



# Red Diamond

## Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Volume 3, Issue 7 JUL 2012

### INSIDE THIS ISSUE

Lashkar-e-Taiba..... 1

WEG Highlight: Russian  
7.62-MM Light  
Machinegun RPK..... 4

The Syrian Shabiha..... 5

OE Quick Guide: Saudi  
Arabia..... 5

Organizing the Battlefield. 6

Complex Threats in DATE  
Challenge Army  
Readiness ..... 9

DATE Quick Links .....10

Monthly Wrap-Up of CTID  
Daily Updates .....11

*Red Diamond is produced monthly by the Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate of the TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA). Send suggestions and feedback to Ms. Penny Mellies (penny.l.mellies.civ@mail.mil).*



## LASHKAR-E-TAIBA: THE THREE-HEADED SNAKE

By Laura Deatruck, OEA Team

From 26-29 December 2008, the world watched in horror as ten armed men staged a three-day assault against multiple civilian targets in Mumbai, India. Investigations by India, the United States, and the United Kingdom revealed the responsible party as Lashkar-e-Taiba, a militant Islamist group based in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The new OEA Team Threat Report, [Lashkar-e-Taiba: The Three-Headed Snake](#), examines the group’s history, philosophy and goals, ties with other organizations, and common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), translated as “Army of the Pure,” is intimately entwined with two other Islamist organizations: Markaz Dawa ul-Irshad and Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Any discussion of one is limited, if not impossible, without reference to the other two. The three groups are so closely related that they may be considered as three heads of a Medusa snake.

Markaz Dawa ul-Irshad, meaning “Center for Preaching and Guidance,” was founded in either Pakistan or Kunar province, Afghanistan in the late 1980s to aid the fight against the Soviets. It was established by Muhammad Hafiz Saeed, Zafar Iqbal, and the late Abdullah Azzam – the last being closely associated with Osama bin Laden. Funding to start the organization was reportedly provided by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, bin Laden, and Azzam. The group set up a headquarters campus in Muridke, Pakistan, with Saeed as its amir (leader).

After the departure of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, Markaz began to shift its focus toward other conflicts. LeT was started in 1990 as the jihadist wing of Markaz. Based in Muridke and headed by Saeed, its initial focus was the continued fight over Kashmir. The group entered the region for the first time in 1990 and began receiving assistance from the ISI for its Kashmir efforts in 1992. LeT committed its first attack in 1993 – against an Indian military base across the Line of Control in Poonch – killing several.

In mid-1999, LeT and several other Islamist militant groups, along with Pakistani military forces, invaded the Indian side of the Line of Control and occupied the Kargil Heights. This caused significant consternation in the international community, and the situation was not resolved until Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was pressured to convince the groups to withdraw. LeT did as requested, only to introduce a new tactic – the fidayeen – into the fight a few months later.

In November of that year, two LeT members stormed the Indian Army headquarters in Srinagar and killed several Indian soldiers before being killed themselves. This fidayeen attack was different than previous militant tactics in that the perpetrators, while not committing suicide, had no expectation of surviving. LeT reached another organizational milestone in December 2000 when it launched its first assault in India proper, attacking the Indian Army's Red Fort in New Delhi.

After the events of 11 September 2001 General Musharraf – under pressure from the U.S. – arrested LeT amir Saeed, but he was subsequently released. In keeping with its focus on international terrorism, the U.S. included LeT in the 05 December Terrorist Exclusion List. Only eight days later, five men stormed the Parliament building in New Delhi, India, leaving at least seven dead and 18 wounded. Though not claiming credit, the attack was believed to be a joint operation of LeT and Jaish-e-Muhammad. The U.S. Department of State (USDoS) designated LeT as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on 26 December, and the organization was banned in Pakistan by General Musharraf on 12 January 2002.

Even before it was banned, the group appeared to be changing tacks. Saeed formally dissolved Markaz in December 2001, splitting it into two groups. The first organization was the already existing LeT, which was to remain focused on jihad, but only in Kashmir. To this end, a new central committee was appointed, consisting entirely of Kashmiris, with Maulani Abdul Wahid Kashmiri as leader. LeT had operated freely and openly in Pakistan until this time – fundraising,

recruiting, and claiming credit for attacks. At this point, the group moved its headquarters from the Muridke campus to Muzaffarabad, in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and stopped claiming credit for attacks – starting with the Indian Parliament attack that month.


The second organization that came from the dissolution of Markaz was a new group that Saeed named Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), or “Society for Preaching.” JuD inherited Markaz’ educational and humanitarian activities, such as running schools and medical facilities, and supplying preachers and speakers for local mosques. The organization also inherited the Muridke campus and a large portion of Markaz/LeT’s leadership including Saeed himself, who became amir.

Though JuD was officially formed as a separate, unrelated organization, it continued to provide support to LeT through fundraising and recruiting. Many experts believe JuD to be a front group for LeT or merely LeT under another name. Despite the obvious close ties of the two organizations, JuD has consistently denied all ties with LeT and claimed itself to be purely a humanitarian organization.

LeT continued to perform attacks across the Line of Control and in India proper after 2001. In August 2003, twin car bombings in Mumbai killed over 50 and wounded double to triple that number. Indian authorities attributed the attack to LeT. Three

months later and perhaps not coincidentally, JuD was placed on the Pakistani watch list. However, the group continued to operate openly and unhindered in the country. Another major bombing in India, this one in New Delhi, occurred in October 2005 and was also blamed on LeT.

That same month, Kashmir experienced a massive earthquake that killed more than 70,000. JuD immediately became a major source of humanitarian aid in the region – providing food, shelter, and medical care for the refugees – with funding said to be from private donations. Working from a long-term view, the organization was still actively involved in relief efforts a year after the quake. JuD took advantage of the opportunity presented by this humanitarian work to re-



open offices that had been closed with the banning of LeT and to begin fundraising openly.

On 11 July 2006, seven commuter trains were bombed in Mumbai. Over 200 died and more than four times that number were injured. After extensive investigation, Indian authorities determined that the attack was a joint operation of LeT with the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). They also concluded that the two groups had not only coordinated their actions, but also received support from the ISI.

On 26 November 2008, ten terrorists began an attack in Mumbai against six different civilian targets, ranging from a rail station to two hotels. Lasting over 60 hours, the assault finally ended after the death of nine perpetrators and the capture of the tenth. Both dead and injured numbered in the low hundreds. Investigations by the U.S., UK, and India uncovered a very sophisticated LeT attack that was supported by both the ISI and the Pakistani Army.

Both the U.S. and the United Nations declared JuD to be an alias for LeT in December 2008, and Pakistan banned the group during the same month. The country denied LeT's involvement for months, but eventually arrested and charged seven individuals – including a senior LeT leader – with planning the assault. Saeed was placed under house arrest, but was released around six months later due to lack of evidence. As of this writing, Pakistan continues to deny official involvement in the attack, and none of the cases have gone to trial.

The Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation (FeF) was established in 2009 after JuD was declared a terrorist organization by the United Nations. Branded as an Islamic charity, it engages in humanitarian relief activities while acting as a front organization for JuD. The group supplied aid to refugees fleeing the Taliban takeover of the Malakand area in 2009, and provided relief during the flooding in 2010. FeF claimed legitimacy after a USAID administrator visited and delivered supplies to one of its relief camps in August 2010. Only three months later, the USDoS declared it to be an alias for LeT.

At the present time, LeT remains one of the largest active militant groups in Kashmir. It has not performed

a major attack in India proper since 2008, but has limited itself to skirmishes across the Line of Control. Saeed is most likely still in control of the organization, despite all claims to the contrary. His goals are also unchanged, as is evidenced from an April 2012 sermon in Lahore in which he publically called for jihad against the United States.

**This fidayeen attack was different than previous militant tactics in that the perpetrators, while not committing suicide, had no expectation of surviving.**

Including groups such as LeT and JuD can provide several benefits when emplaced in a training scenario. Fidayeen attacks against a military installation employ only a small number of local participants and are easy to mimic in the home-training environment. Strong ties between humanitarian organizations and militant groups

are commonplace in many potential operational environments and require coordination between troops in the field and intelligence analysts to discover their relationships. Large-scale attacks against civilians give ample opportunity for troops to practice basic first-responder medical skills.

The [Lashkar-e-Taiba: The Three-Headed Snake](#) Threat Report provides information to the training community on this militant Islamist group. It contains a review of the group's history, philosophy and goals, and ties to other organizations. In addition, it discusses LeT's funding sources, significant attacks, facilities, and international links. The report also contains common group TTP and detailed training implications.

### **Train the Trainer Coming this September**

TRISA-Threats will host its annual Hybrid Threat "Train the Trainer" (TTT) Course of Instruction (COI) from 17-21 September 2012 at the Mission Training Complex, Leavenworth, Kansas. This week-long course covers Hybrid Threat and associated opposing force (OPFOR) application as depicted in the new Army TC 7-100 series (e.g. organization, equipment, and tactics). All interested participants or organizations are requested to submit names as soon as possible, but no later than 1 August 2012, to the course administrator: [patrick.madden@us.army.mil](mailto:patrick.madden@us.army.mil) or 913-684-7997 (DSN 552).

## WEG HIGHLIGHT: RUSSIAN 7.62-MM LIGHT MACHINEGUN RPK

The [Worldwide Equipment Guide \(WEG\)](#) was developed to support OPFOR equipment portrayal across the training community. The WEG is not a product of the U.S. intelligence community. The WEG is a TRADOC G-2 approved document. Annual WEG updates are posted on AKO.

	<p><b>Ammunition</b>  <b>7.62-mm</b>          Ball          Tracer          API          Tracer          Incendiary  <b>Total</b></p>	<p><b>Typical Combat Load</b>  <b>1,000</b></p>
<p><b>SYSTEM</b>  <b>Alternative Designations:</b> none  <b>Date of Introduction:</b> 1964  <b>Proliferation:</b> Widespread  <b>Description:</b>  <b>Weight (kg):</b>              Empty (w/o magazine) (kg): 4.9              Loaded (with magazine): 5.67 w/40-rd mag  <b>Mount:</b> Bipod  <b>Length (mm):</b>              Overall: 1,035              Barrel: 591  <b>Quick Change Barrel:</b> No  <b>Rate of Fire (rd/min):</b>              Cyclic: 650              Practical (auto): 150 (80 sustained, see note)              Practical (semi): 50  <b>Fire Mode:</b> Selective  <b>Operation:</b> Gas  <b>Feed:</b> 40 round-curved box or 75-rd drum magazine. Can also use the 30-round curved box magazine used by the AKM .  <b>SIGHTS</b>  <b>Name:</b> N/A  <b>Type:</b> Leaf sights  <b>Magnification:</b> None    <b>Night Sights Available:</b> yes, (luminous front/rear)</p>	<p><b>AMMUNITION</b>  <b>Name:</b> M1943 (57N231S)  <b>Caliber/length:</b> 7.62x39-mm  <b>Type:</b> Ball, steel core  <b>Range (m):</b>              Effective: 800              Maximum: 800  <b>Armor Penetration:</b> 6 mm mild steel plate at 300 m              Steel helmet at 1,000 m              Flak vest at 60 m  <b>Muzzle Velocity (m/s):</b> 718  <b>Name:</b> M1943 (T-45 or 57N231P)  <b>Caliber/length:</b> 7.62x39-mm  <b>Type:</b> Ball-Tracer  <b>Range</b>              Effective: 800              Maximum: 800              Trace (m): 800  <b>Muzzle Velocity (m/s):</b> 718  <b>Name:</b> M1943  <b>Caliber/length:</b> 7.62x39-mm  <b>Type:</b> API  <b>Armor Penetration (mm @ 0° obliquity @ 500m):</b> 8  <b>Muzzle Velocity (m/s):</b> N/A  <b>VARIANTS</b>  <b>RPKS:</b> Folded stock version (820 mm in length)</p>	

**NOTES:** The RPK is the machinegun variant of the AKM and as such is an extended version of the AKM. It has a longer, heavier barrel than the AKM (591 mm vs 414 mm). Most moving parts are interchangeable with the AK-47 or AKM assault rifles. The sustained rate of fire cannot exceed 80 rounds per minute due to "cook off". It has been replaced by the 5.45-mm RPK-74 in many armies.

# THE SYRIAN SHABIHA

By Rick Burns, OEA Team


The *Shabiha* is a fanatically pro-Bashar al-Assad gang of smugglers that the al-Assad family uses to intimidate anti-government dissenters in Syria, and can be a destabilizing force in Syria. The Shabiha has been implicated in many of the brutal civilian deaths since opposition to Bashar al-Assad began in 2011. The Taldou village massacre near the city of Houla is one of the latest examples of the violence Shabiha members are capable of in support of the al-Assad regime. After a two-hour military barrage on 25-26 May 2012, members of the Shabiha were identified by eyewitnesses brutally killing 49 children, 34 women, and 25 men.

Over decades, the al-Assad family recruited thousands of young, unemployed men from the suburbs and supplied them with weapons and immunity from prosecution. The al-Assad family sanctioned the illegal smuggling activities of Shabiha members and they, in turn, provided an intimidating force to quell anti-government protests. The Shabiha is a formidable force on the Syrian battlefield, able to carry out brutal acts of violence and intimidation. Readily recognizable characteristics such as extremely large steroid-induced physical features, bushy beards, and

white trainer running shoes are identifying features of Shabiha members.

Members of the Shabiha have their own survival concerns that are tied directly to the survival of the al-Assad regime. They are able to justify wide-spread violence against the majority Sunni Syrians because they believe their survival is inextricably tied to the success of the al-Assad regime. Due to its close ties to the al-Assad family, past brutal behavior, and membership in the minority Alawite Islam sect, the Shabiha fears retribution if the al-Assad regime falls. Having created and crafted the Shabiha over the last few decades, it is not at all certain, however, that the current al-Assad government will be able to control the vast network of these groups. The Shabiha's concerns over their own survival may inspire violent, gang-like behavior that is counter to the al-Assad regime's best interests. In the minds of members of the Shabiha, they have no choice but to fight to the death, and have the capability of being an

ongoing force for instability in a post-al-Assad Syria. For more information on the Shabiha, refer to the July 2012 TRISA Threat Report, [The Shabiha of Syria](#).



# OE QUICK GUIDE: SAUDI ARABIA


By Raines Warford, OEA Team

TRISA-CTID's Operational Environment Assessment (OEA) Team has completed another Operational Environment (OE) Quick Guide. OE Quick Guides provide a very brief overview of the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical

Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT) variables of a given OE. Each of the PMESII-PT variables is covered in a brief, accessible format designed to quickly give the reader a comprehensive overview of the OE. The latest OE Quick Guide covers Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia rose from an underdeveloped desert kingdom to become one of the wealthiest nations in the world due to its vast oil resources. Named after the ruling Al Saud family, the kingdom includes the Hijaz region, the birthplace of the Prophet Muhammad and the cradle of Islam. This fact, combined with the Al Sauds' adherence of a strict interpretation of Sunni Islam, commonly referred to as Wahhabism, led it to develop a strongly religious self-identity.

Saudi Arabia is currently confronted with a growing demand for political reform. Calls for social change are on the rise. Activists for women's rights have become more vocal, focusing on



practical campaigns such as the right to drive. Social media users are also testing the limits of freedom of expression. At the same time, the kingdom faces the threat of terrorism from al-Qaeda. The future holds many possibilities for Saudi Arabia. If a U.S. brigade deployed to Saudi Arabia, it would likely be because of either regime instability or challenges to the energy industry.

The Saudi Arabia OE Quick Guides give Soldiers, scenario developers, trainers, and others a concise reference for the OE. While not as in depth as an OEA, the Quick Guide delivers the essential facts of the PMESII-PT variables.

## OPFOR: GETTING READY FOR THE FIGHT— ORGANIZING THE BATTLEFIELD AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

By Mike Spight, Joint Maneuver Readiness Center - OPFOR

The Opposing Force (OPFOR) fully understands that one of the real keys to victory on the battlefield is the ability to rapidly transition from defensive to offensive operations, and also from linear to nonlinear force geometry in the field. Ideally, this should be done rapidly, before the enemy (BLUFOR) can determine what is happening and counter the move. Flexible, adaptive operations are the hallmark of the OPFOR whether BLUFOR is in a training environment at a Combat Training Center (CTC), while conducting Home Station Training with a non-fulltime OPFOR drawn from installation assets, or when participating in a simulation (Warfighter Exercise).

Once given his mission by higher, the OPFOR commander must be able to visualize **WHAT** he is tasked to accomplish. Once he has that firmly in mind, he can then focus on the **HOW**, and the foundation of the **How** is **Organization of the Battlefield**. Specifically, the commander must determine where to position his


forces, their mission, and what zones will he establish for this engagement. These are critical questions than can only be answered by an OPFOR commander who can see the **What** and **How**, and then translate that vision into clear Commander's Guidance to his Staff, whose responsibility is to then transform that vision into Battle (Operational) Orders.

The OPFOR commander will have an assigned area of responsibility (AOR) directed by his higher headquarters, which includes land, bodies of water, and the air space above. The commander is responsible for both mission success and failure in his AOR. The OPFOR designates smaller AORs for subordinate units to conduct operations, and these AORs can be linear or nonlinear.

The OPFOR commander's entire AOR is surrounded by a line of responsibility (LOR) which is directed by his higher headquarters. He cannot conduct operations or fire beyond the boundaries of his LOR without first

coordinating with and receiving permission from higher headquarters.

An AOR for a DTG or BTG will normally consist of three basic zones: support zone, battle zone and disruption zone, and these three zones may also contain attack and kill zones. Note that Bn/BDET and below do not normally have their own disruption zones, but may conduct operations within their higher headquarters' disruption zone if tasked to do so.



OPFOR recon assets are located and maintain contact with BLUFOR, keep constant “eyes on,” and render any movement by BLUFOR elements subject to indirect fires and engagement (if possible) by close air support assets. The overall effect is to “disrupt” BLUFOR offensive or defensive preparation or execution, and to adversely affect the BLUFOR commander’s operational tempo.

The OPFOR commander will determine what zones will be required for the mission. There is no requirement for all three to be used; there could be a battle zone, but no disruption zone, or vice versa. Again, the intent is to provide the senior commander and his subordinate commanders with as much flexibility and agility to achieve their objective(s) as possible, without hindering them with any unnecessary, artificial control measures.

As an operation progresses, it’s important to understand that as the OPFOR moves forward (following a successful offensive or defensive action) what was the disruption zone will move forward and may change into a subsequent battle zone. Designations are not permanent, and must be responsive to the changing situation and physical positions on the ground as ground is gained or lost.

### The Disruption Zone


Simply put, it is the ground and air space where the disruption force conducts its operations and executes its disruption tasks. This is accomplished by making contact with BLUFOR and fixing them with direct and/or indirect fires in order to set the stage for success in the battle zone. Focus is on critical BLUFOR units/systems (mission command, reconnaissance, air defense, engineer) to destroy or attrite them to a level where BLUFOR infantry and armor assets are basically unsupported and rendered ineffective. Additionally,

### The Battle Zone

It is here, in the battle zone, where the OPFOR will exploit the results achieved by its disruption force, and will attempt to achieve decision over BLUFOR. In the battle zone, whether conducting offense or defense, the OPFOR will seek to make maximum effective use of all of its assets to defeat BLUFOR. Examples include the following: penetrate BLUFOR defensive positions so that the exploitation force can break through; seize terrain; inflict casualties on BLUFOR unit(s); fix BLUFOR elements so that they cannot move about the AOR; and possibly locate and engage other OPFOR units.

### The Support Zone

The support zone is where the OPFOR’s logistics and personnel support, mission command nodes, reserves, and other assets are located, and ideally is in an area that is unobserved by and unknown to BLUFOR. The intent is for this area to be as free of BLUFOR activity (including recon and Special Forces [SF]) as possible due to the efforts of OPFOR security forces specifically tasked with responsibility for rear area security. Obviously, there is heavy reliance on camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) by OPFOR service and support units located in the support zone, as all of these disciplines are critical to avoiding detection by BLUFOR recon or SF assets.




Example #2

## The Attack Zone

This zone could be located in either the battle or disruption zone, and is assigned to a subordinate OPFOR unit for the purpose of executing a specific offensive mission. This provides exact guidance to the subordinate unit commander and adjacent OPFOR units, that an offensive operation will be executed at X location on X date time group. Although attack zones are present in the offense and defense, it particularly provides control over offensive operations conducted by a subordinate unit

(Bn or BDET) within the context of a larger defensive battle at Brigade or BCT level where more control by higher headquarters is often required.



Example #3

## The Kill Zone

The kill zone is the area designated by the senior commander where BLUFOR assets will be engaged and destroyed. It may be located in the battle or disruption zones (offense or defense) and in the support zone, particularly during the defense. Typically, a kill zone is located in an area that provides OPFOR with superior fields of fire and

protection from BLUFOR observation, direct and indirect fire systems.

## Examples

---

Example #1 provides an uncomplicated view of a linear AOR including support, battle and disruption zones and attack and kill zones. This depicts an offensive action by the OPFOR.

Example #2 provides a more complex view of a linear AOR, including adjacent units beyond the LOR on the DTG's left flank. Here again, OPFOR is conducting an offensive operation featuring three separate battle zones.

The final example, Example #3, depicts a nonlinear DTG AOR containing three separate BTG AORs, and their specific disruption, battle, support, attack and kill zones.

Note BLUFOR presence in the form of a SPOD (seaport) and APOD, and that the entire DTG AOR is surrounded by its higher headquarters (OSC) disruption zone.

## Conclusion

---

Once he understands the **Why**, the ability to "see" the operational environment, and then conceive, develop and mature his vision for the pending operation is critical for the OPFOR commander. Much like the design of a large skyscraper, stadium, or bridge, the design of a battle –whether offense or defense – must be based on a clear view of a desired end state. This design constitutes the foundation of **How** the OPFOR will conduct its operation with regard to managing the operational environment.

# COMPLEX THREATS IN *DATE* CHALLENGE ARMY READINESS

---

By Dr. Jon H. Moilanen, Threats Terrorism Team (T3) Integration

Chief of Staff of the Army, Raymond T. Odierno, states that "while we cannot predict the future of our increasingly uncertain and complex strategic environment, we can be certain that our Nation will continue to call on America's Army." *Marching Orders*

According to General Odierno, security challenges in today's complex and uncertain global environment are "a wide range of missions – including regular and irregular warfare, humanitarian assistance operations, engagement with allies to build partner capacity, and support to civil authorities." To answer these challenges, he directed development of a dynamic model for all Army training that uses a composite of real-world variables. This model presents the complex conditions that Army leaders, Soldiers, and units will confront and prevail in during the early decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

The Army's Training and Doctrine Command G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) analyzed

operational environment (OE) conditions of current and projected regional threats through a spectrum of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) variables. The resulting product is the **Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE)**. This document portrays an OE for all Army training that is a composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences that could be encountered in current and future military operations.

The *DATE* integrates actual demographics, terrain features, military capabilities and limitations, infrastructure, cultural perspectives, and other realistic factors for training. The OE setting of the *DATE* focuses on competing demands among five sovereign states in the Caucasus region, but geographical names and boundaries differ from actual titles to identify the *DATE* as only a training environment.

Commanders use the *DATE* to integrate appropriate conditions in all live training at home station, exercise locations, institutional organizations and activities, and Army Combat Training Centers (CTCs); constructive and virtual simulations; and gaming in order to improve leader and unit-team readiness. Using the tasks, conditions, and standards of the standardized mission essential task list (METL) or a designated mission, a commander prepares to achieve a mission in an OE that may include conventional enemy forces, insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists, criminals, or combinations of other threats and challenges.

Training to Army standards requires that conditions are realistic and robust. Instituting the *Decisive Action Training Environment* for all training Army-wide enhances the prudent and efficient use of finite capital

**For more information on the *DATE*, access Army Knowledge Online and go to TRADOC G2 DATE at:**  
<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/26833763>.

in an era of reduced resources, and improves a flexible and integrated approach to Army leader development, team-building in Army units, and synchronized combat power among the U.S. joint force, whole-of-government and international partners, and allies.

In May 2012, General Odierno summarized today's and tomorrow's reality and Army mission focus: "We continue to apply the lessons of more than 10 years of continuous combat. We will be leaner. We'll be a more agile Army that is an adaptive, innovative, versatile, and ready component of the joint force."

## DATE QUICK LINKS

---

The *Decisive Action Training Environment* (*DATE*) is a complex model, as is its supporting documentation. This listing of selected direct Quick Links provides easy access to the *DATE* and its sections. If further assistance is needed to find or access a particular topic, document, reference, etc., please contact Mr. Charles Christianson at (913) 684-7984 or DSN 552-7984, or email [charles.e.christianson.civ@mail.mil](mailto:charles.e.christianson.civ@mail.mil).

Full PDF: [DATE 2.0, Dec 2011](#)

Activate the Bookmark icon on the left-hand side of the PDF to easily navigate to any section of the document.

Section 2: [Operational Environment Assessments with Orders of Battle](#) (Orders of Battle follow each OEA)

Section 4. Orders of Battle (OB) and Appendices (separated from the OEAs)  
[Introduction to OB Appendices](#) (read first for important information)

Orders of Battle by Country

- [Ariana OB](#)
- [Atropia OB](#)
- [Minaria OB](#)
- [Gorgas OB](#)
- [Donovia OB](#)

### [Appendices](#)

- Appendix A. Organizational Equipment Tables  
[Criminal Elements](#)
- Appendix B. OPFOR Task-Organization for Combat
- Appendix C. OPFOR Equipment Tier Table

### [Links to Other Products](#)


---

- [TC 7-100, Hybrid Threat](#)
- [TC 7-101, Exercise Design](#)
- [TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics](#)
- [FM 7-100.4, Opposing Force Organization Guide](#)
- [Administrative Force Structure \(AFS\)](#)
- Vol I – Division & Divisional Units
- Vol II – Non-Divisional Units
  - [Separate Combat Brigades](#)
  - [Combat Brigades](#)
  - [Special-Purpose Forces](#)
- Combat Support Units:
  - [INFOWAR Brigade](#)
  - [UAV battalion](#)
- Vol III – Paramil Nonmil Orgs
- [Worldwide Equipment Guide](#)

## MONTHLY WRAP-UP OF CTID DAILY UPDATES


CTID analysts produce a daily [CTID Daily Update](#) to help our readers focus on key current events and developments across the Army training community. Available on AKO, each *Daily Update* is organized topically across the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). This list highlights key updates during July 2012. The *Daily Update* is a research tool, and an article's inclusion in the *Update* does not reflect an official U.S. Government position on the topic. Also, CTID does not assume responsibility for the accuracy of each article.

- 9 July—**Iran:** [Clone Wars: Iran's new drones](#)
- 9 July—**Syria:** [Syria tests missiles against coastal attack](#)
- 10 July—**World:** [Drone hijacking? That's just the start of GPS troubles](#)
- 10 July—**Colombia:** [Colombian military dismantles 5 FARC camps](#)
- 10 July—**Pakistan:** [Is LeT turning against Pakistan?](#)
- 10 July—**China:** [China warns ASEAN on South China Sea disputes: "Don't get involved"](#)
- 11 July—**Yemen:** [Suicide attack on police academy kills 20 police cadets](#)
- 12 July—**Mexico:** [Another border drug tunnel found](#)
- 12 July—**Colombia:** [FARC shoots down military aircraft over Jambolo, Cauca](#)
- 13 July—**India:** [India test-fires Agni I missile](#)
- 16 July—**Russia:** [Russia kills six militants in Makhachkala, Dagestan](#)
- 17 July—**Lebanon:** [Hezbollah drone crashes in Lebanon](#)
- 18 July—**Yemen:** [Yemen uncovers and arrests Iranian-led spy ring](#)
- 19 July—**North Korea:** [North Korea military in crisis](#)
- 20 July—**Peru:** [Shining Path leader offers rare glimpse into Peru drug trade](#)
- 23 July—**Iraq:** [Wave of attacks kill 100+ across Iraq](#)
- 24 July—**Pakistan:** [Taliban recruiting and fundraising in Karachi](#)
- 25 July—**India:** [Northeast India clashes kill 38 and displace 170,000](#)
- 26 July—**Mali:** [Is Mali the next Afghanistan?](#)



*Disclaimer: CTID does not assume responsibility for the accuracy of each article shown on this page. Also, the views and opinions expressed in Red Diamond articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any Department of Defense or government entity.*

## AKO Three “Click” Drill-Down



**Find Your Topic – Do Your Research**

### What We Do for YOU

- ◆ **Determine OE Conditions**
- ◆ **Publish Operational Environment Assessments (OEs)**
- ◆ **Publish OE Threats in FSO**
- ◆ **Publish Army OPFOR Doctrine**
- ◆ **Assess Threat-Enemy & TTP**
- ◆ **Support Terrorism Awareness**
- ◆ **Produce the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE—previously Full Spectrum Training Environment)**

**All CTID products can be found on AKO.  
Check out all of our products at:  
[www.us.army.mil/suite/files/11318389](http://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/11318389)**

**Director, CTID** DSN: 552  
Mr Jon Cleaves FAX: 2397  
jon.s.cleaves.civ@mail.mil 913.684.7975

**OE & OPFOR Doctrine & Training Lit.**  
Senior Analyst CTID: Dr Don Madill 684.7926  
donald.l.madill.civ@mail.mil

**OPFOR Doctrine Team**  
SME: Mr Rick McCall 684.7960  
richard.g.mccall.civ@mail.mil

**Intelligence Specialist**  
SME: Mr Kris Lechowicz 684.7922  
kristin.d.lechowicz.civ@mail.mil

**Intelligence Specialist**  
SME: Mr Jerry England 684.7934  
jerry.j.england.civ@mail.mil

**Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG)**  
SME: Mr Tom Redman BAE 684.7925  
thomas.w.redman.ctr@mail.mil

**Threats Terrorism Team (T3) Integration**  
SME: Mr Jon Moilanen L3-MPRI 684.7928  
jon.h.moilanen.ctr@mail.mil

**Operational Environment Analysis**  
SME: Ms Penny Mellies 684.7920  
penny.l.mellies.civ@mail.mil  
SME: Angela Wilkins L3-MPRI 684.7929  
angela.m.wilkins7.ctr@mail.mil

**Training-Education-Leader Development**  
SME: Mr Walt Williams 684.7923  
walter.l.williams112.civ@mail.mil

**National Training Center - OPFOR**  
SME: LTC Terry Howard USAR 684.7939  
terry.d.howard.mil@mail.mil

**Joint Readiness Training Ctr - OPFOR**  
SME: Mr Marc Williams BAE 684.7943  
james.m.williams257.ctr@mail.mil

**Joint Maneuver Readiness Ctr - OPFOR**  
SME: Mr Mike Spight BAE 684.7974  
michael.g.spight.ctr@mail.mil

**Mission Command Training Program - OPFOR**  
SME: Mr Pat Madden S3 Inc 684.7997  
patrick.m.madden16.ctr@mail.mil

**Threats Website-Support Operations**  
SME: Mr Charles Christianson 684.7984  
charles.e.christianson.civ@mail.mil