



Red Diamond

Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate

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
Red Diamond is produced monthly by the Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate of the TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA). Send suggestions and feedback to Ms. Penny Mellies (penny.l.mellies.civ@mail.mil).



COMING SOON: REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCE TRAINING ENVIRONMENT (RAFTE)-AFRICA PUBLICATION

The Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) is currently producing the first Regionally Aligned Force Training Environment for Africa. The RAFTE is a TRADOC G-2 approved publication that serves as a supplement to the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) publication. The first RAFTE will focus on Africa and will be published fall 2012. The purpose of the RAFTE is to highlight specific OE conditions and characteristics that are unique to the region that are not included in the DATE. Real-world conditions will be translated into generic and representative conditions for each RAFTE produced. This allows for trainers focused on a specific region to be able to use the RAFTE as the baseline document for decisive action training scenario development. Each RAFTE will contain four sections: 1) OEs under review – matrix of conditions; 2) Discussion of unique conditions (by OE variable); 3) Conditions in the DATE that do not apply to the RAFTE; 4) Possible RAFTE-based events linked to specific ASCC tasks.

Each RAFTE will be built through collaboration between TRISA-CTID and each ASCC staff. The ASCC staff will identify the key conditions that must be replicated for any regionally aligned force BCT training for that region. TRISA-CTID will then integrate these conditions into a package within the DATE framework that provides exercise planners with the



COMING SOON: RAFTE-AFRICA *(continued)*

tools and conditions necessary to provide realistic challenges across all the OE variables while also retaining a focus on conditions specifically appropriate to the region covered by a particular RAFTE. Decisive action training scenarios built from a RAFTE provide the perfect blend of conditions appropriate to a specific region and conditions appropriate to maintaining task proficiency. The DATE and RAFTEs are not scenarios. They are tools to support the development of a scenario. Each training venue is responsible for the production of each scenario based upon the conditions represented in the documents, albeit with TRISA-CTID as a partner. RAFTEs will be used by all combat training centers (CTCs), power projection platforms, exercise divisions, Centers of Excellence, and home station venues to support decisive action training. Each RAFTE provides a single source for OE conditions required for such training events for appropriate regionally aligned forces. **Each RAFTE eliminates the need for each training venue to expend time and resources to develop the OE needed to support its exercises.**

**DATE is the framework
for the RAFTE.
RAFTE provides
unique conditions and
characteristics of the
OE.**

OE QUICK GUIDE: INDONESIA

By H. David Pendleton, OEA Team

Over the last few months, the TRISA Threats OEA Team has written several Operational Environment (OE) Quick Guides with the latest one focused on the Asian country of Indonesia. An OE Quick Guide serves as a point of basic information organized across PMESII-PT variables for a given OE.

Due to the country's position near the South China Sea, Indonesia holds an important strategic position in the world. Much of the world's shipping, including a significant amount of hydrocarbon products bound for Japan, travels through the area each day. The South China Sea also contains an abundance of natural resources (crude oil and natural gas) and many excellent fishing grounds that can cause disputes between countries in the region. (See the December 2011 Threat Report on the [Spratly Islands Dispute](#) for more details.

Indonesia also serves as a major ally of the U.S. in the world's fight against terrorism, as the country is a maelstrom for both domestic and international terrorists. Recent pertinent [Threat Reports](#) related to terrorism in Indonesia include the bombings of a mosque and church by the Cirebon Group in 2011 (April 2012); a profile of the convicted terrorist leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (June 2012); and an examination of the Indonesian terrorist group, *Jemaah Islamiyah* (May

2012). In the near future, TRISA-Threats will also publish a product on another Indonesian terrorist group, the *Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid* (JAT), founded by Ba'asyir. While slightly dated since its publication by TRISA-Threats in March 2009, a summation of the major terrorist groups in Indonesia and the Philippines could also prove useful for those readers interested in the region.

The OE Quick Guides follow the standard PMESII-PT format found in a standard Operational Environment Assessment (OEA), with sections on the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time variables. Instead of a detailed analysis found in a standard OEA – usually over 100 pages long – the OE Quick Guides provide the basic information in 20-25 pages that allows the reader to gain a quick insight into the country from eight different but interrelated perspectives. The format and charts provide abundant information in a limited amount of space. OE Quick Guides also include a sources page to provide the reader with the ability to locate other resources to gain further familiarity with a country.

Other countries with an OE Quick Guide include Yemen (published in June 2012) and Saudi Arabia (published in July 2012). These products can also be found on the [TRISA AKO Web site](#).

SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

By Rick Burns, OEA Team

Beginning in the early 1970s, Syria began a chemical weapons program as a defense against the conventional military superiority of Israel. While not admitting that it has a chemical weapons program, Syria has consistently stated that it has a right to such a program as long as Israel has a nuclear capability, although Syria is not capable of a fully independent chemical weapons program.

Two events focused Syria's attention on its particular vulnerability to a growing Israeli threat. First, Syria's chemical weapons program was initially resourced by Egypt prior to its invasion of Israel in October 1973. In 1979, however, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel. This left Syria with a somewhat muted Egyptian ally. The second impetus for a Syrian chemical weapons program came when Syria realized Israel's conventional military superiority during a face-off with Israel in Lebanon in 1982. The Assad regime drew the conclusion that an active chemical weapons research, development, and production capability was a cost-effective strategic equalizer to Israel's military superiority.


Syria's chemical weapons program has been hard to accurately assess due to the country's international isolation. Syria depends heavily on foreign support from North Korea, Russia, and Iran for both precursor chemicals and delivery system technology. While supporting a region-wide ban on weapons of mass

destruction, Syria has not signed or acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Due to increased international cooperation in recent years, Syria has been limited in its ability to expand its chemical production. Limited does not mean, however, that Syria's chemical weapon program is not substantial or a significant threat.

Beginning with the 2011 Syrian protests, civil unrest, and the increasingly volatile nature of the Assad regime's hold on power, security of chemical stockpiles has become a significant concern. It is yet to be seen if Assad will authorize the use of chemical weapons against rebels. It is also yet to be seen if a military faction, exclusive of Assad, will use chemical weapons. Whether Assad stays in power or other less stable factions

gain control of the government, weakened control and security of chemical stockpiles will make them a prime target for militant and terrorist organizations who will take advantage of the instability.

The Threat Report "Syrian Chemical Weapons" provides information on the history of Syria's chemical weapons program, capabilities, and potential scenarios regarding Syria's chemical weapons in the current civil unrest. Since no one knows the outcomes from the Syrian conflict, securing and controlling the substantial chemical stockpiles will need to be a priority to ensure they do not fall into the wrong hands.



WEG HIGHLIGHT: CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) WEAPONS

The Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) supports OPFOR equipment portrayal across in all training venues. The WEG is a TRADOC G-2 approved document with annual updates posted on Army Knowledge Online (AKO).

In the past we have limited the Red Diamond WEG input to equipment/weapon/system sheets. While these sheets comprise a large segment of the WEG, the WEG also contains a great deal of textual information. Some examples include trends, equipment matrices and

tables, explanations of COE and tier tables, TTP, and generally how things, systems, sights, electro-magnetic spectrum & sensors, robotics, ATGMs, technologies, upgrades, categories, etc. work. This issue of Red Diamond we have selected extracts from Chapter 11,

WEG HIGHLIGHT: CBRN WEAPONS *(continued)*

CBRN, to provide additional military context to the Syrian Chemical Weapons article above.

Chemical Warfare

The OPFOR is equipped, structured, and trained to conduct both offensive and defensive chemical warfare. It is continually striving to improve its chemical warfare capabilities. It believes that an army using chemical weapons must be prepared to fight in the environment it creates. Therefore, it views chemical defense as part of a viable offensive chemical warfare capability. It maintains a large inventory of individual and collective chemical protection and decontamination equipment.

Chemical Agents and Effects

One way of classifying chemical agents is by the effects they have on humans, and on other animals. Persistence and delivery method are other selection criteria for a specific mission.

There are two major lethality categories among agents, each with subcategories. Lethal agents, categorized by how they attack and kill personnel, include nerve, blood, blister, and choking agents. Nonlethal agents include incapacitants and irritants. The table below lists characteristic effects of example chemical agents on personnel.

Nerve agents are fast-acting. Practically odorless and colorless, they attack the body's nervous system, causing convulsions and eventually death. Nerve agents are further classified as either G- or V-agents. At low concentrations, the GB series incapacitates; it kills if inhaled or absorbed through the skin. The rate of action is very rapid if inhaled, but slower if absorbed through the skin. V-agents produce similar effects, but are quicker-acting and more persistent than G-agents. Persistence varies among these agents, based on formulation.

- *Blood agents* block the body's oxygen transferal mechanisms, leading to death by suffocation. A common blood agent is hydrogen cyanide (AC). It kills quickly and dissipates rapidly. This is a persistent agent.

- *Blister agents*, such as mustard (H) or lewisite (L), and combinations of these two compounds can disable or kill after contact with the skin, being inhaled into the lungs, or being ingested. Contact with the skin can cause painful blisters, and eye contact can cause blindness. These agents are especially lethal when inhaled. These are persistent agents.
- *Choking agents*, such as phosgene (CG) and diphosgene (DP) block respiration by damaging the breathing mechanism, which can be fatal. As with blood agents, this type is nonpersistent; and poisoning comes through inhalation. Signs and symptoms of toxicity may be delayed up to 24 hours.
- *Incapacitants* include psychochemical agents and paralyzants. These agents can disrupt a victim's mental and physical capabilities. The victim may not lose consciousness, and the effects usually wear off without leaving permanent physical injuries.
- *Irritants*, also known as riot-control agents, cause a strong burning sensation in the eyes, mouth, skin, and respiratory tract. Effects of these agents, the best known being tear gas (CS), are also temporary. Victims usually recover completely without having any serious aftereffects.

Chemical Agent Persistency

Chemical agents are also classified according to their persistency. Persistency is the length of time an agent remains effective in the target area after dissemination. The two basic classifications are as persistent or non-persistent. Generally, the OPFOR uses persistent agents in areas it does not plan to enter and nonpersistent agents where it does.

Persistent nerve agents can retain their disabling or lethal characteristics from days to weeks, depending on environmental conditions. Persistent agents produce either immediate or delayed casualties. Immediate casualties occur when the soldier inhales a chemical vapor. Delayed casualties occur when the chemical agent is absorbed through the skin or is ingested.

WEG HIGHLIGHT: CBRN WEAPONS *(continued)*

Persistent agents may be used to—

- Contaminate rear area supply depots or materiel.
- Block avenues of approach.
- Neutralize personnel defending a strongpoint.
- Protect flanks.
- Degrade an enemy unit's efficiency.

Aside from producing mass casualties initially, persistent agents can affect enemy morale and performance. Rounds fired sporadically may compel enemy troops to wear protective masks and clothing for prolonged periods, reducing morale and degrade performance as a result of fatigue, heat, stress, discomfort, and decreased perception. Many weapons, especially precision weapons, cannot be effectively used by operators wearing protective gear.

Nonpersistent agents generally last a shorter period of time than persistent agents, depending on the weather conditions. For example, the nerve agent sarin (GB) forms clouds that dissipate within minutes after dissemination. However, some liquid GB could remain in chemical shell or bomb craters for periods of time varying from hours to days, depending on weather conditions and type of munition. Because of this continuing but not readily discernible threat from exposure to low concentrations of the vapor, GB can also be highly effective in harassing roles. The use of a nonpersistent agent at a critical moment in battle can produce casualties or force enemy troops into a higher level of individual protective measures. With proper timing and distance, the OPFOR can employ nonpersistent agents and then have its maneuver

Type Agent	Symbol/Name	Symptoms	Effects	Rate of Action
Nerve	G Series GB/Sarin GD/Soman (VR 55)	Difficult breathing, sweating, drooling, nausea, vomiting convulsions, and dim or blurred vision.	At low concentrations, incapacitates; kills if inhaled or absorbed through the skin.	Very rapid by inhalation; slower through skin (5-10 minutes).
	V Agent	Same as above.	Incapacitates; kills if contaminated skin is not decontaminated rapidly.	Delayed through skin; more rapid through eyes.
Blood	AC/Hydrogen cyanide	Rapid breathing, convulsions, coma, and death.	Incapacitates; kills if high concentration is inhaled.	Rapid.
Blister	HD/Mustard HN/Nitrogen Mustard L/Lewisite HL/Mustard and Lewisite CX/Phosgene Oxime	Mustard; nitrogen mustard—no early symptoms. Lewisite and mustard-searing of eyes and stinging of skin. Phosgene oxime—powerful irritation of eyes, nose, and skin.	Blisters skin and respiratory tract; can cause temporary blindness. Some agents sting and form welts on skin.	Blister delayed hours to days; eye effects more rapid.
Choking	CG/Phosgene DP/Diphosgene	Eye and throat irritation, fatigue, tears, coughing, chest tightness, nausea, vomiting.	Damages the lungs.	Delayed, variable.
Incapacitant	BZ/3-Quinuclidinylbenzilate	Slowing of mental and physical activity; disorientation and sleep.	Temporarily incapacitates.	30-60 minutes.
Irritant	DA/Diphenylchloroarsine DM/Adamsite CN/Chloroacetophenone CS/O-Chlorobenzylidene-malononitrile PS/Chloropicrin	Causes tears, irritates skin and respiratory tract.	Incapacitates, non-lethal.	Very rapid.

units advance into or occupy an enemy position without having to decontaminate the area or don protective gear.

Delivery Means

Delivery means include multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), artillery, mines, rockets, and theater missiles. Aircraft delivery means include aerial bombs or spray systems (such as for crop dusters or insecticide craft. Recent additions are cruise missiles and unmanned

aerial vehicles (UAVs). Other possible delivery means include SPF, affiliated insurgent or guerrilla organizations, or unaware infected human or animal vectors.

Either fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft can deliver

Delivery System	Agent Type			
	Blood	Blister	Nonpersistent Nerve	Persistent Nerve
122-mm Howitzer		X	X	
130-mm Gun			X	X
152-mm Howitzer		X	X	
155-mm Howitzer		X	X	
122-mm Rocket	X		X	X
140-mm Rocket			X	
220-mm Rocket			X	X
300-mm Rocket			X	X
SRBM				X
Aerial Bomb 100 kg		X		
Aerial Bomb 250 kg			X	X
Aerial Spray		X		

WEG HIGHLIGHT: CBRN WEAPONS *(continued)*

chemicals by air. They use low-level and contour flight profiles during these missions. Unarmed helicopters can perform these missions, possibly escorted by armed helicopters or attack aircraft. For example, a medium

transport helicopter configured for chemical missions can include a 750- to 1,000-liter dispensing system.

WHERE'S THE LINE?

Rebels, insurgents, criminals, revolutionaries, smugglers, and drug traffickers

By J. Marc Williams, Training Team

During a recent hybrid threats training session at Fort Polk, one Soldier asked “Where’s the line? These rebels, insurgents, criminals, and drug traffickers all look the same.” Good question with a difficult answer: the line between these elements is vague and uncertain, and often blurred by their actions and intent. It is very important for an intelligence operator to understand people like this may not fit into a clean pigeonhole with an accurate definition.

It also does not help that there are numerous definitions for the same element. Or that many writers use the varying titles interchangeably. You will often see the terms “insurgent,” “rebel,” “guerrilla,” “extremist,” and “militant” clumped together in media sources. The problem gets more difficult when these people begin to do business with known criminals such as smugglers, drug trafficking organizations (DTO), hired killers, thieves, and extortionists.

The line gets even more complex when revolutionary or resistance groups stop “hiring out help” and instead engage directly in criminal activity to finance their operations. Militancy is expensive. Materials are required and a

militant organization must pay its fighters and provide food and lodging. Many also give stipends to the widows and families their fighters leave behind. Additionally, the organization needs safe-houses, transportation (e.g., pickup trucks or motorcycles), communications equipment, computers, weapons, munitions, and facilities and equipment for training. There will be overhead costs for travel, fraudulent identification papers, buying influence, paying inside sources, and direct bribery of government officials. If a group does not have a State sponsor, funding must be procured through different means, and that is often through crime.

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Primary Country</i>	<i>Criminal Sources of Revenue</i>
Taliban	Afghanistan	Drug production; smuggling
TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan)*	Pakistan	Kidnapping for ransom; cargo diversion; bank robbery; street crime; cybercrime
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)*	Colombia	Taxation of the illegal drug trade, ransom kidnappings, bank robberies, and extortion of large landholders, multinational corporations, and agribusiness; cattle and vehicle theft
ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)*	Colombia	Taxation of the illegal drug trade; ransom kidnappings; extortion from petroleum companies
Sendero Luminoso *	Peru	Drug trafficking
MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta)	Nigeria	Oil diversion; kidnapping for ransom; extortion of oil companies
MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front)	Philippines	Kidnapping for ransom; extortion
NPA (New People’s Army)*	Philippines	“Revolutionary taxes”/extortion of farmers, businessmen, and mining firms
RIRA and CIRA (Real Irish Republic Army and Continuity IRA)*	Northern Ireland	Gun & explosives smuggling; WMD training, robbery, extortion, “tiger kidnapping”
ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna)*	Spain	Extortion; arms trafficking; robbery
ISI (Islamic State of Iraq)	Iraq	Armed robbery directed against banks, currency exchanges, gold markets and jewelry shops
PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê)*	Turkey	Drug trafficking

WHERE'S THE LINE? *(continued)*

How can intelligence personnel analyze this? These groups will resort to crime for financing and use terrorism to enforce their will against local populace, government elements, and competitors. So are they rebels, insurgents, militants, criminals, or terrorists?

The groups marked with an asterisk in the chart are designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department. However, the Treasury Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation all have differing lists, and divergent definitions of "criminal" and "terrorist."

Classification of these groups will often be based on your PMESII-PT assessment of the operational environment (OE). When conducting analysis it will be important to identify patterns of operation and sources of funding to clarify the threat posed by these groups.

In the end, groups that resort to criminal activities face severe challenges. Criminal activity tarnishes the image of the "brave freedom fighter" or the "holy warrior." It can cause ideological splits within the organization as some rebel against crimes, and others embrace it to pursue a more lucrative criminal career. Criminal activity may turn a local community against the militants, and it certainly makes prosecution by law enforcement much easier to prove. The military unit facing this type of activity in their OE can exploit it using strategic communications in coordination with other elements of combat power.

So, are these groups militants, terrorists, rebels, or just plain criminals? There may not be a simple, clean answer.

ARMY ANTITERRORISM MONTH

By Dr. Jon Moilanen, Threats Terrorism Team (T3) Integration

August 2010² is "Army Antiterrorism Month." The Army antiterrorism strategic communications theme for fourth quarter-fiscal year 2012 is "Know Your Surroundings." An additional accent is clearly stated in the antiterrorism awareness message tri-signed by the Secretary of the Army, Army Chief of Staff, and Sergeant Major of the Army. Every member of the Army family has antiterrorism awareness as a 24/7 responsibility. We care for each other—in our units, at our work places, and in our homes.

Terrorist acts create fear and destroy trust in others and in civic institutions as well as threaten a community's health, prosperity, and quality of life.

A sense of Army Community requires the vigilance to "know your surroundings" and to recognize and report suspicious activity. The Army provides a simple way to report suspicious activity -- the Army **iWATCH** program. The purpose of the program is to focus and encourage Army-wide community awareness and out-reach efforts to address important topics related to protecting our communities from terrorist acts.

Actions that might indicate suspicious behavior can include an individual or people measuring critical buildings or infrastructure sites or asking questions about security procedures. Other actions could include

unattended boxes, bags, and cases; unattended vehicles in an area that should not be used for any vehicle parking; or smells that are unusual for a location. Examples of potential dangers are numerous. The key point is "if something doesn't look right or 'feel' right, it probably isn't." Report suspicious activity.

Several antiterrorism principles guide how to be an active agent in our collective protection. In reviewing credible personal behavior and the expectation of willing mutual support among unit leaders and Soldiers, military and civilian members of your work force, and the awareness of suspicious activity that may be witnessed by your own family, know the Army Antiterrorism Principles. The principles are—

- Assess
- Detect
- Warn
- Defend
- Recover

Effective antiterrorism plans and programs succeed because of partnerships with law enforcement, security, other government agencies, civic groups, schools, faith communities, businesses, and individuals as they help to raise community awareness and responsibility and instill pride and sustained vigilance. Be an active participant in the **iWATCH** program.

ARMY ANTITERRORISM MONTH *(continued)*

In August 2012, the TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) spotlights these antiterrorism principles in its monthly terrorism awareness bulletin. See **TRISA Threats Terrorism Team Advisory No.11-12** in this issue of the *Red Diamond*. The theme of “Know Your Surroundings – Keep Your Focus” complements the

principles, personal responsibility, and teambuilding that enhance our collective antiterrorism protection.

For more information on the Army **iWATCH** program, use Army Knowledge Online (AKO) and access <http://us.army.mil/suite/page/605757>.

US Army Training and Doctrine Command G2

TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity
Threat Terrorism Integration

Terrorism



T3 Advisory

Know Your Surroundings – Antiterrorism Awareness!

TTP

Antiterrorism Principles:

- Assess
- Detect
- Warn
- Defend
- Recover



KEEP YOUR FOCUS!

Use iWATCH =

Report Suspicious Activity!

Soldiers – Civilians – Families

See AKO – More INFO on Army antiterrorism methods and measures
<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/605757>



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We are at WAR on TERROR

Find products on Army Knowledge Online.
Access AKO with password.
Enter: <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/25952049>
See Army TC 7-100 on *Hybrid Threat* for training.



IT'S ON AKO – UPDATE TO SOLDIER'S “HIP-POCKET” PRIMER TO TERRORISM TTP

Terrorism, Preparedness, and Protection

By Dr. Jon Moilanen, Threats Terrorism Team (T3) Integration

The Change 3 (17 August 2012) to TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1.07, **A Soldier's Primer to Terrorism TTP**, provides updated antiterrorism and protection information on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by terrorists and other types of irregular forces in complex operational environments. The intent is to improve situational awareness and operational understanding of current terrorism capabilities-limitations, and complement the deliberate and intuitive processes of –

- Military Risk Management
- Protection of Friendly Forces
- Mission Orders Conduct, and
- Adaptive Leader Decisionmaking.



This unclassified resource focuses on tactical military operations in units, installations, and institutional settings. The simple 5-inch by 7-inch “hip-pocket” reference guide complements–

- Soldier-Leader Self Development
- Joint Professional Military Education
- Operational Mission Focus

Contemporary offensive, defensive, and stability missions experience and intelligence assessments focus increasingly on an enemy that combines the characteristics of regular armed forces with aspects of

irregular forces, terrorism, unconventional warfare, and criminality. These aggregated threats are often described as a hybrid threat.

“We must be prepared to anticipate and defeat myriad hybrid threats that incorporate regular warfare, irregular warfare, terrorism, and criminality.”
– General Raymond T Odierno, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army

The TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) publishes this document as the proponent within the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-2. As a TRADOC G2 handbook, this primer portrays an *Opposing Force* (OPFOR) model. Use of OPFOR in Army training events is intended to support realistic learning and expertise against a robust and uncompromising opponent that uses tactics, doctrine, and equipment representative of a composite of forces that have been encountered in current or recent military operations and could be confronted in future military operations.

Keep It Simple

The “hip-pocket” primer presents current topic definitions, concepts, and actions concerning terrorism TTP. The most significant threats to U.S. security are terrorist organizations and groups with global reach capabilities seeking to acquire and use materiel for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Terrorism ranges from individual acts of wanton damage and destruction of property or person to simple or highly sophisticated operations supported by transnational networks in an operational environment (OE).

Terrorism is the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political. - JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of military and Associated Terms

An OE is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and that affects employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the tactical unit commander, leaders, and soldiers. The learning environments for situational awareness and understanding of terrorism TTP include home station training, resident or distance learning classrooms, and live, virtual, and gaming exercises.

The handbook references contemporary assessments from Federal activities such as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Topics in the handbook include:

- **Nature of Islamic extremist terrorism.** The primary security threat to the United States continues to be from al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents. Other threats include loosely affiliated terrorist cells to al-Qa'ida or other militant-extremist interests that seek notoriety and power. For example, the Haqqani Network is considered the most lethal insurgent group targeting Coalition and Afghan forces in Afghanistan.
- **Islamic extremist organization examples.** Concise one-page summaries address al-Qa'ida (AQ), Taliban, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Shabaab, al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), and other terrorist organizations. Structure and Organization. Models for how organizations function include hierarchies and networks. Identifying critical nodes in either type of structure is fundamental


to disrupting and defeating terrorist capabilities.

- **Capabilities and intentions.** Structure, membership, and resources indicate the degree of capability, resolve, and operational reach of a terrorist organization. Terrorist groups appear to gravitate to acts of terror with increased destruction and notoriety. Components of organization can usually be assessed in general categories of ideology, functions, motivations, and affiliations that state organizational vision, goals, and long term objectives.
- **Targeting U.S. military forces.** A way to assess threat locations or periods of time for antiterrorism and protection considerations can use concepts of deployed forces as in Afghanistan, in-transit forces such as an intermediate staging base, and institutional-installation forces such as critical infrastructure abroad or facilities in the U.S. Homeland. Terrorist goals vary; however, military forces or individual members of the U.S. Armed Forces are often a terrorist target. Rationales may include:
 - Demonstrate terrorist capability in a geographic area.
 - Influence U.S. regional and domestic policy.
 - Influence U.S. relationships with regional allies and partners.
 - Reduce U.S. military capabilities.

Terrorism Vignettes (TTP)

An expanded set of terrorism vignettes illustrate with simple cartoons or describe simply the various ways that terrorism can be part of an OE. Tactical issues include threats and hoaxes, extortion and coercion, hostage-taking and kidnapping, murder, homicide-suicide, and forms of mass casualty attacks. Terrorist attacks use operating principles that key on the psychological impact on a target population. Seven phases can be used as a model to gain situational awareness and "*Know the Threat.*" Cycles may take years from an initial concept to an attack, or occur within weeks.

IT'S ON AKO – UPDATE TO SOLDIER'S "HIP-POCKET" PRIMER... (continued)



The means can be as simple as a blunt instrument in an assault or a USB flash drive to corrupt an electronic system. Other means include small arms and heavy weapons fire, antitank grenade launchers, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and antitank or antipersonnel mines, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), or materiel used as a weapon of mass destruction (WMD).

- ◆ Intense Motivational Extremism
- ◆ Adaptive Organization
- ◆ Improved Operational Capabilities
- ◆ Expanded Transnational Associations
- ◆ Exploited Mass Media Marketing
- ◆ Increased Weapon System Lethality

Trends and the Future

Terrorism in recent incidents indicates what may recur in the future and what trends appear to be evolving in terrorist organization TTP. According to the DNI and NCTC, the next two to three years (2012-2015) will be a critical transition phase for the terrorist threat facing the United States, particularly from al-Qa'ida and like-minded groups. Although the leadership of the movement may become more decentralized, the movement will continue to be a dangerous transnational force. Actions are likely to be conducted by regional groups, and to a lesser extent by small cells and individuals intent on terrorizing within the United States and abroad. Some cells may execute smaller, simpler plots to demonstrate their relevance while others may aim toward mass casualty and economically damaging attacks.

Whether small or large in scale of terror, the overarching intent is to cause a psychological impact on a relevant population and key leaders. Trends or patterns that may appear throughout future incidents can include:

U.S. Army Asymmetric Advantage: The U.S. Army Leader-Soldier Team

Leaders and Soldiers at the tactical level of operations are especially critical to success. They see and act on immediate opportunities with the enemy and relevant population. Leaders and Soldiers will conduct the Army's core competencies of wide area security (WAS) and combined arms maneuver (CAM) in uncertain OEs. Army leaders must develop subordinates in an increasingly complex era of military missions to—

- Learn, think, and adapt faster than an adversary.
- Decide with a moral and ethical compass.
- Excel in uncertain and ambiguous circumstance.
- Encourage prudent risk-taking.
- Demand decisive action.

TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1.07, *A Soldier's Primer to Terrorism TTP*, is a simple visual resource and information guide to better understand the threat of terrorism and the tactics, techniques, and procedures common to terrorists in an OE. A copy of this unclassified handbook in .pdf format is available with Army Knowledge Online (AKO) access password at <http://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/33361621>.

MONTHLY WRAP-UP OF CTID DAILY UPDATES

CTID analysts produce a daily *CTID Daily Update* to help our readers focus on key current events and developments across the Army training community. Available on AKO, each *Daily Update* is organized topically across the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). This list highlights key updates during August 2012. The *Daily Update* is a research tool, and an article's inclusion in the *Update* does not reflect an official U.S. Government position on the topic. Also, CTID does not assume responsibility for the accuracy of each article.

06Aug—**Iran:** [Iran successfully tests upgraded Fateh-110 short-range missile](#)

06Aug—**Nigeria:** [Boko Haram claims attacks in Damaturu](#)

07Aug—**Afghanistan:** [Soldier killed by uniformed Afghans an American](#)

07Aug—**India:** [India's first nuclear submarine set for trials](#)

08Aug—**Syria:** [Satellite images reveal brutal total war in Syria](#)

08Aug—**Liberia:** [Liberia, Chinese sign bilateral military agreement](#)

09Aug—**Vietnam:** [Vietnam, U.S. boost defense cooperation](#)

10Aug—**UK:** [Britain giving Syrian rebels body armor, sat phones, and medical supplies](#)

13Aug—**Mexico:** [The Pentagon mission: to catch El Chapo. . . . or to kill him](#)

13Aug—**Pakistan:** [Pakistan violates ceasefire again, targets Indian posts](#)

14Aug—**Turkey:** [PKK attacks police and gendarmerie stations, 2 officers injured](#)

14Aug—**Mali:** [Gao residents fight Islamist groups](#)

15Aug—**Israel:** ['Brigades of Osama bin Laden' forms in the West Bank](#)

16Aug—**Cyber Warfare:** [Digital apocalypse: The artillery of cyber war](#)

16Aug—**Indonesia:** [U.S. offers 24 F-16 jets in grant](#)

17Aug—**U.S.:** [Hundreds more flee massive wildfires; Guard joins battle in Idaho](#)

20Aug—**Jordan:** [Syrian rockets hit Jordan, wound child: minister](#)

21Aug—**Al-Qaeda:** [AQ militants blow up Yemen gas pipeline](#)

21Aug—**Egypt:** [Egypt to send aircraft and tanks to Sinai first time since 1973](#)

22Aug—**U.S.:** [Iraqi national pleads guilty to 12-count terrorism indictment in Kentucky](#)

24Aug—**U.S.:** [9 wounded, 2 dead in Empire State Building shooting](#)

27Aug—**Afghanistan:** [Senior Taliban commander, 12 other militants killed by U.S. drone strike in Sheegal Darra, Kunar](#)



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
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- ◆ *Publish Army OPFOR Doctrine*
- ◆ *Assess Threat-Enemy & TTP*
- ◆ *Support Terrorism Awareness*
- ◆ *Produce the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE—previously Full Spectrum Training Environment)*

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