

SEP
2012

Syrian Social Media



[TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity](#)
[\(TRISA\)](#)

Complex Operational Environment and
Threat Integration Directorate (CTID)





OEA Team Threat Report



Purpose

- To inform the Army training community about the ways in which social media is being used in the current Syrian conflict.
- To identify the players using social media to further their respective causes.
- To identify the implications of social media use in the Syrian conflict.

Executive Summary

- Social media is a powerful, yet difficult to control, element across most potential operational environments (OE).
- Both sides of the Syrian conflict are using social media to further their own particular cause.
- The same videos are being used by both sides to define the same incident in their favor.
- The Syrian government has used phishing and other techniques to identify protesters and other opposition participants.
- The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) is a loosely aligned group of young hackers using their hacking skills in support of the Assad regime.
- Social media has made the information environment much noisier and more confusing.
- Crowd mapping has the potential to create a more accurate picture of events happening on the ground.
- A critical weakness of social media lies in the inability, often, to verify the accuracy and credibility of information and videos.

Cover photo: Logo used by the [Syrian Electronic Army \(SEA\)](#). (Screenshot from a YouTube video)



OEA Team Threat Report

Our evidence suggests that social media carried a cascade of messages about freedom and democracy across North Africa and the Middle East, and helped raise expectations for the success of political uprising...

People who shared interest in democracy built extensive social networks and organized political action. Social media became a critical part of the toolkit for greater freedom.¹ Catherine O'Donnell, [New Study Quantifies Use of Social Media in Arab Spring,](#) *University of Washington.*

Map



Introduction

The power of social media to organize, rally, and inform government opposition reached new and unparalleled proportions during the Arab Spring. Most visibly, social media inflamed popular support and massed protests in Egypt's Tahrir Square in 2011, leading to the downfall of the Mubarak regime. In the same year, Iran faced the largest uprisings since the 2009 elections, fueled in large measure by social media. As social media technology becomes more easily accessible and user friendly, it will become a more integral tool for planning, organizing, and inflaming opposition to entrenched governments.

The Syrian conflict is seeing an evolving social media environment with new twists. Opposition forces have been using social media to garner support outside of Syria using YouTube,



OEA Team Threat Report



Facebook, and Twitter. Uploading videos of atrocities carries emotional impact on those far from the chaos. To counter this, a pro-Assad regime group of young computer savvy zealots formed the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) to push a different message. Additionally, the Syrian government has used measures such as false Facebook pages to identify opposition protesters. The battle in Syria now rages on the Internet as well as on the ground.

In addition to instantly publishing videos of what is happening on the ground, some have taken it upon themselves to track events in real time. The Website *Syria Tracker*, for example, relies on eyewitness reports submitted via the Internet to track, document, and map such things as Syrians missing, killed, arrested, etc. Collating data in a database and then plotting it on a map allows for analysis and accountability unavailable even a few years ago.

This Threat Report will describe ways in which social media is impacting the ongoing conflict in Syria. The evolving nature and increasing availability of social media technology will require serious consideration of its impact on future conflicts. Social media will continue to be a curse and a blessing and used by both sides in current and future clashes.

What is Social Media?

Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines social media as:

...forms of electronic communication (as Web sites for social networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (as videos).¹

For the purposes of this Threat Report, we will use this foundational definition as a framework. Specific media discussed will include YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and other means of creating electronic communications. Additionally, we will discuss the impact of hackers whose intent is to disrupt this communication.

Use of Social Media by Syrian Opposition Groups

Syrian opposition groups, from at least the beginning of 2011, have used social media technology to plan, organize, and communicate protests. Even after government attempts to put a media blanket around Syria to prevent communication with the outside world, ingenious Syrians are finding ways to engage with the rest of the world. Utilizing satellite phones and

¹ Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, "[Social Media](#)."



OEA Team Threat Report



other end-runs around government restrictions, the opposition has pushed a steady stream of videos and first-hand accounts to Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, email, and other Internet platforms to audiences inside and outside Syria.

Upon close investigation, it becomes apparent that both civilian protesters and opposition military forces use social media to plan, organize, and communicate. One interesting area of coordination is the naming of the protests conducted after Friday prayers. In the early days of 2011, Facebook was utilized to share with protesters the name universally used by all Syrians. This created an important and unified front across the country. Syrians, however, demanded more participation in the naming of the protests. As a result, administrators of the "[Syrian Revolution 2011](#)" Facebook page began creating a poll at the beginning of each week, to which Syrian protesters responded. Typically, five to eight names were posted to the site at the beginning of the week; voting concluded on Wednesday night and the winning name was posted on a variety of grassroots activist Facebook sites. As an indication of the effectiveness of the process, within five hours of the 19 March 2011 week posting, 15,000 votes were registered.

Despite its best efforts, the Syrian government has failed to completely shut off the opposition's ability to communicate with audiences both inside and outside Syria. Social media is a critical vulnerability for opposition forces, being the primary means of communicating across opposition groups in various parts of Syria and with outside supporters. On 16 March 2012, the Syrian government shut off telecommunications in most of the Syrian provinces in response to protests commemorating the one-year anniversary of the Syrian revolution. As a result, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights' Facebook page and the LebanonNow's live tracker were unable to post comments until 19 March. They were, however, able to post limited links to YouTube videos documenting the protests using satellite phones. One activist group from Maryland estimated that it had delivered more than one hundred satellite phones and laptops to Syria for use in circumventing the government's attempts to shut down opposition communication. On 22 May 2012, the Ministry of Information, realizing the impact of satellite phones, outlawed them.

Syria has been relatively closed to outside scrutiny, but the advent of the "citizen journalist" has created a new dynamic that makes it difficult to keep atrocities secret. Cell phone camera technology allows anyone to document events as they happen and instantly upload pictures and video to publically accessible sites on the Internet. Government attempts to create media blackouts have not been successful. Faced with more scrutiny and visibility from the outside world and fearful of repercussions, the Syrian government may have intentionally limited the number of Syrian citizens it killed. In 1982 the Syrian government massacred at least ten thousand protesters over a three week period and managed to hide it for weeks. Contrast that



OEA Team Threat Report



with the Shabiha massacre of Syrians in a small village outside Aleppo in June 2012. Videos and pictures of the dead were instantly uploaded to YouTube and Facebook and talked about on Twitter. Despite Assad regime attempts to blame the rebels, eyewitness accounts captured in real time made the case that it was most likely pro-Assad Shabiha who had killed the villagers.

Social media has also given Syrian expatriates an opportunity to be a part of the revolution. Suhair Atassi is a long-time and prominent opposition leader and founder of the Jamal Atassi Forum in Syria. When the Syrian government formally outlawed the Jamal Atassi Forum, Suhair Atassi moved the forum to the [Jamal Atassi Forum](#) Facebook page. After a one month detainment in March 2011 for participating in protests, Atassi helped put together networks to organize protests, document abuses, and communicate what was happening inside Syria. After going into hiding for eight months, she was smuggled out of Syria and now lives in Paris. She continues to exert considerable influence via Twitter, SKYPE, and Facebook in shaping the conflict within Syria.

Videos coming out of Syria can be an important intelligence source for identifying evolving capabilities. One video posted on Facebook, purportedly by a member of the Syrian opposition forces in August 2012, showed a man with a portable surface-to-air missile launcher with an infrared guidance system. If true, this was evidence of a shift in the capabilities and support of opposition forces.

Syrian Government Uses of Social Media

The Syrian government has attempted to use social media to its advantage while mitigating the benefit to the opposition. Taking lessons learned from social media's use during the Arab Spring, the Syrian government has adopted both a defensive and offensive posture. The government has attempted to counter messages, particularly those involving grisly videos of killed Syrians and attacks on villages, while using media such as Facebook to identify opposition members.

The Syrian government has used several techniques to identify members of the opposition. One method is to set up a Facebook site under an assumed name, put people at ease, and then capture their conversations and friends' user names and passwords. Information is also collected during phishing operations where user information is collected by masquerading as a trustworthy site. Syrians have been tortured by Syrian authorities to obtain user information that can then be used to identify protesters and opposition leaders.

The Assad regime and its supporters have also used the Internet to publish pro-government messages. With few reporters on the ground, the authenticity and credibility of information and videos placed on the Internet by both government and opposition forces is difficult to



OEA Team Threat Report



ascertain. In many instances, the same video has been used by both sides to blame the other side for atrocities. Another technique is to spam sites critical of the Assad regime with thousands of attacking messages. Hacking into Internet news, Twitter, and Facebook sites is another means by which pro-Assad entities are attempting to shape the information environment in their favor. While still relatively unsophisticated, the Syrian government's attempts to capture social media user information have been aided by poor IT security.

It is unclear what the actual results of these social media campaigns will be. The information war being waged by both sides will continue as long as there is hope of swaying public opinion, both inside and outside Syria. The primary result may be simply to galvanize and fortify the already existing sides and opinions, both sides trying to interpret the same events as a positive for its side.

Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) Use of Social Media

The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) is a pro-Assad organization of computer hackers. The formal relationship between SEA and the Assad government is not clear; however, SEA has no other purpose than to support the Assad government's information war agenda. On 20 June 2011, President Assad noted the importance of the [electronic army](#) in a speech. This reference indicates acceptance of the SEA as a part of the fight against the opposition forces.

The [SEA Web site](#) claims to have been created in 2011 in response to the Arab media and Western bias in favor of those opposed to the Syrian government. The SEA has made its presence known outside Syria through hacking into news, government, business, and entertainment sites and even going head-to-head with the international hacking organization Anonymous.

The exact configuration of the SEA is not clear, as with most hacker organizations. Its Web site does list several hacker names which are, presumably, individuals who are either formally or loosely aligned with the SEA. One hacker with the moniker Victor proclaims he is "proud to be a Pro-Assad Hacker" on his [Web site](#) and lists some of his hacking accomplishments. He also states he is an 18 year old hacker and "The Leader of Special Operations Department-Syrian Electronic Army." This indicates that the SEA may have both a formal and an informal organization. Below is the recruiting page of the SEA Web site that lists hacker monikers and an invitation to hack on behalf of the Syrian government.



OEA Team Threat Report



[Syrian Electronic Army Web site Request for Volunteers](#)

The SEA began with a cat-and-mouse chase to keep a Facebook presence. As fast as Facebook administrators took down a site, the SEA would put up another. By 18 May 2011 the SEA had set up eleven new Facebook pages. As a testament to the SEA's tenacity, its current 18 September 2012 Facebook [page](#) origination date was 8 August 2012.



OEA Team Threat Report



The SEA professes to actively engage sites deemed enemies of the Syrian government, yet many of them appear to be business and local government entities that are easily accessible and vulnerable. Additionally, the SEA encourages supporters to make pro-Assad comments on popular sites. Below is a list of some of the attacks for which the SEA is responsible:

The following is a comment written on Oprah's Facebook page on 7 May 2011.



On 12 May 2011, when the administrators for the European Parliament's Facebook page announced that it had been hit with a massive spamming attack, the SEA was annoyed at the suggestion that they were doing anything more than expressing their patriotism on 12 May 2011.



The following is a SEA attack on President Barack Obama's Facebook page. A similar attack was conducted on French President Nicolas Sarkozy's Facebook page.



OEA Team Threat Report



This video, created by the SEA, documents an attack on the British town councils of Royal Leamington Spa Town and Bournemouth & Poole Town.






OEA Team Threat Report



The Twitter feed for Al Arabiya, a leading satellite news channel, was hacked in April 2012. A false news report stating that Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim, the Gulf Emirate's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, had been fired and replaced by the country's heir-apparent, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, caused public discussions about fissures in the royal family. An additional false story reported an explosion in a Qatari natural gas field that purportedly killed dozens. Qatar has been supportive of the Syrian opposition forces and has been identified as a target by the SEA.



In April 2012, the SEA hacked into LinkedIn's blog. Clicking on the "blog" hyperlink redirected the user to a pro-Assad Web site.





OEA Team Threat Report



Qatar-based Aljazeera has been the victim of multiple attacks on its mobile phone alert system and Web site since the SEA began active operations. Among other false reports was one that Qatar's prime minister had escaped an assassination attempt.



One of the more bizarre and interesting results of the SEA's growing prominence is its challenge to one of the most notorious and infamous international hacker groups. In what resembles cyber gangs fighting over territory, [Anonymous](#) and the SEA are facing off on opposing sides of the Syrian conflict. Attacks are accompanied by the tough talk typical of two gangs, each trying to one-up the other.

The tit-for-tat attacks began in 2011 when Anonymous hacked into and defaced the Syrian Ministry of Defense Web site with messages in support of opposition forces. The SEA responded by hacking into and defacing Anonymous' AnonPlus platform, the social network it created after being removed from Google+, with the following.





OEA Team Threat Report



The following Anonymous video published on 8 July 2012 outlines offenses of the Assad regime against its people and promises cyber attacks against the Syrian government in support of the opposition forces.



This video is a response and challenge to the Anonymous video published on 16 July 2012.



The SEA may represent the advent of a new kind of variable in conflicts. Whereas Anonymous is a very loosely aligned group with non-national interests, the SEA is a partisan group representing a specific government. As the sophistication and ease of access to technology improves, the information environment will become a much more relevant and important area of concern.



OEA Team Threat Report



Crowd Mapping

Crowd mapping is a form of social media that facilitates documenting events and actions, particularly in areas where journalists and nonprofit organizations have limited access. Utilizing cell phones and Internet connections, information about protests, detentions, killings, rapes, etc. is relayed to a site where it is plotted on maps to provide a better picture of what is actually happening.

The first widespread online proof of the value of this form of social media was provided by an ad hoc group of technically-minded Kenyans. [Ushahidi](#) was formed when three Kenyans developed an online program in 2007 to plot violence following what many believed to be the illegitimate election of the incumbent president Mwai Kibaki. They believed the number of deaths being reported by the government, police, and media was significantly less than the reality on the ground. They thought it was not only critical to get an accurate picture, but to also create a historical record to ensure accountability of those who may have committed crimes. Utilizing email and cell phone texting, anyone in Kenya could send in reports of what was happening on the ground. Based on evidence collected through the Ushahidi crowd mapping platform, Kenyan leaders Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Francis Kirimi Muthaura, and Mohammed Hussein Ali have been summoned before the international criminal court in the Hague for complicity in the deaths of 1,300 people.


[Syria Tracker](#) is an online crowd mapping site that is currently documenting events in Syria in the same manner as Ushahidi in Kenya. The platform allows Syrians to upload eyewitness accounts and videos. The reports and videos are cataloged and the data plotted on a map. Google Maps has made it easy to create layered and configurable maps that provide a variety of visual representations of the data. As in Kenya, Syria Tracker allows citizens all over Syria to contribute data that in the past was unattainable and, potentially, providing a more accurate picture of events on the ground. One consequence may be to limit violence, as more transparency may force greater accountability on leaders. The picture, however, will only be as accurate as the reliability of the data collected. There is always the potential for providing inaccurate data to further political agendas.



OEA Team Threat Report



Below is a Syria Tracker map with plotted data. Syria Tracker, like other crowd maps, allows the viewer to choose to see one variable or multiple variables plotted on the map. For example, a user could see kidnappings alone or kidnappings and arrests combined plotted on a map.



[Crowd Map - Syria Tracker](#)



OEA Team Threat Report



Below is the report submission page for Syria Tracker. Provided categories allow for collating and systematically cataloging data for plotting on a map. The site also allows for uploading videos and providing narrative descriptions.

Syria Tracker

Missing, Killed, Arrested, Eyewitness, Report

[HOME](#) [REPORTS](#) [SUBMIT A REPORT](#) [GET ALERTS](#) [CONTACT US](#) [ABOUT US \(من نحن\)](#) [INSTRUCTIONS \(الأنشئ الرقسي\)](#)

Thank you for your submission. Syria Tracker

Submit a New Report

Report Title *

Description *

Date & Time: Today at 7:46 pm (UTC) [Modify Date](#)

☐ Aggregate Report (تقرير إجمالي)

☐ Article (مقالة)

☐ Summary Report (تقرير ملخص)

☐ Food Tampering (تلفط بالعام)

☐ Killed (قتل)

☐ Revenge Killings (انتقام بالقتل)

☐ Eyewitness Report (تقرير شاهد عيان)

☐ Water Tampering (تلفط بالماء)

☐ Missing- Detained (مفقود- محتال)

☐ Announcement (إعلان)

☐ Refugees (اللاجئين)

Optional Information

First Name

Last Name

Email

Find a location near you

Select a City

City, State and/or Country

Find Location

* Search for your location using a location name OR latitude,longitude coordinates (format: 38.19, 85.61), OR click on the map to pinpoint the correct location..

Location Name *

Example: Corner of City Market, 5th Street & 4th Avenue, Johannesburg

News Source Link

External Video Link

Upload Photos

Browse...

Submit

[Submit A Report – Syria Tracker](#)

16

UNCLASSIFIED



OEA Team Threat Report



Below is an example of the Syria Tracker report page. Information provided is instantly available to provide a more accurate picture of events on the ground in real time.

Syria Tracker

Missing, Killed, Arrested, Eyewitness, Report

[SUBMIT A REPORT](#)

HOME **REPORTS** [SUBMIT A REPORT](#) [GET ALERTS](#) [CONTACT US](#) [ABOUT US \(من نحن\)](#) [INSTRUCTIONS \(الأنس الرقمي\)](#)

مجزرة في معضمية الشام

11:55 Sep 4 2012 مجلس مدينة معضمية الشام, Al Moadamyeh, Syria VERIFIED

Aggregate Report (تقرير إجمالي) Killed (قتل) Eyewitness Report (تقرير شاهد عيان) Announcement (إعلان)

1. [View Video](#) 2. [View Video](#) 3. [View Video](#) 4. [View Video](#) 5. [View Video](#)
6. [View Video](#) 7. [View Video](#)

Description

ريف دمشق|| معضمية الشام 2012/9/4

مشاهد وفيديوهات للمجزرة التي حصلت اليوم في معضمية الشام بريف دمشق والتي راح ضحيتها العشرات.....حسينا الله ونعم الوكيل

<http://youtu.be/2b7YIVKNIJQ>
<http://youtu.be/N9zaiMIdXd4>
<http://youtu.be/fQAoeTtoxf0>
<http://youtu.be/rkFEhTTIIS4>
<http://youtu.be/CyD4JKz791A>
<http://youtu.be/R10EK5Dp2aU>
<http://youtu.be/9cJNaI6EvB8>
<http://www.4shared.com/photo/hmi2IPV9/P9040019.html>
<http://www.4shared.com/photo/PG7x59xd/P9040018.html>

مع تحيات / مجلس قيادة الثورة في ريف دمشق
الفريق الإعلامي

News Source Link

<http://www.4shared.com/photo/hmi2IPV9/P9040019.html>
<http://www.4shared.com/photo/PG7x59xd/P9040018.html>

Credibility: 0

Additional Reports

1 Killed [GRAPHIC]: محمود رجب 15/05 Feb 02, 2012
مجلس مدينة معضمية الشام 0 Kms

مجلس قيادة الثورة في ريف دمشق - معضمية الشام 2012/4/18 14:52 Apr 18, 2012
مجلس مدينة معضمية الشام 0 Kms

مجلس قيادة الثورة في ريف دمشق - هام أحداث معضمية الشام 17:31 Jun 21, 2012
مجلس مدينة معضمية الشام, Al Moadamyeh, Syria, 0 Kms

مجلس قيادة الثورة في ريف دمشق - هام معضمية الشام 03:58 Jul 15, 2012
مجلس مدينة معضمية الشام, Al Moadamyeh, Syria, 0 Kms

مجلس قيادة الثورة في ريف دمشق - مجزرة معضمية الشام المروعة 16:13 Jul 23, 2012
مجلس مدينة معضمية الشام, Al Moadamyeh, Syria, 0 Kms

Report - Syria Tracker

Crowd mapping has great potential for providing an accurate picture of what is happening in a given area. There is also the added advantage of providing greater transparency and



OEA Team Threat Report



accountability, which can play a role in limiting the amount of violence directed by leaders. Ultimately it will provide historical data and evidence of events on the ground that was unavailable even a few years ago.

Analyst Assessment

Social media is a reality in any operational environment and is ignored at a commander's peril. The ubiquitous nature and relatively low cost of social media requires serious consideration of its implications. Recent history has shown how an obscure video, in the hands of a few provocateurs, can inflame the passions of large numbers of people. Anticipating friction points and events will require familiarity and proficiency with all kinds of social media.

Social media may also be useful for intelligence purposes. Monitoring discussions may provide insights into a population that are useful for understanding socio-cultural trends. Videos distributed on social media sites may provide useful intelligence on evolving capabilities, equipment, manning, tactics, etc. The converse, however, is also true. The enemy is likely looking at our social media sites and gathering intelligence for its own purposes.

Hackers will increasingly be a problem. The traditional non-state, cause-driven hacker may soon evolve into state-sponsored hackers. The loosely Assad regime-aligned SEA is an example of this evolution. Regardless of motivation, hackers have the potential to disrupt economic, social, political, and public infrastructure. Our dependence on networks to run and maintain critical infrastructure and the increasing sophistication of hackers will ensure the need for greater vigilance.

Crowd mapping programs, such as Syria Tracker, provide the potential for a clearer and more accurate picture of an area, particularly in remote places where visibility is limited. Utilizing software platforms and cell phone and Internet technology, citizen journalists and others can provide missing information that may increase transparency and accountability of leaders. All of this is dependent on the accuracy of the information provided. When possible, secondary means of verifying information needs to be employed to avoid politically motivated slants in information.

Social media will continue to be both a blessing and a curse. It will never be something that can be completely controlled. Use of social media can only help anticipate possible events and manage events on the ground once begun.



OEA Team Threat Report



Training Implications

- Social media will continue to be a source of intelligence and a source of misinformation.
- The wide availability and low cost of social media will increase the chance that videos and discussions capable of inflaming populations will impact military operations.
- Crowd mapping has the potential to provide a clearer picture of a unit's area of operation, particularly in remote areas with limited visibility.
- The success of the Syrian Electronic Army, a group of young pro-Assad regime hackers, points to a greater potential for state-sponsored and/or state-affiliated cyber partnerships.
- Over time, the ability of hackers to penetrate secure networks will become more sophisticated and of greater concern.
- Hackers may target economic, social, political, and public infrastructure, potentially disrupting critical operations.

References

- , "[18 Year Old Syrian Hacker Website](#)," *The Pro Website*.
- , "[Al-Jazeera SMS service attacked by pro-Syrian hackers](#)," *BBC News Technology*, 10 September 2012.
- , "[Q&A: Syrian activist Suhair Atassi](#)," *Aljazeera*, 9 February 2011.
- , "[SEA vs. Anonymous](#)," *The Pro*, 26 July 2012.
- , "[Syrian Electronic Army: Disruptive Attacks and Hyped Targets](#)," *Infowar Monitor*, 25 June 2011.
- , "[Syrian Electronic Army Official Website](#)," *Syrian Electronic Army*.
- , "[Syrian gov't: Rebels massacre dozens of 'shabiha'](#)," *CBS News*, 22 June 2012.
- , "[Syria Tracker Official Website](#)," *Syria Tracker*.
- , "[Tag Archives: Syrian Electronic Army](#)," *University of Toronto Munk School of Global Affairs*.
- , "[Twitter, Facebook and YouTube's role in Arab Spring \(Middle East uprisings\)](#)," *Social Capital Blog*, 23 May 2012.
- , "[Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta](#)," *Hague Justice Portal*.
- Abbas, Faisal J., "[Syrian Electronic Army' Declares Cyber-War on Saudi-Owned Al-Arabiya](#)," *The Huffington Post-United Kingdom*, 24 April 2012.
- Abdulla, Namo, "[Social Media and Syria's Revolution](#)," *Rudaw*, 20 December 2011.
- Anderson, Sulome, "[Reuters Twitter account hacked in Syrian tug-of-war](#)," *Foreign Policy*, 7 August 2012.
- Anonymous, "[Anonymous: Operation Syria - Phase 1](#)," *YouTube*, 8 July 2012.
- Apps, Peter, "[REFILE-Disinformation flies in Syria's growing cyber war](#)," *Reuters*, 7 August 2012.
- Barriaux, Marianne, "[Syria propaganda social media war frenzy](#)," *News 24*, 12 August 2012.
- Barriaux, Marianne, "[Syrians wage frenzied propaganda war on social media](#)," *AFP*, 13 August 2012.
- D., Donna, "[Meet Ridiculously Photogenic Syrian Rebel](#)," *BuzzFeed*.



OEA Team Threat Report



Fitzpatrick, Alex, "[Social Media Becoming Online Battlefield in Syria](#)," *Mashable US & World*, 9 August 2012.

Fitzpatrick, Alex, "[What Is the Syrian Electronic Army?](#)," *Mashable US & World*, 10 August 2012.

Goodman, David J., "Watching Syria's War: Videos and images of the continuing conflict in Syria," *The New York Times*, 14 September 2012.

Holliday, Joseph, "[Syria's Maturing Insurgency](#)," *Institute for the Study of War*, June 2012.

Jeffery, Simon, "[Ushahidi: crowdmapping collective that exposed Kenyan election killings](#)," *The Guardian*, 7 April 2011.

Jones, Alex, "[Syrian Electronic Army' hacks al-Jazeera's website](#)" *Alex Jones' Infowars.com*.

Karam, Zeina, "[Syrian Electronic Army: Cyber Warfare From Pro-Assad Hackers](#)," *Huff Post*, 17 September 2012.

Mandalia, Ravi, "[Syrian Electronic Army Punish Anonymous by Defacing AnonPlus](#)," *IT ProPortal*, 9 August 2011.

Meier, Patrick, "Crisis Mappers Official Website," *Crisis Mappers*.

Moe, John, "[Syrian Electronic Army takes fight to the world](#)," *Marketplace Tech Report*, 28 September 2011.

Noman, Helmi, "[The Emergence of Open and Organized Pro-Government Cyber Attacks in the Middle East: The Case of the Syrian Electronic Army](#)," *Infowar Monitor*, 30 May 2011.

O'Bagy, Elizabeth, "[Syria's Political Opposition](#)," *Institute for the Study of War*, April 2012.

O'Bagy, Elizabeth, "[Syria's Political Struggle: Spring 2012](#)," *Institute for the Study of War*, Spring 2012.

O'Donnell, Catherine, "[New Study Quantifies Use of Social Media in Arab Spring](#)," *University of Washington*, 12 September 2011.

Raddatz, Martha, "[Social Media Fuels Protests in Iran, Bahrain and Yemen](#)," *ABC News*, 15 February 2011.

Rafati, Reza, "[Syrian Electronic Army sites](#)," *Cyberwarzone*, 19 May 2011.

Samnani, Hina, "[Crowdmapping Arab Spring - Next Social Media Breakthrough?](#)," *Voice of America*, 27 June 2011.

Siddique, Haroon and Paul Owen, "[Syria: Army Retakes Damascus Suburbs – Monday 30 January](#)," *The Guardian*, 30 January 2012.

Silicon Republic, "[Syrian Electronic Army hacks LinkedIn blog](#)," 26 April 2012.

Syrian Electronic Army, "[Reply from Syrian Electronic Army to Anonymous](#)," *YouTube*, 16 July 2012.

York, Jillian C., "[Syria's electronic army](#)," *Aljazeera*, 15 August 2011.

Related Products

Follow these links to view related products:

- [The Shabiha of Syria](#)
- [Suicide Bombings – Syria](#) (FOUO)

See also the [Red Diamond Newsletter](#), which contains current articles on a variety of topics useful to both soldiers and civilians ranging from enemy TTP to the latest news on cyberspace developments.



OEA Team Threat Report



For detailed information on weapons and equipment, see the [Worldwide Equipment Guide](#).

AKO:

Threat Products: AKO“Easy-Link”
Contemporary Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate

1. Login
2. “Click” Files
3. Search to:
TRADOC G2
TRISA-CTID
4. “Click” & Find !

POCs

OEA Team
913-684-7920 (COMM)
552-7920 (DSN)

TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)
700 Scott Ave, Bldg 53
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027