

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT WATCH



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32 China’s UAV Technology Can Always Use a Little Boost

中國無人機技術較先進 (China’s Unmanned Aircraft Technology is Relatively Advanced) 27 December 2011

“Even if China cannot exfiltrate and decode the programming data on U.S. computer chips, it gains a far higher understanding about how Lockheed designers pursued advances in materials and airframe design to achieve a pre-UCAV (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle) platform.”



36 New Wine in Old Bottles

Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station, 1 January 2012

“...the new leadership in Pyongyang appears as determined as ever to use military threats as a means of extortion”

FMSO Commentary: *The F-35 Lightning II fighter jet, Lockheed Martin's radar-evading jet, was conceived from the start as a global project with participation from many countries. Most of the countries would contribute to the manufacture of the aircraft, as well as purchase it for their own armed forces. The consortium includes the U.S. (the primary customer), England, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Turkey, Australia, Norway and Denmark. Israel and Singapore are considered 'security cooperative participants.'*

An issue that has affected all the international partners in the F-35 project involves access to the computer software codes for the operation of its radar, weapons, flight controls and maintenance. The partners would like to maintain and upgrade their F-35s without U.S. involvement. As the primary customer and main financial backer of the program, the U.S. has stated that 'no country involved in the development of the jets will have access to the software codes' and has indicated that all the software upgrades would be done in the U.S.

Turkey became a member of the F-35 consortium on July 11, 2002 and became involved in the production of the aircraft, but until recently had not been committed to officially purchasing it. On January 5, 2012 the Turkish defense industry authorized the initial purchase of two F-35s, to be delivered in 2015. Turkey has also indicated that it plans to eventually buy 100 of them and is budgeting around 16 billion dollars for this.

*Like other partner nations, Turkey has complained about the U.S. refusal to share the F-35 software code. It would like the U.S. to grant access to the essential codes that would allow the plane's freedom of operation. The article below discusses Turkey's decision to officially purchase two of the F-35 fighter jets, its future plans regarding the project, and its position on the software codes. **End FMSO Commentary (Kaya)***

Turkey Announces Initial Purchase of Two F-35s, Wants Software Codes



13 January 2012

Source: Özgenç, Tolga. "Türkiye ile ABD'nin 'uçuş kodu' pazarlığı ('Flight Code' Negotiations between the U.S. and Turkey)," *Aksam.com.tr* (Evening), 13 January 2012, <http://www.aksam.com.tr/turkiye-ile-abdnin-ucus-kodu-pazarligi-92418h.html>

Ad from the F-35 official site. <http://f35.com>

Türkiye ile ABD'nin 'uçuş kodu' pazarlığı ('Flight Code' Negotiations between the U.S. and Turkey)

The Undersecretary of the Defense Industry Murat Bayar indicated that negotiations with the U.S. regarding the 'flight codes' of the F-35 fighter jets are ongoing, and said, "The flight code of a fighter jet (F-35) does not necessarily mean getting the entire code. It means getting those codes that are the most essential for us to be able to operate the plane independently. That is the part that we want to acquire, and I think we will. Our talks with the U.S. are ongoing."

Bayar evaluated the decisions from the latest Defense Industry Executive Committee meeting to the Anatolian Press, saying that many important decisions had been made and that the decision to purchase two F-35 war planes was extremely strategic for Turkey.

Bayar said that Turkey is part of the consortium to develop F-35s, along with the U.S., England, Italy, Holland, Australia, Canada, Denmark and Norway. "As of today, the Turkish industry has provided about eight million dollars' worth of contributions to the project. The Turkish Air and Space Industry make the F-35's center fuselage. We are currently in the development phase of the project and have started preparing for production. We are taking orders right now. The U.S. had purchased five. Italy and England have also bought a few. Holland and Australia have also started putting in their orders."

Turkey will order two F-35s to be delivered in 2015. This will be officially declared in the consortium's board of directors meeting in March. Bayar said, "Our orders will become official once we declare them. This does not mean that Turkey is buying only two. After 2015, we will order a number of planes each year, according to the decision made by our Executive Committee. Other countries are doing it this way also. We are placing yearly orders."

Continued: “Flight Code” Negotiations between the U.S. and Turkey

Negotiations with the U.S. regarding the flight codes are continuing

Bayar also touched upon the criticism regarding the F-35 codes not being given to Turkey: “We need those codes that are the most essential for us to be able to operate the plane independently. These include software, electronic war programming and support and execution functions. The programming code of a war plane (F-35) does not necessarily mean getting the entire code. If you are not the designer of the plane, there is not much you can do on the programming. You need to obtain as much of it as necessary to independently be able to carry out your missions. That is the part we want to get, and I believe we will. Our negotiations with the U.S. are continuing. The fact that we are placing our orders does not mean that our negotiations are over.”

Bayar said that ordering two planes initially was a strategic decision: “Ordering two F-35s means that, in 2015, we will start using these planes to train our air force pilots. We will place more orders as the F-35 develops and matures. We are talking about a project that is different from a classic plane tender. Since we are a member of the consortium, we can buy the planes in stages. This will give us the opportunity to benefit from the ongoing development of the planes. Last month Japan announced that it will buy 42 F-35s. Israel also wants to buy some. But because they are not part of the consortium, they will have to buy them all at once.”

Bayar said, “The F-35 is a world project, it’s a strategic project and Turkey is one of the partners in this. It is obviously a good plane, because countries with a strong air force are trying to buy it.” Bayar noted that Turkey eventually plans to buy a total of 100 F-35s and is budgeting around 16 billion dollars.

ANKA (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)) will start being mass-produced in two years

The Defense Industry executive committee also decided to move to mass production on the pilotless ANKA planes. “We continue to work on developing ANKA. After the last few tests, we decided that we are ready to start mass production. Our prototypes have reached a certain level. We are ordering a mass production of 10 planes. This will be the first time that Turkey is both designing, developing and mass producing planes of this size. Actually ANKA is one of our first national planes. The mass produced ANKA planes will be completed in two years and start being used by our armed forces. ANKA will be a Turkish brand.”

We looked at performance and cost to decide on which helicopter to buy

Regarding the purchase of light helicopter purchases for the Turkish police, the Executive Committee decided to use the

American Bell Helicopter Textron company. Bayar noted that there was serious competition but that this company was superior to its competitors in two ways.

Bayar said, “The first way that this helicopter is superior [for us] is that this helicopter comes closest to satisfying the needs specified to use by our police forces. The second is that the cost is reasonable. We purchased 15 of them. We looked at performance and cost. When you look at the total value, Bell made us the best offer.”

Bayar also noted that Turkey would develop a light helicopter of its own, and that this would eventually meet the needs of the armed forces, security forces and others.

The RED DIAMOND is the Army’s leading e-journal highlighting current threats in the Operational Environment.

It is produced by the Threats Intelligence Support Activity (U.S. Army TRADOC G-2) and posted at <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/25364306>.



FMSO Commentary: After nearly ten years of negotiations, inspections, reports and resolutions, the international community is still at a deadlock with Iran over its nuclear situation. Negotiations between the two sides have gone nowhere, and the U.S. and Europe have authorized increasingly stringent sanctions against Iran. In return, Iran has threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz, closing the Persian Gulf to tanker traffic and potentially disrupting the flow of Middle East oil to world markets.

Turkey has been trying to restart negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 over Iran's nuclear enrichment program (the P5+1 is the five permanent members of the Security Council: France, the UK, China, Russia, and the U.S., plus Germany). In early January Saeed Jalili, Iran's chief negotiator on nuclear issues, said that Iran was willing to resume negotiations with the P5+1 and that Turkey would be the ideal venue for these negotiations.

Turkey believes that it is uniquely positioned for mediating between the sides, given its increasing trade with Iran, along with its cultural and religious ties. Turkey can provide Iran with a dignified disengagement plan, because if Iran is to make any concessions it will more likely make them to a fellow Muslim-majority state with which it has long and friendly relations (despite the recent tensions surrounding NATO radar facilities in Turkey). Turkey also has over \$8 billion of trade with Iran, giving it some leverage over Tehran. As the host nation to these negotiations, Turkey may be instrumental in preventing a crisis in the Middle East. End FMSO Commentary (Kaya)

Turkey Tries to Avert Mideast Crisis by Hosting Iran Nuclear Talks

9 January 2012

Source: "Müzakereler Türkiye'de Yapılacak (The Talks will be held in Turkey), Sabah.com.tr (Morning), 9 January 2012, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Dunya/2012/01/09/nukleer-muzakereler-turkiyede-yapilacak>.

Ahmet Davutoğlu. Photo by FCO [CC-BY-ND (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0)] via Flickr.com



Müzakereler Türkiye'de Yapılacak (Negotiations will take place in Turkey)

Secretary of State Ahmet Davutoğlu said that nuclear negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran would take place in Turkey. In an interview with Japan's largest economy newspaper Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei), Davutoğlu talked about his recent visit to Iran and his talks with Catherine Ashton, the vice-president and high representative of the European Union for foreign affairs and security policy. He said that they had agreed that negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., England, France, China, Russia, Germany) would take place in Turkey.

The article also touched upon Davutoğlu's comments in which he said, "The sanctions that the U.S. and Europe are enforcing [on Iran] based on their own decisions are not binding for Turkey. Turkey should be exempt from the sanctions." On the topic of Syria, Davutoğlu said regarding the Syrian refugees on the Turkish border, "If the security risk increases, we will bring the issue to the UN."

We will not allow another Cold War

In a speech he gave at the "Turkey in Light of International Developments" conference, Davutoğlu said that Turkey would not allow a new Cold War to emerge in the Middle East: "We do not want new tensions in our region along Sunni-Shia or Arab-Iran lines." He also said that a political earthquake had been taking place from Morocco to Afghanistan, and that the region was on the verge of historic changes. Following his speech, Davutoğlu answered some questions regarding Turkish-Israeli relations, saying that Turkey's position on Israel was clear: "We continue to expect an apology, compensation, and the lifting of the Gaza blockade. Domestic politics is the Israeli public's business. Similarly, we care about fulfilling our political obligations to our own public. If nine of our citizens have been massacred, we will follow this."

The Strait of Hormuz cannot be closed

The U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said on a TV program that if Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, this would be met with U.S. military action. Panetta said, "We have clearly stated that the Strait of Hormuz cannot be closed. This is where we draw the red line." Panetta also said that both diplomatic and economic pressure should be put on Iran. Panetta also warned Israel against unilateral action against Iran. Panetta, who said that Israel should act with the U.S. on the issue of Iran, also reminded that a possible Israeli strike would prompt Iran to strike as well."

***Continued:* What kind of Iraq did the U.S. leave behind?**

alive are the following: The U.S. has established a fortress in the heart of Baghdad. Moreover, Iraq is still not free of the seventh article of the UN, which limits its sovereignty. In the new era, Iraq will have to use diplomatic means to solve its sovereignty problem, and prove to Kuwait and the international community that it is not a 'threat to regional peace.'

Iraq will also be left to face with the fall-out from the invasion. The U.S. presence in Iraq failed to establish a stable and comprehensive order. Instead, it inflamed ethnic-sectarian fault lines and laid the groundwork for long-term conflict. The haphazardly written constitution was not based on national compromise and a long-term democratic order was sacrificed for short term political gains and alliances. The federalism concept mentioned in the constitution was left very vague and this created serious problems regarding the integrity of Iraq. Dealing with these problems will require Iraq to achieve national compromise, radical reforms and constitutional revisions.

A security vacuum will emerge not just because of the U.S. withdrawal, but also because the Iraqi army lacks a central organization. Militarized tribes and Shi'a, Sunni and Kurdish sleeper cells will deepen the internal security problem of Iraq. This makes it urgent for the Iraqi army to quickly re-organize itself around an "Iraqi identity" and transform itself into a professional army.

Competition for Spheres of Influence

The Iraq invasion also created both regional and global competition for spheres of influence. The country turned into a regional conflict zone, costing the country dearly. The U.S. has tried to exert its influence via the Kurds, while Iran viewed Iraq as its 'natural sphere of influence' and followed a sectarian strategy which entailed trying to influence the country via the Shi'a population. It is significant to note that the U.S. invasion laid the groundwork for an increasing Iranian influence in the region. Many Iraqis blamed the U.S. for serving Iraq to the Iranians on a silver platter. In contrast, Turkey has approached Iraq not through the lens of ethnic-sectarian fault lines, but through efforts to promote and enhance Iraqi compromise.


What about El-Maliki?

The fault lines created by the invasion, competition to establish influence over Iraq, and internal systematic weaknesses make it inevitable that Iraq will face conflict. Prime Minister el-Maliki has been using these conflicting dynamics to secure his seat, and this is leading the country into dangerous waters. The country has started asking, "Are we facing a new Saddam?"

The only way that Iraq can overcome these problems is if it can free itself of this competition for spheres of influence and if it can hold Iraqi interests above ethnic-sectarian-political interests.

Tim Thomas's *The Dragon's Quantum Leap* peels back the transformation process and uncovers the digital-age impacts of new modes of Chinese military thinking.

***The Dragon's Quantum Leap* expands the scope of Tim Thomas's two previous works on Chinese information warfare concepts. As with his previous work, Tim Thomas primarily uses all-Chinese source material**



FMSO Commentary: By most accounts, the January 4 statement by Mustafa Abdel Jalil, chairman of Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC), that the country risked sliding into civil war unless something was done to rein in the power of militias was a warning rather than a forecast. The task of convincing those who paid dearest for Qaddafi's overthrow to now put their trust in the hands of an unelected political class (often with ties to the former regime) is certainly a difficult one. Fortunately, Libya does not face the structural difficulties that more divided and complex societies like Iraq or Sudan do.

*A step in the right direction was taken two days later (January 6) with the appointment of Youssef Manqoush (as with Qaddafi/Gaddafi, his last name can also be transliterated Mangoush) as chief of staff to Libya's armed forces. The following article, taken from a prominent and respected Abu Dhabi newspaper, details Manqoush's background and challenges. The article, it is worth noting, does not present the viewpoint of the militias, some of which have voiced objections less to the naming of Manqoush than to the way that major political decisions are being made. The decision-making process is also marginalizing some of the fighters who launched the uprising against Qaddafi in Libya's east: they believe they should form the nucleus of the new army. Provincial militias, still stationed in several strategic parts of Tripoli, have promised to leave the capital once a capable army is in place. **End FMSO Commentary (Winter)***

A New Chief of Staff for Libya's Armed Forces

9 January 2012



Source:
 المنقوش: جيشٌ ليبيٌّ أم حل الميليشيات أولاً
 Manqoush: A Libyan Army or Dissolving the Militias First?
<http://www.alittihad.ae/wajhat-details.php?id=63502>

Chairman of the Libyan Interim National Transitional Council (NTC) Mustafa Abdul Jalil speaking to the media in London, 12 May 2010. Photo by FCO [CC-BY-ND (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0)] via Flickr.com

المنقوش: جيشٌ ليبيٌّ أم حل الميليشيات أولاً؟ (Manqoush: A Libyan Army or Dissolving the Militias First?)

Among the current surprises in Libya is that every time the government takes measures or issues decrees to reorganize the public domain and build new institutions local parties quickly respond. This is indicative of the chaos and the degree to which Libyans are becoming scared of gaps in security. As a result, the National Transitional Council (NTC) chairman himself has warned repeatedly of the possibility of civil war breaking out. On Tuesday, amidst this tense and uncertain context, the NTC announced that retired colonel Youssef Manqoush, the current deputy defense minister, would become Chief of Staff of the Libyan National Army. He was named over more likely candidates, including Khalifa Hiftar, commander of the army's ground forces during the revolution, and Col. Salem Juha, the head of the Misrata Military Council.

The "coalition of Libyan rebels" strongly opposed the appointment of Manqoush. The coalition includes armed groups from areas including Misrata, Benghazi and Zintan. The "Brega Military Council," which includes rebels from the country's east, also opposed the appointment. A commander in the "coalition of Libyan rebels" said the coalition rejects the appointment of someone who was not on the list of six candidates that were proposed to the transitional council. The "Brega Military Council," for its part, nominated Saleh Salem al-Obeidi to lead the army rather than Manqoush.

But who is Manqoush? How was he appointed Chief of Staff of Libya's Army?

Some days before being named army leader, Colonel Yousef Manqoush was promoted to General, the same rank held by his classmate and native of the same city Abdel Fatah Younis, who was killed under mysterious circumstances last year after being recalled from the front in Brega for investigation in Benghazi. Manqoush, who was born in 1950, graduated from the Military Academy in Cairo and then continued his studies in the Soviet Union. He served in the Libyan Army as an officer in the Special Forces, which Younis commanded for various years. In 1999 Manqoush retired from the Army, living in Benghazi until the 17 February Revolution erupted. He was one of the first officers to join the rebellion and became a field commander in the battles of Ajdabiya, Ras Lanouf and Brega. In the last of these he was captured by Qaddafi's Brigades, in April 2011, and remained

Continued: A Libyan Army or Dissolving the Militias First?


imprisoned until Tripoli fell on August 20 and the inmates of the feared “Abu Salim” prison were released.

The chief of staff appointment has been the most controversial since the fall of the Qaddafi regime and the most contested appointment since the early weeks of the revolution and the formation of the National Liberation Army, when General Younis and Colonel Hiftar (who was returning from exile in the United States) both sought to lead the fledgling army. Disagreements resurfaced after the murder of Younis on July 28 2010, for although tens of officers from the national army met in the city of Baida and selected Hiftar to lead the army, the rebels did not recognize his leadership.

Knowing the seriousness and sensitivity of naming a chief of staff for the Libyan armed forces at this stage, the NTC preferred to wait on replacing Maj. Gen. Younis, even if this meant the fledgling army remained without a chief commander for some time. The council’s assessment of the situation has now changed, it seems, and

it believes the time has come to seriously begin building a national army that is able to preserve the peace, protect the nation’s security and prevent the abuses of the militias. As deputy defense minister in Al-Keeb’s government, Col. Manqoush may be just the man to do this, especially since he is not beholden to any of these militias or to any political faction from within or abroad. He is considered a military professional and enjoys the respect of the former army and people from Benghazi as well as from Misrata, where his roots lie.

Except for bits and pieces amidst the large number of militias formed after the fall of Tripoli, the task of forming a national army has yet to take off. The militias refuse to lay down their weapons, dissolve themselves, and leave the capital. They refuse to recognize one another and consider others “illegal,” while threatening security in Tripoli and frightening its residents. Yet without the presence of an army it will be impossible to induce these militias to lay down their weapons and dissolve themselves. How, then, will Manqoush be able to break this vicious circle?



Tim Thomas’s *Decoding the Virtual Dragon* explains how Chinese information warfare (IW) concepts since 2003 fit into the strategic outlook, practices, and activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The book offers IW explanations directly from the pens of Chinese experts. The Chinese authors discuss the application or relation of IW to strategic thought, the transformation plans of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the revolution in military affairs (RMA), and the revolution in knowledge warfare and cognition.

Tim Thomas provides an indispensable source for understanding the fundamentals of Chinese military thought and demonstrating how IW/IO has been integrated into the art of war and strategy.

FMSO Commentary: Who was behind the recent January 6 bombing in Damascus? Both the opposition and the government kicked into high gear immediately after the event, alleging that the other's fingerprints were all over the crime scene. Col. Riyad al-Asaad, the head of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), had promised three days before the bombing that unless the Arab League monitoring mission became more effective within "a few days, or at most within a week" his group would take "a decision which will surprise the regime and the whole world." The FSA, though, was quick to deny complicity in the attack, reiterating that suicide bombings are not part of its tactics. Civilian opposition figures circulated video evidence – unwittingly transmitted live on Syrian state TV – of shenanigans, including evidence being planted and a bizarre scene of a seemingly injured man suddenly storming off in a healthy huff, for reasons that are unclear.

Two weeks prior, on December 23, a deadlier and more sophisticated attack took place in Damascus when two car bombs were detonated inside Syrian security facilities. As with the subsequent attack, the Syrian government blamed it on al-Qaeda. Just days before the bombing Lebanese defense minister Fayez Ghosn had noted that al-Qaeda members were taking sanctuary – under the guise of Syrian opposition members – in the Lebanese town of Arsal, near the Syrian border in the Bekaa Valley. These comments have sparked a political firestorm in Lebanon, generally pitting the anti-Assad "March 14" coalition against the Hizbullah-led government. Continued Syrian tensions threaten to engulf its small and volatile neighbor.

In this context, the following article (from a respected left-wing Lebanese newspaper) explains the denial of involvement in the December 23 bombings by a group aspiring to becoming al-Qaeda's Levantine

Where is al-Qaeda in Syria?

28 December 2011



Source: Abdullah Azzam: The Voice of Al-Qaeda in Syria, <http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/abdullah-azzam-voice-al-qaeda-syria>

Abdullah Azzam Brigades logo via Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), via memri.org

Abdullah Azzam: The Voice of Al-Qaeda in Syria

The Abdullah Azzam Brigades have issued a statement denying their involvement in the twin suicide bombings in Damascus last Friday, pointing the finger at the Syrian regime. The statement is the eighth in an ongoing series that the Brigades have been releasing, entitled "Showing the Ways of the Criminals," which is intended to "expose Hezbollah and its role in preventing al-Qaeda fighters from carrying out attacks against the Israeli occupation."

The statement accuses the Syrian regime of fabricating and extracting false confessions through torture to pin the bombing on al-Qaeda. It also touches on political developments in Syria and Lebanon, condemning the Syrian regime and its "arm" in Lebanon, i.e. Hezbollah, as well as other allies of the regime in the region.

Published on Jihadist websites affiliated with or supporting al-Qaeda and Jihadist Salafism, the statement bore the signature of al-Fajr Media Center. The center releases the statements and achievements of Jihadist groups within al-Qaeda, such as those made by the Abdullah Azzam Brigades and those stamped by Ziyad al-Jarrah Brigades (the Lebanese wing of the Azzam Brigades).

It is possible to draw a number of conclusions from the statement. First, it is a credibly official announcement from the Brigades. This is important as false statements have previously been made, such as those claiming responsibility for rocket attacks on Israel. Second, the statement comes in response to Syrian state media reports implicating al-Qaeda in the bombings. The statement points the finger at the Syrian regime and Hezbollah, and alludes to the "mujahideen in Syria" as if serving as a media spokesperson for them, if not more.

Of course, jihadist groups present in Syria or those that have arrived there recently operate under different names, but the most important of them is without a doubt Jund al-Sham, which has been operating in Syria since before 2000, largely under the media radar.

The communique also addresses the situation in Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camps, such as Ein al-Hilwe near the southern city of Sidon. It accuses Syria and Hezbollah (in addition to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party) of threatening the security and stability of the camp and claims they have used "a series of assassinations, bombings (against UNIFIL), and rocket attacks" against Israel to point an accusatory finger at the camp.


The Brigades also avoid directing blame toward the figures who have been attacking

branch. The group, which calls itself the "Abdullah Azzam Brigades," appears to have cells in various countries, but has been most active in Lebanon (a different "battalion" from the same group claimed an attack on a Japanese oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz in the summer of 2010). For some years the group has regularly published virulent anti-Shia' tracts taking particular aim at Hizbullah and the Assad regime. **End FMSO Commentary (Winter)**

Continued: The Voice of Al-Qaeda in Syria

them in the media the most, like Lebanese Minister of Defense Fayez Ghosn and Minister of the Interior Marwan Charbel, illustrating the marginality of the ministers' respective roles and information (if they have any). As far as Lebanese politics is concerned, the communique focuses on the role of Hezbollah, followed by the commander of the armed forces, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP).

The statement could also be read as an attempt by the Abdullah Azzam Brigades' to distance themselves from any involvement in the bombings in Damascus. This is a signal that al-Qaeda is unwilling to claim responsibility for acts of violence in Syria like it did in Iraq, because these bombings and assassinations (in Syria or Lebanon) will have the effect of strengthening the Syrian regime's argument in the face of its enemies. Even if the regime extracts confessions, the statement suggests that al-Qaeda had nothing to do with the Damascus attacks and raises the possibility that the regime itself is to blame.



Scott Henderson's ground-breaking work, *The Dark Visitor* analyzes the history, ideology, organization, exploits, and political motivations of the Chinese hacker network. Whenever possible, the information contained herein has been taken directly from the Chinese hacker organization itself or from interviews with individual members.

FMSO Commentary: After over two months of fighting both on the ground and in the media, the Houthis and the Salafists of northern Yemen finally reached a ceasefire. Its durability is questionable, though, given the virtual absence of the state in this area and the tense character of political events both in the country and the region as a whole.

The Houthis are focused on immediate concerns, including consolidating their influence in Saada province and expanding where possible. Their recent attempts at expansion have been by force and in areas bordering Saada province from which the government has retreated. This tactic is now being complemented by greater attention to national politics, as evidenced by the recent creation of the Hizb al-Ummah, the new Huthi political party (their own denial of formal linkages notwithstanding). This occurred only days before the “March of Dignity” – partly led by the Houthis – strode into the capital Sanaa after walking hundreds of kilometers from the coastal city of Hudaydah (and echoing a similar march two weeks prior originating from the embattled province of Taiz).

“What do the Houthis want?” This has become one of contemporary Yemen’s most vexing and important questions. From recent behavior it might seem they hope to play a political role in the future Yemen. Yet for many, including opposition members and citizens favoring the full implementation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) plan, the Houthis are acting aggressively at a time when caution and patience are warranted. They are accused of being in cahoots with the Saleh regime, helping it quietly sabotage the transition plan.

The Houthis already control a virtual state-within-the-state, “the Huthi Emirate,” as Yemen’s press has taken to calling Saada Province. They are not only unlikely to put their political future

Huthi-Salafi Fighting Contained in Saada

25 December 2011

Source: Houthis And Salafis Reach Cease Fire Agreement. http://yementimes.com/defaultdet.aspx?SUB_ID=34992



Bab Al-Yaman in Sa'ada city showing the anti-US/Israel Houthi slogans. Houthis made use of lack of state control over the country to expand their influence in north Yemen. YT Photo by Nadia Al-Sakkaf via yementimes.com

Houthis And Salafis Reach Cease Fire Agreement

After intense armed conflict that claimed the lives of over 250 Yemenis since October of 2011, an agreement between Salafis and Houthis in Sa'ada has been orchestrated by a mediation committee. The agreement was reached on Thursday and stipulates a cease fire in the Dammaj area, as well as the removal of all military checkpoints and barriers by both parties. The agreement also calls for neutral armed men from the Bakeel and Hashid tribes to monitor the opening of all roads and ensure that both parties adhere to the peace agreement.

Sa'ada's governor, military commander and a number of tribal sheikhs have guaranteed the protection of both parties to dissuade revenge attempts. Yahya Al-Hajouri, Director of the Salafi Dammaj medical center, demanded that the mediation committee oversee the delivery of food, medicine and fuel to the center, which has been under siege by the area's majority Houthi sect for over three months. "The war was imposed on us by the Houthis, who killed more than 70 men, women and children of the center's students and their families. More than 170 were wounded," he said.

Saleh Murshid Jadban, a member of the mediation committee on behalf of the Salafis, said that only the implementation timeline remains to be resolved. "Several checkpoints have been removed and those remaining will be cleared in the coming few days," said Jadban. He added that around 500 vehicles, each carrying at least 5 men, came from tribal areas and entered Sa'ada on Saturday to prevent clashes.

The Houthis, however, accused those men of siding with the Salafis rather than holding a neutral stance. Saleh Habra, political office spokesperson for the Houthis, demanded that foreigners in Dammaj leave the country and return to their home nations. He added that the Dammaj issue is a political one and not based on religious differences between the Houthis and the Salafis, who have lived side-by-side for the last three decades.

"We confirm that those at the center are an armed militia and not scholars seeking

in the hands of the opposition parties, but also would probably be unsatisfied with whatever (presumably low) electoral results they gain if they decide to enter politics. Incorporating them into a new pluralist Yemeni state will not be easy.

End FMSO Commentary (Winter)


Continued: Houthis And Salafis Reach Cease Fire Agreement

knowledge, as is being claimed. Everyone knows they have weapons and are killing our men,” said Habra. “We have a recording of Al-Hajouri, head of the Dammaj Center, saying that they received 300 weapons from the Special Forces led by Tariq Mohammed Saleh, the president’s nephew.” He added that they gave a copy of this recording to UN Special Advisor on Yemen Jamal Benomar, who visited Sa’ada earlier this month.

The Dammaj District, which includes the Salafi center, is home to around 29 thousand inhabitants, 4,000 of whom are Salafis. The remaining portion of the district’s population are Zaidis, who have also been subjected to the siege imposed by the more powerful Houthis, who entered from outside the district.

The conflict started when a youth Houthi boy of around 13 years of age ventured into the Salafi area of Dammaj with a placard featuring the Houthi slogan “God is great; Death to America; Death to Israel; Damned be the Jews; Victory to Islam.” Salafis who were present physically assaulted the boy, sparking an armed conflict that has lasted for more than three months.

Sa’ada Governorate is heavily controlled by the Houthi sect, which is expanding its influence to neighboring areas of Al-Jawf, Hajja, Amran and portions of coastal areas on the Red Sea, in effect maintaining control over three-and-a-half million Yemenis. According to a local teacher in Hajja, Houthis are creating new armed checkpoints in Hajja in order to further impose their influence.



Tim Thomas’s *Cyber Silhouettes* explores the impact of the Cyber Age on military thinking and operations worldwide.

Cyber Silhouettes presents challenges to the American information operations (IO) expert regarding inadequate current terminology, and the need for reevaluation of “core capabilities and supporting elements.” Tim Thomas further recognizes how cyber processes have allowed criminals and insurgents/terrorists to practice guerilla warfare tactics and illegal or extremist activities online. He contends that the subjective nature of war has changed to include a social context unlike any other time in history.

Tim Thomas provides a unique perspective that will lead to a better understanding of our complex digitized lives, new ideas for US armed forces to consider, and help analysts identify potential danger zones.

FMSO Commentary: The euphoria over a new nation being born was short-lived. Barely six months after South Sudan gained its long fought for independence from Sudan, deep fissures among the population threaten the young country's chance for long-term stability and prosperity. Ethnic conflicts had plagued the region long before it became South Sudan, but any hope that separating from Sudan would unite the people and help quell the violence has proven at best premature and at worst totally unfounded.


The fighting, often escalating retaliatory violence over cattle rustling among tribes in South Sudan's largest state, Jonglei, has grown increasingly deadly. This is in no small part due to the country being awash in weapons from its struggle against Sudan. In the past month alone over one thousand people have died from the Lon Nuer and Murle, two tribes whose animosity for each other runs deep.

Following liberation from their colonial rulers, African governments in areas away from the metropolises would generally continue to allow tribes to govern themselves, impose government rule, or try a mixture of tribal and government rule. South Sudan did not gain its freedom from a European power, but it faces a similar problem to those nations which did, i.e., governing, to include implementing stability and security, in the hinterlands. Clearly, allowing the tribes to settle differences on their own will not work, as whatever mechanisms for peaceful intertribal conflict resolution existed before, if there had been any, are either insufficient or absent, perhaps victims of gun proliferation. Unfortunately, the fledgling government finds itself struggling to impose its rule in this power vacuum in the troubled areas. The military is stretched thin, poorly equipped, and after years of fighting against the Sudanese not a particularly adept peacekeeping

New Nation, Old Conflicts: Ethnic Fighting in South Sudan

2 January 2012

Source: Paterno, Steve. "The Problems of Ethnic Conflict in South Sudan," Sudan Tribune, 2 Jan 2012. <http://www.sudantribune.com/The-Problems-of-ethnic-conflict-in.41149>



South Sudan political map based on South Sudan State map via Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (<http://ceposouthsudan.com>)

The Problems of Ethnic Conflict in South Sudan

In South Sudan, ethnic or inter-ethnic conflict is as an old phenomenon as the rival communities themselves. However, in recent years, the proliferation of modern weaponry in the hands of the civilians increase the level of violence both in scale and intensity. Normally, some of these conflicts are precipitated by an incident involving the murder of a rival group, which often triggers a retaliatory action. In some cases, it does not matter under which circumstances the murder has taken place. Even if it is an accident, a retaliatory response always escalate the violence. Cattle rustling, nonetheless, remains the biggest culprit behind these conflicts. The current case pitting the Lou Nuer on one side and the Murle on the other in Jonglei state underscores this point. Just within the last few months, more than one thousand people from both sides of the conflict are killed. Scores of villages are razed on the ground.

A recent scene of hundreds of thousands of armed Lou Nuer marching across the Jonglei state, attacking the Murle villages has finally caught wider attention. Both the UN peacekeeping force in South Sudan and the South Sudanese military responded by deploying troops in Pibor town; the major Murle town, which is currently under siege by the Lou Nuer. Nonetheless, the efforts of the peacekeeping force and that of South Sudanese military is too little, too late to avert the catastrophe.

force. Thus, Sudan's tribal regions lack both intertribal conflict resolution mechanisms and a sufficiently strong South Sudanese military presence.

UN peacekeepers are trying to supplement the Sudanese forces, but the continued killings are a testament to the difficulty of the problem. In the short term it will probably require additional South Sudanese and other military forces to separate the warring tribes, but with so many intertribal conflicts spread across a wide area, along with the additional need to protect disputed oil rich regions from the Sudanese, it will be difficult to provide enough soldiers to meet all of the new nation's military requirements. As for the long term, it will require intertribal conflict resolution mechanisms, the rule of law imposed by a strong Sudanese government, or a blending of the two. Unfortunately, just like the short-term solution, the long-term solutions, though not impossible, are daunting. South Sudan has already turned to the international community for additional help, without which Africa's newest country risks becoming Africa's newest catastrophe. End FMSO Commentary (Feldman)

Continued: The Problems of Ethnic Conflict in South Sudan

For starters, the number of the UN peacekeeping force in the area is inadequate. The UN effort is also hampered by serious logistical challenges. It only relies on few civilian helicopters for ferrying its troops. The road to the region is treacherous and impassable. According to Lise Grande, the UN Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for South Sudan, the convoy sent for reinforcement “simply didn’t make it. They got stuck in the mud and they couldn’t enter the town.”

The response of South Sudan government is equally pathetic, marred by major challenges and lack of political willingness in addressing the situation. In an interview with BBC, Jonglei governor Kuol Manyang Juuk acknowledged the difficulties facing South Sudan government that the government “can’t work miracles” under the current scenario. South Sudanese Vice President Riek Machar who rushed to the scene with the message of peace is simply scuffed off and ignored by the Lou Nuer armed gangs who continued on with their onslaught. They were eventually able to overwhelm the depleted UN and South Sudanese forces in the process.

Also full of flaws is the instituted South Sudanese disarmament effort. The disarmament effort misses the core of the issue, which has its roots in the tradition of the rivaling groups. Worse yet, the disarmament are always partial, targeting one community at a time. Then the collected weapons are not accounted for, because the military commanders who collected those guns resale them to the next highest bidders for personal profits, whereby those weapons are reused again in the next cycle of killings.

In order to resolve this age-old traditional rivalries, the government must provide uniform security to ensure the safety of the entire citizens of South Sudan so as one community should not feel threatened by the other. A strict law enforcement, plus institutionalization of judiciary system should then be applied, with a particular focus to those who carry on with cattle raiding activities and committing murders with guns. The government must depend on the traditional authorities by empowering them in dealing with issues related to ethnic violence. The fact that the Lou Nuer warriors could not listen to the Vice President Riek Machar demonstrates a serious disconnect between the authorities and civilians—a fact that should have already worry those power in Juba. More importantly, significant emphasize must be placed in education and employment, not only to create a more understandable society, but a prosperous one as well.

FMSO Commentary: Perhaps the situation between oil-rich but landlocked South Sudan and oil-poor but contains-a-pipeline-to-a-port Sudan can be boiled down to a simple economics question, “What is the optimal price for Sudan to charge South Sudan for use of its pipeline?” Set the price too low and Sudan would lose a large amount of revenue. However, set the price too high and South Sudan will balk at using the Sudanese pipeline and might even consider developing an alternate pipeline, in conjunction with foreign investors, which would go through Kenya.

Of course, this economics question can be turned around. What is the price South Sudan is willing to pay to use the pipeline? If it is too low, Sudan will simply refuse and South Sudan will be unable to sell its oil. If it is quite high, South Sudan will lose significant revenue.

In its opening move Sudan set the price to use the pipeline exorbitantly high. South Sudan called it “daylight robbery.” This is where the third party in this economics problem comes in, one which very much looks at the economics as opposed to other issues, such as human rights records or good governance, unless they impact the bottom lines of its companies. That third party is China, and it wants South Sudan’s oil. In fact, since South Sudan provides 5% of China’s oil needs in a globally tight oil market, one could say China needs that oil. Besides being a major consumer of the oil, China has helped develop the oil infrastructure in South Sudan and is a 40% stakeholder in the Sudanese pipeline. These, plus other investments, give China tremendous influence over both countries. Though it is China’s nature not to play out its diplomacy too much in public, it is certainly applying enormous pressure on Sudan and South Sudan behind the scenes.


Having eclipsed American investment in Africa over a year ago, China’s growing African portfolio is a cause of concern because of its willingness to work with the most corrupt and violent governments, including selling them arms, in order to pursue profits. This turn-a-blind-eye-to-poor-governance approach has provided China with significant leverage in certain countries, especially where little or no American investment exists. Thus, Chinese pressure will possibly lead to Sudan and South Sudan agreeing on a price to use the pipeline, and perhaps additional steps to remove tensions between the two countries, not necessarily because China wants peace throughout Africa as something inherently good for the continent, but because peace between these two nations - one with the oil, the other with the pipeline - is good for China’s economic interests. **End FMSO Commentary (Feldman)**

Dragon Diplomacy Based on Economics: Chinese Pressure on Sudan and North Sudan to Keep the Oil Flowing

8 January 2012

Source: Wuoi, Mariar. “China’s Role in North-South Sudan Relations,” Sudan Tribune, 8 Jan 2012. <http://www.sudantribune.com/China-s-role-in-North-South,41210>

Sudan oil pipelines via <http://priceofoil.org>



China’s role in North-South Sudan relations

The governments of South Sudan and Sudan have some unresolved issues left over from divorce that was finalized in July. From border demarcation to oil resources, one would expect South Sudan and Sudan to be at each others throats by now, but that hasn’t been the case at all. Faced with sudden loss of its hard currency earner – oil – Sudan crafted a budget that was filled with glaring shortfalls. To make up for the loss of its share of oil – about 75% worth – Sudan imposed exorbitant transit fees that would allow it to recoup upward of \$2 billion annually.

South Sudan immediately declared this a nonstarter and called it “daylight robbery”. Indeed it was. What the Sudan was doing was something not done in other countries like Cameroon where Chad relies on pipeline running through Cameroon to export its oil to the world markets. Sudan threatened to block South Sudan’s oil if that latter did not yield. So far, we have not seen the government of north Sudan follow through on its threat. It tried stopping the release of tankers but later backed off. This could be a sign that cooler heads prevailed or something more could be at play: China.

China is not known to publicly tell other countries how to run their house. However, behind the scenes, China acts when its strategic interests are at stake. Chinese oil giant China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) owns significant (40%) interest in Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company

***Continued:* China's role in North-South Sudan relations**

(GNPOC) that operates the pipeline. Furthermore, oil extracted in South Sudan accounts for 5% of China's demand. While Sudan is the sovereign authority in areas where the pipeline passes, it does not see any need to antagonize companies by using the pipeline as a weapon. More importantly, China must have intervened on behalf of its companies to protect their investment from political interference.

So what role can China play in North-South relations? China as a major player in Sudan's oil industry holds significant sway over North and South. Let's focus on North for a minute. North or Sudan is one of the most heavily sanctioned countries in Africa today. Those sanctions are likely to stay unless the NCP [National Congress Party] regime is out of power and a more democratic and moderate regime is in place. A new government would be better positioned to solve Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile's simmering rebellions. Given that the NCP is likely to run the country for the foreseeable future, one cannot anticipate any substantial changes in sanctions. Those sanctions have narrowed economic options available to the NCP regime and China is the only glimmer of hope. It developed Sudan's oil fields when no other country could let its companies anger the United States by trading with Sudan. Chinese companies filled the void and built oil infrastructure as well as dams and other economically significant projects. China opened its wallet and Sudan was only willing to indulge.

In addition to economic partnership, the NCP has found an ally in China at the UN Security Council. If China did not block or water down various UN Security Council resolutions on Sudan, the NCP regime would face serious problems. China protects Sudan at the UN in order to protect its economic interest. Now that most of the oil is suddenly in another country called South Sudan, it remains to be seen whether China will continue protecting a diminished asset. China views Sudan through economic lenses and not as a strategic ally like North Korea. So it will not tolerate Sudan biting the hand that feeds it. Sudan is worthless to China without oil and the NCP knows it. Keeping the pipeline open is the strongest link in the relationship.

Sudan and China maintain close military relations and China provides the bulk of Sudan's armament needs. While other countries such as Russia and Iran supply Sudan, China is powerful source and transactions are less costly. The NCP intends to let this relationship continue to thrive rather than risk it just to rob South of its hard currency.

China's relationship with South Sudan is beginning to take shape after years of well-founded mistrust. The South's ruling party – the SPLM – was well aware of China's role in enabling Sudan to develop its oil resources, which were in turn dedicated to procuring weapons used to wage war in the South. It is a bitter memory but one that can be overcome. China took an unusually short time to

recognize the new country and has committed to cooperating with it in various spheres. This was not expected by the South and it was a much-needed confidence builder. China is known to not support secessionist elements in other countries for fear that it would erode its own attempt to stop Taiwan and Tibet from seceding.

So why was China quick to recognize South Sudan? It had no choice. South Sudan's independence was widely expected and many countries were resigned to the idea of a new country emerging on the African continent. Even North Sudan had no choice but to accept the inevitable. Secondly, the SPLM had cultivated some relations with the China during its years in the government during the interim period. The SPLM understand that you needed China in your corner if you are going to outmaneuver the NCP. As long as China sees the new country through nonthreatening a lens, there was little need to rock the boat. South Sudan promised earlier on to protect the assets of Chinese companies and work with them to develop its oil resources. This was a good gesture on the part of South Sudan and it paid off. China is now able to play a true referee and its role as an impartial intermediary is somewhat recognized.

In the future, China is likely to shift its support in South Sudan's direction because it is the one that has more oil under its control. Should Sudan play politics with the pipeline, China has the resources to build an entirely new pipeline to Lamu Port in Kenya. This will even further weaken Sudan's negotiating position and the NCP knows it. However, we cannot ignore that fact that China has leverage on South Sudan in some areas. In addition to India and Malaysia, it is the only country with companies operating in South Sudan's oil industry. China's interest in South Sudan is now purely economical. South Sudan is interested in developing its economy and broadening it away from oil. South Sudan is hoping to attract loans and funds to finance its development projects and China – with its cash – is the number one address to visit.

China will continue to play an important role behind the scenes. Its influence can even rival that of the United States because it is the only country that can instantly get the attention of the NCP. As long as China plays its cards strategically to protect its economic interest and build goodwill with the people of South, it will be an invaluable ally. Furthermore, it can help bridge the trust gap between South Sudan and Sudan on other important issues such as border and unresolved issues.

***FMSO Commentary:** Perhaps one of the most remarkable facts about President Malam Bacai Sanhá is that he died a natural death. In a country plagued by coups, narcotrafficking, and violence, his death from diabetes and heart failure instead of a bullet is noteworthy. Maybe it reflects the slight lessening of tensions ushered in with his election as president in 2009, a contrast to the coups before then. Unfortunately, his death raises concerns that instability could increase, with the result that, unlike Sanhá, many deaths will come from other than natural causes.*

Guinea-Bissau is holder of the unwanted title “Africa’s First Narco-state.” With an archipelago-like geography and corrupt officials, it has become an important transit point for South American drugs, especially cocaine, making their way to Europe. To make matters worse, bribes to local officials are often in the form of drugs, creating addicts in a country which before had relatively few.

While traffickers drive around in BMW sport-utility vehicles on what barely pass as roads, many of the country’s 1.5 million people live in abject poverty. Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest countries in the world, with the dysfunctional and faction-ridden government, pervasive corruption, and other factors serving as a major drag on the economy. Despite numerous development projects, optimism is in short supply.

*Against this backdrop of drug trafficking, poverty, and corruption, Sanhá, who was a hero of the fight for independence from Portugal, exerted pressure to keep Guinea-Bissau a democracy. His death unleashes fears that the military will attempt to reimpose its rule, leading to instability in an already fragile nation and removing any chance for what Sanhá worked so hard to do before his death - have Guinea Bissau removed from the list of failed states. **End FMSO Commentary (Feldman)***

Can Guinea-Bissau’s Democracy Survive the Recent Death of Its President?

11 January 2012

Source: Queiroz, Mario. “Guinea-Bissau: Another Blow to a Fragile Democracy,” Inter Press Service (South Africa), 11 Jan 2012.

<http://www.ips.org/africa/2012/01/guinea-bissau-another-blow-to-a-fragile-democracy/>



Activists from Guinea-Bissau at an event in Lisbon to raise awareness about the situation in the country. Photo by Mario Queiroz/IPS, via www.ips.org

Guinea-Bissau: Another Blow to a Fragile Democracy

LISBON, Jan 11 (IPS) – The death of the president of Guinea-Bissau, Malam Bacai Sanhá, could usher in a replay of the military uprisings that have set an unmistakable seal of instability on the political life of this small West African country.

Sanhá, who died Monday Jan. 9 in Paris, was one of the few surviving heroes of the liberation struggle against the Portuguese colonial army. That enabled him to play a mediating role in the frequent disputes for power in Guinea-Bissau, which gained independence in 1974.

In the most recent military uprising, on Dec. 26, rebels led by the navy chief, Rear Admiral José Americo Bubo Na Tchuto, attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior and the armed forces chief, General Antonio Indjai.

From his sickbed in the Val de Grâce military hospital in Paris, where he was admitted Nov. 24, 2011, Sanhá exerted his influence through a taped declaration; the rebels were imprisoned and the attempted coup was aborted.

The general view of analysts in Portugal is that the demise of the late head of state brings to the forefront, once again, concerns about the stability of Guinea-Bissau.

The stability of the country is repeatedly jeopardized by military officers who are former guerrilla fighters for the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), and who 22 years after the birth of multiparty democracy still refuse to accept its rules.

The rule of law has been even less observed over the last decade, during which Guinea-Bissau has become, in practice, Africa’s first narco-state, according to experts.

South American drug traffickers have set up operational headquarters and safe houses

Continued: Another Blow to a Fragile Democracy

in its territory, the analysts say, as a way-stage for shipments of cocaine in transit to countries of the European Union.

They say members of the military, judges, police and politicians are in collusion with the traffickers and have allowed the sparsely guarded coasts in this country of 36,125 square kilometres and 1.5 million people to become the main stopover for cocaine between its point of origin in the Andean region of South America and its destination in Portugal and Spain, whose coasts constitute the EU's southwestern border.

For the South American drug lords, Guinea-Bissau is a paradise. Most of them, the experts say, are Colombians who quickly learn Portuguese, because of its similarity to Spanish, and Brazilians, who feel at home in this country with which they share a language.

Another factor favoring the impunity enjoyed by organized crime is the violence that has always prevailed in this tiny country between Senegal and Guinea, which the World Bank ranks among the 10 nations with the worst quality of life, alongside Chad, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Niger, Madagascar, Bangladesh, Burundi, Laos and Pakistan.

Against this backdrop, Sanhá, elected in 2009 as president for a five-year term, was viewed as a kind of "moral reserve" of the nation.

In his youth, Sanhá took up arms as a volunteer in the war of independence against Portugal, under the command of Amílcar Cabral, the founder of the PAIGC, who was regarded as the father of the nation.

He fought the Portuguese army in a bloody war that ended with Guinea-Bissau's unilateral declaration of independence in 1973, recognized by Lisbon a year later after the "carnation revolution" in which army captains overthrew the dictatorship that had ruled Portugal since 1926.

Fernando Ka, the president of the Guinean Association for Social Solidarity (AGSS), which provides support for Guinean migrant communities abroad, told IPS that the chronic violence that characterizes Guinea-Bissau could reemerge now, not only because of the struggle for power, "but as a result of the immense corruption of the political class, which is becoming richer and richer."

According to Ka, a lawyer and activist with dual Guinean and Portuguese nationality, "as long as the country lacks a real development policy that generates wealth for a population impoverished to unimaginable extremes, we cannot be surprised at the proliferation of international mafias with local partners and the consequent prolongation of a seemingly endless violence."

The influential Lisbon daily *Público* devoted its Tuesday Jan. 10 editorial to Sanhá's death, under the title "Waning Hope in Bissau".

"There are justifiable fears that the death of Malam Bacai Sanhá

will exacerbate instability in the country, because the truth is that Guinea-Bissau has still not battled firmly against the seeds of violence, personified in the army, which has never accepted civilian control," the editorial stated.


It went on to deplore "the latent coup mentality, together with the lack of structures that could give the country a minimum basis for progress, that are stifling Bissau with nightmarish power, and the death of Malam Bacai Sanhá only helps to thicken the nightmare like a heavy shadow."

The late president's political action was focused on getting his country off the list of so-called "failed states", a struggle that he took up with all his energy since he was sworn into office, in spite of his already precarious state of health.

But his time ran out. The last major battle of the former PAIGC guerrilla was against illness. He was finally defeated Jan. 9, at the age of 64, by diabetes and heart failure.

The United States Army has been involved in a mountain war for a decade. After all this time, mountain combat remains a stubbornly difficult mission and technology can offer only modest support to the infantry's mission of closing with the enemy or the logistician's mission of getting support forward. This book by Les Grau and Chuck Bartles covers operations and tactics, artillery, and aviation support, reconnaissance, communications, training, and logistics in the mountains.

This book is not United States Army doctrine. Rather, it is offered as an alternate view to a most-challenging military environment.



FMSO Commentary: *The mere mention of Boko Haram strikes fear into the hearts of many Nigerians. As the accompanying article suggests, the same might also be said of Cameroonians in the near future.*

Boko Haram has gained infamy across West Africa, and indeed the world, as a ruthless radical Islamist terror cell bent on instilling sharia law throughout northern Nigeria by attacking both non-Muslims and symbols of the Nigerian state. To date, Boko Haram has been a uniquely Nigerian phenomenon hemmed into the borders of the country. Now though, Boko Haram appears to no longer be a uniquely Nigerian problem.

While its emergence in Cameroon is by no means welcomed there, the development nevertheless signals a win for the Nigerian government. Indeed, Boko Haram's move to Cameroon is the result of Nigerian security forces' pressure to root out the extremist group's activities in the northern, Muslim-dominated part of the country. Boko Haram's presence in Cameroon is a rare and encouraging victory for the Nigerian security apparatus, which, under President Goodluck Jonathan's leadership, is often criticized for being incompetent and impotent in the face of a better-organized and surprisingly stealthy Boko Haram.

*For its part, Cameroon appears to have feared a spillover of Boko Haram for some time. As blogger Dibussi Tande reminds us, the 2010 Wikileaks report showed that Cameroonian President Paul Biya was, "concerned about the threat of Islamic extremism" and was "beginning to worry about Islamic extremists infiltrating Cameroon from Nigeria and making inroads through Cameroonian mosques." Biya, as it turns out, had a right to be worried. **End FMSO Commentary (Warner)***

Not Just in Nigeria: Boko Haram Materializes in Cameroon

11 January 2012



Source: Solomon Tembang Mforgham, "Boko Haram infiltrates Cameroon," AfricaNews (Limbe, Cameroon), 11 January 2012, http://www.africanews.com/site/Boko_Haram_infiltrates_Cameroon/list_messages/40827

CIA map of Cameroon, via CIA World Fact Book (www.cia.gov)

Boko Haram infiltrates Cameroon

The Nigerian Islamic sect, Boko Haram, which has been wrecking havoc in the West African country, is reported to have infiltrated northern Cameroon. The militants are said to have taken refuge in northern Cameroon as the Nigerian government has intensified its clampdown on them especially following their bombing of churches on Christmas Day that led to the death of over 50 persons.

Reports say members of the extremist group are more and more present in Lagdo, a cosmopolitan town in the North Region. Sources say they are easily identifiable by their bizarre dressing, long beads and red or black headscarves.

According to reports, for several months, Lagdo residents have testified that the strangers are combing surrounding villages and actively preaching anti-Western sermons, establishing units and proposing huge amounts of money to those willing to follow them.

In a bid to prevent cross-border activities by militants of the Islamic sect, the Nigerian government recently temporarily shut down its land borders with Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, in a televised national address recently, said the closure of the border was to control supposed cross-border activities by members of the sect. He also decreed a state of emergency in 15 local government areas in the Borno, Plateau, Niger and Yobe states.

"The temporary closure of our borders in the affected areas is only an interim measure designed to address the current security challenges and will be reviewed as soon as normalcy is restored," he said

"The Boko Haram being chased from Nigeria's northeast, as well as thousands of

Continued: Boko Haram infiltrates Cameroon

runaway Chadian soldiers in irregular situation here must be closely monitored to avoid unwanted trouble throughout the national territory,” he cautioned. Nonetheless, administrative official in the region are quoted as saying there is no need yet for panic.

“We cannot begin to arrest suspects because the law does not allow for that. At the moment, they are not breaking the law,” one of them is quoted as saying.

Meanwhile, authorities in the region have reinforced surveillance and many Quran learning centres have been reportedly shut down, while Islam teachers are being closely watched by intelligence operatives.

It would be noted that last year some authorities within the

Islamic community in Cameroon had warned that the increasing crack down on the Boko Haram in Nigeria may cause them to run to Cameroon. Cameroon, some of them alleged, was no longer just a hideout for the militants but a field for enlisting converts.

Sources within the Moslem community say there are many indicators that militants of the sect are in Cameroon and are preaching their doctrines in some mosques. It would be recalled that not long ago the Divisional Officer for Limbe I sub-division, Tsanga Foe, closed a mosque in Limbe when there were allegations that members of Boko Haram had infiltrated it. Other pointers that the militants are in Cameroon, sources say, are the distribution of CDs and fliers with the Boko Haram doctrine.

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO.leavenworth.army.mil)

International Research Collaboration Program

Quality researchers outside of the U.S. government express new ideas that will help define the current and future defense and security environment from understudied and unconsidered perspectives.



FMSO Commentary: Nigerian national unity has been hanging by a thread since the very day of the nation's birth in 1960. Increasingly, Nigeria may very well be headed down a rocky road of disintegration, caused primarily by the dual forces of its national fuel subsidy turmoil and its ongoing struggles against domestic terrorism, in addition to the longer term impasses of ethnic, religious, and socio-economic tensions amongst its citizens.

As explained by the previous analysis, over the last several years, the Islamist group Boko Haram has brought Nigeria to its knees. Now, however, rather than turning to the Nigerian government for protection, average Nigerians are rioting against the government's ending of a fuel subsidy that kept fuel in the country at an artificially low price. As mass protests have spread across the country during the past week, with several protestors killed, Nigeria looks to be at its most precarious point since the bloody civil war in Biafra between 1967 and 1970.


*Though a full-on national split is unlikely, this week's deeply-reaching fuel protests, coupled with the fierce, independence-minded calls from the north, mean that pursuing a policy of national reconciliation will be imperative for the country if it seeks to keep itself in one piece in the future. **End FMSO Commentary (Warner)***

Senate Leader: Nigeria Teeters on the Edge of Collapse

11 January 2012

Source: Inalegwu Shaibu, "Nigeria: Nation Heading Towards Anarchy, Says Mark," Vanguard News (Lagos, Nigeria), 11 January 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201201110071.html>

Nigeria population map by Marcel Krüger (english version of map from german wikipedia [1]) [GFDL (www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html) or CC-BY-SA-3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/)], via Wikimedia Commons



Nigeria: Nation Heading Towards Anarchy

Abuja — Senate President, David Mark, yesterday, feared the general unrest in the country and the violent activities of the dreaded Boko Haram sect could throw the country into anarchy.

Mark in his New Year message to Senators, yesterday, after a close door session during which the nation's security situation was discussed, specifically mentioned that the panic movement of Nigerians along ethnic and religious lines from one region to another on the ultimatum of Boko Haram could throw the country into anarchy.

He tasked security operatives to work hard to curtail the dangers posed by the sect, while calling for caution among Nigerians, warning that unnecessary utterances could destroy the nation's fragile peace.

He said: "We have reconvened at a trying period in our nation's history. We are confronted by security challenges in different parts of the country, which are testing our collective resolve to live together as a united indivisible nation.

"The Christmas Day bomb attack at Saint Theresa's Catholic Church in Madalla and other attacks in different parts of the country, especially in the North-East which has claimed many innocent lives, represents the most daring and costly attack by terrorists on fellow Nigerians.

"The current security challenge has reinforced the need to aggressively pursue economic development and simultaneously implement the war on terrorism. In this regard, let me caution against reckless utterances by some Nigerians that endanger our national unity.

"Statements that encourage people to move from one region to another on the basis of faith and ethnicity is unpatriotic. It portends danger to our corporate existence and a clear invitation to anarchy."

Ikweremadu, coming through Order 42 of Senate standing rules, drew the attention of the Senate to the general insecurity in the land.

He said: "I and 70 other Senators are worried about the state of insecurity in our country. We are worried about the movement of people from one area to another, especially on the strength of threat from Boko Haram.

"We are also worried about killings of people in places of worships. These things are like a bonfire, if not quenched, it can consume all of us."

FMSO Commentary: Neither the Central African Republic (CAR) nor Chad win any points for their individual security situations: each is amongst the most chronically insecure states on earth due to the respective low levels of state capacity to project power outside of its capital. When insurgent elements from within each clash, the security vortex that results has predictably disastrous effects on bystanding civilians, as the accompanying article details.

Chad, under autocratic Idriss Déby – most primarily preoccupied with its unendingly tumultuous relationship with Sudan – will likely to turn a blind eye to the violence originating from its side of the border. If the instability is to be addressed, it will likely be CAR’s relatively new prime minister, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, elected in 2008, who will rise to the occasion. A mathematician and academic by training, the international community sees little and knows few details about him. Nevertheless, in a region where the norm is ostentation and self-aggrandizement, Touadéra’s more demure approach to governance at least superficially indicates that he will be a more likely voice than CAR’s current president, François Bozizé, to move his country in a secure direction.

*Also of note is that the Chadian rebel group Front Populaire pour le Redressement (FDR) portrays itself as an ethnic army whose mission is to protect the wider Peul community, an ethnic group that stretches across Africa from Senegal, Guinea, and Mauritania in the west, though the CAR and Chad in central Africa, all the way to Sudan and Egypt in the east. While ethnic conflict is, indeed, common in the region, less so is the emergence of so-called standing pan-ethnic armies like the one discussed here. **End FMSO Commentary (Warner)***

Rebel Group from Chad Exacerbates Instability in Central African Republic

11 January 2012

Source: “République Centrafricaine: « Vide sécuritaire » dans le nord du pays,” (“Central African Republic: ‘Security Vacuum’ in the north of the country), IRIN News, 11 January 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/201201111075.html>

Armed but absent: The CAR army has very little presence outside the capital. Photo by Brice Blondel/HDPTCAR, via irinnews.org



Central African Republic: ‘Security Vacuum’ in the north of the country

Bangui — Among the most pressing security threats in the Central African Republic (CAR) is a Chadian armed group active in the north of the country, which allegedly continues to recruit and acquire weapons, despite having undertaken to return to Chad.

On 26 December, members of this group, the Front Populaire Pour le Redressement (FPR - Popular Front for Recovery) clashed with fighters of a domestic insurgency, the Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC - the Central African People’s Democratic Front) in the northern village of Vafio, on the road between Kabo and Batafongo, according to a bulletin released by the country’s Humanitarian Development Partnership Team, which said two FPR fighters were killed.

The prospect of retaliatory attacks by both sides led the UN to suspend movement along the road.

According to unconfirmed press reports, four civilians were killed and several houses burnt a few days later when 300 FPR elements attacked the town of Kabo.

The FPR, which arrived from Chad in 2008, has also been implicated in security incidents in the central province of Ouaka, where a November 2011 report by local officials said the group “had taken up position in several villages and settlements where they extorted more than 900 cattle, several motorbikes and a large sum of money”.

According to local sources, the FPR has also conscripted members of the Peul community, an ethnic group - sometimes called Fulani - present in many West African states, as well as CAR, Chad and Niger. The FPR claims to be protecting the wider Peul community.

In a 21 December resolution, the UN Security Council expressed “deep concern” about the “extensive recruitment and the acquisition of weapons by the FPR, which threaten peace and security in the Central African Republic and the region and constitute violations of the commitments made by the FPR to lay down its weapons and enter into discussions towards peace in the Final Communiqué signed on 13 June 2011 by FPR leader Baba Laddé and the national mediators of Chad and the Central African Republic”.

A 28 November Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council said talks aimed at implementing the agreement had stalled, “mainly over the issue of security guarantees for the return of Baba Laddé to Chad”.

The same report said a faction of another armed group, the Armée populaire pour la restauration de la démocratie (APRD - the Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy), had said it would only join in a national programme of disarmament and demobilization if the FPR returned to Chad.

Two days after the report was released, CAR President Francois Bozizé said of the FPR, “We will resume previous negotiations to send them back to Chad and if the dialogue fails we will take this matter into our own hands.”

But, as the Security Council report underlined, a “serious security vacuum in many parts of the country” is a direct result of “the lack of state authority outside the capital. The national security and defence forces, which should function as primary security providers in the remote areas of the country, are under-resourced and largely incapable of fulfilling their responsibilities.”

***FMSO Commentary:** Government credibility can be fragile during a time of economic and social stress. Mix in the challenges of separatist movements, insurgency, or criminality and the question can move from government credibility toward government legitimacy. The Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, published by Transparency International (<http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/interactive/>), reveals that in Southeast Asia governments fair poorly in regards to this measure of credibility. The Philippines and Cambodia are rated as “Highly Corrupt”.*

When the highest ranking leaders in government and the military are subject to prosecution or convicted for corruption, it is a good and a bad story – bad in the sense that corruption is present, it exists at the top levels of government, and that it may be pervasive in the system. However, the arrests and prosecutions show a willingness to address the misdeeds of powerful people.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines are the main actor in the decades-old drama of Islamic separatists, political insurgency, and ongoing terrorist activities. The survival of the nation as it now stands is very much the responsibility of the Armed Forces as directed by the civil authority. The indictments of two former military chiefs and other officers is a blow to the prestige of the services, while being a clarion call to the people of the Philippines that the military will be held accountable.

*Concurrently in Cambodia the nation’s highest ranking official in the struggle against illegal drug trafficking has been sentenced to life in prison for his misdeeds. Once again we read a two-sided tale of corruption and accountability. **End FMSO Commentary (Welch)***

Corruption in High Places 5 January 2012

Source: Virgil Lopez. “2 ex-military chiefs, 9 others to face plunder (Charges)” The Sun Star, Manila, 5 January 2012. <http://www.sunstar.com.ph/manila/local-news/2012/01/05/2-ex-military-chiefs-9-others-face-plunder-198970>



Former Armed Forces of the Philippines, Chiefs Diomedio Villanueva and Roy Cimatu. Photo via Vox Bikol National News (voxbikol.com)

2 ex-military chiefs, 9 others to face plunder charges

The Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of plunder charges against two former chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and nine other individuals for alleged misuse of military funds during the past decade.

They are former AFP chiefs Diomedio Villanueva and Roy Cimatu, retired comptrollers Major General Carlos Garcia and Major General Jacinto Ligot, Brigadier General Antonio De Leon, Colonel Tomas Donato and Retired Lieutenant Colonel Ernesto Paranis.

Also included in the recommendation sheet are Generoso del Castillo, Divina Cabrera, Retired Major General Hilario Atendido, and Colonel Roy Devesa.

In a press conference, Justice Secretary Leila de Lima said the recommendations will be forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman, who will weigh on their findings.

“It may adopt, modify or reverse (the recommendations). It’s up to the Ombudsman to decide or determine whether there is need for another preliminary investigation,” she said on Thursday.

The case stemmed from the allegations of whistleblower ex-Lieutenant Colonel George Rabusa, a former military budget officer who told a congressional investigation early last year about the massive financial anomaly in the agency.

Rabusa said several high-ranking military officials are liable for misuse and conversion of some P2.3 billion in military funds from 2000 to 2005.

The retired generals were also accused of living lavishly off funds siphoned from the military.

Exempted from the recommendations, meanwhile, are retired Lieutenant General Gaudencio Pangilinan, retired Major General Epineto Logico, Captain Kenneth Paglinawan, ex-AFP chief Efren Abu, Colonel Gilbert Gapay, Major Emerson Angulo and retired Major General Ernesto Boac.

Continued: 2 ex-military chiefs, 9 others to face plunder charges

Completing the list are Colonel Robert Arevalo, Arturo Besana, Crisanto Gabriel and Manuel Warren, who are not recommended to be charged for plunder for lack of evidence.

Prosecutor General Claro Arellano heads the three-member panel that investigated the alleged funds misuse.

Cambodia's former anti-drug head gets life sentence for corruption, drug trafficking

Source: Xiong Tong. "Cambodia's former anti-drug head gets life sentence for corruption, drug trafficking", Xinhuanet, 5 January 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-01/05/c_131343964.htm

5 January 2012



Former Cambodian head of the National Authority for Combating Drugs Moek Dara talks to journalist after his verdict in front of a court of Baneay Meanchey province, some 350 kilometers northwest of Phnom Penh on January 5, 2012. A Cambodian court sentenced the former chief of the country's anti-drug agency and his aide to life in jail for corruption and narcotics trafficking. Photo via SFGate.com

B ANTEAY MEANCHEY, Cambodia, Jan. 5 (Xinhua) -- A Cambodian court on Thursday convicted the former head of the National Authority for Combating Drugs Lt. Gen. Moek Dara of corruption and organized drug trafficking and sentenced him to life in prison and fined 220,000 U.S. dollars.

His two subordinates: former Colonel Chea Leang, chief of the anti-drug department's money laundering office, was also sentenced to life in jail and fined 21,000 U.S. dollars, and Morn Doeun, who remains at large and was tried in absentia, was sentenced to 25 years in jail and fined 34,000 U.S. dollars.

In addition, the verdict read by the presiding judge Ith Samphos at Banteay Meanchey Provincial Court said all of their properties including land, houses and cash are confiscated.

They were charged with falsifying reports in order to hide confiscated drugs for sales and depicting suspected drug dealers as mere addicts to win them lighter sentences in order to exchange for bribery.

Moek Dara and Chea Leang were arrested on Jan. 12, 2011 after the complaint filed against them by the Anti-Corruption Unit.

Speaking to reporters after the verdict delivery, Moek Dara said he would consider appealing against the court's verdict.

Mexican Drug Cartels Hire University Graduates to Engineer and Construct Narco Tunnels along the Border

13 December 2011

FMSO Commentary: *Between 1999 and 2011 authorities discovered 150 tunnels along the US/Mexico border. At this point, it is thought that these tunnels are utilized for drug and weapons trafficking (the latter from the US back into Mexico). Key cities for tunnel construction include Tijuana, Mexicali, Baja California, and Nogales, Sonora. Officials in Nogales, Arizona have reported that hundreds, if not thousands, of tunnels have been dug underneath the city, weakening the roadways and allowing thousands of tons of drugs to be trafficked into the United States. A common concern associated with tunnels along the border is that drug trafficking organizations would use them to aid terrorists in crossing the border.*

Given the geographical location of the majority of tunnels seized, it can be surmised that they are owned and operated by the Sinaloa Cartel, as this group controls the local drug-trafficking Plazas in both Sonora and Baja California. Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, the leader of this group, is currently ranked on the Forbes 500 list of the World's Billionaires, and is believed to have earned between \$6 to \$19 billion from drug shipments over the last eight years. Given the profits generated from drug shipments, it is highly unlikely that the Sinaloa Cartel would utilize its drug tunnels to aid terrorists.

Another interesting point about narco-tunnels along the border is the individuals who are contracted to engineer and construct them. College graduates, to include engineers, architects, and construction experts from the US and Mexico, are known to participate in this activity because of the cash incentives associated with it. Workers, on the other hand, are common day laborers who risk their lives during the construction process. Following completion of the tunnel, the day laborers may be killed to avoid information leaks regarding the route.

Why Tijuana?

The obvious reason is its proximity to the border, but there are many other supporting factors that have prompted drug cartels to traffic drugs through this coveted corridor, to include proximity to key highway systems, proximity to key marijuana production sites, the presence of warehouses along the border, and the soil quality in the area.

Why Mexicali?

Access to Key Interstate Systems:

Interstate 8 connects with Interstate 10 in Arizona to provide a cross country route to traffic large shipments.

Populated Residential Area:

The abundance of residences on both sides of the border allows for tunnels to be built between these locations.

Why Nogales:

An extensive underground drainage seems to be the key reason the Sinaloa Cartel has chosen Nogales, Arizona as a principal entrance point to introduce drugs into the United States. This drainage system extends from Nogales, Arizona, into Nogales, Mexico, and was built following intense floods in 1930 and 1931.

Common Areas for Tunnels along the Drainage System:

- Downtown Nogales along International Street, which runs parallel to the border

Sources: <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/191894.html> and <http://www.mundonarco.com/2011/12/contratan-profesionistas-para-la.html>

Cartels Hire University Graduates

The Mexican daily El Universal, is reporting that Mexican drug cartels, in particular the Sinaloa Cartel, are recruiting university graduates to include architects, engineers, and construction experts to build narco tunnels along the US/Mexico border. Individuals hired must also be able to cross the border with ease (meaning they have a Visa or are US citizens). Day laborers hired to work on these same projects may or may not be killed after completion to avoid release of details regarding location/the cartel who ordered the construction.

Between 1999 and 2011, authorities have discovered 150 tunnels along the US/Mexico border. Of these, only six were discovered with technological devices while the others were detected by humans. The majority of tunnels built between 2009 and 2011 were constructed with reinforced concrete and cement floors. Amenities within tunnels built during this timeframe generally included: air conditioning, telephone lines, electricity, and video surveillance equipment. When comparing tunnels built in 2010 and 2011, those build in 2011 are significantly more sophisticated.

Continued: Mexican Drug Cartels Hire University Graduates


fence. Tunnels along this area range from rudimentary to complex. A rudimentary tunnel is characterized by the trafficker having just enough space to push his body through the hole with a small shipment of drugs. Once on the US side, a waiting vehicle with a hole built into the bottom accepts the shipment at any hour of the day. The entrance on the US side is usually carefully carved out in the concrete and is nearly undetectable. After the drugs have been loaded into waiting vehicles, the concrete opening is closed with a jack. The trafficker then burrows backwards into Mexico as the space of the hole is too small to even turn around.

Complex tunnels are equipped with rail systems, ventilation systems, lighting, and, in some cases, even a water supply. Tunnels such as these are utilized to traffic large shipments of marijuana, cocaine, and crystal meth.


- Sewer grates. These are popular alternatives to creating holes, as they are already in place and no digging is required. Areas of interest include the Grand Avenue and Morley Avenue drainages in Nogales because of their size and location. These drainage areas run parallel to each other and are large enough to fit an SUV. To access sewer entrances, the trafficker may rent homes in Nogales, Arizona, that feed into the Grand and Morely drainage areas.

End FMSO Commentary: (Fiegel and Rosado)


Select Locations of Tunnels Dismantled between 2009 and 2011




Narco Tunnels along the US/Tijuana Border, via Google Maps



Narco Tunnels in Nogales, Sonora, via Google Maps



Narco Tunnels along the US/Mexicali Border, via Google Maps



Narco Tunnels in San Luis Colorado, Sonora, via Google Maps

FMSO Commentary: Illicit trafficking, whether it is in persons, weapons, or narcotics, has always been a greedy business, where the sheer amount of cash fuels the ingenuity and adaptation of these transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). TCOs attempt to attain their goals with maximum profit and minimum risk, adapting to tactics employed by both Mexican and U.S. law enforcement officials, rival cartels, and intelligence agencies. These adaptations, which drive prices higher due to the amount of risk taken, also fuel the ingenuity of the groups to overcome these obstacles through technological advances. This, in turn, drives the downstream economic chain of passing along progressively higher prices, which also result in higher profits. These higher prices and increased profits help to satisfy the lustful need for greater sums of cash to support these criminals' lavish lifestyles.

Instead of relying on "coyotes" to guide illegal migrants on foot into the U.S., smuggling rings are increasingly relying on cell phones and binoculars to guide groups across the border from observation points on nearby mountaintops on the Mexican side of the southwest border. This not only negates the risk of being captured by Border Patrol agents, but also removes the human intelligence factor of being able to pressure a captured suspect and interrogate him for additional information on tactics, routes, and hierarchy of not only the smuggling ring itself, but also what larger cartel they work for in Mexico. These groups are also using the high ground and cell phone communications to warn the traveling groups of the presence and location of Border Patrol agents, as well as to actively guide the group to a pickup vehicle or safe house on the U.S. side. This methodology has not only frustrated U.S. officials, but also caused them to change their tactics, focusing

'Virtual Coyotes' Used to Guide Illegal Migrants into U.S.

17 November 2011



Source: "Celulares reemplazan guías de inmigrantes ilegales (Cell Phones Replacing Guides of Illegal Migrants)," Terra, 17 November 2011. <http://noticiascl.terra.cl/tecnologia/noticias/0,,OI5475679-EI12466,00-Celulares+reemplazan+guias+de+inmigrantes+ilegales.html>

Cellphone photo by Clyde Bentley [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 (creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0)] via Flickr.com

Celulares reemplazan guías de inmigrantes ilegales (Cell Phones Replacing Guides of Illegal Migrants)

According to investigators, eight men have been charged as the result of an undercover police operation, highlighting a new tactic by which smugglers never cross the border from Mexico. Instead of crossing the border, these smugglers are utilizing cell phones and positioning themselves on nearby mountaintops to give real-time guidance and instruction to their customers at every step of this difficult journey through the desert to enter the United States.

Derek Benner, an ICE Special Agent in charge of investigations in the San Diego area, stated that the defendants were part of one of the first smuggling gangs dismantled on the U.S.-Mexico border that exclusively used cell phones to perform their illegal job. The defendants in question were arrested on 15 and 16 November 2011 in the Los Angeles, California area.

As a general rule, the smugglers continue to use guides on foot, but the utilization of cell phones as their replacement is appearing more frequently in areas where Mexican mountain peaks offer views into the United States. The lookouts keep their clients on well-traveled paths and away from Border Patrol agents.

U.S. officials say they have spotted these new "coyotes," or smugglers, more frequently during the last year, while cell phone coverage has expanded to more remote parts of the country and the devices are becoming more affordable, costing less than US\$50.

their intelligence efforts on arresting and pressuring chauffeurs who preposition these groups of migrants on the Mexican side, as well as those who pick them up on the U.S. side of the border after making the illegal crossing. In addition, the use of prepaid cell phones purchased in Mexico also removes any trace of evidence regarding the identity of the virtual guide.

*By remaining off of U.S. soil and avoiding arrest, a trend is emerging within the TCOs, where autonomy in efforts seems to be the wave of future operations. Whether it is by utilizing a cell phone in human smuggling operations or satellite communications to guide an unmanned vessel, criminal organizations are not giving the U.S. much to work with in regards to prosecuting suspects involved in these illicit acts. Autonomy has already been discovered in semi-submersible maritime vessels, and it is probably just a matter of time before this technology is installed in not only aerial vehicles, but also in submarines, if it already has not been done and in operation. **End FMSO Commentary (Scheidel)***


Continued: Cell Phones Replacing Guides of Illegal Migrants

“Technology is now the guide, not an individual who has to try to return to Mexico when the Border Patrol stops them,” indicated Mike Fisher, Chief of the Border Patrol, during an interview.

While U.S. authorities try to find out how common the use of cell phones are and which gangs of smugglers are using them, they face new challenges. Now you can’t even put pressure on a foot guide in an attempt for them to give up valuable information, such as their travel route, safe house locations, how they locate Border Patrols agents, as well as what criminal organization they work for in Mexico.

Furthermore, it is more difficult to prosecute them on smuggling charges because the guides are safely out of reach, south of the border.

Geoff Demarest’s *Winning Insurgent War* is about a broader set of conflicts than just ‘insurgency.’ In its 144 sections, Geoff Demarest raises new and overlooked concepts related to modern conflict in a provocative manner designed to stir up debate and critical thinking. As Geoff Demarest puts it: “I hope that some of the ideas in it will be contagious.”



FMSO Commentary: Ten years ago the United States began military operations in Afghanistan against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Now, as the US is preparing to withdraw from this country, China's state-owned oil giant, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), has become the first foreign company to win a major oil deal in Afghanistan in decades.

This 25-year oil deal is expected to earn the war-torn state approximately 7 billion dollars over two decades and open hundreds of career opportunities for Afghans. The Afghan government will purportedly get 70 percent of the oil profits. In addition, this contract, enabling CNPC's exploration and extraction in Afghanistan's Amu Darya basin, will help to reduce Afghanistan's reliance on oil imports from Iran and Central Asian states.

*Compared to the apparent benefits for the Afghan side, perhaps a more interesting question is what China could gain from this oil deal. Afghanistan has only a very limited amount of relatively low quality oil reserves, but also the risks are high due to political instability and weak infrastructures. However, China is looking beyond these mere Afghan oil reserves. More importantly, this deal allows greater integration into CNPC's larger market layout in Central Asia, and can be seen as a strategic move that contributes to China's energy security. In addition, the deal will further bolster China's position as Afghanistan's largest foreign investor, in view of the fact that in 2008 Metallurgical Corp of China signed a contract to develop the huge Aynak copper mine south of Kabul. **End FMSO Commentary (Du)***

Afghanistan and China's CNPC Sign Major Oil Deal

28 December 2011



Source: Chunlai Yu, "Zhongshiyou Shouhuo Afuhan Youtian Kaicai Hetong (CNPC Signs First Contract to Develop Afghan Oilfield)," Meiri Jingji Xinwen (Daily Economic News), 28 December 2011. <http://money.163.com/11/1228/01/7MAUP86N00253B0H.html>

China National Petroleum Corp logo via www.cnpc.com.cn

中石油首获阿富汗油田开采合同 (CNPC Signs First Contract to Develop Afghan Oilfield)

The Afghan president's office December 28 announced that Afghanistan's cabinet has approved a 25-year deal with China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) for the development of oil blocks in the Amu Darya basin. This deal is the first international oil production agreement entered into by the Afghan government for several decades. It is also the first oil deal Chinese oil company obtained in Afghanistan. The oil field is estimated to hold about 87 million barrels of oil. Analysts believe that although Afghanistan is not rich in oil and gas resources, CNPC has to turn its attention to Afghanistan and other markets that do not appear attractive to western oil companies, in order to expand CNPC's own oil and gas reserves and to achieve the "overseas Daqing" strategic objective. However, on the other hand, the investment risks are beyond the scope that CNPC can control.

The deal covers drilling and a \$300-million refinery in the northern provinces of Sar-e Pul and Faryab. According to the contract, CNPC will pay a 15 percent royalty on oil, a 20 percent corporate tax and give up to 70 percent of its profit from the project to the Afghan government. The initial investment within the first two years is estimated to be a minimum of \$200-300 million. Although the 87 million barrels of oil are only the equivalent of six thousandths of China's Bohai Sea oil and gas reserves, the deal is considered of great significance.

Zhou Xiujie, a researcher on energy industry at the Chinese Investment Corporation (CIC), believes that CNPC's move is beneficial for its strategic market layout and will clear the way for its follow-up cooperation with the Afghan government. In addition, since Afghanistan borders northwest China, the Afghan crude oil can be directly transported to China through pipelines, which will significantly save transportation costs. Zhou consider the reasons that Afghanistan chose CNPC to be CNPC's outstanding capital strength and its willingness to accept a higher offer, which most western companies usually do not accept. Moreover, while the war has resulted in a hostile attitude in Afghanistan toward western companies, China, which has nothing to do with the war, faces less resistance as Chinese oil companies enter into the country.


In fact, Afghanistan is not considered an ideal oil resource market, not only because of its limited amount of reserves, but also because the Afghan oil is more difficult to exploit due to geological reasons and weak infrastructure. Nevertheless, "since it is much more

Continued: CNPC Signs First Contract to Develop Afghan Oilfield

urgent for Chinese oil companies to find overseas resources than that is for western companies, Chinese companies have to act more proactively in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where western companies are less willing to do business due to higher risks,” says Lin Boqiang, director of the China Energy Economy Research Center at Xiamen University, “the signing of this deal is also significant for the construction of CNPC’s five overseas oil and gas cooperation areas.” CNPC has announced a plan to build five oil and gas cooperation areas of different scales respectively in Central Asia, Africa, South America, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. Zhou Xiujie believes that the oil deal with Afghanistan serves to make CNPC’s layout in Central Asia more comprehensive and complete.

Zhou considers the political instability in Afghanistan and its weak infrastructures as the main risks that CNPC will confront

when it enters the Afghan market. Since these risks are basically systematic, they are most likely beyond CNPC’s control. Therefore, he recommends CNPC to comprehensively assess the risks and benefits of this project and carefully control its investment scale. Another researcher from the CIC Song Zhichen points out that in the event of unrest, CNPC could have nothing to gain from its investments in Afghanistan. Song suggests that CNPC should purchase insurance for the projects with higher risks to minimize possible loss, and that it should seek diplomatic protection from the government, linking the company’s business activities to Chinese foreign policy. Shao Yuqun, deputy director of the Shanghai Institute of International Research Center, considers it very important for the CNPC to promote effective, in-depth cooperation with the Afghan government, as well as to maintain good relations with local political powers and respect local customs.



***Dragon Bytes* by Tim Thomas examines China’s information-war (IW) theory and practice from 1995-2003.** Some specialists may be surprised that the Chinese openly discuss not only computer network attacks and electronic preemption but also the development of IW units and an “integrated network-electronic warfare” theory (which closely approximates the US theory of “network-centric warfare”). The Chinese development of an IW theory is representative of their country’s philosophy and culture. By creating an “IW theory with Chinese characteristics” the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has offered an alternate way of viewing the application of IW than in the West.

FMSO Commentary: On December 4, 2011, a U.S. RQ-170 stealth unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was lost somewhere over Eastern Iran. There has been widespread speculation as to the drone's status. Iran claims to have captured the drone, and other reports suggest that the country was planning to turn to China and/or Russia to reverse engineer the drone. On January 1, Ali Ashraf-Nuri, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Deputy Head for Political Affairs, claimed, "The decoding of the RQ-170 drone is at its final stage and significant achievements have been obtained from it..." In the following article the author downplays the significance of what China can acquire from reverse engineering the RQ-170, saying, "...it is not necessary to copy others' work to make progress."

According to Richard Fisher, a Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs for the International Assessment and Strategy Center, however, "While the article's author is correct to say that China's UAV sector and design sectors are relatively advanced so as not to require large inputs of foreign technology, there is nothing like getting your hands on the other guy's kit that you are also trying to develop."

In the article Wang Ya'nán stresses the difficulty in trying to break through microchips found within the drone. However, Fisher argues, "Even if China cannot exfiltrate and decode the programming data on U.S. computer chips, it gains a far higher understanding about how Lockheed designers pursued advances in materials and airframe design to achieve a pre-UCAV (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle) platform."

The Shenyang Aircraft Co, in particular, is believed to be designing a UCAV similar to the U.S. X-47B, which will also operate from aircraft carriers. Fisher explained that while China is able to come up with its own CAD/CAM designs, the country can save a lot of time by analyzing the internal structure of the RQ-170, rather than starting from scratch. **End FMSO Commentary (Hurst)**

China's UAV Technology Can Always Use a Little Boost

28 December 2011



Shenyang's "Warrior Eagle" UCAV concept model seen at the 2008 Zhuhai Airshow. Photo: Compliments of Richard Fisher

Source: Jia Lei, Ta Kung Pao Online 中國無人機技術較先進 (China's Unmanned Aircraft Technology is Relatively Advanced) 27 Dec 2011. <http://www.takungpao.com/indextop/2011-12-27/1048199.html>

中國無人機技術較先進 (China's Unmanned Aircraft Technology is Relatively Advanced)

One of the United States' RQ-170 stealth UAVs was lost track of in the air over eastern Iran, and it leads one to suspect whether or not this 'unmanned flight vehicle' will ultimately fall into the hands of the Chinese people." Japan's The Diplomat website recently published a US scholar's writing worrying that China would benefit from this, and would research countermeasure means aimed at the US military's unmanned aircraft and other operational aircraft, which caught the attention of the foreign media. Beijing's Hangkong Zhishi magazine deputy chief editor Wang Ya'nán stated to a Ta Kung Pao reporter that the Chinese unmanned aircraft were complete in terms of types, and they had accumulated many years of technology. Using "comparatively advanced" is an accurate description, so it is not necessary to copy others' work to make progress.

The RQ-170 "Sentinel" unmanned aircraft that the Iranian military claims to have shot down this time is a stealth UAV that was researched and developed by Lockheed Martin, and is mainly used to carry out reconnaissance and monitoring of designated targets.

Wang Ya'nán pointed out that the unmanned aircraft is not all-new technology. It is the result of the integration of numerous types of technology such as autonomous flight control, small model flight vehicles, computers, communications data links, etc. The United States' solitary item of unmanned aircraft is relatively advanced. In particular, the integrated effective results are relatively good. While most nations are still mainly reconnoitering and monitoring the battlefield, the US unmanned aircraft has already been moving fairly rapidly toward integrated reconnaissance and attack tasks.

The Advanced Unmanned Aircraft's Value is in the Software


Since the 1960s, China has shot down the United States' "Firebee" unmanned reconnaissance aircraft numerous times, and since it came into contact with the unmanned aircraft technology, it began autonomous unmanned aircraft research. Wang Ya'nán stated that China had accumulated a lot of years in the aspect of the relevant technologies of unmanned aircraft. Looking at the exterior shape, the unmanned aircraft is just a platform with no secrets to speak of. The hidden reference value of the unmanned aircraft has already been revealed with the F-22, and all the world now knows the basic principles.

"The true value of the advanced unmanned aircraft rests in the control software. The

Continued: China's Unmanned Aircraft Technology is Relatively Advanced

calculator for autonomously completing tasks give the orders, but more often than not, the advanced unmanned aircraft might self-destruct when it is hit or has a task malfunction, so whether or not this can completely be obtained by Iran is still worthy of suspicion. Some microchips might be obtained, but if they hope to break through them, it won't be that easy. Whether or not the data link system can be successfully analyzed is also a matter of great difficulty," claimed Wang Ya'nan.

In the 2009 National Day parade, the vehicle-borne unmanned aircraft system was made public for the first time. Because historically everything that has appeared in the National Day parade has been active service equipment, Wang Ya'nan pointed out that this showed that this kind of unmanned aircraft that was relatively advanced in terms of exterior shape had already been deployed to the units. In the 2010 Zhuhai Air Show, the military and civilian aviation manufacturers displayed in concentration at least 25 unmanned aircraft prototypes and models, of which was not missing models that could carry numerous missiles and be adopted for jet engines. The Wall Street Journal used the term "startling and concerning" to describe them.



In resurrecting General Sir Andrew Skeen's *Passing It On*, the Foreign Military Studies Office and the Maneuver Center of Excellence, have provided a detailed look from 1932 that holds valuable lessons and understanding of the Operational Environment in the Af-Pak Theater of today.

FMSO Commentary: Ever since the 1990s, Russia has been pushing for a United Nations Resolution to limit the spread of “information weapons.” China has now taken up the mantle and changed the topic from information weapons to cyber weapons. In October 2011, during the 66th General Assembly, China and Russia submitted a proposal for an International Code of Conduct for Information Security. The joint proposal discussed security challenges surrounding cyberspace and said that states should respect domestic laws and sovereignty. During a discussion about cyber security on October 20, Wang Qun, Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, expressed China’s hope to launch an open and transparent process to develop international norms and rules for information and cyberspace security.

In the article below, Han Xudong, a professor at the National Defense University, urges countries to implement “cyber arms control” in the realm of military cyberspace. Otherwise, he warns, there will be dire consequences.

Han’s article, however, is one-sided and jaundiced. He points only to developments in the United States in the military cyber arena, while ignoring more intrusive developments of similar weaponry and concepts occurring in China, Russia, and other nations. His presentation is also idealistic and extreme. To limit arms control to military cyberspace and not include civilian cyberspace is unrealistic. The military in many countries is the organization designed to protect civilian cyberspace. Chinese writers also often state that the main issue that determines the existence of deterrence theory is uncertainty. By limiting the discussion to only the United States, Han purposefully increases Western uncertainty as to the intentions and plans of the Communist Party. This is no way to initiate discussion over cyber arms control. Han will likely do more damage to the proposal than good due to his one-sided approach. There is little trust or substance in his proposal.

Finally, it would appear that a major problem with implementing global cyber armament controls is in the ideological differences between countries such as China and Russia, and the United States. While China strives to suppress and control society’s use of the Internet, the United States fights to maintain the free flow of information. Furthermore, if the following article is any indication, China’s thought process is considerably different from that of the United States, and reaching a consensus would likely be very difficult. **End FMSO Commentary (Hurst)**

Chinese Expert Pushes for Global Cyber Arms Control

12 December 2011

Source: Han Xudong, National Defense University, 建立全球“网军控”, (Establishing Global “Cyber Armament Control”) 12 Dec 2011. <http://www.zaobao.com/wencui/2011/12/liaowang111222q.shtml>



Cyber Dragon by Aaron Perez (own work)

建立全球“网军控” (Establishing Global “Cyber Armament Control”)

Unlike weapons, the Internet should not be a threat to national security. With the continuous improvement of network warfare capabilities, the time for distinguishing between civilian and military cyberspace has arrived. Implementation of “cyber arms control” within the realm of military cyberspace has thus become a top priority. --

On December 6, the United States officially established its virtual embassy in Iran on the Internet. They also expressed that should the running of this website prove to be effective, they may also consider setting up virtual embassies in countries such as North Korea. With the development and popularization of network technologies, the Internet is pushing society to higher levels of informatization. However, America’s use of the Internet to further its hegemony calls for the public’s awareness.

Unlike weapons, the Internet should not be used to threaten national security. All weapons, whether defensive or offensive in nature, are threats to social security. Weapon systems possess uniquely independent characteristics in the running of a society. The human society can still exist and develop without the presence of weapons. This is not the case with the Internet -- it is continuously and seamlessly integrated into different parts of social mechanisms. Society can run without weapons, but it cannot do without the Internet. As society develops, the Internet continues to improve, while supporting society’s advancement to more civilized levels. The Internet has not only become the basis for social development, but also drives society towards higher levels of civilization. If people are crazy enough to use the Internet to serve their own interests, they will be going against

***Continued:* Establishing Global “Cyber Armament Control”**

the development of human civilization. With its development, the Internet has given deeper meaning to the process of globalization, that is, countries have not only integrated in certain areas, but more importantly, their “nerves” have also become one. Therefore, the Internet should serve as a driver of social development, instead of becoming a weapon used to threaten national security.

The Internet should not be dominated solely by the U.S., but should be a resource shared by the entire global community. The Internet originated in the U.S., and was developed to satisfy the needs of its military. With the development of new technologies, the Internet’s scope of application continues to expand, its usage in various areas of society becoming increasingly widespread. However, the U.S. did not “forget” military applications of the Internet. Prior to the Gulf War, U.S. agents installed virus chips in the printers of Iraq’s air defense system, and paralyzed the defense system during wartime. This was when the U.S. first tasted the sweet rewards of such actions. During the time of NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia in 1999, NATO implanted a large amount of network viruses in the Yugoslav air defense systems, yet again leading to its paralysis in combat. Military applications of computer programs have made the U.S. place ever-increasing emphasis on cyber control.

The U.S. has elevated cyber security to the strategic level of national security as early as February 14, 2003, when it published the National Cyber Security Strategy. Presently, the U.S. has control over a wide range of things, from Intel chips to Microsoft operating systems, from Cisco routers to domain name management systems, and 10 out of the 13 global DNS root servers are currently under U.S. control. Absolute U.S. hegemony in the global cyberspace is an indisputable fact.

As the United States frequently uses the Internet for military purposes, many countries have also begun experimenting with applications of the Internet in the security realm. In October 2010, the U.S. began full operation of the U.S. Cyber Command [USCYBERCOM], which falls under the U.S. Strategic Command [USSTRATCOM]. Since then, the U.S. has launched its “International Strategy for Cyberspace” in May, and subsequently, the “Strategy for Cyberspace Operations” in July. This has firmly reinforced its dominant position in the global cyberspace.

Although other countries may have invested huge amounts of effort on the Internet, the sole dominant position taken by the U.S. is still unshakable. In this case, despite the many threats to cyber security, the Internet’s biggest threat comes from America. For example, during the Iraq War, all applications and analyses of ‘.iq’(Iraq’s top-level domain) were suspended, resulting in the disappearance of all websites ending in ‘.iq’ from the Internet. This means the country of Iraq no longer existed on the Internet. This time, the U.S. even created an embassy in Iran in the virtual world of the Internet. Its dominance in Internet technology and the social

nature of the technology’s applications form sharp contradictions. These contradictions seriously hinder the development of the Internet and its applications. It is an inevitable trend of social development that the Internet will become a public resource. If we treat the CPU as an unprecedented form of weaponry in human history, the CPU may well set human society back a few decades or even centuries. This is a future development of the Internet that the people do not wish to see.

The establishment of “cyber arms control” is a necessary means to serve humanity. U.S. dominance over the cyberspace as well as cyberspace disorder has seriously impeded cyber development. Before the Internet can truly serve the human society, and before the entire community gains control of Internet resources, the establishment and implementation of sound rules in Internet management is a necessary step in promoting social development through cyberspace.

People will not forget that the United States used nuclear weapons such as atomic bombs in combat, thereby pushing the international community onto the path to arms control. At the core of establishing Internet rules are rules that govern military control over the Internet, as well as the implementation of “cyber arms controls”. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the Internet is increasingly used in the area of military security; secondly, there are more and more actual “cases” of the Internet being used in the practice of military security; thirdly, the level of Internet security threats is ever-increasing, and fourthly, the Internet as a foundation for social existence is facing increasingly severe threats, with likely hindrances to social development.

Based on this, the implementation and control of rules on military cyber usage is absolutely necessary. More specifically, we need to: first of all strictly limit cyber war games to the realm of military cyberspace; secondly, set rules for military engagement in such cyber war games; thirdly, set up a supervisory body to oversee global military cyberspace usage, strictly limit the scope of cyber war games to a military nature, and strictly prohibit and punish actions that destroy or interfere with civilian networks.

With the continuous improvement of network warfare capabilities, the time has come to distinguish between civilian and military cyberspace. Implementation of “cyber arms control” in the realm of military cyberspace has also become a top priority. Otherwise, humanity may face the risk of “programs” causing unspeakable catastrophes through nuclear weapons.

FMSO Commentary: For North Korean citizens, the visit of the new Supreme Leader, Kim Jung Un, to the 105th Tank Division was significant, as it was the most successful division when the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) invaded the South in 1950. This division was only a tank brigade in 1950 and was organized by Soviet-trained North Korean officers. By visiting this unit in his first days as new Supreme Leader, Kim Jung Un demonstrated that he will continue to exploit the 'besieged fortress' mentality of the North Korean people.

Most South Koreans are not interested in this kind of article because they have grown inured to this kind of North Korean propaganda over the past sixty years. Although this excerpted radio report contains threats of aggression, the average South Korean today is more interested in domestic politics, economics and the job market. This disdain toward the North Korean propaganda can also be found within the South Korean military. Having a better grasp of the overall situation in North Korea, the South Korean soldier can see the grim truth behind all of this fulsome praise and noisy saber rattling.

Facing severe economic problems, one might think that the North Korean leadership would become less bellicose and more amenable to repairing relations with the South. This would be wrong. Like his father and grandfather before him, Kim Jung Un's political legitimacy is based almost wholly on his perceived ability to protect his country from foreign invaders. His primary objective is to remain in power rather than to build a modern, healthy society. As such, the new leadership in Pyongyang appears as determined as ever to use military threats as a means of extortion. End FMSO Commentary (Kim)

New Wine in Old Bottles

1 January 2012

Source: Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station, 1 January 2012.

Kim Jong Un. Photo by Onion, Inc., via www.theonion.com



Kim Jong Un Visits KPA Tank Division

The respected and beloved Comrade Kim Jong Un, who is the KPA supreme commander and the supreme leader of our party, state, and army, visited on 1 January, on the occasion of the meaningful New Year, Guard Seoul Ryu Kyo'ng-su Tank Division 105 of the KPA, which was conferred with the title of O Chung-hu'p 7th Regiment, and congratulated the soldiers of the people's army.

KPA Supreme Commander Comrade Kim Jong Un was greeted by the commanders of the division.

In the division -- where [the soldiers] received the New Year's joint editorial in each of their blazing hearts and launched, in soaring spirits, onto the road of the onward march of the great upswing -- the flag of the Supreme Commander and the flag of the Republic were violently flying, and the spirit of death-defyingly safeguarding the leader, the invincible and ever-victorious militant spirit -- in which they would continue to fight by devoting their lives to the respected and beloved Supreme Commander Comrade Kim Jong Un, who is the dignity and honor of the socialist fatherland -- were boiling like lava.

Each of the hearts of the soldiers of the unit -- who greeted, amid the highest honor and happiness, the respected and beloved Comrade Kim Jong Un, who imprinted, as the KPA supreme commander, his first trace of inspecting a unit on their division -- was fully loaded with the will to exterminate the enemy and the revengeful thoughts, with which they would entirely become fortresses, shields themselves, and become human bombs on the road of defending to the death the party Central Committee by laying down their lives, and with which they would follow to the end the gang of traitors and finally sweep them away without leaving a soul in case that the hateful enemies dared to defame our highest dignity, coveted our sacred fatherland, and spied on us.

The soldiers of the division offered New Year's greetings, with the fiery affection of adoration of all the soldiers of the people's army, to the respected and beloved Comrade Supreme Commander, who visited their sentry post with the entire fiery love of the fatherly

Continued: Kim Jong Un Visits KPA Tank Division

general after fathoming the hearts of the soldiers who met the New Year on the hill of bitter tears.

Comrade Supreme Commander, who received the welcoming report, affectionately held the commanders' hands and ardently told them to put forth their strength, while also saying that he visited them because he wanted to see them, comrades, who must have spent days in tears after losing the fatherly general.

During the period of the Fatherland Liberation War of the past, the division showed the US imperialist aggressors the true merits of the cast iron horses of the heroic KPA in numerous battles, including the Taejo'n liberation battle, and achieved brilliant war results as well as seizing and occupying Seoul, only three days after the beginning of the war, making the flag of the Republic fly above the Central Government Building [chungangch'o'ng] of the puppets, occupying broadcasting stations of Seoul, and declaring all over the world the news of the liberation of Seoul. Especially, in the division, both the first trace of the military-first revolutionary leadership of the respected and beloved general and the immortal traces which he left after visiting it in the last period of his life are ardently and elaborately engraved.

[He] said that the soldiers of the division should engrave and cherish deep in their hearts the labor of the leader and the general, which they devoted to the strengthening and development of our armed force of tanks, and more firmly solidify the division into a group of dauntless fighters, while also saying that Tank Division 105 was one of the army units in which the historic relics of the leadership of the fatherly leader and the respected and beloved general were embedded most.

The division has changed the deep lamentation for having sadly lost the fatherly general into a thousand-fold and a hundred-fold strength and courage and has risen up like mountains, and is continuing to violently stir up the hot wind of leap in the training in battle politics of the New Year.

Soldiers of the division have erected and harbored in their hearts, like a nuclear bomb, the hatred for and revengeful thoughts about the gang of traitors -- who committed, before the nation which met with a great national mourning, the high treason, which will be indelible however long a time may pass -- and are waiting for a battle order, and forging sharp and strong blades on their swords and guns.

Comrade Supreme Commander rated high the fact that the soldiers of the division were keenly watching the aggressive maneuvers of the enemies and putting spurs on training and the completion of preparations for fights without reducing, even for a moment, the high tension.

The KPA Supreme Commander Comrade Kim Jong Un had a

meaningful souvenir photograph taken together with the soldiers of the division, while expressing his expectation and conviction that they would continue to perform proud, meritorious deeds on the honorable sentry post of protecting and defending the fatherland.

Soldiers, who burst up shouts of hurrah like a storm when the respected and beloved Comrade Supreme Commander came out to the photographing site, shouted from their hearts the slogan of death-defyingly safeguarding Kim Jong Un, while being unable to keep their tears from welling up in infinite gratitude for Comrade Supreme Commander, who visited the sentry post on the early morning of the festive day, realizing the desire of them, who had missed the fatherly general even when they heard the sounds of magpies.

Comrade Supreme Commander repeatedly stopped his departing steps and answered the soldiers, who were ceaselessly shedding tears, by waving his hand.

The respected and beloved Comrade Supreme Commander condescended to hold the hands of the commanders and gave them love and trust, while telling them all to be healthy, put spurs on preparations for fights, and take good care of the soldiers so that the division could become a model of the entire army according to the teaching of the fatherly general.

All the soldiers of the division made a definite and fiery vow to defend to the death, staking their lives, the party Central Committee, of which the head is the respected and beloved Comrade Kim Jong Un, and finally and by all means achieve, with the gun barrel, the historic cause of the reunification of the fatherland by never forgetting the honor and happiness of having the respected and beloved Comrade Supreme Commander on their sentry post and more powerfully carrying out the training in battle politics according to the behest of the fatherly general.

***FMSO Commentary:** Many of the conflicts or violent incidents in Central Asia have been localized. They do not often spread to other parts of a country or across borders despite predictions that they would, and they are typically sparked by a small incident that grows into something larger and more violent. The June 2010 violence in southern Kyrgyzstan was a prime example of this; overnight on June 9-10 a fight among youth got out of control and developed into violence that lasted several days, left a few hundred dead and destroyed numerous homes and businesses.*

Part of the reason that the June 2010 violence grew as quickly as it did was because of already existing ethnic tension between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. In the following article about a recent fight among youth in southern Kyrgyzstan there is a somewhat similar tension between Tajiks and Kyrgyz, although not nearly with the same results. The quick police and firefighter response to the incident certainly helped prevent it from becoming worse, but unofficial sources also credit village leaders. Respected community leaders from both ethnic groups stepped in to calm the situation and compelled the youth to simply go home.

*Another aspect of the fight was that initial reports put the numbers involved in the thousands; this article mentions about 500 on each side, but it is possible even that number is inflated. Information about the story came out (maybe too) quickly but once it was determined that it would not turn into something worse, the incident was forgotten just as fast. In any case, there is still concern in Kyrgyzstan that the June 2010 events could repeat. **End FMSO Commentary (Stein)***

Another Interethnic Fight in Kyrgyzstan?

30 December 2011



Source: Aktalov, Askar. “В селе Андарак после конфликта между таджиками и кыргызами порядок обеспечивают 300 сотрудников силовых структур (300 Security Servicemen Provide Order in the Village of Andarak after a Conflict between Tajiks and Kyrgyz),” K News, 30 December 2011. <http://www.knews.kg/ru/action/8642/>

Photo by K-News.kg, via (www.knews.kg)

В селе Андарак после конфликта между таджиками и кыргызами порядок обеспечивают 300 сотрудников силовых структур (300 Security Servicemen Provide Order in the Village of Andarak after a Conflict between Tajiks and Kyrgyz)

Security services prevented a riot in the village of Andarak, Batken Province (southern Kyrgyzstan, near the border with Tajikistan), where on December 29, hundreds of Kyrgyz from different neighborhoods tried to start a pogrom after a fight between a group of young Tajiks and three Kyrgyz students. An official said that on the previous day (December 29) in the village about 10 Tajik youth, born in the years 1990-1991, beat up three Kyrgyz students, born in the years 1994-1995. “The fight occurred because of a verbal skirmish between young people. All participants of the fight were villagers and citizens of Kyrgyzstan; there were no citizens of Tajikistan,” – said Said Eratov, a Batken Province official.

After the fight about 500 Tajiks and Kyrgyz gathered in the village, the latter demanded punishment for the assailants of the incident. However, late in the evening on December 29 a group of Kyrgyz youth started a pogrom of houses, shops, and vehicles of Tajiks. “There were two houses on fire, but firefighters quickly extinguished. However, two nearby sheds burned down. Eratov said security forces reacted quickly and stopped more pogroms; the youth dispersed after security forces applied used limited force and talked with the youth.

According to Eratov, there are now 300 security service members in the village, including units of the Ministry of Defense and National Security Committee. Joint investigative teams have arrested three Tajiks involved in the fight. Also instigators of the pogroms will be detained.

FMSO Commentary: The year 2011 marked the 20th year of independence for Central Asian countries, but other events in the region have mostly overshadowed any progress made in development and stability. The following article from Kyrgyzstan's Белый Парус (White Sail) reviews some of the major 2011 incidents in Central Asia from a local perspective. According to the author, the 2012 outlook for Central Asia could be grim and primed for change. While this prediction is possible, there are some things to consider alongside Aleksandrov's assessment.

The violence in Kazakhstan last year was a surprise for a country that had been unaffected by incidents that happened to its southern neighbors. The perpetrators of some of the incidents did have ties to terrorist groups, and this kind of violence could very well continue into the coming year. However, it should be noted that the police and security services were the main targets of attacks. Outside of the Zhanaozen incident, civilians and infrastructure were left relatively untouched. Most of the incidents have been acts of revenge solely against police or security services for alleged torture of prisoners arrested on terrorism-related charges.


The peaceful transition to a new president in Kyrgyzstan is a good sign of stability, but it is too early to determine if the new leadership will favor Russia over the United States. President Atambayev recently mentioned that Russia has not paid any rent for use of the Kant Airbase outside Bishkek, much less a few other small military facilities that Russia uses. This should not be interpreted as a sign of favoritism, but economic considerations. The Kant Airbase is used for air units as part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO) reaction force. Kyrgyzstan's membership and involvement with the CSTO is such that the status of Kant is not likely to change. Instead, Kyrgyzstan and Russia

Reviewing Central Asia in 2011

10 January 2012

Source: Aleksandrov, Mikhail. "ЦентрАзия-2011: проблемы только начинаются (Central Asia-2011: the Problems are only Beginning)," Белый Парус (White Sail), 10 January 2012.

<http://www.parusk.info/2012/01/10/55505#more-55505>



Central Asia Borders. By user:Serglo [GFDL (www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html)], via Wikimedia Commons

ЦентрАзия-2011: проблемы только начинаются (Central Asia-2011: the Problems are only Beginning)

The year 2011 turned out to be rough, even by local standards. Destabilization in Kazakhstan, new negotiations between Uzbekistan and the United States, Tajikistan's falling-out with Russia, exacerbation of the conflict around the Caspian Sea, and the first bloodless transfer of power in Kyrgyzstan – all this seems like a prologue of change in the new year.

Kazakhstan: The End of Calm

Kazakhstan in the past year has experienced several bombings, shootings of police by Islamists, and bloody clashes between the government and oil companies in Zhanaozen, Mangistau Province. All this has called into question the inherent stability of Kazakhstan. In May about fifteen thousand oil workers (in western Kazakhstan) went on strike and protests. The workers demanded higher wages, but the authorities, knowing that concessions would entail an avalanche of similar claims across the country, did not meet their demands.

may agree on future economic support. Ultimately the coming year will bring change to Central Asia, but, taking into account the surprise of last year's events, any predications are speculative at best.
End FMSO Commentary (Stein)

Continued: Central Asia-2011: the Problems are only Beginning

Built-up tension resulted in bloody clashes between strikers and the police on the Republic's Independence Day. Zhanaozen was partially destroyed; the crowd smashed the mayor's and oil company's office, as well as banks and shops. During a shooting with police, at least 16 people were killed and over 60 injured. President Nazarbayev, who personally went to the scene, changed the heads of the city and province, and removed his son-in-law Timur Kulibayev from his post as head of KazMunayGas; he was considered the most likely successor to the president.

Kyrgyzstan Without Revolutions

The main event in 2011 for Kyrgyzstan – the country's first peaceful transfer of power from one president to another. For a country that has experienced two revolutions, and undergoing a state of permanent reform, it is a great achievement. Contrary to the hopes of citizens of Kyrgyzstan, which this winter has demonstrated, a violent change of president or the formation of (a real) government does not make the electricity work better. Already in the first days of winter rolling blackouts have begun as well as gas shortages; populism politicians and corruption do not disappear on their own.

Meanwhile, the new prime minister has already said that cooperation with Russia is a priority for Kyrgyzstan. New president Atambayev publicly promised Moscow that in 2014 the United States will leave Manas (Transit Center) in the Bishkek airport. How these statements correspond to the real aspirations of Kyrgyz politicians will become clear next year. Presently, it is a fact that more than half the programs on Kyrgyz national TV are sponsored by USAID and other American organizations. The final decision on the United States exit from Manas has not been accepted.

Heroin River

Tajikistan in 2011, without exaggeration, can be called the year of missed opportunities. Construction on the Rogun Dam did not start, and given the warm relations between the United States and the World Bank with Uzbekistan, we can say that examination results (which would demonstrate the feasibility of the dam) will be negative. The country's economy has not been developed by the promise in last year's presidential address – for a year there was not one industrial facility built.

The loudest, and probably in many respects exemplary, event in Tajikistan this year was the arrest of a Russian pilot. It worsened the already not too warm relations between Dushanbe and Moscow. Two pilots on separate An-72 planes from Afghanistan were arrested in March at the airport of Kurgan-Tyube, Tajikistan. Two months later they were charged with illegally crossing the border and smuggling. Without delay, both received sentences of 10 years in maximum security prison.

The actions of Tajik authorities caused a flurry of condemnation in Russia. It started a deportation of Tajik migrant workers and a proposed ban on labor migration from Tajikistan. As a result of long and secret negotiations in November, the sentences of both pilots were reviewed and they were released. Three weeks later a relative of the Tajik President, who had been convicted in Russia for large-scale heroin trafficking, was released. This story exposed all the problems of the Tajik-Russian drug mafia, which involved not only the swallows of drug filled condoms, but also the highest ranking officials in both countries.

FMSO Commentary: Arguably, no other Central Asian country has imported more Western culture or products than Kazakhstan. While some might criticize Western culture for imposing itself on Kazakhstan the past 20 years, the country has adopted and tailored certain things for its own use. The following article about a military reality show is a good example of this. The public in Kazakhstan has criticized the government and security services for the handling of violent incidents in the past year, especially the police reaction during unrest in the western town of Zhanaozen, where over a dozen people were killed and even more were injured. However, it is difficult to say if this has affected overall patriotism.

The armed forces of Kazakhstan still rely on conscripts to fill the ranks, which often results in those who can avoid service for various reasons doing so. Many avoid service for the same reasons that one of the contestants was surprised to see, like overall quality of life, rather than a sense of duty to the country. The popularity of the show will probably not translate into better quality of conscripts or even help with recruiting, but the Defense Ministry of Kazakhstan might be able to capitalize on at least improving the image of the military. End FMSO Commentary (Stein)

Reality TV and the Kazakh Military

12 January 2012

Source: Zubov, Andrey. “Казахстанская телепрограмма об армии признана лучшей в СНГ (Kazakhstan’s television show about the army is recognized as the best in the CIS),” Liter, 12 January 2012. http://www.liter.kz/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=8540&Itemid=2



Kazakh military soldiers. Photo by Liter, via www.liter.kz.

Казахстанская телепрограмма об армии признана лучшей в СНГ (Kazakhstan’s television show about the army is recognized as the best in the CIS)

The multi-episode project “special assignment” (on the TV channel Khabar) – (has been running for) exactly one year. During this time, its heroes have been famous people of Kazakhstan. The program’s purpose is simple: in various units of the Kazakh Army there are special groups, to which two civilian heroes are sent. For three days they will live in the barracks with ordinary soldiers. No concessions, no telephone or communication with the outside world.

They are just common soldiers, who have a certain job to do. The heroes carry out a lot of difficult tests and checks of physical and psychological endurance. Fitness instructor Baurzhan Karipov fell into service in a special forces units on the Caspian Sea. For three days he was trained in shooting, knife throwing, and underwater sabotage. According to Baurzhan, who once served in the army, everything has changed now: “I like the new outfit, living conditions, and most importantly it’s now a different service – not the past Soviet sloppiness!”

According to Mikhail Cherkov, the head of the Department of Media and Public Relations of Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense, the project has three important social aspects: a strong patriotic principle, the idea of collectivism, and high morals. These are consistent with the new concept of the ideological work in Kazakhstan’s Army.

FMSO Commentary: The October 30, 2011 election of Almazbek Atambayev has been of much interest to those speculating on the future of the U.S. military's Manas Transit Center (MTC) adjoining the airport on the outskirts of Bishkek. Almazbek Atambayev is often described as "pro-Russian" and has made statements before and after the election that the U.S. would pull out of the Kyrgyz Republic. Atambayev's statements about the MTC is not the first time the future of the MTC has seemed bleak.

Kyrgyz public opinion has occasionally soured on the MTC. The highest profile incident, was the December 6, 2006 killing of Alexander Ivanov, a Kyrgyz truck driver of Russian dissent, by U.S Air Force security. Many Kyrgyz believed, and still believe, that killing Ivanov was unwarranted, and were unhappy that the airmen who shot Ivanov went unpunished. Another public relations snafu concerning the MTC resulted from a Russian media report that the U.S. military is using the MTC as an import point for Afghan heroin. The MTC's public relations woes are often exacerbated, or started, by the Russian media, which is the primary news outlet in the Kyrgyz Republic.

Despite these low points, the issue that has come closest to shuttering the MTC was the 2009 negotiations over rental fees for the facility. The U.S. eventually agreed to increase payment for the base to \$200 million. This income is a sizeable chunk of the Kyrgyz government's revenues. In addition, the MTC is a major employer, providing jobs for several hundred local employees. As the analysts in this article point out, Atambayev's comments about the MTC may really be intended to increase bargaining pressure when rental negotiations resume for the MTC.

Another interesting part of this article is Atambayev's comment that the

Leveraging from the Middle: Manas Transit Center Continues to Stoke Political Rhetoric

29 December 2011

Source: Olga Peshnecha, "Threat to Security: Kyrgyzstan Calls for the Date of Withdrawal of U.S. Base," 29 December 2011. <http://vz.ru/politics/2011/12/29/550744.html>



Service members traveling to Manas Transit Center rest on their C-17. Every month, thousands of service members pass through Manas on their way to and from Afghanistan. DOD photo by Cpl. Christopher Bigelow, U.S. Army

Threat to Security: Kyrgyzstan Calls for the Date of Withdrawal of U.S. Base

The president of Kyrgyzstan Atambaev stated that the U.S. Manas Transit Center (MTC) at the Manas international airport in Kyrgyzstan should be closed because it is a threat to the country, and it should be closed by 2014.

"Either the Americans leave by 2014, or the Transit Center will be converted to a civilian facility for joint use of Russia and America. If the U.S. would abandon the shared civic center with Russia, Kyrgyzstan is ready to cooperate in this sphere with Russia and other countries "- said Atambayev, adding that the presence of the Manas Transit Center (MTC) was a "threat to national security."

The U.S. base in Kyrgyzstan appeared in 2001 after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Local and foreign experts link the political instability in Kyrgyzstan to the presence of American influence. In 2009, former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev promised to withdraw the military base, but eventually a new agreement was reached, and the was renamed from Manas Airbase to Manas Transit Center.

Igor Khalanskii, a Russian political scientist, says that Atambaev's promise about the removal of the MTC appear to be a public relations move and works only on paper. He said that in 2013 it will be clear if Kyrgyzstan is ready to get rid of the Manas Transit Center.

Political analyst Medet Tyulegenov said Atambayev wants to please Russia by expressing an intention to establish a civil transit center, with Russia and other countries, in place of the U.S. military MTC. Another possibility is that Atambaev might be posturing to raise rent revenues for the base, and possibly develop costly new projects. "


Russians have paid nothing for their use of the Kant Airbase since 2007. These comments, as Atambayev's comments about the MTC, may be designed to gain some concessions in future Kyrgyz-Russian negotiations. Atambayev may spout some pro-Russian rhetoric, but his interests appear to be much more mundane, that is, gaining financial advantage by leveraging two greater powers. **End FMSO Commentary (Bartles)**

Continued: Threat to Security: Kyrgyzstan Calls for the Date of Withdrawal of U.S. Base

At a press conference Atambayev also referred to the Iranian military threat. Atambayev stated that he believed an Iranian attack on the MTC was unlikely, but possible if hostilities arose between the Iran and the U.S.

At a press conference, President Atambaev also raised the issue of the Russian military base in Kant (20 km from the capital of Kyrgyzstan). "Russia has not paid rent for its military air base in Kant, for four years. The last time the Russian Defense Ministry has implemented a payment was in 2007" He also said that during his meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, the question was raised, after which the Russian head of state ordered the Defence Minister to pay all debts.

In another statement Atambayev criticized the CSTO Secretary Nikolai Bordyuzha, who, in his opinion, interfered in Kyrgyz domestic affairs. Such an attack against the U.S. and Russia, according to a source from the presidential administration, is due to the fact that Atambaev wants to prove that he is neither pro Kremlin or the West.



Tim Thomas's *Recasting the Red Star* describes Russia's culture of military thought through its modernization effort. Adding to his robust library of work on the subject, Tim Thomas illuminates Russia's Defense Ministry reform efforts, the Russian national security strategy take on the operational environment, and a relevant review of the Russian military doctrine.

FMSO Commentary: In May 1960 the USSR was able to shoot down a U-2 spy plane that was performing a reconnaissance mission high over the Soviet Union. The incident proved to be a huge public relations victory for the Soviet leadership, who now had more proof of the perfidy of the U.S. and the strength of the Soviet defense. While much has changed over the past half century, a similar sense of triumph was felt by those responsible for recently bringing down a US drone flying near the Afghan-Iran border.

Given the high-tech secrecy of this equipment, the general fog of war, and the closed nature of the Iranian regime, there are many unanswered questions surrounding this incident. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that a country like Belarus would claim credit for helping to down this unmanned aircraft. As the drone market and technology are certain to expand, the demand for a product to interfere and perhaps neutralize these new intelligence and weapon platforms will increase correspondingly. Countries unable to develop the necessary electronic and digital infrastructure to support unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology will search for an asymmetric response.

*Though there have been some disagreements in the past (primarily over energy supplies), Russia and Belarus continue to maintain a close degree of cooperation, especially in the realm of security. There have been reports in the past that Russian defense firms have used contacts in Belarus to channel military equipment abroad. The excerpted report below makes allegations that Russian officials may have served as middlemen in delivering this electronic warfare (EW) technology to the Iranians. **End FMSO Commentary (Finch)***

Asymmetrical Response from Belarus

14 December 2011

Source: Alyaksandr Alesin, "Belarusian technologies at the service of the Islamist regime," Belorusskiy Partizan Online, 14 December 2011. <http://www.belaruspartisan.org>



RQ-170 drawing by Truthdowser at en.wikipedia [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0) or GFDL (www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html)], from Wikimedia Commons

Belarusian Technology Brings Down US Drone?

It is highly likely that the means used by Iran to down the US drone were manufactured by Belarus, a Belarusian military expert has said. The drone was vulnerable to Belarusian electronic warfare means. Delivery of such components to Iran was probably carried out by a Russian middleman, the author added.

A secret American drone has fallen into the hands of the Iranians. It is not ruled out that this was helped by electronic warfare means designed by the Belarusian defense industry complex.

On 4 December the world media, referring to information from Iranian sources, reported that Iran's electronic warfare systems had downed in the east of the country an American drone, a Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel ("Sentry").

The Americans acknowledged that communication with this device had indeed been lost for unknown reasons. But not over Iran, over western Afghanistan.

Such evasiveness is entirely understandable. This plane was so secret that the USA right up until late 2009 did not recognize even the existence of the "Kandahar beast" (the device received this nickname from the name of the city, near which it was noticed for the first time).

It is known that this drone had been used previously in a number of critical missions: to mount surveillance of the shelter of bin-Ladin in Abbottabad in 2007 and the operation to eliminate it in Pakistan in 2011. The American NBC also reported that in Iran this drone was used in the interests of the CIA to gather information about facilities of the nuclear program in that country.

This time the story had a sequel. On 8 December Iran disclosed a short video, which made it clear that the apparatus was already in the hands of the local military. Not only that - it is clear that it had not received virtually any external damage. Some parameters of the device were also published.

From the publications in the Iranian media it followed that the RQ-170 is equipped with the latest surveillance systems, electronic communications and radar. And it can be used to

***Continued:* Belarusian Technology Brings Down US Drone?**

collect an extremely wide variety of intelligence data, in particular for obtaining high-resolution photographs, readings of the radiation background and air samples.

The Iranian side has already announced that it intends to decode the drone, copy and improve it as part of its program to develop unmanned aerial vehicles. Iran does not intend to return the unit to the USA, as Washington has demanded.

The fact that the loss of this drone is very painful for the USA is also emphasized by a report in *The Wall Street Journal*. According to the newspaper, in an effort to keep the secret technology from the Iranians, the US military proposed activating a special forces group to evacuate or destroy the most valuable equipment. An alternative option suggested the destruction of the drone by an airstrike.

It is true that the Iranians could regard an invasion by the special forces as the beginning of combat action with all the ensuing consequences. It was therefore decided that it was best not to attract attention to the aircraft, which, as was stated by the initial data of the military, crashed in a remote area and is likely never to be discovered.

Vulnerable point of the drone

But, as we see, events took an unpredictable turn. Tehran really got hold of a virtually undamaged sample of the top-secret American spy plane. In this regard, some experts have made an assumption about the credibility of the Iranian version of its landing.

Thus, according to the assessment of the Russian military analyst Vladislav Shurygin, in the control of the drone there is one vulnerable link - the need for constant communication with ground control stations. The large amount of data transmitted requires rather "fat" radio communication channels, for which it is very difficult, almost impossible to provide with a high level of reliability.

In the simplest case they can simply be blocked by interference. A more sophisticated option is to hack into the encrypted signal transmitted from ground stations to the drone's control systems. After that, it is jammed and new commands are transmitted to the drone from the ground source.

For their part, US experts strongly dispute this version, insisting that the unit fell because of a malfunction. At the same time they refer to the anti-radar properties of the device, and to special protection of the control program.

Additional intrigue in this story was made by the publication *Flightglobal*, which suggested that the Iranians could have used in the operation against the RQ-170 a set of radio electronic intelligence (REI), the 1L222 "Motor depot", recently received from Russia. Here, reference was made to the statement by the deputy

director of the Federal Service for Military Technical Cooperation, Konstantin Biryulin, of 27 October.

From this it followed that Russia, within the framework of military technical cooperation, actually had supplied Iran with electronic combat means such as Motor Base, and was in talks on supplying another batch of equipment of this type. Electronic warfare devices are defensive systems and are not subject to UN sanctions.

Belarus production of jamming devices

It is believed by experts in the field of design, manufacture and operation of drones that it is strong interference that can cause malfunction of the program, which was supposed to return the plane home after the loss of the control signal, and the rescue program should have landed the drone more or less gently after the development of fuel.

With regard to the control signal, the GPS satellite stations, on the basis of which it is produced, are in orbit for 15 years and the technology for blocking them has long mastered. But intercepting control of a drone, if the channel is encrypted, is virtually impossible.

For us, the special importance of the incident with the American drone is the fact that many important components of the electronic warfare complex, such as, for example, ground stations of powerful jamming equipment and equipment to block GPS, are produced and presented on the world market by Belarus. We can assume that, in the case of Iran, the supply of these products involved a Russian middleman.

The fact that the leadership of Belarus attaches great importance to the development of electronic warfare can be judged if only on the basis of the speech by [President] Alyaksandr Lukashenka to parliamentarians on 21 April. And although it was a question there of countering cruise missiles, you can rest assured that the Belarusian manufacturers of EW equipment have also prepared means to counter drones.

It is known that military industrial enterprises of Belarus have already produced and delivered for trial operation by the forces of a complex of a jamming installation by Sapfir laser guidance systems, and a set of radio jamming of the GPS global navigation system, Naves-U. The work of the on-board electronics can be disrupted both by the SNP-2 and SNP-4 powerful jamming stations that have long been in service with the Belarusian army, and by new radio interference stations.

It is the development of electronic means of countering modern high-precision weapons and methods of their combat use that today is one of the priority trends in the development of weapons and military equipment in Belarus.

***FMSO Commentary:** The Russian political and military leadership have generally taken a more jaundiced view toward what many refer to as the ‘Arab Spring.’ Not altogether comfortable with the concept that the state derives its power from the consent of the governed, and concerned that extremist elements will exploit the political confusion to secure a hold on power, the Kremlin prefers stability (even if corrupt) over the chaos and uncertainty of democratic change. Added to these concerns is the prevalent belief (at least among those close to Putin) that these popular protests for political change are sponsored and fomented by the United States. Their logic is based on the premise that the U.S. uses the veneer of democratic change/revolution to strengthen its geopolitical position.*

Dmitry Rogozin has been one of the chief proponents of this Kremlin worldview. Prior to serving as Russia’s representative to NATO, Rogozin established his credentials as a ‘great-power’ Russian nationalist, who proclaimed that Russia had the global mission of counterbalancing the nefarious west/US. His appointment by then President Putin in January 2008 was a clear signal that Russia was no longer going to be a passive observer to any further expansion of the alliance (particularly into what some Kremlin leaders refer to as their ‘privileged sphere of influence’). While at NATO, Rogozin proved more effective in defending Russia’s great-power interests than in cooperation with the Western alliance. He considers helping to stop the accession of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO as one of his primary achievements.

Last month Rogozin was promoted to the position of Deputy Prime Minister, with oversight for Russia’s defense industry. There is some conjecture that this was a move to strengthen ‘Team-Putin’s’ re-election bid to the presidency in March, 2012. One of Putin’s chief campaign platforms has been the strengthening of Russia’s military, a subject near and dear to Rogozin. According to their logic, providing a strong defense, as opposed to a popular mandate via elections, is the ruler’s primary legitimizing factor. Such a system, however, presupposes the need for an external enemy; hence, the constant Kremlin warnings over the bellicosity of NATO and the U.S..

Russian Concerns and the Arab Spring

13 January 2012

Source: “Senior Russian Minister Warns West Against Intervening In Syria,” Interfax 13 January 2012.



Dmitry Medvedev with Dmitry Rogozin. Photo by the Presidential Press and Information Office, via kremlin.ru

Senior Russian Minister Warns West Against Intervening In Syria

Any exertion of pressure on the difficult internal civilian situation in Syria will lead to an inevitable disaster, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who until recently was Russia’s permanent representative at NATO, has said.

“The example of Libya should cool everyone down in terms of intervening in other people’s civil wars,” Rogozin said on Friday [13 January] in Brussels.

Russia’s former representative at NATO gave a news conference at the Russian mission at NATO. Rogozin travelled to Brussels in order, as he explained, to bid farewell to the military-political leadership of the organization where he worked for four years.

Asked by Interfax about his views on NATO’s assurances that it has no plans to intervene on events in Syria, and that the case of Syria differs from the case of Libya, Rogozin stipulated that purely political issues are no longer part of his remit. This is the prerogative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But he is ready to reply “as a citizen of the Russian Federation and as a high-ranking official”.


According to him, “there are no heroes in civil wars, and those who intervene in civil wars are anti-heroes”.

Rogozin's ever-loquacious comments below, regarding possible Western involvement in Syria, must be placed within the context of the prevalent Kremlin worldview. A long-time ally of the Assad regime, Russia has portrayed the source of civic disturbances within Syria as growing Islamic radicalism and/or foreign meddling. Rogozin would argue that the stability of the current Syrian leadership (though perhaps not fully democratic) is preferable to any opposition seizing power. Now, as a prominent member of the Putin team, he would contend that the same holds true for Russia. End FMSO Commentary (Finch)

Continued: Senior Russian Minister Warns West Against Intervening In Syria

“Syria needs to be left in peace, and the conflicting parties need to be helped to emerge finally from confrontation and move towards political dialogue. There is no other way. Any war ends in peace. The only issue is the price of this peace. So no one should meddle in Syria. That’s dangerous,” the deputy prime minister stressed.

“You and I can already see how, everywhere in North Africa and the Middle East where the West has attempted to influence the democratization of the political system, the outcome of this influence has been the arrival of Islamists in power. If the West believes that it would be convenient for it to have southern neighbors that are states where the shariat is the basis of the political system, then that, of course, is the West’s choice. But I believe that that is extremely short-sighted,” Rogozin noted.



Les Grau’s classic *The Other Side of the Mountain*, is the most broadly distributed book on the Afghan theater. Capturing the personal stories and perspectives of Mujahedin fighters during the Soviet Afghan war, Les Grau has provided a blueprint of the belligerents in the current conflict.

It is on General Petraeus’s reading list and in the rucksacks of deploying soldiers.

FMSO Commentary: *The 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing served as a huge coming-out party for modern China. Fully aware that they would be at the center of the global stage, Chinese officials worked overtime to ensure that their audience saw the very best this growing power had to offer. More important than their first place standing in the gold medal count was the newfound global respect China earned for this public relations spectacle.*

A similar strategy must have driven Russian officials in their successful bid to host the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Recall that when Russia won this honor (July 2007), the country was flush with fossil fuel revenues and a steadily growing economy. (Then) President Putin may have conjectured that by hosting this event, Russia could not only show off its modern, soft-power strength on the global stage, but, by holding the games in the problematic North Caucasus region, the country could also provide needed investment into this potentially profitable tourist area. Robust economic growth would help to deliver jobs and investment, which, in turn, could aid in eradicating extremist ideology.

The games will not commence for another two years (Feb 2014), and much progress has been made in constructing the necessary facilities to host this global sporting event. Billions of rubles have been allocated toward this project, and, more than likely, Russia will complete the necessary infrastructure to make these Winter Olympic games a success.

An Olympic venue, however, also provides a rich target for those who might want to use negative public relations (read 'terrorist act') to gain notoriety (e.g., 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich). Besides concerns over international terrorists, Russian security officials must prepare to defend against local threats. Despite the new investment in the area to support these games, the Caucasus region (both North and South) still has plenty of potential threats. From a security standpoint, protecting this mountainous region will take considerable resources and effort. As the excerpted article below suggests, Russian officials are already working to ensure that uninvited visitors have no opportunity to disturb this mega-event.
End FMSO Commentary (Finch)

Olympic Challenges

30 December 2011

Source: Oleg Galitskikh, "RG Has Checked Out How the Russo-Abkhazian Border Is Being Guarded," Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 30 December 2011



Black Sea map Created by User:NormanEinstein (Own work) [GFDL (www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html) or CC-BY-SA-3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/)], via Wikimedia Commons

New Equipment, Traditional Resources Employed in Sochi Security Area

Sochi—More than 460 persons that had turned up within the vicinity of the border were detained in the border zone in the Sochi area in 2011. As far as intruders who had been attempting to cross the Russo-Abkhazian lines or to jump through checkpoints unnoticed are concerned, there were in the year roughly 50 of them. Your RG correspondents set out for a mountain border unit to check on whether everything really is “under lock and key”.

The border division of the locality of Yermolovka (they used to be called border units) has been tallying the year’s results. The civilian population was present at the function also, what is more: the border guards are now helped by the rural volunteer troop and the troop of the Adler Cossack company. Eleven community activists received testimonials for assistance in protection of the border.

Continued: New Equipment, Traditional Resources Employed in Sochi Security Area

Ninety persons who violated border-zone procedures were detained this year in the 25-kilometer section that is controlled by this subunit (it is stationed on mountain terrain on spurs of the Western Caucasus and is part of the FSB of Russia Coast Guard Black Sea-Azov Border Directorate). These were not spies or saboteurs, of course--there were none of these here. Incidental folks or groups of casual tourists, who are on alpine hikes, most often stray into the border zone. Such a group was recently detected in the area of Mt Dzykhra. Unauthorized presence in a sensitive area is regarded as an administrative offense.

“Citizens without papers may be held for up to 48 hours to establish identity, they are also issued a fine of R500,” Lieutenant Vladislav Toportsov, officer of the border division of the Yermolovka locality, says. “If they have papers, they are issued a fine also, and the intruders are simply transported outside the border zone.”

As far as people who have fetched up at an illegal border crossing, both in a forest tract and at a checkpoint, are concerned, approximately 50 of them were detained last year throughout the territory controlled by the border subunits billeted in the Sochi area.

Not everyone crosses the border with some malign intent, incidentally. An occasion when a detail came in a mountain forest upon an exhausted individual is recalled here. “Is this Russia,” the unknown individual unexpectedly inquired. It turned out that he was a Russian citizen who had escaped the bondage in which he had been held for several years in a Transcaucasus state.

Now the border is guarded entirely differently from what was the case some 10 years ago. A possible intrusion may be detected without it being necessary to leave the premises: the duty officer can spot it in a technical center, where information from motion sensors and video cameras is aggregated. If it is suspected that the border has been violated, an alarm team--mounted or vehicular--goes to the scene. Attempts to cross the border occur most often in the summer, when the rivers run shallow.

At the Yermolovka border unit also everything looks different from what we are accustomed to seeing at the movies. This is a modern complex equipped with technical innovations and communication facilities, satellite included, and computers with an internet outlet have been installed in the service premises. A 74-apartment building for the officers and contract personnel was put up here this spring. It has its own helicopter pad, boiler house, power plant, athletics grounds, and training simulator room and an Orthodox chapel in honor of Sergiy Radonezhskiy. And the grounds also have an entirely original appearance: space has been found even for palm trees and flowerbeds.

But the border guards are not, for all that, relinquishing the

traditional assistants either: there are stables and a K-9 service at the border unit.

“If it is not possible to send out a vehicle alarm team, it is broken terrain here, after all, we send a mounted detail,” Toportsov explains. “We take dogs with the horses also, there are special containers for this.”

The border guards are helped by the local residents, many of whom are in volunteer troops.

“The border guards protect us, and we help them the best we can,” Ashot Markaryan, a resident of the village of Yermolovka, says. “The local people all know one another, and if an outsider has shown up, they report this immediately. There have been many such instances.”

There are officially 180 residents of the village, but, in actual fact, there are more folks here for some of the citizenry is registered elsewhere. Nonetheless, each newcomer is in the public eye.

Your RG correspondents were shown how an alarm team is put together. We leave the grounds together with a mounted detail, the riders easily climb a rocky mountain road. Here we have a chance to see what the border unit looked like earlier: not far off are decommissioned unsightly huts without any conveniences. The border guards huddled here for just under 13 years--since 1992, when border development began here. The present border unit was built here six years ago, and regular life, which is entirely comparable with urban life, arrived here together with the new technical equipment. The border guards say that the local authorities also render them diverse assistance, organizing a cultural program, for example.