



Red Diamond

Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate

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


HORN OF AFRICA-OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ASSESSMENT

by Angela Wilkins, OE Assessment Team Lead (BMA Ctr)

The *Horn of Africa Operational Environment Assessment* will be released this Fall 2013. TRISA-CTID's Operational Environment Assessments (OEAs) are comprehensive documents detailing conditions of an operational environment (OE) based on the PMESII-PT [Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time] variables. This newest OEA will focus on the Horn of Africa (HOA), which includes seven countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan.

Since CTID produced a Horn of Africa (HOA) OEA in 2008, this new version is often referred to as an update, but in reality it's much more than that. Our analysts have thoroughly reviewed all PMESII-PT elements of the now seven countries that comprise the OE, so trainers will have accurate, relevant, and current information easily accessible prior to any deployments to the area. Another useful document is the [Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment – Africa](#), which identifies conditions that are likely to be present in any African OE. Inherent in its design is a composite of real-world African conditions for training to be used in conjunction with the [Decisive Action Training Environment \(DATE\)](#) to prepare soldier for deployments when the exact location is not known. Both the HOA OEA and RAFTE-Africa are real-world, and both are effective training tools. (Continued at page 4.)



The 2013 *Horn of Africa (HOA) OEA* from TRISA-CTID is a complete update.

RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST

by Dr. Jon H. Moilanen, TRISA-CTID Operations and Chief, *Red Diamond* Newsletter (BMA Ctr)

This issue of **Red Diamond** features articles on advanced situational awareness training by the Wargaming, Experimentation, Test, and Evaluation Directorate (WETED), and a study on displaced Syrians and Jordanian stability by the Modeling & Simulation Directorate and Operational Environment Laboratory.

An article on electromagnetic pulse (EMP) as a weapon focuses on possible North Korean intentions and evolving ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities.

The Ferghana Valley, a valley that spans three Central Asian countries' borders, presents an excellent case of a operational environment (OE) for study and analysis with the complex variables of PMESII-PT.

The CTID Threat Report *Barisan Revolusi Nasional* discusses an Islamist insurgency in southern Thailand and reviews BRN ambush tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Another article presents a model for training and understanding persistent conflict in an insurgency operational environment (OE) with OPFOR.

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US ARMY TRADOC

KNOW THE ENEMY

TRISA

Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate

- ◆ Insurgents
- ◆ Guerrillas
- ◆ Terrorists
- ◆ Criminals
- ◆ Affiliates
- ◆ Adherents

TC 7-100.3 CTID Approved FINAL DRAFT

Know the Threat in Complex OE

With Army Knowledge Online Access—Go to: <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/40913959>

Know the Threat—Know the Enemy

Training Readiness

U.S. Army TRADOC
G2 Intelligence Support Activity

TRISA Combating Terrorism (CbT)
Poster No. 11-13
(Photo: DOD Image)

Irregular Opposing Forces

TRISA-CTID Approved Final DRAFT JUL 2013

Director's Corner: Thoughts for Training Readiness



by Jon Cleaves, Director, Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate

One of the major objectives of the [Decisive Action Training Environment \(DATE\)](#) is to provide a training environment in which multiple echelons and training venues can be linked to conduct a synchronized, distributed exercise. Picture, if you will, a future training event where one BCT is live at one CTC, a second BCT is live in a second CTC, the rest of the division is in a MCTP WFX, the pilots of the supporting Apache squadron are lieutenants flying simulators in BOLC and the higher command structure is a War College class—all operating simultaneously in the same exercise and environment. Exciting stuff. But also hard to make happen.

One of the many challenges to this future goal is that the DATE must be and remain consistent across echelons and venues. If different venues (CTCs, Centers of Excellence (CoEs), unit training centers, etc.) have different versions of the material in DATE, then the ability to conduct a distributed, synchronized exercise becomes problematic.

We recognize that the various training venues out there have different, specific needs. We realize that the current version of DATE (2.0) does not go into every detail of every aspect of every inch of ground. Venues will want to—and have begun to—add granularity to DATE as they build scenarios from it in order to meet their needs. That is OK, but it must be done in a coordinated and quality controlled manner.


Approval for changes to DATE rests in my office. We are absolutely ready to incorporate changes requested from the field to make DATE ever more detailed and responsive. We just need to have visibility over these proposed changes. If one CTC wants a province boundary added and a town name changed, we can probably accommodate that. But if it happens one way at a given CTC and a different way at a given CoE, then things begin to unravel and down the road we will have multiple versions of DATE which defeats its major purposes.

The method we request is that proposed changes to DATE be requested of this office. We will review, edit, alter for consistency, and when complete: approve, integrate and disseminate. Venues are specifically prohibited by policy from making their own unapproved changes to DATE, and the reasons for this are the ones I have already discussed. But DATE was built with the cooperation and input of the various venues that it is designed to serve and will continue to be built with that same collaboration. As changes are proposed and approved, we require that approved modified versions and supplemental material be marked with the graphic below. In this way, other users of the material will be able to differentiate draft material from that which has been approved for use Army- and JIIM-wide.

Thanks for being a great set of partners in this enterprise.

Jon

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HOA OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ASSESSMENT—TO BE RELEASED FALL 2013

Horn of Africa Operational Environment Assessment (OEA) (Continued from Page 1)

by Angela Wilkins, OE Assessment Team Leader (BMA Ctr)

While certain conditions have not changed significantly in terms of culture and economics, the effects of ongoing conflict (such as between Eritrea and Ethiopia) and the continued presence of threat groups (al Shabaab in Somalia, for example) negatively shapes the HOA OE. These negative elements can have cumulative detrimental effects that impair the stability of the governments in the individual countries and keep the people impoverished and at risk, not only in terms of health (HIV/AIDS continues to be a serious problem), but also in the context of safety and sustainability of life and home.




Figure 1. Horn of Africa OEA and regional areas of interest (2013)

Several changes occurring over the course of the last six years also contribute to instability in the HOA OE. The most visible change to the region since 2008 is the split of Sudan into two countries, Sudan and South Sudan. This split became official in July 2011 after a referendum in January of that year. Since the division, conflict over oil profits presents problems in the two countries. Currently, Sudan is threatening to shut down the Sudan/South Sudan oil pipeline.

Natural disasters along with local and international politics contribute to important changes in these countries that are captured within the PMESII-PT variables. A drought throughout 2010 and 2011 was especially devastating for Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, causing famine, migration of large groups of the population, and other economic consequences. Even in the less outwardly hostile countries, such as Djibouti, internal strife is present as evidenced by political party boycotting of elections. In fact, several of the countries' governments have seen changes recently in terms of new parliaments, constitutions, presidents, and prime ministers. In nearly every case there have been protests causing civil unrest, at the very least. Recent international involvement has taken the form of UN sanctions on Eritrea, and US approval of military aid to Somalia. China continues to show interest in the area and is finding ways to gain influence.

Overall the entire HOA OE has significant terrorist group presence, repressive governments, impoverished and only moderately literate populations on average, significant health issues, displacement of citizens, human rights violations,

violence, and only emerging information and technology capabilities. Existing and potential humanitarian, security, and antiterrorism missions are abundant in the Horn of Africa. The AKO link to the *Horn of Africa Operational Environment Assessment* will be publicized in next month's *Red Diamond* newsletter.


TC 7-102, OE CONSIDERATIONS FOR TRAINING AND EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT

by Walter L. Williams, Training-Education-Leader Development Team Leader (DAC)

TC 7-102, *Operational Environment (OE) Considerations for Training and Education Development*, is currently scheduled for publication later this Fall. TC 7-102 was originally scheduled for publication in the Fall of 2012 (refer to the June 2012 Red Diamond article "TC 7-102, Operational Environment Considerations for Training and Education Development to be Released this Fall"). However, due to the delay in the staffing, adjudication, and publication of TR 350-70-XX, *Training and Education Development in Support of the Institutional Domain* (Final Draft), the CTID Training, Education, and Leader Development (TELD) Team delayed the publication of TC 7-102 to ensure there are no inconsistencies with analysis, design, development, implementation, and evaluation (ADDIE) policies and/or procedures.

TC 7-102 outlines a methodology for the incorporation of the OE to support individual training in accordance with ADDIE process. Further, it describes training development procedures and methodologies, responsibilities, and analysis for those who develop lesson plans and training support packages, as well as those who plan and control Army situational training exercises or "lane training" exercises intended as a culminating or capstone training event that critically assesses unit-training status. The TC is applicable to training developers in both the Generating Force and Operational Force.

Currently, CTID TELD is conducting a final review, edit, and indexing of TC 7-102 prior to submission to the Army Publishing Directorate (APD). Additionally, we are reworking some of the graphics within the "Blueprints" section to better discuss lane training as it applies at the institutional level as well as Home Station Training. In the meantime, we strongly encourage training developers to use the 28 June 2013 final draft version of the document on the incorporation of the OE within training, education, and leader development materials until publication and posting of the final approved draft version.



How to get Your Copy of TC 7-102

The final draft of TC 7-102, *Operational Environment Considerations for Training and Education Development*, dated 28 June 2013, is located on the TRISA-Threats AKO webpage and is accessible through the Army Training Network (ATN). The following is a path to get to TC 7-102:

- Access the product via the ATN at <https://atn.army.mil/>
- Once you are on ATN, click on the Links tab.
- Then scroll across to the Training Resources tab and click.
- Then scroll down to the "TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) - Threats" tab and click. You should be at the TRISA CTID folder.
- Scroll or go to page two to the folder "TC 7-102 OE Conditions for Training and Education" and download the document. The folder parameters are set for automatic approval for those requesting access to the document.

For further information, please contact the TC 7-102 principal author Mr Walt Williams, TELD Team Leader, at 913-684-7923 or email at walter.l.williams112.civ@mail.mil.

Advanced Situational Awareness Training:

*Saving Lives
One Vignette at a Time*



TRISA Wargaming, Experimentation, Training, and Evaluation Directorate in Complex Environments
by Mike Sullivan, TRISA WETED Red Team

Toward the end of their time in Fort Benning's Maneuver Center of Excellence's (MCoE) basic leader development courses, armor, cavalry, and infantry officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) spend three or more days in operations observing and interacting with the population in a village that replicates the realities, complexities, and uncertainties they will find when they deploy around the globe carrying out the United States' national military strategy. This happens at Lee Field, a former drop zone and, since late 2011, the "home" of the Maneuver Center of Excellence's (MCoE's) Advanced Situational Awareness Training (ASAT) program. Those responsible for the courses and the program have been told by graduates and senior leaders alike that the time spent in ASAT saves soldier and civilian lives in the end. How ASAT came to be is truly a remarkable tale of how caring leaders, insightful staffs, committed contractors, and willing players can come together to make a good and necessary thing happen.

The core question and challenge facing MCoE decisionmakers was how best to support ASAT in a resource-constrained world. This is where TRISA's Wargaming, Experimentation, Training, and Evaluation Directorate (WETED) got involved.

The question and challenge was: If ASAT was important, then high standards were needed to ensure consistency of outcome for the officers and NCOs putting forth the effort. The Army has long been willing to invest whatever it takes to make sure training has the rigor, fidelity, and intensity to ensure soldiers and leaders go into the field with the skills necessary to succeed and protect themselves. The NTC, CMTC, and JRTC are but the tip of that iceberg.

The ASAT concept was and is ambitious. The students deploy to the field and are spread among several observation posts (OPs) and a command post (CP). The OPs are in places allowing observation of a village at the Lee Field Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) site. The "deployed" students are confronted with multiple scenarios and are expected to detect, process, analyze, and make operational decisions and recommendations regarding the threads of information presented.



Figure 1. Suspected Opposing Force (OPFOR) insurgent-active supporter in village council (example)

Initially, the role players in the village were to be members of the 197th Infantry Brigade, the long established training support unit at Fort Benning. At the beginning of each ASAT iteration, NCOs and soldiers in the brigade were trained to play the roles of insurgents, militia, police, civilian leaders, shopkeepers, teachers, clergy et al. Continuity and consistency were huge challenges for the unit and the trainers of the role players.

The ASAT Program Director had, over time, witnessed WETED's OPFOR (Opposing Force) Emulation at another Fort Benning site in support of other ongoing sets of experiments. In the end, WETED, through a contractor providing the role players, emulators, and subject matter experts to the other site began to build the "cadre" to support ASAT as well as improve the ASAT village site. By late 2012 and into mid-2013, the ASAT program began to flourish as the Army's preeminent example of how to best train leaders in reading the human dynamic in a complex operational environment (OE).



Figure 2. TRISA-WETED threat emulation in training (example)

There is no question that role player ASAT support is an investment. It takes 40-60 "citizens" of varying posture, attitude, and demeanor to demonstrate the behaviors found in the typical village. There are those who say it could and should still be done by the 197th Brigade using soldiers and NCOs trained in the roles. A WETED briefing slide included below lays out the pros and cons of the argument.

Two key features of the site and the cadre of role players and emulators are flexibility and long term potential. Virtually any environment and embedded scenario can be created and portrayed. Currently the village replicates situations the Middle East and Southwest Asia. In short order the village can become a place in the Far East or South or Central America and the role players can be retrained in the behaviors and activities found in those places. The supporting contractors, ThreatTec (provider of the role players, equipment, threat emulators, and subject matter experts) and Orbis (owns the ASAT trademark and conducts the training of the players), pride themselves on their adaptability, responsiveness, and flexibility in getting the job done.

The one significant gap in the environments portrayed is and likely will remain the lack of any linguistic challenge. If the students augment OP effort with active patrolling, any encounter with the villagers and their leaders is done in English. TRADOC and the MCoE are aware of this gap and are examining options for reducing or closing it.

In the course of 2012 and thus far in 2013 more than 5,000 Soldiers and Marines have been trained at and around ASAT. Beyond the NCO and Junior Officer courses, the site and its capabilities are being used and considered by the US Army Sniper School, Ranger Training Brigade, and other combat soldier skill trainers, including small unit unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) employment.

Look at the attached pictures for some examples of what those students "see" from those OPs. It is as real as we can make it and keeps getting better. All involved believe that the investment is well worth the lives it has saved as young leaders are learning how better to see and understand what is happening in their operational environment.

The way ahead for ASAT is to be part of the "Expand Delivery" goal by accepting and meeting the challenges of maintaining continuity in the high standards surrounding threat emulation, managing the resources required to achieve that goal, and constantly adapting the existing capability to the ever-changing strategic and resource environment. It seems clear at this point that a "bench of qualified players" must be built and then able to replicate the ASAT level of OE fidelity in field exercises, experiments, and tests such as AEWE, NIE, Wireless Networked Soldier, and candidate combat

vehicle evaluations. TRADOC G2, through WETED, the supporting contractors, and the Army's Centers of Excellence have set a very high standard for themselves to maintain as new requirements emerge.

THREAT EMULATOR (TE)



- ◆ A Threat Emulator (TE) provides a high fidelity depiction of any operational environment (OE)—trained and validated by TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity's (TRISA) and its Wargaming, Experimentation, and Threat Evaluation Directorate (WETED).
- ◆ Brings “turn-key” solutions to supported events - cultures, costumes, equipment, battlefield effects and technical vehicles.
- ◆ Provides a rigorous representation of any selected OE. Emulates PMESII-PT variables and other environmetrics with a high level of accuracy. Provides a continuity of effort allowing progressive development and improved accuracy through the 50/70/90 solution.
- ◆ Thinks and acts with Threat Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).
- ◆ Through TRADOC G2, Threat Emulators have an open contracting vehicle for ease of acquisition.
- ◆ Threat Emulators are consistently improving the OE depiction through continuity of effort.

Note. Is a Threat Emulator just another name for Roleplayer? No. TEs are trained and certified by TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity Wargaming, Experimentation and Threat Evaluation Directorate (TRISA WETED) to provide the robustness required for Operational Environment (OE) depictions in accordance with AR 350-2 and FM/TC 7-100-series.

Figure 3. Threat emulation options for an opposing force: regular military or paramilitary (example)

Next month we will hear about some recent WETED efforts in support of the Maneuver Command Battle Lab and Unified Quest, the Army Chief of Staff's annual exercise designed to assess the way ahead for the Nation's Ground Force.

Combating Terrorism in Complex Operational Environments

The TRISA *Red Diamond* will periodically present “hip-pocket” examples of tactics and techniques that can be applied in training, education, and leader development. Incident narratives and simplified graphics will assist Soldier-leader situational awareness and understanding of the threat. For more details and a preview of vignette “snapshots,” see TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.07 C3, *A Soldier's Primer to Terrorism TTP* (2012)



SHAPING THE NORTH KOREAN EMP THREAT

by Steffany A. Trofino, Threat Integration Team (DAC)

North Korea's February 2013 nuclear test highlights advancements in the country's nuclear program. Particular attention is being paid to North Korea's new leadership and the arsenal of ballistic missiles the country is speculated to possess. While little is known of North Korea's new leader, Kim Jong-un's incidents of aggressive military behavior have increased substantially since assuming office in December of 2011. North Korea maintains a military first doctrine, yet speculation remains high as to North Korea's full capabilities and intentions with regard to its missile research and development programs.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense annual report to Congress released in February 2013 indicates North Korea's "advances in ballistic-missile delivery systems, coupled with developments in nuclear technology ... are in line with North Korea's stated objective of being able to strike the U.S. homeland."¹ As North Korea seeks to develop missiles capable of reaching the United States, the primary concern on the US should be discovering North Korea's intentions regarding their weapon systems. Could North Korea be working on an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapon system?

The notion of North Korea developing a ballistic missile affixed with a miniaturized nuclear warhead for the purpose of detonation in the atmosphere above the United States has been discussed among analysts for years. Effectively, this would create an EMP wave which would render all electrical systems within the radius of the detonation wave useless. The ramifications of such a weapon, over a period of time, would cause the most collateral damage within the United States with the least amount of cost. According to James Carafano, Senior Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, "Communications would collapse, transportation would halt, and electrical power would simply be nonexistent. Not even a global humanitarian effort would be enough to keep hundreds of millions of Americans from death by starvation, exposure, or lack of medicine."²

Electromagnetic Pulse

The Technology and Standards Division of the National Communications System defines an EMP as "a wide frequency range, high-intensity, extremely rapid, and

short duration burst of electromagnetic energy which produces electric and magnetic fields which can couple to metallic conductors associated with electrical and electronic systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges."³ Mechanisms necessary to deploy an effective EMP weapon entail a nuclear warhead and a ballistic missile capable of reaching a minimum altitude of 30 km. The effectiveness of the EMP weapon depends largely on altitude at time of detonation.



A detonation of a nuclear weapon at an altitude of approximately 500 km above the United States would generate a near-continental wide EMP wave. The effects of such an attack may instantaneously destroy or disrupt substantial portions of the electrical systems that operate the critical infrastructure of the United States, as well as portions of Canada and Mexico.⁴ "An EMP weapon is one of a small number of threats that has the potential to hold American society seriously at risk and that might result in the defeat of our military forces."⁵ The Congressional Electromagnetic Pulse Commission and the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission established that detonating a nuclear weapon high above any part of the United States mainland would generate a catastrophic electromagnetic pulse.⁶

With North Korea's past eight months of missile testing, analysts should note that the patterns indicative of creating an EMP weapon are noticeably present, beginning in December 2012 with North Korea's successful launch of a Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 satellite into orbit. This was followed by the February 2013 underground testing of a nuclear weapon. Finally, between May 18 and 21, North Korea launched six

short-range guided missiles, all of which landed in the Sea of Japan.




Figure 1. [EMP Radius by Burst Altitude, July 1997](#)

North Korea's December 2012 Satellite Launch

There are several capabilities necessary to effectively develop and deploy an EMP weapon. First is the nuclear material. Second would be the capability to shape the nuclear material into the nose of a missile which is known as "miniaturizing." Third is the delivery system; the capability to deploy a ballistic missile with a range adequate enough to reach a minimum 30 km altitude. North Korea's 12 December 2012 deployment of a Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 satellite into low earth orbit equates to a progressive path toward an EMP weapon capability. While little is known of the specifications of the satellite system, the same technology required to launch a satellite into orbit is also used in multistage ballistic missile deployment.⁷ The United States Navy was able to recover the front portion of the rocket used in North Korea's satellite launch. Analysts who reviewed the nose of the missile have concluded Pyongyang "possessed the ability to miniaturize the components necessary to yield a nuclear explosion for a crude warhead that would sit atop a ballistic missile."⁸ Since 2006, North Korea has had at least three successful nuclear tests and orbited a satellite, thus fulfilling the basic technological advancements necessary for an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead against the United States.⁹

North Korea's February 2013 Nuclear Test

On 12 February 2013 North Korea conducted its third underground nuclear test. Analysts concluded that the

February test emitted a stronger blast than the North's previous explosions of 2006 and 2009. In June 2013, *Reuters* reported that "Pyongyang indicated it has made progress in the capability of miniaturizing an atomic weapon which is essential in fitting the nuclear warhead into the cone of a missile."¹⁰ In assessing North Korea's recent test activities, one may notice a pattern leading toward North Korea's intent on developing an EMP weapon. All hallmark characteristics of an EMP weapon system are present. However, creating an EMP weapon system is not a difficult task as North Korea has proven its advancements in missile development and capabilities over the past several years. Effectively delivering the weapon to the appropriate altitude and at a location rendering the weapon most destructive (such as over the heartland of America) would be the challenge for North Korea. This is where the capabilities of a Russia Club K missile system may be most useful to North Korea.

Club K Missile System

During a 2010 tech expo in Indonesia, Russia began to display the Club K missile system with intent on selling and exporting the system to interested nations. The significance of the system is that it is designed to launch ballistic missiles using a standard 40 foot shipping container and as such, it is not immediately recognized as a weapon system. At a price of \$10 to \$20 million per system, it is highly cost effective which provides smaller countries with alternatives to more expensive missile systems. Both Iran and Venezuela have expressed interest in the system.



Figure 2. [Club K Missile System, September 2010](#)

While the United States continues to develop various missile defense programs, one notion remains the same: it only takes one EMP device deployed and detonated at the right altitude to exert extensive

collateral damage within the United States. Because of this possibility, the US should investigate options on developing methods to protect essential electrical systems. Such electrical systems should include banking and transportation as well as hydro-electric plants.



Figure 3. [Club K Missile System, August 2011](#)

North Korea's recent advancements and progressive path of missile and nuclear testing strongly suggests North Korea's intent to develop and employ a nuclear-

tipped ballistic missile capable of reaching an altitude of 30 km into the atmosphere. Acquiring platforms which may be used to deliver an EMP weapon could be as easy as North Korea leasing a cargo ship under another country's registration. Once the vessel is acquired, it could sail a few hundred miles off the coast of the United States and launch a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile into the atmosphere above the United States and detonate the weapon.

The old thought of nation versus nation in a nuclear enriched environment has long passed. The new emerging threat lies in the proliferation of nuclear technologies which have shaped our strategic landscape of viable threats. In today's era of modernized weapons, it is more about how existing weapons may be redesigned enabling the weapon to cause the greatest collateral damage with the least amount of cost to the developing nation. Essentially, it is taking existing weapon systems and "adapting" these weapons to be more lethal based on available technologies. In a resource constraint environment such as within North Korea, the adaptability process on how North Koreans develop capabilities coupled with intent of the specific nuclear weapon should not be overlooked.

Notes

- ¹ The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, "[Military and Security Developments Democratic People's Republic of Korea 2012](#)," 15 February 2013.
- ² James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, "[EMP Attacks—What the United States Must Do Now](#)," 17 November 2010.
- ³ National Communications System, Technology and Standards Division, [Telecommunications: Glossary of Terms](#), 7 August 1996.
- ⁴ Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, Military Research and Development Subcommittee, Doctor Gary Smith, Prepared Testimony, [Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse \(EMP\) to United States Military Systems and Civil Infrastructure](#), 105th Congress, 1st Session, 16 July 1997.
- ⁵ Dr. Lowell Wood, "Opening Statement: Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack," United States Senate, 8 March 2005.
- ⁶ R. James Woolsey and Peter Vincent Pry, "[How North Korea could Cripple the United States](#)," *The Wall Street Journal*, 21 May 2013.
- ⁷ Eli Lake, "[Exclusive: How North Korea Tipped Its Hand](#)," *The Daily Beast*, 15 April 2013.
- ⁸ Eli Lake, "[Exclusive: How North Korea Tipped Its Hand](#)," *The Daily Beast*, 15 April 2013.
- ⁹ R. James Woolsey and Peter Vincent Pry, "[How North Korea Could Cripple the United States](#)" *The Wall Street Journal*, 21 May 2013.
- ¹⁰ Fredrik Dahl, "[North Korea nuclear test still shrouded in mystery](#)," Reuters UK, 18 June 2013.

Hybrid Threat

The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.

ADRP 3-0 (2012)

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS OF THE FERGHANA VALLEY

TRISA Threat Integration Awareness

by Jennifer Dunn, Threat Integration Team (DAC)

Since the terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001, Central Asia has become a region of the world that has received international attention and focus. While the limelight has primarily been shed on Afghanistan and Iraq, Central Asia contains many unique operational environments (OE) that present opportunities for further analysis and study. The Ferghana Valley, a valley that spans three Central Asian countries' borders, presents an excellent example of a unique OE.

The OE – Ferghana Valley

The Ferghana Valley is a little-known fertile valley located in the heart of Central Asia. The valley is surrounded by two mountain ranges, the Tien-Shan and the Gissar-Alai, and is unique because it stretches across the borders of three countries: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The borders of these countries were drawn as part of Stalin's "divide and rule" strategy that aimed to prevent any one country from controlling all the agricultural resources of the valley.



Figure 1. [The Ferghana Valley](#)

The deliberate way in which the valley was piecemealed out to the three Central Asian countries has presented a challenge to the region for decades. This is primarily due to the ethnic tensions that have arisen as a result of country borders not aligning with ethnic community boundaries. Tajikistan's part of the valley has a large Uzbek population and a smaller Kyrgyz minority, Kyrgyzstan's part of the valley has Uzbek and Tajik minorities, and Uzbekistan's part of the valley has a large Tajik population and smaller Kyrgyz minority.¹ To make the situation even more challenging,

there are pieces of territory (enclaves) that politically belong to one country but physically fall within the borders of another country.

While these border issues have caused internal conflict since their inception, additional OE conditions have caused a recent increase in violence and conflict in the region. The OE conditions that have contributed to the recent increase are poor economic conditions and increased Islamic radicalism. The above mentioned OE conditions are conditions of two OE variables, the economic variable and the social variable. This article will discuss how these economic and social conditions are playing out in the Ferghana Valley. The result is a situation where economic and social conditions are having a significant impact on the military variable.

Economic – Poor Economic Conditions

The economic situation in the Ferghana Valley has been steadily deteriorating since the breakup of the Soviet Union, but the recent world recession has pushed the deterioration into overdrive. Living conditions have plummeted and unemployment has skyrocketed. Laborers that once worked in the booming agriculture industry are now struggling to find jobs and are forced to migrate to cities looking for work.² The increased competition for urban resources (jobs, healthcare, education, etc.) is causing increasing strain on already tense ethnic relations in the cities in the valley. In addition to the competition for resources, in many cities that are controlled by a majority ethnic group, minority ethnic groups are continually discriminated against economically which has led to significant outbreaks of violence.

The deadliest outbreak of violence attributed to this OE condition occurred in June of 2010 in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, a large city located in the Ferghana Valley. For the past several years, the Uzbek minority population has been increasingly marginalized economically in the city of Osh. This is due to the policies set in place by the Kyrgyz nationalist mayor. While the Uzbeks once disproportionately participated in the business realm, the seizure of Uzbek-owned businesses by the government has greatly reduced the economic influence the minority group held.³ This created a sense of political, economic, and social isolation among the Uzbek population that bred a violent anger that broke out on 10 June 2010.

That evening in June, a dispute broke out between Kyrgyz and Uzbek youths in the city center and eventually resulted in riots with Uzbek men rampaging through the city for several hours. Retaliation by the Kyrgyz followed after the local Kyrgyz government was able to mobilize a large population of restless, unemployed, and uneducated Kyrgyz youth by using nationalist slogans. Over the course of the next two days, several hundred died and around 400,000 Uzbek fled their homes in fear for their lives.⁴ While this incident is over three years old, more recent outbreaks of violence have occurred as recently as January of 2013 with Uzbek citizens attacking Kyrgyz border guards.⁵ Given the recent outbreaks of violence, this trend of conflict is likely to continue. This situation is only further exacerbated by the increase of Islamic radicalism in the region.



Social – Islamic Radicalism

Historically, the Ferghana Valley authoritarian governments have been willing to do anything to co-opt, undermine, and oppress any type of Islamic movement. Despite the harsh tactics undertaken by these regimes, or perhaps because of it, Islamic radicalism has prevailed.⁶ The valley has been historically difficult to govern and recent economic unrest in the region has created an environment that is becoming friendly to radical Islamists. Two threat groups that may take advantage of this favorable situation in the valley are the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT).

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a group of salafi jihadists that was established in Uzbekistan in the late 1990s. The US Department of State (DOS) recognizes the organization as a terrorist group as its espoused goals are to overthrow the government of Uzbekistan and institute an Islamic caliphate in the Ferghana Valley region by any means necessary.⁷ While the group has historically operated in the Ferghana Valley and Uzbekistan, the introduction of US troops to Afghanistan in 2001 resulted in a change of focus for the IMU. After 2001, the group aligned itself with the Taliban and al-Qaeda and began conducting operations south of the Ferghana Valley, in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was

estimated in 2009 that the group had four or five thousand militants operating in Central Asia.⁸ Typical tactics of the IMU in the past included kidnapping, ambushes, raids on military bases, assassinations, and car bombings. Due to the IMU's increased presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it has suffered significant casualties. This has prompted some to determine that the group poses little to no threat to Central Asia.⁹

However, despite heavy attrition from US forces and the death of its commander in 2012, the IMU has been able to maintain a somewhat coherent organization and still has the potential to pose a threat to US interests in Central Asia. The IMU actively advocates jihad against the US and its allies and maintains the goal of establishing a caliphate in Central Asia. In the past year the IMU announced a new commander and continued mounting attacks in Pakistan.¹⁰ While not much is known about the new commander and what influence his leadership will have on the group, it is clear he is still supporting attacks in the region. While these attacks have focused on Pakistan of late, members of the IMU have been recently arrested in Tajikistan indicating that the group is maintaining a presence in Central Asia.¹¹


Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT)

The Hizb ut-Tahrir is a radical Islamist movement that has been banned in countries throughout Central Asia. It was founded by Palestinians in Jordan in the 1950s and like the IMU seeks to create a unified Islamic caliphate in Central Asia. Unlike the IMU, the HT claims to seek a peaceful transition from the current governments to the Islamic caliphate. It does not openly advocate violence and has not been known to conduct lethal operations against US forces or the governments of Central Asia. Despite its history and reputation for non-violence, the group is still banned and feared by the governments of Central Asia. Because the HT purports itself as a political party that aims to effect social change for those in need, its membership has grown to an estimated 15-20,000.¹² Consequently, Central Asian governments have resorted to violent repressive measures against the banned group, and it is believed that these repressive actions have led to a further-radicalized Islamic movement.¹³

Despite the HT's non-violent reputation, the group has the potential to pose a threat to US interests.¹⁴ The group has a very divisive and hate-filled doctrine that calls for the deaths of Americans and some American allies.¹⁵ While there is no evidence of the HT ever having conducted an attack as a group, there is evidence of HT individuals using terrorist methods to achieve their goal; some members are believed to have been involved in coup attempts in Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Iraq.¹⁶ Despite the participation of members in the affairs of countries in the Middle East, members of the HT are still actively involved in Central Asia. Several members were arrested in Russia in November of 2012 in possession of grenades, rifles, and TNT. In addition, members were arrested in July of 2013 in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, indicating a continued presence in the Ferghana Valley.¹⁷

Training Implications:

This article illustrates how two OE conditions, economic crisis and Islamic radicalism, can create a potential for instability in a real-world OE. These are the types of OE conditions that CTID training products incorporate to ensure soldiers are training against all eventualities. The *Decisive Action Training Environment* (DATE) 2.0 contains elements of both the economic crisis condition and the Islamic radicalism condition discussed in this article. For more information, please see [DATE 2.0 located on ATN](#).



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HOW WILL THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR AFFECT JORDANIAN STABILITY?

Complex Operational Environments and the World of Modeling and Simulations

by Mr. Art McKinney and Dr. Robert Arp, TRISA Modeling & Simulation Directorate and Operational Environment Laboratory

In June 2013, the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) asked TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity Operational Environment Laboratory (TRISA OE Lab) to conduct the Jordan Stability Study examining factors affecting Jordanian political, economic, and social stability as a result of the Syrian civil war.

The study's purpose was to inform the AWG's Operational Advisors supporting Operation Eager Lion 2013 and Combined Forces Jordan. Eager Lion is a Jordanian-led "12-day annual military exercise involving 8,000 personnel from 19 countries" intended to "strengthen tactical proficiency in critical mission areas, support long-term relationships, and enhance regional security and stability by responding to modern-day security scenarios."¹



Figure 1. Eager Lion 2013 multinational exercise logo with participants from 19 countries

In its study, the OE Lab used the Athena simulation, a decision support tool developed by NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the OEL, designed to consider the intended and unintended consequences of various courses of action (with a particular focus on social science complexities) in a specified OE. Athena represents DIME-FIL [Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law Enforcement] interventions, within a PMESII-PT [Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment and Time] context, while assessing the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd order effects of those interventions over a simulated time period (generally 3 months to 3 years). Athena enables leaders to explore the potential implications of interventions in a simulated environment to enhance real world decision making.

To inform Athena, the OE Lab analyzed available research data (classified and unclassified), and conducted personal interviews with experts at the Department of State (Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations), the Foreign Military Studies Office, the University of Tel Aviv, and the Asymmetric Warfare Group whose Operational Advisors provided real time information from Jordan.

The study considered three potential Syrian futures—and their effects on Jordan—over a simulated two- year period:

- **The continuation of the Assad regime in Syria.**
- **The fall of the Assad regime followed by an Islamist government.**
- **The fall of the Assad regime followed by fragmentation of belligerents into discrete geographic locations with continuing conflict and no single group in control.**

Given these potential outcomes, the study team identified the preeminent variable resulting from the three potential futures: *the rate of flow of displaced Syrians into Jordan*. The study team described the flow of displaced Syrians into Jordan as low (1,500 individuals per day), medium (2,500 individuals per day), and high (3,400 individuals per day),

suggesting a correlation of potential refugee flows to the three alternative Syrian futures. The central question to evaluate through Athena modeling became: *How do the three rates of displaced Syrians entering Jordan affect its political, economic, and social stability?*

The TRISA OE Lab study produced six key insights:

- If the *aggregate* number—regardless of flow—of displaced Syrians in Jordan exceeds one million the Jordanian economy will experience significant socio-economic shocks. The Jordanian labor market does not have the capacity to absorb more than 1 million displaced Syrians. Athena output indicates that the presence of one million displaced Syrians will result in an unemployment rate of 22%. More than one million displaced Syrians in Jordan will result in an unemployment rate of 35%. Overall, unemployment, housing, and food costs will increase in relation to the aggregate number of displaced Syrians participating in the Jordanian economy. Moreover, these factors will cause increasing social instability/volatility and decreasing social mood.²
- Decreasing the number of displaced Syrians living outside of camps will increase socio-economic stability. 40% of displaced Syrians reside in official refugee camps while the other 60% participate in the Jordanian economy.³ This places enormous strain on the Jordanian economy. Increasing the percentage of displaced Syrians in official refugee camps from 40% to 80% decreases the Jordanian unemployment rate from 21% to 14%. Increasing the number of Syrians in official refugee camps is central to mitigating rising unemployment.
- Humanitarian assistance and security operations conducted by Jordanian forces are more effective than operations conducted by international forces. Athena output indicates that Humanitarian Assistance operations led by the Jordanian Armed Forces will mitigate increases in social volatility and a decline in social mood when compared to the same operations led by international forces.
- An annual injection of \$3.1 billion in aid is necessary to ensure Jordan's economic stability beyond two years. Athena output indicates that an injection of \$60 million per week (\$3.1B annually) can stabilize Jordanian GDP at \$28 billion, the pre-refugee level; and can slow rising unemployment, effectively mitigating the effects of displaced Syrians.
- The negative socio-economic effects of Syrian refugees in Jordan can be mitigated by implementing the recommendations contained in insights 1-4.
- There will be no change of political control in Jordan during the next two years. This is due to three reasons: (1) the government of Jordan remains effective in providing security, (2) the political opposition in Jordan remains fractured, marginalized, and non-violent, (3) King Abdullah may be unpopular with many Jordanians, including his East Bank Jordanian base; however, the fear of instability is of greater concern to Jordanians than ineffective governance.




Figure 2. Modeling issue of displaced Syrians

This study discovered that Syrian refugee flows pose a significant threat to Jordan's socio-economic stability. These insights—affirmed by the Athena simulation—indicate that providing near-term economic assistance to the Jordanian government can mitigate the immediate socio-economic problems resulting from the inflow of Syrian refugees.

To obtain a copy of the full Jordan Stability Study, please contact Mr. Mel Cape, Deputy Director, TRISA OEL, melvin.r.cape.NGO@mail.mil or call commercial: 913-684-7909.

Notes

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²*Volatility*: how likely it is that a random person will get caught up in violence unrelated to her/his presence. *Mood*: the average mood across all civilian groups in an operational environment.

³Estimates of this percentage vary from a low of 20% to a high of 50%. 40% comes from interpolation of UN data.

HYBRID THREAT TRAIN THE TRAINER (HT3) CLASS—MARCH 2014

Training the Trainer for Complex Operational Environments

by Pat Madden, Training, Education, Leader Development Team

If you aren't able to attend our September 2013 Hybrid Threat Train the Trainer (HT3) class, consider joining us for our next class that is currently scheduled for 10-14 March 2014 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This annual resident training focuses on those that have roles and responsibilities in training or designing a challenging and realistic Threat in Army training, professional education, and leader development venues. The profile of our attendees is purposely varied due to the many different types of activities, organizations, and institutions that require and use a credible Threat in their missions. Previous attendees include observer-controllers (O/Cs); scenario developers; Army leaders in an opposing force (OPFOR) at our Combat Training Centers (CTC); staff officers and Threat subject matter experts from Army schools and Centers of Excellence (CoE); and other unit planners, exercise action officers, and Threat operators from the Active Component, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard, as well as joint and multinational partners.

This week-long instruction covers Hybrid Threat and associated OPFOR applications as depicted in the new Army TC 7-100 series (e.g. organization, equipment, and tactics). This 40-hour block of instruction includes lecture and practical exercises designed to train the trainer. The intent of this class is to train a limited number of attendees who will return to their installation and/or command to teach the material to others. All instruction will be held in our new, state-of-the-art classrooms and conducted in small groups of 16 students per instructor. Students will be provided all necessary course material. This also includes our latest approved and draft OPFOR publications.

The class content has been updated with information from [TC 7-100, Hybrid Threat](#) as well as the recently approved Army TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics which will include animated videos of selected OPFOR tactics. In addition, the final approved draft of Army [TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces](#) will also be included. This new TC provides tactical examples of how the irregular OPFOR (e.g., insurgents, guerrillas, and/or criminals) can act to achieve desired effects using conventional-like tactics and techniques and/or terrorism.

Participating organizations are responsible for funding their attendees' TDY. However, there are no additional attendance fees and clearances are not required. Contractors and foreign military students are welcome to attend. Please inform us via email as soon as possible, but NLT 10 January 2014, of the number of people you would like to attend this class. Names of attendees are required NLT 7 February 2014. Please note that seating is limited to first 80 students that sign up. Seats fill up fast, so don't delay.


Interested in attending? If so, please contact The Hybrid Threat Train the Trainer coordinator Mr. Pat Madden (CTR) at 913-684-7997 or email at patrick.m.madden16.ctr@mail.mil. We look forward to seeing next year.

BARISAN REVOLUSI NASIONAL IN THAILAND

Threats in Complex Operational Environments

by H. David Pendleton, OE Assessment Team (CGI Ctr)

Since about 2004, insurgents in southern Thailand have increased their attacks against government officials in an attempt to gain the independence of the provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala to form a new Islamist state. There are approximately 50 different loosely-linked insurgent groups, but one of the largest and most vocal groups is the *Barisan Revolusi Nasional* (BRN). The TRISA Threat Report, [*Barisan Revolusi Nasional – On the Rebound?*](#) presents background information on the group; provides a history of the BRN's role in the Islamist insurgency in southern Thailand; discusses the BRN's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and analyzes one of the attacks on Thai security forces attributed to the BRN. The Threat Report also provides a sampling of the attacks that have taken place in southern Thailand since August 2011, many of which are traceable back to the BRN.



In less than a decade since the insurgency began to intensify in 2004, insurgent attacks have killed at least 5,500 people and injured over 10,000 more. Since January 2009, approximately 30 people per month have been killed and 65 wounded in Thailand's three southernmost provinces. Of the almost 1,500 people killed in the last five years, about 28% of the victims belong to the Thai security forces. In the same timeframe, the government's security forces have suffered about 38% of the injuries inflicted by the insurgents.

As one of the largest and most active insurgent groups in southern Thailand, the BRN plays a major role in any negotiations with the government located in Bangkok, 650 miles north of Pattani. In February 2013, the BRN and the other insurgent groups agreed to negotiate a political settlement to their issues. The catalyst for the insurgents to talk with the government may stem from an event on 13 February 2013 when 50 to 60 insurgents attacked a military base in Narathiwat province. With prior intelligence about the impending assault, the alerted base easily held off the insurgents, killing 16. Later, another four insurgents died of wounds suffered in the attack. Since then, the two sides have met three times—in March, April, and June.

The Thai government and the insurgents have not resolved any of their major differences during the negotiation sessions. The BRN attempted to impose preconditions on the Thai government before they would meet, always insisting on the withdrawal of all federal security forces from the three southernmost provinces. Still, they reluctantly came to the negotiation table. At the third meeting on 13 June 2013, the BRN agreed to halt the insurgent attacks on Thai security force personnel during Ramadan, which would last from about 9 July 2013 until 7 August 2013.

On 25 June 2013, however, the BRN announced seven conditions the Thai government must meet before the BRN would participate in the previously agreed-upon Ramadan truce. Again, the BRN's demands included the removal of Thai federal security forces from Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala provinces. The Thai government refused to meet the BRN's demands, calling them a psychological move. Other analysts believe that the insurgents made unacceptable demands on the Thai government for the Ramadan peace because the BRN maintains no actual control of their own insurgent cells and even less control of the forces in the other 50 insurgent groups.

Despite the negotiations between the Thai government and the insurgent groups, attacks against security forces, government representatives, and civilians continue in southern Thailand. While the number of attacks in recent months

is lower than in previous months, the size of the attacks has gotten larger. Between October 2011 and March 2012, there were 415 attacks that killed 168 people and injured 21 others. In the same six-month period from October 2012 to March 2013, there were 221 attacks that caused 117 deaths and another 306 wounded.




Figure 1 of 2. Preparations for the insurgent ambush on government forces (assumed TTP)

The BRN and the other insurgent groups in Thailand use a variety of TTP. These include direct assaults, snipers, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Because motorcycles are highly maneuverable and omnipresent in cities, they have become the Thai insurgents' weapon of choice for perpetrating IED attacks. In the more rural areas of Thailand, one of the most common TTP is to hide the IED along a highway or bury it in the road itself. Most IEDs in southern Thailand are less than 11 pounds in size, but there have been cases of 50 to 100-pound IEDs. Since January 2009, there have been at least 595 IED attacks in southern Thailand, for an average of about 12 incidents per month.

Since about 2004, insurgents in southern Thailand have increased their attacks against government officials in an attempt to gain the independence of the provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala to form a new Islamist state. There are approximately 50 different loosely-linked insurgent groups, but one of the largest and most vocal groups is the *Barisan Revolusi Nasional* (BRN).

On 24 May 2013, despite the negotiations between the BRN and the Thai government, insurgents detonated an IED against a security force pickup truck in rural Buarae Tambon (sub-district), less than 200 meters from the tambon's

administrative center offices. The attack killed five members of a military/paramilitary patrol and severely injured the remaining soldier. The following diagrams based on open source data depict the attack's details:




Figure 2 of 2. Conduct of insurgent ambush and insurgent exfiltration to safehouse (assumed TTP)

See the [Threat Report on the BRN](#) for more details on this IED attack, additional information on other insurgent TTP, the BRN's history since its founding in 1960, the negotiations between the two sides, and a listing of insurgent attacks in southern Thailand since August 2011.

What Comprises an Irregular Force?

US Joint Definition—Joint Publication 1-02

Irregular Forces

Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2013)



by Jon H. Moilanen, CTID Operations (BMA Ctr)

Part 1 of this article in the July TRISA *Red Diamond* introduced a model for training with opposing forces (OPFOR) in persistent conflict operations. The model is not prescriptive but does provide a concept that can integrate varied types of collaborative and distinct actors and actions in an insurgency operational environment (OE) with OPFOR. Part 1 grouped an initial stage of an insurgency as focusing grievances of a relevant population and fomenting resistance. This is an initial period of mobilizing resources and support in the conflict. Part 2 describes the other stages of a persistent conflict model that include fomenting and expanding resistance, creating influence and massing effects, and achieving the intended outcomes of an irregular OPFOR insurgency. The four stages can be visualized as sequential, overlapping, or simultaneous—complex and uncertain—and can be ongoing concurrently at different paces or tempos. An example to visualize the stages of an OPFOR evolving insurgency that function in a continuum of persistent conflict is as follows:




Figure 1. Irregular OPFOR conceptual stages in a persistent conflict (example)

Persistent conflict is often associated with an insurgency. To achieve the aim and goal of an insurgency, violent actions among state and non-state actors are a norm. However, irregular OPFOR may initially favor indirect and asymmetric approaches to counter or defeat an adversary. When necessary, irregular OPFOR employ a full range of available military and other capabilities in order to erode an enemy's power, influence, and will.

Conflict with irregular forces is and will be a norm for challenging US Army training readiness in a complex operational environment. Irregular OPFOR replicate capabilities and limitations or constraints as a plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of actual worldwide forces (doctrine, tactics, organization, and equipment) used in lieu of a specific threat force for training and developing US forces (Army Regulation 350-2). Use of OPFOR in training events provides realistic and robust conditions to stress Army leaders, Soldiers, activities, and units in operations against a noncooperative, uncompromising opponent that uses tactics, doctrine, and equipment representative of a composite of forces that could be encountered in current or future combat operations.

Stages of Resistance, Change, and Success in OPFOR Persistent Conflict

Irregular OPFOR are adaptive and versatile in use of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in order to achieve specified objectives. Irregular OPFOR may form alliances or develop affiliations that are dynamic within changing conditions of a particular geographic, political, cyberspace, or ideological environment. Irregular OPFOR may also portray a number of groups in an OE that are in conflict with each other as well as a common enemy such as a state governing authority that is considered corrupt. The presence of military forces such as the US Army remains a recurring target of irregular OPFOR direct actions in support of an overarching OPFOR purpose.

Training for OEs will replicate complex mission sets with dynamic conditions ranging the situational variables of PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time). In training, adversaries and enemies must be credible and relevant as an agile opponent. A recurring threat in training is the varied types of irregular OPFOR that impact accomplishment of a unit mission. Irregular OPFOR expect and plan for long-term campaigning in persistent conflict. Whether training at home station, institutional locations, or exercises in live, virtual, constructive, or gaming (LVCG) environments—the US Army Soldier and leader must be ready to apply disciplined initiative within a commander's intent to counter threats such as irregular OPFOR and achieve his or her mission tasks.

Collaboration among irregular OPFOR organizations, units, and/or individuals may be based on willing volunteerism, persuasion, coercion, and/or contractual agreement to achieve common goals and objectives. If necessary in a long-term conflict, irregular OPFOR develop capabilities similar to regular forces and may even transition selected forces into a regular or formal paramilitary organizational structure. Situations may exist where an irregular OPFOR is committed to its own power and corporate wealth. In such instances, a façade of care and concern for a relevant population may be part of a focused media affairs campaign to acquire public support. In other instances, brute force and acts of violence may be used to defeat public confidence in the ability of a governing authority to provide effective law enforcement, order, and governance. In such instances, an irregular OPFOR may establish de facto enclaves within a state or geographic region that is superficially under the sovereignty of a recognized nation-state but in actuality has no practical jurisdiction of governance.

Organize Resistance

When irregular OPFOR focus on resolving the grievances of a relevant population, organizing resistance is initially clandestine in nature with a gradual introduction of direct actions. A core element of the irregular OPFOR capitalizes on a compelling issue or issues of discontent within social, economic, religious, and/or political conditions in a specific OE. The irregular OPFOR heightens discontent with public and private sector initiatives in order to discredit local governance.

As irregular OPFOR continue to operate and incite public dissatisfaction with governing authorities with whom the OPFOR is in conflict, overt resistance includes ongoing public and private forums and rallies, organizational strikes or work production slow-down events, and media affairs that create narratives which denounce the governing authority and its activities. Influential people within the communities may be coerced to make comments in support of the OPFOR. Other respected citizens may assist the OPFOR and voluntarily encourage public support to irregular OPFOR

initiatives. Concurrently, some irregular OPFOR action elements may use subterfuge and sabotage to accent the civil unrest and an inability of authorities to maintain civil order.

An insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing control by an insurgent organization. Insurgent actions are violent, persistent, and protracted. The nature of an insurgency is embedded in the relevant population of the region. Conditions indicative of an emerging insurgency are as follows:



Figure 2. [Irregular OPFOR inciting demonstration](#)

- Organized active and passive resistance.
- Subversion of effective governance.
- Overt acts of civil disturbance in the civilian sector that demand change in government policies.

Note. The OPFOR categorizes insurgents in local and higher organizations. Their capabilities and limitations are discussed in chapter 2, TC 7-100.3.

Forms of resistance associated with irregular forces include guerrilla warfare or an insurgent movement. Guerrilla units may appear at the squad and platoon levels, and sometimes may attempt limited company-size operations. Guerrilla units may operate independently, be associated or a part of the insurgency, and may even cooperate with conventional military units of other states in the region which oppose the government in authority.

Note. OPFOR guerrilla units' capabilities and limitations are discussed in chapter 3, TC 7-100.3.

Direct actions start usually as small scale opportunities to develop specific functional capabilities. Significant large-scale combat actions do not occur in this phase. Force on force confrontation, when it does occur, is usually by small direct action insurgent cells or small guerrilla units against targets designated by the irregular OPFOR leadership.

Violent direct action increases in scope and number of incidents. As clandestine activities continue at an accelerated rate in communities, some of these insurgent or guerrilla elements infiltrate the society in the working class, commercial business organizations, as well as elementary, secondary, and higher educational institutions. More cadres form and expand networks at various levels of expertise with additional recruitment and training in particular skill sets. An increase in incidents directed against a governing authority and introduction of acts of resistance alert the general population to a visible irregular OPFOR organization operating in the public sector. Opposition within the population is suppressed by irregular OPFOR with threats or actions such as kidnapping and murder of notable citizens, or assassination of local and regional public officials.



Figure 3. [OPFOR inspired rioting](#)

Popular support for practical-sounding or charismatic irregular OPFOR individuals may project them into positions of key leadership in the social, religious, and other sectors of the community. These leaders and their actions attract more of the citizenry to align, passively or actively, with irregular OPFOR programs. When the irregular OPFOR provides segments of a community with the basics required in daily living such as potable water, food, or health services, irregular OPFOR may be accepted willingly by the community.

Media affairs emerge even more important than in earlier operations. Media narratives by irregular OPFOR reinforce the rationale for public resistance. Personal and moral commitment to remedy compelling injustices may include concerns of social inequality, religious intolerance, economic programs exclusion, or corrupt civil governance.



Figure 4. Irregular OPFOR direct actions

Indirect and direct actions by irregular OPFOR intensify conflict against the governing authority. Rationales that fuel public dissatisfaction can be culture bias, religious fundamentalism and extremism, or exclusion from economic prosperity or political representation. Actions exhibit an overt political aspiration during this phase. If tolerated by the governing authority, individuals associated with irregular OPFOR may become viable candidates in local and regional elections for public office. If such participation is not officially allowed, terrorism may be employed by the irregular OPFOR to continue disruption in support systems of the governing authority. Irregular OPFOR continue its informal support to services and general care for communities. Critical deficiencies in public services are satisfied selectively by supporting organizations.

Elements of irregular OPFOR use a combination of persuasion, subversion, coercion, and other direct actions to offset the strengths of government security forces and law enforcement activities. Irregular OPFOR intent is usually to protract the struggle, stress finite assets of the governing authority with whom it is in conflict, and develop sufficient popular support for continued covert and overt actions against the governing authority.

Irregular OPFOR conduct activities to solicit and mobilize support to expand capability and/or remedy shortfalls in required resources. Activities and capabilities include:

- Organize the irregular OPFOR functional networks and command and control (C2) structure.
- Establish advisory councils to the organization's senior leadership.
- Integrate local insurgent organizations into the irregular OPFOR network.
- Integrate local guerrilla units into the irregular OPFOR network.
- Collect intelligence and counterintelligence.
- Create a fiscal revenue program spanning from local communities to the diaspora.
- Recruit willing members into the organization or unit.
- Train willing or coerced members in specific actions that support the organization or unit.
- Acquire technical expertise and materiel.
- Plan and conduct direct actions.
- Develop logistics-support-transportation networks.
- Plan and conduct information warfare (INFOWAR).
- Promote a robust local-regional civil affairs program with perception management.
- Demonstrate escalating public dissatisfaction with governing authority.
- Provide social and health services on a selective basis to the relevant population.
- Infiltrate and subvert key government institutions and civilian groups.
- Provide covert support such as safe havens and specialized caches.
- Promote a media affairs campaign that encourages domestic and foreign moral support.

Leaders in irregular OPFOR develop associations with legitimate political action groups, youth activities, trade unions, and other community or business institutions. The charisma of irregular OPFOR leaders is important in convincing indigenous citizens and foreign advocates to support irregular OPFOR program. Even when grounded in an ideology that appeals to a population, the compelling presence of a key leader can often create a commitment by the citizenry to ideals and sacrifice in support of those ideals. The basic needs and grievances of a relevant population may have marginal connection with the intellectual ideology of irregular OPFOR leaders, but can be exploited to generate support for the irregular OPFOR.




Figure 5. [Charismatic OPFOR leader](#)

Irregular OPFOR may seek active support external from people and/or organizations in a particular geographic region in conflict. In addition to creating a desired narrative and back-story of real or perceived conditions via global information systems, irregular OPFOR solicit support from people who have emigrated from the region but retain ethnic, social, or religious links to the region. Funding and general support may be obtained through donations from sympathetic foreign governments. Fundraising, promoted publicly as voluntary contributions, demonstrates a support base claiming humanitarian or social need and justification. Coercion can be used, when necessary, to tax local, regional, and international groups in order to ensure such a flow of resources to the irregular OPFOR.

Irregular OPFOR instigate disruptive acts by citizen committees, civil-social coalitions, or faith system groups with the intention of causing violent repression by the opposing form of governance. Such reprisals by law enforcement, internal security organizations, or the military assist in distancing and eventually separating the people from the governing authority. Subversive activities continue and are planned and conducted to complement the overarching concept of obtaining the support of a relevant segment of the population. Willing support is the desired outcome, but coercion can be used to silence or compel particular citizen or groups to support irregular OPFOR, or at least not actively counter the operations of irregular OPFOR.



Figure 6. [Irregular OPFOR in rural combat](#)

Criminal activities can be sanctioned by irregular OPFOR and may include acts such as robbery, theft, bribery, extortion, kidnapping, and murder. Organized crime cooperation can provide revenue from trafficking narcotics, arms, and people, as well as benefit from piracy and related black market activities. Illicit financial activities diminish government revenues, can increase corruption among local officials, and weaken the legitimacy of the government. Irregular OPFOR can convey that it is the power broker in such coordinated criminal activities, and that such power is to the advantage of the relevant population, rather than allegiance to the governing authority.

Mobilizing resources into an organization can be visualized as a hierarchy, network, or a combination of hierarchy and network. Recruitment is a controlled process which may be based on familial, tribal, or other forms of social allegiance before consideration and acceptance into an organization or unit. In an example of an insurgent organization, knowledge of interconnections between and among cells is usually compartmented, and normally retained by a functional leader rather than being common knowledge of all members. Conversely, groups such as guerilla units appear more centralized in a military-style hierarchical C2 structure. However, guerrilla units may incorporate complex arrangements with local or regional citizenry, public institutions, and criminal organizations, and insurgent organizations.

Create Change

Irregular OPFOR use direct action cells and/or guerrilla units to produce change through persuasive, coercive and/or violent actions while other irregular OPFOR increase social activism and political discord in the public arena. A significant increase in guerrilla warfare activity indicates irregular OPFOR can challenge the governing authority openly in military combat operations, and is approaching equality in combat power in selected geographic areas. Whether in an urban or rural area, irregular OPFOR guerrillas can be organized into larger formations that may include company, battalion, or brigade units, but typically remain dispersed until required for coordinated operations. Guerrilla units secure and establish geographic enclaves in which to train, prepare, and deploy for combat operations. These enclaves are also used to refit and prepare for subsequent operations. The irregular OPFOR enclave may develop capabilities to conduct the following actions:

- Establish and expand the insurgent or guerrilla organization.
- Indoctrinate the ideology through INFOWAR.
- Incite antigovernment activity such as demonstrations and strikes.
- Raise funds through illegal taxation and criminal activities.
- Organize irregular forces with training and rehearsals.
- Sabotage governmental and population area infrastructure.
- Intimidate uncooperative government officials and members of the population.
- Terrorize selected individuals and/or segments of a population.

Direct and indirect actions of irregular OPFOR are a supporting element of an overarching agenda to overthrow or force concessions from the governing authority, or can be a particular agenda unrelated to political power. As the populace loses faith and trust in the governing authority and/or realizes that irregular OPFOR can produce change, larger segments of the relevant population the people may decide to actively align with irregular OPFOR.

If the irregular OPFOR is part of an insurgent movement, an OPFOR counter-state or “shadow government” may start to appear with the support of a relevant population, to satisfy gaps that the governing authority is unwilling or unable to address. In a rural-based insurgency, guerrillas normally operate as units from a relatively secure base area in insurgent-controlled region. In an urban-based insurgency, guerrillas continue to operate clandestinely within the population. In the political arena, the movement concentrates on undermining the people’s support of the government and further expanding areas of irregular OPFOR control.

A higher and local level of insurgent organization may emerge.

Both levels of insurgent organization have many similar capabilities; however, the local organization is characterized by small functional or multi-functional cells which operate normally within a locale. The higher insurgent organization typically comprises two or more local organizations within a larger regional area. In addition to functional or multi-functional cells, this higher level of insurgent organization can incorporate guerrilla units and advisors or liaison from regular military forces. Other supporting activities can be incorporated such as covert assistance of a nation-state or transnational organization. In addition to a political focus, an insurgency has functional elements such as guerrilla forces for direct paramilitary action. Support systems such as auxiliaries remain clandestine in their support roles and covert underground activities complement, but may not be available to, the direct actions of guerrillas and insurgents.



Figure 7. [Irregular OPFOR in urban combat](#)

Criminal organizations, with or without irregular OPFOR affiliation, may take advantage of the turmoil of conflict in order to pursue their own interests such as financial gain and related power and economic profit. They might also accept financial aid to support or not interfere with irregular OPFOR operations.

Note. Criminal organizations and possible irregular OPFOR affiliations and/or independent actors are discussed in chapter 4, TC 7-100.3.

Nonmilitary organizations are an integral element in persistent conflict and do not necessarily rely on the force of arms to accomplish their purposes. They do not resemble military forces in their organization, equipment, training, or purpose. Capabilities include active or clandestine supporters of an irregular OPFOR such as a supportive media, international humanitarian relief organizations, transnational corporations, or notable citizens or dignitaries of the region. These groups are generally noncombatants. While considered noncombatants, some of the nonmilitary elements may be armed. One armed example is a private security company (PSC) of a large transnational corporation that has been infiltrated and/or co-opted by the irregular OPFOR.

Note. Noncombatant organizations and other possible irregular OPFOR affiliations or independent actors are discussed in chapter 5, TC 7-100.3.

Protect the People

When irregular OPFOR have disrupted, and in many case defeated, the military, internal security, and/or law enforcement capabilities of a governing authority, an insurgent movement proclaims and institutes its charter to protect the people. If a guerrilla unit independent from an insurgency defeats its enemy, the guerrilla unit could establish similar security for people in an enclave formed and protected by the guerrilla unit.



Figure 8. [Irregular OPFOR patrol](#)

This security and stability by irregular OPFOR may not be uniform throughout a region and display varied levels of protection depending on situational context. Major rural regions may become semi-autonomous or autonomous from the governing authority. Metropolitan or megalopolis centers may remain contested urban areas or interconnecting regions between insurgent forces and the governing authority. Guerrilla warfare may approach or transition to types of conventional warfare if guerrilla forces achieve a high level of functional capabilities.

Instability in a region and its impact on larger transnational issues may warrant the introduction of direct and general support to the insurgency. As the governing authority in a region concedes its resolve to continue the conflict and acknowledges defeat, irregular OPFOR may pursue its agenda along at least one of two avenues toward recognized legitimacy. The insurgent movement can declare, establish, and be satisfied with selective geographic enclaves within an existing nation-state as a region under irregular OPFOR control. Another approach, coordinated with the governing authority and possibly the intervention and oversight of the international community, is irregular OPFOR participation in a representative political process that can replace the defeated governing authority as the legitimate political authority.

In either the self-declared politically motivated movement or representative political process, the irregular OPFOR main objective is to remedy the grievances of the relevant population that endorsed actions to displace an ineffective governing authority. As the insurgent movement gains control of geographic regions of the state, the insurgent movement becomes responsible for the population and its welfare, resources, and territory under its control. To consolidate and preserve its gains, an effective insurgent movement improves networked social, economic, and political structures. Other ideological edicts may include an obligation to institute particular theology-based dogma and lifestyles. As fundamental to protecting the people and demonstrating legitimacy, an insurgency plans for and institutes comprehensive programs which include support as follows:

- Civil administration.
- Social programs that service the needs of the people and community.
- Military and paramilitary forces.
- Law enforcement and impartial judicial activities.
- Economic development and access to personal advancement.
- Infrastructure improvements.
- Religious practice as promised in stated grievances of the former insurgency.
- Special programs that demonstrate the former insurgency as a legitimate governing entity.
- Security from famine, disease, hostile actions by domestic and foreign influences.

Training in Complex Operational Environments

Current and future OEs will often be the setting for persistent conflict in complex missions with dynamic conditions ranging the situational variables of PMESII-PT [political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time]. In training, adversaries and enemies must be credible and relevant as an adaptive and agile opponent.

One recurring threat in training is the different types of irregular opposing forces that can impact on accomplishing a unit mission. Irregular OPFOR expect and plan for long-term campaigning in persistent conflict.

Irregular OPFOR are versatile in use of TTP in order to achieve specified objectives. While a key intention of irregular OPFOR is to establish and maintain influence over a relevant population, the presence of military forces such as the US Army remains a recurring target of irregular OPFOR direct actions in support of an overarching OPFOR insurgency.

Whether training at home station, institutional locations, or exercises in LVCG environments—the US Army Soldier and leader must be ready to apply disciplined initiative within a commander’s intent to counter threats such as irregular OPFOR and achieve his or her mission tasks. Insurgencies, guerrilla operations, resistance movements, and criminal organization activities may often appear to be a complex array of regular and irregular OPFOR organizations, units, or individuals with various near-term, midterm, and long-term aims. OPFOR affiliates and individuals who declare themselves as adherents to a particular OPFOR further complicate *who* the Threat is and *why* they act the way they do. Discrete incidents in an OE, in casual observation and assessment, may not seem to complement a collaborative plan of action. However, detailed analysis of social, political, economic, information, and paramilitary events of contemporary Threats typically indicate a vision and long-range aim of a core cell with an ideological purpose or compelling desire to resolve a fundamental social or political grievance.

Irregular opposing forces (OPFOR) in US Army training display a wide range of motivations and actions in complex and uncertain OE. Tactical applications with irregular OPFOR in persistent conflict can include small unit home station training (HST), large field exercises, wargaming and experiments, and other forums for unit, activity, and Army training, professional education, and leader self-development.



Figure 9. [Soldiers: trained-adaptive-agile-ready](#)

THREAT PRODUCTS FOR COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS

by CTID Operations



Sampler of Products:

TC 7-100 *Hybrid Threat*

TC 7-101 *Exercise Design*

TC 7-100.2
Opposing Force Tactics

DATE v. 2.0
*Decisive Action
Training Environment*

RAFTE-Africa
*Regionally Aligned Forces
Training Environment*

*Worldwide Equipment
Guide (WEG)*

COMING in 2013:

TC 7-100.3
Irregular Opposing Forces

For documents produced by TRISA's Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) of U.S. Army TRADOC G2, with Army Knowledge Online (AKO) access, see <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/11318389>

Q: *Do you need a copy of Irregular Opposing Forces?*


A: *AKO access, see CTID Approved Final Draft TC 7-100.3*
<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/40913959>

Q: *When will TC 7-100.3 be published by HQDA?*

A: *TC 7-100.3 is at the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) for review and approval. Publication is planned for 2013.*

Q: *Do you have a question on a Threat or Opposing Force (OPFOR) issue that CTID can assist you with in identifying a solution?*

A: *Send us a request for information (RFI).*



THREATS TO KNOW—CTID DAILY UPDATE REVIEW

by Marc Williams, Training and Leader Development Team/JRTC LNO (ISC-CG CTR)

CTID analysts produce a daily [CTID Daily Update](#) to help our readers focus on key current events and developments across the Army training community. Available on AKO, each *Daily Update* is organized across the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). This list highlights key updates during the month.



Note. No monthly summary of CTID Daily Update highlights is posted in the August *Red Diamond*. The *CTID Daily Update* summary of monthly highlights will appear again in the September *Red Diamond*.

You Can Obtain a Copy of “Approved Final Draft” TC 7-100.3, *Irregular Opposing Forces*—Go to ATN

Irregular Opposing Forces for Training—Professional Education—Leader Development



Sample of Irregular Opposing Force (OPFOR) Symbols



Insurgent



Guerrilla



Criminal

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CTID Mission

CTID is the TRADOC G2 lead to study, design, document, validate, and apply Hybrid Threat in complex operational environment CONDITIONS that support all U.S. Army and joint training and leader development programs.

What We Do for YOU

- Determine threat and OE conditions.
- Develop and publish Threat methods.
- Develop and maintain Threat doctrine.
- Assess Hybrid Threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
- Develop and maintain the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE).
- Develop and maintain the Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment (RAFTE).
- Support terrorism-antiterrorism awareness.
- Publish OE Assessments (OEAs).
- Support Threat exercise design.
- Support Combat Training Center (CTC) Threat accreditation.
- Conduct "Advanced Hybrid Threat Tactics" Train-the-Trainer course.
- Conduct "Hybrid Threat" resident and MTT COE Train-the-Trainer course.
- Provide distance learning (DL) COE Train-the-Trainer course.
- Respond to requests for information (RFI) on threats and Threat issues.

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