a counterrevolution on the national reconciliation government and president Hadi himself.”

Al-Saqqaf does not believe Hadi can effectively be Yemen’s president with the presence of these leaders in the Republican Guard, Central Security, National Security and the Air Force. He considers the military leadership supporting the peaceful revolution as a different model to what Saleh’s relatives are doing regarding Hadi’s decrees.

According to him, they announced their commitment to carrying out the GCC initiative and accepting any dismissal decreed by the president, something that was announced by the head of the First Armored Division and Commander of the Northwest Division, General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar.

President Hadi paved the way for his latest decree, which was issued last Friday, by dismissing three prominent Saleh supporters: the head of the department of political and moral guidance in the armed forces, Brig. Gen. Ali Hassan al-Shatir; the chairman of the military economic institution Hafez Maayad; and, the commander of the southern division, Maj. Gen. Mahdi Maquwala. Many considered this the “first blow” landed by Hadi on his deposed predecessor.

FMSO commentary: *There has been progress, to be sure, in rolling back al Shabaab, a group with uncertain and perhaps wavering ties to al Qaeda and often described as Somalia's Islamist militia. Their setbacks are perhaps none too surprising as they face an array of forces: Ethiopian, Kenyan, those from the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Somali militia groups supportive of the TFG. Additionally, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a regional peacekeeping mission, besides securing or preparing to secure areas significantly cleared of al Shabaab, also periodically fights against the terrorist group. Still, despite the recent progress, significant concerns persist, including if it will be possible to totally rid the country of al Shabaab and, perhaps even more important, whether Somalia can form a lasting central government, a goal that has repeatedly eluded its people for the past two decades.*

At first glance the thought the country could be rid of al Shabbab in the near future does look promising. Ethiopian troops have made significant gains, especially in the south-central region. More recently joining the fray, Kenyan troops have made progress in the southern part of the country, which they entered following a series of kidnappings by Somalis on Kenyan territory. Most important though is that many Somalis appear to be tiring of al Shabaab's attempts to impose its radical form of Islam, one which is at variance with the more moderate form of Islam practiced by the majority of the populace. This has led to increasing friction between al Shabaab and many of the people in the territories it still controls. The recent famine appears to have greatly widened this gulf as initially al Shabaab refused to allow emergency food aid into stricken areas or to allow the starving Somalis living there to leave.

It would probably be premature, though, to completely write al Shabaab off. The group still has some local

Even if al Shabaab Is Eventually Defeated, Can Somalia Govern Itself?

11 April 2012

Source: James Smith, "Somalia's 'Newly Liberated Areas' – What Comes Next?" African Arguments (hosted by the Royal African Society and the Social Science Research Council) 11 Apr 2012. <http://africanarguments.org/2012/04/11/somalias-'newly-liberated-areas'-what-comes-next-by-james-smith/>

Map of Somalia 23 March 2012, after the government expansion in the fall of 2011, with the blue areas being under control of the Transitional Federal Government and the autonomous region of Puntland, the yellow area being the secessionist region of Somaliland, and the rest being held by Islamist militias (CC-BY-SA), via Wikimedia Commons



Somalia's 'Newly Liberated Areas' – What Comes Next?

Somalia's Islamist militia, al Shabaab, is on the back foot. Each week brings news of another town seized. The forceful departure of al Shabaab however does not necessarily imply victory for the inhabitants of the 'newly liberated areas'.

In late 2011 Ethiopian forces together with pro-government Somali militias captured Beledweyne, not far from the Ethiopian border. Eight weeks later Baidoa, a strategically important city in the south, fell to Ethiopian troops and pro-government militias. In late March Ethiopia overran El Bur, one of the group's main bases in central Somalia. Kismayo, on the southern coast, is now the last major city held by al Shabaab.

The mission to remove al Shabaab's black flag from Somalia's urban centres throughout the south-central region is advancing more rapidly than many thought possible. But ridding a town of one militia is just the beginning. Filling the power vacuum left behind by al Shabaab unearths a new set of problems underscored by one key factor – a willing, capable and legitimate alternative remains elusive.

It comes as no surprise that Ethiopian forces are making the greatest headway in south-central Somalia. The Ethiopian military is well trained, well equipped and one of the largest on the continent. It has more experience in Somalia than all other forces currently fighting put together. Ethiopia however has made clear that it does not intend to hang around. Nor, if it did, would it be welcome.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is developing plans to replace troops in Ethiopian held towns throughout south-central Somalia. Baidoa is now host to the first contingent of AMISOM troops outside of Mogadishu. 2,500 troops will be deployed in phases to strengthen and later replace Ethiopian forces. Another contingent is expected to arrive in Beledweyne in the coming weeks.

It has taken AMISOM four years to build a fragile trust with Mogadishu's residents. Outside of the capital, winning the 'hearts and minds' of a population who are understandably dubious of (if not openly hostile towards) external interventions will be a challenge for troops from Uganda,

supporters, especially among the young males who joined its ranks when no other opportunities were present. Additionally, it has proven itself quite capable of change, for instance, now allowing young females to join, and may yet metamorphose into something more compatible with traditional Somali culture. It could also wage a prolonged guerrilla war. Still, the initial signs, including foreign fighters trickling back to their home countries, bode well that maybe al Shabaab could eventually be marginalized or even defeated.

Unfortunately, ridding Somalia of al Shabaab may be easier than actually establishing an effective central government that can exert its authority beyond Mogadishu's borders. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU), whose militant youth wing formed al Shabaab, filled some of the void created by a lack of government. The ICU provided education, healthcare, and, as its name says, courts. It is uncertain if the ICU's demise will be followed by a rise of the TFG to supply such services. Many questions exist regarding the capabilities - and honesty - of the TFG or even any government that may follow. The greatest challenge - one which could prove to be almost insurmountable - will likely be the clans and militias, which will need to be either convinced through enticements or coerced by force, to join the central government. Failure to do so will most likely doom the mission, and any progress in stabilizing Somalia could prove to be short-lived.

*This time may be different, but there is no ignoring the numerous prior failed attempts to form a working government. Still, with steady progress in fighting al Shabaab, training for the TFG and its successor, a populace which has grown wary of extremism, and support from the AU, as well as the UN, there is a tiny glimmer of hope that Somalia might someday be on the path to peace. **End FMSO Commentary (Feldman)***

Continued: Somalia's 'Newly Liberated Areas' – What Comes Next?

Burundi, Kenya and Djibouti.

How local residents in Baidoa and Beledweyne receive them will provide some indication of the extent of the challenges that lie ahead. According to @HSMPress, Al Shabaab intends to “employ every available avenue in the fulfillment of its objectives.” Those thought to be siding with or facilitating the “African invaders” and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) are also considered legitimate targets. Open support of AMISOM during this uncertain phase of expansion presents a formidable risk to local populations.

Even if welcomed, AMISOM's capacity to secure the ‘newly liberated areas’ is questionable. Despite Kenya's recent integration into the mission and new commitments made at the London Conference, AMISOM is overstretched. Despite al Shabaab's ‘tactical withdrawal’ from Mogadishu in mid-2011, 12,000 AMISOM troops supported by the TFG's own forces still struggle to secure the city. Last week's suicide bombing at the newly re-opened National Theatre serves as a reminder that al Shabaab is still able to penetrate supposedly safe areas of the city with devastating consequences.

UN Security Council Resolution 2036 (2012) requested the African Union increase AMISOM's force strength to a maximum of 17,731 uniformed personnel. Even if successful, foreign troops holding towns surrounded by vast tracts of ungoverned land is not a durable solution. The legitimacy and capability of whoever eventually governs and administers the ‘newly liberated areas’ will determine whether they can break free from the cycle of instability and violence that has characterized the last two decades.

The TFG Prime Minister Abdiwali Mohamed Ali has announced that his government intends to create regional administrations for all ‘newly liberated areas’. Already the appointment of new regional administrators has become another source of contestation. Following the capture of Beledweyne, the TFG officially declared a new administration in the Hiraan region and appointed Abdifatah Hassan Afrah, President of the Shabelle Valley Administration (SVA), as TFG provisional regional chairman. By doing so, the TFG publicly snubbed the moderate Sufi group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ) who, alongside the Ethiopians and SVA, captured Beledweyne from al Shabaab.

Fighting has since broken out between ASWJ and SVA in Beledweyne. Human Rights Watch has accused both ASWJ and SVA of summary executions of civilians in the town, naming SVA militias as the worst offenders. Unsurprisingly the TFG has denied the claims. Al Shabaab has been able to take advantage of hostility between ostensibly ‘allied’ forces within the town with a series of low-level attacks targeting military bases.

The TFG's mandate expires in August, terminating its official engagement with ‘newly liberated areas’ sooner than AMISOM's. How Mogadishu engages with the local administrations and how they in turn engage with local residents in post-TFG Somalia will at least partly determine what comes next.

However, in light of the uncertainty surrounding the political structure of Somalia after August, competition for authority is set to intensify in the coming months. Leadership battles, both local and national, may well receive greater attention among the political elite than the establishment of a viable constitution.

Ousting al Shabaab from towns throughout south-central Somalia is widely perceived as a major step forward for the country. Optimism abounds that this will prove to be a defining moment. Without a lasting political solution however the Ethiopian and ‘allied’ forces’ take-over of towns throughout the country is just the latest in a seemingly endless series of occupations.

James Smith is the Horn of Africa Project Manager for the Rift Valley Institute in Nairobi. The views in this article are his own, and do not represent a collective position on the part of the Institute.

FMSO Commentary: Long known as one of Africa's most notably massive and unwieldy states, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is home to a number of civil society groups that are now sending a clear message to the international community: stop propping up a corrupt DRC security apparatus.

With a variety of conflicts sputtering throughout the country, DRC's security sector has long been a powerful (if not ineffective and, at times, downright aggressive) agent within the country. The DRC's security apparatus has for years benefited from international aid intended to help end the overlapping conflicts that have embroiled the country's North Kivu and South Kivu provinces for more than a decade. Serving as the center of various proxy wars among Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and DRC, the international community has funneled money into the country in an attempt to quell the conflicts there, collectively the most deadly since World War II.

That money has lamentably been leveraged for less than ideal means, mostly to help politicians achieve political ends. For example, in the lead-up to the November 2011 presidential elections reports of police and other security forces attacking, detaining, and jailing civilians supporting opposition candidates were rife in the country. That the DRC's security forces are in desperate need of reform is beyond question.

Despite these calls for change, however, expectations should be tempered. The extent to which the global donor community will demand such reforms and coordinate to enact them is likely low. Unfortunately, though the problem has been underlined and a solution proposed, true reform will likely remain elusive precisely because of the entrenched interests discussed below.

End FMSO Commentary (Warner)

Groups Rally for Changes in DRC's Security Sector

16 April 2012

Source: Ann Garrison, "Congo-Kinshasa: Military Reform Urgently Needed," allafrica.com, 16 April 2012 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201204160186.html>



DRC map by United States Central Intelligence Agency [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Congo-Kinshasa: Military Reform Urgently Needed

The international community and Congolese government must urgently agree upon a new deal to reform the Congolese military, according to a new report by 13 leading international and Congolese civil society groups. The report argues that the lack of political will to reform the security sector in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) risks not only billions of dollars of international aid but also the very stability of the country.

“At the end of the day, many of Congo’s seemingly intractable conflict-related problems can be traced back to dysfunctional security services: the army, police and courts. The Congolese government has failed to take concrete action to reform these vital institutions,” said Emmanuel Kabengele, National Coordinator of the Congolese civil society Network for Security Sector Reform and Justice.

“Yet the international community has continued to sustain the government, investing money and effort with no actual return. It’s high time that donors demand that Congo engage in real army reform.”

The report, Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform, was signed by 13 leading international and Congolese organizations and networks (see below for full list). It was completed after extensive research and interviews in DRC and donor countries. It argues that the army not only fails to provide security but actively preys upon the population, being one of the major perpetrators of human rights violations in the country. “An effective security sector - organized, resourced, trained and vetted - is essential to solving problems from recruitment of child soldiers, internal displacement and rape, to economic growth or the trade in conflict minerals,” says the report

The report concludes that the main reason for the failure of army reform in DRC is a lack of political will from parts of the Congolese government - notably those elements which have benefited from endemic corruption.

FMSO Commentary: *No country exits in a vacuum: conflicts, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, have a pesky way of spilling over into other countries at rapid rates. No more evident has this phenomenon been than in the Saharan and Sahelian regions of West Africa, where the huge weapons caches used for the Libyan uprisings have found their ways to all corners of the region. Particularly, as the article below details, Nigeria is now having to confront these new arms inflows as well.*

Various stories have surfaced around West Africa about how Libyan arms have infiltrated West Africa. Most starkly, the coup d' état that ousted Malian president Amadou Touré in March was no doubt at least partly facilitated by the inflow of Libyan arms into that country. Algeria's political and economic elite, known as le Pouvoir (the Power), have also expressed worry about the impact of leftover arms on their country's domestic stability. Mauritania, Niger, and, as noted below, Nigeria are also feeling the residual effects of Qaddafi's overthrow.

*To be sure, the introduction of Libyan arms into Nigeria – particularly their first entry point in the north – is the last thing that the Nigerian government wants. Having been fighting an uphill battle against the militant Islamist group Boko Haram, which resides in that region (and which most recently orchestrated an Easter Day bombing that killed 36), the Nigerian government will now be forced to deal with one more confounding factor in its quest to ensure domestic stability. **End FMSO Commentary (Warner)***

Libya Collapse Continues to Impact Sub-Saharan Africa

16 April 2012



Source: Senator Iroegbu, "Nigeria: Obada - Looted Libyan Weapons Now in Country, 11 April 2012: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201204110266.html>

Mrs. Olusola Obada Minister of State for Defence, by US Coast Guard (CC-BY-NC-ND) via http://www.flickr.com/photos/coast_guard/6477975317/sizes/l/in/photostream/

Nigeria: Obada - Looted Libyan Weapons Now in Country

Abuja — Minister of State for Defence, Mrs. Olusola Obada, yesterday confirmed speculations that weapons stolen from Libyan armoury have found their way to Nigeria.

In the dying days of the regime of Libyan leader, Col. Muammar Gaddafi, the armoury was looted and some sophisticated weapons were reportedly stolen.

There had been unconfirmed reports that some of the looted weapons, which included surface-to-air launchers, had found their way into Nigeria and might be part of the Boko Haram armoury.

Obada, speaking in Abuja when a delegation of the National Defence University of Pakistan visited the Ministry of Defence, confirmed the report but expressed confidence that Nigeria is at peace with all countries of the world and, therefore, free from any form of external security threats, especially from its immediate neighbours.

“Today in Nigeria, we are at peace with our neighbours and do not face any external threats. I cannot recall right now any external threats because we are at peace with everybody. However, we are aware that since the end of the Libyan war, some weapons made their way down south and in Nigeria. Nevertheless, today in Nigeria, we do face serious internal threats, but we do hope that the threats will be reduced to the barest minimum,” she said.

She however acknowledged that the country was being challenged by serious internal security threats, such as the current terrorist attacks by Boko Haram.

The minister also noted that in addition to the Boko Haram challenge, the country had other internal issues of arms smuggling, piracy and oil theft, which she described as non-military issues that constitute security threat.

FMSO Commentary: In the wake of Iran's increased isolation in the international arena, observers are watching with great interest as South Africa's powerhouse cell phone company, MTN, attempts to disentangle itself from damning accusations that it planned to bribe the South African government to support Iran's nuclear program.

While increased scrutiny has of late been given to the relations between Iran and states in Africa, arguably the most important bilateral continental relationship is that between Tehran and Pretoria. Historically, Iran has been friendly to African states – not least South Africa – in the spirit of Third World solidarity that proliferated in the wake of the global decolonization process of the 1960s. However, relations between Iran and South Africa soured over the latter's apartheid regime: Tehran imposed a trade embargo on Pretoria in protest in 1979, yet later rescinded it after the country's integration in 1994.

More recently, Iran under Ahmadinejad has been actively trying to court African allies, particularly South Africa, to support its ostracized nuclear program. For its part, South Africa has been vocal about Iran's right to develop peaceful nuclear technology and, in 2008, insisted that the IAEA alone should be in charge of monitoring, not the UN Security Council. Pretoria later went on to decry the threats against Iran by the United States and Israel.

*Since South Africa's largest cell phone company has now been accused of complicity in growing Iran's enigmatic nuclear program, the historically rosy relations between the two countries will likely be less so in the future. **End FMSO Commentary (Warner)***

Tehran, Phone Home?: The Fuzzy South-Africa Iran Connection

8 March 2012

Source: Erin Conway-Smith, "Is South Africa aiding the Iranian military?" Global Post.com, 10 April 2012: <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/south-africa/120409/south-africa-aiding-the-iranian-military>



A lawsuit alleges that the South African MTN cell phone company promised to deliver South African military helicopters to Iran in exchange for a lucrative contract to operate a cell phone network in Iran. A Rooivalk attack helicopter flying at the Ysterplaat air show in 2006 by Danie van der Merwe [CC-BY-2.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/>)], via Wikimedia Commons

Is South Africa aiding the Iranian military?

A lawsuit alleging that Africa's biggest cell phone company conspired to help Iran obtain South African weapons and government support for its nuclear program has drawn fresh scrutiny to Pretoria's close ties with the Islamic Republic.

Cell phone company MTN, in exchange for a license to operate in Iran, allegedly said it would persuade the South African government to vote in favor of Iran's nuclear program at the UN and to sell it heavy weapons prohibited by international sanctions.

The accusations of bribery and corruption against MTN are made in a lawsuit by a rival mobile firm that was also vying for the Iranian operating license. The suit was filed in a US court under the Alien Tort Statute.

South Africa, already under pressure from the US over its substantial Iranian oil imports and historic friendship with Tehran, could face new strain over the allegations, which involve one of the country's highest-profile companies and several top political and business figures.

The lawsuit alleges that MTN struck a deal to deliver a large shipment of military arms and technology, code named "The Fish," to Iran's defense ministry in 2004. This was to include Rooivalk helicopters, based on the US-made Apache, sniper rifles, G5 howitzers,

Continued: Is South Africa aiding the Iranian military?

canons, radar technology and other defense equipment barred by international sanctions.

According to court documents, politically connected MTN executives also offered to influence South Africa's votes at the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear agency, on Iran's nuclear weapons program in the company's pursuit of an Iranian GSM operating license. The lawsuit alleges that MTN prevailed upon South Africa to abstain from three IAEA votes on Iran.

Other accusations charge that MTN allegedly offered the Iranian defense ministry access to its devices to "facilitate installation of eavesdropping technology on MTN devices."

Avi Jorisch, a former US Treasury Department official, accused MTN of following Iranian government instructions to suspend text-messaging services and block Skype, used heavily by Iran's opposition movement during protests following the 2009 presidential election.

On the issue of a nuclear Iran, South Africa has repeatedly emphasized Iran's right to nuclear enrichment for energy purposes, while strongly opposing nuclear proliferation.

But the government has so far been unclear about whether it will participate in sanctions against Iranian oil exports. Senior government officials have sent contradictory messages, typical of Pretoria's recent foreign policy on issues such as Libya.


South Africa relies on Iran for more than 25 percent of its annual crude oil imports. Their friendly relationship dates back to the apartheid era, when Tehran supported the liberation movement, but Pretoria is under mounting American pressure to sever ties or else lose access to the US financial system.

COSATU, the South African trade union group and an alliance partner of the ruling African National Congress, railed at the US for "its attempts to bully countries to cut imports of Iranian oil," on the basis of "unproven allegations."

The South African government must "stop this kowtowing to the US imperialists," COSATU spokesman Patrick Craven said.

Tim Thomas's *Decoding the Virtual Dragon* explains how Chinese information warfare (IW) concepts since 2003 fit into the strategic outlook, practices, and activities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The book offers IW explanations directly from the pens of Chinese experts. The Chinese authors discuss the application or relation of IW to strategic thought, the transformation plans of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the revolution in military affairs (RMA), and the revolution in knowledge warfare and cognition.

Tim Thomas provides an indispensable source for understanding the fundamentals of Chinese military thought and demonstrating how IW/IO has been integrated into the art of war and strategy.



FMSO Commentary: In January 2012 President Obama announced, “We will be strengthening our presence in the Asia-Pacific.” Recent reaction to this emphasis on Asia and ongoing US military presence has come from several countries. During the November 2011 ASEAN meeting in Bali, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Dr. Hassan Wirajuda expressed concern about stationing of US Marines Australia. He feared a potential “vicious circle of mistrust” in the region. Syahganda Nainggolan, director of an Indonesia-based think tank, suggests that the US Marines in Darwin, Australia, posed a threat to Indonesian sovereignty and state integrity. The concern is over the independence movement in Papua. His comments were in the Indonesia language paper, *Republika*, in April. Other scattered reports indicate a popular sentiment that questions the motives of US government actions in the region. The Camp Zama Open Source Center translated live reports on the Indonesian Radio Station, *Radio Dakta*, marking a student protest of the US ambassador’s visit to Bekasi by a local Islamic Student Association. The English language *Jakarta Post* did not mention the local protests when reporting the story.

The ripple effect of this perceived change in US strategy is now being felt in the Philippines. US naval and marine forces continue to participate in exercises in this strategically important country. This long-term military-to-military relationship is drawing new and increasing scrutiny by elements of the press and political organizations. The stationing of US Marines in Australia has increased concern among certain Philippine political groups that the US may attempt to reestablish bases in the Philippines. **End FMSO Commentary (Welch)**

US Military Presence in Philippines

17 April 2012

Source: Student activists protesting Balikatan deface US embassy seal, *The Philippine Star*, April 17, 2012, By Sandy Araneta <http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=797771&publicationSubCategoryId=63>



Brig. Gen. Padilla, Balikatan 2012 exercise director for U.S. forces, and Philippine Navy Rear Adm. Martir, Philippine exercise director, stand shoulder to shoulder, displaying the partnership of their respective countries, April 16, at Camp Aguinaldo, Philippines. Balikatan 2012 is the 28th iteration of the annual exercise and the third humanitarian assistance disaster response focused exercise for the Philippines and the U.S. Padilla is the 3rd Marine Division commanding general, Okinawa, Japan. Read more: <http://www.dvidshub.net/image/560105/balikatan-2012-officially-opens#.T5BX0NU4KkM#ixzz1sVo0ySap>

Student activists protesting Balikatan deface US embassy seal

MANILA, Philippines - Student activists defaced the seal of the United States embassy along Roxas Boulevard in Manila to protest the Philippines-US Balikatan military exercises that started yesterday.

At least 100 members of the leftist League of Filipino Students (LFS) surprised Manila policemen and US embassy security guards. The students slipped through security to stage a lightning rally near the main gate of the embassy at around 6 a.m., then sprayed red and blue paint on the embassy seal.

Another student used an improvised club to smash the metal letters of the seal while security guards watched helplessly from the embassy compound.

There were no Manila policemen or crowd control unit on site to confront the activists.

The students brought placards that read, “Defend national sovereignty!” “Junk VFA (Visiting Forces Agreement)!” and “US troops out now!”

The activists also burned an American flag.

The VFA was signed in 1999 to authorize the Phl-US joint military exercises.

Witnesses said militants pretended to be joggers and then staged the lightning rally at the embassy gate. The protesters dispersed after 30 minutes when three policemen arrived. The police failed to arrest any activist.

Embassy security guards decided not to go out of the compound, but they took photographs of the students who were vandalizing the embassy seal.

Policemen later blocked several militants who tried to return to the embassy.

Senior Superintendent Ronald Romero Estilles, chief of the District Directorial Staff of MPD, told *The STAR* that they have sent some 100 Manila policemen to secure the embassy perimeter.

“There was a lightning rally made by the militants. And they threw some paint on the seal of the embassy. That’s why we have reinforcements here in our deployment so that no

Continued: Student activists protesting Balikatan deface US embassy seal

similar incident would happen again. They were more or less about 100 militants,” Estilles said.

“No arrests were made. We were thinly dispersed this morning. Police were then less than 10, and rallyists were about 100. We do not want to create any violent reaction. We were not able to arrest them because they were so many,” he said.

MPD spokesperson and head of the MPD Public Information Office (PIO) Chief Inspector Erwin Margarejo said that the Constitution guarantees the right of rallyists to peacefully assemble and air their sentiments.

“But if they will violate the law, the police is also mandated by the law to preserve peace and order,” said Margarejo.

The LFS said, “Despite the people’s clamor for independence, Noynoy Aquino continues to be at the beck and call of the government of the US and, in doing so, exposes himself as a slave for his imperialist masters instead of us Filipinos.”

Charisse Bañez, Anakbayan secretary-general, said in a separate statement that they also opposed the presence of US troops in the Philippines.

“Thus, we are also opposed to the Balikatan war games between American and Filipino troops which will begin today, and will take place simultaneously in several parts of the Philippines,” Bañez said. Bañez said these war games allow US troops to be based in the country without the actual and physical military bases which the Philippine government had evicted back in 1991 and which are expressly forbidden under the Constitution.

American troops who are part of this year’s Balikatan military exercises refused to comment on the defacing of the US embassy seal.

“We are just here for the Balikatan exercises,” said US Marine Lt. Col. Curtis Smith, spokesman for the US Balikatan contingent, in an interview in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) urged militant groups to avoid damaging property when staging mass demonstrations.

“We respect their views but they should not violate our laws when staging protests. They should not destroy property,” said Balikatan Philippine spokesman Maj. Emmanuel Garcia.

He also asked the activists to consider the benefits of staging the bilateral exercises. Garcia claimed the exercises would enhance the disaster preparedness and knowledge of soldiers while uplifting the lives of people in poor communities.

“These exercises will help boost our capabilities and will enable us to learn new things,” he said.

US and Philippine military officials say nearly 7,000 American and Filipino troops have begun two weeks of major military exercises in Palawan, but they stress that China is not an imaginary target.

Garcia said Monday that the annual drills, called Balikatan or shoulder-to-shoulder, will include combat maneuvers involving the mock retaking by US-backed Filipino troops of an oil rig supposedly seized by terrorists near the South China Sea.

In a speech at the opening ceremony for the exercises, Armed Forces chief Gen. Jessie Dellosa did not specifically mention China but said the war games highlighted strong US support for its weaker ally. “Given the international situation we are in, I say that this exercise, in coordination with all those we had in the past, (is) timely and mutually beneficial,” Dellosa said.

“The conduct of this annual event reflects the aspirations to further relations with our strategic ally, a commitment that has to be nurtured especially in the context of the evolving challenges in the region.”

The Philippines has over the past year made repeated public calls for closer military ties with the United States, its former colonial ruler and longtime ally, as part of its strategy to deal with China over a maritime dispute.

China claims nearly all of the South China Sea, even waters approaching the coasts of the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia.

Tensions spiked again last week when the Philippines sent its biggest warship to Scarborough Shoal, about 230 kilometers west of Zamales, where eight Chinese fishing boats had been seen.

The Philippine government has sought to emphasize that the Balikatan exercises have nothing to do with the Scarborough Shoal dispute and there is no reason for the war games to provoke China.

However, the Philippine military has confirmed some of the drills will be held just off the western coast of Palawan in waters facing the South China Sea.

The Balikatan exercises are also being held as the United States is rebuilding its military presence across the Asia Pacific, partly to counter the growing political, economic and military might of China.

China has criticized the US move, with the Chinese defense ministry describing it as proof of a “Cold War mentality.”

President Aquino said last month he was willing to help the US in this context by allowing more joint exercises such as Balikatan.

More anti-Balikatan protests

Continued: Student activists protesting Balikatan deface US embassy seal

Environmental activists joined yesterday's caravan from Manila to the former US military base at the Clark Freeport in Pampanga to protest the Balikatan exercises.

"These military exercises have been proven to be enormously taxing on the environment and local communities. In the past Balikatan exercises, war and combat simulations which involved naval maneuverings and live fire exercises have caused coral reef destruction and ecological pollution. These activities also consumed massive resources like fossil fuels and released large volumes of toxic waste into air, land, and sea," said Frances Quimpo, secretary-general of environmental political group Kalikasan party-list group.

The Kalikasan-People's Network for the Environment (PNE) said the caravan aims to raise awareness on the negative social, political and environmental impacts of the 2012 Balikatan exercises.

The activists said that in 2004, US Naval ships participating in Balikatan exercises allegedly dumped sewage and oil in Subic Bay.

"These same military exercises will definitely exact a heavy toll on the pristine environment of Palawan and its surrounding marine ecology. Not only Palawenos but also all Filipinos should oppose the anti-environment Balikatan exercises. The local government units

in Palawan province and Puerto Princesa can declare their area as a Balikatan military exercise free-zone like what Davao City did," Quimpo said.

Some 1,000 members of the Alyansa ng mga Magbubukid sa Gitnang Luzon (AMGL) and other groups also joined the protests at the Clark Freeport.

They said hundreds of farmers and fisherfolk in Central Luzon are again likely to be barred access to their livelihood sources to give way to Balikatan under the VFA.

"The areas of Balikatan exercises are usually where farmers, fisherfolk and indigenous people get their livelihood. During these dangerous exercises they are banned from attending their crops and fishing in the sea," said Joseph Canlas, AMGL chairman.

Anakpawis party-list Rep. Rafael Mariano urged yesterday "all freedom loving Filipinos to oppose the latest US-Philippines Balikatan military exercises."

"Once again, US is using the Philippines as a launching pad of its defense strategy shift to the Asia-Pacific. It is enraging that the Aquino government willingly allows this mockery of our national sovereignty and patrimony," Mariano said.

Protest against greater US presence Activists warn States is not welcome in light of previous 'abuse and intervention'

Source: Protest against greater US presence Activists warn States is not welcome in light of previous 'abuse and intervention', Union of Catholic Asian News, February 28, 2012 By D'Jay Lazaro, Manila <http://www.ucanews.com/2012/02/28/protest-against-greater-us-presence/>

February 28, 2012

Philippines: A militant youth group staged a protest rally outside a Manila hotel today to protest against a visit by US deputy trade representative Demetrius Marantis.

He is in the country for talks on proposals to increase US military presence in the country, including deployment of more soldiers and personnel for joint defense and training exercises.

His visit follows last month's "Manila Declaration" in which the US and the Philippines agreed to reinforce "the significance of our mutual defense treaty as the basis for the alliance and the treaty's continued relevance to the peace, security, and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific [region]."

Vencer Crisostomo of the Anakbayan youth group said the protest was to send a message to the US that "they are not welcome" in the country.

"The Filipino people have had enough of US abuse and intervention in the country. Plans for the increase of US troops and the return of US bases will be opposed vehemently by different sectors," he said.

Crisostomo added the US is merely using the Philippines' conflict with China as an excuse for US military deployment in the region.

"The Filipino people must be vigilant and must fight increased US imperialist intervention and oppression. We cannot allow the further rape of our women and sovereignty. We cannot allow further exploitation of our people," said Crisostomo.

FMSO Commentary: Since President Felipe Calderon took office in December 2006, more than 50,500 people in Mexico have fallen victim to organized crime-related violence. During this same time period murder rates within the country have virtually doubled annually, which indicates that organized crime-related violence is spiraling out of control. Still, no one really knows the number of individuals who are actually employed by cartels to work as hitmen and distribute drugs within Mexico and Central America. Drug consumption and its sale are directly related to organized crime, but this is a problem that is largely ignored; instead, focus has been centered on eradicating drug cartels. Still, it is a problem that should be addressed, given the fact that new and growing addiction problems are causing security issues within the country and can no longer be ignored. The fact is that Mexico does have a drug problem, and at the center of it are an army of young adults who act as consumers, retailers, and cartel employees.

For the last ten years drug use in Mexico has increased by 20% annually, with cocaine being reported as the new gateway drug for minors. In 1993 elementary and high school surveys throughout the country reported that approximately 3% of students were using cocaine. In 2006 this number jumped to 15%. It is estimated that 70-80 tons of cocaine are consumed yearly by the Mexican population as a whole. Mexico City alone demands 50,000 pounds, resulting in drug cartel profits of \$30,000,000 monthly.

Eduardo Medina Mora, who previously served as the Attorney General of Mexico, agrees that there has indeed been a steady increase in drug use over the course of last decade. He attributes this problem to the fact that the only issues addressed regarding drugs is their trafficking to the U.S. and seizures made within Mexico. During the time

Recruitment of Youths by Mexican Drug Cartels

11 April 2012

Sources: Recluta narco a adolescents [Recruitment of Youths by Mexican Drug Cartels]”, Reforma, <http://www.reforma.com/nacional/articulo/652/1303261/>, Accessed on 11 April 2012



Young teenage members of a street gang in Monterrey. Street gangs in Mexico are a prime breeding ground for drug cartel “sicarios” (assassins), photo via <http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2010/11/up-to-35-thousand-children-work-for.html>

Recruitment of Minors by Drug Cartels on the Rise in Mexico

In February 2012, two adults from the same family were arrested after authorities caught them recruiting minors to work as lookouts and hitmen for Los Zetas in the Cienega de Flores municipality of Nuevo Leon. During this same incident, six minors, to include a 13 year old boy, were arrested. Following his arrest, this child confessed to having worked as a hitman, and stated that he had already participated in at least one murder.

According to the Attorney General of Mexico, the recruitment of minors by organized crime groups in Mexico is on the rise. This idea is evidenced by the arrests of 7,738 minors, to include 700 females, for their involvement with drug cartels between 2006 and 2011 in Mexico.

In 2006, authorities arrested a reported 768 minors. In 2011, 1,857 were arrested; a 141% increase when compared to 2006 figures. Regarding charges, 63% of those minors arrested in 2011 were charged with crimes related to drug possession, drug trafficking, and drug production. The remaining 21% were charged with organized crime related offenses to include owning illicit properties. Those states with the highest recruitment of minors during 2011 were reported as:

- Baja California: 253
- Guanajuato: 179
- Jalisco: 177
- Federal District: 130
- Nuevo Leon: 107
- Sonora: 105
- Tamaulipas: 100

Continued: Recruitment of Youths by Mexican Drug Cartels

President Felipe Calderon has been in office, a record 78.3 tons of cocaine and 4,380 tons of marijuana have been seized. However, in the last six years addiction rates have grown by 78%.

The Force behind the Addiction:

A reason behind the growing addiction problem is that it has become profitable for cartels to sell drugs internally due to the high demand for them. Throughout Mexico an estimated 35,000 drug distribution points feed the needs of users. Genaro Garcia Luna, the Secretary of Public Security in Mexico, asserts that small time drug trafficking has permeated society, and that housewives, young adults, and criminals are all involved in it. Points of sale can be found in hotels, bars, discotheques, and night clubs, but it is not uncommon for individuals to run the business out of their homes.

The area in Mexico with the most concentrated internal trafficking problem is the Federal District. Since 2002 small time drug trafficking has increased by 756% here. A survey published by the news source Reforma reported that 43% of individuals interviewed in neighborhoods within the Federal District confirmed that small time drug trafficking was very common. Earnings yielded from Mexico City's internal market generate an estimated \$200,000,000 yearly, confirming that this is a profitable and expansive enterprise. States like Baja California, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, and Jalisco are also known to have extremely profitable internal markets.

Security Issues Associated with the Internal Drug Market:

Serious problems overlooked regarding internal drug trafficking in Mexico are the security issues it raises, given the increased crime associated with it. Those areas with the highest volume of internal drug trafficking also have the highest rates of crime. Take, for example, the epicenter of drug trafficking in Mexico, the Federal District. Tepito, Iztapalapa, the Historic Center, Roma, and Lomas de Chapultepec—the neighborhoods where it is most prevalent—also have the highest number of reported murders, kidnappings, and violent robberies in the city.

Also increasing the level of violence and threatening national security in Mexico is the diverse crowd involved in trafficking drugs. In the Federal District a new trend is the recruitment of indigents to sell drugs and to act as “halcones,” the eyes and ears of those individuals selling. The benefit of using these individuals is that they know the ins and outs of neighborhood activity given they are on the street all the time.

If the recruitment of homeless individuals is new, the

recruitment of young adults has been continuous. Adolescents and teenagers alike are recruited by organized crime groups to sell drugs and to act as lookouts. The hope of recruiting children is that they will become addicts who have no choice but to work for the cartels. And what other choice do they really have to get ahead? If these children worked normal jobs, they would make about 52 pesos a day or \$4.04. As a drug cartel employee they can make up to 350 pesos per day or \$27.00.

A Focus on Youth:

Carlos Cruz, the director of an organization that helps young people in Mexico, has found that the youths joining criminal organizations are younger every day. A decade ago new recruits were between 20 and 35 years old. Now they are range between 12 and 15. Proof of this is the recent arrest of a 14-year-old Beltran Leyva hitman known by the media as “El Ponchis.” This individual started working as a hitman at the age of 11 and stated that he was commonly given drugs and alcohol so that he would become an addict.

According to Cruz, the economic crisis has also made recruitment easier, noting that due to economic necessity many parents look the other way when their children join these groups. However, Clark Alfaro of the Binational Center for Human Rights makes an important point in stating that these parents must face the fact that these young people are not recruited to engage in money-laundering activities or to establish relations with business people or politicians. They compose the base of the pyramid and do the dirty work that includes selling and transporting drugs and, lately, the work of hitmen.

They Are Born Surrounded by Violence

Luis Astorga, the author of *El Siglo de las Drogas: El narcotrafico, del Porfiriato al Nuevo Milenio (The Century of Drugs: Drug Trafficking from the Time of Porfirio Diaz until the New Millennium)* looks to history to explain the phenomenon of recruitment. Sinaloa, as well as Sonora, Durango, Tamaulipas, and Chihuahua, are the oldest drug-producing and trafficking regions in Mexico. Historically, this type of activity goes back at least 70 years; in reality, drug trafficking is so deeply rooted in these areas that it is seen by the population as a way of life. For this reason, he believes that the probability is greater that a person who shares this cultural affinity with those who recruit will join the ranks of organized crime groups.

Astorga explains this idea with an example: “If I take a child to a ranch in the mountains of Badiguarato, Sinaloa, where for several decades, most of the population has been involved in the

Continued: Recruitment of Youths by Mexican Drug Cartels

drug trade, you can be sure there is a 99% chance that child will become a trafficker.” The tragic thing is that there are more and more ranches, villages, and cities where drug trafficking is part of the culture and where children are brought up surrounded by violence and with stories of the traffickers. New areas involved in this type of activity include communities in Michoacan and Guerrero. These are places, Astorga mentions, where the State has no presence and that have experienced historical social abandonment (referring to government help).

Lost Generation

Examples stated in this article, to include recruitment in the Federal District, a 14-year-old boy working as a hitman for the Beltran Leyva Cartel, and the propensity of children in Sinaloa to be pulled into the world of drug trafficking, make it clear that children are targeted to work for cartels. However, the question then stands, how many children are actually employed by these groups? The proliferation of 35,000 small drug-selling points (“narco tienditas”) within the country provides some insight, given that each of these sites requires a lookout. Normally, lookouts are the most basic component of the organization, as little training is needed. Taking into consideration that a child sitting around on his bike in a neighborhood is much less conspicuous than a grown man or woman, children are obviously perfect to fill these roles.

Turning this situation around is imperative; otherwise future generations, with no better options, could be destined for a life of crime. Children mimic what they see and hear, and right now Los Zetas, murders, and drug trafficking are all the rage. So that is what they talk about and that is what they mimic.

Drug trafficking in Mexico and the violence associated with it are problems that are being addressed. The immediate response has been implemented, but this immediate response has failed to encompass the new and growing problem regarding an expanding cartel work force and a new generation of drug abusers. Possible reconciliations for this trend could include basic programs like D.A.R.E. (drug abuse resistance education) and more employment opportunities for school-age children. Starting with basic and moving on to broader measures is the best approach to take, considering the massive amounts of work that need to be done. However, if basic issues regarding drug consumption and child labor associated with organized crime are not addressed, future generations stand to continue the trend that has already been set in place and the violence and instability associated with organized crime will flourish. **End FMSO Commentary (Fiegel and Gonzalez)**

FMSO Commentary: During the Vicente Fox Administration from December 2000 to November 2006, what at that time were simply referred to as Mexican drug cartels began their slow transition into what they are referred to today: transnational criminal organizations (TCO). What started as illicit businesses trafficking illegal narcotics have now become billion-dollar enterprises run like Fortune 500 companies, many (if not all) enticing professionals to leave well paying careers, allured by the greed of obtaining a piece of the global illicit trafficking industry that is approaching profits of \$1 trillion annually.

Fueled by an insatiable appetite for more and more money, these organizations have diversified into unstaked territory, as well as absorbing and controlling by force other illicit markets, to include weapons trafficking, kidnapping, human smuggling and trafficking, prostitution, extortion, vehicle theft, pirate merchandise, and money laundering. These groups even start small in individual municipalities by selling contraband cigarettes and liquor, illegally manufactured CDs/DVDs and software, and pirated name brand clothing, shoes, backpacks, purses, hats, and other apparel. From this smallest scale the TCOs have recently outmaneuvered even the Mexican government on the largest level by stealing mass quantities of fuel from the state-owned Petróleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, petroleum company. Not only do the criminal organizations fuel their own vehicles for free from these illegal taps, but they also sell fuel siphoned from the pipelines at below-market prices, even going as far as stealing crude oil and relabeling it via front companies for sale to refineries in the U.S. According to a report by the Office of the Mexican Attorney General (PGR), from October 2007 to March 2009 Pemex employees collaborated with the Gulf Cartel and

Changing Financial Strategies of Mexican TCOs

18 March 2012



Sources: “Las mafias desangran Pemex y abren boquete en sus finanzas (Mexican ‘Mafias’ Bleed Out Pemex and Open a Hole in Their Finances),” Proceso, Edition 1846, 18 March 2012. <http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=301268>

PEMEX logo via www.pemex.com

Mexican ‘Mafias’ Bleed Out Pemex and Open a Hole in Their Finances

One of the many flanks that were discovered by the Felipe Calderón Administration in his militarized fight against Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs, referred to as “mafias” in the title) was that of the strategic installations of Petróleos Mexicanos, or Pemex (a Mexican state-owned petroleum company). A number of reports from Pemex-Refining show how a problem that remained constant over previous PRI (“Partido Revolucionario Institucional”; Mexico’s center/center-left leaning Institutional Revolutionary Party) presidential administrations that increased during the Fox administration, skyrocketed when the cartels sought to make the most from “their territories” by diversifying. They began to extract hydrocarbons from Pemex pipelines, stealing fuel tankers and selling fuels to U.S. refineries, until it opened a hole in the finances of state-owned Pemex.

Felipe Calderón’s war on drugs, launched without a clear strategy, to include the protection of the country’s economy, led to the diversification of organized crime activities. This even reached a strategic area and one of national security: Pemex, the mainstay of the country.

At the end of the PRI era, fuel theft grew large enough to appear in statistics, and during the Vicente Fox Administration became a constant problem, and now in the Felipe Calderón Administration, the situation has deteriorated to the point where organized crime has been involved in the theft of crude oil with the end state of selling it abroad to foreigners.

Pemex documents—of which Proceso obtained a copy—shows how from 1998 to the present, that there has been a constant increase in the theft of fuel traveling through the bowels of the country through their pipelines and on the highways in fuel tankers, as well as the illegal extraction of gas and condensates. The theft of crude oil was also not spared.

Continued: Mexican 'Mafias' Bleed Out Pemex and Open a Hole in Their Finances

Los Zetas to steal more than \$(MXN) 1.448 billion (equivalent to approximately \$(USD) 110 million) worth of crude oil from the Burgos petroleum basin in northern Tamaulipas, which was then sold to U.S. companies. The PGR also indicated that it believes this type of activity has been going on since 1998, raising theoretical profits to over \$(USD) 1 billion. Operating with increasing levels of impunity, as well as organized crime profits far surpassing the rates of any public or private industry, not only can we expect to see levels of corruption increase, but we should also watch for further ventures by these organized criminals to co-opt those in other legitimate business industry to additionally encourage this ravenous behavior. End FMSO Commentary (Scheidel)


From this data, it can be established that criminal groups steal large quantities of hydrocarbons and sell them illegally in zones most heavily controlled by the drug cartels, although it is not reported which groups are committing these criminal acts.

How Do Belarusians Perceive Democracy?

By Alena Daneika, Wider Europe

“Pollsters conclude that Belarusian authorities rely on citizens being passive, and not active.”

<http://FMSO.leavenworth.army.mil/International.html>



FMSO Commentary: In its February 20th issue, the Colombian weekly magazine *Semana* published a brief article titled ‘Se quedaron sin luz’ (Lights Out [for the Shining Path]) about the capture of one of the last leaders of the famed communist revolutionary insurgent group Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path. The article provides a good summary of the history of that once powerful, then badly mauled insurgency. The original can be read at <http://www.semana.com/mundo/quedaron-luz/172339-3.aspx>. Shortly after this article was published, the Peruvian government picked up other, lesser Sendero leaders. See, for instance, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-17253453>.

Semana’s quick review highlights a few aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency that may have become under-esteemed by interpretations of recent experiences in Central Asia. The removal of the insurgency’s leadership can be a near-fatal blow, depending on the group’s command structure and ability to regenerate leadership. The Shining Path’s ability to replace leaders was not great. With second-tier leaders and isolated to remote geographies, an insurgency can indeed survive for a long time, especially if it counts on some outside support and has access to financial flows, probably from illicit trade. Still, it probably will not be able to project much power, and, if the government remains sufficiently resolute, will eventually succumb. Although it can be argued that the struggle of the Shining Path is exemplary of inherently protracted conflict, it can also be argued that the effective life of the Shining Path as a challenge to the Peruvian state lasted only as long as the periods of ineffective government response. Once the government applied the right prescriptions, and especially when it learned to neutralize the insurgency’s few leaders, the effective power of the Shining Path was short-lived. End FMSO Commentary (Demarest)

Lights Out for the Shining Path?

18 February 2012



Sources: “Se quedaron sin luz” (Lights Out), *Semana*. com, 18 February 2012. <http://www.semana.com/mundo/quedaron-luz/172339-3.aspx>

Florindo Eleuterio Flores Halas, known as Comrade Artemio, via <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/narc/rewards/144800.htm>

Se quedaron sin luz (Lights Out)

With the capture of Comrade Artemio, their last leader, the Shining Path guerrilla group has apparently been defeated after 20 years of death throes.

“I’m a commando, and I want to fight against Chile,” ranted a badly wounded Florindo Eleuterio Flores Halas, known as Comrade Artemio, while being transported to Lima by military helicopter. It was a delirious end for the man who prided himself on being the only founding leader of the Shining Path guerrilla group still at liberty. His hefty resume includes such experience as leading one of the two remaining Shining Path factions for almost twenty years; attacking law enforcement in the communities of Puente Chino, Pumahuasi, Santa Cruz, Angashyacu, and Tocache; producing 4.8 tons of cocaine a year; and maintaining a strategic alliance with the drug trafficker “Braulio.”

In a way, it was a foreseen end: Artemio issued a statement last December acknowledging the defeat of his guerrilla group and proposing a negotiated solution to the conflict, a proposal emphatically rejected by the government. Instead, after an exhaustive intelligence effort, the Peruvian Army attacked his encampment in the jungles of Alto Huallaga, an Amazonian province in the north of the country. They pursued him for four days until serious wounds to his arms and hip prevented him from continuing to flee. He will now be put on trial for over thirty crimes, including drug trafficking and terrorism, which carries a life sentence.

This blow, the most resounding since President Ollanta Humala took office, sent the people of Peru a message of peace, and they received it with jubilation. “Peru has won, and we can declare that the terrorists in Alto Huallaga have been defeated,” said the president.

Artemio’s defeat seems to have been the mortal wound for the outlawed group that terrorized the nation and left some 60,000 dead between 1980 and 1992, but Shining Path’s decline has actually stretched over the last twenty years. Following the 1992 capture of leader Abimael Guzmán, today serving a life sentence in a maximum security prison, this guerrilla group faced problems it was never able to solve.


Shining Path never managed to form a new core leadership to direct their subversive activities. The group also lost its once strong campesino support, and some campesinos

Continued: Lights Out

even took up arms themselves to fight the guerrillas when the violence became unbearable. Furthermore, government incentives to demobilize dramatically reduced the size of the guerrilla force, which once numbered more than 6,000 combatants. Not even assistance from the FARC, which according to newspaper reports offered Shining Path logistical and military training, could restore the power they once enjoyed.

Their increasingly weak position allowed for the capture of their key leaders, most notably Feliciano in 1999, Comrade Irma in 2004, and Epifanio Espiritu in 2007. And so, the group's momentum, influence, and power diminished, and Shining Path began to dim.

Although Artemio's capture extinguished Shining Path's guiding light and meant the eradication of danger in Alto Huallaga, Peru must continue its fight against the drug trade, which is the guerrilla group's primary source of funding, especially in the coca-producing region of Apurímac-Ene. There, the last and most aggressive remnant of Shining Path operates under the command of Comrade José. In contrast to Artemio, José's faction, which survives with close to 300 combatants, is strongly opposed to a negotiated solution to the conflict and ruthlessly protects its territory and lucrative business. Putting a tombstone on this Peruvian movement may, therefore, be a bit premature.



Geoff Demarest's *Winning Insurgent War* is about a broader set of conflicts than just 'insurgency.' In its 144 sections, Geoff Demarest raises new and overlooked concepts related to modern conflict in a provocative manner designed to stir up debate and critical thinking. As Geoff Demarest puts it: "I hope that some of the ideas in it will be contagious."

FMSO Commentary: This commentary, from Singapore's highest circulation daily newspaper, touches upon the hidden tensions between Russia and China. In spite of the historical grievances and colliding economic and geopolitical interests between the two countries, Russia and China in recent years have been able to avoid major political disputes and cooperate within the framework of their "strategic partnership." Nevertheless, many points of contention remain unresolved, and some of them are becoming increasingly more salient as China's rise has gradually changed the power balance between the two countries.

In particular, trade and demographic imbalances are two of the most imperative problems for Moscow concerning its relationship with China. On the one hand, Russia fears that China's cheap manufacturing exports will squeeze Russia's industries out of both its domestic and foreign markets; on the other hand, Russia is concerned about Chinese migration into Russia's sparsely populated Far East across its eastern border.

As the author of the article points out in the commentary, Strategy 2020, an official plan for Russia's economic development in the next decade, has identified China as Russia's rival for the first time in two decades. It seems that in order to maintain the trust-based Russia-China "strategic partnership," the two countries will have to find more common interests and improve their dialogue mechanisms. End FMSO Commentary (Du)

Hidden Tensions between Russia and China

9 April 2012



Left: Peace dragon by Aaron Perez [own work], Right: Standing Brown Bear [public domain] via www.clker.com

Source: Vladimir Radyuhin, "Russian Bear Wary of Chinese Dragon," The Straits Times, 9 April 2012.

Russian Bear Wary of Chinese Dragon

MOSCOW: The Russian bear smells danger near its lair. The Chinese dragon is too close - and powerful - for comfort.

Strategy 2020, a voluminous roadmap for Russia's economic development in the next decade written by more than 1,000 experts, sees the giant across the border as a major challenge to its growth.

The plan - prepared for President-elect Vladimir Putin and published last month, ahead of his inauguration next month - warns that China, with its cheaper exports, is threatening to kill off Russia's industries, push them out of their traditional markets and reduce their political weight.

What makes this message even more sensational is that for the first time in two decades, a Russian government paper mentions China in the same breath as 'rival' and 'risks'. The first version of the plan did not contain the China passage.

Relations between the two nations, which share the world's longest land frontier stretching 4,300km, have had their ups and downs, but rarely have they ever been as close and friendly as today.

When the Russian bear was licking its wounds from the collapse of the Soviet Union, China provided solace in the form of cheap food and clothes. In 2001, the giants bonded in a pact against 'hegemony', to keep the American eagle away.

They have since made common cause on most regional and global issues. Russia has supplied China with tens of billions of dollars in weapons, and opened access to Siberia's vast energy and mineral resources. Bilateral trade is expected to soar to nearly US\$100 billion (S\$126 billion) this year, and double again over the next few years.

Moscow and Beijing both extol their trust-based 'strategic partnership', and vow to take it to still-greater heights.

Thus the sudden growl from Russia comes as a surprise. 'The growth of China's economic potential and international standing poses main risks for Russia connected with the rise of new 'centers of power', the Strategy 2020 report said.

Continued: Russian Bear Wary of Chinese Dragon

More competitive manufacturing exports from China will 'further oust' Russian producers from the domestic and foreign markets, it warned. China's push into Central Asia may derail Russia's plans to bring the region back in its fold, it said.

In fact, Russia's fear of China goes much deeper than the report suggests.

It is fuelled by China's overwhelming military strength and the slow but inexorable Chinese migration to Russia driven by demographic imbalances, with 130 million Chinese in three north-east provinces enviously eyeing expanses across the border, home to just six million Russians.

Memories are fresh in Russia of the bloody border clashes with China in the late 1960s. Though they have since resolved the disputes, Beijing still believes vast chunks of Russia's Far East should belong to China as they were 'unfairly seized' by Russia in the 19th century.

The Kremlin's experts do not think, however, that the Chinese threat should rile Russia. On the contrary, they say Moscow should embrace the dragon.

Strategy 2020 argued that Moscow should seize opportunities offered by China's rise to 'radically' speed up its economic growth. As Mr Putin said in an election manifesto: 'We must catch the Chinese wind in the sails of our economy.'

But some experts warn that the current trade pattern drives China's economic growth and depletes Russian resources. It ships oil, timber, metals and other commodities to its neighbor, and imports consumer goods and machinery.

Can Moscow turn this relationship on its head? Maybe it can, but the problem with its leaders is that they do not always practice what they preach.


In 2009, Russia and China signed a nine-year economic cooperation agreement that smacked of colonial-era deals.

The accord assigned Russia to the role of supplier of energy and raw materials to China. It processes them into manufactured goods for export back to Russia.

Academic Alexei Yablokov, a prominent Russian environmentalist, denounced the pact as 'humiliating' for Russia, and said it would reduce eastern Siberia and the Far East to a 'raw material appendage of China'.

Unless the Russian bear can come up with a better strategy to deal with the Chinese dragon, it risks being eaten alive, sometimes literally. Russian state news agency Itar-Tass last year reported officials in the Amur region had seized over 1,000 bear paws from Chinese poachers.

Scott Henderson's groundbreaking work, *The Dark Visitor* analyzes the history, ideology, organization, exploits, and political motivations of the Chinese hacker network. Whenever possible, the information contained herein has been taken directly from the Chinese hacker organization itself or from interviews with individual members.



***FMSO Commentary:** While China and India have shared economic and strategic ties for many years, over the past few decades these ties have been marred by a number of issues. For example, the two countries have engaged in ongoing border disputes which, to this day, are still not completely resolved. Both countries have built up military infrastructure along the borders and within their surrounding regions, such as the Indian Ocean. Additionally, with both countries undergoing significant economic growth, they have been competing for strategic minerals and other resources to help fuel their growth. China and India are the two most populous countries in the world, with a combined total of about 2.5 billion people.*

*Another issue at play is old and emerging bilateral relations that threaten to throw off the balance in Asia. India, whose arch enemy has long been Pakistan, is suspicious of China's strong strategic relations with that country. Meanwhile, India and the United States have enjoyed growing ties since the 1990s, which concerns China, which views the United States as infringing upon its own territories, such as in the South China Sea. **End FMSO Commentary (Hurst)***

Checkmate?: India Commentary on China's Rising Power and Ambition

22 February 2012

Source: Ranjit B Rai, China's Game is for Real, Mail Today E-Paper, April 11, 2012. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2127972/RANJIT-B-RAI-Chinas-game-real.html>



Checkmate by Alan Light [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

China's Game is for Real

With its ingress into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and the strong Sino- Pak alignment, China already dominates South Asia and claims Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin. China also claims riparian control over the upper reaches of India's rivers that originate in Tibet.

China's defence budget has crossed \$ 105 billion and its investments in Bangladesh and Myanmar are rising.

It just delivered two Jianghu frigates (F21& 23) to Myanmar. Therefore no issue in international relations will be more demanding than how nations, especially those in South and South East Asia, relate to the rising might and ambitions of China. The United States sees this as a threat. President Obama recently announced that the US's 'strategic pivot' will move East and be strengthened in this region and the US has stationed Marines in Australia. The stated motive is to protect freedom of navigation in the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea. China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi immediately called on the US to tread carefully on issues related to China's core interests in order to build trust and avoid conflicts. China fears India could join hands with the US, Japan and Australia in what is called the QUAD to contain its rise and ambitions in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

China with the number two position in the world with a GDP of \$ 5.6 trillion and its geography, and expanding maritime power has emerged as a Pacific power, which worries

Continued: China's Game is for Real

Japan and its ally America. The PLA (Navy) is adding long legs with nuclear submarines, long range aircraft, anti ship missiles like DF- 21 and aircraft carriers and space assets, all essential ingredients for big power status, that could challenge the US.

Strategy

Since 2008 the PLA's Navy has moved into the Indian Ocean Region by continuously patrolling off the Horn of Africa with a task force of three warships to combat piracy and has honed its skills in expeditionary roles with operational turn around (OTA) at Salahah in UAE. China has built up and cultivated friendly ports and regimes in the IOR which has been called China's 'Necklace of Pearls', to surround India, as pearls can be added or removed at will.

The Chinese play a board game of patience called 'weiqi' (igo in Japanese, baduk in Korean), a game that is rich in strategy, and ends when the opponent is surrounded. It originated in China more than 2,000 years ago. Weiqi is unlike chess at which Indians excel, which has a definitive result in 'Check Mate'. Weiqi is akin to how 'Papa Shark' teaches 'Baby Shark' to keep encircling the prey till the prey flounders. That is how China's ' Pearls' to contain India originate.

China has invested in Gwadar in Pakistan, and Hambantota in Sri Lanka where a spanking new commercial port and airport are ready for commissioning. China has funded pipelines, ports and roads in Myanmar and Bangladesh. Soon after Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Seychelles, on the last leg of his eight- nation African tour last year, China's navy was granted OTAs in Seychelles. US warships now call at Port Victoria more often and a PC- 3 operates from there as do Indian Dornier- 228 aircraft from time to time.

These moves are significant as Seychelles is distant from the area of piracy but can be used by China as a spring board for exploration of the seabed for nodules granted to China by the International Seabed Authority (ISA), as provided in UNCLOS(1982).

China inaugurated an embassy in Maldives last year when Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh was attending SAARC at Male.

The then Foreign Minister and current President of Maldives Md Waheed Hassan Manik who ousted Md Nassem (through a coup) agreed to be the chief guest even though the chancery building was incomplete.

The recent change of guard in the strategically located islands of Maldives near Diego Garcia affords China opportunities to execute deft moves of weiqi to pierce what Chinese analysts call ' India's Iron Curtain of Influence' built over time to gain influence in the Indian Ocean islands and rim countries.

Exigency

The curtain is so called as China suspects India's ' Look East policy' is tailored against China and calls the Andamans an iron chain. China knows India has provided security assistance to Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius which also benefited from the very special Double Taxation Avoidance Treaty (DTAT).

To face the unlikely disruption in the Malacca Straits passage, called China's ' Malacca Dilemma', China, which depends on imports of oil and gas, would use the land route through Pakistan to Western China — called the Karakoram highway— which is being strengthened. China is also investing in Iran, US's arch enemy, to add pearls where India plans to build Chahbahar port, next to Gwadar, for access to Afghanistan. China has offered to fund the Kra Canal through the narrows of Thailand to avoid Malacca and negotiated a transshipment route for tankers from East to West through the narrows of Malaysia, which will be economically viable if oil price exceeds \$ 170 per barrel.

India

China knows it needs oceanic space to expand its teeth in the Indian Ocean, as much to see its rising competitor India does not dominate it, as to retain its influence over the rising South East Asian states and to secure its sea and life lines of communication for trade and energy from the Gulf. Indians have to yet study the game of weiqi so as to not be checkmated.

The External Affairs Minister S M Krishna and Defence Minister AK Antony, during their visits last year, promised assistance and aid to Maldives— where GMR is building an airport— but the actions on the ground have been slow in delivering and China is aware of it. The recent visit of China's Foreign Minister Yang Jeichi to India for talks with S M Krishna, suggesting maritime co- operation, should be analysed in that vein. It should not see China being allowed to bide its time in its game of weiqi.

FMSO Commentary: Serbia's pre-election season promises to stay noteworthy with a head to head race between Serbia's current president and leader of the Democratic Party (DS) Boris Tadić and Tomislav Nikolić, leader of Serbia's Progressive Party (SNS). According to the latest polling numbers, Nikolić narrowly leads the race with 35.8 percent of the vote, while Tadić has garnered 35.7 percent.¹ Nikolić's SNS party is also leading ahead of Tadić's Democratic Party. Yet, these days it is mufti Muamer Zukorlić's bid for Serbia's presidency, and the subsequent indignation over the mufti's political ambitions that is attracting the most attention for the May 2012 elections.

Zukorlić is a Sandžak native, having grown up in Tutin – a town located in the Raška municipality of Serbia. Zukorlić studied in Sarajevo, travelled to Tunisia where he received his bachelor's degree, and went on to earn his master's degree in Lebanon. Following his return, Zukorlić gained notice as an outspoken promoter for Bosniak rights and has become a prominent personality in Serbia's, as well as Bosnia i Hercegovina's (BiH), news media. This has especially been the case since 2007 and the break-up of Serbia's Islamic Community (IZ), when Hamdija Jusufspahić broke away from the Sandžak-based IZ – a move that was allegedly supported by Belgrade's political elite. Ever since, Zukorlić has accused Belgrade of its intention to split Serbia's IZ.

In other words, Zukorlić is not a newcomer to Serbia's political stage. He has, in fact, been quite active, though he often claimed that he had no political ambitions and has avoided answering overtly political questions.

1. "Faktor Plus: Tadić i Nikolić skoro izjednačeni". Polika. Accessed April 9, 2012. <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/Faktor-plus-Tadic-i-Nikolic-skoro-izjednaceni.lt.html>

Islamic President in Serbia?

7 April 2012

Source: "Zukorlić's Candidacy Is Political Marketing." Tanjug, 7 April 2012.



The radical Mufti Muamer Zukorlic in his office by Giuliano Koren via www.giulianokoren.com/bosniaks/

Mufti Zukorlic's Declared Plan to Run for President of Serbia

Belgrade, 7 April (Tanjug) – Mufti Muahmer Zukorlic's declared intention to submit his candidacy for the Serbian presidential election in May comes as no surprise and constitutes an act of personal political marketing, as well as promotion of the political party of his choice, namely the Bosniak Democratic Union, which is headed by Emir Elfic, Tanjug's interviewees say.

Bosniaks say that Zukorlic's announcement "would be tragic if it was not laughable" and that it is "a shame and a disgrace" for the Islamic Community in Serbia and its believers.

Reis ul Ulema [Grand Mufti] Adem Zilkic of the Islamic Community in Serbia [as published; correctly: of Serbia] has said that Zukorlic's declaration of intention to submit a candidacy for the May election is the most flagrant violation of the Constitution of the Islamic Community and is unprecedented in the recent history of secularism. Zilkic invited the imams, professors, to come and reach an agreement together about the unity of the Islamic Community.

"Zukorlic's candidacy is an act whereby he has stepped out of the Islamic Community and stopped being a mufti of Sandzak. This has removed the main reason for the disunity of the Islamic Community in Serbia," Zilkic told Tanjug.

Meho Omerovic, member of the National Assembly and senior official of the Social Democratic Party of Serbia, maintains that Zukorlic's announcement is "a shame and a disgrace" for the Islamic Community and the believers, whom he should be serving.

"This is an unthinkable and scandalous decision! The mufti's sick ambition to be everything, to have everything, has led him, a religious leader, to run for president of

Nevertheless, Zukorlić has met political leaders on a somewhat regular basis, having conferred with late president Zoran Đinđić, as well as, most recently, presidential contender Nikolić, among others. Zukorlić also played a relatively active role in the Bosniak National Council (BNV) and most recently supported the Bosniak Democratic Union (BDZ), whose leader, Emir Elfić, is Zukorlić's brother in law.

In early April 2012 Zukorlić's ambitions became clear after he announced his bid for Serbia's presidency. Many politicians, as well as analysts, are outraged at this move and question the mufti's decision, as described in the article below. Head of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) Rasim Ljajić, for instance, perceived the mufti's bid as an embarrassment, while Safet Softić, the president of the Assembly of the BiH Islamic Community, recalled that in the past other muftis were dismissed for political involvement. Sandžak's IZ is part of BiH's IZ, according to which Zukorlić is under the jurisdiction of BiH's Islamic Community. Belgrade-based mufti Muhamed Jusufspahić, however, has a somewhat different view. He maintains that Serbia is a free country and, therefore, Zukorlić is free to run for president. The views on Zukorlić are obviously split and it remains to be seen how Zukorlić plans to conduct his campaign. **End FMSO Commentary (King-Savic)**

Continued: Mufti Zukorlic's Declared Plan to Run for President of Serbia

Serbia. It is deplorable that this man is bringing shame and disgrace in this way to the Islamic Community and the believers, whom he should be serving," Omerovic said.

Political analyst Djordje Vukadinovic was not surprised by Zukorlic's announcement and said that Zukorlic has so far been acting more like a political leader than a religious one.

Vukadinovic told Tanjug that the fact that Zukorlic is a mufti is not an impediment, either formal or legal, to his candidacy.

Vukadinovic says that the reasons for the candidacy are that Zukorlic wants to give a boost to the political party of his choice in the forthcoming elections, especially the local election in Sandzak, and also to push himself forward, ahead of the other Bosniak leaders in Sandzak, particularly ahead of Rasim Ljajic, as well as to make sure that the Bosniak vote does not go directly to Boris Tadic or Cedomir Jovanovic, but opens scope instead for himself for possible negotiation with Tadic or Tomislav Nikolic ahead of a runoff.

Zivica Tucic and Mirko Djordjevic, analysts of religious affairs, also believe that Zukorlic has only confirmed his political ambitions by announcing his intention to run for president.

Both Tucic and Djordjevic agree that the mufti's candidacy is not in dispute in point of either form or law and that everybody, irrespective of national or religious affiliation, has the right under the Constitution to run for the highest office in the country.

Tucic, however, believes that Zukorlic should first have resigned as mufti, whereas Djordjevic argues that this cannot be an obstacle to his candidacy.

Muamer Bacevac, chairman of the Town Committee of the Sandzak Democratic Party, has said that Zukorlic's announced candidacy for president of Serbia "would be tragic if it was not laughable."

FMSO Commentary: *Veterans in Kazakhstan are a highly respected group; the holidays and related events that commemorate veterans and their service are important occasions and are typically well attended. It may come as a surprise to some, then, that the following article on veterans' affairs in the country reveals a different situation. Funding and benefits for Kazakhstan's veterans are probably not far off from the situation in which other people in the public service field find themselves. Retired teachers, doctors, and other civil servants have not had their pensions or benefits increased with the current cost of living in Kazakhstan. In response to this, unofficial groups have formed to advocate the government for their respective benefits, in this case the "Combat Brotherhood."*

Kazakhstan was not immune to the recent worldwide economic recession; serious problems developed in the banking and real estate sectors, not to mention a rise in unemployment. While the government worked to keep these sectors from crashing, defense spending became a lower priority, and most likely veterans benefits suffered or did not increase as a result. The government of Kazakhstan may not have maliciously ignored veterans, but these issues have arisen nonetheless.

Now that Kazakhstan has managed to get through some of the worst parts of the recession, defense spending could come back to the forefront. The government has also had to deal with a number of similar issues, including housing, health care, and salaries for active duty members of the military, contract soldiers and conscripts alike, much less veterans. It also wants to develop a military-industrial sector capable of competing on an international scale. The Kazakhstan Defense Expo (KADEX) in 2010 appeared to generate some outside interest, with another expo scheduled for 2012. If this continues, veterans groups may have an even tougher time competing for attention and resources.
End FMSO Commentary (Stein)

Veterans Affairs in Kazakhstan

19 March 2012

Source: Severniy, Vladimir. "Ветеран ветерану рознь (Veteran to Veteran Strife)," Megapolis, 19 March 2012. http://megapolis.kz/art/Veteran_veteranu_rozn



Coat of arms military of Kazakhstan by Bingread, (Own work) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Veteran to Veteran Strife

We have just returned from the United States of America, where at the invitation of the "Veterans of Foreign Wars," met with military personnel and veterans of the armed forces, and became acquainted with the work of the Department of Veterans Affairs – said the president of the union "Combat Brotherhood," Sergey Pashevich. The attitude of the state toward the military compared to us is so different that it's terrible.

The U.S. government has a very developed system of assistance to veterans of military service and their families. Much of this aid comes from the Ministry of Veterans Affairs (sic) and the Department of Defense. Veterans are entitled to be buried free of charge with the provision of all military honors for every veteran whose family requests it. – Pashevich.

"I heard that the U.S. Department of Defense provides health care services to veterans. More than four million former military personnel and their families are entitled to comprehensive medical care and they have medical insurance." – Vladimir Severniy

"They have it, but we do not. Our legislation says nothing about free health insurance. Our veterans can be seen in the military hospital at the place of their service. Different from us, they provide health care benefits for retired military personnel and their families regardless of their current residence. Soldiers can also buy goods in grocery stores at prices that are generally lower than other stores; these products are exempt from local and federal taxes. We dream about this (!), (but it is) impossible. – Pashevich.

"The veterans are deprived of many things. I agree. Of the privileges, what do you have to date?" – Severniy.

"We do not pay tax on transportation, real estate, and land. That's all. We work and pay taxes regularly. We have no disability pension, but an allowance not exceeding 200 dollars. Veterans have lost the right to priority housing. At present the prospect of military apartments through the Ministry of Defense is blurred." – Pashevich.

The President of "Combat Brotherhood" Pashevich is sure that current officials do not blush about things said in this article. Perhaps the time will come when our country will understand that to hurt veterans is a major wrongdoing. They are loyal defenders of the Fatherland and the government should assist (them) in every possible way.

FMSO Commentary: *Several incidents of violence (including bombings and a shooting spree) in Kazakhstan in 2011 revealed that the country is no longer immune to terrorism. Some sources in Western media (particularly in the United States) quickly blamed radical religious groups for carrying out the attacks. While it was eventually revealed that those behind the violence were influenced by extremism, the connections with international terrorist groups appear to be tenuous at best, as the following article explains.*

On October 31, 2011, two bombs went off in the western city of Atyrau, Kazakhstan, killing one (the bomb detonated prematurely and killed its handler) and causing minor injuries to residents of a nearby apartment building. A terrorist group, Jund al-Khalifah (Soldiers of the Caliphate), claimed responsibility a few days after the attack. Around this time it was also revealed that the group had warned the government of Kazakhstan through a video a week before the bombing to repeal a law that banned women from wearing a hijab. The law in question required religious groups to reregister with the government, and mentioned nothing of the hijab, leaving analysts questioning the real motives of the group. Soldiers of the Caliphate has now also claimed responsibility for the March shooting in Toulouse, France.

Political analysts and journalists in Kazakhstan questioned the existence of the group and its alleged ties with other terrorist groups in the region, although they admitted the men conducting the attacks were influenced by extremist ideology. The analysis in this article is largely similar; Soldiers of the Caliphate is probably more of an associate group that claims credit for terrorist attacks while the real culprits go unnoticed. People in Kazakhstan who practice a strict version of Islam, namely Wahhabism, have little to no political

The Threat of Terrorism in Kazakhstan

Source: Bakhtigareev, Ruslan. “«Солдаты» виртуальные, угроза реальная (Virtual «Soldiers», Realistic Threat),” *Vremya (Time)*, 7 April 2012. <http://www.time.kz/index.php?module=news&newsid=26739>

7 April 2012



Members of the Jund al Khalifah, from their latest videotape (26 Oct. 2011). Image from the SITE Intelligence Group. <http://news.siteintelgroup.com>

«Солдаты» виртуальные, угроза реальная (Virtual «Soldiers», Realistic Threat)

The Islamist group “Jund al-Khalifah (Soldiers of the Caliphate),” operating in Kazakhstan, has claimed responsibility for the killing of French soldiers and an attack on a Jewish school in Toulouse, as reported a few days ago by the BBC Russian Service.

According to the BBC, “Soldiers of the Caliphate,” said that Mohamed Merah was one of their fighters. Merah is the French terrorist who from March 11-19, 2012 conducted two attacks on French soldiers and one at a Jewish school. Seven people were killed and two were seriously injured. Merah was killed in a shootout with police.

What does this mean for the international image of our country? – “The fact that our country appears to be an exporter of terrorists for certain groups is already not a secret” – said political analyst Marat Shibutov. “It must be understood, Kazakhstan is not a terrorist state. A terrorist country, is a country that supports terrorism. Regarding the “Soldiers of the Caliphate,” that Merah is a member, I think this is nonsense. In my opinion, “Soldiers of the Caliphate is a virtual organization. They just act like a public relations terrorist organization. They credit themselves with responsibility for high-profile terrorist attacks, because they are impossible to find. Some commit acts of terrorism, while others take responsibility for them. Then, the attention of intelligence services is distracted.”

Do not believe in the reality of the terrorist groups (according to) political analyst

Continued: Virtual «Soldiers», Realistic Threat

ambitions. Their goals are to encourage people to be more devout Muslims and believe they can bide their time until their ideology permeates society. They do not feel a need to accomplish their goals through political means. While terrorism in Kazakhstan should continue to be closely watched, perhaps more attention should also be put on analysis closest to the source. End FMSO Commentary (Stein)

Erlan Karin. “I do not believe in their existence,” – he said. – “Of course, I remember that prosecutors and intelligence agencies of Kazakhstan confirmed the activities of this organization, but I doubt it. The activities of terrorist organizations require a lot of resources – organizational and material. “Soldiers of the Caliphate” claimed responsibility for the attacks in Kazakhstan and now their people allegedly carried out attacks in France. It turns out that this is an international organization, but this is not believable.”

The colleague of Karin, Dosym Satpayev: “To verify the authenticity of such statements is difficult; whether this is the main organization or they simply attached themselves (to a terrorist group). On the other hand, it is no secret that citizens of Kazakhstan are involved in the activities of terrorist groups in Russia (Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia) and fought on the side of the Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. We cannot exclude the possibility that in the future our citizens will be actively involved in an international terrorist organization.”

The Kazakhstan-Russia Axis: Shaping CSTO Transformation

By Roger N. McDermott

Senior International Fellow,
Foreign Military Studies Office

United Kingdom



“Viewed from Kazakhstan’s perspective, the need to transcend the symbolism of the CSTO’s collective defense theme and promote ways in which it might meet real transnational and emerging security challenges is both real and urgent..”

<http://FMSO.leavenworth.army.mil/International.html>

FMSO Commentary: *The relationship between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan has been strained since the two countries gained independence, and during the past few years relations have deteriorated even further. The most significant issue between the two has been construction of the Rogun Dam. The dam had originally been a Soviet project whose construction began in the 1970s. The goal was to develop the hydroelectric sector of the then Tajik Soviet Republic, without harming the Uzbek Republic's agricultural industry, which relied on water flowing downriver (from Tajikistan to Uzbekistan) during specific times of the year for irrigation. Construction halted as money ran out during Soviet rule, and the government of Tajikistan has tried to get it started again. Control over the operation of dams and water flow was under a single government (the Soviet Union), but now has to be coordinated between the two governments, which has led to contention, among other issues. The government of Uzbekistan does not want Rogun to be built, as it could interfere with the country's irrigation during planting season.*

The following article is a statement from the government of Tajikistan, published through a Tajik news website. While it may have a bias of its own, it does bring up some good points that could lead to serious problems, including a conflict. There is always a possibility that conflict could happen between the governments of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. However, most past conflicts in Central Asia were related to an internal dispute over resources or positions of power. Disputes between regional groups and the government were at the core conflicts in Tajikistan, dating back to the Tajik Civil War (1992-97). This was part of the reason for the fall 2010 fighting between Tajik government security forces and militants in the Rasht District.

Determining the Possibility of Conflict in Tajikistan



3 April 2012

Source: “Узбекистан требует отдать часть территории Таджикистана (Uzbekistan Demands That Tajikistan Hand Over a Part of Its Territory),” Avesta, 3 April 2012. <http://www.avesta.tj/government/11745-uzbekistan-trebuat-otdat-chast-territorii-tadzhikistana.html>

Map of Farkhad Dam based on country map from Planiglobe.com. [CC-BY-SA 2.5(creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5)]

Узбекистан требует отдать часть территории Таджикистана (Uzbekistan Demands that Tajikistan Hand Over a Part of Its Territory)

The Uzbekistan's leadership has continued the policy of confrontation and the use of economic, transport, communications, and other levers of pressure to compel Tajikistan to take decisions favorable to them. As noted in a press release posted on the official website of the Embassy of Tajikistan in Russia, in 2010 Uzbekistan has carried out a transport blockade of the southern and central regions (of Tajikistan) through delays on the railroad.

From November 17, 2011, to the present day, the Uzbek side blocked the transit of train cars with cargo destined for southern Tajikistan, supposedly because of a “terrorist attack.” (This happened) in the midst of the cold winter and the beginning of planting season, leaving inhabitants of these areas without goods and fuel. Despite numerous requests and suggestions from the Tajik side for assistance in restoring this section of railroad that connects Tajikistan with other CIS countries, Uzbekistan has not started reconstruction work. Additionally, the Uzbek side has been dismantling this section of the railway.

A particular point that occupies Tajik-Uzbek relations are construction plans to build the hydropower project Rogun. Over the past few years, the Uzbek side has used flimsy and unsubstantial claims to prevent the development of this vitally important sector of the economy of Tajikistan.

Many unresolved questions remain on the delineation and demarcation of the Tajik-Uzbek border on remaining contentious areas, in accordance with Article 4 of the Treaty

Continued: Uzbekistan Demands that Tajikistan Hand Over a Part of Its Territory

For Tajikistan it is difficult to determine which issue would build up and boil over into violence. The government of Tajikistan may not be able to hold off conflict or even civil unrest indefinitely, and it has looked for any leverage it can find in the dispute with Uzbekistan. While Russian, China, and even Iran have invested in Tajikistan's economy, none of them has intervened in the dispute. One overlooked aspect that has helped alleviate problems is that much of the population has struggled through fuel, food, and electricity shortages over the past several years, but nothing has happened despite predictions of violence. The older generations that remember the Civil War do not want a repeat of events. The problem, then, is whether or not younger generations think the same way. End FMSO Commentary (Stein)


between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on the "State border." The Uzbek side, contrary to all international norms and sufficient grounds, issued an ultimatum requiring the transfer of ownership of the Farkhad Dam, which means nothing more than an attempt to annex territory of the sovereign state of Tajikistan.

These unilateral actions of the Uzbek authorities serve as proof of the permanent and undeclared embargo of Tajikistan, aimed at destabilizing the socio-political situation in the republic. The current situation will lead to further deterioration of the population of Tajikistan, threatening a humanitarian catastrophe in the country, said in a statement (by the government).

Measuring Progress in Reconstructing Afghanistan

By Christiaan Davids,
Sebastian Rietjens
& Joseph Soeters

Netherlands National Defence Academy



“Nation building and its supporting policy development should no longer occur without a careful cost-benefit analysis.”

<http://FMSO.leavenworth.army.mil/International.html>

FMSO Commentary: Discussions of military reform typically revolve around the issues of technology, doctrine, and force structure, but in the post-Soviet Union armed forces one of the most important, and unglamorous, military reform issues is the availability of military housing for troops and their families. In Soviet times housing was often in short supply, and one benefit of military service was a guarantee of housing (usually in the form of an apartment) during military service and upon retirement. The Republic of Kyrgyzstan, as most other post Soviet Central Asian countries, has continued this practice. Unfortunately, Kyrgyzstan has had much difficulty in acquiring enough housing for retiring personnel. To complicate the matter, in accordance with Kyrgyz law, retired personnel are not required to vacate government housing until they are provided their retirement allotments. The net effect of this practice and Kyrgyz law is that the government-provided housing intended for active duty personnel is being inhabited by retirees waiting for their mandated housing allotment. This situation often forces new personnel and their families to find off-post accommodations at much of their own expense.

The following article discusses a recent Sino-Kyrgyz agreement that provides apartments to Kyrgyz military retirees. This particular agreement is unique because, although Kyrgyzstan is involved with several security cooperation programs, including with Russia and the United States, little effort has gone toward resolving the issue of military retiree housing. The Russian Federation is still struggling with a military housing shortfall of its own, and the U.S. has no security assistance program that would allow for the funding of such a project. In short, Chinese assistance in this matter helps fills a gap that is not being met by other programs.

An additional perceived benefit of Chinese security assistance cooperation is the turnaround time between an agreement being signed and product delivery. The

Kyrgyz Military Housing and the Manas Transit Center

5 April 2012

Source: China to build two 9-storey houses for officers of Kyrgyz Defense Ministry, AKI Press (Kyrgyzstan), 05 April 2012. http://www.akipress.com/en_news.php?id=109451

Kyrgyz Defense Minister Taalibek Omuraliev, poses for photos after a U.S. counterpart meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgystan, March 13, 2012. (DOD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley) via <http://www.flickr.com/photos/secdef/6986576715/>



China to build two 9-storey houses for officers of Kyrgyz Defense Ministry

China plans to build two 9-storey houses with 108 apartments for the military personnel of the Ministry of Defense of Kyrgyzstan. Construction will be completed by August 2013. The Chinese military delegation headed by Deputy Chief of Staff of Foreign Affairs under the Ministry of Defense, Major-General of China arrived in Kyrgyzstan to participate in the ceremony of laying a capsule for the construction of residential buildings, reported the press service of the Ministry of Defense. Minister of Defense of Kyrgyzstan Taalibek Omuraliev met with the Chinese delegation on April 4. He thanked the government and Defense Minister of the National Liberation Army of China for their support and assistance, noting the interest of the Kyrgyz side in the further development of relations. The head of the Chinese military delegation stressed that the leadership of the Liberation Army treats Kyrgyzstan and its population with particular sympathy. He also expressed appreciation for the positive solution to the problem of transit of the Chinese units through the territory of Kyrgyzstan to Tajikistan for their participation in joint military counter-terrorism exercises of the Armed Forces of SCO "Peace Mission-2012". The parties also discussed the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Defense Ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which will be held in Beijing (China) in late April 2012.

Continued: China to build two 9-storey houses for officers of Kyrgyz Defense Ministry


Chinese are well known in Central Asia for quickly delivering after an agreement is inked, often delivering within months. In contrast, major U.S. security assistance agreements require lengthy staffing requirements, routinely resulting in large products and construction projects being delivered/completed years after negotiations begin.

China's construction of retiree housing continues the pattern of increasing Chinese involvement in Kyrgyzstan and the region. China is currently making major infrastructure improvements in Kyrgyzstan through large low interest loans to the Kyrgyz for road construction and improvements. Chinese investment does have some strings attached: Chinese companies must be used for the projects, and, although the following article does not mention it, the apartments will almost certainly be built by a Chinese company. Although Chinese support is likely greatly appreciated, 108 apartments puts only a small dent in the number of retirees waiting for apartments. Like most post-Soviet militaries, Kyrgyz military forces are spread through various ministries, including the Ministry of Defense, National Security Service (KGB successor), Border Service, Ministry of Interior, Customs Service, and Ministry of Emergency Situations, the relevance being that the number of retirees requiring housing is substantially greater than what would be supposed from solely looking at personnel in the Ministry of Defense. Unless the Republic of Kyrgyzstan experiences a substantial windfall of cash for retiree allotments, housing problems will likely continue to plague Kyrgyz civil-military relations for the foreseeable future, as any change in the laws regarding retiree housing would be very unpopular with the Kyrgyz military, and probably would be untenable for the Kyrgyz government.

*Although the U.S. has no predefined security assistance program allowing for the construction of military housing, an agreement concerning the funding of such a project could be struck if it was part of the incentive package for extending the presence of the U.S. Manas Transit Center past 2014. Unfortunately one obstacle to such an idea is the somewhat negative reputation that U.S. DOD-funded construction projects have in post-Soviet Central Asia. Such projects are notorious for huge cost overruns and major quality control problems that have occasionally resulted in the U.S. needing to do some considerable arm twisting of the host nations for them to accept the projects. In order for an agreement of this type to be approved it is likely that the U.S. would need to find a different method of implementing the project, or have limited DOD involvement with any construction project management. **End FMSO Commentary (Bartles)***

The United States Army has been involved in a mountain war for a decade. After all this time, mountain combat remains a stubbornly difficult mission and technology can offer only modest support to the infantry's mission of closing with the enemy or the logistician's mission of getting support forward. This book by Les Grau and Chuck Bartles covers operations and tactics, artillery, and aviation support, reconnaissance, communications, training, and logistics in the mountains.

This book is not United States Army doctrine. Rather, it is offered as an alternate view to a most-challenging military environment.



FMSO Commentary: Here we go again. Earlier this month, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) began its semi-annual campaign to conscript young men (18-27 years old) to serve for one year in the military. One might presume that with all of the government-sponsored patriotic PR, convincing some 155,000 willing Russian men to join the military would be relatively easy. Not quite.

While love for their country remains strong, many Russians still retain a jaundiced view of mandatory military service. Corruption and a lack of accountability within the entire system have made many Russian parents reluctant to have their sons join the military. They fear for their sons' welfare and doubt their ability to find justice should something negative occur. Despite the many recent positive changes within the conscript system, continued negative reports reflecting the military's inability to properly care for draftees have hampered efforts to change Russian public opinion.

*Russia plans to significantly increase defense expenditures over the next decade, with plans to modernize and introduce a variety of new weapon systems into their inventory. As the excerpted article suggests, more of this funding ought to be directed at creating a professional contract system for manning the force. **End FMSO Commentary (Finch)***

Spring Conscript Round-Up

30 March 2012



Source: Aleksandr Chernykh, Ivan Safronov, "The Defense Ministry Is Requesting Response to the Call: the Army Is Increasing the Plan of Recruitment of Conscript Soldiers Owing to Problems With the Contract Personnel," *Kommersant Online*, 30 March 2012.

Russian Soldiers by Kremlin.ru [CC-BY-3.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0>)], via Wikimedia Commons

Минобороны просит откликнуться на призыв (The Defense Ministry Is Requesting Response to the Draft)

Army Raising Spring Draft Quota

For the first time in several years the Russian Federation Defense Ministry has not reduced the number of those drafted for compulsory military service, on the contrary, it has increased the plan for the intake of recruits: almost 20,000 persons more than last fall—155,000 young persons—will fetch up in the army this spring. This is contrary to the Defense Ministry's intentions announced earlier concerning the gradual replacement of conscript servicemen by contract servicemen. Sources in the General Staff explain this by problems with the recruitment of contract personnel.

Colonel-General Vasilii Smirnov, deputy head of the RF General Staff, pointed out on Thursday that the spring draft begins in the Russian Federation on 1 April and announced that in the spring of 2012 the Defense Ministry plans to call up approximately 155,000 citizens for compulsory service. "This number of conscripts is sufficient for manning the armed forces," Mr Smirnov said. Prior to this, the number of conscripts had for the past several years constantly declined: 135,000 young men were dispatched for army service in the fall of 2011.

The Defense Ministry is complaining about the shortage of potential soldiers: *Kommersant's* sources in the defense department say that only 11.3% of the draft contingent is at this time subject to the draft. Approximately 15% of potential conscripts are exempt from service on health grounds and over 51% of students of institutions of higher learning have deferments here, and the number of draft dodgers is roughly 7%. Since there are coming to be fewer young people who may be called up for the armed forces, it was decided more than 10 years ago to recruit contract servicemen to take their place.

The experiment was kicked off in the 1990s, but in 2008, *Kommersant's* Defense Ministry source says, the department was forced to change the system of recruitment of contract personnel "owing to the lack of a desire to serve, the low pay, and inadequate

Continued: The Defense Ministry Is Requesting Response to the Draft

qualifications.” A plan, according to which the servicemen were first to take a course in a training unit and could switch to a higher appointment only after special training, was developed, but the most important thing was that their compensation was increased considerably.


The General Staff planned that by 2017 the number of such servicemen would constitute 425,000. For this the military planned each year, beginning 2012, to increase the number of contract servicemen by 50,000. This matter is handled by the General Staff Main Organization and Mobilization Directorate and the Main Personnel Directorate.

All the more unexpected was General Smirnov’s statement on an increase in the number of conscript soldiers. Kommersant’s General Staff source acknowledges that this decision was made “owing to certain problems with the recruitment of contract servicemen.” “Up to this point the contract serviceman had been an unskilled specialist, who had been suitable only for general fatigues or the servicing of the boiler house,” Kommersant’s source says. “But following the increase in the pay and allowances, the number of those wishing to serve on contract grew. We had to create a maximally stringent multi-level system of candidate screening here.” It was this fact, he said, that was key: many of those wishing to conclude a contract did not fit the strict requirements of the Defense Ministry. Kommersant’s source declined to give the extent of the contract-serviceman shortfall last year.

Rights advocates are surprised by the army’s decision to once again increase the number of conscripts. “Kaliningrad Oblast was unable, despite all the endeavors of the enlistment offices, to meet even the low fall draft plan. There are simply no conscripts, we are in a demographic hole,” Mariya Bontsler, chairman of the Kaliningrad Oblast Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, says. “The boards have now been forced to call up boys who are sick, it is on this fiction that the draft is maintained. We need to continue regular reform—full transition to contract service.”

Les Grau’s classic *The Other Side of the Mountain*, is the most broadly distributed book on the Afghan theater. Capturing the personal stories and perspectives of Mujahedin fighters during the Soviet Afghan war, Les Grau has provided a blueprint of the belligerents in the current conflict.

It is on General Petraeus’s reading list and in the rucksacks of deploying soldiers.



FMSO Commentary: *As the previous article points out, the Russian military continues to struggle in conscripting a sufficient number of healthy young men into its ranks. To offset some of this shortage women have increasingly been encouraged to join, and today there are approximately 50,000 females serving in various capacities within the Russian military.*

Women played a critical military role in the Great Patriotic War (WW II), performing admirably in both combat and support positions. After the war women played a less prominent role (though the first woman to walk in space was an air force officer), serving mostly in a service support capacity. Since the creation of the Russian military in the early 1990s, many wives of Russian officers, particularly those stationed in remote locations, signed up to serve, often for economic reasons.

Using a multidimensional information approach, Russian political and military authorities continue to foster a positive image regarding military service. Given the demographic challenges facing the country, defense officials are now targeting the female audience. For instance, besides extensive mass media touting the virtues of military service, Russian military authorities recently opened a cadet academy for girls in Moscow, where young women can learn basic military skills, among other subjects.

*The excerpt from the referenced article describes the important role women are now playing in the Russian military. As anyone who has ever visited Russia can attest, women are certainly one of the country's most valuable assets. Attracting a greater number of females into military service may help to solve the military's manpower problem. **End FMSO Commentary (Finch***

Female Attraction

11 March 2012

Source: "Female Officers in Russian and Other Armies: Afterward to Holiday," Murmansk b-port.com, 11 March 2012

Female Russian soldiers by Schekinov Alexey Victorovich (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0) or GFDL (www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html)], via Wikimedia Commons



Женщины-офицеры в российской армии (Female Officers in the Russian Army)

In word and deed the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense is battling against the stereotype that service in the army is “not women’s work”: Nearly 3,000 representatives of the weaker sex are now serving as officers in the Russian Federation Armed Forces (VS), and a year ago there were 1.5 times fewer of them. The number of women wearing the shoulder boards of senior officers - majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels - has more than doubled in the last year, it was reported at the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense on the eve of International Women’s Day.

“Women Ennoble the Army”

According to Russian Federation Ministry of Defense data, nearly 50,000 women in shoulder boards (of which 11,000 hold the rank of “warrant officer”) are currently serving in the army and navy, and nearly as many are in civilian positions. Of this number, 1.5% occupies primary command positions, and the remaining portion of this category of military service members is serving in staff positions and has been activated as specialists in medical and financial services, communications troops, and so forth.

In addition, 1.8% of female officers have higher operational-tactical military training, 31.2% have complete military-specialization training, and 19% have received military training in military departments of civilian institutions of higher learning. Female military service members are also performing military service under a contract in positions as privates and sergeants in nearly all branches and arms of troops, military districts, formations, and military units.

Igor Korotchenko, the chairman of the public council under the Russian Federation

Continued: Female Officers in the Russian Army

Ministry of Defense, stated that “women must have equal rights with men; they cannot be offered only secondary positions; women must also be permitted to serve in combat positions, wherever it is possible.” Moreover, Korotchenko made it clear that a woman must have the right to make a military career and to obtain the rank of general.”

Colonel General (ret) Leonid Ivashov, the former chief of the main directorate of international military cooperation of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and president of the Academy of Geopolitical Sciences, also noted that the weaker sex strengthens the military collectives. “Both in Soviet times and today women in the army handle several very important tasks: they ennoble the army and the military collectives and they remind men that they are men. Today when there is a shortage of draft resources and many young men do not want to join the army, women are solving a critical task in staffing the army,” Ivashov stated.

“‘First Ladies’ of the Ministry of Defense”

During the 3.5 years of radical military reform, the management apparatus of the Russian military agency has been completely changed. Its image has become more “womanly”: While for three years only one woman was among the agency’s leaders - Deputy Minister of Defense for Financial and Economic Work Lyubov Kudelina (Vera Chistova replaced her in 2009), currently nearly 50 women are in high positions there. Most of them worked previously in structures of the Federal Tax Service (prior to his appointment as the head of the Ministry of Defense, Anatoliy Serdyukov headed this very agency).

Igor Korotchenko pointed out: “Today female professionals are in positions as department chiefs, where they must ensure transparency chiefly in financial flows and fight against corruption.”

Dr. Les Grau’s article “The Delafield Commission: Forerunner to FAO Program” is the lead article in the December 2011 edition of The FAO Journal: International Affairs. The issue also includes Karen Kaya’s “Turk Concerns with US Withdrawal from Iraq” as well as “Southeast Asia: ‘Indo’ or China’?” by Ivan Welch



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FAO HISTORY

Will the original FAO please stand up?

Inside This Issue ...

The Delafield Commission: Forerunner to FAO
 In-Country Training Report: Paris and Brussels
 The DPMO: New Inroads with Chinese Military
 Winning Without Fighting: Toppling North Korea
 Book Reviews, Proponent news and other Field Reports

A Joint FAO Intro Course?
 OSS Society’s Annual Banquet Report
 Turk Concerns of US’ Iraq Withdrawal
 Southeast Asia: “Indo” or “China”

FMSO Commentary:** The lack of available housing for retired military officers continues to hamper the larger military reform. Despite the many proclamations over the past decade that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) was going to fully resolve this housing backlog, thousands of officers remain on active duty simply due to a lack of retirement housing. As the chief retirement benefit, these officers will not retire until they get the keys to their promised housing. The excerpted article describes economic measures taken by the Kremlin leadership to gain the political support of senior (retired) military officers during the recent presidential campaign. It also explains why the Russian MoD has proposed changes to the regulations regarding the mandatory retirement age. Rather than just forcing these homeless officers into retirement, the MoD wants to allow these officers to remain on active duty until their promised housing is made available. **End FMSO Commentary (Finch)

Lack of Retirement Housing

19 March 2012

Source: Viktor Litovkin, "Aging by Rank — The Defense Ministry Is Correcting Distortions in Personnel Policy," Ogonek Online, 19 March 2012



Vladimir Putin meeting with top officers on the occasion of their promotion to higher positions and military (special) ranks. Photo by Kremlin.ru [CC-BY-3.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/>)], via Wikimedia Commons

Стареющие по званию (Aging by Rank)

Literally over the course of a month several interesting events took place one right after the other.

First, postal remittances in the amount of 4,000 rubles came to all retired generals and admirals on the eve of the "Defenders of the Fatherland Day" holiday. The bewilderment of the recipients of this money was dispelled rather quickly: Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov had decided to patronize their prizes from his own, personal award fund.

Then almost 4,000 retired Moscow generals and admirals were invited to the military commissariats where they were on the rolls and were asked to sign a contract with the Defense Ministry on participation in the Defense Ministry's group of inspectors. It was explained to each that their service in this body would be paid monthly in the amount of 15,000 rubles for a major general and rear admiral, 20,000 rubles for a lieutenant general and vice admiral, and 25,000 rubles for a lieutenant colonel, general army, admiral, and admiral of the fleet.

And finally, a new draft law came to the State Duma last week, which increases the maximum age for service in a combat formation for senior officers, generals, and admirals. Now a lieutenant colonel and captain 2nd-rank may be discharged into the reserves not at age 45 like in the past, but only at age 50; a colonel and captain 1st-rank not at 50, as specified today, but at 55 years; a major general, lieutenant general, rear admiral, and vice admiral may be discharged at 60 years versus today's 55 years; and a colonel general, general army, admiral, admiral of the fleet, and marshal of Russia, if such should appear, may discharged at age 65.

Is there a connection between these various events?

Continued: Aging by Rank

Pre-election Maneuver

One is struck by the fact that all of these organizational measures took place on the eve of 4 March — election day for the president of Russia. And since rumors about the impending bonuses, contracts, and extensions in the period of military service started going around in the Army milieu and among retirees much earlier than this event, interested people were able to note that there was no one in uniform at Bolotnaya, Sakharov, or at other meetings of the non-system opposition.

But if one recalls that starting 1 January of this year, the pay of the Armed Forces' officer corps increased sharply, by two-three times, and the retirees' pensions increased by 1.5-2 times (retired generals and admirals even with a minimum of 30 calendar years of service, which is rare for this category, started to receive not 20,000 rubles a month as before, but a minimum of 37,000-40,000), one could easily guess for whom the retirees as well as the Army and Navy voted in mass numbers on 4 March.

The Time Factor and the Apartment Issue

There is no doubt that this is a good undertaking. But there is one substantial problem: an army must not only meet today's needs, but tomorrow's as well. And this means that calling up 4,000 retirees on a short-term contract (one-year and with a possible, but not obligatory extension) will not solve the problem, for neither in Soviet times nor in the 1990s and 2000s were new methods of troop command and control used, and many of the components that are ordinary for the Army today (communications systems, precision-guided weapons, etc) simply did not exist. Some experts believe that this is why the draft law on increasing the maximum age of military service has been submitted to the State Duma, for it affects the current lieutenant colonels, colonels, captains 2nd-rank and 1st-rank, major generals, and rear admirals who have mastered the modern arsenal and are then able to pass on their experience to their replacements in the combat formation. And they will not retire having just learned to "subjugate" the new science.

However, another motive is also seen in the initiative to increase the maximum age of military service: an attempt to correct the personnel mistake which was made three years ago when the Defense Ministry started fundamental reforms in the Armed Forces and sharply cut the officer component from 350,000 to 150,000.

At the time this radical step was explained by the need to change the "cadre egg into a pyramid". By "egg" is meant the obvious disproportion that had developed in the troops: a minimum of generals and colonels on one pole, a minimum of lieutenants in another, and an enormous number of unpromising captains and majors in the middle. The "pyramid" was envisioned thusly: a minimum number of generals, no more than 500 persons, at the top and tens of thousands of lieutenants at the foundation.

It did not work out. Not only because there were so many lieutenants in the reformed Army that it was necessary to demobilize several whole years' worth of military VUZ graduates, appoint officers to sergeant positions, and generally announce a two to three-year moratorium on acceptances into Defense Ministry higher educational institutions. A much more serious obstacle also arose — the apartment problem became a barrier in the way of Serdyukov's and his team's concept.

By law, an officer cannot be discharged from the Army who has served a minimum of 10 years without providing him with permanent housing. It has not yet been possible to solve this problem fully: as of today, based on various estimates and for various reasons, of 170,000 officers without apartments, there are around 50,000 left. Of these, more than 8,000 are in Moscow, where because of the high price per square meter the Defense Ministry is not buying apartments. And there are no chances in sight that Dmitriy Medvedev's and Vladimir Putin's promises to eliminate this issue by the end of 2012 and then by the end of 2013 will be fulfilled.

And many experts believe that it is this problem that has forced the Defense Ministry leadership to increase the original minimum number of officer positions from 150,000 to 220,000 and now to also propose to the State Duma that the maximum age for military service be raised for senior officers by five years

FMSO Commentary: For centuries, anti-Western rhetoric has been a handy tool for the Russian political leadership. Whether tsar, general secretary, or president, having a large bugaboo along the western flank has helped to consolidate the country. Understandably, some of these fears were well founded. For instance, this year Russia is celebrating the 200th anniversary of Napoleon's ill-fated invasion. History has taught Russians that their Western neighbors have often been their greatest threat.

Over the past decade, viewing the West (particularly NATO and the US) as an enemy has ebbed and flowed. This negative perception reached a high point in August 2008, when Russian forces defeated the NATO/US-trained and equipped Georgian army. The anti-US/NATO sentiment also rose during Russia's recent election season, where the West was charged with trying to foment a 'colored revolution.' Besides the allegations of interfering in Russia's domestic politics, some Russian commentators have also interpreted US/NATO plans to build a ballistic missile defense system as a means to weaken Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent. According to Russian logic, once neutralized, the US/NATO could treat the Kremlin leadership like they did in former Yugoslavia, Iraq or Libya.

How then to interpret the recent decision to allow NATO to use transit facilities in the southern city of Ulyanovsk (birthplace of Vladimir Lenin) to help move supplies in and out of Afghanistan? Having cast NATO as an archenemy, some Russians now fear that NATO will use this supply point as a foothold for a larger expansion. Rhetoric aside, Russian political leaders understand that this decision will not only help the local economy, but also could signal a larger willingness to greater cooperation with this Alliance in bringing stability to Afghanistan.

NATO 'Invasion' of Ulyanovsk 21 March 2012

Source: "Practical to Help the West", Voenno-Promyshlenny Kuryer Online, 21 March 2012.



Map of Ulyanovsk airport based on country map from Planiglobe.com. [CC-BY-SA 2.5(creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5)]

Целесообразно помочь Западу Practical to Help the West (Transit Facilities Being Built in Ulyanovsk to Support NATO Afghan Ops)

At a minimum, a cargo transfer point for the North Atlantic Alliance to use for Afghanistan could be developed in Ulyanovsk, though this is far from the "NATO base" about which many mass media outlets are writing.

Admiral Vladimir Komoyedov, representative of the State Duma Committee on Defense, spoke on this.

"In due course, a protocol message on this issue was provided at a plenary session of the State Duma and the request was sent to the Ministry of Defense," Komoyedov stated. An official response was received from the military department: "The Afghan law enforcement agencies are not capable of independently deterring the extremist pressure and it is presumed to be practical to continue interaction with the United States and other NATO countries on the transit of nonlethal cargoes through Russian territory. In accordance with Russian Federation legislation, cargoes being transported through Russian territory are to be inspected by customs agencies. The cargo transfer point in Ulyanovsk is not a NATO or United States military base."


Assistance in securing transit through Russian territory for the needs of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) contingents is currently being implemented within the

Continued: Transit Facilities Being Built in Ulyanovsk to Support NATO Afghan Ops

Reversing public opinion in Russia, however, may prove to be more challenging. End FMSO Commentary (Finch)

framework of intergovernmental agreements with Germany, France, Italy, the United States, Spain, and Sweden in regard to the airborne transport of military personnel and property. In addition, cargoes of a non-military nature for the needs of ISAF contingents are within the framework of agreements from the Russia-NATO Council summit in Bucharest in April 2008 in respect to rail transit to Afghanistan via Russian territory (in accordance with decisions by the Russian government in March 2008). Moreover, agreements on the advancement of a simplified procedure for rail transit in the reverse direction — from Afghanistan — were formed in November 2010 at a summit of the Russia-NATO Council in Lisbon. A refusal to fulfill the international obligations undertaken by Russia on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1386 in 2001 would undermine the reputation of the Russian Federation as a reliable partner in the security sphere.

This document calls for rendering any assistance to the ISAF that may be necessary to include providing authorization for aircraft passage and transit. Even during the cooling in relations with NATO in 2008, interaction on transit to Afghanistan was not interfered with by Russia, which to a great extent facilitated a pragmatic understanding by NATO as to the necessity of more quickly reestablishing normal relations with Moscow. Meanwhile, the issue of creating a cargo transit point in Ulyanovsk is currently only at the stage of consideration, while notably what we are talking about is a business project.



Tim Thomas's *Recasting the Red Star* describes Russia's culture of military thought through its modernization effort. Adding to his robust library of work on the subject, Tim Thomas illuminates Russia's Defense Ministry reform efforts, the Russian national security strategy take on the operational environment, and a relevant review of the Russian military doctrine.

FMSO Commentary: Like the political leadership in any other country, the current political leadership in Russia believes it must have a strong and robust military to defend against foreign threats. During his recent presidential campaign President-elect Putin stated that Russia would invest 20 trillion rubles (\$667 billion) through 2020 in modernizing its military forces. Besides updating traditional conventional armaments, a portion of this funding will go toward research and development of new weapon systems.

Alongside defending against foreign threats, Russian defense thinking is also predicated upon the belief that a multipolar system of global governance is preferable to the unipolar (US-led) model. To this end Russia will also work to ensure the viability of its strategic nuclear forces. Though impressive, Russian defense expenditures do not compare with those of the U.S. at the conventional level, and, consequently, some Russian military theorists advocate developing an asymmetrical response to counterbalance US conventional military power.

The excerpted article describes a handful of possible areas where Russia could direct its military research. While a few may seem farfetched, some have already been touted as genuine threats. For instance, during the unseasonably warm summer of 2010 there were serious-looking scientific reports in the Russian media that the US had employed 'geographic-weapons' against Russia, raising the temperature and causing fires in the country. Perhaps stemming from their long history of censorship, Russian military theorists also continue to warn of the dangers of information manipulation, and a favorite canard is to claim that the US plans to use high-tech tools to brainwash the Russian population.

Even with the economic, social, and political trauma of the past twenty years, Russia still retains theoretical expertise in researching new weapon systems. On paper, at least, increased defense expenditures might permit the actual development and testing of these innovative armaments. However, these developments are doubtful, should the larger infrastructure of the country remain in such poor condition. **End FMSO Commentary (Finch)**

Russian Super-Weapons

22 March 2012



Source: Roman Kretsul, "Interview with Center for Military Forecasting Director Anatoliy Dmitriyevich Tsyganok; The Warfighting System Is Changing," Vzglyad Online, 22 March 2012.

The DoD Non-Lethal Weapons Program demonstrated its latest system to a group of Marine Corps and DoD personnel. The U.S. ADS system works on the same principals Russia describes as "Infrasonic Weapons using frequencies below 16 hertz." Produced by Sgt. Andrew Milner. Read more: <http://www.dvidshub.net/video/139338/active-denial-system-demo#.T2dWVvU4KkM#ixzz1pZxGyojY>

Tsyganok Elaborates on Serdyukov Statements on New Weapon Development

Defense Ministry head Anatoliy Serdyukov stated on Thursday that a program for creating a weapon based on new physical principles will be developed in Russia. According to him, a program for creating such a weapon after 2020 will be prepared by the end of the year.

"Creation of a weapon based on new physical principles — beam, physical, wave, genetic, psychophysical, and so on — those tasks have been put into implementation of the program for 2011-2020," Serdyukov stated at a conference on questions of accomplishing tasks assigned in pre-election articles of RF President-Elect Vladimir Putin.

We will recall that Putin said the following in one of the pre-election articles: "Military capabilities of countries in outer space, in the sphere of information conflict, and above all in cyberspace will be of major if not decisive importance in determining the nature of armed warfare. And in the more distant future will be the creation of weapons based on new physical principles (beam, geophysical, wave, genetic, psychophysical, and so on). All this along with nuclear weapons will permit obtaining qualitatively new tools for achieving political and strategic objectives. Such weapon systems will be comparable in employment results with nuclear weapons, but more 'acceptable' from a political and military aspect. Thus, the role of a strategic balance of nuclear forces in deterring aggression and chaos will gradually decline."

VZGLYAD turned to Anatoliy Tsyganok, director of the Center for Military Forecasting, with a request to tell about these kinds of weapons in more detail.

[Vzglyad] Anatoliy Dmitriyevich, what would be your comment on the report about creation of new kinds of weapons in the future?

[Tsyganok] Now we have to talk about prospects for creating new kinds of weapons and military equipment. First, there must be new varieties of weapons and military equipment

Continued: Tsyganok Elaborates on Serdyukov Statements on New Weapon Development

of all branches of the Armed Forces in terms of design, in terms of the laws of nature contained in them, and so on. Secondly, the development of scientific knowledge outstrips the improvement of military affairs. Thirdly, the sphere of application of all these technical sciences changes.

It now is believed abroad that man's superior nervous system must be used in creating new kinds of weapons. One has to clearly understand that the weapons that existed in the 19th century are unsuitable in many parameters in the 21st century. While the most important thing in the 20th century was the destruction of equipment, weapons, and ammunition, the system of warfare now is changing. We have a different attitude toward war and military equipment; the desire to preserve it is becoming paramount.

[Vzglyad] How realistic do you find the stated time periods?

[Tsyganok] The minister perhaps is not quite correct when he mentions the period 2020. In about 20-30 years, perhaps in 40, we will use weapons based on other physical principles. But in speaking to the president now, the minister himself does not understand what he is saying. He was told that this must be said, and he said it. He does not understand the essence, he does not know the capabilities. The defense minister can say whatever he likes; all the same, he is not responsible for anything.

[Vzglyad] What main kinds of weapons of the future could you single out?

[Tsyganok] First, kinetic weapons. This is the aggregate of ballistic projectiles which are accelerated to high speeds and destroy the target by mechanical destruction. For example, warheads enter the atmosphere at a speed of 6-7 km/sec.

Secondly, beam weapons. These are directed-energy weapons with deeper penetration into material.

Thirdly, laser weapons. The Americans use laser weapons to destroy missiles, but operate them only on one condition: where a Russian missile, let's assume, is flying, there must be three aircraft.

Electromagnetic weapons which use various types of accelerators. By the way, the first patent on an electromagnetic gun was obtained in 1901. A century already has gone by and we are only developing this subject.

Infrasonic weapons using frequencies below 16 hertz. These are very serious weapons. The effect of an infrasonic weapon still cannot be understood. When it was used to disperse demonstrators, instances were noted where a beam was directed at a person and his temperature rose instantaneously as if he had been shoved into a red-hot frying pan. The duration of emission has not been determined to this day. Even Spetsnaz personnel with their level of

training do not stand it.

The geographic weapon, about which no one has been talking of late, but at one time we held first place in these developments. Why were our submarines looking for troughs in the ocean in the 1950s? The motivation was that if you find this trough and carry out an explosion there, the tectonic plate located there may shift. When Nikita Sergeevich pounded his fist and promised to show what's what in 1959, he was talking specifically about the geographic weapon. Now all those very same things are being called "geomagnetic radiation weapons." What is interesting is that in 1977 the USSR joined the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. Russia has adhered to this convention since 1977, but insofar as I understand, the Americans lately are not doing so and are testing this weapon in Alaska.

[Vzglyad] What kind of weapon would you call the top priority?

[Tsyganok] All directions must be developed. While we are developing precision-guided munitions rather well, the other advanced kinds of weapons — infrasonic, laser, kinetic — either are in development or are not even being developed.

In general I think that destructive, penetrating, and fragmentation weapons will not be employed in 20 years. Perhaps there will be no explosive projectiles at all. Stopping, calmative, and frightening weapons will be employed. Nonlethal weapons now are being used primarily to disperse demonstrations, but I believe they will be employed in combat actions as well in 20 years.

A few years ago a so-called stink weapon was tested against the Taliban in Afghanistan. A psychogenic weapon using a laser was used in Africa: they suggest to you something about God, and write with a laser that God is on high. Can you imagine what goes on in the hearts of aborigines?

By the way, one can judge the difference between Russian and American approaches from what kind of definitions are being given for the concept of nonlethal weapons. Russia defines weapons with nonlethal effect as follows: "Special technical means permitting effectively accomplishing political and peacekeeping missions; effectively participating in local conflicts; and achieving one's goals without inflicting excessive losses on the opposing side, with minimal victims among the civilian population and without significant destruction of material values or doing harm to the environment." But the Americans believe that nonlethal weapons "are created and employed chiefly for disabling personnel or materials while minimizing fatalities and prolonged injuries to personnel, as well as undesirable harm to those around them."

FMSO Commentary: In 2010 Dmitriy Rogozin, then Russia's Representative to NATO, published a biographical account of his political activities in post-Soviet Russia (Yastreby Mira or Peacehawk). In this volume Rogozin not only spells out his political philosophy (i.e., Russia was, is, and will be a great power), but also describes the role he has personally played in shaping this history. In a chapter titled "Vampires," he portrays the Russian perspective as to what occurred in 1992 in the semi-autonomous region of Transnistria (the breakaway territory located on a strip of land between the Dniester River and the eastern Moldovan border to Ukraine; see map).


After first establishing the fact that this region has had close ties to Russia since the time of Catherine the Great, Rogozin describes how the conniving Romanian-backed Moldovan forces attempted to militarily reintegrate this area in early 1992. He recounts how, along with other volunteers from Russia and Ukraine, he helped to initially defend Transnistria against the superior Moldovan forces. According to Rogozin, it was only after much hesitation and indecision that Russian forces (under command of General Alexander Lebed) finally entered the fray, defeating the Moldovan forces and establishing the safety and semi-autonomous nature of this enclave. Twenty years later Russian peacekeeping soldiers, along with forces from Transnistria, continue to protect the peace and independence of the region.

Negotiations to determine the political status of this region have started and stopped repeatedly over the past two decades. Backed by the EU and the US, Moldovan leaders insist that the region formally belongs to Moldova, while the 40% Russian population in Transnistria advocate either independence or closer alignment with Russia. To date, Kremlin leaders have tried to use the unclear political status to their advantage.

Russian Influence in Transnistria

Source: Oleg Bondarenko, "In What Way Is Romania Better Than Russia? Or, Should the Dniester Region Be 'Surrendered,'" Moskovskiy Komsomolets Online, 3 April 2012

2 April 2012



Map of Moldova, including Transnistria [Transdnestria, Dniester region], via www.moldova.org

Russia Should Focus on Developing 'Enclave' in Dniester Region

A thin strip on the left bank of the Dniester remains essentially the only Russian-populated state formation in the post-Soviet space not to be recognized by Russia. Of the half-million inhabitants of the Dniester Moldovan Republic, one-third officially have Russian Federation citizenship but in practice it is difficult to find a family here when they do not have several passports each. Having passports from Russia, Ukraine (officially there are more than 100,000 Ukrainian citizens in the Dniester Moldovan Republic), Moldova, and Romania makes life considerably easier for the inhabitants of the Dniester Region.

There is a crisis in the Dniester Moldovan Republic today — the Dniester Region's gas debt to Russia is in excess of \$3 billion. After no agreement could be reached in the fall of 2011 with former President Smirnov on support for the "pro-Russia candidate" — Supreme Council Chairman Anatoliy Kaminskiy — in the presidential election, the Dniester Region was deprived of Russian funding. The Kremlin-backed Kaminskiy won fewer than 20% of the votes — as against 73.5% for Yevgeniy Shevchuk. And it is not that Shevchuk, a citizen of the Russian Federation and a graduate of the Russian Federation MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Management Academy, is an Orange Putinophobe — he is well known as a supporter of Russia and an admirer of Putin. It is simply that the Kremlin cadre people

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While continuing to subsidize the region's economy, Russia has proposed various forms of greater autonomy for Transnistria—all rejected by the Moldovan government. Besides losing this valuable piece of territory, Kremlin leaders fear that a united Moldova will continue to work toward integration with the West, perhaps even being subsumed by Romania.

*Recent political changes, however, may signal a change to this 'frozen conflict.' Besides Putin's re-election as Russian president in March 2012, Moldova and Transnistria both have recently elected new leaders. Perhaps most significantly, Vice Premier Dmitry Rogozin was appointed last month as Russia's special representative to the region. Given his reputation as nationalist and great-power advocate, combined with his earlier experience defending Russian interests in this region, his appointment could signal greater Russian intransigence regarding Moldovan plans to reintegrate this territory. As the referenced article makes clear, Russia will likely take stronger measures in the near future to ensure its continued influence in this region. **End FMSO Commentary (Finch)***

often back people on the principle of personal devotion and almost always lose as a result.

But now, against this unfortunate background, the election of the first president for two and a half years has taken place in the Moldovan parliament, defying all expectations. He is 63-year-old Nicolae Timofti. More of a figurehead than a president, he is the only compromise figure from the team of the real Moldovan leader, Prime Minister Vladimir Filat. Timofti's election was made possible by yet another group of deputies who split from Voronin's Moldovan Communists.

This event can hardly have been predictable for the Kremlin. Therefore the first thing Moscow does in response is to unfreeze economic aid to the Dniester Region, saving it from economic collapse. Following this, by a decision of President Medvedev, Dmitriy Rogozin, vice premier for the defense industry complex, is appointed to the long-vacant post of special representative for the settlement of the Moldovan-Dniester conflict. Now it only remains to pin hopes on the wisdom of Shevchuk, the new president of the Dniester Moldovan Republic, enabling him to forget about the standoff and remain Russia's friend. The president's new special representative faces difficult talks in a region that is familiar to him.

On Tuesday 3 April the new Dniester Region leader is planning to visit Moscow. It can be assumed with a high degree of probability that Russia's new policy in the region will be discussed at the talks.

What should we do now? Continue the present policy of trying to drag Chisinau into Moscow's Eurasian orbit in exchange for the "surrender" of Tiraspol? (These were the proposals of the "Kozak memorandum," according to which the Dniester Region would become a de facto autonomous region of the "asymmetrical federation" of the Republic of Moldova along with Gagauzia.)

One would like to believe that our country will finally stop swallowing the bait of

"friendship in exchange for territory." The time has come to say clearly: Moldova is hardly likely to join the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization] or become part of the Customs and Eurasian Unions in the foreseeable future. Chisinau is more likely to become increasingly Romanianized, following the path of the plan proposed by Bucharest for the creation of "another Romania" in the shape of a formally independent but effectively affiliated state. This process is already under way — a joint session of the two countries' governments took place in Iasi in Romania on 3 March, at which, in particular, it was decided to create the institution of Romanian "commissioners for Euro-harmonization" in the Foreign Ministry and "advisors for the exchange of experience" in the Moldovan Ministry of Internal Affairs.

We will not get Moldova back, but we could lose the Dniester Region. So it is better not to exchange the Dniester bird in the hand for a Chisinau in the bush, but to continue to build an enclave of Russian interests on the border of Moldova and Ukraine, defending the interests of our fellow citizens on a priority basis without calling into question the strategic presence of the Russian peacekeepers there. With the prospect of gradual recognition of an independent ally, accelerated by the Romanianization of Moldova.

If the poorest EU country — Romania — can afford to try to create an alternative space, "another Romania," next to it, appropriating 100 million euros for its development, why should Russia not consider putting into practice for the Dniester region the experience of the development of Kaliningrad Oblast as an enclave of the Russian Federation? Especially since Dmitriy Rogozin was previously the special representative of the president of the Russian Federation on resolving the question of Kaliningrad transit. And he knows how to talk to Europe.