

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT WATCH



Volume 1 | Issue 4

August | 2011

For over 25 years, the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has conducted open source research on foreign perspectives of defense and security issues, emphasizing those topics that are understudied or unconsidered.

FMSO's Operational Environment Watch provides translated selections and analysis from a diverse range of foreign articles and other media that our analysts believe will give military and security experts an added dimension to their critical thinking about the Operational Environment.

Materials, outside of the original foreign press article, under copyright have not been used. All articles published in the Operational Environment Watch are not provided in full, and were originally published in foreign (non-US) media. For questions or original articles, contact FMSO at leav-webfmso@conus.army.mil. The Operational Environment Watch is archived, and available at <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil>.

FMSO has provided some editing, format, and graphics to these articles to conform to organizational standards. Academic conventions, source referencing, and citation style are those of the author.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Foreign News & Perspectives

IN THIS ISSUE

TURKEY

- 3 The End of Military Politics: Top Generals Resign En Masse
- 5 Tensions Rise Between Turkey and Syria
- 7 Turkey to Train Afghan Security Forces

SYRIA, YEMEN

- 8 The Beginning of the End for the Syrian Regime?
- 9 Renewed Clashes in Northern Yemen

TUNISIA

- 10 The Tunisia Army's New Responsibilities

SUDAN, SOMALIA

- 12 South Sudan Receives Statehood, So Why Not Somaliland?
- 14 With Sudan Split, China Works to Ensure it Will Receive Oil
- 15 Africa, the Rest of the Story: More Than Just Famine, War, and Terrorism

ERITREA, MALI

- 17 The Thorn in the Horn: Why Eritrea Planned Attacks on an African Union Summit
- 18 Covering Aggression: Forest in Mali and Mauritania Used as AQIM Hideout

MOZAMBIQUE

- 19 Opposition Asserts it is Ready for a New Civil War in Mozambique

INDIA, VIETNAM

- 20 Naval Action: Seas of South and Southeast Asia
- 21 Vietnam Submarines
- 22 India Rescues Chinese Vessel from Pirates

MEXICO

- 23 Illicit Trafficking
- 25 Security in Ciudad Juarez

CHINA

- 27 Russia and China Deepen Military Cooperation

KAZAKHSTAN, TAJIKISTAN

- 28 Kazakhstan Shooting
- 29 Peacekeeping Training in Kazakhstan
- 30 New Tajik Base?

RUSSIA

- 31 Officer Career Challenges
- 33 Genuine Russian-Chechen Reconciliation?
- 35 A Worn-out Washington Record

Regional Analyst

Africa	Robert Feldman, robert.feldman1@us.army.mil
Sub-Saharan Africa	Jason Warner, jason.s.warner2.ctr@us.army.mil
Middle East	Lucas Winter, lucas.winter@us.army.mil
Turkey	Karen Kaya, karen.kaya@us.army.mil
China	Ruoxi Du, doroxi1988@ku.edu
India	Ivan Welch, ivan.welch@us.army.mil
Mexico	Tony Scheidel, anthony.scheidel@us.army.mil
Central Asia	Matthew Stein, matthew.stein2@us.army.mil
Russia	Ray Finch, raymond.c.finch@us.army.mil
Layout/Graphics	Aaron Perez, aaron.d.perez@us.army.mil



Features



5 Tensions Rise Between Turkey and Syria

“Davutoğlu Esad’ı İkna Edebilecek mi? (Will Davutoğlu be able to Convince Assad?)” Milliyet, 9 August 2011

If Assad does not heed Turkey’s final warning and calls to stop applying further violence during the holy month of Ramadan, this will mark the end of Turkey’s friendship with Syria.



8 The Beginning of the End for the Syrian Regime?

Abdel Halim Khaddam: Ahdath Hama al-Bidayah al-Haqiqiyah li-Niyahat Nidham al-Assad (Abdel Halim Khaddam: Events in Hama are the True Beginning of the End of the Assad Regime)” al-Ahram, 1 August 2011

Four important factors that will help determine the outcome of Syria’s current transformation are the role of the army in this conflict and beyond, the role of Sunni Islamic groups in the opposition movement, the present and future of the Syrian economy, and the role and credibility of the exiled opposition



14 With Sudan Split, China Works to Ensure it Will Receive Oil

“East Africa: China FM Warns North & South Sudan Against Losing Peace Equation,” Sudan Tribune, 7 Aug 2011

The Chinese top diplomat was quoted as saying by the government sponsored Sudanese Media Center (SMC) website that North and South Sudan “will lose the peace equation” by not cooperating on the joint and controversial issues.



25 Security in Ciudad Juarez

“Desata confrontación suspensión de apoyo a Juárez (Suspension of Public Security Funds in Ciudad Juarez Unleashes Conflict)” Frontera.info, 29 July 2011

Relations between the Federal Public Security Secretariat and the municipal government of Ciudad Juarez grew tense on 25 July 2011 when Federal Police (PF) agents fired at the vehicle of the Ciudad Juarez Secretary of Public Security, Julian Leyzaola



27 Russia and China Deepen Military Cooperation

“Россия и Китай продолжают практику проведения совместных учений по борьбе с терроризмом - Минобороны РФ (Russia and China will continue to hold joint exercises to combat terrorism – Russian Defence Ministry)” ITAR-TASS Sibir, 8 August 2011

Both sides emphasized that a military relationship of mutual trust is conducive to regional and global peace and stability.

The End of Military Politics: Top Generals Resign En Masse

31 July 2011

Source: Idiz, Semih. "Artık Muhtıra Değil, Emeklilik Dilekçesi Veriliyor" (Resignation Letters instead of Warning Memorandums)," Milliyet (Nationality), 31 July 2011. <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/artik-muhtira-degil-emeklilik-dilekcesi-veriliyor/siyaset/siyasyazarde-tay/01.08.2011/1421112/default.htm>



Recently resigned Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces General Işık Koşaner (left) [Public Domain], and the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (right) [CC-BY 2.5 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5>)] via Wikipedia.org

Retirement Letters Instead of Warning Memorandums

The resignations and retirements of the Chief of the Armed Forces Işık Koşaner and the commanders of the army, navy and air force have garnered much attention abroad. Many foreign agencies have called us and asked us in a concern manner, "Is this the long-awaited coup that never came?" Indeed, this impression was caused by our domestic press, which reported the news as an "Earthquake in Ankara." We of course don't want to underestimate what happened. This was a first in the history of our republic. However, it was "earthquake" only for certain people. The fact is that most people in the country were not expecting to wake up to "sounds of tanks" anymore.

The government acted swiftly and prevented a power vacuum by immediately appointing a new Chief of the General Staff. Whether we like it or not, this earned them very good marks. The civilian authority has reassured both domestic and international audiences that it is now in the driver's seat, and that the vehicle will not veer off the road.

Not Just to the West

So we had to tell excited foreign audiences that, "The generals, who used to say 'we are coming' by issuing warning memos, are now saying 'we are going' by submitting retirement letters." Basically, the events may seem 'abnormal' to some who are refusing to

FMSO Commentary: On July 29, the Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Işık Koşaner, along with the heads of the Turkish Army, Navy and Air Force resigned in group, a first in Turkish history. The Prime Minister quickly appointed General Necdet Özel, the Commander of the Military Police, as the new Chief of the Armed Forces. The move was a result of the military's frustration with the arraignment of many of its top and junior officers over allegations that they were planning coups to overthrow the government. The generals' decision to resign was in stark contrast to the days of military coups; and was interpreted as the end of military involvement in Turkish politics.

Since the Turkish Republic's founding 88 years ago, the military had been a powerful institution and the 'unquestioned guardian of the secular republic' founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Starting in 1960, the military conducted coups d'état almost every decade, removing administrations which it deemed threatened the secular nature of Turkey or deviated from its constitution. All the coups (1960, 1971, 1980 and a 'soft-coup' on 28 February 1997, in which the military forced the government to resign) resulted in a change of government. Regardless of the political party in power, the Turkish Armed Forces maintained its control over the state system and its authority to have the last word.

The Turkish military's traditionally powerful role in Turkey's domestic, foreign and security policy had been declining ever since the popular Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002. Diverging views between the government and military, in addition to a series of legal changes, had significantly curbed the power of the military. More recently the military's influence had also been declining due to on-going allegations of military coup plots, which would have

entailed drastic measures to create unrest in the country in order to justify a coup to remove the ruling AKP from power. These allegations have resulted in a series of investigations and trials in which a number of senior military commanders, as well as journalists and others, have been charged with conspiring to overthrow the government. Within the last year more than 40 generals- approximately a tenth of the senior military command- and about 250 junior officers have been detained, leaving the military demoralized and furious.

The military and government have recently been at odds because the military wants to promote some of the officers who have been detained as suspects in the conspiracy cases, but cannot because they are in custody. The military is frustrated about the procedural flaws in the arraignments without trial of the generals and officers. The latest confrontation between the military command and the prime minister was over the latter's insistence that 14 active-duty generals and admirals who had been arrested but not indicted would not only be bypassed in their promotions but also forced to retire. In addition, on July 28 police arrested 22 additional top officers, blocking their likely promotion.

The generals' resignation letters were a response to these developments, and mark the end of the military's ability to influence politics in Turkey. The Turkish military-the second largest force in NATO- has irreversibly lost its former 'special place' within Turkish politics. Though many view this as a step towards increased democracy in Turkey, they also question the legal basis under which the officers and others are being held. End FMSO Commentary (Kaya)

The End of Military Politics: Top Generals Resign En Masse

accept the changing dynamics in our country. However, most of us view this as a step in the right direction towards 'Turkey's normalization.'

Indeed, most of what we read and hear indicate that -except for a few self-proclaimed elites- that most people in this country do not like the military's meddling in politics. This is proven by the fact that, in each democratic election following a military coup, the party which the military was against has ended up winning the elections.

Looking abroad, it is clear that the resignations were met with positive reactions not just in the West, but also in the Islamic world, where military regimes have suppressed the countries much more so than in Turkey and continue to do so. In fact, they were actually pleased with this development.

The government's swift reaction, which avoided a power vacuum and any internal confusion, increased Prime Minister Erdoğan's standing even more in those countries. In Pakistan, the English-daily "The Express Tribune" claimed in an opinion piece:

"Erdoğan is making Turkey into an example by pioneering a mildly-Islamic movement, which is not yet comprehended in the Islamic world, where certain Muslims have not understood the importance of finding a middle way between their faith and politics. The final action of the Turkish military -which has controlled Turkish politics from behind the scenes- have removed the final obstacles standing in the way of democratization in Turkey."

Important in Tahrir Square

This message from Turkey is important in Tahrir Square, where the public is starting to gather with the complaint that the transitional military regime is not acting quickly and decisively towards democracy in Egypt. However, despite these compliments for the Turkish government, an important warning must be noted here.

Currently, many commissioned officers are either in custody or being pursued. It is claimed that these individuals were planning a coup against the government. These allegations should undoubtedly be taken seriously, given the serious events that have taken place in Turkey's recent history.

However, among both the public and in the West, there is serious concern that the legal process is not being carried out in accordance with the rule of law or with proper human rights standards. People are also concerned that some detained journalists are being held unfairly.

What's more, there is serious concern that this is a 'witch hunt' against the Turkish Armed Forces and certain parts of society as revenge for its past actions; and that this is being done by using the legislative branch as a vehicle. This perception makes us question whether the developments in Turkey are being carried out in the name of democracy or something else.

Tensions Rise Between Turkey and Syria

9 August 2011

Source: Kohen, Sami. “Davutoğlu Esad’ı İkna Edebilecek mi? (Will Davutoğlu be able to Convince Assad?),” Milliyet (Nationality), 9 August 2011. <http://dunya.milliyet.com.tr/davutoglu-esad-i-ikna-edebilecek-mi-/dunya/dunyayazardetay/09.08.2011/1424330/default.htm>



Bashar Assad. Photo by Hakobyan [CC-BY-NC-ND (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0)] via Flickr.com



Ahmet Davutoğlu. Photo by FCO [CC-BY-ND (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0)] via Flickr.com

Will Davutoğlu be able to Convince Assad?

The Foreign Minister is going on a difficult trip today. His mission is to convince the Syrian President Bashar Assad to end the violence and come to an agreement with his opponents...

Can he succeed this time?

In the last 5 months, during which 2,000 people have died as a result of public protests, all Turkish leaders, particularly the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have continuously called on Assad to stop killing the protesters and start implementing political reforms. However, the Syrian leader has not heeded this ‘friendly advice’ and instead has sent tanks against the people, provoking even more violence.

The events have turned into a massacre in these holy days of Ramadan, and have prompted Erdoğan to harden his stance against the Assad regime. This time, instead of giving him suggestions or friendly advice, he has decided to send Davutoğlu to Damascus to deliver a ‘final warning.’

Thus Turkey has moved from the position of ‘closely monitoring’ the events in Syria, to taking on an ‘active role’ for change.

Old Allegations

This initiative by Ankara comes at a time when the international community is also hardening its line against the Assad regime. In a statement approved by both Russia and China, the United Nations Security Council has condemned the events in Syria... The United States claimed that the Assad regime is losing its legitimacy... For the first time, the Arab League issued a statement criticizing Assad... Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Damascus... And now, in a diplomatic initiative, Turkey is trying to give the Assad regime ‘one last chance’ to change.

FMSO Commentary: Until recently, Turkey’s relations with Syria were becoming increasingly more friendly as Turkey tried to establish good relations with its neighbor through increasing bilateral trade and lifting visa restrictions. The “Arab Spring” has reversed this trend. When the unrest began in March, Turkey realized that it could not continue its friendly relations with such a regime and was forced to reconsider its position. Faced with this dilemma, it called on Assad to stop using violence and carry out immediate reforms. This soured relations between the two countries. (Turkey’s criticism of Assad has also angered Iran, which warned that if Turkish officials insisted on their ‘contradictory behavior’ and continued on their present path, Iran would ‘choose Syria over Turkey.’)

An important factor in the two countries’ relations has been the influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey (around 12,000 as of August 2011) following the Syrian government’s crackdown on its citizens. As the Syrian forces have approached the Turkish border, there has been concern and talk of possible encounter between the two militaries at the border, signaling a significant shift from the formerly good relations. Due to the 850 km (~530 mile) border (Turkey’s longest border with a neighbor) between the countries, Turkey has said that the situation in Syria directly impacts Turkey.

On August 9, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, the mastermind of Turkey’s ‘zero problems with neighbors’ policy, travelled to Damascus to meet with Syrian President Bashar Assad and to give him a ‘final warning’ to stop the violence and implement reforms. Prior to the visit, Syrian officials had warned that if Turkey were to deliver a harsh warning, they would deliver an even harsher response.

It is unclear whether Davutoğlu’s

final warning and calls to stop applying further violence during the holy month of Ramadan will have an impact on the Syrian leader. If they do not, this will mark the end of Turkey's friendship with Syria, which it has carefully nurtured over the last decade, and leave Assad more isolated and dependent on Iranian support than ever. End FMSO Commentary (Kaya)

Tensions Rise Between Turkey and Syria

In the words of the Prime Minister, the answer from Damascus will mark a new phase.

Of course, nobody knows how the Syrian leader will respond to what Davutoğlu will say. We hope that his response won't be as harsh as the one Assad's advisor gave to Erdoğan's last speech. We also hope that it won't be the same old response that the officials in Damascus have been giving us all along.

The official line in Damascus is that the protests across the country are the work of a handful of provocateurs and that the government is simply taking the necessary precautions to remove this threat. The situation is not that simple, of course. Had the Assad regime been able to read the events better, and chosen to cooperate with its opponents instead of bombing cities where tens of thousands of people have been protesting, the country would not be in its current situation.

A new phase

But Assad still has a chance to bring the country back from chaos. He just needs to stop using force and start making the changes that the public expects.

If Bashar Assad gives Davutoğlu a clear and binding message in this direction, the Foreign Minister's mission will have succeeded... Otherwise, Turkey will say, "We tried our best," and the new phase that the Prime Minister mentioned had alluded to before, will begin.

If this happens, the options that will be available to Turkey are a matter of speculation. These can entail diplomatic and political pressure to isolate the Assad regime. Some economic sanctions may be applied by the international community.

When the government delivers its 'final warning' to Assad, it would be great to get a satisfactory response. This would improve Turkey's international standing. But what will Turkey do if Assad's response is negative?

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO.leavenworth.army.mil)

International Research Collaboration Program

Quality researchers outside of the U.S. government express new ideas that will help define the current and future defense and security environment from understudied and unconsidered perspectives.



Turkey to Train Afghan Security Forces

28 July 2011



Afghan National Police Cadets. Photo by Sgt. Decatur [CC-BY (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)] via Flickr.com

Source: "Afgan Polisinin Eğitimi Başladı (Afghan Security Forces Training has Started)," Haberpan.com, 28 July 2011. <http://www.haberpan.com/haber/afgan-polisinin-egitimi-basladi>

Training for Afghan Security Forces Starts

The Afghanistan National Police Training Project, which foresees the training of Afghan police in Turkey, commenced with an opening ceremony which was attended by the Secretary of Interior Idris Naim Şahin, and officials from countries who support the project. The first phase of the project entails 492 police candidates from Afghanistan to be trained at the Sivas Police Academy for a 6 month period. The project includes 9 Afghan instructors, 30 interpreters and 6 Japanese Judo instructors who will teach fighting techniques.

The program commenced with a moment of silence and the Turkish National Anthem, followed by the Afghan National Anthem. Many officials gave speeches, including the Sivas Police Academy Principal Adnan Karadeniz, Japanese National Police International Relations General Manager Sununchi Kuryu, Commander of the NATO training mission in Afghanistan U.S. General William Caldwell, the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Francis Riccioardone. Riccionarde said in his speech that Turkey would transfer the know-how and professionalism of its military, police, and security forces to the Afghan police and said, "Turkey has contributed greatly to Afghanistan's social welfare, in addition to committing to Afghani security. Turkey has shown once again, through its building of hospitals and numerous schools that it places great importance on Afghanistan's success. This training center will strengthen the Afghan National Police and represent the deep ties between the U.S., Japan, Turkey and other NATO allies."

"WE PLACE GREAT IMPORTANCE ON ANTI-TERRORISM EFFORTS FOR THE ENTIRE GLOBAL COMMUNITY"

Secretary of Interior Idris Naim Şahin said that terror threatens the entire world, and is a crime that disregards the human life. He said that such crimes cannot be fought on an individual basis. "As such, we consider efforts to fight terrorism and organized crimes not just on a national scale, but on an international scale. However, we also know the importance of bilateral activities in addition to international efforts. Turkey has signed agreements with over 80 countries. In the last five years, we have trained 8500 personnel from over 40 countries. One of these countries is Afghanistan, a country with whom we have deep historical ties, ethnic kinship and friendship. Its fight for independence happened around the same time as ours. This concurrent effort has brought our two countries and our founding leaders close. Our relations with Afghanistan are developing in every area, and our country is contributing to international security and support forces to bring security to Kabul."

"The Sivas Police Training Academy has been dedicated to this goal, and has committed to training on average 500 Afghan police her semester. Turkey will contribute 2,5 million dollars to the project. Approximately half of the rest will be provided by Japan, and the rest by NATO Afghanistan Training Mission. This project will enable our friend Afghanistan to develop its internal security, and make great strides towards becoming a peaceful country. The police officer candidates that complete their training in this school in our country, will serve as middle and high ranking officers in their police forces. This training will deepen the friendship between Turkey and Afghanistan even more." Following the Afghan police candidates' ceremonial march, Secretary Naim Şahin and his guests toured the school buildings and received information about the upcoming training programs.

FMSO Commentary: Turkey has been a key contributor to training local police and military forces in Afghanistan. More recently, it has taken the lead within the NATO training mission in Afghanistan to train 15,000 Afghan policemen over the course of a decade. Turkey is being hailed as a country that already has a close relationship with Afghanistan in addition to having cultural and religious ties.

On 1 March 2011, senior representatives from Afghanistan, Turkey, Japan, and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan signed an agreement for the training of Afghan police officers at the Police Officer Candidate School in Sivas, Turkey. In accordance with the agreement, the first round of 500 officers arrived in Turkey in July. They will receive professional instruction during a six-month course given by Afghan and Turkish instructors. Upon graduation, officers will be assigned to units of the Afghan National Police (ANP) throughout Afghanistan.

In addition, 300 senior cadets from the Afghan National Academy will complete a one-month training period in Izmir with the Turkish Army in September 2011.

The Turkish military is thoroughly westernized after more than five decades of assistance and training, giving them a military full of pro-Western officers. Thus, such training programs are an example of how the U.S. Army can use Muslim allies or 'proxies' to shape or influence countries such as not only Afghanistan, but also the "Arab Spring" countries. U.S. Army training of Turkish forces via exchange programs, coupled with Turkey's initiative to take the lead in training the security forces of other Muslim countries, presents a long-term opportunity for the U.S. to influence the military training and education of security forces in those countries. End FMSO Commentary (Kaya)

FMSO Commentary: The unfolding of events in Libya has in large part been affected by the opinions and advice of Libyan dissidents. For many of them the Qaddafi government's days were counted from the outset (and have been so for many months now), a fragile regime always on the brink of collapse. Such analytical levity and inaccuracy has been less prominent in the Syrian case, where only recently have exiled dissidents begun speaking in such fatalistic terms. The turning point was the entry of Syrian military and security forces into Hama, a city that was partly razed to the ground after rising up against Hafez al-Assad's government in 1982. This is a major gamble by Syrian leadership and there has understandably been much commentary regarding its significance. It is in this context that the following interview with Abdel Halim Khaddam was conducted.

Khaddam is a former member of the inner echelons of the Syrian Baath regime, having served as foreign minister and then vice-president for over 35 years. In 2005, five years after Bashar al-Assad's accession to power, he resigned from the Baath Party in what many saw as a successful purge of the "old guard." Ever since, he has become a vocal critic of the Syrian regime and a prominent opposition figure from his base in Europe. Khaddam is one of the few opposition figures with insider knowledge of the regime. Unlike most of the inner circle, he is Sunni Muslim. Despite all of this, he is distrusted and highly unpopular in most of Syria, and his resorting to a language of rights, justice and equality understandably rings hollow in the ears of many, not least of whom Hama's residents.

Four important factors that will help determine the outcome of Syria's current transformation are the role of the army in this conflict and beyond, the role of Sunni Islamic groups in the opposition movement, the present and future of the Syrian economy, and the role and credibility of the exiled opposition. Different sides will present different explanations for how each of these factors will unfold, but a true picture can only come from a composite of a variety of opinion. What follows is Khaddam's take. End FMSO Commentary (Winter)

The Beginning of the End for the Syrian Regime?

7 July 2011

Source: "Abdel Halim Khaddam: Ahdath Hama al-Bidayah al-Haqiqiyah li-Niyahat Nidham al-Assad" (Abdel Halim Khaddam: Events in Hama are the True Beginning of the End of the Assad Regime), al-Ahram, 1 August 2011

Abdel Halim Khaddam: Events in Hama are the True Beginning of the End of the al-Assad Regime

Former Syrian Vice-President Abdel Halim Khaddam believes that the Syrian Army's incursion into Hama yesterday is the true beginning of the end for the Bashar al-Assad regime. In a telephone conversation with the German Press Agency (DPA) from Cairo, Khaddam said, "The violence, killing and military incursions that took place in Hama yesterday and previously in Homs and other areas are likely to continue and this means one thing, which is that Syria will move into a new phase that will end the Bashar al-Assad regime."

Early yesterday (Sunday), Syrian army and security forces launched a broad incursion into the city of Hama, killing more than one hundred people and injuring hundreds others. Khaddam, who from exile heads the anti-regime National Salvation Front, disclosed his attempts to ask the international community to create safe zones within Syria to protect people fleeing the killing. "As the regime continues its severe repression," he noted, "it is the international community's duty, in accordance with the UN Charter, to take steps to protect the Syrian people from this regime, which has lost its national and international legitimacy. Thus far, Syrians have put up with every crime committed by the regime so as not to fall into conflict or strife that could lead to further bloodshed."

Khaddam rejected the idea of the "Islamization" of the Syrian revolutionary movement, emphasizing that "those who say the revolution is Islamic are the regime's front groups. Syria has Muslims and Christians, all of them religious but never ever extremists... Muslims are the vast majority in the country and therefore are clearly more numerous in the protests, which is natural. It is by no means an extremist majority, though, and I am certain that there is no movement toward Islamic extremism in Syria."

Khaddam played down divisions within the Syrian army and the potential for defecting officers to save Syria from Bashar's regime. "They are a group of officers, whether five or twenty or more," he said. "This does not constitute an army, an army has other requirements and these are not available under current circumstances. These officers defected from the army as they do not want to kill their fellow countrymen, but we cannot say that they represent an army that could save Syria now."

Khaddam rejected official declarations regarding the strength and resilience of the Syrian economy. "What they say is simply false," he said. "If everything is fine, why have they printed tens of billions of Syrian Pounds in Austria and Germany and deposited them in the Central Bank in order to pay salaries and carry out government affairs? Why are they taking around 500 Syrian Pounds per month out of each employee's salary, allegedly to support the pound?"

"They are trying to mislead people, but the people know how bad the situation is since they have lived under harsh economic conditions. They know about price increases and inflation, and they know that industry is shut down, as is agriculture and tourism. I ask myself what this favorable situation they speak of is, given that state resources are not even able to meet 25% of the country's budgetary needs."

Khaddam acknowledged criticisms that people within Syria have made of the opposition in exile due to the latter's holding expensive conferences without any actual results to support the revolutionary movement or at least become a unified opposition. "The issue of conferences raises two negatives, the first that there are differences among the opposition regarding the general situation even though everyone agrees on toppling the regime, and the second because they are extremely expensive and the funds could instead pay for relief and assistance for Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan."

Renewed Clashes in Northern Yemen

20 July 2011

Source: B'ad Fashil Wasata al-Mushtarak... Tajadud al-Muajihat fi al-Jawf baina Shabab al-Thawra wa al-Huthiin" (After the failure of JMP mediation... Renewed Clashes in al-Jawf between the Revolutionary Youth and the Huthis), al-Ahale, 20 July 2011. <http://alahale.net/details.asp?id=6629&catid=1&key word=%C7%E1%CC%E6%DD>

After the failure of JMP mediation... Renewed Clashes in al-Jawf between the Revolutionary Youth and the Huthis

JMP (Joint Meeting Parties) mediation failed to impose a long-term truce between the revolutionaries and the Huthis in al-Jawf, as clashes were renewed following the departure of the mediation committee headed by Yahya Mansour Abu Asb'a two weeks ago.

The Huthis refused to give up the al-Safra military base as requested by the mediation, and they fortified their position with the arrival of supplies from Saada province. The clashes began in the region of Sabda, near the provincial capital, in an attempt to take over the provincial capital and the 115th Infantry Brigade, which fell into the hands of revolutionaries after its commander fled.

The Huthis had tried to pressure the revolutionaries to divide up the equipment from the military brigade, but the committee of al-Jawf tribes refused, saying that the equipment would be delivered to the next state. This did not convince the Huthis, who opened new fronts in the clashes in al-Jawf that have been ongoing for months.

Al-Jawf JMP leader Shaykh al-Hassan Abkar accused national security forces of supporting the Huthis in al-Jawf in order to control the province, which fell in the hands of rebels last March. He told News Yemen, "We gained control of the province and its military and civilian facilities last March, and we are protecting them until there is a new regime in place. In the meantime, the Huthis came to take it over, with support from national security, which encouraged them in order to say that infighting is taking place among the rebels."

He said that the regime encouraged the Huthis, who fought against their rebel brothers and killed 88 and injured 139 in battles he described as crushing and in which various types of light and heavy weapons were used and several homes destroyed. He added that there were also many casualties among Huthi ranks although the exact number is unclear. He also noted that the mediation effort led by Shaykh Hussein al-Dhanin was opposed by president Saleh.

Abkar said they had reached an agreement to end the fighting, but the regime's thugs had attacked the Huthis and fired upon them, "sabotaging the agreement despite our denials and offer of arbitration to the Huthis, who did not listen to the voice of reason." Mediation by the JMP, represented by Yahya Mansour Abu Asb'a, is the latest to fail.

Abkar called on the Huthis to reconcile and use reason and logic and stop the fighting and bloodshed in the province. He also launched a scathing attack against the local, Arab and international press for neglecting the province, where violent fighting has been ongoing for more than four months.

The head of the Bakil Youth Forum, Hassan abu Hadra, told News Yemen that the ongoing fighting between the Huthis and JMP elements is an artificially created one in which foreign parties are meddling. He noted that Iran supports the Huthi in order to gain a presence in the region, while Saudi Arabia supports the JMP and other tribes fearing Huthi expansion into its strategic provinces of Najran and Shurura, located along the shared and practically open-desert border.

FMSO Commentary The situation is fairly complicated in northern Yemen in mid-March, as popular protests picked up steam throughout the country, clashes broke out in the northern province of al-Jawf. Fighting on one side were the Huthis and their backers. Fighting on the other is a possible combination of pro- and anti-government troops and allies. It is not entirely clear.

The large, remote, sparsely populated and underdeveloped province of al-Jawf lies in Yemen's north, along the Saudi border. To the west it borders Yemen's Saada province, scene of intermittent, heavy and indecisive fighting (2004-2010) between the Huthis and their allies on the one hand and the Yemeni government and Saudi tribal allies on the other. With the government retrenching around Sanaa and other key areas due to the peaceful protests in Yemen's urban areas, the Huthis are now said to act with free reign in neighboring Saada.

The fighting began over who would control the 115th Brigade's base and equipment, located near the provincial capital. The brigade commander was recalled by President Saleh around the height of protest growth, but he defied orders and allegedly turned the base over to "anti-government revolutionaries," here meaning backers and clients of Islah, a large and multi-faceted Yemeni political party with strong tribal and religious (Sunni) backing. The Huthis seemingly tried to claim at least part of the spoils, possibly encouraged or provoked by Saleh backers. Some accounts have Saleh loyalist troops and those of defected General Ali Muhsin joining Islah allies in the subsequent battle against the Huthis and their allies.

Fighting flared again in early July. The type of suggestions that were often – and misleadingly – used to frame the conflict between the Huthis and the Yemeni government have been resurfacing on the one hand that Iran is exploiting Yemeni instability to support the Huthis, and on the other that the Saudi government and/or al-Qaeda are by force trying to spread Wahhabism and other anachronistic and intolerant ideologies into Yemen's Zaydi heartland. The reality, of course, is somewhere in between.

Following the publication of the article below, a truce was mediated between the two sides. This came on the heels of the earlier and failed attempt by the JMP (the main opposition bloc, in which Islah plays an important role). Over 100 had been killed in July fighting and the truce is not expected to hold for long. Al-Jawf is too peripheral for the Yemeni government to focus on right now, fighting as it is for survival. Because of this, it is an interesting place to follow. End FMSO Commentary (Winter)

FMSO Commentary: The twin challenges of maintaining security and protecting borders are a major test for the transitional Tunisian state as it cautiously marches toward a new political order. The Tunisian Army, one of the country's few stable institutions, has thus far met both challenges with success.

Although Libya's armed conflict has remained within the confines of the country's borders, spillover into Tunisian territory is likely to become more pronounced the longer the conflict continues. Of the countries' two shared border crossings, the Qaddafi-controlled coastal one is by far more important. A few hundred kilometers to the south, in the Nafusa Mountains or Jabal al-Gharbi, is the smaller of the two crossings, currently under rebel control.

This rebel-controlled crossing (Wazin-Dehiba) was fiercely contested in April and has withstood a number of loyalist counterattacks since. It has become the Nafusa Mountain rebels' main line of supply for various goods and equipment and is likely to be contested for as long as the conflict remains. This will, in turn, pose additional burdens on the Tunisian Army, which recently sent heavy reinforcements to this area; the risk of spillover will make it increasingly difficult for Tunis to appear neutral in its neighbor's conflict.

Tension has already spilled across the coastal border, including clashes between refugees and residents, as well as a separate incident involving Tunisian supporters and opponents of Qaddafi, both incidents that required Tunisian Army intervention to be diffused. Tunisia's main concerns at present, though, are domestic in nature.

Over the weekend of July 16-17, protests turned violent in various parts of the country, including the central town of Tazerouine, where police and national guard posts were among the government

The Tunisia Army's New Responsibilities

24 July 2011



Libyan soldiers loyal to Gaddafi at the Libyan-Tunisian border crossing of Dehiba. Photo by B.R.Q [CC-BY 2.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/>)] via Flickr.com

The Tunisian Army Brings Security Back to Tunisian Cities and Strengthens its Positions along the Libyan Border

Even though the Tunisian Army is numerically one of the weakest in North Africa (35,000 men), following the revolution that overthrew Zine al-Abidine ben Ali it found itself taking over several and at times contradictory responsibilities. Anyone passing through the cities of Tunisia today will notice military equipment in front of official headquarters and public facilities, including the Interior Ministry on Habib Bourguiba Street in the heart of the capital Tunis.

The conflict that broke out in Libya last February 17th between Qaddafi's brigades and the rebels has given the army responsibilities that were ignored by former presidents Bourguiba (1956-1987) and Ben Ali (1987-2011), both of whom relied on a defense policy closely aligned with France and the United States. With the fighting in Libya's Jabal al-Gharbi escalating and inching closer to the Tunisian border, Tunisian towns like Dehiba have not been spared from rocket and mortar attacks. The shelling has more than once affected Tunisian army units stationed on the eastern border towns, as the brigades and rebels fight across the border for control over the Libyan town of Wazin.

Tunisia's official news agency said yesterday that the Tunisian Army had over the past two days strengthened the defensive capabilities of its border positions on the eastern edge of Tataouine Province with heavy equipment in order "to anticipate any threat to the integrity of state sovereignty." A correspondent in the region attributed this step to the arrival of reinforcements to the Libyan area of Ghazaya, an indication of an impending attack near the Wazin-Dehiba border crossing, which has been in rebel control since last April 29.

The agency indicated that Qaddafi's brigades had more than once attempted to enter Tunisia to surround and ambush the rebels from the Tunisian side of the border, but Tunisian

The Tunisia Army's New Responsibilities

armed forces prevented this and kept them from entering Tunisia. The news agency added that Tunisians had returned elements from Qaddafi's brigades to where they came from every time there was an incursion.


The Wazin-Dehiba crossing grew in importance after becoming vital to both sides of the conflict, as it is the only means for rebels in the Nafusa Mountains (Jabal al-Gharbi) to provision and equip themselves. In turn, Qaddafi forces are unable to enter and control Jabal al-Gharbi without controlling the border crossing.

The agency added that "more than 5 Grad rockets fell in the night between last Tuesday and Wednesday near the Tunisian

border crossing center without causing human or material losses although they did cause panic in the hearts of workers and residents of the area in general."

In a related matter, Tunisian armed forces have worked to restore security in the country, according to Colonel Mokhtar ben Naser, a Tunisian defense ministry spokesperson. Ben Naser, in a meeting with journalists yesterday, said that the current security situation is "calm and under control, after the violence and attacks on public and private institutions that took place in parts of the capital Tunis as well as Tagerouine, Sidi Bouzid and Menzel Bourghiba."

facilities burned down; Menzel Bourguiba northeast of the capital, which witnessed gunfire exchanges between protesters and security forces; and Sidi Bouzid – the birthplace of the "Arab Spring" – where a 14-year old boy was shot dead during protests. Tunisia's transition continues. The Tunisian Army has become the main guarantor not only of Tunisia's national sovereignty but also of its political stability, not an easy task under present circumstances. End FMSO Commentary (Winter)



Regarding the kind of conflict the book addresses, it is about a broader set of conflicts than 'insurgency.' The umbrella category might be 'irregular.' I defer to a section on 'Terms' in a 1960 US Army field manual titled Operations Against Irregular Forces. It states,

The term irregular, used in combinations such as irregular forces, irregular activities, and counter-irregular operations, is used in the broad sense to refer to all types of nonconventional forces and operations. It includes guerrilla, partisans, insurgent, subversive, resistance, terrorist, revolutionary, and similar personnel, organizations and methods.

As for whom the book was written, the title seeks its audience. The text touches on a broad range of subjects. My hope then, is that the book will find its best audience, and that some of the ideas in it will be contagious.

— Geoff Demarest
geoffrey.demarest@us.army.mil

FMSO Commentary: It must have been bittersweet for the Somaliland representatives attending South Sudan's independence celebrations on 9 July this year. Surely like the other attendees they were welcoming Africa's newest nation, born out of a civil war which left over 2 million dead, and hoping the cleaving of Sudan into two parts would foster peace in the region. However, they must also have been wondering why South Sudan gained sovereignty when Somaliland, which has long sought independence, is still not free. Perhaps a more telling question is will South Sudan's independence help open the door to Somaliland's, or is Somaliland destined to remain a part of Somalia forever?

While much of Somalia has been in turmoil for the past two decades, Somaliland, which occupies the northwestern section of Somalia, has perhaps the most valued commodity in that region of the world, a modicum of stability, as evidenced, in part, by a multiparty democracy and a growing economy. This is not to say all is well. It does have border disputes and there are concerns regarding the rise of extremist elements within its territory, but it has largely been spared from the chaos of the Transitional Federal Government and Al Shabaab battling for control of the middle and southern sections of Somalia..

At first glance it might seem strange that Somaliland, which seems to be further along than South Sudan with regards to a functioning democracy capable of providing services to its people, did not get the nod for statehood and South Sudan did. This reflects, in part, marked international pressure on Sudan's government, composed mainly of northerners who were Muslim, to allow the southerners, mainly Christian and Animist and who did not want to live under Sharia, to be allowed to have their own state. In contrast there is not as much of an international

South Sudan Receives Statehood, So Why Not Somaliland?

8 August 2011

Source: Walker, Timothy. "Somalia: Revisiting Africa's Indifference to Somaliland's Quest for Self-Determination," Institute for Security Studies (Tshwane/Pretoria South Africa), 8 Aug 2011
http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1332



Map of South Sudan and Somaliland based on Somaliland_in_Africa by TUBS [CC-BY-SA 3.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/>)] via Wikimedia Commons

Somalia: Revisiting Africa's Indifference to Somaliland's Quest for Self-Determination

An autonomous self-declared territory that broke away from the Republic of Somalia in 1991, Somaliland recently celebrated twenty years of independence despite not being recognized as a sovereign state by any state or international organization.

Since the 1990s, many African states have regarded the thought of an independent Somaliland with a marked indifference that in some cases bordered on hostility, despite the territory fulfilling many of the criteria listed in agreements that define statehood, particularly the Montevideo Convention of 1933.

As an entity that, arguably, has all the trappings of a state and that provides more human security for its inhabitants than many of the recognized states on the continent, the response towards Somaliland appears to make little sense when one regards the welcome accorded to South Sudan.

While the African Union (AU), and its predecessor the Organization of African Unity (OAU), made the inviolability of inherited colonial borders a key principle of pan-African relations, Somaliland's search for greater self-determination can be justified on the basis that, unlike South Sudan, it has been recognized as an independent state in the past, even if just for three days after it gained its independence from Britain in 1960 and before it chose

South Sudan Receives Statehood, So Why Not Somaliland?

to unify with the south (a former Italian colony) to form the Somali Republic.

Representatives of Somaliland have been making concerted efforts at increasing their country's visibility and have increased their political contacts not just at the regional and continental level, but now also at the global level. For instance, the recent offer by President Silanyo to host United Nations (UN)-backed prisons for captured pirates has been seriously considered by various countries. Somaliland has attempted to establish international relationships, mostly of an informal nature, but the increase in links on both sub- and supra-state level, particularly in the Horn of Africa region, means that there is a possibility of countries proceeding to unilaterally recognize Somaliland.

Somaliland's greatest assets that could help it secure international recognition and support are its strategic location bordering the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa, and its deep-water port of Berbera. The future prosperity of the country arguably centers on Berbera, and on the industrialization and development that would occur if regional and international investment increased. A commitment to use the port in combating piracy or to assist patrols in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean would require supporting facilities, factories, storehouses and infrastructure. Berbera therefore has the potential to become a thriving hub of international trade and a centre for security in the region. Such moves could also interest Ethiopia, which has been landlocked since the 1990s and is reliant on Djibouti for much of its imports and exports. In addition Berbera was used as a naval port during the Cold War. However, Somaliland at present cannot guarantee that it can secure the inland areas through which goods can move cheaply enough to appeal to investors and businesses, meaning that at present the expense and risk involved in investing and utilizing this route remain unappealing.

Somalilanders have managed to build their state without access to resources, funding or aid, a task that they have carried out impressively. This contrasts with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia, which is almost totally dependent on foreign support and which has not been assisted by the massive amount of aid in establishing sovereignty over the country. The answer to Somaliland's isolation must therefore be located in international relations theory - and in the imaginations of those in power in states that could face secessionist claims or the irredentist policies of their neighbors should such a transformation of the African geopolitical map gather momentum. The fear that a successful secession would lead to similar calls across the continent, fracturing tenuous stability and possibly causing internecine conflicts, can also be located in Morocco and Western Sahara, Katanga in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Cabinda in Angola.

While there is much to admire about Somaliland, there is still need for caution. Its quest for recognition does not warrant unbridled enthusiasm. The region has frequently clashed with its neighbor Puntland, itself a relatively stable territory that also seeks to secede from Somalia. The clashes have revolved around border demarcation and there is a danger of the conflict intensifying. Within Somaliland itself, inhabitants of the Adal state also seek to declare their autonomy.

The AU, therefore, needs to critically reflect on the topic of self-determination, particularly that of Somaliland, in order to give its people a fair chance of participating in international and global relations.

outry for Somaliland, which like the rest of Somalia is composed of Muslim Somalis, to have its own nation. Indeed the opposite is true, with the African Union trying to prevent any additional fracturing of existing countries, no matter how strange the borders drawn by 19th century European powers. Nor does the African Union seem to care about the prospects of a forced coupling of a relatively peaceful region, Somaliland, with the larger Somalia chaos. Thus, while Somaliland may have a glimmer of hope that it will be next for internationally recognized statehood, it is far from certain that there will be any "next." End FMSO Commentary (Feldman)

FMSO Commentary: China's energy-hungry economy depends, to a large extent, on being fed by foreign sources of oil, much of which comes from what was previously known as the southern part of Sudan. However, on 9 July 2011, that region became the independent nation of South Sudan. Though South Sudan is still anxious to sell China oil and China is still anxious to purchase it, there's a third party involved, Sudan, through which the pipelines of oil-rich but landlocked South Sudan run.

Oil flow has already been disrupted at least once as Sudan and South Sudan argue over the amount of fees to be charged for using the pipelines. Sudan wants higher pipeline charges in order to maximize its revenues, but the cost of oil is essentially a zero sum game, so if Sudan raises pipeline fees, South Sudan will need to lower the cost of its oil so that the final price remains competitive on the global market. These threats to the flow of oil are precipitating intense consternation in Beijing, which is why China's foreign minister is visiting the capitals of the two nations.

Prior to South Sudan gaining statehood, China was careful not to get too involved in Sudanese politics. China's emphasis on purchasing oil and selling weapons in Sudan while essentially ignoring many of the human rights abuses occurring there earned it significant acrimony from many in the international community. Now, with Sudan split in two, it seems to be finding itself no longer a relatively detached merchant but rather a more diplomatically involved player in a region of intense strategic importance. China has a vested interest in keeping Sudan and South Sudan not just at the bargaining table over pipeline charges, but also over unresolved border disputes which could lead to all out war, a situation China knows would likely involve a complete cutoff of the oil it relies on to help fuel its economy. End FMSO Commentary (Feldman)

With Sudan Split, China Works to Ensure it Will Receive Oil

7 August 2011

Source: "East Africa: China FM Warns North & South Sudan Against Losing Peace Equation," Sudan Tribune, 7 Aug 2011.

<http://www.sudantribune.com/China-FM-warns-North-South-Sudan,39770>



Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, Yang Jiechi. Photo by Harald Dettenborn [CC-BY (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0)] via Wikimedia Commons

East Africa: China FM Warns North & South Sudan Against Losing 'Peace Equation'

Khartoum — The Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi arrived to Khartoum on Sunday on a two-day visit that will take him to South Sudan's capital of Juba.

Jiechi's discussions will likely focus on pressing the two countries on resolving the post-secession issues through the talks that have been dragging on without any breakthroughs.

China is mainly concerned about preserving stability in the newly split country for the sake of preserving its multi-billion dollar investments particularly in the oil sector.

The rising world power relied on Sudan as its sixth largest source of oil imports in 2010, and has been keen to build a relationship with leaders in the south, which became the world's newest country last month.

Khartoum and Juba are at odds over how much should be assessed in fees for using the pipelines that transport the oil from the landlocked South Sudan to the Red Sea coastal city of Port Sudan.

Khartoum has proposed at least \$22.8 per barrel which was labeled as "daylight robbery" by Juba. The latter said afterwards that Sudan dropped this figure.

He also affirmed that Beijing's policy towards Khartoum will not change regardless of the pressures, internal and external variables adding that China will continue its support for infrastructure projects in the fields of economy and development.

China has been one of the main backers of Sudan in recent years despite criticism from rights groups who allege that the Asian nation is turning a blind eye to gross human right violations committed by Khartoum. It recently received president Bashir who is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on ten counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur.

However some observers questioned whether China will remain as staunch in supporting Bashir's government following the secession of the South which contains most of the oil reserves.

Africa, the Rest of the Story: More Than Just Famine, War, and Terrorism

7 August 2011

Source: Warah, Rasna "The Unholy Alliance in Somalia - Media, Donors And Aid Agencies," The East African, 7 Aug 2011, <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/The+unholy+alliance+in+Somalia++Media++donors+and+aid+agencie s/-/2558/1214866/-/c8h7n0z/-/index.html>

The Unholy Alliance in Somalia – Media, Donors and Aid Agencies

The season of giving has started — and it not even Christmas yet. Leading international aid agencies ... have launched massive campaigns to save the thousands of Somalis who are facing hunger in their own country and in refugee camps in neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia.

Media-savvy aid agencies

Images of starving Africans are part and parcel of fund-raising campaigns, as are journalists. As one leading humanitarian official told the BBC's Andrew Harding, the UN can produce endless reports, but it is only when the images of starving people are televised or placed on the front page of newspapers that politicians take action.

The problem is that the story that they see or read is not as impartial as they would like to believe. More often than not, it is told by aid agency staff on the ground or independent filmmakers. News organizations that do not have the resources to send reporters to far-flung disaster zones such as the camp in Dadaab, have entered into an unholy alliance with aid agencies, whereby the aid agencies' spokespeople — wearing T-shirts and caps bearing the logos of their respective organizations — "report" the disaster via satellite to international audiences.

Dutch journalist Linda Polman believes that the "unhealthy" relationship between journalists and aid agencies does not allow for independent, objective reporting, and is often slanted in favor of the agency doing the "reporting".

Media-savvy aid workers fully exploit the eagerness with which journalists accept their version of a disaster or crisis. On their part, says Ms Polman, journalists "accept uncritically the humanitarian agencies' claims to neutrality, elevating the trustworthiness and expertise of aid workers above journalistic scepticism."

This non-nuanced, simplistic story about African disasters has foreign policy implications, says Karen Rothmyer in a discussion paper published by Harvard University's Joan Shorenstein Centre early this year.

"Top US officials responsible for Africa policy who begin their days with media summaries focusing disproportionately on Africa's problems are unlikely to see the continent's potential."

The cozy relationship between aid workers and journalists has thus distorted the way Africa is reported. Journalists often do not get to the heart of the story or take the time to do the research into the causes of a particular crisis. Africans do not feature much in their stories, except as victims.

"In public affairs discussions the term 'starving Africans' (or 'starving Ethiopians' or 'starving Somalis') rolls from the tongue as easily as 'blue sky'," wrote former aid worker Michael Maren in his 1997 book *The Road to Hell*.

In a recent phone conversation, Ms Polman told me that the "starving African" story is not just the easiest to tell, especially in a continent that does not generate much international

FMSO Commentary: Somalia's famine has riveted the eyes of the world on that destitute nation. The images are heart-rending: starving parents on the move, sometimes choosing which of their dying children to be left behind; gaunt infants moments from death, and overfilled camps continuing to receive a steady stream of refugees. The world has seen the horror play out across television and computer screens, but, unfortunately, this and similar tragedies are probably what many people outside of Africa mainly envision, and for some perhaps only envision, when thinking of what that continent is alike.

A large problem with almost exclusively focusing on the famines and other catastrophic events is that many positive aspects of Africa are overlooked. There are African nations which are relatively peaceful and provide excellent business investment opportunities, as well as beautiful and friendly places for tourists to visit. Stores, factories, and visitors would bring badly needed capital to many of these countries and, in turn, would probably help neighboring nations where problems such as famine and drought exist. However, when the entire continent seems to be engulfed in war or another tragedy, businesses will be hesitant to make a commitment and tourists might stay away. The economic consequences of a lack of foreign investments could result in unrest and instability in regions where they could have been prevented.

Additionally, with a picture that leaves out African success stories, generalizations may creep into policy and other reports, leading to decisions being made with incomplete and/or biased knowledge. Even news stories from the areas where famine occurs can sometimes lack impartiality, as this article describes, and may lead to programs, including military stability operations, being implemented that in the long run are of only minimal value, or worse, counterproductive.

To be sure, there is a large-scale famine going on in Somalia, and this commentary is not intended to minimize it. However, there is more to Africa than just famine and war...much more. End FMSO Commentary (Feldman)

Africa, the Rest of the Story: More Than Just Famine, War, and Terrorism

media coverage, but is also the most “politically correct.” After all, who in their right mind would want to be accused of doing nothing for dying people?

Disasters such as the famine in Somalia fuel the aid business, with each aid agency eager to “brand” itself as the most competent in handling the disaster. In her recently published book *The Crisis Caravan*, Polman describes how crises become “business opportunities” for aid agencies.

Avenues for bribery

What is also not mentioned in the appeals for funding is the fact that a lot of the funds are used to pay off or bribe officials and militia to allow aid convoys to pass. (In Somalia, Ms Polman claims, the “entry fee” charged by warlords has in the past run to as much as 80 per cent of the value of the aid.) In many countries, it is not militia, but government officials, who steal aid money.


In my assessment, there is a strong relationship between the number of donors and aid agencies in a country and its level of poverty – the more donors and aid agencies there are, the less likely that country is to significantly reduce poverty levels.

And here is why. Aid to governments often has the net effect of suppressing local economies and initiatives. In Somalia, for instance, Maren noted that food production was suppressed by food

aid, as farmers had no incentive to grow their own food. Aid also makes governments less accountable to their own people. When the work of government is taken over by aid agencies and NGOs, and when government budgets are heavily subsidized — or entirely funded — by foreign donors, governments become less accountable to their own citizens, and more accountable to the donors. It also makes it easy for governments to blame lack of donor funding for their failures to carry out development programs. This leads to a vicious blame game, where the victim is always the ordinary citizen.

Donor aid also reduces countries’ sovereignty. Aid is the most effective (and cost-effective) way in which foreign donor countries control other countries without being labeled as colonialists. It leads to bizarre situations where a donor country — and even more alarmingly, an international aid agency — sets government policy for a poor country, while presidents, ministers and permanent secretaries look on helplessly. Donors have a keen vested interest, therefore, in keeping the aid industry well-oiled.

However, neither the donors nor the aid agencies could play their part without the complicity of African governments, which have unquestioningly taken on the roles of victim and beggar.



This book explores the impact of the Cyber Age on military thinking and operations worldwide. Four issues are examined: the contrast between the concept of “cyber operations” used by civilians, including criminals and terrorists, and the concept of “information operations” used by armed forces; the differences in information operations (IO) theory among the US, Russian, and Chinese militaries; the manner in which militaries use information operations in peace and in war; and the impact of cyber and information processes on the mind, the military machine, and their interface

– Tim Thomas

tim.l.thomas@us.army.mil

The Thorn in the Horn: Why Eritrea Planned Attacks on an African Union Summit

28 July 2011

Source: “L’Érythrée a planifié un attentat contre un sommet de l’Union africaine selon un rapport de l’ONU” (Eritrea planned an attack against an African Union Summit, according to a report by the United Nations), AllAfrica.com, 28 July 2011, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201107290196.html>



Map of Eritrea — Map derived from UNCS [Public Domain] via Wikipedia Commons

According to UN, Eritrea Planned Attack Against African Union Summit

According to a new report from the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, the Eritrean government conceived of, prepared, organized, and directed an attempted sabotage on the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa. By means of attempted bombings, the Eritrean government targeted a certain number of civil and government targets – without succeeding, the report concluded.

“Although numerous Eritreans have deep and legitimate qualms against Ethiopia as a result of the non-implementation of the border delimitation that officially put an end to the 1998-2000 war between the two countries, the means by which the leaders of Asmara [Eritrea] are apparently intending to pursue their objectives have gone beyond the norm of reason and proportionality,” continues the report.

The Monitoring Group also considers the fact that “since the Eritrean intelligence services responsible for the attempted attacks against the African Union Summit also operate in Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, it is necessary to reevaluate the degree to which they serve as threats in these countries.”

According to the Monitoring Group, Eritrea continues to “play a role on the Somalian chessboard, in ways that are not entirely important, but are nevertheless troubling.” The fact that Asmara continues relations with al-Shebab, which controls entire regions of Somalia, seems to have to be intended to “legitimate and encourage the movement rather than slow its extremist orientation or bring it to participate in a political process.”

FMSO Commentary: Eritrea has been aptly described as Africa’s North Korea because of its unpredictability, belligerence, and generally sour disposition toward the rest of Africa and the world. It is within this sober context that one should understand the accompanying story that details how Eritrea, under the leadership of President Isaias Afiwerki, conceived of, planned, and executed an attack on an African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

There are at least two readings of the action. The first possible interpretation of these attempted bombings – and likely the most convincing – is that the attacks were primarily aimed to embarrass Eritrea’s historical adversary, Ethiopia. Since gaining its independence from Ethiopia in 1994, Eritrea and Ethiopia have been engaged in numerous border skirmishes, and each is believed to have funneled money to proxy groups to attack the other. The plot may simply be read as one blip in a much longer history of Eritrean aggression towards Ethiopia.

However, the second possibility is that the attack was intended to send a message to the African international community writ large. To be sure, Eritrea consistently feels that it is being bullied collectively by other African countries, which constantly side with Ethiopia when it comes to placing blame for proxy conflicts in Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda. To this end, the African Union has rebuked Eritrea several times, for instance, for violating Djibouti’s sovereignty when Eritrea chased some of its fleeing soldiers into the neighboring country in 2008.

In reality, the ultimate cause for the planned attack was likely a combination of both rationales, meaning that the “North Korea” of Africa is unlikely to soon lose the unenviable distinction. End FMSO Commentary (Warner)

FMSO Commentary: AQIM's recent attacks on both a Malian military base (on June 24) and a Mauritanian military base (on July 5), have highlighted the truly transnational threat posed by AQIM in the Sahel and Sahara deserts. Yet while additional governments in the West African region – such as Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria – increasingly dedicate themselves to the eradication of AQIM, they would be wise not to miss the trees for the forest: indeed, as the accompanying article details, AQIM is apparently employing a well-worn tactic of using the terrain of the forests outside of the Malian town of Wagadou to conceal its activities.

The choice for AQIM to hide in the Wagadou forests is a logical one. The forests are unique in the otherwise easily-aerially surveyed Sahel desert, providing cover for meetings of AQIM, as well as being inaccessible due to the lack of roads that enter within. Moreover, the location of the Wagadou forests is also ideal, given that they are a comfortable distance from both the base positions of Mauritanian troops, now stationed near the Malian border in the town of Bassikounou, and the Malian contingent, now back in Bamako undergoing further training for what is assumed to be a raid on the area in the coming months. End FMSO Commentary (Warner)

Covering Aggression: Forest in Mali and Mauritania Used as AQIM Hideout

9 August 2011

Source: Mali-Mauritania: AQMI de retour dans la forêt Wagadou” (Mali-Mauritania: AQIM returns in the forests of Wagadou), Jeune Afrique, 9 August 2011, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20110809081010/mali-mauritanie-islamisme-terrorisemali-mauritanie-aqmi-de-retour-dans-la-foret-de-wagadou.html>



Map of Mali — Map based on ESRI data and political boundaries from www.gadm.org [CC-BY-NC-SA 3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/)]

Mali-Mauritania: AQIM Returns in the Forests of Wagadou

Having been classified as completely “clean” by the Malian and Mauritanian militaries until recently, the forest in Wagadou is more than ever occupied by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Now, they are returning due to the strategic advantages that the zone provides for the fight against the group.

The rumor that has been circulating around the villages on the edge of the Wagadou Forest for the past week has just been confirmed by Malian security forces. Less than two months after the attack on June 24 on the Malian and Mauritanian armies, in this zone, the jihadists are back once again.

“One week ago, the citizens alerted us of the presence of several cars belonging to members of AQIM parked in the forests of Wagadou. But it was on Saturday, August 6 that I knew with certainty that these cars in fact belonged to AQIM,” said a source from the Malian security apparatus posted on the Mali-Mauritanian border.” He added: “The information that we have received has shown us that there are three groups of jihadists, but I cannot reveal the exact number of these elements.”

Opposition Asserts it is Ready for a New Civil War in Mozambique

9 August 2011

Source: “Ameças de Afonso Dhlakama: Não há condições para regresso à Guerra” (Threats from Afonso Dhlakama: [But] Under no condition will we return to war, *Jornal Noticias* (Maputo), 9 August 2011, www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/pls/notimz2/getxml/pt/contentx/1266292)



Flags of FRELIMO (left) and RENAMO (right) political parties based on Flag_of_FRELIMO [Public Domain] and MZ_RENAMO3 [CC-BY 3.0 (www.creativecommons.org/license/by/3.0)]

Threats from Afonso Dhlakama: But No Return to War

“Under no condition will Mozambique return to civil war,” stated a FRELIMO spokesman who sent a letter to our Paper recently.

This statement comes after Afonso Dhlakama, having just exited from a “profound political hiatus,” threatened to regroup and quarter former guerrillas from RENAMO, a clear reference to the preparation of a war. Moreover, he also threatened to overthrow the Executive branch, run legitimately by FRELIMO, while installing a transitional government, in the event that the party in power refuses to renounce its power and convene new elections.

Of note, FRELIMO’s Department of Mobilization and Propaganda indicated that it was “incomprehensible that, in the middle of the month in which the Muslim community dedicates itself to fasting and cultivating peace, tolerance and love, that the leader of RENAMO would contrarily appear with a violent and belligerent discourse, attacking the most basic values of Ramadan.”

Having chosen to proceed as such, the opposition leader [Dhlakama] is now not only acting out against the law, but also against the conventions of religion, morality, and social and political order. Nevertheless, under no conditions will the country return to war.

“No Mozambican is prepared to hand over his son, brother, or father for a [potential] unjust war of destruction and destabilization. For Mozambicans, peace and stability are irreversible rewards,” reads the document.

*FMSO Commentary: The civil war that raged in Mozambique from 1977 to 1992 between FRELIMO (the post-independence ruling party) and RENAMO (the South African- and Rhodesian-funded insurgent group) ended with a FRELIMO victory and control of government, and a return to peace. Yet as the accompanying article from Mozambique’s newspaper *Jornal Noticias* asserts, Afonso Dhlakama, the longtime leader of the RENAMO opposition, has recently threatened to remobilize his troops, indicating a renewed threat of civil war in the country.*

Mozambicans have been forthcoming with hypotheses trying to rationalize these renewed threats from Dhlakama. Some are taking the claims from the former presidential candidate – who has been politically quiet for the past several years – as flashy attempts to thrust himself back into the public sphere; another hypothesis is that he is trying to burnish his credentials within RENAMO, where his leadership has historically been accused of being less than stellar. Yet by far the most interesting hypothesis is that Dhlakama’s new threats have been intended to incite “Arab Spring” style riots in Mozambique against the ruling FRELIMO party, which, if successful, would likely make Dhlakama the new de facto president of the country.

As the FRELIMO spokesman asserts, a return to violence in Mozambique will most likely not come to pass. But the extent to which local media have been alarmed by Dhlakama’s threats should indicate that Mozambique warrants more attention than it is typically afforded, and suggests that rhetoric from the Arab Spring might now be used across the Global South as a path to personal political gain. End FMSO Commentary (Warner)

FMSO Commentary: The Seven Seas of Medieval lore were the watery passages from Europe to China. Voyages motivated by commerce and driven by the monsoon have given way to continual flows of super-tankers, container ships, and every manner of merchant ship. The oceans of South and Southeast Asia now carry the world's hopes for prosperity and peace.

80% of the world's seaborne trade in oil transits through Indian Ocean choke points. 50% of container ship traffic and one third of bulk cargo pass through the Indian Ocean. With trade comes piracy and with piracy come concerns for maritime security. The once fierce Malaccan pirates have been subdued and supplanted by the Somali Pirates of increasing prowess. All concerned parties have responded with increased naval presence along these critical trade routes.

The following articles point to the diversity of naval forces and the potential for conflict amongst them. Several constructs for security have developed. These include EU NAVFOR Somalia, NATO Operation Ocean Shield, Standing NATO Maritime Group, US CENTCOM CTF 151, unilateral Chinese deployments, and unilateral Indian deployments. The current common threat of piracy has fueled the presence of several national naval contingents. The question remains open as to whether this will develop cooperation or conflict.

This first article is from The Hindu, an Indian English-language daily published in Chennai. It is the third most widely read English newspaper in India, with a readership of some 22 million. It was the first Indian newspaper to create an online edition. End FMSO Commentary (Welch)

Naval Action: Seas of South and Southeast Asia

8 July 2011

Source: The Hindu. Special Correspondent Published: June 24, 2011 15:31 IST <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2131663.ece?css=print>



The Pakistan Navy destroyer PNS Babur (D 182) operates in the Persian Gulf as part of the Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan conducted under Commander Task Force One Five Zero (CTF-150) in the 5th Fleet area of responsibility. Babur is designed to provide effective defense of a convoy or other force against attack by surface ships or submarines. Coalition forces are working to prevent attacks against critical maritime infrastructures in the region, including the oil and shipping industries, and stopping the flow of terrorist and terrorism related materials. (Photo by U.S. Navy/Journalist 2nd Class Elton Shaw)[Public Domain] via Wikimedia Commons

INS Godavari damaged in PNS Babur maneuvers

Last week's close encounter between the naval warships of India and Pakistan on the high seas caused damage to INS Godavari after PNS Babur brushed past it.

A helicopter net was damaged when the Pakistan ship moved close to INS Godavari, coming from behind. PNS Babur was escorting Egyptian merchant vessel m.v. Suez, which was released several months after having been held hostage by Somali pirates.

Interacting with correspondents after a function here, Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Nirmal Verma said the Indian naval ship was going at a particular speed and the other ship approached from the rear.

"It must have tried to pass at a certain distance... but it didn't happen as it turned up very close... we operate helicopters from ships and keep helicopter nets down [during landings]. One of our helicopter nets got damaged," he said adding the Pakistani ship came much closer than what was considered prudent by those operating ships in the seas.

Issue taken up

The Navy Chief said India already raised the issue with appropriate authorities. New Delhi had lodged a protest with Islamabad and given photographs in evidence of PNS Babur's dangerous manoeuvres.

Vietnam Submarines

3 August 2011

Source: <http://tuoitrenews.vn/cmlink/tuoitrenews/politics/vietnam-to-have-submarine-brigade-in-5-6-years-1.39357>



Soviet Kilo class submarine. Photo by US Navy [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Vietnam to have submarine brigade in 5-6 years

Vietnam's Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh

Vietnam's Navy will have a submarine brigade in five to six years, confirmed defense minister Phung Quang Thanh on August 3, soon after he was re-elected to keep the post by the National Assembly.

The unit consists of six Kilo 636-class subs, he added.

The minister had a press conference today in Hanoi:

How will Vietnam invest for naval forces?

It depends on our economic ability. Vietnam has yet to produce modern weapons and military equipment, which are costly to import.

How about Vietnam's plan of buying submarines and jet fighters?

It is part of Vietnam's long-term project till 2020. But in 5-6 coming years, we will have a submarine brigade with six kilo 636-class subs.

Buying submarines, missiles, fighter jets and other equipment is for self-defence of Vietnam's sovereignty. It's definitely not

meant as a menace to regional nations.

What are your comments about military build-up having taken place among nations in the region?

It is a common trend in the world that accompanies economic developments.

I don't think it's an arm race. Armies build up their strength to defend their sovereignty.

It's a normal job of nations, including Vietnam.

Protecting fishermen at seas is also a task of defending sovereignty...

Defending security at sea and sovereignty is one of the political tasks of the army. Navy, maritime police and coastguard unit are Vietnam's main forces taking over the task which includes rescue.

We will certainly protect our fishermen working lawfully at seas.

The army is responsible for providing aid to fishermen in case of mechanical troubles, accidents and risks.

Vietnam's army has friendly relations with regional nations as Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei,

FMSO Commentary: This article is from the Vietnamese newspaper Tuoi Tre (Youth) published in Ho Chi Minh City. It remains the official mouth-piece of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Organization and is now the largest newspaper in the country.

Viet Nam has a historic animosity toward Chinese presence within its territorial waters and claimed economic exclusion zone (EEZ). On May 26, 2011 Chinese Coast Guard Ships intercepted a survey ship of the Vietnam National Oil and Gas Group within Vietnam's EEZ. Vietnam Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh made it clear that the decision to purchase submarines, jet fighters, and air defense missiles was not related to the incident.

This increased maritime capability will give pause to all Navies operating in the South China Sea and its approaches. End FMSO Commentary (Welch)

China and others.

Do Vietnam and ASEAN nations keep similarities in regional issues?

Yes in general. Unity among ASEAN nations plays an essential role in multilateral cooperation and sustaining stance of each nation.

Are other non-ASEAN nations, as the US, interested in the East Sea?

Geographical location of the East Sea has remained a strategic role for economic developments and other matters.

The US has announced to keep a neutral posture in territorial conflicts among regional nations, but the US has benefits in ensuring maritime freedom.

Regional nations have voiced different ideas on the involvement of the US in the region; some praise its positive role in the region while others say it makes the issue more complicated.

We believe that all nations have benefits in the East Sea, including power nations as the US. Despite sticking to various views, all nations share a common thing: peace and stability.

FMSO Commentary: This article is from the The Tribune, an Indian daily newspaper published in English, Hindi, and Punjabi. It is a major Indian newspaper with a worldwide circulation.

Contact between military forces operating against pirates in the Indian Ocean is routine. These interactions can appear benign at the operational level, yet often have strategic consequences beyond their control.

With increasingly larger and more aggressive naval contingents plying these waters, there is potential for misunderstanding and confrontation. End FMSO Commentary (Welch)

India Rescues Chinese Vessel from Pirates

6 May 2011

Source: Ajay Banerjee Tribune News Service, New Delhi. May 6 2011



Tupolev TU-142. Photo by US Navy [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Indian Navy rescues Chinese vessel China refuses to acknowledge Indian efforts

That India enjoys edgy relationship with China was reinforced when China today did not acknowledge the effort of the Indian Navy in saving its merchant vessel from the clutches of pirates some 850 km off Karwar on the western sea coast of India.

Navy's effort led to the rescue of 24 Chinese sailors and the merchant vessel, MV Full City (Chinese name Fucheng) in the Arabian sea after Somali pirates had boarded it and the sailors were huddled together in a strong room. The incident occurred yesterday morning and Navy's aviators and warships played a major role in the three-hour-long operation.

The Chinese official line given by its transport ministry is that US and Turkish warships played a role. It does not mention India. The same has been reported by China's official news agency Xinhua from Beijing.

The Indian Navy was alerted by an SOS from the ship around 8: 45 am yesterday. The Chinese Embassy here in New Delhi followed it up with written request that was sent through fax. Once the operation was over the Chinese Navy's anti-piracy task force - two warships and tanker - deployed in the gulf, thanked the Indian Navy over the open maritime communication band that was heard and recorded by merchant vessels, warships and naval aircraft in the vicinity. The Chinese ships were stationed some 2000 km away from the spot.

The Indian Navy today said following an SOS from the merchant vessel to a maritime reconnaissance aircraft Tupelov 142 was pressed into action. Along the sea coast vessel CGS Samar was speeding towards the ship.

The Naval aircraft reached above the MV Full City around 9: 15 am. The aircraft observed a pirates main vessel next to merchant vessel and an empty skiff - a fast boat -- alongside it.

The aircraft made a number of low passes over the ship and warned the pirates, over the open radio, to leave the merchant ship immediately, advising them that Naval warships were closing in the area. On getting the warning the pirates fled the merchant ship.

Since no warship was close by, the naval aircraft maintained overhead surveillance for over three hours assisting the rescue operation by co-ordinating with the NATO sea task Force. Sailors from the Turkish naval vessel, Giresun, which is part of the NATO Force, eventually boarded MV Full City and sanitised it even as the Indian Navy aircraft hovered overhead. Incidentally, the Chinese task force was in the know of Indian Navy's role and were in radio contact throughout.

Illicit Trafficking

23 March 2011

Source: Holguín, Juan Carlos. "Capturada red del Cartel de Sinaloa en México y Ecuador (Sinaloa Cartel Network Captured in Mexico and Ecuador)," *Expreso*. ec, 23 March 2011. <http://ediciones.expreso.ec/ediciones/2011/03/24/nacional/judicial/capturada-red-del-cartel-de-sinaloa-en-mexico-y-ecuador>

Photo: Joaquin Guzman-Lorea, via America's Most Wanted www.amw.com



Sinaloa Cartel Network Captured in Mexico and Ecuador

Information coming from Mexico launched the operation. Intelligence work revealed that a shipment of drugs was going to be sent to Mexico from Ecuador. Thus, authorities from both countries launched a joint effort that led to a series of simultaneous raids.

A total of 18 people running the drug trafficking from Colombia towards Central America and the United States were captured in these raids; nine from each of Mexico and Ecuador, with Ecuador being used as the point of embarkation.

A total of 4,176.5 kilos of cocaine were seized, batches of which were found in different places in Mexico and the provinces of Guayas, Los Rios, and Santo Domingo in Ecuador. The shipment is valued at \$167 million and could bring 8 million individual doses into the market.

The following individuals were among those arrested in Mexico: Victor Manuel Felix Felix, aka El Señor, Compadre [Godfather], and father of the spouse of Joaquin Guzman Loera's child, who is also called El Chapo Guzman, leader of the Sinaloa Cartel and one of the most wanted drug traffickers.

The Organization

General Rodrigo Suarez Salgado, National Director of Police Operations in Ecuador, said that Chapo Guzman, through his in-law, had made up an organization in Guadalajara, Mexico, formed by Jorge Guillermo Gonzalez Cardenas and Luis Roberto Garcia Fierro.

This organization established in Guayaquil a group of Colombians -- Gilberto Giraldo Avila, his wife Maria Claudia Urbano Rosas, and his cousin, Cesar Augusto Fernandez Avila -- who leased two warehouses in Mapasingue and at the Duran Industrial Park, where they received the alkaloid that came overland from Colombia, using various means of transportation.

In Ecuador the operation was called Pacific and began on 17 March. Gilberto Giraldo and Cesar Fernandez were arrested here, while Maria Urbano remains at large. In addition, Mexican nationals Rigoberto Villa Lopez, Zeferino Rodriguez Tirado, and Alejandra Costich Esqueda, as well as Ecuadorans Juan Carlos Naranjo Aleman, Yandry Bernabeth Cevallos Palacios, Gerardo Benitez Mera Ibarra, and Freddy Fabian Espinel Ruiz were also arrested.

FMSO Commentary: The Sinaloa Cartel is one of the largest, if not the single largest, transnational criminal organization (TCO) in the world. One thing is for sure, its leader, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera, is the only illicit trafficker in the world on Forbes' World's Billionaire list. According to Forbes.com, he ranks in as the world's 937th richest person, with an estimated net worth of \$1.0 billion dollars.

In recent years, it has been apparent that El Chapo has been trying to expand his enterprise into a worldwide network. Information has been released that business meetings between the Sinaloa Cartel and potential "clients" were being brokered in Panama, as well as claims that he evades Mexican authorities by seamlessly slipping into and out of many Central American countries, including Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.

The attached article is proof-positive of the continued efforts of the Sinaloa Cartel to become a global enterprise. In the ever-evolving world of interconnected global commerce, illicit activities are no different. It is now found that drugs, arms, and human trafficking are business-wise much the same as licit activities. In a world where business is business, no matter what the product, the Sinaloa Cartel has connected with other TCOs like Italy's Ndrangheta and Japan's Yakuza, and continues in its quest to set up a network of global illicit trafficking partners. End FMSO Commentary (Scheidel)

Illicit Trafficking

Six buildings, two warehouses, and a farm were also raided. Three vehicles and \$3,576 were seized.

The other part of the operation, called Colmena, was carried out in Mexico. The following people were arrested there: Chapo Guzman in-law Luis Roberto Garcia Fierro; Francisco Javier Soto Colmenares y Sanchez, Armando Medina Quintero, Jose Daniel Espinoza Caballero, and also Romano Darwish Eli, alias Eliot, Jorge Guillermo Gonzalez Cardenas, and Rodrigo Soto Colmenares y Sanchez, who were the financial wing [of the organization]. A total of 500 kilos of cocaine were seized in Mexican territory.

Fabiola Gallardo, Ecuador's narcotics prosecutor who was involved in the operation, explained that when they received initial information about the shipment that was going to be sent to Mexico, she personally traveled to the Central American country to coordinate actions. "In Mexico we were carrying out investigations and verifying legal aspects related to agreements to request international assistance. We have the migratory movements of two citizens who came to Ecuador."

General Suarez pointed out that investigations helped establish ties between this organization and groups that were arrested in previous operations. Operation Mirador was carried out on 6 November 2010. Some 2,513 kilos of cocaine were found at kilometer 103 of the Guayaquil-Salinas highway. The packets had a cloverleaf logo and the word Curum, the same design that was found in Operation La Victoria carried out on 25 November 2010 in La Victoria, San Placido parish in the municipality of Portoviejo.

A warrant for the arrest of Cesar Emilio Montenegro Castillo, who currently is the main suspect in the murder of police Corporal Darwin David Andrango, a member of Narcotics Intelligence who was killed on 19 March, was issued during Operation Mirador.

"The Colombian supplier of the drugs seized in Mirador turns out to be the same one who was supplying drugs to the organization disbanded in Operation Pacific," the operations director said. According to authorities, this allows the allegation that there is a tie between the disbanded network and the murder of the policeman.

On the packages of drugs seized during the latest operation new logos were found: the symbol of the Apple company, the words jeep and taxi, and the letters XXX, the number 4.5, the logo and word Movistar, the logo for Mazda, the figure of a rooster with the letter K on the chest, and labels with a happy face and the letters KM.

"These drugs were found in blue 45-gallon tanks which have a lead lining. The purpose of this is to mislead dogs of the National Police, as well as scanners at checkpoints, so that the alkaloid cannot be detected," General Suarez said.


Eduardo Pequeno, head of the Mexican Federal Police's Antinarcotics Office, said that Operation Colmena was carried out in his country on 18 and 19 March in the states of Jalisco, Quintana

Roo, and Mexico City. "We learned that this organization (Sinaloa Cartel) had a cell in Guayaquil."

Victor Manuel Felix was being followed since 2009, when "abnormal" banking transactions were detected in his accounts and money laundering was investigated. The financial information and wiretapping allowed them to discover the connection with Ecuador.

In addition to the 500 kilos of cocaine seized, four vehicles, phones, radios, and \$500,000 were also confiscated from the detainees in Mexico.

The American infantry battalion is now a well-established actor in the Afghan theater. So why would the Foreign Military Studies Office and the Maneuver Center of Excellence resurrect a book from 1932 for the leaders of those units? Well, the book is about fighting Pushtun tribesmen in the remote regions of Afghanistan/Pakistan — an unchanged battlefield and an opposing force consistent in the difficulties it has caused for great armies over millennia. This book, originally published as a guide for British lieutenants and captains, demonstrates that improvements in technology — much of it available to both sides — have had only a modest impact on infantry fighting in this rugged terrain. However, it also demonstrates that the key to enhancing basic infantry effectiveness is using the terrain effectively, maintaining force security and understanding the mountain people.



— Lester W. Grau
les.grau@us.army.mil

Security in Ciudad Juarez

21 June 2011

Source: “Desata confrontación suspensión de apoyo a Juárez (Suspension of Public Security Funds in Ciudad Juarez Unleashes Conflict),” Frontera.info, 29 July 2011. <http://www.frontera.info/EdicionEnLinea/Notas/Nacional/29072011/531814.aspx>

Mexican Federal Police. Photo by Huitzil [CC-BY 2.0 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/)], via Wikimedia Commons



Suspension of Public Security Funds in Ciudad Juarez Unleashes Conflict

In the midst of a dispute between the municipal government of Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, and the federal government, the office of the executive secretary of the National Public Security System (SESNSP) announced on 28 July 2011 that public funds for Ciudad Juarez will be suspended because of the city’s failure to comply with the Public Security Municipalities Subsidy (SUBSEMUN) operating rules.

Relations between the Federal Public Security Secretariat and the municipal government of Ciudad Juarez grew tense on 25 July 2011 when Federal Police (PF) agents fired at the vehicle of the Ciudad Juarez Secretary of Public Security, Julian Leyzaola.

The Federal Police said that Leyzaola had violated the security protocols by attempting to enter the perimeter of a maximum risk area while an investigation regarding an alleged escape of prisoners from a municipal jail was underway. That incident resulted in the death of 17 inmates.

Leyzaola claimed that the agents had attempted to assassinate him.

On 28 July 2011, the SESNSP announced that it would cut off federal government funds for Ciudad Juarez since the authorities of this border city have not complied with the requirements set for 2010.

This failure, said the SESNSP, is in reporting progress made in the following areas: adoption of the police model program, wage standardization, and implementation of the police career professional service system.

The mayor of Ciudad Juarez, Hector Murguía Lardizabal, described the decision to suspend the SUBSEMUN resources for the city as “a bucketful of cold water,” and he denied that they had failed to meet the requirements for obtaining this subsidy.

The Juarez mayor’s office said that Murguía’s administration has complied with the SUBSEMUN operating rules, to the extent that it has already used 40 percent of the funds authorized for 2011.

This year Ciudad Juarez has received its first installment of 38 million pesos [\$3,289,524.87 USD] of SUBSEMUN funds, but the next two installments, coming to a total of 95 million pesos [\$8,098,535.13 USD], have been suspended until last year’s obligations have been met.

According to SESNSP data, in addition to Ciudad Juarez, another 174 municipalities

FMSO Commentary: Going back many years, the relationship between federal and local law enforcement in Ciudad Juarez has been notoriously bad. Corruption has not helped this issue either, with both entities having numerous officers arrested on charges of illegal activities at all levels. This has led to general distrust between the groups resulting in multiple armed confrontations between the police forces in Ciudad Juarez, most recently on 10 and 25 July 2011, with the latter involving the city’s police chief.

Following the 25 July 2011 incident, where Federal Police opened fire on the convoy of Julian Leyzaola, Ciudad Juarez’s Secretary of Public Security, federal officials indicated that they were pulling funding from the city “for their failure to comply with operating rules” involved with obtaining and maintaining the subsidy. The city sees it as a penalty for the mayor publicizing the story and allegedly blowing it out of proportion.

On 26 July 2011 Ciudad Juarez Mayor Hector Murguía told Milenio Television that federal officials had also made a decision to withdraw some 5,000 federal agents who had been present in the city since April 2010. He continued, stating that these officials would begin leaving in September, based on a federal assessment that the city was under control. The following day, at a time when Ciudad Juarez was beginning to feel completely abandoned by the Mexican Government, Interior Minister Francisco Blake corrected the remark made by Mayor Murguía, stating that he was mistaken and that the federal forces would not be removed. With the federal forces remaining, hopefully the two entities can learn to work together to continue to reduce crime and increase security, changing the reputation of the city into a positive one. End FMSO Commentary (Scheidel)

Security in Ciudad Juarez

could be subject to this cutoff of funds, as their deadlines for complying with the rules for the use of funds intended to improve public security during 2010 are about to expire.

SUBSEMUN is a financial contribution that the federal government earmarks for municipalities and for administrative divisions in the Federal District to improve the performance of their public security forces, to upgrade their professionalization, to purchase equipment (bulletproof vests, patrol cars, among other items) and also to improve their infrastructure.

Reprisals

“This was a strong blow to Juarez,” said the mayor, who felt that this action could be a response to the charge of attempted homicide that the city has filed against the Federal Police agents who fired at the head of the municipal police force, Lieutenant Colonel Julian Leyzaola.

Murguia said that he will review the federal decision and will speak with the officials responsible for it in order to determine the causes behind the decision. “I will tell them right now that I find it very surprising that this decision was made at this time, after the accusation made by Lt Col Leyzaola,” he said.

On 26 July 2011, the mayor reported that the Federal Police would cease handling public security work in the city and that the majority of the Federal Police agents would be leaving the city.

The Secretariat of Public Security confirmed the departure of the PF agents and added that their withdrawal would be gradual, that it would culminate in September, and that after that month their levels in Ciudad Juarez would be similar to those that the Federal Police maintain elsewhere in Mexico.

Delay

The SESNSP, which is attached to the Interior Secretariat, added that from 2008 to 2010 Ciudad Juarez had reported the training of only 145 members of its police force using SUBSEMUN funds; that is only 6 percent progress in the professional upgrading of its security personnel.

In fact, during that period, the city reported no training at all for its police agents.

In reference to the implementation of the Comprehensive Police Development System (SIDEPOL), established by the General Law of the National Public Security System, Juarez has made no progress in its police career service, in its professionalization system, or its disciplinary methods.


According to the federal government, the city has also not complied with its legal obligation to bring its regulations into compliance with the Constitution and with the General Law of the National Public Security System.

The incident that took place on 25 Jul 2011 involving the Federal Police and Leyzaola is not the first of that nature. On 25 January 2011, Federal Police agents shot two of Mayor Hector Murguia’s guards. The Federal Police argued that the guards were in plain clothes, carrying rifles, and without any visible identification indicating that they were security personnel.

Good ideas are not exclusively found in the English language or even the American military experience. FMSO analysts are foreign area specialists with the language skills, military backgrounds, and the regional experience that enables them to mine foreign sources for insights that uniquely enhance our forces’ understanding of the operational environment. *Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems* uses Russian, Pakistani, Indian, Argentine, Afghan, and Uzbek sources.

The United States Army has been involved in a mountain war for a decade. After all this time, mountain combat remains a stubbornly difficult mission and technology can offer only modest support to the infantry’s mission of closing with the enemy or the logistician’s mission of getting support forward. Training, equipment, weapons, tactics, and logistics all require significant adjustment for mountain combat. This book covers operations and tactics, artillery, and aviation support, reconnaissance, communications, training, and logistics. It demonstrates that the key to enhancing effectiveness is using the terrain effectively, preparing the soldiers properly, and understanding the environment.

This book is not United States Army doctrine. Rather, it is offered as an alternate view that could help our forces successfully adapt to a most-challenging environment and carry out their mission.



– Lester W. Grau
les.grau@us.army.mil

– Charles K. Bartles
charles.bartles@us.army.mil

Russia and China Deepen Military Cooperation

8 August 2011



Source: Rossiya i Kitai prodolzhat praktiku provedeniya sovmestnyh uchenii po bor'be s terrorizmom - Minoborony RF (Russia and China will continue to hold joint exercises to combat terrorism – Russian Defence Ministry),” ITAR-TASS Sibiri (itartass-sib.ru), 8 August 2011

Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, Chen Bingde. Photo by Presidencia de la Republica del Ecuador [CC-BY-NC-SA 2.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/>)], via www.flickr.com

Russia and China Hold Joint Exercises to Combat Terrorism

Russia and China will continue to hold joint military exercises “in bilateral format as well as within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” This is reported by Itar-Tass in the Office of Press and Information of the Russian Defense Ministry after the talk held in Moscow on August 4 between Nikolai Makarov, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, and Chen Bingde, chief of the People's Liberation Army's General Staff.

“We will keep conducting dialogues between the chiefs of the General Staff of Russian Armed Forces and the People's Liberation Army of China. The next round of dialogue will be held in Beijing in 2011,” noted the Office. During the talk the two sides agreed to continue the exchanges of military delegations at various levels between the Armed Forces of the two countries. “At the same time we will keep strategic coordination so as to better deal with new challenges and threats on both regional and global scale,” the Office informed.

During the meeting with Chen Bingde on August 4, Nikolai Makarov confirmed that one achievement of these negotiations is that the two sides will sign a memorandum of intention to hold joint naval exercises. “It's very positive that our meetings are becoming a regular event,” emphasized the head of the Russian General Staff, “We have an opportunity to discuss both regional and international issues.”

“We treat China as a great power,” said Makarov. “It is very important that our relations develop in confidence, in the spirit of strategic partnership, and many issues are resolved productively in our framework,” he added.

This assessment is supported by Chen Bingde. According to him, “these meetings are important, because they provided progressive impetus for the two countries and contribute to global stability.” Chen also expressed his hope that the “relationship of trust between Russia and China will ensure regional security.”

FMSO Commentary: August 8th, China's Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army Chen Bingde concluded his five-day official visit to Russia, during which he met with Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov and chief of the Russian General Staff Nikolai Makarov. He visited several Russian units, including the 5th Guards Independent Motorized Infantry Brigade of Russia's West Command, as well as the Kuznetsov aircraft carrier and the Akula-class K-317 Pantera nuclear attack submarine in the northern Russian city of Murmansk.

Upon conclusion of the visit, Russia and China issued a joint statement on bilateral military ties, in which the two sides agreed to expand military exchanges, continue to hold joint anti-terror drills, and further develop the top-level strategic consultation mechanism. The two countries expressed confidence in their cooperative bilateral military relations and expectation for further progress in their strategic partnership. Both sides emphasized that a military relationship of mutual trust is conducive to regional and global peace and stability. In particular, Nikolai Makarov said that Russian military officials expect to hold joint naval exercises with the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

Interestingly, two days after Chen's visit, China's first aircraft carrier, originally built in the Soviet Union, set out on its first sea trial. The ship, formerly named Varyag, is an Admiral Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier. According to a Chinese researcher, it suggests that China is able to make new contributions to maintaining global maritime safety and peace. End FMSO Commentary (Du)

FMSO Commentary: The recent shooting outside Aktobe, Kazakhstan, might be viewed by some as more proof that the country is dealing with an Islamic militant threat; two suicide bombings took place in Aktobe and Astana in May of this year. The bombers and shooters had reported links with Islamic extremist groups. While this link is possible, a likely reason for recent violence is the growing disillusionment and poverty among part of the population. Kazakhstan continues to develop economically, but, while this has meant better opportunities and quality of life, only a segment of the population has benefited from it. There has also been a strike by oil workers in the city of Aktau in western Kazakhstan since May.

The article attached is a journalist's account of traveling to the region after the shooting. One of the details of her report might be one of the most important: Kazakhs are not fervent followers of Islam. They practice Islam in ways that combine Sufism, Islam mixed with mysticism, and their own cultural traditions. Outside Islamic influence gained ground in Kazakhstan since its independence, but did not push out local beliefs and values. Extremist views may have contributed to these young men taking violent action, but the underlying issues that keep them out of employment opportunities continue to push them into crime. End FMSO Commentary (Stein)

Kazakhstan Shooting

6 July 2011

Source: Akmaral Maikozova, "The bloody night in Shubarshy," Vremya, 6 July 2011



Map based on GADM data [CC-BY-NC-SA 3.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/>)], via gadm.org

Bloody Night in Shubarshy

Aktobe Region is living in a state of alarm. On the night of 1 July, bloody events took place in the village of Shubarshy in Temir District. As a result, two police officers and a commando were killed. Commandos from Almaty have been brought by air to Shubarshy. The village is now reminiscent of a military training ground. Helicopters, special military equipment and tents are everywhere. It is hard to get into the village. Commandos with sniper rifles thoroughly check every vehicle. I went through nine checks on the way from Aktobe.

There is hushed silence in the village. According to old-timers, even the difficult 1990s did not see this kind of a shoot-out. They said that local young people who faithfully go to mosque on Fridays suddenly attacked law enforcers. Two police patrol officers, 30-year-old Nurlan Alpysbay and 39-year-old Aydos Boranbay, were hit by bullets. When the shoot-out began, police officers were at work. Armed villagers opened fire on the police station. The men were killed with particular cruelty. "We know them well. They were fine men," a pensioner, Damesh, said. "They often visited houses, asking whether there were any complaints..." That night did not end with two victims only. A commando from "Arlan", Ruslan Zholdybayev, was killed as well. Shubarshy is a little village with a population of some 4,000.

I met 10 believers at the Ak-Meshit mosque in the very centre of Shubarshy. A half-hour conversation with mosque-goers showed that they could not even write their own names in Arabic. "We need an imam from Egypt. Locals do not know what the truth is. We need a person who would open Islam to us without any introduced novelties!" the believers demanded. At the same time, those mosque-goers did not say what they thought about the bloody events. They only kept saying: "We will stay at the mosque and will not go anywhere."

Meanwhile, the police have extended the geography of the search for suspects. The search for six suspects has already gone beyond the region and being conducted in the entire western region.

Meetings are being held with local people almost every day in the village. The village government has called for calm. The Interior Department's press service is holding briefings almost every day. The special operation under the leadership of the head of the Aktobe Regional police department, Maj-Gen Patris Nokin, continues.

Peacekeeping Training in Kazakhstan

11 August 2011



Source: Mira Mustafina, "Steppe Eagle" *Liter*, 11 August 2011 http://www.liter.kz/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=6963&Itemid=2

A Kazakh soldier shows a Soldier from 1st Battalion 157th Infantry Regiment, Colorado National Guard of Fort Carson, Colo., how to use the front and rear sites on the AK-47 assault rifle during a combined familiarization range as part of exercise Steppe Eagle at Camp Illisky, Kazakhstan, Aug. 9, 2011. Photo by Staff Sgt. Mylinda DuRousseau U.S. Army via <http://co.ng.mil>

Steppe Eagle 2011

On the "Iliyskiy" range, in conditions as close as possible to combat, the tactical peacekeeping exercise "Steppe Eagle 2011" recently opened and will run for three weeks. At the exercise is a unit of the Kazakhstan Peacekeeping Battalion, the only one of its kind in Central Asia, and the armed forces of the Great Britain and the U.S., as well as peacekeepers from Latvia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, totaling 1,400 troops. The purpose of the exercises, which are being held for the ninth time, is to check the interoperability of the Kazakhstan Peacekeeping Battalion (KAZBAT) and NATO for peacekeeping operations. The culmination of the exercise will turn into an active phase, during which peacekeepers conduct an operation in compliance with all international regulations.

The value of the Steppe Eagle exercise is that a true partnership is formed in the field, mastering modern weapons systems and technology and the exchange of experience, said the first deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Major-General Mukan Dyusekeev. We can remember that the KAZBAT contingent adequately fulfilled its tasks as a peacekeeping mission in Iraq. Our troops destroyed more than 4.5 million rounds of ammunition, trained around 500 members of Iraqi security forces, and Kazakh doctors have helped more than five thousand Iraqi citizens.

Not surprisingly, a lot of attention from the Kazakh media, as well as from foreign governments, was paid to this exercise. It is not only the magnitude of the exercise; it is the fact that Steppe Eagle 2011 is to check the so called "new image" of Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This exercise has all the dimensions to prove that the "new image" is a qualitative step in the development of Kazakhstan's Armed Forces.

FMSO Commentary: The 2011 Steppe Eagle exercise is not a momentous event; the exercise has been conducted annually since 2003, with support largely coming from the U.K., the U.S., NATO, and even Turkey. However, this exercise comes not long after the senate in Kazakhstan rejected the president's decision to deploy four peacekeepers to Kabul, Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) effort. The deployment could still happen, but domestic support for it appears to be nonexistent.

The following article from the government-backed newspaper Liter highlights the cooperation, development, and interoperability of Kazakhstan's peacekeeping battalion (KAZBAT) with NATO. KAZBAT has made strides in development, the Iraq deployment certainly one of them, but there are some lesser publicized beliefs that its growth and interoperability are being rushed. Regardless, the government of Kazakhstan is most likely promoting this exercise in an effort to display that it will continue to cooperate with NATO, but how far the relationship goes is yet to be determined. End FMSO Commentary (Stein)

FMSO Commentary: This article shows that the Central Asian “Base Race” speculation continues; that the U.S. and Russia, and to some extent China, India, and Pakistan, are maneuvering for access to Central Asian military bases. This journalist makes an interesting deduction – that because the U.S. uses former Soviet bases in Afghanistan the same thing could happen in Tajikistan – and his viewpoint should not be immediately dismissed.

It is true that the U.S. and other countries are involved with military and security cooperation projects in Tajikistan. From a U.S. standpoint this assistance is not contentious; it develops infrastructure and capabilities for Tajikistan to combat drug trafficking and militants. However, some in Tajikistan are suspicious of the U.S., but not in the most obvious ways. Tajikistan is not ungrateful for the assistance provided, but cautious of what it means for long-term security interests. The country is balancing involvement in several non-U.S.- or non-NATO-led military and security organizations, and, most importantly, is looking to what will happen in Afghanistan over the next few years. How the latter issue plays out, particularly if it does not include Tajikistan in the planning process, could be the biggest contributor to these suspicions. End FMSO Commentary (Stein)

New Tajik Base?



Sgt. 1st Class Krause shows Tajik soldiers how to use hand and arm signals during an exercise in Tajikistan. Photo by Staff Sgt. Licea U.S. Army

8 July 2011

Source: Humayro Bakhtiyor, “The American training center: cooperation or balance?” Ozodagon, 8 July 2011 <http://ozodagon.com/khabarho/tojikiston/1220-2011-07-07-07-33-15.html>

The American Training Center: Cooperation or Balance?

It is not ruled out that a base might be set up in Tajikistan under the pretext of building a training centre and that America’s influence in Tajikistan might increase. Kenneth Gross, the US ambassador to Tajikistan, and Rajabali Rahmonali, a commander of the National Guard, laid a foundation stone for a training centre in Qaratogh. The Tajik general, who was speaking to journalists, said that the total square of the training centre was 200 ha and added that there were plans to construct a labyrinth, a firing range, barracks, kitchen and a medical ward. A total of 300 representatives of Tajikistan’s law-enforcement bodies could get education at this centre simultaneously. The commander of the National Guard of Tajikistan said that the purpose of building the military training centre was to train professional specialists in combating terrorism, drug trafficking and human trafficking.

Rahmatkarim Davlat, a political analyst describes establishment of such a training center as important. “Tajikistan has inherited a number of training grounds from the Soviet army and the interior troops of the former Soviet Union’s Interior Ministry which do not have conditions for conducting training to respond to modern challenges such as terrorism, human trafficking and drug trafficking. However, it does not mean that by investing in a project the USA is not pursuing its own interests.

Rahmatkarim Davlat does not rule out a theory that a base might be built under the pretext of building a training center or that America’s influence will increase. This is because if the USA sees that a place is empty it will certainly fill this space. All those bases where the Americans are located in Afghanistan - in Baghlan, Shendan and Kandahar - formerly belonged to the Russians. No doubt that the same thing may happen in Tajikistan.

Komyob Jalilov, an analyst on security issues of the Strategic Research Centre says that Tajikistan should be cautious while developing cooperation with foreign countries and should place its national interests above. Of course, the construction of a military training centre is a good means for training Tajik specialists inside the country. Komyob Jalilov says that every military cooperation might have both negative and positive consequences.

It should be said that this training centre will be built in two stages. It is expected that the first stage of the construction of the training centre will be completed by the 20th anniversary of independence using 3.1m dollars, and the second stage will be completed by the end of 2012 using 10m dollars. Kenneth Gross said that it was possible to speed up the construction of this training centre, but Washington wants to build the training centre in line with international standards and with a high quality. Therefore, this training centre will be completed in set deadline.

Officer Career Challenges

20 May 2011

Source: Yuriy Gavrilov, "Exchange of Personnel. Officers Look for New Places to Serve," Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 20 May 2011



Image based on Flag of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation by Flanker [Public Domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Officers Resistant to Mandatory Rotation System

The Armed Forces are preparing for the next officer rotation. It will take place from June through December.

Mandatory cadre personnel replacement, in addition to planned relocation, was introduced in the Army two years ago, when Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov ratified the Instruction on Officer Rotation in the Armed Forces. On basis of that document, thousands of army officers can switch their duty locations within the next six months.

The Ministry of Defense gives three reasons for this arrangement: the need for personnel renewal, concern for officers' career advancement, and the creation of conditions to facilitate such advancement.

However, the official goals of the rotation are supplemented by an objective that is rarely talked about aloud. The Army leadership frequently sees the voluntarily-compulsory relocation of colonels and generals as the only means of "smoking bronzed military officials out of warm armchairs." It applies in the first place to Moscow General Staff officers, their colleagues from St Petersburg and other major Russian population centers. It is not a secret that only in both capitals you can meet hundreds of senior and higher officers, whose journey from cadet shoulder straps to general's stripes had never crossed with remote garrisons.

Recently, Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Makarov used a specific example to explain to Armed Forces veterans how difficult it can sometimes be to deal with such subordinates.

FMSO Commentary: As part of the overall effort to reform their military, Russian leaders want to develop a more effective officer career system. In the past, officer career growth was often a function of good fortune, personal connections, bribery, or favoritism. Without the right pull, worthy officers could languish in positions for years. Moreover, there was no mechanism to ensure a proper balance between staff work and actually working with soldiers. Indeed, as the excerpted article points out, a Russian officer could become a general without ever having commanded a unit. Besides the imbalance in the officer-soldier ratio, this overemphasis upon staff-type work led to a bloated central bureaucracy. Some of these desk officers have proven to be a major obstacle in making the military more combat-ready.

The reluctance of officers to serve in line units has been tied to larger problems, such as the lack of housing and adequate infrastructure outside of cities (where many of the combat units are located). The difference in the quality of life between major Russian cities and remote service locations can be dramatic, and particularly poignant when taking the officer's family into account. For an officer to command a unit in distant Siberia is a challenge, but becomes more pressing when considering the dearth of decent housing, employment opportunities for spouses, and schools/healthcare for children.

As part of reforming their military, Russian leaders understand that rotating officers from staff assignments to command positions can help with career stagnation and officer development. However, as in other areas of reform (i.e., development of an NCO corps, restructuring the weapon procurement process), policies are being adopted before the necessary infrastructure changes have been established. As the article suggests, this plan may help to reduce bloated staffs, but whether it will create more dedicated officers remains to be seen. End FMSO Commentary (Finch)

Officer Career Challenges

“In the Moscow Military District, lieutenants would serve until they attained the rank of major general. When they were offered the Siberian Military District, 80% of the officers in one General Staff directorates immediately submitted their resignations,” Makarov recalled.

Of course, no one was going to hold onto “refusniks” in the Army as they would have done in former times. However, officials in the capital who are eligible for retirement and who have accumulated apartments, dachas, and valuable contacts obviously do not fear parting with the Army. Things are different for company officers, especially junior officers with the rank of captain and below. They still have a long way to go and are therefore alarmed about the impending rotation.

The point is that, as a rule, the relocation is within the boundaries of the same district. For example, an officer who has spent over three years (that is the term that the Ministry of Defense considers the minimum for relocation) in the God-forsaken Borzya garrison beyond Baykal is offered a move to another “dump” named Kyakhta. Moreover, there are no guarantees that the officer will receive an identical position at the new location, because the instruction allows for rotation with demotion.

The picture differs somewhat as far as unit chiefs are concerned. Officers with the rank of brigade deputy commander and higher are generally rotated to other military districts or sent to central staffs or main commands. However, refusal to move results in parting with shoulder-boards for senior lieutenants and generals alike in most cases.

Nevertheless, this is not a current threat for hundreds of senior and junior commanders. The new military districts were forming in Russia throughout last year, and this process was accompanied by a mass rearrangement of command personnel. There is no need to rotate them again.


As far as officials of the Ministry of Defense, main commands, and main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense are concerned, it appears that some of them will have to part with the capital temporarily or else resign. However, here too the situation is not always the same. For example, where would you transfer a Moscow general who was the head of a center or main command that has no analogues in the Armed Forces? It seems that rotation practice will use an individual approach in cases like these.

What General Petraeus is reading

The Boston Globe’s H.D.S. Greenway finally tells us, after a whole lot of throat clearing, what the U.S. commander in Afghanistan is reading these days:

“Thomas Barfield’s *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*; **Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau’s *The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War***; Greg Mortenson’s *Three Cups of Tea*; and Sir Winston Churchill’s *The Story of The Malakand Field Force*, about frontier fighting in the late 19th century. In Churchill’s time there was a similar tremendous debate about Britain’s “Forward Policy,” whether to really go in and build up civil institutions, pacifying the Pashtuns, or whether to maintain a lesser footprint, punishing the frontier tribes when necessary; the 19th century equivalent of drone attacks and special-ops, nicknamed “butcher and bolt.”

Thomas E. Ricks, *Foreign Policy*
www.ricks.foreignpolicy.com



– Lester W. Grau
les.grau@us.army.mil

Genuine Russian-Chechen Reconciliation?

13 July 2011

Source: Anna Potekhina, "Ramzan Kadyrov: 'I Am Only a Servant of the People,'" Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 13 Jul 2011

Ramzan Kadyrov: 'I Am Only a Servant of the People'

On 5 March 2011 the Chechen Republic Parliament endowed Ramzan Kadyrov with the powers of Chechen Republic leader for a second term on the recommendation of the Russian Federation president. Kadyrov has been the region's leader since 2007. His term of office expires in March 2016. Today Ramzan Kadyrov is Krasnaya Zvezda's interlocutor.

Calling card

Ramzan Kadyrov was born on 5 October 1976 in the village of Tsentoroy in the Shalinskiy (now Kurchalovskiy) District of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

From 1996 he was an assistant and chief bodyguard to the Chechen Republic mufti. From June 2000 through May 2002 he was a communications and specialist equipment inspector with the headquarters of a separate militia company attached to the Russian Federation MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Affairs Administration. From May 2002 through February 2004 he was a platoon commander with a separate militia company attached to the Chechen Republic MVD that was responsible for the protection of Chechen Republic state authorities' facilities and buildings. From 2003 he was chief of the Presidential Security Service. From 2004 he was an assistant to the Chechen Republic minister of internal affairs and Chechen Republic State Council member from Gudermesskiy District. The same year he graduated from the Makhachkala Business and Law Institute. From 10 May 2004 he was first deputy chairman of the Chechen Republic Government. On 19 October 2004 he was appointed an adviser to the Russian Federation president's plenipotentiary representative for the Southern Federal District.

From 18 November 2005 through 4 March 2006 he was acting chairman of the Chechen Republic Government. From March 2006 he was chairman of the Chechen Republic Government. On 2 March 2007 the Chechen Republic Parliament endowed him with the powers of Chechen Republic leader on the recommendation of the Russian Federation president. He is a member of the United Russia political party's Higher Council. He is a Hero of Russia. He has been awarded the Order of Valor and the medal "For Service in the Caucasus."

[Potekhina] In 2010 the conscription of Chechen Republic citizens for draft service was organized in the Chechen Republic for the first time in 20 years. Where are they serving, and in what capacity?

[Kadyrov] You said that this was the first draft in 20 years. Readers might think that inhabitants of Chechnya did not serve the Fatherland for all of these 20 years. Of course that is not so. Hundreds and thousands of young people have died and received high ranks and decorations. They have served both in MVD subunits and in other departments' structures. Admittedly there was no mass conscription, but not because some people do not wish to serve. There was no quota allocated.

Chechens are today serving in the Russian MVD Internal Troops' North and South battalions. North Battalion Commander Colonel Alibek Delimkhanov has received the title of Hero of Russia for heroism and bravery displayed in combating illegal armed formations.

[Potekhina] What is the attitude of Chechen Republic society toward draft service in the Russian Armed Forces and training in military higher educational establishments?

[Kadyrov] Chechens are fighters and defenders by nature. Correspondingly, this is the root of their attitude toward compulsory military service. Many young people link their lives specifically with a military career in the ranks of the Russian Armed forces. Parents send their children to train in the cadet corps, the Suvorov Academy that operates in the republic. Unfortunately, not all of them are successful; the competition is too great. So Chechens wish to and will defend Russia against any threat.

FMSO Commentary For the past two decades (some might say two centuries') Kremlin leaders have been wrestling with how best to handle the restless aspirations of the Chechen people. Enjoying different cultural traditions and language, some Chechens have advocated, and have sometimes fought for, a greater degree of autonomy. In response, Russian leaders have employed a mixture of carrots and sticks to gain the allegiance of the Chechen people.

While the threat of force remains on the table, for the past few years the primary Kremlin approach has been to buy the support of a local Chechen, who, in return, has pledged nominal loyalty to the Russian government. Some years ago, then President Putin, referred to this as the "Chechenization" of resolving their differences. The current Chechen ruler, Ramzan Kadyrov, has effectively been leading the region since his father's assassination in 2004. In the process Ramzan has created a variety of security forces that, even though they might wear a Russian uniform, swear loyalty first to this Chechen leader.

Recently, Russia's main military newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda, interviewed Kadyrov (see excerpt below). The publication of this interview is remarkable for both its medium and its message. That the Russian Ministry of Defense would publish such a fabricated portrayal of this individual and the situation in this region speaks volumes about media freedom in Russia today. While Krasnaya Zvezda has always worked to support the Kremlin political control, it has also been reflective of Russia's senior military leadership. This may no longer be the case.

The substance of this interview is even more curious. It attempts to portray that Chechen forces are subservient to the Russian Ministry of Defense, and that Kadyrov is similar to any other regional governor/leader. This is false. Draft-age Chechen men serve only in units loyal to their leader and are not stationed outside of the republic. It also attempts to portray a civil harmony (i.e. "Cossacks are an integral part of our society") and a security situation that does not correspond to the picture painted by the few independent journalists familiar with this region.

All conflicts ultimately end. That today's Chechen leadership would honor the sacrifices made by Russian soldiers who died fighting Chechen terrorists' boggles the imagination, yet might be a genuine step toward reconciliation. The same logic could apply to this interview. Suggesting that normalcy has returned to Russian-Chechen relations may be a prerequisite to a lasting peace. End FMSO Commentary (Finch)

Genuine Russian-Chechen Reconciliation?

[Potekhina] Of the 6,800 young people placed on the military register in 2010 in the Chechen Republic only 10 were deemed unfit for military service and 40 partially fit. This indicator is much better than in the Russian Federation as a whole. To what do you attribute this?

[Kadyrov] I consider that the main reason is that alcoholism and drug addiction are not widespread among the republic's young people. You will hardly see a young person drunk on the streets of Grozny. You will not even encounter a person holding a cigarette in our part of the world.

However, customs are customs, but the fact that the republic's leadership and public organizations do enormous work on the spiritual and moral education of the rising generation also plays a part here.

I consider that Russia's young people should be the best in the world. They should get involved in sports and achieve good results in training and culture. If young people are interested only in liquor and drugs, there will be nobody to defend our country.

[Potekhina] The concept of "patriotism" is not confined to a readiness to defend your people and the Motherland weapon in hand. A real patriot and citizen needs to play an active part in civilian life. What military-patriotic work is being done in your region?

[Kadyrov] You are right. Patriotism is not only the ability to fight for the Motherland. This can be taught. But a readiness to come to the defense of the Motherland is a life stance. It needs to be inculcated in young people. This is why so many patriotic clubs have appeared in the Chechen Republic in recent years. Kids play a very active part in their work. They are working to restore Grozny and other centers of population. They are not indifferent to the fate of Russia. And, particularly importantly, the overwhelming majority of them have a healthy lifestyle. They do not use drugs or alcohol.

[Potekhina] Do you intend to support the Cossack community in the republic? How do you see its role in maintaining law and order and ensuring citizens' security?

[Kadyrov] We support the Cossack community within the framework of Russian laws and age-old traditions of friendship and neighborliness. But it is the duty of the law-enforcement agencies to maintain law and order and citizens' security. They are coping very well with this in Chechnya. In places with concentrated populations of Cossacks we are building churches, repairing apartment blocks, and installing gas pipes and new roads. Cossacks are an integral part of our society. There has not been a single instance of conflict between Cossacks and Chechens on ethnic grounds in the republic.

[Potekhina] The second Chechen campaign officially ended on 16 April 2009. From 13 October 2009 control over the operational situation was transferred to the republic authorities. How do you assess the security situation in the republic today?

The war in our republic ended much earlier, but the counterterrorist operation was called off on 16 April 2009. We celebrate this day as a public holiday. Because it was precisely from the moment that the counterterrorist operation was called off that we were able to give Grozny Airport international status and open customs offices. All this is contributing to the republic's economic development and to attracting investment. Today the Chechen Republic is one of the safest regions of Russia. This is noted not only by the republic's inhabitants but also by numerous visitors from other parts of the country and abroad. We recently opened a new stadium -- named for Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov. On that day world soccer stars and well-known singers came to visit us. I think that says a lot.

[Potekhina] How is interaction with the Russian MVD Internal Troops organized?

[Kadyrov] The Chechen Republic leadership devotes special attention to service personnel's needs. Literally a few months ago a new military cantonment for the Internal Troops' South Battalion was opened in Vedeno. Comfortable conditions for service and life have been created there. Last year saw the commissioning of a cantonment and residential housing for the North Battalion.

[Potekhina] Personnel of the Russian FSB [Federal Security Service] Border Directorate for the Chechen Republic are today serving on one of the most responsible stretches of the Russian state border with Georgia. What kind of assistance is provided to these security structures?

[Kadyrov] The republic's leadership provides the border guards with all possible assistance in creating normal conditions for service personnel's life and service. And warm and friendly relations have long since become established between local residents and the border guards. There is one thing that I can say with confidence: Russia's southern borders are reliably protected.

[Potekhina] In 2000, 84 Pskov paratroopers died during an operation in the Chechnya mountains. How is their memory preserved, and do you meet with the parents of those who died?

[Kadyrov] On the eve of Defender of the Fatherland Day in 2008 there was a ceremonial opening of a Grozny street named to perpetuate the dead paratroopers' exploit. We are grateful to the parents, who raised true sons of Russia! I have also had meetings with the parents of the paratroopers who died.

[Potekhina] It is clear is that a settlement of the situation in the North Caucasus as a whole requires the adoption of a set of additional measures that are not only of a military and preventive nature but are also aimed at encouraging economic activity. What do you see as the priority areas for the republic's development?

[Kadyrov] Today security issues are not a pressing matter for the Chechen Republic. The priority task for us is to create a strong economy and solve the unemployment problem. First and foremost we have created favorable conditions for the development of small and medium businesses and peasant and livestock farms. Today the republic is already in a position to fully provide itself with locally produced meat products.

[Potekhina] When she visited Chechnya, a certain well-known Russian writer wrote: "Kadyrov is an effective remedy against the militants." How do you personally see your mission in stabilizing the situation in the republic?

[Kadyrov] I am only a servant of people. Russia's leadership and the republic's parliament entrusted me with this post in order to solve our residents' problems. But I would not be able to cope with all the tasks on my own. A very great deal is being done by the team of Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov, the first president of the Chechen Republic. This relates to all areas of life. We can now see the results of his team's work. Grozny, which was virtually completely destroyed, has been restored, and other towns and villages in the republic have been rebuilt. Today people associate the Chechen republic with the achievements of our sportsmen, figures active in culture and art, and academics. And glory be to Allah that the times when Chechnya was only mentioned in military communiqués are a thing of the past!

FMSO Commentary: Just as the Summer 2008 Olympics were about to begin, major hostilities erupted between Georgian and Russian forces in South Ossetia. The conflict soon spread to the other Georgian semi-autonomous region of Abkhazia. As an analyst who monitors media, I was amazed at how this conflict was portrayed within Russian news sources compared to the story told in the US. The Russian media was nearly unanimous in condemning what they termed as the 'genocidal' actions of the Georgian leadership, while praising the prompt and victorious Russian military response to this aggression. Most Americans heard a different story, where US news sources relied on the Cold War trope of the belligerent Russian bear re-establishing its empire.

One might presume that, after three years, an agreed upon consensus as to what actually happened might have been reached. Hardly. The different story lines have hardened into opposing myths, with each side now operating under certain categorical assumptions. For the Russians, the 'truth' of the August 2008 war revolves around the Georgian President's treacherous decision to use force to crush separatists in South Ossetia. In the process, Georgian military forces killed a number of Russian peacekeepers and innocent civilians (many holding Russian passports).

The backdrop to the Russian version is built both upon their long history of fighting in this region, and, more importantly, the events of the past twenty years. Since the end of the Cold War, some Russians maintain that the West has taken advantage of their internal weakness to further its own geopolitical advantage. For instance, they would point to the enlargement of NATO or the recognition of Kosovar independence as 'proof' that the West was meddling in Russia's traditional sphere of influence. Plans to include Georgia in the NATO alliance were interpreted as a menace to Russia's national security. According to this account, the Russian military not only defeated Georgian forces, but also those of NATO/US, who were threatening Russia's interests.

It should come as no surprise then that Russian authorities would express indignation at US attempts to alter the Kremlin's version of the August 2008 story. As the brief, excerpted article makes clear, Russian leaders have grown increasingly deaf to what they perceive as Washington's view of the truth. Approximately 5,000 Russian soldiers and associated equipment have been stationed in the quasi-independent countries of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Pragmatic believers in realpolitik and that 'might makes right,' this new breed of Russian leaders believe that possession is nine-tenths of the law. End FMSO Commentary (Finch)

A Worn-out Washington Record

1 August 2011

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 1 Aug 2011 <http://www.mid.ru>

Russia Slams US Congress Resolution on Georgia

Text of "Answer by Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman A.K. Lukashevich to a media question about the resolution of the Senate of the US Congress on Georgia" published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website on 1 August

Question: Will you please comment on the adoption by the US Senate of the resolution that describes Abkhazia and South Ossetia as "Georgian regions occupied by Russia"?

Answer: The new resolution on Georgia passed by the Senate on 29 July leaves the impression of a worn-out record. It contains the full range of clichés and stock phrases about the alleged "violation of Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty" which have been coming out of Washington for the past three years. The subject of the so-called "occupation" is of course not passed over either. We have already had to explain on many occasions how absurd the use of this term is in this context.

There is not a single Russian serviceman on Georgian territory. There are Russian military contingents in the region, but they are deployed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the states recognized as sovereign by Russia following [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili's criminal military adventure in August 2008. Moreover, subunits of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation are deployed there on the basis of relevant interstate treaties between the Russian Federation and these independent countries, that is, with their explicit consent.

Generally speaking, from the point of view of international law, the decisive factor for establishing the existence of an occupation regime is one state's effective control over the territory of another state and the civilian population living in it, that is, the actual replacement of the local authorities with occupation authorities. And yet Russian military formations have never supplanted the lawful authorities either in Abkhazia or in South Ossetia. Neither the Russian authorities nor the Russian military formations have ever issued any regulatory acts mandatory for the local population.

Statements to the effect that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are allegedly occupied by the Russian Federation therefore have no basis in fact or law. As for the US senators' statements to this effect, they demonstrate either poor knowledge of international law, or a complete disregard for real facts. All this clearly shows that this resolution is no more than a PR exercise carried out in order to "leave their mark" on the subject of Georgia.

Such statements, however, are by no means harmless. They feed the revanchist sentiment present in Tbilisi's policies, they condone and encourage the Georgian side's unwillingness to talk to Sukhum [Sukhumi] and Tskhinval [Tskhinvali] with mutual respect and on an equal footing. And yet it is precisely the establishment of this dialogue that is the key to peace, stability and prosperity in the region. US senators, among others, would do well to remember this.