



# Bannu, Pakistan Prison Attack (15 April 2012)



Bannu Prison after Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attack 15 April 2012<sup>1</sup>

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# Purpose

- ☐ To inform deploying units, trainers, and scenario writers of the 15 April 2012 Taliban attack on the Bannu Prison in Bannu, Pakistan
- ☐ To describe the terrain and environment in which the attack occurred
- ☐ To identify the particular details and motivation behind the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Student Movement of Pakistan), commonly referred to as the TTP, attack on the Bannu Prison

***Product Caveat:*** *This presentation has been developed from multiple unclassified sources and is primarily intended for use as a training product for the Department of Army. This briefing should not be considered a finished intelligence product, nor used in such a manner.*



# Executive Summary

- ☐ Provides information on Bannu, Pakistan.
- ☐ Describes the prison setup prior to the attack.
- ☐ Provides information on Adnan Rashid, for whose rescue the attack was planned.
- ☐ Describes the timeline for the attack.
- ☐ Describes the immediate consequences of the attack.



# Bannu, Pakistan<sup>2</sup>

## □ Bannu

- Colonial Britain used Bannu as a major base in actions against Afghan border tribes.
- Divisional administrative center and army garrison with a population of over 35,000.
- Important road junction and market town, close to the Afghan border.
- Famous for its weekly Friday market.
- Located in Bannu are the University of Engineering & Technology, two post graduate colleges, an engineering college affiliated with Peshawar University, two degree colleges for girls, and more than 300 primary, middle, high, and higher secondary schools for girls and boys.



- Considered the gateway to North Waziristan, a tribal region along the Afghan border and a stronghold for Taliban insurgents and other militant groups.

Map of Bannu, Pakistan<sup>3</sup>



# Bannu Jail Setup<sup>5</sup>

- ☐ Surrounded by open fields and borders Pakistan's volatile tribal areas.
- ☐ Ten-minute drive from the Frontier Region.
- ☐ Less than 2 miles from 3 police stations.
- ☐ Surrounded by cement walls topped by barbed wire.
- ☐ Three successive entry gates.
- ☐ The outer gate is called the Phatak gate and is located on the main road.
- ☐ One person is deployed at each of four towers overlooking search areas.
- ☐ At the Phatak gate there are a total of 5 security personnel:
  - 3 x armed guards
  - 1 x to register visitors
  - 1 x to frisk visitors
- ☐ While not stated in sources, it is assumed there is security at the second gate as well.
- ☐ At the last gate there is one policeman with a baton.
- ☐ Full manning is 151 persons.
- ☐ Prisoners, to include Adnan Rashid, had use of cell phones and social media such as Facebook.
- ☐ On the day of the attack:
  - 119 police on duty
  - 21 police performing their duties
  - 8 police lent to Dera Ismail Khan Jail; 4 lent to Karak Jail, 10 on leave, and 6 AWOL
  - Limited available weapons, possibly as few as 5 AK-47s





# OEA Team Threat Report



View is from the ground looking up.



Bannu Prison Gate after Attack<sup>4</sup>

View is from the ground looking into the prison.

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# Adnan Rashid – Purpose of Attack<sup>6</sup>

- ❑ Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the Bannu Prison attack.
- ❑ The primary purpose for the TTP attack on the Bannu Prison was to free Adnan Rashid.
- ❑ Rashid served in the Pakistan Air Force.
- ❑ Rashid is the convicted master-mind of a failed attempt to assassinate then Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf in 2003 in Rawalpindi.
- ❑ Arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for his role in the assassination attempt.
- ❑ Moved to Bannu Prison from Adiala Jail in Rawalpindi in 2011.
- ❑ Rashid had served eight years and four months in prison.
- ❑ Rashid actively communicated with journalists and others through cell phone, Facebook, and blogs.
- ❑ As many as 20 other dangerous and militant prisoners were consolidated at the Bannu Prison.

**Analyst Assessment:** For a more detailed treatment of the TTP, see TRISA Threat Report “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,” (March 2012); See also, TRISA Threat Report “Taliban Attacks in Kandahar,” (June 2011) for similar attacks in Afghanistan.



# Bannu Prison Attack Timeline<sup>7</sup>

- ❑ The TTP arrived unopposed at the front gate in pickup trucks between 1:30-2:30 a.m. on 15 April 2012.
- ❑ TTP attacked the front gate using small arms fire, hand-tossed grenades, and rocket propelled grenades (RPG).
- ❑ Due to smaller numbers and lack of weapons, prison guards offered little resistance.
- ❑ TTP moved to the death row area of the prison and freed Adnan Rashid.
- ❑ TTP used hand-held radios to coordinate movement through the prison.
- ❑ Locks were broken with hammers or shot off.
- ❑ Requested support was too slow to have any effect.
- ❑ Some prison guards donned prisoner uniforms and “escaped” with prisoners.
- ❑ Prison records were burned.
- ❑ Additional 384 prisoners freed.
- ❑ The disciplined operation lasted less than two hours with 3 officers wounded.
- ❑ Some reports claimed that prisoners were forced to flee at gunpoint.
- ❑ 103 prisoners returned voluntarily – most citing lack of food and water in the surrounding mountains or their relatively short remaining sentences as reason for their return.
- ❑ Raids conducted in Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Karak, and elsewhere to recapture prisoners; more than 24 were captured in the days following the attack.





# Immediate Consequences<sup>8</sup>

- ❑ Peshawar High Court chief justice ordered a judicial inquiry into the incident.
- ❑ Justice Dost Mohammed Khan constituted a two-member committee to investigate.
- ❑ A special five-member committee was set up by Chief Minister Amir Haider Khan Hoti, Chief Minister of Kyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK).
- ❑ Officials immediately removed from their posts in the aftermath:
  - Commissioner Bannu, Abdullah Khan Mehsud
  - Inspector General of Prisons, Arshad Majeed Mohmand
  - Deputy Inspector General Police Range Bannu, Mohammad Iftikhar Khan
  - Deputy Superintendent Bannu Jail, Mohammad Zahid
- ❑ Ayub Khan, 70, an escaped prisoner on death row, was found dead at Peng in Frontier Region from hunger and thirst.
- ❑ Zahir Sha, a 25-year-old prisoner who returned voluntarily, stated that another two runaway prisoners died in the mountains from lack of food and water.
- ❑ Exposed Pakistan's inability to deal effectively with internal terrorism in contradiction to recent government pronouncements of success against anti-government militants.
- ❑ Decreased local confidence in the government's ability to provide local security.



# Analyst Summary

- 1. Adnan Rashid's (and possibly others') use of cell phones and social media compromised security and allowed the Taliban to obtain intelligence information to plan and execute the attack.**
- 2. Lack of adequate manning and weapons ensured a successful attack.**
- 3. Consolidating dangerous and militant prisoners at the Bannu Prison, so close to the uncontrolled Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), provided the Taliban a rich target with quick attack and egress routes.**
- 4. Being so close to the FATA area, it is reasonable to assume that local security forces have relationships with the TTP that compromised the security of the Bannu Prison.**
- 5. The poor response of the neighboring prisons and other security forces points to either an inadequate coordination plan or collusion between security forces and the TTP; it was likely a combination of both.**
- 6. Attacks of this nature have been rare in Pakistan; however, due to impending reduction in NATO forces in Afghanistan and growing international war fatigue, the TTP will become bolder and more aggressive in future attacks on the Pakistan government and its security forces.**



# Training Implications

- ☐ The Bannu Prison attack is a realistic scenario faced by many small advisory teams assigned to train and advise military and police forces in remote areas.
- ☐ Scenarios can be built around ensuring proper vigilance by small remote training and advisory teams related to adequate security manning, vetting of security forces, development and enforcement of SOPs, support coordination, and intelligence gathering and analysis.
- ☐ Scenarios can also be built around determining local support for insurgent groups and activities that might lead to an attack similar to the Bannu Prison attack.



# OEA Team Threat Report

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❑ AKO <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/portal/index.jsp>

## Threat Products: AKO“Easy-Link”

Contemporary Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate

The screenshot shows the AKO Army Knowledge Online portal. On the left, there is a login section with fields for Username and Password, and a 'Login' button circled in red. Below this is a 'CAC Login to AKO/DKO' section. The main content area shows a 'Home' page with a search bar and a 'Favorites' list. A red box highlights the 'Files' tab in the Favorites list, and a red arrow points to the 'TRISA-CTID' folder. A red circle highlights the 'TRISA-CTID' folder in the Favorites list. A red circle highlights the 'TRISA-CTID' folder in the Favorites list. A red circle highlights the 'TRISA-CTID' folder in the Favorites list.

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