

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT WATCH



This Edition:
A special look at
“Information” in the OE

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For over 25 years, the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has conducted open source research on foreign perspectives of defense and security issues, emphasizing those topics that are understudied or unconsidered.

FMSO's Operational Environment Watch provides translated selections and analysis from a diverse range of foreign articles and other media that our analysts believe will give military and security experts an added dimension to their critical thinking about the Operational Environment.

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The struggle for the information domain is nothing new. Throughout time, men have fought over what they believed to be true. These beliefs were shaped by the stories they read and the images they saw. Modern technology has made this struggle for information dominance ever more complicated. In a number of articles for this month's edition of the OEW, analysts have examined how information is being used in the foreign operational environment.

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"We are at war right now. The wars are now waged in the electronic domain. Wars are not fought by armies anymore..."



13 African Media Stir a Resurgence of Anti-AFRICOM Sentiment

United States Looming Invasion of Central Africa (2)," The Moment (Nigeria) 29 Oct 2011

The United States must send 'special forces'; a catch-all term for spies, hit squads, intelligence officers and other destabilizing forces, to Central Africa to catch Joseph Kony.'



30 Security and the Media

Justifica Anonymous ataque contra los Zetas (Anonymous justifies attack against Los Zetas)," Milenio, 02 November 2011

The hacker group "Anonymous" recently indicated that they were going to conduct Operation Cartel, a movement to release detailed information regarding the Los Zetas organization



35 Chinese Perceptions of US Info Operations

Han Xudong, Professor at China's National Defense University, "New Form of Global Warfare by the United States,"

Liaowang, 10 Oct 2011

This form of warfare differs from traditional warfare with regard to a number of features. This new form of warfare poses a greater threat and greater danger to national security than traditional warfare.



42 Major Russian Media Coverage in the Northern Caucasus

Darya Mazayeva, "Russian mass media coverage of the terrorist situation in the North Caucasus from 1 January 2001 through 11 October 2011

From the Russian perspective (or at least that view cultivated by the state-controlled media), the problems in the North Caucasus over the past decade stem largely from foreign involvement.



52 Information Counter-Attack

El Murid (pseudonym), "Information Wars," Krasnaia Zvezda, 3-9 August 2011

In the information war against Russia, our goal is the education of a population that is resistant to negative factors (that are destroying our Weltanschauung).

Turkey Prepares for Cyber War: The Turkey-PKK War Goes Online

2 October 2011

Source: "Ulusal Siber Ordu Kuruluyor (A National Cyber Army is being Established)," Sabah (Morning), 2 October 2011. <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Teknoloji/Haber/2011/10/02/ulusal-siber-ordu-kuruluyor>



Online attacks on computer networks around the world have been increasing. Photo: Cyber Warfare via Atlantic Council US <http://www.acus.org/trackback/34868>

Ulusal Siber Ordu Kuruluyor (A National Cyber Security Army is being Established)

The cyber security army, which will be formed with the participation of all public and private institutions, will select its members from hackers.

Turkey has given the go-ahead for its first cyber security army. The army is expected to comprise 200 people and will be composed of hackers.

Efforts are underway to start a team called the 'National Cyber Security Coordination Council' against cyber attacks that might threaten national information systems. The Council will include cyber security experts, academics, public institutions, civic organizations and high level managers from the private sector. The Army will have about 200 members.

The President of the Information Security Association Mustafa Alkan said that the experts' council will include hackers and information security experts from the public and private sectors. Alkan said, "Even our finance system is at risk. Turkey ranks among the 10th worst countries in the field of information security." According to information provided by the Head of the Computer Engineering Department at Gazi University Şeref Sağıroğlu, there have been 47 thousand cyber threats just in the last three days, and there are about 15 thousand threats a day. Sağıroğlu said, "We are at war right now. The wars are now waged in the electronic domain. Wars are not fought by armies anymore."

THIS IS NOT ABOUT WIKILEAKS OR ANONYMOUS

Alkan reminded that Wikileaks and Anonymous are the only known threats right now but that there were many others. "Turkey faces many attacks 24/7. We do not know what strategic knowledge they have and how they will use it. Thousands of our servers are being attacked. Our most critical information is being used to threaten us."

The following agencies will contribute members to the cyber security force: The Turkish Armed Forces, the Defense Department, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Information, Technology and Industry, the Justice Department, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense Industries, Aselsan, Havelsan, the Information, Technology and Communication Agency (BTK), the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK), the Turkish National Police, and the Office of the Undersecretary of Public Security.

FMSO Commentary: The decades-old war between the Turkish government and Kurdish militants has now expanded to a new front: the Internet. On November 8th the terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) attacked the website of the Turkish Finance Ministry (www.maliye.gov.tr). The PKK's cyber attack brought down the ministry's site for a short period, during which the site was replaced with propaganda material such as a You Tube video of a song praising the group's leader Abdullah Öcalan.

The attack led many to question whether Turkey was ready for cyber warfare. Analysts criticized the finance ministry's lack of preparedness, particularly given past instances of hacking in Turkey. In July, the international hacker movement called Anonymous had hacked Turkish government sites. Turkey apparently ranks among the ten worst countries in the field of information security.

The government has long been aware of the threat and has been criticized for being slow to act. It was not until October 2010 that the National Security Council added cyber-threats into its 'National Security Policy Document,' its official policy paper defining security threats. Since then, government officials and security experts have been closely watching the development of the United States Cyber Command and have recently taken steps to establish a cyber army based on the U.S. model, and is planning to do so using experienced hackers. The article attached, from the mainstream daily Sabah (Morning), discusses this initiative. **End FMSO Commentary (Kaya)**

FMSO Commentary: Turkey is concerned about a possible Israeli attack on Iran, triggered by the recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is worried about the broader question of the impact of a nuclear-armed Iran for Turkey and the Middle East.

A nuclear Iran and an Israeli attack would complicate Turkey's security relationships with the U.S., Israel and Europe. Turks consider that a possible Western or Israeli intervention in Iran would place them in a precarious position between its allies and neighbor, where Turkey would play a role analogous to Germany during the Cold War. Second, Turks know that a nuclear Iran would affect military balances and perceptions not only in the Middle East, but also in Russia, the Balkans and the Aegean.

In the past, Turkey viewed itself to be in the unique position of having good relations with the U.S., Israel and Iran, even offering to mediate between the U.S. and Iran in 2008. In fact, Turkey voted against imposing further sanctions on Iran on June 9, 2010, at the United Nations, arguing that sanctions could undermine the diplomacy track. This has changed recently due to developments related to the Arab Spring. Iranian officials in recent weeks have stepped up their attacks against Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for allowing NATO to station early warning radar in Turkey as part of NATO's missile defense system aimed at countering ballistic missile threats from Iran. Iran is also furious about Turkey's continuous support of Syrian opposition forces, who are suffering a brutal crackdown from the Assad regime.

The article attached, from the mainstream daily Milliyet (Nationality), argues what Turkey's position should be regarding a possible Israeli strike on Iran. **End FMSO Commentary (Kaya)**

A Turkish Perspective on Iran's Nuclear Program and the Middle East

Source: "İdiz, Semih. "Türkiye bu İşe Bulaşmamalı (Turkey Should not get Involved)," Milliyet (Nationality), 9 November 2011. <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/turkiye-bu-ise-bulasmamali/siyaset/siyasetyazarde-tay/09.11.2011/1460711/default.htm>

9 November 2011



IAEA Nuclear Symbol [Public Domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Türkiye bu İşe Bulaşmamalı (Turkey Should not get Involved)

The main countries responsible for the instability in the Middle East right now are Iran, Israel and Syria. If a crisis or war erupts in the region, these countries will be at the center of it. It is now clear that the report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which will be released any day now, will reveal that Iran has not given up its nuclear ambitions. Consequently, Israel is sending serious warnings to Iran. It is not a good sign that even Shimon Peres, the "peaceful" President of Israel, is talking about war.

On top of all this, Iran has adopted a rhetoric that they will "crash and burn" us because of the U.S. bases we host on our soil. Actually, a new war situation will benefit all three countries [Iran, Israel, Syria] in the region. All three are disturbed by the Arab Spring. A war would divert attention from the Arab Spring.

Israel's Assad Worries

Israel was completely shocked by the fall of the "Israel friendly" Hosni Mubarak. Israel had prided itself for being the "only democracy in the Middle East" for years, but it is now concerned that the Arab Spring will bring democracy to the Arab countries in the region. As in the case of Egypt, if the Arab people are to elect their own governments, Israel will become increasingly isolated in the region.

This may sound odd, but Israel is even concerned about the fall of Bashar al-Assad, its biggest foe. It is worried that if Assad goes, the country will fall into the hands of radical Sunnis, who are even more anti-Israel. So it views the situation as, "Better the devil you know." Even if Israel will temporarily feel better by hitting the nuclear facilities in Iran, it is doubtful that this will ensure their long-term stability. Such an attack will only benefit the Mullah regime in Iran.

It is not clear whether Iran will lose its nuclear capability; and even if it does, this will only be temporary. What will happen is that countries in the Middle East will put their sectarian differences aside and focus on their shared hatred of Israel. Iran will have increased its profile in the region because of its status of "the center of the fight against Zionism." Meanwhile, Israel's security concerns will worsen.

Continued: Turkey Should not get Involved

Will the U.S. Trust Ankara?

A possible Israeli strike against Iran will even benefit Bashar al-Assad, who needs to divert attention from himself right now. The regional chaos that would ensue from such an attack would also diffuse Turkey's pressures on Damascus. As seen in the final UNESCO voting, the U.S., which unconditionally supports Israel, must be extremely concerned right now. The Islamic world will no doubt perceive that the U.S. is behind the Israeli strike against Iran. The U.S. will lose its chance to influence the Arab Spring.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has some expectations from Turkey, but Washington – particularly after the 1 March 2003 debacle – believes that it cannot trust Ankara. Turkey must not get involved in a conflict situation that might erupt between these three countries [Iran, Israel, Syria].

Is there Anything Nuclear in Incirlik?

It is clear what Ankara needs to do in such a scenario. It must not get involved in such adventures with unclear outcomes and must protect its own interests. It should focus all its attention on “the humanitarian factor” and help bring peace to the region as much as it can.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Erdoğan must stop his argument that, “If Israel has nuclear weapons, then why shouldn't Iran have them?” At the end of the day, if Iran (and eventually Syria) acquires nuclear weapons, this will threaten Turkey's security. An Israeli attack on Iran will not only fail to prevent a nuclear competition in the region, it will facilitate it. As long as Israel has these weapons, other countries in the region will want them too.

Turkey's position then, should be based on the argument that the entire region should be free of nuclear weapons. If the U.S. is housing any nuclear warheads in Incirlik, as has been suggested, this would be problematic for Turkey.



The RED DIAMOND is the Army's leading e-journal highlighting current threats in the Operational Environment.

It is produced by the Threats Intelligence Support Activity (U.S. Army TRADOC G-2) and posted at <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/25364306>.

FMSO Commentary: Despite worsening relations between Turkey and Iran (see previous article), the common threat posed by Kurdish militants in northern Iraq continues to be the glue that binds the countries in a joint fight. The two countries have recently pledged to coordinate efforts to battle this threat. This cooperation between Turkey and Iran is significant for the U.S. because it represents cooperation between one of the U.S.'s strongest allies and one of its major adversaries.

Turkey has recently intensified its operations against the terrorist organization known as the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), which is fighting for an independent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey. Similarly, in Iran, the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), which is the PKK's Iranian offshoot, aims to free Iranian Kurds and has long been a problem for the Iranian military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Foreign Ministry officials from both countries recently announced that they view the PKK and the PJAK as being one and the same and declared their intentions to tackle the issue by exchanging intelligence and increasing security cooperation.

Partly inspired by the PKK, PJAK was founded as a civil society movement in Iran in the late 1990s to promote Kurdish nationalism among Iran's five million Kurds. However, within a few years the group's increasing success and acts of violence against Iran's security service provoked a government crackdown. This forced its leadership to move near the PKK's main camp in the Iraqi portion of the Qandil Mountains near the Iran-Iraq-Turkish border. Following this move the PJAK became increasingly more militant and began to receive military training and logistical assistance from the PKK. Since then the group has routinely targeted Iranian troops and is allegedly getting stronger.

Turkey and Iran Pledge to Cooperate Against Kurdish Terror Groups

21 October 2011

Source: "Terör Tehdidi Tümüyle Tasfiye Edilene Kadar Birlikte Çalışacağız (We will Work Together until the Terror Threat is Eradicated)," Haberturk (Turkish News), 21 October 2011. <http://www.haberturk.com/dunya/haber/681396-teror-tehdidi-tumuyile-tasfiye-edilene-kadar-birlikte-caliscacagiz>



The PKK and PJAK are based in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq, which border Turkey, Iran and Iraq. Map: Kurdish Inhabited Area [Public Domain], via CIA

Terör Tehdidi Tümüyle Tasfiye Edilene Kadar Birlikte Çalışacağız (We will Work Together until the Terror Threat is Eradicated)

Foreign Minister Davutoğlu and Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Ekber Salihi held a joint press conference following their meeting at the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Davutoğlu said, "Our joint determination against the PKK and PJAK will continue. From now on, we will work together within a joint action plan until the terror threat is completely eradicated. This terror organization threatens all the countries in the region and we must act with solidarity to fight against it."

Davutoğlu said that all the mechanisms that exist between Iran and Turkey would be mobilized, and that a Higher Security Commission meeting would be held to ensure the continuity of this cooperation between the foreign ministers of both countries. Davutoğlu indicated that he and Salihi had held comprehensive talks on the issue of terror, which threatens both countries and thanked Salihi for the strong coordination efforts.

Davutoğlu said, "We view the PKK and PJAK as a common threat against regional stability, the Kurdish, Turkish and Iranian people," and claimed that there had been important cooperation between the intelligence and security institutions of the two

Continued: We will Work Together until the Terror Threat is Eradicated

countries and that important strides had been made against this common fight.

OUR TALKS WILL CONTINUE TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE COORDINATION

“Our fight against the PKK and PJAK will continue. We have regional cooperation against terror. As foreign ministers, we will make sure that this cooperation continues in the most effective way. Today, we also talked about the most recent regional developments. We talked about Qaddafi’s death in Libya. As Turkey, we support the democratization in the Middle East. We hope that Libya will make this transition as soon as possible and continue to exist as a democratic country.”

“SYRIA DID NOT LISTEN TO OUR WARNINGS”

“It is crucial for both Iran and Turkey that Syria also completes its democratization process. We had constantly been telling Iran about the importance of Syria’s democratization. The developments in the region have proven once again that it is impossible for regimes that crack down on their citizens to survive. Turkey has done all it can to ensure that Syria’s transformation process will be a peaceful one. But the Syrian regime has ignored all our warnings and preferred violence instead of a peaceful transformation. We will continue to work for Syria to have a democratic transformation.”

ASSASSINATION CLAIMS IN WASHINGTON

Davutoğlu said that the allegations that Iran was behind assassination attempts in Washington had come up, and that he had shared information from the U.S. with Salihi and indicated that Salihi had said that these allegations are “completely baseless.”

He also said that the important thing was that the information had been shared and that the issue had been resolved, “We

believe that Iran will be conscientious about this. We need to resolve this situation with the least amount of tension between the two sides and ensure that all the information is being shared. The U.S. claims to have some proof. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has also made some claims. What needs to happen is that all sides share their information and resolve the situation with minimum tension. It is unthinkable to even conceive of such an attack on a diplomatic representative office. We, as Turkey are ready to do whatever we can to help.”

INCREASED PKK ACTIVITY IN IRAQ

Salihi indicated that the two leaders had talked of regional security and discussed the increasing activities of the terror organization PKK and said that the U.S. was the leading force in the region. “The U.S. was aware that heavy weapons were being transferred to the terrorists. If the actions of the terrorists and their possession of these weapons were relayed to Turkey beforehand, then our Turkish brothers would not have to face such crises.”

Salihi also talked about the U.S.’s allegations that Iran was behind an assassination plot and said, “Such allegations are so baseless that we should not even spend our precious time talking about them here.” Salihi also reminded that the U.S. had previously claimed that it had signed documents showing that Iraq had nuclear weapons but that this had later turned out to be baseless. He claimed that such allegations were unfair to Iraq and that his country was based on religion and ethics.

Salihi, who said that relations with Turkey were improving by the day, also reminded that the trade volume between the two countries was expected to reach 15 million dollars by year’s end. Salihi said that the cooperation with Turkey should be an example for the rest of the world.

Turkey and Iran’s discussions of cooperation against Kurdish militants date back several years but have intensified as of late. The article below, from the mainstream daily Haberturk (Turkish News), discusses the cooperation that Turkey and Iran have pledged against the PKK and PJAK. End FMSO Commentary (Kaya).

FMSO Commentary: *The Huthis and their allies continue consolidating their grip on power in northern Yemen. Their most recent target is a prominent Salafist school, the “Dar al-Hadeeth Center” in Dammaj, on the outskirts of the provincial capital Saada.*

The dynamics between Salafist groups and Zaydi Shi’a are crucial to understanding the rise of the Huthis. The influx of Salafism into Yemen’s northern Saada province in the 1980s and 1990s was seen by many traditional Zaydis (a branch of Shi’a Islam endemic to this region) as a challenge from the outside. Yemeni unification in 1990 saw the proliferation of many new civil society groups, including a Zaydi revivalist movement that would become the Huthis. This group saw itself as a defender of the Zaydi faith, which it felt was under siege from attacks by the growing influence of Salafist groups.

With Yemen in political turmoil and state influence contracting, the Huthis have taken advantage and begun spreading their influence beyond their key strongholds in Saada province. Over the summer the Huthis fought with backers of the Sunni Islah party and what remained of government presence for control over the neighboring province of al-Jawf. Clashes have also broken out in Hajjah province, to the south of Saada, between Huthi fighters and government-backed tribes.

*With the Huthis and the Islah party (the strongest opposition group) fighting for control over northern Yemen, the government, as it has done for many years, is likely to foment tensions between these two groups. Alliances and oppositions will continue to shift in strange and unexpected ways, making it all the more difficult to predict where Yemen is headed next. **End FMSO Commentary (Winter)***

Huthis Consolidate Power in Northern Yemen

30 October 2011



Source: “Sectarian conflict looms in Sa’ada), Yemen Times, 30 October 2011. http://yementimes.com/defaultdet.aspx?SUB_ID=34745

Yemeni army soldiers, via IRIN (www.irinnews.org)

Sectarian conflict looms in Sa’ada

Signs of a fresh Sunni-Shiite conflict in Sa’ada appeared after the latter blockaded a Sunni school in Damaj, a local told the Yemen Times on Wednesday. The Sunni school, known as Dar Al-Hadeeth, is at the heart of attacks by Houthi rebels. The school has been under siege for eight days by the rebels, who have been engaged in six separate wars with the central government since 2004.

Dar Al-Hadeeth is run by the hard-core Salafism group and teaches around 7,000 students, including women and children, from Yemen and foreign nations.

“The Houthis are now positioning themselves around the school, blocking food supplies, and have set up their own checkpoints, searching anyone entering or leaving the area,” said the citizen, who requested anonymity for security reasons.

Tensions between the opposing sides surfaced two weeks ago, after a letter written by the principal of the school, Imam Yahya Al-Hajoori, was leaked to the Houthis. In the letter, Al-Hajoori thanked Brigadier General Yahya Mohamed Abdullah Saleh, the president’s nephew and chief commander of Yemen’s security forces, as well as Saudi Arabia, for fighting Houthis in his region. The leaked letter provoked the Houthis who launched the blockade on the school in Damaj before attempting to gain control of Al-Baraqa Mountain, which overlooks Damaj and remains under Sunni control.

“The Damaj School has made attacks against us and is attempting to take control of military positions outside of their area,” a spokesman for a Houthi leader told the Yemen Times. “Plus, they have continued to incite us, describing us as non-believers and carrying out military training for their supporters.” However, Al-Hajoori denied the veracity of the statement and said it was fabricated in order to inflame sectarian conflict in Sa’ada. Now, the area surrounding the school in Damaj is under siege and families have begun fearing the potential for war if no action is taken.

Students in doctrinally similar Salafi schools located in other governorates have begun discussing what to do to stop the Houthi blockade and prevent their military expansion, according to a Salafi student in Damaj. “The threat is that this tension could develop into

Continued: Sectarian conflict looms in Sa'ada

sectarian war. Already, around 69 students from Damaj were killed in clashes with the Houthis/Shiites during the fifth round of war between Yemen's army and the Houthis in 2009," the student explained.

Tribesmen loyal to the Salafi group in Sa'ada have already blocked the Al-Boqa' road connecting Saudi Arabia and Yemen by way of the Sa'ada governorate. The Hashid tribe, which has sided with the opposition demanding the ouster of president Saleh has, at the same time, blocked the Sana'a-Sa'ada road. Yet more tribesmen loyal to the Salafists have attempted to block the Maran Road, which leads to the hometown of the Houthis' leader, Abd Al-Malek Al-Houthi.

A mediation committee composed of Fares Mana', an arms dealer who is currently the governor of Sa'ada (though not designated

as such by the government), tribal leaders, and representatives of the Houthis and Salafists met on Tuesday to resolve the current situation, but no concrete results have yet been reached. A source close to Mana' told the Yemen Times that "this is simply a personal disagreement between both sides" and that "they would reach an agreement soon".

In addition to having different interpretations of Islam, the Shiite Houthis and the Sunni-Salafist Damaj school also have different political positions towards the popular uprising which erupted last February and which demands an end to Saleh's 33-year regime. The Houthis have joined the uprising, while the Damaj Salafi group based in Sa'ada has sided with Saleh and banned anti-regime demonstrations and protests, calling them "rebellious acts against the ruler".

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO.leavenworth.army.mil)

International Research Collaboration Program

Quality researchers outside of the U.S. government express new ideas that will help define the current and future defense and security environment from understudied and unconsidered perspectives.



FMSO Commentary: With the recent death of Prince Sultan, King Abdullah was forced to appoint both a new crown prince and a new defense minister. While there was general agreement that Prince Nayef, the interior minister, would be appointed crown prince, the identity of the new defense minister was less certain.

According to the following article, the surprise appointment of Prince Salman, former governor of Riyadh, as defense minister did not sit well with Prince Abdul Rahman, his older brother and deputy defense minister, who expected to be promoted to this important position. Not only was he not promoted, but – perhaps fittingly – he was dismissed from his position on the first day of the Feast of the Sacrifice (Eid al-Adha).

This event is unlikely to be of major consequence, but it does point to the turbulent road ahead as Saudi Arabia's royal family attempts to smoothly transition into a new generation. Sultan's son Khaled remains as deputy defense minister, a post he has held for a number of years. He is likely to continue playing a major role in the ministry, despite the damage his reputation took after Saudi Arabia's muddled intervention in Yemen in 2009-2010. **End FMSO Commentary (Winter)**

Royal Power Shuffle in Saudi Arabia's Defense Ministry

7 November 2011

Source:

الامير عبد الرحمن اعفي من منصبه لرفضه 'البيعة': تعيين الامير سلمان المفاجئ وزيراً للدفاع جنب القيادة السعودية حرجاً سياسياً
(Prince Abdul Rahman Relieved of his Post for Refusing "the Pledge": The surprise appointment of Prince Salman as Defense Minister averts political complications for Saudi leadership), al-Quds al-Arabi, 7 November 2011. <http://www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=data\2011\11\11-07\07z498.htm>

الامير عبد الرحمن اعفي من منصبه لرفضه 'البيعة':
تعيين الامير سلمان المفاجئ وزيراً للدفاع جنب القيادة
السعودية حرجاً سياسياً

(Prince Abdul Rahman Relieved of his Post for Refusing "the Pledge": The surprise appointment of Prince Salman as Defense Minister averts political complications for Saudi leadership)

Saudis were surprised on the morning of the first day of Eid al-Adha (the Feast of the Sacrifice) when several royal decrees were issued, including some expected appointments and some surprise dismissals. This is especially the case given that no member of the kingdom's royal family had previously been relieved of his post without it being qualified by the phrase "at his request."

Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul Azziz issued decisions appointing Prince Salman, former governor of Riyadh, as minister of defense, and Prince Khaled bin Sultan as his deputy. A royal decree also relieved deputy defense minister King Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Aziz from his post but not "at his request." He was not appointed to another post.

Analysts said the appointment of Prince Salman as minister of defense averted political complications for Saudi leaders and pleased more than one group in the ruling family.

Sources close to the royal family told Al-Quds al-Arabi that the dismissal of Prince Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Aziz occurred on the first day of Eid al-Adha (the feast of the sacrifice). He was planning to meet senior officials in the Saudi armed forces on the second day of the holiday, and the royal decree kept this meeting from taking place.

The sources believe that on more than one occasion, Prince Abdul Rahman expressed to visitors his frustration at not being named crown prince, especially given that he is older than princes Nayef and Salman. Furthermore, he in practice ran the affairs of the ministry of defense during the absence of the deceased prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz as a result of his long illness. Since he had not been asked to be named crown prince, he thought King Abdullah would at least name him minister of defense. This did not happen, and he expressed his disappointment by refusing to swear allegiance to Prince Nayef as crown prince.

Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz also issued a decree appointing Prince Fahd bin Abdullah bin Mohammed as head of the Civil Aviation Authority, thus separating it from the ministry of defense. Prince Talal bin Abdul Aziz sent a strongly worded letter to the ministry of civil defense asking that it keep its hands off civilian airlines and assigning it to a civilian institution until it recovers from corruption and repeated losses. In his letter, Prince Talal asked, "What is the use of having the defense ministry oversee civilian institutions? It is known that the role of the defense ministry is to defend the nation, so what is the justification for having it supervise civilian airlines such as Saudi Airlines?"

Integrating Libyan Rebel Fighters

4 October 2011

Source:

ليبيا: الثوار مهتمون بحقائب الأمن في حكومة الكيب

(Libya: Rebels Interested in Security Portfolios in al-Keab Government), al-Hayat, 9 November 2011. <http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/326956>



A rebel fighter releases balloons from the rooftop of the rebel headquarters in Libya. Photo by Kate Thomas/IRIN, via (www.irinnews.org)

ليبيا: الثوار مهتمون بحقائب الأمن في حكومة الكيب (Libya: Rebels Interested in Security Portfolios in al-Keab Government)

As Libyan prime minister designate Abdel Rahim al-Keab holds consultations on forming the first post-Qaddafi transitional government, the rebels that led the fight against the former regime's forces seem determined to hold the security portfolio in the new government. Informed sources say that they want to have a word on who is assigned to the defense and interior portfolios.

Anis al-Sharif, the spokesperson for the Tripoli Military Council, said what is needed now is to begin building Libyan state, and that this requires rebuilding Libya's army and security services. In an interview with al-Hayat, he added that the disarming of rebel factions "will not come from a mere decision" issued by the National Transitional Council or the transitional government, explaining that what is needed is to "integrate the rebels" into state institutions, whether military or civilian.

Al-Sharif added that resolving the issue of weapons among the rebel factions "requires a general national project that confirms that these rebels are a part of Libya's future." He warned that rebels who paid dearly in the fight against Qaddafi's brigades cannot simply be told: "your job is done ... you can go home now."

He stressed the importance of the defense and interior portfolios, which are currently overseen respectively by Jalal al-Digheily and Ahmed Darrat in the executive committee of the NTC. He said that the rebels want to "put appropriate people" in these two positions in the new government to be formed by al-Keab.

Al-Keab knows how sensitive these portfolios are to the rebels, and on more than one occasion he has said that he would not seek to disarm them by force and that this process may take months (perhaps until the end of the transitional election of the first Founding National Congress eight months from now).

While the rebels' interest in the interior and defense ministries is clear, what is not clear is who speaks in their name and can discuss the names of the appropriate candidates for the security positions in the new government. The rebels themselves are not unified into

FMSO Commentary: Skirmishes among rival Libyan militias have been taking place over the past few weeks and are likely to continue until security is further institutionalized under a new governmental authority. Indeed, one of the main challenges for the new transitional government will be to curb the power of the regional armed groups that overthrew Qaddafi. For this to take place the new national security institutions will have to be staffed with figures that the militias trust and respect. At the same time, the central government must be wary of handing too much power to these militias.


The central authority is likely to be weak at the outset and it will take some time to incorporate regional militias, particularly those from areas that saw heavy fighting, such as Misrata, al-Zawiya and Zintan. Some armed groups from the provinces remain in Tripoli; the success in incorporating them into the new Libyan state will provide a useful barometer for the early success of the state. **End FMSO Commentary (Winter)**

Continued: Libya: Rebels Interested in Security Portfolios in al-Keef Government

a single institution. Perhaps the exception is the rebels in the east who largely fall under the banner of the Rebel Brigades Council led by Fawzi Abu Katif. The same applies to the Misrata rebels, who are largely under unified leadership. The situation is different in Tripoli, where rebels are divided between locals and outsiders. For instance there is the Tripoli Military Council led by Abdel Hakim Belhaj, which recently reformed its executive office (20 people) to include members from the capital itself. Belhaj, from the Souq al-Jumaa neighborhood in Tripoli, was previously criticized by his enemies for appointing members from outside of the capital. On the other side of Belhaj's council is the Tripoli Rebels Council led by Abdullah Nakir al-Zintani, who is from the Libyan capital but has roots from Zintan in the Nafusa Mountains. To these two basic rebel groups in the capital are added a number of rebel detachments coming from the outside and who entered after the former regime's troops were expelled from Tripoli in operation "Mermaid Dawn" last August. Some have begun returning to their homes in the past days, after they are no longer needed in Tripoli and pursuant to a request in this regard made by the Transitional Council.

This "chaos" among the rebels in Tripoli applies to the entire Libyan coast, from the capital to the Tunisian border. Each city has a military council of strength or weakness relative to the size of the city and its participation in the fighting against Qaddafi forces (one of the strongest of these is the Zawiyah Rebel Council). The same is also the case in cities and towns in the Nafousa Mountains, where rebels do not have a unified command. This also applies to Libya's south (its largest city Sabha), where the rebels have different detachments that coordinate with one another but are not under unified command yet. It is also not clear yet which rebel group oversees the central coast area, most importantly Sirte, which rebels entered last month in two teams, one from the east (Benghazi) and one from the west (Misrata).

Anis al-Sharif explains to al-Hayat that the rebels are talking amongst one another in order to find a solution to this growing, noting that this may bear fruit soon with the announcement of the creation of a "Unified Rebel Detachments" throughout Libya, which will represent all detachments and speak on their behalf.



Geoff Demarest's *Winning Insurgent War* is about a broader set of conflicts than just 'insurgency.' In its 144 sections, Geoff Demarest raises new and overlooked concepts related to modern conflict in a provocative manner designed to stir up debate and critical thinking. As Geoff Demarest puts it: "I hope that some of the ideas in it will be contagious."

African Media Stir a Resurgence of Anti-AFRICOM Sentiment

29 October 2011



Source: Ezeanya, Chika, "United States Looming Invasion of Central Africa (2)," *The Moment* (Nigeria) 29 Oct 2011. <http://www.momentng.com/en/news/4681/united-states-looming-invasion-of-central-africa-2.html>

Seal of the United States Africa Command By User:JustMyThoughts, United States Federal Government [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

United States Looming Invasion of Central Africa

In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, perhaps, owing to global outcry over the despicable role it played in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the United States has maintained a guarded interest in the mineral dense country. China has no such inhibitions. The terms of the several bilateral agreements that exist between China and DRC are steeped in secrecy. The vague 2009 infrastructure and mining agreement is the most recent and most widely publicised, with actual figures fluctuating between six to 13 billion.

Under the 2009 agreement, it is generally known that Congo has committed to supplying Chinese state firms no less than 10 million tons of copper, and several hundred thousand tons of cobalt (Congo has the world's largest reserve of cobalt, the main ingredients in the manufacturing of cell phones). In return, China has generally pledged to embark on several infrastructural projects, including 'roads, railways, hydroelectric power stations, universities and health centers.' President Laurent Kabila from every indication is following closely behind President Robert Mugabe in the latter's famous statement that 'we have turned East, where the sun rises, and given our back to the West, where the sun sets.'

Clearly, the United States is a latecomer in the Central African wealth scramble; mere economic maneuverings and diplomatic persuasions are insufficient to grant it a slice of the cake commensurate with its appetite.

Joseph Kony is a despicable human being, who should be hunted down like the hound he has presented himself to the world. However, bringing Kony to justice must not be at the expense of the stability of Central Africa and the risk of even more civilian deaths. For more than two decades, the United States watched unconcerned as thousands of children, women and innocent civilians were slaughtered by Kony and his pack of wolves in Central Africa. It was not then in the United States' national interest to act decisively. China was not reaping heavy economic benefits from the region, oil was not yet discovered in Uganda, there was relative stability in the Middle East, so Sudanese oil reserves and DRC's minerals did not amount to life and death for the American economy.

FMSO Commentary: The headlines are telling: U.S. Tightens Grip on Africa (Daily Trust, Nigeria); The U.S. Power Grab in Africa (The South African Civil Society Information Service); and perhaps the most virulently titled of them all, AFRICOM - The Devil in the Backyard (The Herald, Zimbabwe), which begins with "Africa Command was established by blood covered former US President George W Bush..." If there was any question as to whether the African media's opposition to American military plans in Africa was a singular occurrence, based solely on the announcement of AFRICOM's formation, these headlines put that doubt to rest. Anger against America in general, and AFRICOM in particular, has seen a resurgence in the African media. The articles are not pretty, and they are not always accurate, but they are spreading quickly and most likely influencing African public opinion against the United States.

There appear to be multiple triggers for this newfound anger, with the most significant one being America's decision to send a relatively small contingent of forces to help train the Ugandan military to more effectively pursue Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a group of militants responsible for innumerable atrocities. It might seem such an action by the United States would be greeted by enormous and almost unanimous praise throughout the African media. However, in the eyes of some African editors the troops are being sent because America is interested in Central Africa's minerals, or because America is trying to counteract the favorable impression the Chinese have created for themselves through large-scale projects in the region, or because the special ops forces are spies, or because of some other cynical view that does not allow for America's genuine interest in preventing additional LRA atrocities.

To be sure, not all African papers have reinvigorated claims of neocolonialism or Western economic imperialism. Some actually praise the American initiatives, but enough are spewing forth anti-American invectives to be a cause of concern for future relations between the US and several African nations.

America was previously criticized for not doing enough to stop Kony, and now, with boots on the ground, it is being criticized for doing too much or for acting with less than honorable intentions. Thus, at least with some of the African media, no matter what America does it will always be the wrong course of action, pursued for the wrong intentions, or both. An American public, waiting for an appreciative Africa, could be mightily disappointed by these pronouncements. Meanwhile, the US could possibly find it is easier to win the war against Kony than the public relations battles which surround the fight. Should AFRICOM increase activities on the continent, expect parts of the African press to find fault with any new actions, stirring the pot of anti-Americanism even further and perhaps making it difficult for American forces, in partnership with African forces, to carry out their operations. End FMSO Commentary (Feldman)

Continued: United States Looming Invasion of Central Africa

Now, the stakes are extremely high. The United States must send 'special forces'; a catch-all term for spies, hit squads, intelligence officers and other destabilizing forces, to Central Africa to 'catch Joseph Kony.' In the letter to the Congress, President Obama stated that the deployment 'further U.S. national security interests and foreign policy...' That is correct. The invasion clearly furthers the ailing national economic interests of the United States at a time of grave insecurity.


The United States' recent action is a strong policy statement, and both a covert and overt operation aimed at controlling Central Africa. China is being warned of the arrival of its global rival, in style, as a competitor, backed by military might. Governments of East and Central Africa are subtly, if clearly, being told that the United States is now fully involved in their affairs.

In truth, unless there is another 'wikileakage' in the future, the extent of the espionage activities of the deployment in Central Africa might never come to light. From every indication, it appears that Central Africa is being tilled for a second wave of externally-induced conflict. The first wave of conflict was in the form of proxy wars, fought between the United States and the old USSR, during the Cold War.

There appears to be a repetition of history about to unfold in less than a generation. Unless immediate action is taken by the African Union, this singular United States' action in Central Africa might evolve into a warm or boiling-point war between the United States and China in that region.

Dragon Bytes by Tim Thomas examines China's information-war (IW) theory and practice from 1995-2003. Some specialists may be surprised that the Chinese openly discuss not only computer network attacks and electronic preemption but also the development of IW units and an "integrated network-electronic warfare" theory (which closely

approximates the US theory of "network-centric warfare"). The Chinese development of an IW theory is representative of their country's philosophy and culture. By creating an "IW theory with Chinese characteristics" the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has offered an alternate way of viewing the application of IW than in the West.



Chinese Weapons to Zimbabwe: A Dysfunctional Government Now Has 20,000 More AK47's

10 November 2011

Source: "Zimbabwe: Rearming the Security Forces," Southern Africa Report, 10 Nov 2011.

<http://www.southernafricareport.com/Member/SecurePages/SecureNews.aspx?niid=11805>

AK-47 Rifle By Alex07 (Own work) [GFDL (www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html), CC-BY-SA-3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/) or FAL], via Wikimedia Commons



Zimbabwe: Rearming the Security Forces

The Zimbabwe Defense Force (ZDF) has taken delivery, via an African intermediary, of the first of several consignments of Chinese small arms and equipment. The delivery, via a so-far unidentified intermediary, has been negotiated by Defense Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa. The indirect route is intended to keep the deliveries below the radar of Western governments, which have imposed an arms embargo on Zimbabwe since 2002 - and of Southern African governments, trade unions and journalists who have hampered recent deliveries.

The consignment is intended to re-equip the army ahead of a national referendum and national elections within the next 18 months. It includes basic equipment for the ZDF's infantry units: at least 20,000 AK-47 automatic rifles, uniforms and 12 to 15 trucks. The inclusion of 21,000 pairs of handcuffs points to the intended domestic deployment of the refurbished units. A second consignment is due before year's end.

Although the intermediary country is so far unidentified and it is unclear whether the weapons' end-user certificates identify Zimbabwe as the recipient, it is unlikely that Beijing is unaware of the ultimate destination. Chinese officials are directly involved with Zimbabwe's Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) - China is constructing an intelligence training campus for Harare - and with its armed forces.

China has in the past been Zimbabwe's most reliable source of weaponry for the past decade. During Zimbabwe's involvement in the civil war in the DRC (1998-2002), China sold it at least US\$66-million worth of small arms. Since 2004 China has sold to Zimbabwe 139 military vehicles and 24 combat aircraft. This has, however, not been sufficient to offset the losses in the DRC campaign or the ravages of Zimbabwe's hyperinflation period. With a Western arms embargo imposed in 2002, Zimbabwe has been seeking a reliable source of arms, particularly small arms.

Since South African trade unions thwarted delivery of six container-loads of small arms and equipment in 2008 (preventing China Ocean Shipping Company's vessel from unloading in Durban), Harare has also been keen for a reliable delivery route. In March this year Mnangagwa told local journalists the military was looking for arms, but was struggling to acquire them because of the arms embargo.

A month later (April 2011), dockworkers in Beira, Mozambique identified two containers unloaded from another China Ocean Shipping Company vessel as containing arms. The consignment was addressed to a company owned by Neville Mutsvangwa, son of a Zanu-PF official and former ambassador to China. After Mozambican trade unionists informed their counterparts in Harare, the containers were reportedly never collected.

FMSO Commentary: The failure of Zimbabwe's longstanding ruler, Robert Mugabe, to relinquish the reins of government when he lost the 2008 presidential election, coupled with the nation's dismal human rights record, has led many Western nations to impose an arms embargo on that once relatively prosperous (by African standards) country. However, despite the embargo, a shipment of Chinese-made weapons recently arrived in Zimbabwe for use by that nation's security forces.

As the article states, though the delivery was made through an intermediary, China probably knew the weapons were destined for Zimbabwe. Much of the Zimbabwean Army's equipment is Chinese-made, reflecting a long term relationship between the two countries. Thus, it probably came as little surprise to many people when China tried several times after the embargo's imposition to send weapons to Zimbabwe. Though according to open sources those previous shipments did not get through, a recent consignment of Chinese-made weapons, including 20,000 of the continent's most ubiquitous rifle, the AK47, finally did find its way into Zimbabwe. Purportedly additional Chinese weapons are scheduled for future delivery.

With uncertainty as to how the problems of Zimbabwe's will play out, and with ongoing political violence still plaguing the country, the addition of thousands of Chinese-made weapons into the fray could be problematic. South Africa's President, Jacob Zuma, has called Zimbabwe's unity government "dysfunctional." Now it is dysfunctional plus 20,000 more AK47s.

Whether to Zimbabwe or other African countries with present or previous arms embargoes, weapons often seem to readily filter through to those who are not supposed to be receiving them. Though Viktor Bout, the notorious Russian arms trafficker who until relatively recent times supplied tons of weapons to Africa - often to opposing sides - now sits in an American prison, other smugglers have already filled the gap. The low cost of an AK 47 in places such as Somalia serves as a testament to the difficulties in enforcing arms embargoes.

End FMSO Commentary (Feldman)

FMSO Commentary: Kenya's recent incursion into Somalia to rescue kidnap victims abducted on Kenyan soil by Somali criminal gangs, pirates, and/or al Shabaab, as well as prevent additional kidnappings, has had the additional benefit of reducing the ransom demands for foreign nationals already held by pirates in Somalia. It appears the pirates are nervous as Kenyan troops make inroads into Somalia territory, battling militants along the way. Already the average amount requested in ransom demands has dropped by about 50%.

Pirates and criminal gangs usually hold their captives for ransom to foreign sources, often the shipping company from whose ship they were abducted, though there have been reports that the kidnap victims of some criminal gangs have been sold to al Shabaab. Additional reports note links to al-Shabaab might be developing with the pirates, raising fear that the pirates' captives, like those of the criminal gangs, could similarly be sold to that militant organization. At the very least the militants appear to be providing protection and arms, at a cost, to the pirates. Thus, Kenya's invasion has put pressure not just on the pirates but also on one of their protectors, suppliers, and possibly even customers for their kidnap victims - al Shabaab.

The militants and, to a lesser extent, the pirates have been subjected to a two-pronged ground attack. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), in conjunction with African Union (AU) troops, has recaptured most of Mogadishu from the militants and plans to extend its grip on the country even further. Meanwhile, Kenya has launched its offensive from the border it shares with Somalia. With many of the pirates based further north of both of these efforts, it is uncertain how much pressure either the Kenyan or TFG/AU forces will come to bear directly on pirate activities if they do not actually reach the pirate sanctuaries. Naval operations to protect

Pirates Cut Ransom Demands in Wake of Kenya's Invasion of Somalia 9 November 2011

Source: Benard Sanga, "Kenya's Somali incursion cuts piracy costs in Indian Ocean," Business Daily (Kenya), 9 Nov 2011 <http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate+News/Kenya+Somali+incursion+cuts+piracy+costs+in+Indian+Ocean/-/539550/1269660/-/ute9l/-/index.html>



Kenyan soldiers marching [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Kenya's Somali incursion cuts piracy costs in Indian Ocean

Kenya's operation against Al Shabaab in Somalia has helped reduce ransom demands on captured ships as pirates seek to close deals before a battle between the militants and Kenyan forces at Kismayo. Shipping experts said that the amount of ransom demanded by pirates for vessels had dropped by about 50 per cent and could fall further in coming days once "Operation Linda Nchi" (Defend the Country) is completed.

"Initially, the pirates holding captive the Algerian flagged MV BLIDA were demanding \$6 million to release the vessel and her multi-national crew. But a package of \$3.5 million was delivered on the vessel and they freed it," said Andrew Mwangura, the Seafarers' Assistant Programmes (SAP) coordinator.

It is believed that the militants offer protection to pirates in exchange for cash, arms and logistics in a pirate value chain estimated to be worth between \$4.9 billion and \$8.3 billion.

The turn of events comes as a relief to shippers who are shouldering the commercial burden of piracy along the gulf of Eden. Maritime sources privy to ransom negotiations in Mombasa said the military campaign had tilted negotiations in favour of vessel owners as pirates rush to close deals.

"Pirates are keener than before to make sure that negotiations for the release of at least nine vessels held in Somali are completed," said a manager at one of a Mombasa-based shipping agents, who wished to remain anonymous. "It is clear the trend is due to the military operation in Somalia."

The fall of Gen Said Barre's administration in 1992 plunged Somalia into civil strife, disintegrating its navy and coastguard services, marking the onset of piracy along its coast.

The surge in piracy led to an increase in the price of ransoms in recent years with \$9.5 million for the release of Samho Dream, a South Korean oil tanker, in November last year the highest amount paid to date.

"In 2005, ransoms averaged around \$150,000. By 2009, the average ransom was around

Continued: Kenya's Somali incursion cuts piracy costs in Indian Ocean

\$3.4 million. In 2010, ransoms averaged \$5.4 million. Higher ransom demands lengthen negotiations and the duration seafarers are held hostage," said Fredrick Wahutu, a maritime expert in Mombasa.

The Kenyan economy has borne the brunt of piracy with the Kenyan Shippers Council estimates showing that the crime increases the cost of imports by \$23.8 million and exports by \$9.8 million per month. These costs are then passed on to consumers.

"The Gulf of Aden was classified as a 'war risk area' by Lloyds Market Association (LMA) Joint War Committee in May 2008,

and is therefore subject to these specific insurance premiums," Capt Wahutu said in an earlier interview.

The country has also lost out in cruise ship business because of the illegal activities with the number of expeditions arriving at Mombasa dropping from 40 in 2007, to 16 in 2008 and two last year. A cruise ship earns Kenya between \$200,000 and \$350,000 per arrival depending on the duration its patrons stay at the Coast. Industry sources estimate Kenya may have lost \$6 million through reduced cruise ship activity over the four years.


vulnerable ships transiting off the coast of Somalia have had only limited success, with the result that perhaps only ground operations can solve the piracy problem. For this reason many are hoping the Kenyan incursion, which has moved rather rapidly, will push far enough north to actually end piracy, or at least severely diminish it.

If such a northward thrust occurs, it will be interesting to see if ransom amounts drop even further, perhaps in an almost linear fashion in step with how far north the troops actually push. Should Kenya, which has been hit particularly hard economically, as cruise ships are hesitant to risk sailing to its ports and being captured by Somali pirates along the way, actually decide to enter the area from where the pirates launch their attacks, many would breathe a sigh of relief as this scourge of international shipping was eliminated. As noted, it is, however, significantly farther north than the present location of the Kenyan troops, and such an operation might have to wait another day. End FMSO Commentary (Feldman)

Tim Thomas's *Decoding the Virtual Dragon* explains how Chinese information warfare (IW) concepts since 2003 fit into the strategic outlook, practices, and activities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The book offers IW explanations directly from the pens of Chinese experts. The Chinese authors discuss the application

or relation of IW to strategic thought, the transformation plans of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the revolution in military affairs (RMA), and the revolution in knowledge warfare and cognition.

Tim Thomas provides an indispensable source for understanding the fundamentals of Chinese military thought and demonstrating how IW/IO has been integrated into the art of war and strategy.



FMSO Commentary: *Espionage in Africa is a topic that rarely receives substantial consideration. When it does come to the fore, those accused are usually Western states (particularly viewed as culpable is the U.S. Peace Corps), not internal agents of subversion. As a result, the article below, which details Zimbabwe's arrest of three alleged spies – telecommunications businessmen who purportedly gave confidential Zimbabwean state secrets to the United States and Canada – has added a new domestic dimension to a rarely discussed facet of the African security mosaic.*

Despite these accusations, the validity of the arrests are, however, highly questionable, given that the accusatory body is the regime of President Robert Mugabe. Mugabe, who has been in power since 1980, when he led the overthrow of the white settler regime in then-Rhodesia, has held onto power in the country with an iron fist. Notably, Mugabe has been criticized for undermining civil liberties, jailing dissidents, and exacting calculated violence upon his adversaries, particularly his main opposition, current Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai. One therefore imagines that there is more to this story than meets the eye. Indeed, with the ramped up U.S. presence in both Somalia and Uganda, it is highly possible that authoritarian regimes like Mugabe's are worried about their own security, and might increasingly rely on accusations of imperial collaboration as excuses to arrest whomever they please.

End FMSO Commentary (Warner).

Zimbabwe Arrests Three for Satellite Espionage

29 October 2011



Source: Anonymous Contributor, "Zim Businessmen Charged with Espionage," Daily Observer (Zimbabwe), 29 October 2011 <http://portaloafrica.com/news/africa/general/zim-businessmen-charged-with-espionage/>

CIA map of Zimbabwe [Public Domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Zim Businessmen Charged with Espionage

Harare - Three Zimbabwean businessmen have been charged with espionage for allegedly leaking confidential government secrets to the United States, Canada and Afghanistan, state-controlled media said on Saturday.

"Two Africom Holdings bosses and a Harare businessman yesterday [Friday] appeared in court on espionage charges after they reportedly illegally set up satellite communication equipment and leaked official secrets to foreign countries," The Herald daily reported.

"It is the State's case that between July this year and Thursday this week, the three sent confidential security information to Canada, the United States and Afghanistan," the paper said.

The three executives - Simba Mangwende and Farai Rwodzi of Africom, and Oliver Chiku, an executive of Global Satellite Systems - were all remanded in custody on Friday, the paper said.

According to The Herald the three allegedly connived to install communication equipment at an undisclosed location with the help of Canadian nationals without the authority of a local communication company and the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe.

The paper said if convicted, the three face up to 25 years in prison.

Al-Shabaab Receives Arms Shipments from Eritrea

2 November 2011

Source: Peter Leftie and Agencies, "Kenya: Shabaab Gets Third Planeload of Arms," Daily Nation (Nairobi, Kenya), 2 November 2011, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201111030021.html>

Map based on Eritrea in Africa map By TUBS [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0) or GFDL (www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html)], via Wikimedia Commons



Kenya: Shabaab Gets Third Planeload of Arms

A third shipment of arms has been made to Al-Shabaab, the Somali terror group that Kenyan troops are fighting, military spokesman Major Emmanuel Chirchir has said.

"We can positively confirm that another aircraft with weapons has landed in Somalia," he said.

The arms are believed to have originated from Eritrea, which the United Nations and the international community have accused of arming the militants.

The weapons delivered are for retaliatory attacks against Kenyan troops. The military has announced that it will launch airstrikes to destroy them.

Eritrea, which seceded from Ethiopia and has fought a war against it, has supported Somali groups that are opposed to Ethiopia.

On Wednesday, Eritrea issued a statement denying arming Al-Shabaab and accused its bitter enemy, Ethiopia, of fabricating the reports.

"The Government of Eritrea states categorically that these accusations are pure fabrications and outright lies as Eritrea has not sent any arms to Somalia," the statement read.

The Eritrean authorities claimed they have never advocated a military solution to the Somali problem, but a Somali-owned political process "inclusive of Somaliland, Puntland and all other key stakeholders."

"Tuesday's baseless accusations are the latest product of disinformation campaign orchestrated to undermine Eritrea and frustrate its constructive regional and international engagement. Chief among the authors of this campaign is Ethiopia, which is not only occupying sovereign Eritrean territory in violation of international law and UN Security Council resolutions, but is also the main cause

"Eritrea's sole interest in Somalia is to see peace and stability return. There can be no military solution to the problem of Somalia," the statement read.

FMSO Commentary: Kenya's recent decision to invade Somalia in an attempt to put an end to the reign of terror exacted by the extremist Islamic group al-Shabaab has been met with mixed reviews.

Yet the revelation in the article below that Eritrea has been accused of providing al-Shabaab with planeloads of arms with which to attack Kenyan troops has been unequivocally criticized by the international community, serving to further reinforce the pariah status of Eritrea. Indeed, the country's leader, Isaias Afiwerki, who led the country's independence movement from Ethiopia in 1993, has long served as a thorn in the Horn of Africa's side. His army's frequent attacks against Ethiopia have placed the two countries among the most war-prone in all of Africa, while his attack on Djibouti in 2008 has come under fire for being inexplicably belligerent. That he is now also being accused of stoking the fires in Somalia will mean that Afiwerki is more than ever gaining the status of a pariah leader of the magnitude of Kim Jong-Il, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Omar al-Bashir.

Indeed if Kenya ultimately proves successful in ousting al-Shabaab, it could be Afiwerki himself who will be regarded as the biggest threat to regional security.

End FMSO Commentary (Warner).

FMSO Commentary: Perhaps second only to the Middle East, Africa is arguably the world region most preoccupied with the threats posed by mercenaries.

Mercenaries have had a storied – and assuredly, contentious – place in the history of African politics. France is known to have employed the now infamous mercenary Bob Denard throughout the postcolonial period to initiate coups d'état in places such as Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, and Gabon, just to name a few. For their part, states in southern Africa, during their mutual wars of independence in the mid-1970s to early 1990s, all mutually accused each other of funding mercenaries to impede each others' liberation wishes. Moreover, as the article details, the so-called "Wonga coup" in Equatorial Guinea in 2004 was in part orchestrated by nefarious British mercenary Simon Mann.

Indeed, this article's revelation that South African mercenaries may have helped Qaddafi to maneuver his way out of Tripoli serves as a blow to that country's leadership on the issue. Lamentably, despite rhetorical moves to the contrary, one expects to see the use of mercenaries increasing, rather than decreasing, on the continent. **End FMSO Commentary (Warner).**

South African Mercenaries Helped Gaddafi to Escape

7 October 2011

Source: Sabelo Gumedze, "Africa: Fugitive Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and the SA Mercenaries," Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria), 2 November 2011, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201111030742.html>

Photo: Saif al-Islam Muammar Al-Gaddafi, via Wikia.com



Africa: Fugitive Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and the SA Mercenaries

Disturbing reports about the late Muammar Gaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, allegedly hiring South African mercenaries to help him escape from Libya, come as no surprise.

South African mercenaries continue to be active in deadly conflicts across Africa, despite the fact that an Anti-Mercenary Act was drawn up as far back as 2006. The Act has still not been written into law due to inaction by President Jacob Zuma. This procrastination is extremely damaging to the efforts to curb mercenary activities.

It is clear that the South African Government has not prioritised the prohibition of mercenary activities in order to give effect to the values enshrined in the South African Constitution and international instruments.

These reports corroborate the assertion that South Africa is in fact encouraging mercenary activities by its inaction to put a stop to the breeding of mercenaries within its borders. The destabilization effect of mercenary activities within Africa is now well documented and the South African citizens continue to be active in these mercenary activities.

If these rumors prove to be true, and if the Anti-Mercenary Act was in place, it would have been the ideal opportunity for South Africa to try these mercenaries and show its commitment to ridding the continent of mercenary activities.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) process against Saif al-Islam in itself could provide an opportunity to get to the bottom of the facts surrounding the alleged mercenary activity in Libya.

However, the fact that South Africa has not promulgated the Anti-Mercenary Act will jeopardise any processes against the South African mercenaries allegedly hired by Saif al-Islam to face criminal charges in South Africa in terms of the Act.

This is an opportunity that would be missed by South Africa once the identity of the mercenaries involved in the Libyan conflict are revealed, possibly during the trial of Saif al-Islam by the ICC, that is, if he is eventually arrested and tried.

It is almost four years that South Africa's former President Thabo Mbeki assented to

Continued: Africa: Fugitive Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and the SA Mercenaries

the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act No. 27 of 2006 (Anti-Mercenary Act).

The Wonga coup of 2004, which involved British mercenary Simon Mann and South African Nick du Toit is still vivid in our minds. In 2009 President Zuma was reported to have justified the release of Mann and du Toit in Equatorial Guinea on the basis that President Theodore Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea had learnt from former President Nelson Mandela to forgive. This was an unfortunate statement, to say the least, particularly because of the dangers associated with the use of mercenaries in staging coups in Africa.

According to the United Nations working group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the enjoyment of the right to self-determination, such a move of pardoning mercenaries was not in accordance with the Government of Equatorial Guinea's obligation and declared intention to hold mercenaries accountable for their activities.

In the same year, 2009, there were reports of South African mercenaries being recruited to reinstate deposed Malagasy President Marc Ravalomanana. These mercenaries are reported to have held meetings with the deposed president in Swaziland where he had fled to after being deposed by Andry Rajoelina, the President of the High Transitional Authority of Madagascar.

As argued before, the reports on the use of South African mercenaries in Africa remains an indictment to the South African Government that has procrastinated in bringing into operation the Anti-Mercenary Act.

In conclusion, this issue of the alleged participation of South African mercenaries in the Libyan conflict should provide the South African Government with a sense of urgency to ensure the entering into force of the Anti-Mercenary Act and the adoption of the required regulations necessary for the entry into force and consequent implementation of the Act.

Failure to do so, will cast serious doubt over South Africa's approach towards curbing the use of mercenaries in African conflicts.



Tim Thomas's *The Dragon's Quantum Leap* peels back the transformation process and uncovers the digital-age impacts of new modes of Chinese military thinking.

The Dragon's Quantum Leap expands the scope of Tim Thomas's two previous works on Chinese information warfare concepts. As with his previous work, Tim Thomas primarily uses all-Chinese source material

***FMSO Commentary:** During World War II the Japanese occupied the Dutch East Indies colony. After the war colonies across the globe moved toward independence under United Nations mandate. In 1949 all of the Dutch East Indies, except for western New Guinea, became the new nation of Indonesia. The Dutch intended for western New Guinea to become a separate nation and began a process of government formation to insure independence by 1960. After elections and the seating of a government, Indonesia moved to invade. The area was then put into the hands of the United Nations and eventually became part of Indonesia in 1963. This left the seeds for political turmoil and potential insurgency by the indigenous Papuans, who had hoped for independence. The other half of the world's second largest island was under UN mandate after WWII and gained independence from Australia in 1975 to become the nation of Papua New Guinea, a member of the British Commonwealth.*

Since the 1960s a movement known as "Free Papua Movement" has resisted development of all kind while holding out for complete autonomy and independence. The tremendous natural resources of the region have drawn in mining operations of great scale. Recent violence associated with these operations and police forces is the latest episode of this long saga. This first article is from ANTARA, which is the official news agency of the Indonesian government.
End FMSO Commentary (Welch)

Indigenous Insurgency in Indonesia: Free Papua Movement

Source: <http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/76944/ri-govt-alert-over-separatist-flag-raising-actions-in-papua>



Indonesia map by Rei-artur pt en Rei-artur blog [GFDL (www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html), CC-BY-SA-3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/) or CC-BY-SA-2.5-2.0-1.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5-2.0-1.0/)], via Wikimedia Commons

Indonesia govt alert over separatist-flag-raising actions in Papua

Jakarta (ANTARA News) - Chief security minister Djoko Suyanto said the government, the security apparatus in particular, was paying special attention to unlawful separatist-flag-raising actions in Papua such as had recently happened outside Jayapura.

"In view of the dynamics of the events there, the TNI (military) is now on heightened alert. The illegal raising of the separatist OPM (Free Papua Organization) flag continues to happen there. We must be balanced (in seeing the facts)," Djoko said at the presidential palace here on Tuesday.

He admitted he was concerned over the shooting incidents that had claimed the lives of civilians in Timika and also a local police commander in Mulia district recently.

"We deplore the shooting of the Mulia sector police chief and three civilians in Timika recently," he said.

Djoko called on the public to also understand that armed separatist elements there had also committed acts of violence. So, "do not only report about violence by the state's apparatus. This is real. An officer has been attacked. Community members have been attacked. So, if police/TNI forces chase them, people must not connect it with other issues" he said.

Minister Djoko said all of the incidents were still under investigation and no information had been received so far that they were linked to separatist elements abroad.

He said alertness had indeed been increased.

The chief of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), Marciano Norman, meanwhile said that the agency was continuing to work hard to help solve the incidents and prevent them from

Continued: Indonesia govt alert over separatist-flag-raising actions in Papua

recurring.

“Regarding the problem in Papua we are still working hard to overcome it. We maximally tried to prevent them from recurring. In connection with the problem in Timika all parties need to strive to make the management and employees find an agreement,” he said.

Employees of PT Freeport Indonesia have been on strike to demand a pay raise. Recently they clashed with security forces causing deaths.

On the shooting of the Mulia police sector chief to death Norman said that based on indications so far it was a pure crime.

“It is a pure crime in which the criminal took the chief’s gun and with it shot the police chief to death. We must increase alertness,” he said.

Papua separatist groups building strength by stealing guns, police say

Source: The Jakarta Post “Papua separatist groups building strength by stealing guns, police say” <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/10/26/papua-separatist-groups-building-strength-stealing-guns-police-say.html>

26 October 2011



Flag of West Papua used as symbol of independence from Indonesia. [Public Domain] via Wikimedia Commons



A Papuan woman demonstrates for greater autonomy in Jakarta. Local anger about inward migration continues, and rekindling of separatist violence in Indonesia’s easternmost province. Jefri Aries/IRIN, (irinnews.org)

The National Police believe that the escalating attacks on police officers in Papua are due to the fact that separatist groups are in need of guns to help them strengthen their might.

“Their strategy is hit and run, or stealing guns, killing and then fleeing. This is done so that they can collect firearms to strengthen their power,” National Police spokesman Insp. Gen. Anton Bachrul Alam said on Wednesday, as quoted by tribunnews.com.

He explained that the perpetrators of the shootings of police officers were old players who belonged to different groups based in

forests and on mountain slopes.

Each group consisted of 30 people armed with 10 long-barreled firearms, which Anton said was insufficient for them.


“So they still need more firearms,” he said.

On Monday, a police officer was wrestled to the ground and shot in the face by two unknown attackers at the Puncak Jaya airport. In June, a Mobile Brigade officer was shot at the same airport. On both occasions the perpetrators stole the officer’s gun and ran away with it.

FMSO Commentary: Increasing demonstrations for independence are spreading across the Papua District of Indonesia. As the local and international media pick up on these incidents, the Indonesian government is being pressured for a more measured response. The article below details some of the recent activity and motivations behind these demonstrations. This is from the *Straits Times*; a newspaper which is Singapore's most widely purchased English daily. **End FMSO Commentary (Welch)**

Papua Turmoil

Source: <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/papua-turmoil/474394> 27 October 2011



Grasberg Mine By ISS Crew Earth Observations experiment and the Image Science & Analysis Group, Johnson Space Center. [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Jakarta. Tensions are boiling over in Indonesia's restive Papua province, with the government rushing in paramilitary reinforcements following a spurt in killings blamed on separatist rebels.

Meanwhile, labour unrest, allegedly incited by the rebels, leaves the world's second-largest copper mine crippled.

National Police spokesman Anton Bachrul Alam said security has been raised to the highest level in Puncak Jaya, where a local police chief was shot dead this week, bringing the death toll to 12 in two weeks.

National Police chief Timur Pradopo disclosed that the police had asked the military to assist in security-related issues in the region.

General Timur said: "We'll work together as the region is enormous and the geographical situation is difficult."

Analysts have warned that the situation could worsen if Jakarta does not show Papuans it is serious about improving their lot. They remain one of the poorest Indonesians despite being home to the country's richest resources.

"There are more parties now, and the issues are no longer confined to political sovereignty," Muridan Widjojo, a co-author of the Papua Road Map, intended as a blueprint for peace, said. "The resistance is now not only from the indigenous people, but also from workers."

Tensions rose last month when workers in Freeport's giant gold and copper mines in Grasberg walked out on their jobs for the second time this year demanding better pay.

The strike forced Freeport to declare yesterday force majeure on some sales from the mine, freeing it from contractual obligations to supply buyers.

Continued: Papua Turmoil

Besides the mine strike, there has been a spate of shootings in recent weeks, allegedly by separatists. A pro-independence congress held in Abepura town was forcefully dispersed, leaving six dead. About 300 of the 5,000 involved were arrested. Six were charged with treason.

The latest incident occurred on Monday, when two men shot a police chief in the head at the airport in Puncak Jaya, a regency in the Papua highlands.

Violence has plagued Papua since 1969, when Indonesia took over control of the region from the Dutch, ignoring Papuan demands for political sovereignty. In response to rising demands to separate, Jakarta granted the region special autonomy in 2001, with a promise that the funds allocated from the government budget would help accelerate development in Papua's restive provinces.

Indonesia began giving land concessions in Papua for mining projects soon after, assuring Papuans they would gain from such investments.

Earlier this year, the government's Supreme Audit Agency revealed that 4.12 trillion rupiah (\$\$589 million) of the 19.12 trillion rupiah in special autonomy funds between 2001 and last year had been misused and embezzled.

By and large, many Papuans remain impoverished and believe they have not reaped the benefits of their resource-rich province.

Speaking by phone from Papua, Father Neles Tebay of the Papua Peace Network said a deep mistrust of Jakarta has prevailed and spurred the insurgents.

"The inconsistent implementation of the special autonomy law has caused Papuans to be disappointed. They see that their livelihoods have not improved and feel they are becoming a minority in their own lands... that they are marginalized economically, and now the Papuans feel that they are not protected," the respected priest and Papua peacemaker said.

In 2005, immigrant numbers were estimated at 41 per cent of the population in Papua. It is expected to jump to 53.5 per cent by the end of this year, making indigenous Papuans a minority in their own home, according to the Papua Road Map.

Neles called for a thorough annual evaluation of the implementation of the special autonomy law in Papua. "So far, this has not been done, although the law states it should," he said.


Muridan urged Jakarta to engage prominent Papuan leaders, release political prisoners and reduce military posturing to demonstrate political will in resolving the issues.

He said: "We succeeded in establishing peace talks in Aceh, so we should find another way of talking to the Papuans. No violence is justified... and that is why we have to convince both sides to start talking."

The success of a society depends on construction of formal, liberal property regimes. Formalized property information feeds conflict resolution mechanisms by clearly identifying owners, claimants, rights and duties so that

disagreements can be more peaceably reconciled; creates confident stakeholders willing to support the rule of law; helps create and expose capital, which ameliorates negative socio-economic conditions that fuel internal conflict; produces landowners who are less inclined to engage in illegal behavior because they risk forfeiture; and the records associated with formal property provide a powerful forensic tool with which to support peaceful conflict resolution processes, restitution programs, and bring violators of basic human rights to justice.

Geoff Demarest's *Property and Peace* is the seminal book that advances this critical subject.



FMSO Commentary: Gangs collaborating with Mexican drug-trafficking organizations have become more violent and are in direct contact with Central American gangs, such as the Mara Salvatrucha, and U.S. gangs, such as the Mexican Mafia. This collaboration has resulted in recruitment on US soil, evidenced by the fact that, of those gangs working with Mexican drug cartels, approximately 20% are from US states such as Texas, Arizona, and California. In Ciudad Juarez, just across the border of El Paso, approximately 1,500 gangs with members between the ages of 14 and 25 have created alliances with other criminal organizations, such as La Linea.


Those individuals living in the US and working with Mexican drug cartels are from all walks of life, but the common profile of one of these workers is a young male of Latino descent, living in the country either legally or illegally. Take for example Frediberto Pineda, a Sinaloa Cartel operator who was arrested on 20 April 2011 in Gaston, South Carolina. Pineda was originally deported from the U.S. almost 10 years ago, yet had returned, and was living in the country illegally at the time of his arrest. Phone taps initiated by the DEA had recorded multiple conversations from the residence where Pineda was arrested to locations throughout Mexico. The majority of those conversations concerned cocaine shipments and the earnings they generated. In the wake of this arrest, residents in Gaston (population 1,034) began questioning how a prominent Mexican drug cartel was able to establish itself within their small community without anyone noticing.

It is common knowledge that Mexican drug cartels are operating in large metropolitan areas like Los Angeles, Houston and Chicago, but it seemed nearly unfathomable to residents of Gaston that these same organizations would target small town America. Part of the answer can be found in information that goes beyond what was provided by police regarding this case — Mexican cartels are diversifying their trafficking and operational methods in an attempt to expand their areas of operation into previously uncharted waters, to include outlying areas like Gaston. Common diversification efforts include exchanging gang attire for khakis and polo shirts, and having tattoos removed to blend into smaller communities with relative ease.

Given the fact that the drug-trafficking industry is so prominent within the United States, it is no surprise that US gang members are needed to support operations. The problem with the growing involvement of US gangs in Mexican drug trafficking is that it provides new and expanded markets in which Mexican drug cartels can operate. Even small cities in the Midwest have not been spared, and it can be hypothesized that with increased manpower, both distribution of drugs and levels of violence will increase in US cities where Mexican cartels are being supported by local gangs. **End FMSO Commentary (Fiegel)**

US Gangs Collaborating with Mexican Drug Cartels 5 November 2011

Source: Pandillas de EU surten de armas a cartels”, El Universal, <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/806282.html>. Accessed on 03 November 2011



Map of areas in which US street gangs supporting Mexican Drug cartels are operational. Map data by U.S. Department of Justice [Public Domain]

Pandillas de EU surten de armas a cartels (US Gangs Provide Weapons to Cartels)

A Department of Justice study named Gang Threats 2011 revealed that a minimum of 33,000 street gangs with an estimated 1.4 million members are operating on streets in the United States; an increase of 40% when compared to two years ago. This same study pointed out the relative ease these groups have in acquiring high-caliber weapons. Increases in size and the ease in which these groups are able to gain access to weapons represent security issues for the entire country according to the Department of Justice. Furthermore, this threat is enhanced in the sense that US gangs are forming closer working relationships with transnational organized crime groups; especially Mexican drug cartels.

US gangs represent an important role in the operational capacities of Mexican drug cartels in the sense that they serve as intermediaries to traffic illicit goods to include drugs (into the United States) and weapons (into Mexico). Furthermore, those gang members who are US citizens are able to work on both sides of the border are extremely valuable given the relative ease their migratory status allows them in conducting operations in the United States and Mexico alike. US citizens working within the ranks of gangs are commonly put in charge of protecting contraband routes, charging and collecting payments, and transporting illicit materials.

When examining street gangs operating in the United States, those whose ranks are composed of African-American and Hispanic descent are the most likely to participate in the distribution of drugs purchased directly from Mexican drug cartels. For example, the Sinaloa Cartel is known to use local gangs in Los Angeles to carry out kidnappings, to buy and sell drugs, and to collect earnings generated from trafficking. At the same time, gangs to include the Latin Kings, the MS -13, the Surenos, and the Nortenos maintain close relationships with Los Zetas in states to include California and South Carolina.

The Invisible Border between Mexico and Guatemala

31 October 2011

Source: Mandujano, Isain. "Frontera invisible [Invisible Border]". Proceso. 05 June 2011



Map of Guatemala, data from Gadm.org [cc-by-sa (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via gadm.org

Frontera invisible (Invisible Border)

The border that divides Mexico and Guatemala is a prime trafficking area for weapons, drugs, and humans. The border itself measures 572 kilometers, and includes natural water boundaries in the form of the Usumacinta and Suchiate Rivers.

Data gathered by the International Border and Water Commission reports that eight formal crossing points are present along the border of Mexico and Guatemala. Of these eight points, seven are located in the state of Chiapas, while one is located in Tabasco. Despite the presence of formal crossing points, officials from both countries agree that thousands of highly porous sectors along this border are used by criminals to traffic weapons, drugs, and humans.

On the Guatemalan side of the border, approximately 250 miles from Tuxtla Gutierrez; La Mesilla commercial plaza serves as a popular shopping area for thousands of Mexicans and Guatemalans. Items sold in this plaza include weapons that can easily be transported back into Mexico. A Pietro Beretta can be purchased there for as little as 11,000 pesos, while it is important to note that weapons laws are not nearly as strict in Guatemala as in Mexico.

FMSO Commentary: To cross into Guatemala from Mexico legally, it is necessary to pass through control points, but anyone interested in avoiding these customs checkpoints has more than a dozen options of doing so. Highways leading from cities to include El Sabinalito, El Jocote, Pacayalito, and Las Champas are commonly used by Los Zetas to cross into Guatemala (see map). At the same time, the Gulf Cartel, the Sinaloa Cartel, and Los Zetas are known to purchase properties in border regions along Frontera Comalapa, La Trinitaria, and Comitán, where they can easily store drugs and weapons and conduct business.

The numerous porous areas along the Guatemalan and Mexican border serve as prime trafficking areas for humans, weapons and drugs. Yet, the Mexican government commonly criticizes the U.S. government for its lack of controls on weapons sales, when, in reality, the southern border in Mexico serves as a highly accessible point to transport large quantities of weapons and ammunition.

This idea is evidenced by large seizures in 2008, 2009, and 2010. In 2008, authorities in Chiapas arrested four Los Zetas operators with 51 weapons, two submachine guns, 161 magazines, 5,956 rounds of ammunition, and 90 grenades as they were entering into Mexico from Guatemala. In 2009, three more gunmen were arrested in Chiapas as they were returning from Guatemala with 306 grenades, a Barrett .50 weapon, 18 AK-47s, 21 AR-15s, and 17,212 rounds of ammunition. Then again in July of 2010, four individuals were arrested in Tapachula with 11 AK-47s, 3 M-16s, 1 AR-15, and more than 500 rounds of ammunition.

These are three instances that clearly indicate that the border area along Mexico and Guatemala serves as a medium for illegal activity. This same situation is compounded by the lack of security along both sides of the border. In terms of a security issue for the United States, terrorists looking to find an easy access route into the United States could enter Mexico through Guatemala without a problem. This border area is also a prime route utilized by thousands of Central Americans looking to enter into the United States illegally. As for weapons and drugs trafficking in this region, the prevalence of this activity continues to grow as criminality proliferates along the unsecured border. **End FMSO Commentary (Fiegel)**

FMSO Commentary: Gangs to include Las Mara Salvatruchas, unsecured borders, ungoverned regions, thousands of demobilized soldiers without jobs, and decades of violence within Guatemala pose serious security risks to the country. When discussing drug-trafficking violence, Mexico is the country that comes to mind, and indeed, Mexico has experienced unprecedented levels of violence directly related to drug-trafficking activity since the end of 2006. Current figures estimate that at least 50,000 individuals have been killed as a direct result of this violence. At the same time, increased pressure by the Mexican government on organized crime factions has pushed groups, to include the Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas, into ungoverned territories along the Guatemalan border.


Within Guatemala, Mexican Cartels have found a haven of sorts. In terms of weapons, there are an estimated 4.5 million weapons in circulation. In terms of personnel, there are at least 900 Mara Salvatrucha gang members in addition to an undetermined number of demobilized soldiers who fought in civil wars that plagued Guatemala for 36 years, who are willing and ready to work at the service of drug trafficking organizations. Finally, throughout Central America, there are an estimated 70,000 Mara Salvatrucha gang members who could provide additional forces if necessary.

Apart from providing ungoverned territories, Guatemala is also a popular choice for organized crime groups because it is a transit nation for the estimated 560 metric tons of cocaine that pass through Central America on a yearly basis. Of this quantity, it is a certainty that large amounts pass through Guatemala before being sent to the United States or areas in Mexico. These 560 metric tons of cocaine represent earnings for cartels in the billions, an idea that is evidenced by the fact that organized crime activity alone

Mexican Drug Traffickers in Guatemala

Source: Jaramillo, Velia. "Centroamerica, propensa y contaminada". Proceso, 05 June 2011

5 June 2011



Map of Guatemala, data from Gadm.org [cc-by-sa (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via gadm.org

Centroamerica, propensa y contaminada **(Central America, Prone to Contamination)**

When Mexican drug traffickers arrived in Guatemala, what they found there was an abundance of demobilized soldiers (many of which were already participating in criminal activities) and thousands of Mara Salvatrucha gang members. In addition to an ample criminal base, they also discovered a large market dedicated to illegal weapons trafficking, a prosperous industry dedicated to providing hitmen for hire, and an advanced infrastructure that promoted violence.

All of these factors are believed to be directly related to internal institutional fragility coupled by budget cuts within the Guatemalan military and police force. These cuts have left border regions surrounding Guatemala without protection, while decades of war have effectively served to establish a culture based on violence.

According to the Director of the Pro-Justice Movement in Guatemala, Carmen Aida Ibarra, criminal groups from outside the country now constitute one of the most serious threats to internal security. These groups are coming to the country not because they are untouchables, but instead, because Guatemala is currently in a tenuous situation, and although the current state of affairs is not promising, Guatemala is not a failed state. Instead, one of the problems lies in the fact that sufficient time has not been allocated to

Continued: Central America, Prone to Contamination

create strong institutions. To add to this situation, groups of drug traffickers represent an additional problem that must be dealt with by an already weak system.

In terms of Departments (States), Peten is just one of the regions within Guatemala without sufficient governance due to restructuring and budget cuts within military and police forces. Following cuts, high ranking military officials chose to allocate available funds to keep high-ranking Officers on board. As a direct result, the Guatemalan military virtually converted itself into an army of Officers. These same Officers were then given the responsibility to select the zones they wanted to work in and provide services to. Those areas not chosen have been left without governance and are prime areas in which drug traffickers and criminal groups choose to operate. Additionally, budget cuts did not allow for investments in the Air Force or Navy; a factor that has left Guatemala without external defenses and border regions without protection.

In terms of improving the situation in Guatemala, the only option is to strengthen State governance and those institutions that oversee security measures. There are no other choices. If this does not happen, the probability is that the country could convert into a prime setting for a mass chaos.


represented 10.1% of the Guatemalan GDP in 2008.

This number represents stark differences when comparing the resources available to the forces contracted to counteract drug trafficking. The current military budget in Guatemala is 33% of the GDP, a number that has been fixed very firmly since 1997. To further add complications to budget shortfalls in the face of the bottomless resources afforded to drug-trafficking organizations, impunity allows for question-free operations for these same groups in many sectors of the country.

*Putting all the pieces together, one can see that the problems that are brewing in Guatemala are not the result of a singular phenomenon. Instead, there is currently a large workforce, to include demobilized soldiers and gang members, who are willing and ready to work in the service of organized crime groups from Mexico at a moment's notice. Secondly, large quantities of weapons circulating throughout the country facilitate violence. Finally, military budget stagnation, combined with impunity and the allowance of operations in ungoverned areas, stands to pose enormous security problems in Guatemala if changes are not made to combat criminality and weak institutions immediately. **End FMSO Commentary (Fiegel)***

Scott Henderson's ground-breaking work, *The Dark Visitor* analyzes the history, ideology, organization, exploits, and political

motivations of the Chinese hacker network. Whenever possible, the information contained herein has been taken directly from the Chinese hacker organization itself or from interviews with individual members.



FMSO Commentary: Since the “war on drugs” in Mexico began in December 2006, criminal organizations have increasingly targeted media reporters, as they continued to release more and more information regarding the groups. This information has become progressively harmful to the existence of the criminal organizations. To combat this, these criminal organizations have even infiltrated numerous media organizations with sleeper reporters, responsible for censoring what was released in the media. Security news-blog sites, such as Al Rojo Vivo and Blog del Narco, circumvented this through anonymous reporting of security incidents involving criminal groups that could no longer censor the press releases. Los Zetas, one of Mexico’s most prominent trafficking organizations, then enlisted the help of computer-savvy hackers who helped to track down the identities and locations of some of these anonymous contributors who thought they were truly nameless; Los Zetas proceeded to mutilate the bodies of these contributors and subsequently hang them from the bridge of a heavily-traveled thoroughfare, sending a strong message that anonymity was no longer the case.

During a three-day, antidrug cartel march in August 2011 in the Mexican state of Veracruz, members of Los Zetas allegedly kidnapped a male protester aligned with the hacker group “Anonymous.” Hackers associated with the group Anonymous then covertly collected as much information as possible on Los Zetas, including identities of its members. On 2 November 2011 Anonymous released a decree, indicating that it would divulge this information publicly if they did not release the kidnapped Anonymous member by the end of the day on 4 November 2011. Los Zetas released the individual on the 4th, signifying a truce, but indicated that if the group did indeed release information regarding their

Security and the Media

13 September 2011 & 2 November 2011

Source: Torturan y ejecutan a pareja y los cuelgan en puente de Nuevo Laredo, Firman Zetas, mandan mensaje al Blog del Narco (Zetas Take Responsibility for Torturing and Murdering Couple and then hanging them from a bridge in Nuevo Laredo, Sending a Strong Message to Blog del Narco),” Narcoviencia.com, 13 September 2011. <http://www.narcoviencia.com/2011/09/torturan-y-ejecutan-pareja-y-los.html> and “Justifica Anonymous ataque contra los Zetas (Anonymous justifies attack against Los Zetas),” Milenio, 02 November 2011. <http://www.milenio.com/cdb/doc/noticias2011/a0f-c9194996e25b1bb26e10fa673bc13>



Anonymous Logo by Anonymous per Definition (Own work) [CC0 (creativecommons.org/Public Domain/zero/1.0/deed.en)], via Wikimedia Commons

Narco letter, via <http://www.narcoviencia.com/2011/09/torturan-y-ejecutan-pareja-y-los.html>



Los Zetas Target Bloggers and ‘Anonymous’ Responds

During the early morning hours of 13 September 2011, the bodies of a male and female murder victim were hung from a pedestrian bridge located on Airport Boulevard in the Los Mayas neighborhood of Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas. Motorists driving that particular route were met with a surprise of the mid-20-year-old victims who had been visibly tortured before being put on display for their actions. Narco messages left at the scene indicated that the two individuals were killed for having posted information on websites to include Al Rojo Vivo and Blog del Narco, two of many security blog media sources.

Continued: Los Zetas Target Bloggers and 'Anonymous' Responds

The contents of the two narco messages left with the victims read as follows: "This is what happens to loose lipped individuals who report on incidents via blog sites (Al Rojo Vivo, Blog del Narco, or citizen complaints via government sites). If you stick your dicks out (by anonymously reporting on activities), we're going to cut them off. Sincerely, Z (Los Zetas)".

The hacker group "Anonymous" recently indicated that they were going to conduct Operation Cartel, a movement to release detailed information regarding the Los Zetas organization. The group was originally going to release this information on 30 October 2011, but postponed the release of information until 5 November 2011 in conjunction with Guy Fawkes day in Britain. Fawkes was one of 13 English Catholic conspirators who were arrested after a failed assassination plot on Protestant King James in 1605, and whose character was revived for the movie "V for Vendetta".

Operation Cartel all began after the kidnapping of an Anonymous member by alleged Zeta members during a street demonstration in Veracruz as part of Operation Paperstorm, an anti-drug cartel march that took place over three days in August 2011. The motive was to convince Los Zetas operators to release the kidnapped individual by a 4 November 2011 deadline, or they would release information regarding cartel members, and possibly other harmful information regarding the group.


organization, they too had information on members of Anonymous in Mexico, and that their actions would be met with dire consequences.

Although they have released the unidentified Anonymous group member, abiding by the terms that the hacker group laid out, another independent Anonymous group member in the U.S. had indicated that he may still release the information. He also openly stated where he lives in the U.S. and that he is not afraid of the group. He continued that the entire Anonymous group, especially those in Mexico, should not be targeted because of his proposed actions because they are solely his. This individual has since changed his mind and avowed that he will not release the information as previously proposed, but did not cite any specific reasoning for the change of heart (although I have a few ideas of my own). In this stalemate we have seen that both groups have employed internet hackers in their operations. As these scuffles evolve, whoever maintains superiority on hacking, electronic warfare, and the like will most likely maintain the upper hand in this ongoing battle between criminal organizations and the many forms of media currently reporting on President Calderon's "War on Drugs." End FMSO Commentary (Scheidel)

Tim Thomas's *Cyber Silhouettes* explores the impact of the Cyber Age on military thinking and operations worldwide.

***Cyber Silhouettes* presents challenges to the American information operations (IO) expert regarding inadequate current terminology, and the need for reevaluation of "core capabilities and supporting elements". Tim Thomas further recognizes how cyber processes have allowed criminals and insurgents/terrorists to practice guerilla warfare tactics and illegal or extremist activities online. He contends that the subjective nature of war has changed to include a social context unlike any other time in history.**

Tim Thomas provides a unique perspective that will lead to a better understanding of our complex digitized live, new ideas for US armed forces to consider, and help analysts identify potential danger zones.



FMSO Commentary: The armed conflict in northern South America is complex, and getting more so, as this translation of a pair of articles from Venezolanos en línea and Infobae demonstrates. The Barraez article reports a representative sample of tensions among variously shaded guerrilla groups within Venezuela, mostly in the border regions. It also helps highlight the methods of sustainment (road checkpoints and petty extortions being prominent) and the competition among armed groups over the best geography for that parasitism. The Infobae article adds to the first, highlighting complicity or integration of local government with the guerrilla groups, along with the growing discontent among some local populations. To this FMSO analyst, we are seeing the fermentation of a dangerous brew that could lead to civil war, depending on the outcomes of external factors, these to include the health of President Hugo Chavez and the unfolding of a now distorted electoral process. End FMSO Commentary (Demarest)

Mixture of Armed Actors in Venezuela

16 September 2011 – 14 October 2011

Source: Sebastiana Barraez, 'ELN vs. FPLN: War between Guerrillas,' Sebastiana sin secretos, Venezolanos en línea, 16 de septiembre de 2011

http://www.vlinea.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19320:sebastiana-sin-secretos&catid=96:actualidad&Itemid=1;

Inofabe, 'El ELN Mexico,' Infobae, 14 de octubre de 2011

<http://america.infobae.com/notas/35723-El-ELN-colombiano-se-esta-infiltrando-en-Venezuela>

The ELN vs. FPLN: War between Guerrillas

The ELN is the National Liberation Army, and the FPLN are the Patriotic National Liberation Forces. For a number of years it, like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), ensconced itself on Venezuelan territory. Over the years, some fronts have moved around. The district of Alto Apure, specifically in El Nula and its surroundings, may be where they have remained most consistently.

Their principal adversary within Venezuela has been the Bolivarian Liberation Forces (FBL), a guerilla group comprised mainly of Venezuelans. That clash has cost a number of lives.

Shortly after Chávez came to power, the definitive moment occurred. Then the fight was between the military fronts of the FBL and ELN. It left at least thirty killed. The ELN fell back a little, but never left Venezuelan territory. The FBL split. Part of Apure, Táchira, and Barinas remained in the hands of the traditional FBL commander, Jerónimo Paz. He created the Patriotic National Liberation Forces (FPLN). But that is past history.

They have been in a new stage for several years. They [uncertain from original if speaking of the ELN or the FPLN] are trying to leave behind the activities that were most damaging to their image: kidnapping and extortion. They have made progress in organizing the campesinos. Jerónimo's group has two fronts in the struggle: the armed front, which is embodied by the FPLN, and the communal front, which includes various campesino organizations. It is not difficult for them to thrive on that border area. There are still cattle ranches and large estates. The poor are still poor, with hardly any access to the country's oil wealth.

The FPLN Demand that the ELN Leave Venezuelan Territory

This is the situation today between the ELN and the FPLN (ex-FBL). The community is divided. The FPLN demand that the ELN leave Venezuelan territory, and they use their origins in the community to displace them [the ELN]. They have succeeded in intercepting several drug shipments that the ELN was transporting to the center of the country. There are already at least eight dead and more wounded. There was an armed clash a week ago. Two youths from the FPLN died in Sirirí. Protests are emerging. Some inhabitants occupied La Pedrera (Táchira), demanding that the Theater of Operations No. 1 [unit of the Venezuelan Army] assert Venezuela's sovereignty and make the ELN leave the country.

The ELN claims that they are the ones who maintain social peace on the border. "In El Nula you can sleep with your doors open. Here there are no thieves or robberies." Commander Carlos of the ELN established a camp of armed men in the Bocas de Río Viejo

Continued: The ELN vs. FPLN: War between Guerrillas

sector in Páez de Apure municipality. A group of campesinos went there and, practically in front of the camp, sang the Venezuelan national anthem.

They tried to deliver a communiqué, but the ELN would not meet with them. Possibly the oldest ELN leader in the area, alias Banana, positioned an armed group opposite Puerto Chorroquero. This was a bold move, because until now the area has been controlled by the ex-FBL. Another group was positioned at Puerto Maraco. This military advance by the ELN would have been ordered by Commander Lenin, head of the ELN Eastern Front in Colombia. The ELN has said that they are only responding to the demands of a community “fed up with the FBL’s conduct. It is intolerable how they walk all over the humble campesinos, take what little they have – as when “borrowing” a canoe or vehicle, and even take money the Venezuelan government has sent for community projects.” The ELN has also pointed out that on the Arauca River from La Morita to the 30, a distance of 50 kilometers, there are seven National Guard and Army checkpoints. “They aren’t so much checkpoints as extortion-points.”

Two Communiqués Have Been Issued

One was signed by the Bolívar and Zamora Revolutionary Current (CRBZ), the Simón Bolívar National Communal Front (FNCSB), the Ezequiel Zamora National Campesino Front (FNCEZ), the Workers’ Popular Power Movement (MPPO), the Circle of the People’s Struggles for Human Rights and Against Impunity (CLPDHI), the Simón Bolívar Socialist Communal City, communes, and communal councils.

They charge that the ELN “brazenly not only remains on sovereign national territory, but also has increased its forces and hostile actions against us who raise the flag of our Bolivarian Revolution.” The second statement, from the CRBZ only, stresses that the relationship with the ELN “was rather fraternal, and even ‘guevarista’ if we may use the term, until the arrival of Commander Hugo Chávez and with him the Bolivarian Revolution, but then everything changed. . . for the worse.” They accuse the ELN of viewing Venezuela as “a rich source of financing, through kidnapping, extortion, and smuggling, with the new component of drug trafficking.” They assert that after reaching an agreement with the FARC, the ELN came to lord it over, and that they are advancing toward the center of the country, “arriving in Barinas with kidnappings and extortion – specifically in Guacara-Carabobo, where kidnappings have occurred. They have positioned irregular units in the mountains of Socopó.”

The ELN tried to organize a strike but did not manage to gather sufficient strength. In this the FPLN have them beat. But in terms of operations, the ELN is stronger, and therefore, in military clashes, the FPLN have not fared well. The ELN has formed various cooperatives with some 60 moto-taxis, the majority illegal. The authorities know that they are ELN supporters and use the moto-taxis for intelligence, deployment, and skirmishes. The ELN in La Ceiba engages in extortion with the excuse that the funds are for repairing roads, and in El Piñal the people complain about them. In the end, it seems that the FPLN and organized communal groups are the roadblock to the ELN’s advance on Venezuelan territory.

The ELN in Mexico

In Apure, a state bordering Colombia, the population endures the invasion of terrorists who, according to reports from locals, have even “invaded seats of municipal government,” while officials remain indifferent.

It is no longer an issue of mere incursions by elements of this Colombian guerilla group. In some cases, virtual occupations of Venezuelan soil have taken place. “We have very detailed reports,” stated, for example, José Walter Aparicio, coordinator of the Simón Bolívar National Communal Front, from this Venezuelan region bordering Colombia. The ELN (National Liberation Army) has imposed mandatory curfews requiring people to remain in their homes after 6pm, collects protection money from producers, and eliminates whoever disobeys their orders.”

The leader complained about the indifference of officials in the face of this extremely serious state of affairs: “The situation with the ELN in our territory is something that some entities don’t want to see; they hide behind the assertions of the President [Hugo Chávez], who says there aren’t guerrillas here, but that is false, because we know what is happening; we see them marching armed and in uniform, and even setting up checkpoints on our soil.”

Recently, area residents, backed by local authorities, marched chanting slogans against the guerilla group and denounced both the violation of Venezuelan sovereignty and the crimes these terrorists commit against the area’s campesinos and land owners, including extortion, kidnapping, and murder. Leaders of civil organizations that participated in the protest stated that the ELN already has more than 500 combatants and militia members in the southern zone of Táchira state and in Alto Apure.

FMSO Commentary: China and Pakistan have a deepening relationship based on many commonalities. They each have had a turbulent past with India, which borders both countries. They also are both skeptical about U.S. foreign policy and the role the United States has been playing in the area. Finally, their relationship is mutually beneficial. China needs natural resources, which Pakistan can provide; and Pakistan needs infrastructure, which China can provide.

YOUYI-IV translates to “Friendship-4” and is the fourth joint exercise in a series between the two countries. The first three Friendship exercises took place in 2004, 2006, and 2010.

In addition to conducting joint exercises, after Washington imposed military sanctions on Pakistan in 1990, China took over as Pakistan’s primary source for arms and weapons and has provided a variety of weapons and military systems. As a result, it is possible that India could one day face a two-front war against the two countries, both of which are undergoing modernization programs.

Finally, China currently views the U.S. as conducting a containment strategy in the region. While these Friendship exercises are said to be focused around antiterrorism, China’s growing military ties with Pakistan could also be a counterweight to the U.S. strategy of constraining China’s growing influence.
End FMSO Commentary (Hurst)

China-Pakistan Growing Military Ties: A Counterweight to a U.S. Containment Strategy?

14 November 2011

Source: South Asian News Agency, 14 Nov 2011. <http://www.sananews.net/english/2011/11/pak-china-joint-military-exercise-youyi-iv-starts/>



Troops participating in Pak-China joint exercise Friendship-IV (2011), near Jehlum. Photo by Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) department of Armed Forces of Pakistan, via http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1904#pr_link1904

Pak- China Joint Military Exercise YOUYI-IV Starts

RAWALPINDI, (SANA): Pakistan–China Joint Military Exercise YOUYI-IV has started on Monday near Jehlum.

According to a statement issued by ISPR the joint exercise, spread over a period of two weeks, is aimed at sharing mutual exchange of experience and information through a comprehensive training programme in real time.

This exercise is fourth in the series in which Special Forces from both sides will participate. Exercise YOUYI-IV is a Brigade level joint exercise between the two armies.

Chinese Army being well equipped and highly technical in nature is very meticulous, keen and equally professional in their approach. During last joint exercise in China they demonstrated high sense of professionalism and friendship towards Pakistan.

Exercise YOUYI that literally translates “FRIENDSHIP” between two countries started in 2004. So far three exercises have been conducted including two in China and one in Pakistan. These exercises were mandated to boost existing professional relationship between the two friendly Armies.

It is worth mentioned here that Pakistan and China enjoy extremely close and brotherly relations since their inception, which have matured and strengthened over the years.

The forthcoming Joint Military Exercise YOUYI-IV will certainly pave the way for further cementing the existing bilateral relations between the two countries.

Senior Military leadership from both sides will also attend the Exercise. The YOUYI-IV exercise will be a true manifestation to a famous Chinese phrase “Pakistan China friendship is higher than the mountains and deeper than oceans”.

Chinese Perceptions of US Info Operations

10 October 2011



Source: Han Xudong, Professor at China's National Defense University, "New Form of Global Warfare by the United States," Liaowang, 10 Oct 2011, No. 40-41, p. 96

Seal of United States Cyber Command [Public Domain], via Wikimedia Commons

New Form of Global Warfare by the United States

The United States is initiating a new, global, soft-power gamesmanship war [bo yi zhan]. This new conflict can be understood to be the "sixth world war." This new form of warfare poses a greater threat and greater danger to national security than traditional warfare.

To date, there has not yet been a history book or a historian who has pointed out that a certain war was the first war in the history of human development. However, global warfare is still something that can be researched. It is not hard to discover that human development has now quietly entered the "sixth global war realm."

The first global war in the history of human development began with the colonial wars that appeared in the 15th century. This kind of global colonial war brought nearly every country in the world into the colonial system, with only a very few countries still maintaining a certain degree of independence. To date, this kind of colonial war, the goal of which is to control land and resources and engage in plunder, slavery, and exploitation, has not yet concluded in a fundamental sense.

The second and third global wars were World War I and World War II. These two great wars turned most regions of the world into battlefields. The Cold War that developed between the two major camps of East and West — particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union — was a kind of global military confrontation, and can be termed the fourth global war. During the Cold War era, there was no direct warfare between the United

States and the Soviet Union, but behind nearly every war that broke out in various places around the world, the shadows of the United States and the Soviet Union were always there. The fifth was the war in Afghanistan, which was launched by the United States in 2001 on the grounds of "fighting terrorism." Most of the countries in the world were again caught up in this war on terrorism, and furthermore it was launched worldwide. To date, there is still no end in sight to the global "counter-terrorism" war.

Along with the proposal by the United States in its military strategy report issued this year about wanting to improve its "global military leadership," this shows that the United

FMSO Commentary: The concept of "soft power" has been discussed for several years worldwide. In China the issue is discussed in both civilian and military journals. Exploiting the concept can lead to a situation where a nation can "win without fighting," a popular Chinese stratagem and goal since the time of Sun Tzu.

In this article the author notes that network space will be the primary battlefield of the future; that the "high ground of public opinion" must be occupied; that a nation that controls advanced technology can generate deterrence; and that striving for dominance over the "rules of the game" is a crucial victory that must be won. A nation with the ability to generate soft power advances its ability to achieve each of these goals.

The author adds that the United States is initiating a new game of "soft power gamesmanship," and that this form of warfare is a "greater danger to national security than traditional warfare." In this sense the Chinese appear to agree with Russia's concept and focus on the importance of gaining an information-psychological warfare advantage (almost identical to the soft power concept) over an opponent. Both China and Russia appear to fear a revolution from within that would be generated through the Internet, much like the example of the Middle East's recent experience with Arab Spring uprisings. It is expected that China's Communist Party will continue to stress the importance of soft power for the next several years as it attempts to maintain control over the population.

End of FMSO Commentary (Thomas)

***Continued:* New Form of Global Warfare by the United States**

States is in the process of initiating a new, global, soft-power gamesmanship war. This new conflict can be understood to be the sixth global war, and its salient features are expressed in the following several areas:

First, network space [wang luo kong jian] will be the primary battlefield. Along with the continued development and materialization of network technology, it is promoting the close linking of society as a whole. This situation has to an enormous degree inhibited the outbreak of traditional wars. However, this really is unable to eliminate the mutual strife and struggles between various countries and nationalities, so warfare will be expressed in a new form, namely, death-struggles launched in network space.

The main reasons that network space may become the main battlefield for human warfare are, first of all, networks are becoming the foundation for the existence and development of society, nations and nationalities as a whole. As soon as the network of a given country has been destroyed, or its network capabilities have been weakened, the ability of this country to contend with other countries will decline significantly. Second, networks are the nerves of military hard-power. Weakening network capabilities also weakens military hard-power capabilities, and thus achieves the ultimate goal of getting others to submit without a fight. Third, the United States is in a dominant position in competition in network space, and it hopes to launch soft-power gamesmanship, with network space as the breakthrough point, to achieve the goal of maintaining world hegemony. The United States was the first in the world to organize a Cyber Command, as well as being the first to put such a command into operation, which has now highlighted its intentions.

Second, occupying the public-opinion high ground. First of all, guiding public opinion. For many years, in the form of its "Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," the United States has been potentially inducing the international community to misjudge China's military might, creating a breeding ground for the "China threat theory." From the perspective of international public opinion, the countries of the West are more willing to accept the mistaken viewpoint of the United States toward China's military might. This kind of "Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China" that was released by the United States has been enormously disruptive to the understanding of and trust in China's "Defense White Paper" on the part of the international community. Second, boosting the influence of network data. In network space, data that appears in English accounts for the vast majority. Of that, data put out by the United States also accounts for the vast majority. This then enables the United States to occupy a position of absolute dominance with regard to the impact in the realm of network data. Furthermore, the criterion for data put out by the United States is that it is in its national interests. Third, continually expanding the influence of video information.

Essentially, all the countries around the world adopt the video information put out by the United States. Given that situation, on one hand the United States steps up the volume of video information it provides, thus expanding its influence, while on the other hand it can also use this form to provide false video [information] to mislead world opinion.

Third, using control of technological superiority to generate deterrence. In April last year, the United States and Russia reached a new pact on reducing nuclear arms, committing the two countries to reducing the number of nuclear warheads respectively by one-third, limiting the number of nuclear warheads to 1,550, and limiting the total number of delivery means to 800. In order to maintain the deterrence of its nuclear force, the United States has switched to improving its nuclear technology. The National Nuclear Security Administration in the United States will invest \$100 billion to construct a new type of "reliable replacement" warhead. From that one can see that the United States is going all out to maintain its leading position with regard to technology. This kind of control of technological superiority is a kind of deterrence. Along with the age of the decentralization of advanced technology, more and more countries will strive for advantageous positions with regard to advanced technology in order to improve their own deterrent power.

Fourth, striving for dominance with regard to the rules of the "game." Following the Cold War, more and more countries have joined in the gamesmanship of the international community. Among them, the struggle for dominance in formulating the rules of the "game" and the international gamesmanship involving the rules of the "game" have become increasingly intense. The expansion of NATO is one prominent example. During the NATO expansion process, NATO has continually applied pressure to other countries who want to join NATO to accept its rules of the game in order to raise the degree to which these countries are close to NATO, ultimately forcing these countries to accept NATO's rules and absorbing them into NATO, thus achieving the expansion objective.

The aforementioned gamesmanship is the latest form in the development of global warfare. This form of warfare differs from traditional warfare with regard to a number of features. This new form of warfare poses a greater threat and greater danger to national security than traditional warfare. In order to seize the initiative in this kind of warfare and ensure our national security, we must not only understand the features of traditional warfare, even more we must emancipate our minds and achieve a profound understanding of the new features of this new form of warfare.

A New Jihadist Group in Central Asia?

2 November 2011

Source: Maytanov, Azamat. “Справка «АЖ»: Кто такие Солдаты Халифата? («АЗН» - Ak Zhayyk Asks: Who are the Soldiers of the Caliphate?)” Ak Zhayyk.

<http://www.azh.kz/news/view/7692>



Members of the Jund al Khilafah, from their latest videotape (26 Oct. 2011). Image from the SITE Intelligence Group. <http://news.siteintelgroup.com>

Справка «АЖ»: Кто такие Солдаты Халифата? (Ak Zhayyk «АЗН» Asks: Who are the Soldiers of the Caliphate)

This “Jund al-Caliphate”, which suddenly appeared out of nowhere and posted statements threatening the government of Kazakhstan – what is this? Is it fake, created by intelligence agencies as a practical joke, or a real statement, recorded by terrorists somewhere outside the country? The well-known English-language site The Long War Journal, which monitors religious extremism, brought up “Jund al-Caliphate” as a new and previously unknown jihadist group.

It is assumed that “Jund al-Caliphate” is operating in the Afghan province of Khost, near the Afghan-Pakistani border. If you believe this site the threats are coming directly from members of “Al Zahir Beybars Battalion”, which is made up of Kazakh militants fighting against NATO forces.

But why did they start by detonating a bomb in Atyrau and not Astana, where power is concentrated? Remember the following detail: those arrested in Atyrau in September were charged with funding foreign Islamic militants. It is thought they transferred money to Kazakhs in Pakistan and Afghanistan. We also know last year Kazakh jihadists received a fatwa (permission) to destroy members of the local security services who “tortured and jailed innocent Muslims”.

FMSO Commentary: The October 31st bombing in the western city of Atyrau is the third suicide bombing (although in this instance one of the bombs exploded early, killing the bomber) to take place this year in Kazakhstan since May. The previous bombings happened in the city of Aktobe (May 17) and the capital Astana (May 24). The bombs did not kill any bystanders in any of the incidents; there were a few injuries in the Aktobe bombing. As the article mentions the Atyrau bombing came several days after Jund al-Khilafah (Soldiers of the Caliphate) threatened the government of Kazakhstan over a new law banning prayer rooms in state buildings. The group claimed credit for the bomb.

While it appears that extremist groups have penetrated Kazakhstan, very little is still known about what has been happening. This article from Ak Zhayyk, an Atyrau newspaper, questions the existence of the group and how much of a threat it really presents to Kazakhstan. This bombing took place near government administration buildings, including the national security committee and police offices. The author makes an interesting observation, that the bombing did not take place in the largest cities but in Atyrau. Recent and any future attacks in Kazakhstan may be more about revenge against a specific target than against the state as a whole. **End FMSO Commentary (Stein)**

FMSO Commentary: *Kazakh language newspapers in Kazakhstan often refer to the 'language problem,' specifically that Kazakh does not have an important enough place in society. Kazakh is the state language (Russian is considered an official language) and many non-ethnic Kazakhs have little or no Kazakh language ability. This includes a sizable number of ethnic Kazakhs, most of whom live in the northern regions. Despite concerns among advocates of Kazakh, the language has nevertheless become more important over the past several years. Knowledge of it is now a legal requirement for certain government positions, although this requirement is implemented sporadically.*

The following article shows that the military and security services can be affected by the language requirement, which could exclude a fair number of ethnicities (Russians, Ukrainians) from promotions and senior positions. If this is the case, it could push out a number of well qualified and experienced officers, like the article's example of Colonel Bakhirev. However, language may only be a part of the issue in this example. Because the language requirement is applied erratically, it is likely there was some other problem in this particular case. There are instances of Kazakhs replacing other ethnicities in government positions, regardless of language ability, and this could also be happening in the border forces. In any case, based on the demographic changes in Kazakhstan, non-Kazakh speakers are gradually becoming a minority. Russian will continue to be a language of instruction in military and security services, but it will probably have a smaller role than Kazakh as the next generation takes over.

End FMSO Commentary (Stein)

The Language Problem in Kazakhstan

25 November 2011

Source: Alyokhova, Aleksandra. "Кому язык не по зубам? (For Whom is the Language Too Difficult?)," Vremya (Time), 5 November 2011 <http://www.time.kz/index.php?module=news&newsid=24369>



Cyrillic alphabet with Flag of Kazakhstan [Public Domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Кому язык не по зубам? (Who is the Language Too Difficult For?)

The former director of the Border Academy (former Military Institute) of the KNB (National Security Committee) of Kazakhstan decided to implement ahead of schedule a state program of the development and functioning of languages for the years 2011-2020. The first steps in engaging the academy for using the state language (Kazakh) were made long before the government program, in November of last year. The then head of the academy, Major General Abdyrzak Ilyasov, verbally ordered that the academy exclusively use Kazakh in their morning reports. The first commander that the language order was too difficult for was senior instructor in tactics, Colonel Vladimir Bakhirev of the Border Guards. As a result, the colonel was suspended from duty.

There were two official investigations, according to Bakhirev's brother, the disciplinary committee rejected the first, but General Ilyasov ordered another. The second time he was found guilty. The constitution guarantees freedom of the choice of language, and military service provides use of the government and Russian language.

Colonel Bakhirev decided to defend his rights; he asked to have his disciplinary actions (written in an official report in Russian) reviewed and to review the removal from service on linguistic grounds. However, the military court of the Almaty garrison refused this on the grounds that the plaintiff did not contest the charges directly to the general.

According to Bakhireva, the academy cancelled Kazakh language classes for those who are over forty, recognizing that they not useful. "There are a lot of people like me (who do not know Kazakh) at the institute, they prefer to remain silent."

War of Words in Uzbekistan



26 October 2011

Source: Ozhereleva, Mari-anna. ““Быть или не быть” по-узбекски (“To Be or Not To Be” in Uzbek) Голос России (Voice of Russia), 26 October 2011 http://rus.ru/radio_broadcast/no_program/59404767.html

CSTO Flag [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Быть или не быть” по-узбекски (“To Be or Not To Be” in Uzbek)

President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko has invited the heads of the CSTO member states to decide on the future participation of Uzbekistan in the organization. According to Lukashenko, Uzbekistan has not ratified any essential document in the framework of the CSTO. In an interview with the “Voice of Russia” The President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, Doctor of History, Colonel Leonid Ivashov, commented on Lukashenko’s statement...

“First, the Collective Security Treaty (the predecessor organization to the CSTO) was signed in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) May 14, 1992. Uzbekistan was an active member of the first Collective Security Treaty Organization, and then it ceased participation. Then the country again tried to build bilateral relations with Russia of a strategic nature, and then again entered (the CSTO). But keep in mind that the United States and Europe strongly pressure Uzbekistan on human rights. Uzbekistan faces a dilemma – whether Americans will put their troops (into Uzbekistan), or the infrastructure that they will withdraw out of Afghanistan (referencing the rail line from Termez, Uzbekistan into northern Afghanistan). I think Lukashenko raised the question correctly: either you – as a member of the CSTO, execute decisions of the organization, or leave, which is of course undesirable.”

On October 25 Armenia’s parliament ratified two treaties adopted within the framework of the CSTO. It turns out that in the absence of consensus, members who disagree shall be exempt from liability. In connection with these amendments, could Uzbekistan continue their actions like they were previously? Colonel Ivashov: “Most likely Uzbekistan will act this way. Islam Karimov (President of Uzbekistan) is likely to not state the country will leave the organization, but that relations are frozen. The country would not technically be out of the organization, but would not be active.”

Is Uzbekistan’s departure from the CSTO a worst-case scenario? Colonel Ivashov: “This is the worst option. Things are not all peaceful there. We see that in Afghanistan there is a battle against Islamic terrorist groups. With the departure of the Americans, this pressure can become stronger. Karimov decided to reenter the CSTO when the threat of terrorism grew, when large-scale terrorist attacks took place in Uzbekistan, and there was unrest on the border. Karimov made a decision under pressure and threats to state security. Everything is calm now, but this is a temporary lull.”

FMSO Commentary: While there is a debate going on about whether or not the U.S. should engage and cooperate with Uzbekistan (specifically on security assistance), there is also a dispute among some members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on the purpose and function of the organization. The CSTO, originally the Collective Security Treaty, as the article mentions, came under scrutiny after the June 2010 violence in southern Kyrgyzstan. The government of Kyrgyzstan and some analysts believed the CSTO was wrong not to intervene and send peacekeepers to stop the violence, despite the fact that the organization’s charter does not allow interference in the domestic affairs of a member state.

In December 2010 CSTO members amended the charter to allow the organization to intervene in a conflict in a member state, provided that there is a majority agreement among members and the member state in question agrees to an intervention. However, Uzbekistan never agreed to these changes and refused to sign any amendments; the government felt that state sovereignty would be violated in the case of any intervention. This decision comes in the wake of Uzbekistan’s not supporting or contributing troops to the CSTO’s Collective Reaction Force, not participating in CSTO joint military exercises, and, at times, not attending annual CSTO summits.

The following article is part of recent criticism against Uzbekistan for its lack of CSTO participation. While Lukashenko is a high profile name to offer harsh words on this and other criticism came from Russian pundits, this is not likely to result in Uzbekistan’s leaving the CSTO. As Colonel Ivashov mentions in the interview, this would be the worst option. Uzbekistan’s participation, no matter how unreliable it might be, is important for regional security.

End FMSO Commentary (Stein)

FMSO Commentary: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held a prime-minister-level meeting on November 7 in St. Petersburg, where Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin again stated his support for the expansion of the SCO membership. According to him, “enlargement will only add to the SCO’s capabilities, authority and influence.” To date, India, Pakistan and Iran have applied to join the organization, all of which have received Russia’s positive reaction. China, as the other core member state of the organization, has not openly expressed its stance with regard to the issue of expansion.

This article, written by a Chinese expert and scholar on Russia, lays out three scenarios for further integration of the SCO, among which the author advocates the most cautious one, which is to maintain the status quo and focus on self-improvement and pragmatic cooperation within the organization. The author casts doubt on Russia’s rationale that the expansion of the SCO would be the best way to achieve several strategic goals, including to enhance the organization’s influence and promote the trilateral interaction among Russia, China and India. He also points out the risks of rapid expansion of the SCO membership, and the fact that some candidate states are not qualified to be admitted into the organization. Towards the end of the article the expert makes his speculation about Russia’s real motive for the enlargement of the SCO, indicating that Russia actually intends to contain China’s growing influence in the organization and in the region. Moreover, he suggests that, in the near future, China’s activity in the region can go beyond the framework of the SCO and the Sino-Russian relations. **End FMSO Commentary (Du)**

Speculating about Russia’s Motive for Expanding the SCO Membership

11 November 2011

Source: Shanghe Zuzhi Xishou Yinba De Fengxian (The Risks for the SCO of Absorbing India and Pakistan),” Yang Cheng, Dfdaily.com, 11 November 2011 <http://www.dfdaily.com/html/51/2011/11/11/695529.shtml>



Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Council of Heads of State 2011, by the Kremlin [CC-BY-3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0)], via Kremlin.ru

The Risks for the SCO of Absorbing India and Pakistan

During the November SCO summit in St. Petersburg, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s advocacy for the expansion of the SCO has attracted much attention. The claim to absorb India and Pakistan as full member states proved to be particularly sensitive.

According to the SCO Charter, originally, the main duty of the prime ministers’ meeting should be working on multilateral cooperation, especially the principles of economic cooperation, within the organization’s framework. However, due to Putin’s personal influence and the role of Russia as a core member of the SCO, it can be expected that the issue of expansion will soon be put on the SCO’s future agenda.

Full member states of the SCO have remained unchanged since 2001, but both observer states and dialogue partners have increased. This means that the most important issue for the SCO in the next decade will still be the positioning of the organization and its development direction: Through what means to integrate the organization? Should the SCO put more emphasis on its internal potential or on other regional and global participants? These are obviously two completely different paradigms and dimensions.

Although in recent years the heads of the SCO member states have approved several documents in reference to the regulations of receiving new members, many problems still exist in practice. There is no consensus among the member states with regard to the principle of organization’s openness.

In theory, the SCO can choose from the following future integration plans.

The first option is to maintain the status quo while being adhere to the principle of

***Continued:* The Risks for the SCO of Absorbing India and Pakistan**

openness until the opportune moment for accepting new member states comes. Actively but steadily increasing the observer states and dialogue partners can not only eliminate the concerns about the SCO's closed nature, but also avoid the impact of external factors on the organization's internal integration, which makes this plan a preferential option for the SCO.

The second option is to expand the SCO prudently with careful definition of the conditions for admission of new members. The bottomline of this idea is that the SCO must provide sophisticated conditions and procedures for accession, like the European Union, NATO and other international organizations. Each member state must take a certain number of strict obligations. Before considering the absorption of India or Pakistan into the SCO, the organization must well position itself.

The third option is to increase observer states and full members of the organization as soon as possible. The default premise of this idea is that new members of the SCO will help expand the organization's geographical space, thereby strengthen its international position and influence. The accession of regional powers, such as India and Pakistan, would thus be a positive factor.

From this year's SCO summit in Astana to the prime ministers' meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia has been increasingly active in promoting the expansion of the SCO, particularly in encouraging the joining of India. Russia's logic is that the accession of India will help promote the formation of the "strategic triangle" of Russia, China and India, and thus transform SCO into an international regional organizations that no one can neglect any more. It appears that Russia's support for the joining of Pakistan is a compromise made to pacify China's strategic concerns.

It should be acknowledged that Russia does have its own rationale. However, the question is whether it is necessary to achieve these strategic goals by expanding the SCO. If Russia wants to enhance the trilateral interaction between Russia, China and India, the BRIC countries also provide a good mechanism, in addition to the existing foreign ministers meeting mechanism. If the expansion aims at making the SCO an vibrant organization, the truth is that today the international community already cannot imagine a Central Asia without the SCO. Russia and China, as core member states of the SCO, have ensured the organization's influence and prestige.

In fact, the SCO summit in Tashkent in 2010 has set the conditions for enlargement: First, only Eurasian states are qualified candidates for SCO membership; Second, the candidate state should have established diplomatic relations with all present member states; Third, the candidate country must have been granted observer or dialogue partner status; Fourth, the candidate country

should maintain positive trading and cultural relations with current member states; Fifth, the candidate state must not be subject to UN sanctions; Sixth, the candidate state must not be in military conflicts with the other states. In strict accordance with such criteria, even India, which is strongly supported by Russia, does not completely meet the standard, needless to talk about Iran. Despite that India-Pakistan relations have been improving in recent years, the situation could easily deteriorate during emergencies.

The analysis of some Russian media might have revealed the underlying truth: the real aim of Russia's active promotion of accepting India into the SCO is to use India to counterbalance China's increasing influence in the SCO. In short, China's robust development has caused strong concerns among other countries, including Russia. From the restart of the Customs Union to the promotion of the Common Economic Space among Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, then to Putin's recent proposal of the "Eurasian Union," all these are part of a Russia-led integration mechanism, in effect contributing to containing the growing Chinese influence in Central Asia.

The SCO should make a strategic choice between superficial prosperity and pragmatic cooperation. Enlargement of the SCO is not an objective in itself. There is no immediate need to accept new members in order to prove the organization's significance and openness. What important is whether the process of further integration can help maintain and consolidate peace, stability and development in the region, and promote internal reform to improve the quality of the governance in member states, and thus create more favorable external conditions for increasing the national welfare of the member states.

In the absence of sufficient capacity to digest the impacts that could be brought by expansion, the wiser choice for the SCO should be focusing on self-improvement. The idea of accepting India and Pakistan as member states might appears attractive, but it is also highly risky.

In short, China respects Russia's traditional influence and interests in the region, but expansion is not the only option for the SCO's development in the next decade. How and when to carry out enlargement should be subordinated to the common interests of member states and in strict accordance with the principle of consensus.

Perhaps, in China's future foreign policy, China no longer needs to promote its relations with the Eurasian states merely within the framework of the SCO, or in the contexts of Sino-Russian relations. What China can do and should do is to provide more regional public goods and wholeheartedly promote common development and common prosperity in the region.

***FMSO Commentary:** After the separation of powers into executive, legislative and judicial bodies, some have pointed to the media as the essential lubricant of a well-functioning democracy. Free and independent journalists are able to keep the citizenry informed and let them know of any excesses or distortions within the political system. An independent media is the often painful antiseptic that allows a society to accurately identify, and hopefully cure the ailing members of a body politic.*

For much of the 20th century the muckraking function of journalism was lacking within the Russian media. During the Soviet period newspapers, magazines, radio, and then TV were largely used for propaganda purposes. Without the party's approval it was impossible for journalists to write candidly about the problems facing Soviet society. When censorship guidelines were finally relaxed in the mid-1980s, the flood of exposed problems was like a tsunami which helped to flood and destroy party control.

The 1990s were a period of significant media freedom in Russia. Unfortunately, it was also a time of great economic distress. Some of those who became unbelievably wealthy in the unfair privatization of state assets bought up media outlets and then used them to increase their power or to attack their rivals. Problems were exposed, less to correct them than to score political points. The nexus between using the media to identify and then rectify social problems was never fully restored.

After being elected president in 2000, regaining centralized control over Russia's main media outlets was one of Putin's first major initiatives. By buying controlling shares in media companies or removing the most outspoken journalists, the Kremlin leadership has been able to ensure that their version of the 'truth'

Major Russian Media Coverage in the Northern Caucasus

18 October 2010

Source: Darya Mazayeva, "Russian mass media coverage of the terrorist situation in the North Caucasus from 1 January 2001 through 11 October 2011," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 18 October 2011

МИРНАЯ ЖИЗНЬ КАВКАЗУ ПОКА НЕ ГРОЗИТ (Peaceful Life is Not yet Threatened in the Caucasus)

The data was prepared specially for "Nezavisimaya Gazeta-Politika" on the basis of the Medialogia informational-analytical system. A review of the mass media from 1 January 2001 through 11 October 2011 is used in the material. Regardless of the daily reports about terrorist acts and the difficult situation in the North Caucasus, which even the officials are confirming, the attention being given by the mass media to events in the region is declining. And, at the same time, the number of hot spots in Russia continues to increase.

From 1 January 2001 through 11 October 2011, 5,536 reports in the mass media were devoted to special operations in the Caucasus. According to information provided by the Medialogia informational-analytical system, the attention [of the mass media] to events in the Caucasus reached a peak in 2006.

An increase in the number of reports devoted to events in the Caucasus was observed in the period 2001-2002. At that time, the attention of the mass media was locked on the severe battles of the federal troops against terrorists. Chechnya was the main hot spot at that time. At that time, the mass media gave special attention to the numerous special operations for the liquidation of the insurgents. In turn, the official command of the federal troops emphasized, through the mass media, as it were, that the militarized structures were putting their best foot forward in dealing with the terrorists.

The coverage of the foreign mercenaries in the ranks of the insurgents was one of the central themes in the mass media. With a reference to the special services, the mass media reported that, in the majority of cases, the illegal armed formations in Russia acted under their leadership [that is, under the leadership of the foreign mercenaries] and with their participation. The mercenaries purportedly underwent special training abroad and received funding from abroad.

According to various estimates, in 2001, up to 1,000 foreign insurgents from Pakistan, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Jordan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Tunisia, Turkey, Tajikistan, Algeria, and Syria were destroyed.

The period 2002-2006 was marked by a sharp increase of the attention of the mass media toward events in the Caucasus. The main battles also continued in the Chechen Republic during that time.

The military asserted that the border with Georgia presented a special threat to the security of Russia during that period. In their opinion, groups of insurgents regularly penetrated [into Russian territory] from the territory of that former republic of the USSR. For example, in 2003, a band of terrorists, which included mercenaries, was liquidated in Chechnya. According to

Continued: Analysis of RF Mass Media Coverage of North Caucasus Terrorist Situation

Sergey Yastrzhemskiy, an aide to the president of Russia, the bandits were found to have passports with Georgian visas. He said: “Georgia was and continues to be an open door for the terrorists.”

Regardless of the continuation of the battles, the Russian press did not overlook the events of 2003, when a pro-Russian administration was formed in Chechnya. It was headed by Akhmat Kadyrov, who sided with Russia. At that time, a new constitution was approved for the Republic of Chechnya and, according to it, Chechnya was a subject of the Russian Federation. However, in a year, the attention of the mass media was locked on a sad event: On 9 May 2004, Kadyrov was killed during a terrorist act at a stadium in Grozny. His successor was Alu Alkhanov.

Reports on the liquidation of the leaders of the terrorists regularly came in during this same period. The liquidation of Aslan Maskhadov in March 2005 was one of the events that was most widely covered in the mass media.

The liquidation of Shamil Basayev, one of the main terrorists, was among the central events covered by the mass media in 2006. He is considered to be the organizer and executor of one of the greatest acts of terror in the history of modern Russia—in Budennovsk [REFERENCE here is to the large group of people who were killed in Budennovsk when Basayev’s terrorists seized a hospital in that city and took hostages in June 1995].

The period 2007-2008 was marked by a decline in the interest of the mass media in events in the Caucasus.

However, some of them were not neglected [by the mass media]. In the first place, Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov became president of Chechnya in February 2007. He still holds that post at the present time. In the second place, the sensational political murder of Magomed Yevloyev occurred. He was the creator and owner of the [Ingush news] website, Ingushetia.org [formerly,

Ingushetia.ru], which was in opposition to the government of Ingushetia. This crime evoked a wide public response and, as a result, by demand of the opposition, the president of Ingushetia was sent into retirement. Yunusbek Yevkurov was appointed president of Ingushetia.

In the period from the end of 2008 to 2010, there was a small interest on the part of the mass media in events in the Caucasus. Flare-ups of information about some incidents turned up in the press. In June 2009, there was an attempt on the life of President Yevkurov, resulting in the wounding of him. Moreover, in April 2009, the antiterrorist regimen was abolished in Chechnya. At that time, it will be recalled, President Kadyrov made a statement about the beginning of peaceful life in the Chechen Republic.

Regardless of the obvious lack of the due attention of the mass media toward the region, it is too early to speak about peace in the Caucasus. Thus, diversionary and terrorist activities are continuing in regions neighboring Chechnya. In particular, the situation in Ingushetia remains tense. There, murders of peaceful citizens, kidnappings, inter-clan conflicts, and political intrigues are facts of everyday life. This year Aleksandr Tikhomirov (Said Buryatskiy), age 28, one of the ideologues of the insurgents of the North Caucasus, was killed in the territory of Ingushetia. According to information that turned up in the investigation, he had managed to train 30 suicide-bombers before he was killed. Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and Dagestan are also included in the hot spots.

A statement of Anatoliy Bortnikov, Chairman of the NAC, which he made in June of this year, also does not inspire optimism: “Wahhabism, like the plague, is consuming the North Caucasus.”

receives top billing. A good example of this control deals with media coverage in the Northern Caucasus. The excerpted article below describes how the major Russian media have portrayed the situation in this region over the past decade.

*From the Russian perspective (or at least that view cultivated by the state-controlled media), the problems in the North Caucasus over the past decade stem largely from foreign involvement. Radical Islamic fighters from abroad, combined with the treacherous role of Western-leaning Georgia, have been the key catalysts for the spreading instability. While there may be a grain of truth in these allegations, they are not the main causes. Shifting blame to external actors has helped Kremlin and local leaders strengthen their political position, but failing to address the primary causes of this deteriorating situation (corruption, unemployment, past injustices, etc...) has done little to stabilize this region. **End FMSO Commentary (Finch)***

FMSO Commentary: *In the debate over the question as to which is more important—stability or freedom, most Russians have traditionally opted for stability. Freedom and democracy have often been associated with chaos or disorder, and, most recently, with economic decline. During the past decade the current Kremlin leadership has continually pointed to the economic and political confusion of the 1990s as ‘proof’ that the authoritarian, quasi-democracy of the Putin administration is superior to the raw and tumultuous democracy of the Yeltsin period.*

Something similar holds true with the concept of ‘revolution.’ While some in the West might associate a positive connotation to this phenomenon (witness the support for what has been termed the ‘Arab Spring’), Russians and other peoples in the Eurasian landmass hold a more jaundiced view. The horrific events following the 1917 Revolution (and, to a lesser degree, that of 1991) have etched a profound wariness of radical political change.

*It’s not surprising then that the leader of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) would suggest (in the excerpted interview below) that this Russian-led military alliance would consider intervening and using force should an Arab-Spring type situation develop in one of its member countries. Though he qualifies this suggestion with certain conditions (the request must be made by the ‘elected’ authority and must be unanimous), it is clear that some members view democratic protests as a threat to stability. The radical notion that the state derives its authority from the consent of the governed—even when those citizens take the streets in protest—has yet to be embraced by the participants of the CSTO. The ‘demos’ remains something to be managed or manipulated, but not necessarily listened to, and certainly not obeyed. **End FMSO Commentary (Finch)***

Stability over Freedom in CSTO

17 October 2011



Source: Aleksandr Grishin, “CSTO General-Secretary Nikolay Bordyuzha: ‘No Country Today, Not China, Russia, Kazakhstan, or Even the United States, Is Capable of Counteracting All of the Hazards and Threats on Its Own,’” Komsomolskaya Pravda Online, 17 October 2011. <http://www.kp.ru/>

Nikolay Bordyuzha, Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), by Evstafiev [CC-BY-SA 3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia

Генеральный секретарь ОДКБ Николай Бордюжа (CSTO Chief Bordyuzha on Security Threats and Conflict Management)

Why is the Collective Security Treaty Organization needed, who has benefited most of all from participation in it, and can it become NATO’s new rival?

The last volleys of the “Center-2011” strategic military exercises of the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization] member states had barely died down when Nikolay Bordyuzha, the general secretary of that military-political bloc, came to visit the journalists of Komsomolskaya Pravda. Today we are offering our readers some of the main excerpts of our conversation with him.

Not the ‘Policeman of Eurasia’...

[Grishin] Nikolay Nikolayevich, at the recent informal meeting of the leaders of the CSTO member states in Astana in August, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus shocked everyone by stating that the bloc forces could be used to suppress all types of revolutions. Was that his personal initiative?

[Bordyuzha] Not at all. Alyaksandr Grigoryavich informed the public of the agreements the CSTO heads of state had reached because he chaired the informal summit meeting of the presidents, where regional threats to the security of the member states and of the bloc as a whole were discussed. It is true that the challenges we are facing were discussed quite seriously there. During this two-day meeting in an informal atmosphere, the president discussed the best ways of counteracting many difficult problems and threats to security the states are facing. You would have to agree that informational influence — or, more precisely, the use of the news media to destabilize the situation in a particular state and the use of media resources for unlawful purposes, including terrorism or simple crime

***Continued:* CSTO Chief Bordyuzha on Security Threats and Conflict Management**

— is a reality today. That is why those problems were discussed and certain agreements were reached. One of them was that the potential of the CSTO would be used in emergencies, if a state could not stabilize the situation in a crisis. This does not mean that troops will be sent there to suppress revolutions — orange, red, “blue,” “tulip,” and others. It means that the potential of the organization will be used to prevent bloodshed, chaos, and the fall of the system of government. The CSTO not only has military potential, but also has political, economic, law enforcement, and other capabilities. And if necessary, it also has troops. These would not be collective rapid response forces, as the press implied, but peacekeeping units sent in to separate the opposing sides. There are two other fundamental facts the journalists ignored. The first is that the decision to use the potential of the CSTO will be made in response to a request from a legally elected head of state. And the second is that this must be the unanimous decision of all the presidents. I want to stress again that the heads of state and A.H. Lukashenka in particular were not saying they would agree to send in the troops. They said the potential of the CSTO would be used. It consists not only of troops and of collective or peacekeeping forces, after all. This potential also includes interaction by special services, by border guards, by law enforcement agencies, and so forth. There is interaction by the foreign ministries and the possibility of influencing the situation politically. Everything depends on the specific situation. For this reason, this is not at all a case of endowing the CSTO with the functions of a policeman, or of turning the organization into the “policeman of Eurasia,” as some of the news media reported.

[Grishin] But the CSTO probably is not strong enough for this. In comparison with NATO, for example, our military-political alliance looks like a child in training pants.

[Bordyuzha] It has different potential and a different history. NATO is already more than 60 years old. And we also have to remember that these are states with developed economies. This is a considerable amount of experience and a considerable amount of money, including money for promotional purposes. It is difficult for us to compete with them in terms of media resources, of course, but this does not mean that the CSTO is a weak and underdeveloped entity. The CSTO today has serious potential in its collective strength, consisting of two military groupings — Russian-Belarusian and Russian-Armenian. There are the collective rapid deployment forces of the Central Asian region. There are more than 11,000 well-trained and fairly well equipped servicemen, who can participate in localizing regional armed conflicts. There are the CSTO peacekeeping forces and, finally, there are the collective rapid response forces. The CSTO has mechanisms for coordination and for, in my opinion, extremely vigorous work in the suppression

of the illegal drug traffic and illegal migration, the prevention of extraordinary situations and the elimination of their after-effects, and the safeguarding of the states’ informational security. The CSTO has many instruments to be used in the establishment of a collective security system. We are preparing to counter hazards and threats through collective action, realizing that no country today — not the Russian Federation, China, Kazakhstan, or the United States — is capable of responding to the hazards and threats these states encounter on its own, not to mention counteracting them. The events of 11 September 2001 showed that in spite of all the money spent on the U.S. special services and in spite of all the attempts to reinforce them, they could not prevent the major terrorist act in New York.

***FMSO Commentary:** Some have pointed to a possible correlation between the overthrow of governments and protests in northern Africa and the Middle East and Kremlin plans to significantly raise the salaries for Russian military and security personnel. Regardless of culture or form of government, political leaders understand the importance of maintaining a good relationship with those who defend the state.*

Actually, plans to restructure and re-equip Russia's armed forces predate these recent social protests, but the scenes from Cairo or Tripoli have likely added a new incentive for the Kremlin leaders. The upcoming Duma and presidential elections provide further motivation. According to some estimates, uniformed personnel (both active duty and retired) make up nearly 15% of the Russian electorate. A good portion of this electorate, however, is less concerned with acquiring new weapon systems than with receiving promised social benefits.

*Buoyed by huge fossil fuel revenues, Kremlin leaders will be theoretically able to spend significantly more on defense over the next decade. Corruption and mismanagement, however, will affect whether the allocated funds hit the intended target. Furthermore, as the article below makes clear, the Ministry of Defense is still plagued with a huge housing backlog for active duty and retired officers. Should the Russian government fail to provide for adequate housing, these dissatisfied officers could serve as a nucleus for larger social protests. This unresolved housing issue continues to hamper construction and undermines faith in Russia's 'new-look' military. **End FMSO Commentary (Finch)***

Increased Defense Spending and Political Stability

19 October 2011



Source: Sergey Kononov, "Military-Budget Monster: In the Next Three Years the Social Problems of Servicemen and Retirees Will Thus Not Be Resolved," Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, 19 October 2011. <http://www.NG.ru/printed/260862>

Anatoliy Serdyukov by Cherie A. Thurlby (defenseimagery.mil) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Военно-бюджетный монстр (Military-Budget Monster)

[M]inister of Defense] Anatoliy Serdyukov has a department with a great and stably growing budget.

In the State Duma a draft federal law on the country's budget for 2012 and the next three year period is being prepared for discussion. The committees have drawn their conclusions, although the date for the review of the draft law in the first reading has not yet been determined. Even now it is clear, that a radical growth of military expenditures is in the offing. Annual growth of budgetary expenditures over the next three years varies within the limits of 6-10%, although on national defense it constitutes on average more than 20%. Moreover, even this will not resolve all of the social problems of servicemen and military pensioners. In this the draft budget-2012 indicates, that the party in power once again has not fulfilled its promises to resolve the housing problem in the army. Fulfillment of these promises is being delayed at a minimum until 2015 and, apparently, even to a much later time.

Ex-Minister of Finance Aleksey Kudrin recently yet again criticized the growth of military expenditures in the country. Moreover, this growth does not take into account the full militarization of Russia. In 2012 and the next three years, from 3.1% (2012) to 3.6% (2014) of our gross domestic product (GDP), will be spent on military needs, which corresponds to the level of military expenditures in many countries. Let's say, the US will spend annually more than 4% of GDP on defense, Saudi Arabia - 10.4%, Israel - more than 6% and so forth. Even within the ranks of budgetary expenditures, the military budget Russia is not very large. The state will spend more on the social sphere and also on the development of the national economy, than on national defense.

As is apparent from the conclusions of the Duma Committee on Defense, in the draft federal law on the 2012 budget and for the planning period for 2013 and 2014, the growth of military expenditures is connected primarily with "the reforms to be carried out from 2012 of monetary allowances for servicemen and the fulfillment of prior state obligations to provide permanent housing for defenders of the Homeland." However the main growth in the monetary expenditures on defense entails the realization of the State Armaments

Continued: Military-Budget Monster

Program for 2011-2020 (GPV-2020). According to the index in question, expenditures for the development, acquisition and repair of armaments, military and specialized equipment in 2012 will be 730.8 billion rubles (increased in comparison with 2011 by 20%), in 2013 - 1156.3 billion rubles, in 2014 - 1463.6 billion rubles. That is, real expenditures on GPV-2020 in comparison with 2012 as early as within two years will be increased in Russia by more than two-fold.

However the financial plans of the country's leadership for the modernization of the army and navy in the near-term three years above all do not resolve the problem both for current servicemen, as well as retirees.

First, as is apparent from the conclusions of the Duma Committee on Defense on the draft law on the budget-2012, the promises of the authorities to provide continuous housing for officers and retirees by 2010, and thereafter by 2012 can only be realized by 2014. Meanwhile the time-frame for providing the army in-service housing generally is being displaced by an indeterminate time. In the document, signed by United Russia's Viktor Zavarzin, it is noted, that by 1 January 2015 the deficit of housing in the army's service fund "may be 126.8 thousand apartments, which creates high risks for the fulfillment of the RF President's assignment on providing service housing for servicemen." But in the assignment on providing officers with in-service housing the President designated a date - the end of 2014.

Second, the expected (at a minimum by 2-3-fold) increase in living standards of officers and other categories of servicemen, as the country's leaders talked about this, in point of fact will not be so large-scale. As is apparent from the conclusions of the State Duma Committee, the summary "increase in expenditures on monetary support in 2012 are envisaged in amounts, exceeding 2011 approved budgetary expenditures by 92 billion rubles (36.5%)." That is, the sums for monetary support to servicemen will not be increased many-fold, but rather in total only by little more than a third.


Given this practically all social benefits for officers and contract enlistees will be eliminated. Meanwhile the right to an annual paid trip to a resort in Russia and back will be possessed only by a limited number of servicemen. In the budget-2012 and for the subsequent three years there are no articles on expenditures on the indexing of monetary allowances and pensions for retired servicemen.

Leader of the youth wing of the SRs Dmitriy Gudkov, who is organizing a protest action of homeless officers, said to NG, that Russia's military budget in the years 2012-2014 will hardly be executed at 100%. "Russia is expecting the next wave of the economic crisis, and there is the probability that in the next year the country's budget will undergo a sequestration. Thus, similarly, the

regular promises and plans of the country's leadership to provide housing for servicemen will also not be fulfilled," - Gudkov says. He predicts a growth in the mood for protests, including even among military cadres. As proof, Gudkov offered Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov's directive of 12 October 2011, in which he "with the goal of economies in the federal budget" demanded from commanders that monetary allowances to homeless officers, on the rolls for more than six months, not be paid. "By law they cannot be retired without the provision of housing. They themselves cannot retire, since in this case they lose the right to housing space. To seek other work is impossible, since this is counted in the Defense Ministry's instructions," - Gudkov explains the situation.

Les Grau's classic *The Other Side of the Mountain*, is the most broadly distributed book on the Afghan theater. Capturing the personal stories and perspectives of Mujahedin fighters during the Soviet Afghan war, Les Grau has provided a blueprint of the belligerents in the current conflict.

It is on General Petraeus's reading list and in the rucksacks of deploying soldiers.



FMSO Commentary: *The Armed Forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense have been going through massive reforms since the appointment of Anatolii Serdyukov as Minister of Defense in 2007. By many accounts Serdyukov is enacting some of the most radical reforms in the Russian Armed Forces in well over 100 years. One of the most controversial of these reforms is the abandonment of the regimental/division structure and adoption of a U.S.-style brigade system.*

The regimental/division structure is a vestige of the Soviet conscript-based Army orientated to large-scale warfare, a structure that is notoriously officer heavy. Russia's civilian leadership and some elements in the military leadership believe the Armed Forces structure should emulate the forces that are serving in Chechnya. Russia has been experimenting with combined arms battalions operating in the North Caucasus with generally positive results.

Serdyukov's transition to a brigade structure is not just a change in an organizational hierarchy; it is a fundamental deconstruction of the prior Soviet/Tsarist conscript-based Army by eliminating almost all "skeleton units" and transitioning to units of "permanent readiness." The regimental/division structure was based on a system of mass mobilization, and the key to this model was that the majority of units were "skeleton units," or units that were manned by small cadres of officers that would be fleshed out with conscripts and reservists in the event of a mass mobilization. This structure was ideal for fighting large-scale, state-on-state warfare like the Soviet Union experienced in World War II and expected in the Cold War era, but this model has had difficulty dealing with the low intensity conflicts that Russia has recently faced, is facing, and will continue to face in the near future.


The transition of the Russian Army from mostly "skeleton units" to units of "permanent readiness" has reduced ground force troops from 1,890 to 172 units, abolishing almost all division/regimental structures and replacing them with approximately 85 brigades.

Russian Abandonment of Large Scale Warfare Capabilities Still Under Scrutiny

19 October 2011

Source: Vyzov, Leontiy, Moscow Literaturnaya Gazeta, №41 (6342), 19 October 2011.

<http://www.lgz.ru/article/17388/>



Russian Military Districts map by Bartles [Public Domain], via FMSO

Армейская лямка (Army Sling Shot)

– Major General Aleksandr Vladimirov, Vice-President of the Collegium of Military Experts

At the present time our leadership lost its orientation in the area of national strategy, defense and the country's security. Attempts to create a small, but effective army on the model of the European states led to the point, where we now have no army.

The country, not having its own ideology and national strategy, is unable to protect itself, because it does not know, what and how it must protect.

And indeed modern war - is not just when the tanks fire. It is also continuous change in the potentials of the sides. No one attacked the USSR, but it is no longer a great power.

Russia lives, based on the imperative of peace time, while a war is being carried out against it. Therefore we find ourselves setting off into a no-win situation.

We lack the state practice of mobilization, of those obligated to support the national defense. As a result our General Staff is in a blind alley.

Earlier, when we served in the Soviet army, we knew, that we had a strategy, we knew

Continued: Army Sling Shot

what actions would be taken in the event of military operations in any part of the country and the world, who were our enemies and our allies, how we had to influence the surrounding countries in peacetime and so forth. Today all of our military force, with the exception of a declining nuclear potential, as well as the entire modern national military concept, has been reduced to the conduct of local wars of battalions in the countryside or neighborhood. No one knows anything about strategy or even operational art, since the basic elements of conducting operations, - the combined-arms divisions and armies, were eliminated. No one even knows properly, what sort of equipment and its purpose that we need.

This tragedy is being intensified by the practical absence of the country's industrial production and its complete dependence on the technology and production of our probable enemies.

And even if the promised money comes to the army, it won't help, because no one really knows, on what to spend it. They're buying Mistral helicopter carriers, but for what, for the solution of what goals, and who will support them in a combat capable status?

We can only observe the non-professionalism and irresponsibility bordering on the criminal against Russia, but our authorities do not need the opinion of professionals, all of them are guided exclusively by "effective managers," who have led the country to rock bottom.

And the most terrible thing is, that we have no one preparing the officer corps, since nowhere is anyone educating officers. For example, the M. V. Frunze Military Academy, which provided a basic professional education to practically all command cadres and the operational staff of the Armed Forces, was eliminated and transformed into courses. Brigade commanders, having graduated from the General Staff Academy, have themselves not once in their lives carried out a company

live fire exercise, that is, an exercise on the combat coordination of companies, which divisional commanders of the Soviet era carried out by the hundreds. In the law "On Education" "academies" as a form or class of educational institution are not generally foreseen, while the platoon commander from a military Institute will have to be graduated with a "bachelor's degree" not understanding any sort of science, certainly, in order to have the ability to successfully compete on the military labor market with graduates from the American West Point.

Therefore, our army today - is "brainless and illiterate." And since no one is preparing the junior command component [NCO corps] that is the "bread of the army," that our modern army - is "spineless." If here one adds a fundamental desire to have in the country a state ideology of military service, then army today is also "spiritless."

Over the last 20 years they attempted to instill in our military as in the entire society, the idea, that "everything is for sale and everything is being bought." If people, called upon to defend the Homeland, are guided by those principles, this can lead to irreparable consequences.

The following graphic from the Russian media displays the location, or expected location, of brigades and combined army headquarters.


Serdyukov sees the brigade-based structure as a way to remove excess bureaucratic overhead and form a more modern, flexible, and capable Armed Forces. A necessary step in this process is the streamlining of the rank heavy, bloated Russian officer corps. This reform has significantly changed Russian tables of organization and equipment (TO&E), giving Russian brigades similar officer-to-enlisted ratios as their Western counterparts. In addition, these TO&E changes have provided Serdyukov with justification for drastic cuts in the officer corps, a reform which the Russian Armed Forces have adamantly resisted.

The following article by Major General Aleksandr Vladimirov, Vice-President of the Collegium of Military Experts, is typical of the anti-reform critique of Serdyukov's reforms. The author is critical of the abandonment of the mass mobilization principle, officer corps downsizing, defense industry drawdown, and change of focus from strategic-operational art to low intensity conflicts.
End FMSO Commentary (Bartles)

The United States Army has been involved in a mountain war

for a decade. After all this time, mountain combat remains a **stubbornly difficult mission** and technology can offer only modest support to the infantry's mission of closing with the enemy or the logistician's mission of getting support forward. This book by Les Grau and Chuck Bartles covers operations and tactics, artillery, and aviation support, reconnaissance, communications, training, and logistics in the mountains.

This book is not United States Army doctrine. Rather, it is offered as an alternate view to a most-challenging military environment.



FMSO Commentary: *Moscow is clearly worried about the US and Israeli lead in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology, but Moscow continues to develop its own. Some 40 countries now have some form of UAV in their defense inventory.*

The proliferation of UAVs creates its own set of problems. UAVs can be nuclear tipped and target air, sea and ground systems. Cruise missiles are, after all, UAVs. How does a military defend against UAV intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or attack? UAVs are almost impossible to shoot down with jet aircraft. Helicopter gunships armed with Gatling guns have a better chance, but they have to be vectored to the right area, right flight path and right altitude on time. Helicopter crews are not normally trained for air-to-air combat. UAVs can be very hard to detect on radar. Naval anticruise missile and kamikaze weapons are designed for point defense of a small area. Can these be applied to protect a ground or air force?

The author sees future UAV development as a threat to nuclear disarmament since they could detect and target mobile systems, attack nuclear launch sites and launch disabling attacks within the same short time span as intercontinental ballistic missiles.

UAVs have created a problem in airspace management. The current solution is to separate systems by altitude. This is a barely workable solution, and once the element of a genuine air threat is introduced the solution falls apart.

Moscow's concerns are genuine. Some concerns are raised as bargaining points for future negotiations. Others show a genuine concern for dealing with a rapidly growing technological threat.
End FMSO Commentary (Grau)

Growing Russian UAV Concerns

8-10 September 2011

Source: Operational Advantages and Risks in the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Eugene Miasnikov's remarks at the Round Table "International Humanitarian Law and New Weapon Technologies," San Remo, Italy, September 8-10, 2011
<http://www.armscontrol.ru/UAV/em090911.html>



MQ-1 Predator UAV Drone By U.S. Air Force photo/Lt Col Leslie Pratt [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Operational Advantages and Risks in the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

After a quick run-down of the well-known advantages of UAVs, Dr. Eugene Miasnikov, a physicist with the Moscow-based Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies addressed the issue of the risks of UAVs.

The risks are:

1. Those which occur because practice of unmanned system application creates contradictions with the Humanitarian Law (or it may create in future). CIA drone operations in Pakistan and other places raise profound and timely questions. In particular,
 - What is the legal basis for this kind of operations?
 - At what circumstances can an operator of a remotely piloted vehicle decide to use lethal weapons against suspects?
 - Who is to blame, for collateral damage, for deaths of civilians and especially of children that result in such operations? Does targeted killing with drones really solve the stated goals, make the region a safer place and contribute to sustainable development? If the answer is "no", it risks further destabilization of a political region with a huge impact on the rest of the world.
2. How to protect the basic human right to privacy, as UAVs are increasingly used for surveillance purposes by police or security forces? Who is to decide that such methods of gathering evidence are legal and under what circumstances?
3. Most of unmanned systems are not sufficiently reliable. Frequently UAVs malfunction or go out of control. UAVs are not cheap. UAVs may cause damage as they fall into urban areas. Finally they share airspace with manned aircraft. Fortunately, the pilots of a USAF C-130 airplane managed to land after a mid-air collision with an RQ-7 Shadow

Continued: Operational Advantages and Risks in the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles


UAV in the skies of Afghanistan this August, but it could have been much worse.

4. UAVs used for military roles (especially offensive ones) by one state, may cause legitimate concerns and reaction by other states, and stimulate regional arms races. In particular, efforts to get rid of nuclear weapons may be undermined by current trends in development of conventional arms, especially in the United States. One of the directions of UAV development is developing hypersonic long-range UAVs for Prompt Global Strike missions. The Prompt Global Strike project intends to develop the capability to deliver conventional strikes anywhere on the globe within a half-an-hour to one hour. ISR UAVs may also have a role in the Prompt Global Strike missions, as there is a need for guidance of the strikes and post-strike damage assessment. Another direction of UAV evolution -is their potential use in ballistic missile defense systems - particularly those, that are intended for boost-phase intercept.

Development of unmanned systems in the US is watched attentively in Russia. There is a view, shared by a majority of Russian analysts, that the next phase of nuclear reductions will require setting limits on strategic conventional arms. Ballistic or hypersonic missiles carrying conventional warheads are considered destabilizing arms, since they might have capability to disable strategic ICBM launchers.

5. Finally, what might happen, if UAVs fall into the hands of non-state actors, like terrorists? The threat of terrorist's UAVs is not the top item in the threat priority list these days. Nevertheless, it exists and it will eventually grow. Even small payloads of a few kilograms can create significant damage and mass casualties, especially armed with biological or chemical weapons. The most likely threat may occur from mini-UAVs. The most worrisome situation stems from model aircraft, where uncontrolled access to the knowledge, skills, and equipment required for mini-UAV assembly exists.

In resurrecting General Sir Andrew Skeen's *Passing It On*, the Foreign Military Studies Office and the Maneuver Center of Excellence, have provided a detailed look from 1932 that holds valuable lessons and understanding of the Operational Environment in the Af-Pak Theater of today.



FMSO Commentary: Since the advent of information warfare (IW) theory, Russia has stressed the existence of two categories of IW: information-technical and information-psychological. The latter category is the focus of excerpts of this article.

The fall of communism and loss of all the trappings of that ideology caused a tremendous loss of integrity and trust between the people and the governing elite. Russian leaders have worried about recapturing the minds and souls of its citizens ever since. This article, which appeared recently in the Russian military standard newspaper *Red Star*, is indicative of this trend as it continues to focus on that theme and the requirement of the current leadership to develop a new *Weltanschauung* for the people of Russia, especially its youth.

The author notes that “In the information war against Russia, our goal is the education of a population that is resistant to negative factors (that are destroying our *Weltanschauung*).” The advice he offers to accomplish this is, by his own admission, extremely radical. For example, he notes that “A system of boarding schools must be created, through which all children must pass. Let us say from the age of three. This system should be maximally closed off from the public by creating inspection membranes with unilateral conductivity. Children should know their country and their society, but there must be a mechanism for restricting their consciousness from foreign penetration.” **End of FMSO Commentary (Thomas)**

Information Counter-Attack

3-9 August 2011

Source: El Murid (pseudonym), “Information Wars,” *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 3-9 August 2011



Russian Psyber by Aaron Perez. (CC-BY-SA) derived from Flag of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation by Flanker [Public Domain] via Wikimedia Commons

Information Wars

The collapse of the USSR, which had withstood the trials of the “Cold War” but could not hold its ground in the “war of ideas,” demonstrated the possibility of victory over an adversary “without war.” It is also not surprising that problems of information security today stand in the foreground, even more so that Russia remains a target of spiritual [dukhovnaia] aggression. An expert, writing on the Internet under the pseudonym El Murid (see *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 13 July 2011), recently gave an account of his views in a blog on threats to Russia’s national security and possible methods for countering them. His thoughts, often radical and controversial, merit the attention of specialists.

War in the material world is simple and comprehensible: strategy, tactics, operational art, resources, tactical-technical characteristics, and the ability to use all this to maneuver and operate.

War for the soul of men, for their ideas, their way of life, their values, and their morale is practically an unworkable task. When the concept “information war/warfare” is employed, for the most part the term is understood as informing the audience—one’s own or the adversary’s—about one’s version of events that are happening. This, however, is an extremely narrow explanation that, in general, in no way reflects the essence of this warfare.

Information war/warfare is the implanting of one’s own *Weltanschauung*. It is specifically the implanting—crudely or delicately, directly or roundabout. The idea of this warfare is the reformatting of an alien *Weltanschauung* under parameters given from outside. In principle, Western civilization was not the pioneer or the first to walk this path, although, of course, it has tried and left its traces more than all the others. Proselytizing (the attempt to spread one’s beliefs, turn others to one’s beliefs) is the most ample formulation of all information warfare.

Under normal conditions man is completely capable of self-restricting his requirements—he is physically unable to consume more than the physiological norm, own an endless number of things, experience an endless number of pleasures. In this are included biological

Continued: Information Wars

mechanisms of self-regulation.

It is namely because of this that the Protestant ethic, from the moment it originated to the present day, is extremely aggressive and directed at “overfeeding” [okormlenie] the maximum number of neophytes (new followers), together with destroying the self-restriction mechanism in them. An endless increase in profit can be guaranteed only by expanding the number of addressees. The mechanism of self-restriction is not enconced in the Protestant ethic; it will attempt to broaden its influence throughout the globe, after which, strictly in accordance with the Second Law of Thermodynamics, it will die happily, taking everything away with it.

Nevertheless, the imposition of the Protestant ethic on another Weltanschauung may result in a mutant that will also have extremely poor motivation for self-restraint. Trotskyism, contemporary Islamism, and a number of regional sects are such mutants. Fortunately, they have all the signs of degeneration.

From this very complex construction there is one extremely important conclusion that touches upon the subject being discussed—information warfare. Aggressive Weltanschauungs conduct information warfare, their goal is to be victorious in it. For the remaining ones the goal is different—not to lose.

Since in general the question is about Russia, our aim in the information war being waged against us is namely that we must not lose it. By definition, we cannot win it. We do not spread our Weltanschauung, we acknowledge the right for other civilizations to exist, and, therefore, for Russia it is not a war, but rather a counterwar in the information domain. And the theater of military operations is always our territory and our people.

The question of Russia’s socialist experience certainly arises. It is true that the Trotskyite trend of exporting revolution existed—it was namely that very mutant. Fortunately, however, it was squelched rather quickly, although, undoubtedly Trotskyite ideas wandered through the minds of our leadership until the very end of the USSR. On the whole, however, we acknowledged for everyone else the right to their own view and their own choice, within some framework or another. These frameworks were determined not so much by ideologies as the nature of the conduct of the “Cold War.”

Thus, what are the principal trends of our struggle against information aggression? The main trend is youth. Strictly speaking biologically, the young and the undeveloped of any living species possesses a very flexible and receptive psyche. Nature, however, envisions serious mechanisms for accumulating experience. From the first days of his life a child sets up psychic barriers between himself and the outside. He filters surrounding information, blocks and ceases to take in dangerous information and amasses useful information. It is namely this reason that these filters and

blocks form a Weltanschauung, that is, a set of prohibitions and restrictions, a system of “mine-someone else’s,” signs of danger. Upon completing childhood, a grown-up possesses stereotypes of conscience that are extremely difficult to transform in the future.

In other words, educated in a certain medium and developing a certain Weltanschauung, a man for the rest of his life reproduces it—in his deeds, in his children, in his grandchildren. In this sense we have already lost. Two generations of our children—the generations of the 1990s and the 2000s—are already strangers. They perceived the situation that was created for us by other reformers. They were imprinted with consumption as a higher value of life, with riches as a criterion of success, with the absence of moral restrictions as an instrument for attaining one’s goal. Unfortunately, this has already occurred. Today it is not the citizen who is being educated, but rather the consumer of services—educational, medical, legal, military...

[Insert: Proekt “Rossii”]

The sphere of influence on the conscience is always considered the “private domain” of the state. Foreigners are not allowed there. The incursion of foreigners in the process of modeling the conscience is seen as a mortal danger for the state. A foreigner might direct social energies not where it is useful to the people and the country, but rather where it is useful for him. A clear example of this is the state of our minds today. They sing us incomprehensible songs, whose words we do not even understand. We dance to them at discotheques. We look at hard-boiled soldiers and erotica. In sum, we are not happier. Nevertheless, this has made us consumers, the majority of whom are doomed for our entire lives to a vegetative existence.

In the information war against Russia, our goal is the education of a population that is resistant to negative factors (that are destroying our Weltanschauung). This does not mean the creation of a bigoted nation looped into some dogmas; this means the creation of a fundamental framework in the mass psyche, in the collective unconscious, within which any ideas not originating from them are possible.

For this the country must create a system of education and upbringing that is absolutely different from the one existing now, or which existed earlier. For this reason I will state a number of what sound like completely unacceptable ideas. They are, indeed, extremely radical.

The breakdown of society today has reached an extremely dangerous line. Therefore, it cannot be entrusted with the upbringing and education of children. A system of boarding schools must be created, through which all children must pass. Let us say from the age of three. This system should be maximally closed off from the public by creating inspection membranes with unilateral

Continued: Information Wars

conductivity. Children should know their country and their society, but there must be a mechanism for restricting their consciousness from foreign penetration. In such a system it will also be necessary to resolve the assigned mission—the inculcation of a stable psyche and fundamental values.

In parallel with this, it is necessary to keep children healthy, to not allow the emergence of harmful and dangerous habits, to create blocks in them that prevent the impression of negative information and a way of life from outside. It is necessary to select children with respect to their inclinations, their interests, and their capabilities. It is necessary to inoculate them with satisfaction from work and the knowledge process; with the ethic of family relationships and the ability to transfer experience and knowledge to children, since such boarding schools are an extreme measure and they cannot last forever.

In fact, 15 years later we will have the first generation for whom it will be necessary, both practically and forcibly, to clear the path in the social structure—this is also a very complex task—the creation of “social elevators” for this generation. However, 30-40 years later we will have a state and society in which the lower and middle component will be occupied by these new generations. As a matter of fact, with such a development of events we have a chance of not losing this war.

Having assessed in a very limited fashion the prospects of different variants of conflicts that Russia may conduct, and already is partially conducting, one can make generalized and, in my opinion, very unexpected conclusions. Russia is capable of repelling any kind of armed conflict.

We are, however, losing the information conflict. As a matter of fact, the USSR also lost the information war—it was coping most assuredly with the rest.

I do not think that everything is predetermined. It seems that we are still not ready, in the course of the life of one generation, to so radically and decisively destroy the country that has been left to us by innumerable generations of ancestors. I think that before us there is still a minimum of one attempt to return to the original idea of a just state. Ultimately this is the national idea in Russia. Just as a unified Europe is the national idea of Germany or freedom is the national idea of the Americans. It is simply that such things are not exchanged for hamburgers and Ford Focuses on credit.

Tim Thomas's *Recasting the Red Star* describes Russia's culture of military thought through its modernization effort. Adding to his robust library of work on the subject, Tim Thomas illuminates Russia's Defense Ministry reform efforts, the Russian national security strategy take on the operational environment, and a relevant review of the Russian military doctrine.

