



Red Diamond Threats Newsletter



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Topic Inquiries:
Jon H. Moilanen (DAC), or
Angela Williams (DAC),
Interim Branch Chief,
ACE-TI

Copy Editor:
Laura Deatrick (CGI CTR)



ACE-TI PRODUCT DELIVERY METHODS HAVE CHANGED!

by [Laura Deatrick](#) (CGI CTR), TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

Two important changes have been made to the way ACE-TI delivers products to its customers.



First, the Army Training Network (ATN) has recently revised its website design. While the new ATN has improved search capabilities and other updated features, the previous link to the ACE-TI page is no longer valid. These changes also affect the direct links to ACE-TI's products. The new link to ACE-TI's ATN page is

[https://atn.army.mil/tradoc-g22-analysis-and-control-element-\(ace\)/operational-environment-and-training-products-tr](https://atn.army.mil/tradoc-g22-analysis-and-control-element-(ace)/operational-environment-and-training-products-tr)



Second, Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE), Training Circular 7-100 series, and Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) content is now available on the Operational Environment Data Integration Network (ODIN). ODIN offers a web-based version of these products that makes them more user friendly, all on a freely accessible website. Additional DATE content will be available soon. The link to ODIN is

<https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/>

For more information about
 **ATN** and  **ODIN**
see the article on page 21.

RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST

by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

During the past year, ACE-TI analysts have been creating three new versions of the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE), which have been developed in collaboration with both US Army combat training centers and multinational partners such as the UK, Australia, and Canada. DATE Europe, DATE Pacific, and DATE Africa focus on those respective parts of the globe. Separate articles provide introductions to the new DATEs through excerpts taken from the current drafts of these upcoming products. Topics covered include an overview of each new DATE country, a description of the regional

strategic setting, and a summary of the regional political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) variables.

Delivery methods for ACE-TI products are improving, as highlighted on page 1. The Army Training Network (ATN) recently underwent a major revision, and TRADOC's Operational Environment (OE) Data Integration Network (ODIN) website has gone live. The final article of this *Red Diamond* edition delves deeper into navigation on each of these sites and the products available.

Red Diamond Disclaimer

The *Red Diamond* newsletter presents professional information but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official US Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official US Army publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of material that they reference. The *Red Diamond* staff reserves the right to edit material. Appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the US Army for information contained therein.



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Introduction to DATE Europe



by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

During the past year, ACE-TI personnel developed a new version of the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) based in the European theater. This article provides a brief introduction to DATE Europe through excerpts taken from the current draft of this upcoming product. Pending final review and approval, ACE-TI expects to release DATE Europe on the [OE Data Integration Network \(ODIN\)](#)ⁱ platform by 1 October 2018.

The purpose of the **Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) Europe** is to provide the US Army training, education, and leader development community with a detailed description of the conditions of five composite operational environments (OEs) in Nordic Europe. It presents trainers and educators with an operational environment baseline to serve as a starting point in the construction of scenarios for specific training events, but is not a complete scenario in itself. DATE Europe offers discussions of OE conditions through the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) variables. This DATE applies to all US Army units (Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard) and partner nations that participate in DATE-compliant Army exercises.

DATE Europe's composite countries encompass over 290,000 square miles, a varied and complex region that encompasses much of the Nordic region of Europe. The region includes the OEs of Arnland, Bothnia, Framland, Otso, and Torrike—as derived from NATO Joint Warfare Centre's Skolkan scenario—as well as allowing for the DATE Caucasus OEs of Donovia and Pirtuni to be utilized if required. This DATE differs generally from DATE Caucasus (formerly DATE 3.0), DATE Africa, and DATE Pacific in a unique way: With the exception of Arnland, Bothnia, Framland, Otso, and Torrike, all other countries in DATE Europe are real-world European countries. For scenario purposes, it must be emphasized that these real-world countries cannot act as belligerents/aggressorsⁱⁱ; only the composite OEs can fulfill this role. Of note, Donovia and Pirtuni border countries in Europe—both real-world and composite—so the DATE Caucasus OEs can, if required, affect the DATE Europe OEs.

Discussion of the OEs within the DATE Europe Operational Environment

Republic of Arnland

Arnland sits on the southern tip of the Torrikan peninsula. Originally part of the Skolkan Empire, it gained independence in 1917. Arnland is a multi-party democratic republic with open elections. While there are currently six political parties with varied representation in the National Assembly, two of these—the center right and the social democrats—have dominated the political landscape for the past 25 years. Arnland's foreign policy supports the country's strategic goal of maintaining its independence. The Arnish maintain neutrality in the region while fostering diplomatic—and in some cases military—relations with their regional neighbors. The regional and international relationships maintained and the priorities that are placed in maintaining them change as the ruling parties change, and are a major cause of internal political tension. The European Union (EU) has been in negotiations with Arnland over membership but has yet to enter into any formal agreement.

The Arnland Armed Forces consists of two distinct components. The Active Defense Force comprises the regular Army, Navy and Air Force units subordinated to the General Staff, while the Standby Defense Force is a regionally based reserve

ⁱ See page 21 of this issue of *Red Diamond* for more information on ODIN.

ⁱⁱ As per Army Regulation 350-2, paragraph 3-2 b.

force that answers to the regional governor in peacetime and to the General Staff during war. Arnland's military forces are essentially dysfunctional. Although there are pockets of excellence, the majority of the forces is poorly trained, poorly equipped, badly paid, and ineffective.

Bothnian Democratic Republic

Bothnia is a country famous for its scenic beauty. Thousands of lakes dot its landscape, and thick forests cover almost two-thirds of the land. The country is a socialist state; although officially there are three main political parties, in reality the Socialist Party of Bothnia dominates the political environment—in effect allowing the other two parties to exist to offer the illusion of choice for the population. Relations with other former Skolkan Empire countries are good except for that with Torrike, which has been strained over Bothnia's claim to the island of Gotland.

The essence of Bothnia's defense policy is to defend the State and the achievements of the Bothnian people against all aggressors and threats, whether external or internal. To this end, the purpose of the military is to prepare, plan and execute the total defense of Bothnia, in conjunction with all other agencies of the Bothnian State. The policy allows for all methods to be used to ensure the survival of the State and does not preclude preemptive actions or actions limited to the territory of Bothnia. As such Bothnia's military is sizeable, with some 120,000 troops in service with, theoretically, another 1,000,000 eligible to be called up from the Reserve.

The deterioration of relations with Torrike and the increased threat of NATO have forced Bothnia to reevaluate its status in the region. It increasingly sees Donovan as an ally and a useful counterbalance to the influence of NATO and the EU. Bothnia is also wary of the motivations of the Baltic States following their admission into NATO; as a result, Bothnia perceives a "threat" from multiple entities.

Kingdom of Framland

Framland is a prosperous country to the east of Torrike; it stretches from the Baltic Sea to north of the Arctic Circle. The country is a multi-party constitutional monarchy with open elections and political power vested in the prime minister. Its population enjoys freedom of speech and expression, and its relatively stable economy ensures a reasonable standard of living. The Framish people clearly consider themselves Europeans, but are hesitant to become a member of the EU, seeing it as compromising their national identity.

While maintaining good relations with the rest of European nations, Framland is extremely aware of the strategic visions of Bothnia and Torrike. Their claims to power and land within the region create the potential for confrontation with Framland. Notwithstanding these perceptions, Framland cultivates and enjoys good relations with both of its larger neighbors. It is a member of the UN and continues to build its relationship with both NATO and the EU, albeit keeping the latter two at arm's length. Framland and Donovan have normal political relations with growing economic and cultural exchanges, especially on a regional basis; however, they both foster an age-old distrust, and have diverging attitudes toward democracy and human rights.

The Framland Defense Force is unusual in the region in that it is all volunteer and does not rely on conscription. It is also the smallest force in the region by a considerable margin. Notwithstanding size, the armed forces in general, and the army in particular, have built up considerable operational expertise through deployments on UN and associated missions. In



Figure 1. DATE Europe Region

keeping with the country's modern and Western outlook, the armed forces are completely apolitical. The Framish government uses its armed forces as a useful diplomatic tool to build stability throughout the world.

Royal Duchy of Otso

Otso sits on the easternmost edge of the region. Previously part of a larger Otsobothnia, it has been an independent nation since the end of World War II. Otso is a constitutional monarchy with open elections and three prominent political parties. The country prides itself on being neutral not only within the old Skolkan region, but also in regards to the EU and NATO. In reality, the government and populace tend to have Donovanian sympathies. Donovania originally utilized Otso as a buffer between itself and the wider alliance of Torrike and Bothnia. The recent souring of the relationship between Bothnia and Torrike created the opportunity to use Otso as a stepping stone to advance Donovania's influence in the region.

Otso's main political and military aim is to contribute to regional stability through the application of a firm and fair policy of neutrality. Otso considers itself as setting an enlightened example and support for the UN is a key pillar of this policy. A primary component of this is to ensure that any dispute is brought to arbitration at the earliest opportunity and full engagement of the relevant international bodies is actively pursued.

Otso has a small population and its armed forces are correspondingly small. The basic structure is built on the Otsonian perception of the Canadian model, with a single service (defense forces) and specialist branches (land, air, naval). The forces are largely conscripted, with a professional core; the ratio of regular personnel to conscripts varies depending on the complexity of the assigned task. On completion of service, conscripts have a reserve liability until their 50th birthday.

Republic of Torrike

Torrike lies in the region's west and represents the heartland and remnant core of a once considerably larger and more powerful political entity, the Skolkan Empire. The country's formal political system is a democratic republic, with both President and Parliament being subject to periodic election. However, Torrike's power structure is highly centralized and features appointment rather than election to most offices, with control of patronage resting with the President. Parliament is dominated by the Torrike Unity Party, either alone or in coalition with the Torrikan Nationalist Party. There are formal and informal mechanisms for dealing with political dissent that can be used ruthlessly when needed; however, most Torrikans are content with their system, and those who oppose current policies have little traction.

The country's foreign policy is based on the overriding principle that it is the natural regional leader and that the other nations should align themselves under Torrike's benevolent guidance. Frictions are high between Torrike and Bothnia due to the latter's recent claim of sovereignty over the island of Gotland, despite it being in Torrikan waters. This is further exacerbated by the improving relationship between Bothnia and Donovania, putting not only the Torrikan concept of resurrecting Skolkan in jeopardy, but also strengthening Bothnia's position within the region. Torrike has increasingly come to regard NATO as an aggressive, expansionist, and interventionist political entity that poses a potential strategic threat to the country's regional ambitions. Framland is considered a reliable neighbor, albeit one with a differing international outlook.

The Torrikan Armed Forces are modern, structurally sound, and well equipped. In theory a largely conscript force, national service is used to identify suitable candidates for long-term service and the reserves. All adults are subject to conscription and must complete an induction period that provides basic military training and an assessment period for identifying potential future leaders. The armed forces have always had a highly intellectual approach to warfare, seeking to maximize their effectiveness through a vigorous analysis of strategy and tactics. However, the Torrikan Armed Forces have little actual operational experience and have only exercised with Framland and, to a lesser extent, Arnland. Otsonian military observers monitoring Torrikan exercises have found them to be somewhat rigid in outlook.

Strategic Positioning

The Skolkan Empire once comprised all of what are now the countries of Arnland, Bothnia, Framland, Otso, and Torrike, with lordship over Norway. The Empire periodically attempted to extend its power into Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but its influence was always tenuous. Toward the end of the 19th century it became more and more obvious that the cohesion amongst the Skolkan nations was rapidly degrading. The Empire ultimately split into the countries of Arnland, Framland, Torrike, and Otsobothnia, with the latter eventually dividing into the nations of Otso and Bothnia; Norway also gained independence during this turbulent time.

Relations among the countries in this region are heavily influenced by this past history and proximity to Donovia. Framland considers itself a staunchly neutral European nation and is wary of its stronger and more ambitious neighbors of Bothnia and Torrike. Arnland works to maintain its independence through neutrality and diplomacy, and leans toward the West and EU membership; it also borders the regionally important chokepoint between the North Sea/Atlantic Ocean and the Baltic Sea. Torrike is working to re-establish the Skolkan Empire and sees itself as the regional leader—thus setting itself against Donovanian interests in the region. Torrike’s alliance with Bothnia helped bolster its position until their recent falling out over the island of Gotland. As the westernmost country on the Gulf of Finland, Bothnia can potentially limit both Otso’s and Donovia’s wider maritime access to the Baltic Sea as well. However, the country is unlikely to do so: it simultaneously views Donovia as an ally and Otso as a buffer against the same—thus helping to ensure its continued independence. Otso seeks to utilize this position to its advantage, fostering positive relations with both Donovia and Bothnia in order to cement its position as neutral neighbor and buffer state.

Regional Views of the US

The view that each country holds toward the US primarily aligns with its political leaning and strategic position. Torrike is wary of the US for several reasons: the Torrikan plan to revive the Skolkan Empire; US dominance in the Atlantic Ocean—and thus ability to curtail Torrikan access to the same; and US presence in neighboring NATO member Norway. Bothnia takes a similar view of US power and influence in the region, and for comparable reasons. Otso is careful to remain neutral in its interactions with the United States in light of its geographical position as Bothnia’s and Donovia’s neighbor. Framland and Arnland are inclined to view the US as part of the NATO and EU counterbalance to Bothnia, Donovia, and Torrike—which helps ensure their continued independence—and react accordingly. While US strength is respected throughout the region, none of the countries would place the United States in the category of “friend or protector.”

Regional PMESII-PT Overview

Political

The governments in DATE Europe tend to fall on opposite ends of the spectrum. Arnland, Framland, and Otso are liberal democracies, while Bothnia and Torrike are effectively one-party autocratic governments. With the exception of Torrike—which desires regional hegemony—all of the governments act in ways to ensure their country’s continued existence as an independent entity, either by working to remain neutral or by allying themselves with other, more powerful nations or organizations.

Military

Military forces in the region vary in size, but have similar purposes. Arnland has a small, dysfunctional defensive military that is focused on the country’s perception that Torrike poses a threat to its independence. Bothnia’s military forces are strongly defensive in nature and focused against the West, though possession of ballistic missiles means the country could choose to take the offense. In addition, the nation is modernizing its defense equipment. Framland possesses the smallest armed forces in the region. Acutely aware of this fact, the country focuses on other methods—diplomatic and economic—to help ensure its continued existence as an independent entity. Otso’s military focus is two-fold: defend against external aggression, and support world peace through deployments in support of international peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. Torrike fields modern, well-equipped armed forces designed to prevent interference with its regional ambitions by outside parties—namely NATO. While the military is supposedly defensive in nature, Torrike states it will not hesitate to use power projection in order to protect its interests.

Economic

The economic conditions in the five countries cover a wide spectrum, ranging from strong open markets, to weak capitalistic systems reliant on international aid, to oppressive state-controlled ones. Despite their differences, the countries’ economies are heavily intertwined with each other. Arnland exports goods and electricity to Torrike and the EU. Bothnia’s primary trading partners are other regional countries. Framland receives part of its energy from Torrike—one of its most important trade partners. Otso is heavily dependent on raw material imports from other regional countries. Torrike relies on Arnland for energy and labor. Any major change to just one of the regional economies could have significant ripple effects on those of the others.

Social

The countries in the region vary little in social aspects. All possess a nearly homogeneous population in terms of both ethnicity and language, with English as a common second language. Christian religions—primarily Lutheran and Catholic—are the most common faiths, but church attendance is sparse and an increasing number of people do not identify with a religion at all. Though indigenous religions are present, they are followed by only a small minority of the population. Birth rates are low throughout the region, while the percentage of elderly is growing. Education is highly valued in all countries as a way for individuals to improve their socioeconomic situations, and public education is universal and usually high-quality. The exception is Arnland, where residents must rely on private tutoring for any hope of gaining acceptance to a university. Crime in the region tends to be similar in type and level to that of other European nations.

Information

The countries all possess a modern communications architecture and each government recognizes the importance and influence of media and its control. Approaches range from extremely loose to tight governmental control. Bothnia and Torrike practice strong control over public communications media in an attempt to control their populations, while Arnland, Framland, and Otso do the opposite. However, even in the latter group there is some soft censorship: extremist views are rarely published, and Otsonian media outlets are wary of distributing material that would easily offend Donovan or Bothnia. New means of information-sharing using modern technology are rapidly adopted by the population, unless the government intervenes in an attempt to control information flow.

Infrastructure

The region displays relative uniformity of infrastructure in types, scope, and maintenance levels. Over 60% of the populace resides in cities; the one notable exception is Framland, where fewer than half of the residents live in an urban environment. With the exception of the far north, utilities and transportation are well-distributed in both urban and rural areas. Power generation relies heavily on hydropower, nuclear, and fossil fuels, with renewable fuels (biomass, peat, wood) and wind power playing a lesser role. All countries have modern Western-style roads, rail, airports, seaports, and mass transit, though maintenance levels vary somewhat. Framland and Torrike's infrastructures are well-maintained; Bothnia and Otso have recently completed infrastructure development programs, including improvements to their ports for cold-weather operations; while Arnland's deteriorating infrastructure reflects the country's struggle to fund maintenance. Of the five countries, Otso is the only country whose infrastructure is somewhat lacking in scope. Regional travel is efficient and can occur by road, rail, ferry, or plane.

Physical Environment

Arnland, Framland, and Torrike lie to the west of the Gulf of Bothnia, on the same peninsula as Norway, while Bothnia and Otso are on the eastern side. Each country possesses a mainland area, a coastline, and a few outer islands. The countries all consist of flat to




Figure 2. DATE Europe Terrain

rolling terrain except Torrike, which also has a mountainous spine on its western border. Heavily treed, the far southern part of the region has deciduous trees, while the more northern areas boast conifers. The higher mountains of Torrike lie above the tree line, and are instead covered with hardy grasses. The southern areas experience a temperate climate, while the northern climate is subarctic in nature. All countries have four seasons, with winter increasing in length the farther north one travels—resulting in a corresponding lessening of agricultural cultivation. Major geographic features include the Torrikan mountains and a plethora of rivers, lakes, and streams. The most important bodies of water are the seas and gulfs, which provide both sustenance and a means of transportation. Multiple natural hazards exist, including droughts, floods, forest fires, land and mudslides in the mountains, and ice floes on the major bodies of water.

Time

All DATE Europe countries use the Gregorian calendar. Arnland, Framland, and Torrike are in the Central European time zone (GMT +1), while Bothnia and Otso are on Eastern European time (GMT +2). All of the regional countries observe Daylight Savings Time (DST). The relative proximity to the North Pole means that the days are very long in summer (up to 18 hours of sunlight) and short in winter (seven hours of sunlight).

Approaches to time are consistent throughout the region: goodtime keeping is the norm, and poor timekeeping is seen as disrespectful. The only notable exception is Bothnia, in that the more senior/high-ranking an individual is, the more lax he will be in adhering to a schedule. This is accepted and should be taken into account when planning meetings, etc.

Conclusion

All DATE OEs focus on the relevant characteristics of each region so that exercise participants can appreciate the unique challenges of a regional rotation. In the case of Europe, the influence of the EU, likely involvement of NATO partners, substantial maritime issues, and the presence of Donovia will further complicate theater and follow-on operations. When historical differences are added to the mix it ensures that a deeper understanding of each OE is required to really have a lasting impact. Applied in the right context, DATE Europe gives units the opportunity to challenge their assumptions and test their skills in a theater while simultaneously working with multiple international partners.

Figure & Table Credits

Banner: TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI and TRADOC G-2 Global Cultural Knowledge Network (GCKN). "DATE Europe Countries." July 2018.

Figure 1: TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI and TRADOC G-2 Global Cultural Knowledge Network (GCKN). "DATE Europe Region." July 2018.

Figure 2: TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI and TRADOC G-2 Global Cultural Knowledge Network (GCKN). "DATE Europe Terrain." July 2018.



Introduction to DATE Pacific

by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

During the past year, ACE-TI personnel have been creating a new version of the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) that is based in the Pacific theater. This article provides a brief introduction to DATE Pacific through excerpts taken from the current draft of this upcoming product. At present, ACE-TI expects to release DATE Pacific on the [OE Data Integration Network \(ODIN\)](#)ⁱ platform by 1 October 2018.

The purpose of the **Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) Pacific** is to provide the US Army training community with a detailed description of the conditions of five composite operational environments (OEs) in the Pacific region. It presents trainers with a tool to assist in the construction of scenarios for specific training events, but does not provide a complete scenario. DATE Pacific offers discussions of OE conditions through the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) variables. This DATE applies to all US Army units (Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard) and partner nations that participate in DATE-compliant Army or joint training exercises.

The region can be broken geographically into two primary components: (1) Olvana, and (2) a subregion consisting of Belesia, Gabal, North Torbia, and South Torbia. The operational environment of DATE Pacific is a complex and multi-layered set of conditions. From the economic and military hegemony of Olvana, to the persistent tensions between North and South Torbia, to the developing nations of Belesia and Gabal, many different potential conflicts may arise. The region has a long history of instability and conflict; ethnic and religious factionalism; and general political, military, and civilian unrest. In addition to these internal regional divisions, outside actors have increasing strategic interests in the region. DATE Pacific thus represents a flashpoint where highly localized conflict can spill over into widespread unrest or general war.



Figure 1. DATE Pacific Subregion

Discussion of the OEs within the DATE Pacific Operational Environment

Federated States of Belesia

Belesia is a relatively new democracy in the region. The turbulence of its independence from colonial rule continues to create stability challenges throughout its many member islands. Political turmoil, popular unrest, and widespread terrorism combine to create a volatile environment for this young federation. One of the few stabilizing factors is the development of economic opportunities and trade. Despite progress in this area, Belesia is hampered by infrastructure and business processes that have yet to develop to meet its needs.

ⁱ See page 21 of this issue of *Red Diamond* for more information on ODIN.

Federated States of Gabal

Gabal is a relatively new democracy, having emerged from joint rule by two Western European countries in 1977. Gabal faces numerous political and economic challenges that have undercut the effectiveness and legitimacy of its government since independence was declared. Tribal politics run deep within the government, and the country is deeply federalized among tribal lines. Issues associated with climate change, however, have largely united the country in recent years, as Gabal, along with many other small island nations, seeks to influence global climate change politics.

Gabal's military serves more as a symbol of the country's independence from its neighbors than as a true fighting force. Due to its small size, the military possesses little offensive capabilities and is no threat to any of its neighboring countries. It also lacks the ability to defend itself against any major external threat. The military's main purpose is the prevention of illegal fishing activities in the country's territorial waters.




Figure 2. DATE Pacific Region

People's Republic of Olvana

Since Olvana is the largest country in terms of size and population in the region and desires to serve as the regional hegemon, it maintains the largest military in the Pacific region. The Olvana People's Army (OPA) is composed of not only a land force, but the Olvana People's Navy and Olvana People's Air Force are subordinate to the OPA. Olvana attempts to influence the region by the deployment of advisors to various countries and the sale of military weapons to its allies. Today, the Olvanese Communist Party seeks to change some traditions while preserving others, such as the family structure and culture of obedience to the state, as being integral to society.

Democratic People's Republic of Torbia

This country, also called North Torbia, is one of the most militarized countries in the world, with over one million active duty military personnel and over six million reservists. North Torbian military spending is around 20% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP), and about one-quarter of all adults serve in some military capacity. Ground, air, and naval forces all fall under the umbrella of the Torbian People's Army (TPA). The TPA controls the ground, air, and naval forces in North Torbia.

Republic of Torbia

The Republic of Torbia, also known as South Torbia, is a constitutional republic that occupies the central part of Luzon Island. After centuries of foreign occupation and despotic rule, South Torbia emerged in the late 20th century as one of the world's fastest-growing economies, and today is one of the world's wealthiest, most stable, and most militarily powerful nations. However, a massive corruption scandal that included the South Torbian president has recently rocked the government to its core, creating many questions about the stability and viability of the current republic.

The South Torbian military is primarily a defensive force aimed at stopping North Torbia from taking over the former's country. Many years ago due to the fear of North Torbia, South Torbia adopted a universal military service of short duration for all its male citizens. After leaving active duty, military veterans serve in an active or inactive reserve role as a deterrence against external threats to the country's independence.

Strategic Positioning

Relations among the nations in this region are a tense game of power. As Donovia's strategic influence has shifted to Europe and the Caucasus regions, Olvana has aggressively sought to press its will on the region. Similarly, nations such as South Torbia, Gabal, and Belesia view the shift as an opportunity to grow their influence and develop economic ties both in the region and with external partners. Control of critical mineral and fishing resources, manufacturing, and unfettered

transport of goods in the region's shipping lanes is a key point of tension for all. Within the states of the region, groups that had previously seen no opportunity for influence view the instability as a path to develop their voices. Internal conflict is a persistent and potentially destabilizing factor as governments position for legitimacy and consolidate their power. Whether expanding influence or building new power bases, the region will continue to be a driver of worldwide tensions and increasing volatility.

Regional Views of the US

The US has many competing interests in the region, ranging from economic stability and trade to geopolitical influence. The US sees Olvana as both partner and rival, as the two economies are intertwined and depend on each other. Olvana's main strategic challenge is that the US controls the seas. Geography means Olvana's imports and exports must traverse coastal bottlenecks in and among the other nations of the region that the US or other countries could easily close. Maintaining trade and international shipping through the region, as well as developing new relationships with these emerging economies is vital to ensuring economic growth and continued participation in the region's development.

The United States' support of antiterrorism efforts in the region is expected to tamp down past criticisms of the South Torbian and Belesian governments and lead to renewed cooperation between these US allies despite a wary Olvana. The ongoing political positioning and economic battles waged with the US and the constantly shifting, multi-faceted regional interrelationships will be both a source of opportunity and conflict.

Regional PMESII-PT Overview

Political

The governments in DATE Pacific tend to fall on opposite ends of the spectrum. Both South Torbia and Gabal are liberal democracies, though not without issues—the former has recently experienced a major political scandal, while the latter is only a few decades old and tribal in nature. Belesia is also a newer democracy that has to continually fight against the autocratic tendencies of its political class. Both Olvana and North Torbia are one-party autocratic governments that seek to both control their populations and influence their neighbors—the first for hegemonic purposes and the second for regime survival. With economies that are intertwined, the Pacific countries' political dance is complex and multifaceted, and it is easy for one country to step on the political "toes" of another—either accidentally or intentionally.

Military

Military forces in the region vary greatly in both size and purpose. Gabal, as the smallest country in terms of both size and population, has an equally small defensive military that is focused on the prevention of illegal fishing in its waters. Belesia also has limited military capability with old (tier 3) equipment and poor training, but the country does have some offensive capability and is working to improve both manpower and equipment. North Torbia's tier-3 military is offensive in nature and very large in comparison to its population. The country's primary goals are self-preservation through the elimination of both internal and external threats, and reunification with South Torbia—by force, if necessary. In response, South Torbia has fashioned its modernized (tier 2) military as primarily defensive, though the country's use of armed forces in its fight against internal threats—insurgent groups and criminal enterprises—is decidedly offensive in nature. Olvana fields a large, offensive military of tier 1–2 that is focused on both self-defense (internal and external) and regional power projection, with the goal of gaining an equal footing with the United States and Donovia.

Economic

The economic conditions in the five countries cover a wide spectrum, ranging from strong capitalistic market systems to oppressive state-controlled ones. Despite their vast differences, the countries' economies are heavily intertwined. Gabal relies on South Torbia for economic aid while it tries to find its feet after exhausting its natural resources. North Torbia's command economy is cut off from the rest of the world, but it still trades heavily with Olvana and Belesia. South Torbia's modern capitalistic economy also relies on trade with Olvana, whose mixed command/free market system is used by its government to buy influence with other nations through a carrot-and-stick approach. Belesia is attempting to diversify its emerging agrarian-based economy via manufacturing and trade with its neighbors, but lack of high-skilled employment opportunities continues to be an issue. Any major change to just one of the regional economies will have significant ripple effects on those of the others.

Social

The countries in the region present a mix of social influences. Three of the countries have a large number of diverse ethnicities—of which a specific one may or may not make up a majority of the population—and multiple languages and dialects. North and South Torbia fall on the other end of the spectrum, with an nearly homogeneous population in terms of ethnicity and language. Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity are the most common faiths; though indigenous religions are present, they are followed by only a small minority of the populations. While large youth bulges and continued high birth rates are common in Belesia and Gabal, the opposite is true in Olvana and South Torbia. North Torbia falls between the two, primarily due to high starvation levels decreasing the population by default. Education is highly valued in all countries as a way for individuals to improve their socioeconomic situations. Crime and terrorism reflect the diversity and political freedom of the country in question: the more diverse and free, the greater the level of criminal and/or terroristic activity.

Information

The countries all recognize the importance and influence of media and its control. Approaches range from low-level to modern technical capabilities and from extremely loose to tight governmental control. Olvana and North Torbia practice strong control over public communications media in an attempt to control their populations, while South Torbia and Gabal do the opposite; Belesia maintains some media control, but the government has started relaxing restrictions in recent years. New means of information-sharing using modern technology are rapidly adopted by the population, unless the government intervenes in an attempt to control information flow.

Information warfareⁱⁱ (INFOWAR) capabilities run the gamut—from Gabal’s basic attempts to portray the country in a positive light to Olvana’s full range of capabilities. INFOWAR is usually directed externally in the region, with countries focusing on their regional opponents in an effort to gain an advantage, no matter how minor. North Torbia is an exception to this rule, as it focuses equally on internal and external targets.

Intelligence capabilities are as varied as the region’s countries. Gabal has minimal collection capabilities and relies on either open-source intelligence (OSINT) or support from friendly countries. Belesia’s capabilities are greater, and are focused on electronic warfare (EW) and cyber security. The remaining countries have large and sophisticated intelligence programs. As with INFOWAR, these are primarily focused on regional opponents except for North Torbia, which also uses its capabilities against its own populace.

Infrastructure

The region displays a great mix of infrastructure levels throughout the countries, from old and dilapidated to modern and robust. Around half of the populace resides in cities; the one notable exception is South Torbia, where nine out of ten residents live in an urban environment. As is common worldwide, utilities and transportation are both more modern and more prevalent/available in urban than rural areas. Power generation relies heavily on fossil fuels, though hydropower is also used. All countries have mass transit, airports, and seaports, though condition and usage varies. The easiest and most common method of international travel in the region is by water, mainly due to abundant sea access and the relatively high cost of airfare. South Torbia and Olvana display the most modern and capable infrastructure, while North Torbia falls at the opposite end of the spectrum. Belesia and Gabal are attempting to expand and improve their infrastructure systems, but are limited by lack of available funds.

Physical Environment

Four of the five countries in DATE Pacific lie in an archipelago bounded by the Philippine Sea to the east, the South China Sea to the west, and the Celebes Sea to the south. While Gabal, North Torbia, and South Torbia lie entirely within this island group, Belesia also possesses the northernmost part of the island of Borneo, which lies to the southwest. The islands are mountainous in nature, with interspersed lowland valleys and low coastal plains on the larger islands. Mountain ranges are heavily forested, while valleys are typically fertile and comprise most of the subregion’s arable land. Vegetation and climate are tropical in nature. Major geographic features include peninsulas, volcanos—both active and inactive—and

ⁱⁱ Information warfare consists of seven components: electronic warfare, computer attack, information attack, deception, physical destruction, protection and security measures, and perception management.

both surface and subsurface caves. Though common, rivers are not long and are only navigable for short distances, if at all. The most important bodies of water are the seas, which provide both sustenance and a means of transportation. Multiple natural hazards exist, including droughts, earthquakes, floods, forest fires, land and mudslides, tropical cyclones, tsunamis, and volcanic activity.

The fifth country, Olvana, lies in the eastern portion of the Asian continent and borders the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea from north to south. Its terrain contains a mix of mountains, basins, plateaus, and plains, with the only major difference between north and south is that the northern part has highlands, while the south has river deltas. The terrain in the west is extremely mountainous, progressing into basins, plateaus and plains as one progresses eastward. The eastern coast is a mix of plains and urban terrain, with some mountains in the southeast. The fertile Yangtze River Valley starts in the center of the country and flows east to East China Sea. Both vegetation and climate vary greatly, based on location and elevation, and arable land is relatively scarce. Natural hazards include typhoons, flash floods, land and mudslides, earthquakes, droughts and tsunamis.

Time

All DATE Pacific countries use the Gregorian calendar. Belesia, Gabal, and South Torbia are in time zone GMT +8.0, Olvana is an hour different at GMT +7.0, and North Torbia sets its clocks at GMT +8.5. None of the regional countries observe Daylight Savings Time (DST).

Approaches to time vary throughout the region. Gabal and Belesia have a relaxed approach to time and often work on several tasks simultaneously; doing things “in order” is a foreign concept. South Torbians behave similarly when it comes to personal and local matters, but conduct business with foreigners using a formal, “in order” manner. While the Ovlanese also focus on several things at once, they are very conscious of time and live by the adage, “He who arrives on time is already late.” North Torbians follow a similar philosophy, with the added impetus of extremely negative consequences if one should be tardy.

Conclusion

The DATE OEs focus on the relevant characteristics of each region so that exercise participants can appreciate the unique challenges of a regional rotation. In the case of the Pacific, economic, political, and social dynamics may be amplified beyond what they’ve witnessed in other experiences. Additionally, the lack of easy land access, substantial maritime issues, and political sensitivities will further complicate setting their theater and follow-on operations. Applied in the right context, DATE Pacific gives soldiers the opportunity to challenge their assumptions, and test their theater access and expeditionary concepts in a unique manner.

Figure Credits

Banner: TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI and TRADOC G-2 Global Cultural Knowledge Network (GCKN). “DATE Pacific Countries.” June 2018.

Figure 1: TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI and TRADOC G-2 GCKN. “DATE Pacific Subregion.” June 2018.

Figure 2: TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI and TRADOC G-2 GCKN. “DATE Pacific Region.” June 2018.

Figure 3: TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI and TRADOC G-2 GCKN. “DATE Pacific Terrain.” June 2018.




Figure 3. DATE Pacific Terrain



Introduction to DATE Africa

by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

During the past year, ACE-TI personnel have been creating a new version of the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) that is based on the African continent. This article provides a brief introduction to DATE Africa through excerpts taken from the current draft of this upcoming product. At present, ACE-TI expects to release DATE Africa on the [Operational Environment \(OE\) Data Integration Network \(ODIN\)](#)ⁱ platform by 1 October 2018.

The purpose of the **Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) Africa** is to provide the US Army training community with a detailed description of the conditions of four composite operational environments (OEs) in the African region. It presents trainers with a tool to assist in the construction of scenarios for specific training events. It is not a full scenario but is sufficiently robust to allow scenario developers to set the conditions to exercise unit mission essential task list (METL) items.. DATE Africa presents hybrid OE conditions found across the entire continent using the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) variables. This DATE applies to all US Army units (Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve) and partner nations that participate in DATE-compliant Army or joint training exercises.

Over 795,000 square miles comprise DATE Africa, a varied and complex region that ranges from Lake Victoria in the west to the Indian Ocean on its eastern coast. The region includes the fictional countries of Amari, Kujenga, Nyumba, and Ziwa. The region has a long history of instability and conflict; ethnic and religious factionalism; and general political, military, and civilian unrest. In addition to these internal regional divisions, outside actors have increasing strategic interests in the region. DATE Africa thus represents a flashpoint where highly localized conflict can spill over into widespread unrest or general war.

Key Points

- The countries in the region have experienced dramatic changes in governing regimes over the last few decades.
- Political, economic, and environmental changes have created societal pressures that spawn conflict between nations, political factions, international players, and potential threat actors.
- The complex tapestry of ethnic, tribal, linguistic and religious loyalties makes diplomatic and military operations in the region difficult.
- US forces may be required to conduct operations in the region in a wide range of roles and will likely operate in a combined effort with other forces.

Discussion of the OEs within the DATE Africa Operational Environment

Republic of Amari

Amari, with its capital at Kisumu, is a functioning and relatively stable democracy, receiving significant support from the US and other Western countries. The country gained independence from a Western European colonial power in 1968, during a time when colonial powers were divesting themselves of their African colonies. The government consists of an executive branch with a strong president, a bicameral legislature, and a judiciary with an associated hierarchy of courts. Amari is making significant progress in areas of good governance, but still struggles with institutional corruption. A new

ⁱ See page 21 of this issue of *Red Diamond* for more information on ODIN.

constitution, implemented seven years ago, has attempted to create a framework for better governance with good results. Ethnic and tribal tensions play out in multi-party politics, which has led to a history of electoral violence and distrust of the government. The last election was uniquely free of the violence of past elections. Other concerns include border security, instability spillover from neighboring countries, regional competition for resources, and terrorism.

The Amari National Defense Force (ANDF) is the state military of Amari. Its composition, disposition, and doctrine are the result of years of relative peace. Internal security and the constant struggle against border incursions continue to shape its structure and roles. The ANDF consists of the Amari Army, Air Force, and Navy. Amari paramilitary forces include the Border Guard Corps and Special Reserve Force. The ANDF is a well-integrated and professional force with good command and control and high readiness. It has a limited force projection capability and a mixture of static and mobile forces. Amari is an active contributor to both regional and international peacekeeping forces and has hosted such forces within its borders.

Republic of Kujenga

Kujenga gained semi-independence in 1962 under a post-colonial United Nations mandated trusteeship. Three years later, the country gained full independence, establishing a constitution built on a single-party political system. Working under the UN mandate, the outgoing colonial power lent support to the group of elites who had made up the bureaucracy under colonial rule. These elites united under the political party People of Change (POC). They have since controlled the government through successive elections, except for a brief experiment with multi-party rule seven years ago that ended five years later with the subsequent election.

After independence, Kujenga established diplomatic relations with the United States. Relations between the two countries have been strained at various times because of Kujenga's tight-knit oligarchic political structure and repressive tendencies. Ongoing tensions and violence between the Kujengan government and the Tanga region brought US condemnation. The Kujengan government is focused on addressing rampant corruption and government inaction, but the country has also experienced a shrinking of democratic space.

The Kujenga Armed Service (KAS) is the state military of the Republic of Kujenga. It emerged from a somewhat turbulent past and a range of internal security challenges. Kujenga's military relations with its neighbors are relatively stable, although border security issues and ongoing tensions in the Tanga region increase the risk of regional conflict. The KAS consists of the Kujengan Army, Kujengan National Air Force, Kujengan National Navy, and Security Corps. The country's primary internal security concerns include Tanga separatists, violent bush militias in the central mountains, and the brutal "Army of Justice and Purity" guerrillas in the Kasama region. External threats include border incursions by presumed Amarian paramilitaries and cross-border smuggling.

Democratic Republic of Nyumba

Nyumba is a troubled nation and has had little in the form of democracy since its inception. It has been primarily ruled by authoritarian governments and wracked with internal turmoil and paranoia about perceived external threats. It is suspicious of regional government alliances with Western countries and, particularly, what the Nyumba government leaders see as international meddling in its sovereign domestic and regional concerns.




Figure 1. Countries of DATE Africa

The government is authoritarian in all aspects. Beginning in 1959, a military coup overthrew the newly elected civilian government, lasting only six years before an Islamist government took power. While the government remains based in Sharia law, tribal influences dominate the government as well. Economic, religious, ethnic, and tribal interests complicate Nyumban politics and have led to decades of civil war and other internal conflicts. These conflicts have threatened border countries with refugees and provided a safe haven for terrorists, insurgents, criminals, and other disrupters. These deep-seated challenges show no signs of dissipating.

The Nyumban Armed Forces (NAF) is the state military of Nyumba and is key to the country's stability. The NAF has experienced significant challenges from both the various threat actors in Nyumba, and distrust within its ranks and from politicians. Civilian distrust is particularly high, leading to widespread tribalism and the rise of armed militias. Its composition and deployments are driven by political desires to maintain control of key forces and the de facto ceding of territory to tribes or armed groups. The NAF consists of the Nyumban National Army, the Nyumban Armed Forces Air Corps, and the Nyumban Navy. The Nyumban National Security Service controls a paramilitary group, the Rapid Security Forces, which is usually deployed in support of border and anti-insurgency operations. The NAF has inherited a varied structure and culture due to several regime changes and its colonial legacy. The lawlessness of the territory and general instability has heightened both political and military leaders' wariness of the armed forces.

Republic of Ziwa

Ziwa is a small landlocked nation located on the southern end of Lake Victoria. Despite a troubled past, the country is making progress toward greater transparency and good governance. Its development path stems from political turmoil in the last few decades and a growing economy, largely based on technical advancements and extensive mineral resources. Ziwa seeks to become a key player on the continent, but has experienced internal dissent and been affected by regional disputes. Ziwa's history since gaining independence in 1961 is one of coups, disputed elections, regional and ethnic violence, and general instability. While Ziwa has demonstrated intent to improve its governance, a lack of deep-rooted democratic and civil society institutions make it one of the most vulnerable and unstable countries in the region.

The Ziwa People's Defense Force (ZPDF) is the state military of the Republic of Ziwa. Its structure and focus has adapted over the last decade alongside the country's economic development. The ZPDF consists of the Ziwa Ground Forces Command, Ziwa Air Corps, and the National Guard. Ziwa's military relations with its neighbors—Amari to the north and Kujenga to the south—is generally stable, despite sporadic low-level incidents along the border. The scope of border control operations has contributed to the forward deployment of dedicated maneuver elements and leveraging of former rebels to ensure the appearance of security.

Multiple threats exist to exploit Ziwa's dependence on natural resources and external power generation and transmission. Brutal militants in the northeast mountain area ("The Watasi Gang") and pockets of ethnic rebels throughout the country continue to plague stability and keep the military at continually high operational tempo. Although both Kujenga and Amari have active security agreements with Ziwa, rumors persist of covert support to the rebels by both countries.

Strategic Positioning

The greater African OE is one of the most politically dynamic regions in the world. Almost nowhere else have geopolitical forces and regional ambitions combined to produce such volatile results. State developments ranging from gradual reforms to often violent regime change have occurred throughout the region's history. Although the region may not have been the primary focus of global geopolitical contests, it has often been a factor in the larger geopolitical landscape. This volatility is not likely to change in the coming years as multipolarity continues to increase throughout the region.

Coinciding with increased international interest, the region's states have grown stronger over the past several years, exerting their sovereignty in ways that challenge the post-Cold-War development and humanitarian models. International players have increased pressure to gain a foothold on the continent. As the countries in the larger OE reach out to forge new relationships, they find a range of willing potential partners with a diverse set of motives. Non-state threat actors have also found fertile ground for often extremist messages. Uneven economic growth and the injection of international anti-terrorism military aid have empowered some states while channeling resources to specific interest groups in power, specifically to the executive and security sector. However, this will not guarantee stability or equitable human development. Rather, the region may see more money pouring into the system along with alternate seats of power and contestation.

Strengthening centers of power could prevent nonviolent political change from emerging. Ambitious leaders in the periphery may then resort to violence to unseat ruling regimes that themselves came to power as products of deeply embedded ethnic conflicts, cross-border regional power projection, and horizontal inequalities. The regional OE is often viewed as a “political marketplace,” the challenges of which could begin to lead the region down a violent path. The region has always had to weather changes in the international context, while also managing significant local political conflicts and economic problems. The legacy of internal legitimacy deficits co-exists within an international context that often undermines the development of local solutions. While regional integration has increased regional stability and the level of cross-border interference has declined, the future is anything but certain as international, regional, and national forces strain the ability of national and regional institutions to regulate and manage nonviolent change.

Regional Views of the US

The OE countries voice mixed views of American soft and military power. There is little consensus about US-style democracy and many oppose the spread of American ideas and customs in Africa and around the world. At the same time, many in the region still believe the US respects the personal freedoms of its people and aspire to similar freedoms. While the US and other nations have been involved in widely popular peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, the presence of outside forces has been a rallying cry for disenfranchised groups. The general pull away from US intervention in the region has been aided by aggressive inroads from other external countries, such as Olvana,ⁱⁱ that promise to supply an alternative to previously undisputed economic and military power.

Regional PMESII-PT Overview

Political

The governments in DATE Africa are vulnerable to widespread corruption, entrenched political leaders who repeatedly amend constitutions to extend their rule, and the historical absence of a democratic political culture. They are apt to place legal restrictions on civil society. A history of coups, civil conflicts, and political stalemates between opposing factions suggest a potential for democratic backsliding across the region. Weak and failed states contain ungoverned spaces that provide operational bases for numerous irregular threats.

Military

The countries represented in DATE Africa are a cross-section and composite of states and state forces. State forces have evolved from a diverse set of conditions including colonial histories, to a succession of regime changes and revolutions. They are generally pragmatic in both structure and equipment—the result of constrained budgets and constantly changing threat conditions. The forces of the more modernized countries, such as Amari and Ziwa, are generally more integrated, better-equipped, and more professional. At-risk countries, such as Kujenga and Nyumba, demonstrate tribal or ethnic segregation, degraded readiness, and a structuring for regime survival. Participation in regional or international peacekeeping forces and exercises is often as much to train and equip their own forces as to develop interoperability and cooperation. A variety of threat groups and endemic criminal activity throughout the region contend to destabilize governments or build power in difficult-to-govern areas.

Economic

The economic conditions in the four countries cover a wide spectrum, ranging from modern economic systems to reliance on traditional cash-only systems. In all of the countries, the underlying structure of family and tribe motivate most economic transactions and policies. Corruption is an issue in the region, with the level varying by country, as is organized criminal activity.

The often unstable economic and security situations across the continent have allowed such activities to flourish. Elsewhere in the world, corrupting and co-opting of government officials by criminal enterprises is usually to gain operating freedom. In the DATE Africa countries, such activities are competitive enablers, intended to gain access to internal and external markets. How these large-scale domestic criminal enterprises and international criminal organizations manifest are characteristic of each country’s circumstances and history.

ⁱⁱ See “Introduction to DATE Pacific” on page 9 for more information on Olvana.

Social

The countries in the region present a mix of social influences. Each country has a large number of diverse ethnicities—of which a specific one may or may not make up a majority of the population—and multiple languages and dialects. Islam, Christianity, and indigenous religions all play a role in both individual and group interactions. A large youth bulge and continued high birth rate is common throughout the region. Under these circumstances, megacities will continue to grow rapidly, poverty will persist, and governments will struggle to provide basic services. Insurgent and terrorist groups will seek to exploit these conditions though competing with the state to provide social services; employing violence to intimidate political opposition; using terror attacks to provoke external actors into delegitimizing military interventions; and aggressively recruiting among the region's youth.

Information

The countries all recognize the importance and influence of media and its control. Approaches range from low technical capabilities with tight governmental control to rapidly modernizing technical capabilities with ineffective attempts by the government to control the public's perceptions. New means of information-sharing using modern technology are rapidly adopted by the population, unless the government intervenes in an attempt to control information flow. Countries jump directly from limited landline telephone systems to ubiquitous cell phone usage. Distances and improvements in technology, software, and infrastructure allow African countries to implement new information systems at a very rapid pace. In several instances, countries are on the cutting edge of adopting new information technology to enhance the public's standard of living. Other instances see the leaders of a country attempting to control access to information systems to remain in power and to exploit it for their own benefit.




Figure 2. Regional Infrastructure Architecture Diagram

Developed infrastructure correlates with population density. Amari's main cities—Nairobi, Kampala and Mombasa—are key nodes of the 800-mile Northern Victoria Corridor, a road, rail, and pipeline network. Kujenga follows Amari in both population and infrastructure development, with the competing Dar Es Salaam-Kigoma Corridor linking the Indian Ocean

Infrastructure

African infrastructure is expensive. Long distances, low population densities, uneven management, and intraregional competition contribute to these costs. Infrastructure projects usually emphasize expensive rehabilitation over basic maintenance. The World Bank estimates that about 30% of Africa's infrastructure requires rehabilitation—even more in rural and conflict-prone areas.

Despite the cost, both domestic and international players are keen to expand the region's infrastructure. States control most infrastructure systems, but public-private partnerships are increasingly more common. The World Bank and international development finance institutions provide most of the financing, followed by domestic government financing. Olvana is the largest financier and constructor of African infrastructure.

The typical project involves a consortium of non-African state development agencies, international government organizations, private financiers, and construction companies. Following the financing announcement, spending or progress is hard to trace until the project is complete. A large portion of the announced projects are either scaled back or never completed. In some cases, competing projects do not have the demand to justify the large investments.

port of Dar Es Salaam with Lake Tanganyika and Ziwa's capital, Mwanza, on the southern shore of Lake Victoria. A major north-south transportation artery runs through Moyale in Nyumba, crossing into Amari just south of Isiolo, through Nairobi to Mbeya, Kujenga, in the south. Nyumba, Amari, and Kujenga all compete to be the Indian Ocean gateway of choice to landlocked countries.

Proposed infrastructure projects are increasingly gathering strong opposition through both standard and social media, quickly gathering international support. The more disruptive to the environment, the more opposition they garner. Examples include port expansion and coal power plant construction in Lamu, Nyumba, and transportation corridors bisecting wildlife ranges in all four countries. Opposition campaigns often start on social media sites and increasingly evolve to on-site demonstrations.

Physical Environment

Though making up less than a fifth of Africa, the DATE Africa region includes most of the geographic and climatological features present on the continent. The central features are the Eastern and Western Rift Valleys that run from Kujenga in the south all the way to northwest Nyumba in the north. They are home to the African Great Lakes, which are the origins for both the Congo and Nile Rivers. Their peaks also make up the highest elevations in Africa. Eastward from the Rift, descending savanna and desert meet the Indian Ocean along an expansive coastline containing the natural deep-water ports of Dar Es Salaam in Kujenga, Mombasa in Kenya and, to lesser extents, Lamu and Kismaayo in Nyumba.

Lake Victoria is the world's largest tropical freshwater lake and sustains an ever-growing population. Despite the relative water wealth contained in the Great Lakes, much of the region suffers from water stress or water scarcity. Man-made crop irrigation is minimal and the major perennial rivers flowing to the Indian Ocean are prone to severe flooding during the rainy seasons.

Time

All DATE Africa countries use the Gregorian calendar. However, within that daily routine, great importance is paid to the rising and setting of the sun. As is common in equatorial Africa, none of the regional countries observe Daylight Savings Time (DST).

While Western approaches to time are *o'clock*, or by the clock; regional attitudes towards time are the opposite. In many rural areas, some of the elder population might not even have access to a clock or watch. However, their apparent lack of concern for clock time should not be mistaken for an inability to accomplish key tasks. The local populations will commit energy to their tasks with great industry, on their timetable, to achieve their own goals.

Across the whole region there is a much more flexible approach to time. "Africa time" is very much a thing. In short, Africa time means things will happen when they happen; there is no point worrying about what might be. For example, you cannot control the rain—if it rains and crops grow, so be it. Conversely, if it doesn't rain they will not grow. You cannot plan to harvest crops that depend on rain because you cannot control the rain. Once the differing approach to time is understood, business with DATE Africa countries should be straightforward. Attempting to rush them or impose a Western approach to time will not be of benefit to either US forces or the host nation. This is the case in the cities as well as the countryside.




Figure 3. DATE Africa Terrain

Conclusion

The DATE OEs focus on the relevant characteristics of each region so that exercise participants can appreciate the unique challenges of a regional rotation. In the case of Africa, economic, political and ethnic dynamics may be amplified beyond what they've witnessed in other experiences. Additionally, the unforgiving and extreme terrain, and austere or overburdened infrastructure will further complicate setting their theater and follow-on operations to a scale rarely seen elsewhere. Applied in the right context, DATE Africa gives soldiers the opportunity to challenge their assumptions, and test their theater access and expeditionary concepts on a new level.

Figure Credits

Banner: TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI and TRADOC G-2 Global Cultural Knowledge Network (GCKN). "DATE Africa Countries." June 2018.

Figure 1: TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI and TRADOC G-2 Global Cultural Knowledge Network (GCKN). "Countries of DATE Africa." June 2018.

Figure 2: TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI. "Regional Infrastructure Architecture Diagram." June 2018.

Figure 3: TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI and TRADOC G-2 Global Cultural Knowledge Network (GCKN). "DATE Africa Terrain." June 2018.



Combating Terrorism (CbT) Poster Cyber 18-06
TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

Train to Protect and Respond — Readiness

Active Shooter Terrorism

! Follow Instructions of Law Enforcement and Police Officers.

- 1 Keep both hands up and visible.***
- 2 Do not carry or hold any items.***
- 3 EVACUATE to safe space.***

US Army TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment Enterprise
For more on Threats/Opposing Forces for Training—Go to <https://atn.army.mil/>
Click "Menu" and Click "OE/OPFOR Publications"—Search folders and retrieve files

ATN
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(Image: USAF A1C C. Worpel)



DELIVERING ACE-TI TO YOUR DOORSTEP



by [Laura Deatrick](#) (CGI CTR) and [Jon H. Moilanen](#) (DAC), TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration

Two important updates for easy access have been made to the way ACE-TI delivers products to its customers. First, the Army Training Network (ATN) has recently revised its website design. While the new ATN has improved search capabilities and other updated features, the previous link to the ACE-TI page is no longer valid. These changes have also affected the direct links to ACE-TI's products. New link to ACE-TI's ATN page and to popular products are shown below.

Table 1. Popular ACE-TI Products and Associated Links on ATN

ACE-TI Main Page	https://atn.army.mil/tradoc-g22-analysis-and-control-element-(ace)/operational-environment-and-training-products-tr
Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE)	https://atn.army.mil/tradoc-g22-analysis-and-control-element-(ace)/operational-environment-and-training-products-tr/decisive-action-training-environment-and-regionall
Operational Environment Assessments (OEAs)	https://atn.army.mil/tradoc-g22-ace/operational-environment-and-training-products-tr/operational-environments-(oeas),-oe-quick-guides
Red Diamond Newsletter	https://atn.army.mil/tradoc-g22-analysis-and-control-element-(ace)/operational-environment-and-training-products-tr/red-diamond-newsletter
Training Circular 7-100 Series/Opposing Force Threat Force Structure	https://atn.army.mil/tradoc-g22-analysis-and-control-element-(ace)/operational-environment-and-training-products-tr/opfor-threat-force-structure
Threat Reports and Handbooks	https://atn.army.mil/tradoc-g22-ace/operational-environment-and-training-products-tr/threat-reports-and-handbooks
Threat Tactics Reports	https://atn.army.mil/tradoc-g22-analysis-and-control-element-(ace)/operational-environment-and-training-products-tr/threat-tactics-reports
Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG)	https://atn.army.mil/tradoc-g22-ace/operational-environment-and-training-products-tr/worldwide-equipment-guide-(weg)

Second, ACE-TI is pleased to announce that the Operational Environment Data Integration Network (ODIN) is now operational. ODIN offers a web-based version of the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG), the Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series, and DATE Caucasus (formerly known as DATE 3.0), all on a freely accessible website. A TRADOC G-2 video that provides more details on the ODIN website and its contents can be found on YouTube at <https://youtu.be/3-olyNchb8I>. PDF versions of the 2016 WEG, TC 7-100 series, and DATE Caucasus will continue to be available on ATN, but will not be updated; all updates for these products will now appear exclusively on the ODIN platform. The direct link to ODIN is <https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/>; links are also on ACE-TI's main ATN page and those for these products.

Figures 1 and 2 on the next two pages display basic navigation from the ATN and ODIN home pages.

Figure & Table Credits

Banner: Army Training Network. "ATN Logo." Accessed 13 June 2018; TRADOC G-2. "ODIN Logo." Accessed 13 June 2018.

Table 1: TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI. "Popular ACE-TI Products and Associated Links on ATN." June 2018.

Figure 1: TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI. "Navigating through ATN." June 2018.

Figure 2: TRADOC G-2 ACE-TI. "Navigating through ODIN." June 2018.

Figure 1. Navigating Through ATN


G-2 Operational Environment and Opposing Forces on the Army Training Network

1 Go to <https://atn.army.mil>

2 Click "Menu"

3 Click "OE/OPFOR Publications"

! Search Folders and Retrieve Files



The screenshot shows the ATN (Army Training Network) homepage. The navigation path is as follows:

- Step 1: Go to <https://atn.army.mil>
- Step 2: Click "Menu" (indicated by a red arrow pointing to the "MENU" button in the top left corner)
- Step 3: Click "OE/OPFOR Publications" (indicated by a red arrow pointing to the "OE/OPFOR Publications" link in the "Unit Training Management" section)

The final screen shows the "OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND TRAINING PRODUCTS - TRADOC G-22 ACE" section. A list of folders and files is displayed, including:

- Operational Environment (OE)
- Opposing Force (OPFOR)/Hybrid Threat Doctrine
- Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE)
- Red Diamond Newsletter
- Threat Tactics Reports
- Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG)
- OPFOR/DATE Leader's smart book
- OE Assessments (OEs), OE Quick Guides and OE Threat Assessments
- Threat Reports and Handbooks
- FMSO's Bookshelf, OE Watch Newsletter and Special Essays
- Threat Tactics Course
- Operational Environment Master Plan (OEMP)

The TRADOC G-2 logo is also visible in the bottom right corner of the screenshot.

Figure 2. Navigating Through ODIN

G-2 Operational Environment and Opposing Forces on the OE Data Integration Network

1 Go to <https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/>




2 Click Desired Database

Welcome To ODIN

3 Use the Buttons to Navigate...

! ...or Use the Search Function



What ACE Threats Integration Supports for YOUR Readiness

- ◆ Determine Operational Environment (OE) conditions for Army training, education, and leader development.
- ◆ Design, document, and integrate hybrid threat opposing forces (OPFOR) doctrine for near-term/midterm OEs.
- ◆ Develop and update threat methods, tactics, and techniques in HQDA Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series.
- ◆ Design and update Army exercise design methods-learning model in TC 7-101/7-102.
- ◆ Develop and update the US Army *Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE)*.
- ◆ Develop and update the US Army *Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment (RAFTE)* products.
- ◆ Conduct Threat Tactics Course resident at Fort Leavenworth, KS.
- ◆ Conduct Threat Tactics mobile training team (MTT) at units and activities.
- ◆ Support terrorism-antiterrorism awareness in threat models and OEs.
- ◆ Research, author, and publish OE and threat related classified/unclassified documents for Army operational and institutional domains.
- ◆ Support Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and Home Station Training (HST) and OE Master Plan reviews and updates.
- ◆ Support TRADOC G-2 threat and OE accreditation program for Army Centers of Excellence (CoEs), schools, and collective training at sites for Army/USAR/ARNG.
- ◆ Respond to requests for information (RFIs) on threat and OE issues.

ACE Threats Integration POCs

Angela Williams DAC	Interim Branch Chief	angela.m.williams298.civ@mail.mil	-7929
MAJ EJ Kesselring	Deputy Branch Chief	emil.j.kesselring@mail.mil	-7898
WO2 Danny Evans	UK LO to ACE-TI	daniel.j.evans92.fm@mail.mil	-7994
LTC Bryce Frederickson	Threats Officer	bryce.e.frederickson@mail.mil	-7930
Jerry England DAC	Threat Models/WEG	jerry.j.england.civ@mail.mil	-7934
Kris Lechowicz DAC	Threat Tactics Course	kristin.d.lechowicz.civ@mail.mil	-7922
Dr. Jon H. Moilanen DAC	Threat Doctrine	jon.h.moilanen.civ@mail.mil	-7928
Walt Williams DAC	TELD & LO to JMRC	walter.l.williams112.civ@mail.mil	-7923
Brian Allen CGI	Threat Analysis	brian.d.allen44.ctr@mail.mil	913-684-7948
Rick Burns BMA	Threat Analysis	richard.b.burns4.ctr@mail.mil	DSN:552-7987
Laura Deatrick CGI	Thr Analysis & Editing	laura.m.deatrick.ctr@mail.mil	-7925
Jay Hunt CGI	Threat Analysis/TTC	james.d.hunt50.ctr@mail.mil	-7960
Pat Madden BMA	LO to MCTP	patrick.m.madden16.ctr@mail.mil	-7997
Mike Marsh CGI	Threat Analysis	michael.g.marsh3.ctr@mail.mil	-7897
Brad Marvel CGI	Threat Analysis	bradley.a.marvel.ctr@mail.mil	-5963
Matt Matthews IDSI	Threat Analysis	matt.m.matthews.ctr@mail.mil	-7919
Dave Pendleton CGI	Threat Analysis	henry.d.pendleton.ctr@mail.mil	-7946
Jamie Stevenson CGI	Threat Analysis	james.e.stevenson3.ctr@mail.mil	-7995
Wayne Sylvester CGI	Threat Analysis	vernon.w.sylvester.ctr@mail.mil	-7939
Marc Williams ThreatTec	LO to NTC/JRTC	james.m.williams257.ctr@mail.mil	-7943