



Red Diamond

Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate

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Red Diamond is produced monthly by the Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate of the TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA). Send suggestions and feedback to Jon H. Moilanen, Ed.D (jon.h.moilanen.ctr@mail.mil).



AL SHABAAB UPDATE


by Laura Deatruck, OEA Team

The past two years have seen a reversal of fortune for al Shabaab in Somalia. Previously in control of the southern half of the country, the group now finds its territory reduced by almost 50%. Mergers with two other organizations have not stemmed the reversal, and may have weakened the group due to subsequent disagreements among its leaders. Recruitment and fundraising continue, but the latter has been hard-hit by the loss of specific revenue sources. Al Shabaab has also shifted tactics, techniques, and procedures from more conventional warfare methods to a focus on asymmetric techniques. Despite setbacks, the group still retains the potential to regain ground, both physical and psychological, if allowed the opportunity. The new OEA Team Threat Report, [Al Shabaab Update](#) (Nov 2012), reviews recent changes to the group's organization, associations, and area of operations.

In the beginning of January 2011, al Shabaab controlled practically the entire southern half of Somalia. The only exceptions were a small area adjoining Ethiopia near the Kenyan border and less than one-quarter of Mogadishu (Banaadir Region).

This began to change in 2011 as the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and its allies began an offensive from the north and in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab initially attempted to hold on to its territory, but without success. After losing around 200 fighters in an attempt to retain the Bakara Market area in Mogadishu, the group withdrew from the city on 6 August 2011.

Kenyan troops arrived on the western border in September 2011, and crossed



over into Somalia on 16 October of that year. Ethiopia joined the fight a month later entering from the north and moving southward. Djibouti then added its troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) effort in Mogadishu, win December. By early 2012, pro-SFG forces controlled Mogadishu, were gaining territory in the north, and had made significant inroads in the west.

The SFG and allied militias, Kenyan, Ethiopian, and AMISOM troops continued to act in concert in 2012. Kenya moved westward, capturing Afmadow in June and the major port city of Kismayo on 3 October. Ethiopia advanced south and southeast, liberating the cities of Baydhaba and Xudur in Bay and Bakool Regions, respectively. AMISOM forces took Afgoye and Marka, the latter being another port city. By the end of October 2012, al Shabaab had lost approximately half of the territory it had controlled just two years earlier.

One new area has recently opened up for the group. After merging with a Puntland-based Islamist organization in February 2012, many al Shabaab fighters have moved to the Galgala Mountains area south of the city of Bosaso, which lies in Puntland on the Gulf of Aden. There they have engaged in guerrilla tactics such as ambushes and

remote-controlled improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against local security forces.

Several characteristics of this group will make it of interest to trainers and scenario writers. First, al Shabaab has the ability to quickly shift between conventional and asymmetric TTP, thus allowing for simultaneous training against both. There are currently disagreements among senior leadership, which provides an opportunity to divide the organization from within.

The group relies on in-country revenue sources (taxation), presenting yet another method to reduce the group's abilities. Several additional challenges also exist: International involvement remains critical for upholding recent gains against the group, political corruption in the host government promotes skepticism from the general populace, and the group's change of basing territory provides an additional challenge to friendly forces.

The [Al Shabaab Update](#) (Nov 2012) Threat Report provides information to the Army training community on the current status of the group. It reviews changes to the organizational structure, funding sources, and recent

tactics, as well as a summary of major attacks instigated in 2012. In addition, it contains a detailed review of the 12 September 2012 attack on the Jazeera Hotel, Mogadishu, in which the new Somali President was the main target.



THE BENGHAZI ATTACK

by Jim Bird, OEA Team

On the night of 11 September 2012, the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya was attacked by militants using a combination of small arms, heavy weapons, and lethal combustible materials. The U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens, and three other Americans died as a result of the attack. Opinions vary regarding the adequacy of measures taken by the Department of

State, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the U.S. military to deter or prevent this type of incident. The loss of American life speaks for itself as an indicator that systems then in place failed to provide diplomats serving in Libya a level of security required to guarantee their personal safety.

A new, soon to be released OEA Team Threat Report, [Diplomacy Meets the Fog of War: The Benghazi Attack, September 11, 2012](#), examines the incident in light of facts that have been made public so far. The goal is to glean insights that trainers and scenario writers can apply to the kind of decisive action environments deploying units may encounter. The core issue in the political arena is whether the tragedy was a fluke that revealed systemic weakness that only the advantage of hindsight now renders visible, or a predictable contingency that should have been prevented by due diligence on the part of persons occupying high positions of public possibility. Because the attack occurred at the height of a political campaign, it became an issue in the 2012 U.S. presidential election.

A House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, a State Department Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB), and internal audits initiated by the Department of State Inspector General are delving into the facts surrounding the incident. Little doubt exists that the outcome of these inquiries will result in policy and procedural changes geared to improving security arrangements for U.S. diplomats serving in overseas assignments. It is equally certain that the Benghazi tragedy has heightened public awareness of the dangers inherent in pursuing a career in the Foreign Service.

The OEA Team Threat Report uses a recently released CIA timeline to note some significant occurrences in the weeks leading up to the attack, as well as a chronology of events that unfolded in Benghazi during the night of 11-12 September 2012. Also included is a discussion of weapons used by the attackers and defenders of the American diplomatic mission, and an overview of conditions in Libya, with particular focus on the eroding effect local militias have had on efforts by government authorities to establish a cohesive political and security infrastructure throughout the country. Since the attack,

it has become apparent that some of these militias are under the ideological sway of al-Qaeda. This is particularly the case with Ansar al-Shariah, a Libyan threat actor comprised of local militants known to have contact with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (IQIM).

Libyans, unique among Arab peoples for being favorably disposed toward the United States, were outraged by the events that took the life of Ambassador Stevens. They took to the streets in thousands to protest their government's failure to control unruly militia elements, and ransacked the headquarters of Ansar al-Sharia and other militias with known anti-Western leanings.

The OEA Team Threat report also emphasizes differences in culture and mentality between the Department of State and the Department of Defense that sometimes produce friction between the two agencies.

The importance of physical security as an integral part of force protection cannot be overstated. It is noteworthy that neither Ambassador Stevens nor information management specialist Sean Smith died from wounds directly inflicted by the attackers, but from smoke inhalation. A former Special Operator who survived the Benghazi attack declared that Ambassador Stevens would still be alive today



Truck with Ansar al Sharia markings parked in front of burning U.S. consulate in Benghazi

if the safe room in the consulate compound had been equipped with an adequate ventilation system. The observation underscores a painful reality: what may appear as mundane oversights in the realm of physical security can rapidly mean the difference between life and death under the stress of emergencies. In this instance, merely having protective masks readily available might have made that difference.

There is little choice but to learn from the Benghazi tragedy, commit the resources required to shore up physical security and quick reaction force responsiveness to American diplomatic missions, and to remain mindful of who our friends are in the region. In a recent interview on National Public Radio, former U.S.

Ambassador Ryan Crocker said in effect that serving in dangerous environments is an unavoidable dimension of the diplomatic profession, and achieving success occasionally requires accepting a measure of risk. The Benghazi Threat Report should help trainers and

scenario writers understand how diplomatic missions can unexpectedly morph into potential theaters of operation where non-state players employ asymmetric strategies to overcome the advantages of their opponents.


OE QUICK GUIDE: SYRIA

by H. David Pendleton, OEA Team

With its recent publication on [Syria](#), the TRISA Operational Environment Assessment (OEA) Team has now published four “OE Quick Guides” during the past five months. The initial OE Quick Guide, published in May, was on Yemen, and was soon followed up by the Saudi Arabia Quick Guide in July and the Indonesia Quick Guide in August.

Many of the countries listed in TRISA’s Top 10 Potential Operational Environments are located in the Middle East, including Iran, Yemen, Egypt, and Israel. Syria borders two of America’s most important allies in the Middle East—Israel and Turkey. The two years of almost continual violence in Syria, bordering on civil war, has threatened to spill over into other countries in the region. With over twenty different Syrian insurgent groups engaged in combat with the Syrian government headed by President Bashar al-Assad, the violence will not likely end any time soon. Even after the UN negotiated a cease-fire for the four days of the Eid al-Adha holiday in October, over 500 Syrians still died from the violence

over that long weekend. Over 36,000 Syrians have now died in 19 months of fighting since February 2011.



The Syria OE Quick Guide provides a condensed look at the PMESII-PT variables—political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time—that allows the reader to quickly gain a basic understanding of Syria, its background, and its problems. At just over 40 pages, the reader can quickly grasp Syria’s fundamental issues and, if needed, can use the sources to learn more about a particular variable. The Syria OE Quick Guide also provides military equipment charts for the Syrian army, navy, and air force; a list of the country’s major runways, media outlets, and Internet providers; and a summary of the major non-governmental organizations

(NGOs) that operate throughout the country. While not as detailed as an OEA, military personnel will still find the [OE Quick Guide: Syria](#) to be a useful reference about an important country in the Middle East.

As the name implies, the OE Quick Guide abbreviates the OEA production process to rapidly convey information to the field, but it also does not allow for the in-depth exploration and collaboration found in the normal OEA process. A full-length OEA on a single country or an area takes four to five team members several months to research, write, and edit. On the other hand, a single team member can produce a Quick Guide for a particular country in about a month.

With the publication of TRISA’s Top 10 Potential Operational Environments list earlier this year, we discovered that many of the areas of the world where the U.S. may deploy a combat brigade did not have an OEA written for them. The OE Quick Guide can serve as an interim document for those strategically important areas until TRISA can complete a full-length OEA.

OPFOR MORTAR DISPLACEMENT

by Walter L. Williams, Training-Education-Leader Development Team

The emplacement/displacement times of fire support units are difficult to quantify precisely. They reflect the size of the unit, the type of equipment used by the unit, the unit's training level; the crew's fatigue level, environmental conditions, and a number of other factors. Thus, a mortar crew uses varying displacement techniques. For example, an 81/82-mm mortar crew can generally displace the mortar in 65 seconds or less. The time is based upon the following criteria:

- The unit is trained to appropriate national standards and has received a rating of "good" (or its equivalent). This rating includes proficiency in mechanical training, crew drill, and fire commands.
- It is daylight, the weather and terrain are moderate, and there are no specialized clothing requirements—i.e. nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protective equipment for the crews.
- Other factors (equipment operational readiness rates, training, environment, fatigue, etc.) will alter these numbers (normally increasing them).

The displacement time does not include the crew displacement to a rally point at a designated distance away from the occupied position. The OPFOR squad leader generally determines a firing unit rally point at least 300 meters away from the occupied position. The OPFOR bases this distance for displacement on the target location error by enemy countermortar/counterbattery radar, the dispersion pattern of submunitions, and possible projectile delivery errors. The rally point location is given to each crewmember and the fire direction center (FDC). The mortar crew may travel to the rally point by foot, vehicle, animal, etc.

The techniques of taking a mortar out of action will vary from gun crew to gun crew. For example, an 81-mm gun crew (consisting of four personnel) may take the following steps:

- The squad leader will issue the command, "Out of Action."
- One of the gun crew (normally an ammunition bearer) will retrieve the aiming posts. The gunner will remove the sight and place it in the sight box or a unique carrying case.
- One of the gun crew (normally the assistant gunner) will remove the barrel from the yoke assembly. This entails turning the barrel 90 degrees, lifting up on the base end of the barrel and removing the barrel from the yoke assembly. Another member of the gun crew or the squad leader will retrieve the bipod and the ammunition bearer will retrieve the baseplate.


During displacement the mortar crew proceeds in the most expeditious manner to the rally point. Upon arrival at the rally point, the gunner will remove the M53 sight unit (from the sight box or carrying case), place an elevation of 800 mils and a deflection of 3,800 mils, and return the sight unit in the carrying case or sight box. Additionally, all equipment is properly secured and a check of all equipment and personnel is conducted prior to movement to the crew's alternate or temporary position. The rally point is occupied no longer than 3-5 minutes. The gun crew remains vigilant in providing local security throughout the displacement process as they are vulnerable to observation and attack by enemy ground forces.

ATTACK AT PAF BASE MINHAS

by Laura Deatrick, OEA Team

On 16 August 2012, nine men attacked a Pakistani air base in an endeavor to destroy military aircraft. Their attempt ended just a few hours later with their deaths at the hands of security personnel. The new OEA Team Threat Report, [Attack at PAF Base Minhas](#), examines the details of the attack and possible training implications.

Complex is located adjacent to the base in the same military facility, and is the assembly and overhaul location for Pakistan's Mirage and JF-17 Thunder fighters. Other planes housed on base include F-16s, P-3 Orions, and Saab 2000s. Around 30-40 military aircraft may be present at any given time.



Base Minhas is one of the Pakistan Air Force's (PAF's) largest air bases. It lies some 40 miles northwest of Islamabad in Kamra Cantonment, Attock District, Punjab Province. Also called PAF Base Kamra, Base Minhas is named after Pakistani pilot Rashid Minhas, a hero of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. The Pakistan Aeronautical

Shortly after 0200 on Thursday, 16 August 2012, nine Islamist militants breached the outer perimeter of PAF Base Minhas in an apparent attempt to destroy aircraft that were located on base. It was near the end of the month-long fast of Ramadan, and many people on base and in the surrounding towns were awake and either

eating or attending mosque. The attackers were armed with AK-47s, hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), mines, and suicide vests. Though able to successfully enter the base, they were quickly engaged by security forces. The ensuing firefight lasted for 2-5 hours (reports vary), and resulted in nine militants dead, two security force personnel dead, and three security forces wounded. One airplane hangar and one aircraft were also damaged in the fight.

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant Islamist group that is based in North Waziristan, northwestern Pakistan, was quick to claim credit for the attack. Group spokesman Ihsanullah Ihsan made multiple statements to the press, claiming anywhere from four to nine attackers, three to “dozens” of security personnel killed, and one to three aircraft destroyed. The motives given were likewise mixed but related: The attack was in revenge for the death of former TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud, the death of Osama bin Laden, and/or the deaths of TTP members from military operations (mainly U.S. drone strikes) in the group’s home area. The attackers’ apparent target was the military aircraft housed on base.

Several aspects of this event will make it of interest to trainers and scenario writers. First, it is an excellent scenario of MI and MP units, and would be easy to mimic in a training environment. The location allows participants to focus on incident investigation skills without the distraction or delay caused by crowd control requirements. The small number of attackers allows for efficient use of role-players. The discovery of mines during the base search complicates the clearing effort. The presence of recoverable intelligence – namely fingerprints and mobile phones – permits use of appropriate investigative techniques.

The [Attack at PAF Base Minhas](#) Threat Report provides information to the Army training community on the August attack. It contains a detailed review of the event with accompanying map and a discussion of post-incident measures taken. In addition, it considers base security and recent threats, provides an analyst assessment of the attack, and examines training implications.

THE 2012 EDITION OF THE WORLDWIDE EQUIPMENT GUIDE (WEG)

The 2012 WEG is now available online from TRISA. Published in three volumes (Ground; Airspace & Air Defense Systems; and Naval & Littoral Systems), the WEG was developed to support the FM/TC 7-100 series. It is the approved document for OPFOR equipment data used in all of U.S. Army training (live, virtual, constructive, and gaming.)

The WEG contains over 800 pages and provides a detailed description of equipment representing military systems, variants, and upgrades U.S. forces might encounter now and in the foreseeable future. The authors continually analyze real-world developments, capabilities, and trends to ensure the OPFOR remains relevant.

Distribution is unlimited and the WEG is available for downloading and local distribution. The 2012 WEG can be accessed online at AKO by either clicking on or pasting this link to your browser:

<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/21872221>.

The direct links to each volume follow:

Volume 1 - Ground Forces

<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/25963538>

Volume 2 - Air and Air Defense

<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/25963539>

Volume 3 - Naval Littoral

<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/25963540>

JEMMAH ANSHORUT TAUHID (JAT)

by H. David Pendleton, OEA Team

The Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) is the latest separatist organization in Indonesia founded by the convicted terrorist Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Ba'asyir's involvement in the insurgent movement against the Indonesian government dates back to the 1970s when he joined the Darul Islam (DI) movement that wanted to establish an Indonesian Islamic state. Ba'asyir later served as a leader in other insurgent Muslim groups in Indonesia – such as the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) – before he founded JAT in 2008. The Threat Report [Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid: Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Final Indonesian Terrorist Group](#) provides an overview of the organization, its formation, structure, and major terrorist activities since it began.

In 2008, Ba'asyir left the MMI due to philosophical differences with the organization's other leaders. The MMI was not a democracy where the majelis syuro or executive council voted on decisions; instead as the amir (leader) of the Muslim group, Ba'asyir felt that he should make any final decisions after consultations with the other leaders. Ba'asyir also felt that once he reached a decision for the organization, all other MMI members needed to support that decision. The other MMI leaders, however, charged that Ba'asyir erroneously claimed MMI leadership for life, preached infallibility in his actions, showed no need to answer to the rest of the MMI regarding his decisions, and misused the organization's funds. Due to this ideological split over the role of the amir, Ba'asyir left the MMI to form JAT.

Unlike many of the other Muslim separatist organizations in Indonesia, Ba'asyir founded JAT (meaning “partisans of the oneness with God”) as a public group that eschewed violence to achieve its goals. In reality, however, JAT covertly embraced violence, as do most other Indonesian insurgent groups. Unlike most groups, however, JAT found methods to compartmentalize the nonviolent and violent arms of the organization, which made it difficult early on for the

Indonesian authorities to tie any illegal insurgent or terrorist activities to JAT.

JAT's primary purpose is to establish an Islamic caliphate (dominion) in Indonesia based on Salafist jihadism (struggle/warfare).

JAT members came from a variety of sources. Ba'asyir brought many MMI loyalists to the new organization because they personally supported him. Other supporters came from teachers and students associated with Ba'asyir's pesantren (Muslim school) in Ngruki, Solo, Central Java,

Indonesia. Many former JI members that had worked previously with Ba'asyir decided to rejoin their former leader in his newest organization. Many times, local MMI chapters converted in total to JAT.

JAT's primary purpose is to establish an Islamic caliphate (dominion) in Indonesia based on Salafist jihadism (struggle/warfare). Some JAT members wished to expand the caliphate beyond Indonesia's borders to other countries in the area that contain a large Muslim population, including Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, southern Thailand, and the southern Philippines (Mindanao). Other JAT members wanted to work only at the local level.

Ostensibly a public Muslim group whose announced purpose was to use peaceful means to obtain their goal, JAT presented the appearance of a nonviolent group until the Indonesian anti-terror police raided several terrorist training camps in Aceh Province on the island of Sumatra on 9 March 2010. The police discovered documents during the raids indicating that several former MMI leaders, with previous or current connections to Ba'asyir, financed the terrorist training camps. About three months later, on 6 May 2010, Indonesian government forces raided the central JAT headquarters in Ngruki and discovered additional evidence that linked three of the current JAT leaders to the camps. After three more months of investigation, the Indonesian authorities finally connected Ba'asyir to the Aceh terrorist training camps and then arrested him in West Java on 9 August 2010.

THE FREE SYRIAN ARMY: RIFLES TO MANPADS

by Rick Burns, OEA Team

The Free Syrian Army (FSA) is the main opposition group operating in Syria. It is an organization composed of loosely aligned groups that have organically grown up around defecting Syrian armed forces personnel, local militias, activists, and other volunteers actively opposing the Assad regime. The leader of the group identified himself as Colonel Riad al-Asaad on 29 July 2011 in an Internet video with a group of deserters from the Syrian military. In the video, Colonel al-Asaad called upon members of the Syrian army to join them. The stated objective of the FSA is to work with protesters and activists to bring down the Syrian government, and the group has declared that any forces attacking civilians will be justified targets.

In September 2012, the FSA announced it would move its headquarters from exile in Turkey to rebel-held territory inside Syria. This move is evidence of the growing confidence of the FSA in its efforts to end the current Syrian government. The tactics and resources used to bring the FSA to this point have taken a logical progression from small arms to the current introduction of SA-7s into the fight.

With modest beginnings, the FSA has progressed from small arms against the Assad regime's air, artillery, and armored combat power to a force slowly chipping away at these advantages. Utilizing mostly unexploded ordnance and captured Syrian security force weapons obtained from both defecting military members and via

bribery, the FSA has been able to increase its ability to combat Syrian government forces. The FSA has also experimented with some unconventional weapons with limited success.

The November Threat Report, [The Free Syrian Army: Rifles to MANPADS](#), discusses the evolution of the FSA tactics in its fight with the Assad security forces. The FSA began fighting tanks, air assets, and artillery with small arms. As has been seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, the FSA used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to level the combat advantage enjoyed by the Syrian security forces. More recently, the FSA has acquired a limited number of man portable air defense systems (MANPADS), threatening al-Assad's ability to freely conduct air raids. As the conflict continues, the FSA will continue to find additional ways to mitigate the combat advantage enjoyed by the Syrian government.

UPDATE. Since the original publication of this report earlier this month, new information emerged: On 27 November 2012 and 28 November 2012, the FSA shot down a Syrian helicopter and a Syrian MiG jet fighter, respectively, using MANPADS. It is not clear what specific weapons are being used, but they are most likely SA-7s. This represents a significant shift in FSA capabilities. The Threat Report provides links to two videos that show the shooting of the helicopter and the MiG.



TERRORISTS' USE OF REMOTE CONTROL MODEL AIRPLANES

by H. David Pendleton, OEA Team

In August 2012, security personnel in three different countries uncovered possible plots by terrorists to use remote control (RC) model airplanes as an explosives delivery method. This is not the first time that terrorists thought about using RC model airplanes as a possible way to attack a target. Back in 2002, Colombian military personnel raided a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) camp and found nine RC model airplanes, including one already loaded with explosives. In September 2011, an American was arrested for planning to bomb federal buildings in Washington DC with three RC model airplanes.


RC model airplanes have at least five limiting factors for use as a terrorist weapon. First, the model planes cannot carry that much extra weight. Since the planes only weigh about 6 to 8 pounds and the engines do not produce that much power, it would be difficult to add any substantial amount of explosives and still be able to get the airplane off the ground. Second, most RC planes can only fly for short duration, four to five minutes, before they need to land and refuel. This limits the time that the terrorist would have to launch the attack. Third, RC planes possess a limited range of approximately 800 yards. This restriction forces the operator to be within about one-half mile from the intended target. Fourth, the operator must maintain a clear line-of-sight of both the plane and the target to hit the target. The terrorist would require a location where he can observe both the launch site and the target without drawing undue attention to himself. While a model airplane can carry a small nose camera – which would extend the range – the weight would reduce the amount of explosives the RC airplane could carry. Lastly, the likelihood that a terrorist could drop some bombs from the plane instead of crashing the plane into the target is nearly impossible. Depth perception and timing issues would likely cause the dropped bomb to miss its target.

The most notable of the terrorist plots to use RC model airplanes involved Rezwan Ferdaus, an American citizen who graduated with a degree in physics from Northeastern University in Boston. In a sting operation,

FBI agents arranged to accept eight cell phones modified by Ferdaus, who thought he was passing them to al-Qaeda (AQ) operatives to use in future terrorist attacks. During this sting, Ferdaus told the agents of his plan to blow up both the Pentagon and the U.S. Capitol building in Washington DC with three RC model airplanes loaded with explosives. The use of the RC airplanes was only the first phase of his plan, as he wanted to arm six accomplices with AK-47s and hand grenades to kill survivors from the initial attack as they fled from the building. Ferdaus even traveled to Washington DC to conduct reconnaissance and took pictures of the two buildings and a

possible launch site. The FBI undercover agents transferred 25 pounds of inert high explosive material, six inoperable AK-47 assault rifles, and several non-functioning grenades to Ferdaus. The FBI conducted over 18 months of investigation, but only arrested Ferdaus when he took possession of the non-functional weapons and explosives to secure them in a storage locker. In October 2012, Ferdaus pled guilty to several criminal counts in return for a 17-year prison sentence with ten years of supervised probation upon his release, instead of the maximum 35-year sentence possible if he took the case to court.

The three RC model airplane incidents that took place in August 2012 occurred in the countries of Egypt, Spain, and Turkey. The perpetrators were all caught before any damage could be done. The Threat Report, [Remote Control Model Airplanes as a Terrorist Weapon](#), provides a summary of five potential attacks over the last decade, possible terrorist TTP related to RC toys, and the limitations of RC model airplanes as a delivery device for explosives.



GUERRILLA RECONNAISSANCE ATTACK AGAINST A COALITION FORCE

by Jon H. Moilanen, Ed.D

A *reconnaissance attack* is a tactical offensive action that locates moving, dispersed, or concealed enemy elements and either fixes or destroys them. It may also be used by an opposing force (OPFOR) commander to fight for information about the enemy's location, dispositions, military capabilities, and/or tactical intentions. (For more information related to reconnaissance attack options, see TC 7-100.2, chapter 3, para. 3-193 to 3-212; and chapter 8, para. 8-108 to 8-110.)

Reconnaissance elements penetrate or circumvent the enemy's security elements and can be directed to fix, defeat, and/or destroy enemy security elements. This may require additional security elements working in conjunction with reconnaissance elements. This type of offensive action can exploit a tactical situation with action elements that continue the reconnaissance attack toward objectives. Support elements provide capabilities to sustain the combat power of the OPFOR to accomplish the assigned mission task. The decision to conduct a reconnaissance attack is deliberate and requires detailed planning and significant resources.

A reconnaissance attack objective may be force-, terrain-, or facility-oriented with a force-oriented attack as the overarching objective. Key factors in the reconnaissance attack are —

- Identify the enemy location, and as required, its disposition, capability, and/or intention.
- Contact conditions.
- Tempo.

Functional Organization for a Reconnaissance Attack

Depending on the tactical situation, a guerrilla leader organizing a reconnaissance attack may designate reconnaissance, security, action, and/or support elements. There may be more than one of each type element. The guerrilla battalion commander will use a term such as ambush or raid when to best describe an attack element function.

Reconnaissance Element(s)

With a role to locate enemy elements operating in the guerrilla organization's area of responsibility (AOR), the primary task is to locate and report the location of enemy reconnaissance patrols and/or security observation posts (OPs) along the Budo river line. The reconnaissance elements are to monitor the movements of enemy roving patrols and/or OPs but not initiate contact with the enemy. The reconnaissance task will shift to security, on order, to fix and/or defeat identified enemy forces from disrupting the attack by the guerrilla companies deep in the AOR.

A reconnaissance element is generally deployed with missions for—

- Timely detection of an enemy.
- Locating enemy direct-fire and indirect fire support weapons.
- Locating minefields.

Reconnaissance elements in this mission are task-organized platoon-size elements of an irregular OPFOR guerrilla company. Each element moves and maneuvers with preplanned indirect fire support of the battalion.

Security Element(s)

The guerrilla company commanders organize one or more security elements. Security elements can work in conjunction with reconnaissance elements or perform a reconnaissance role of their own. (In figures 1 and 2, reconnaissance elements transition to security elements with tasks to identify and be prepared to fix and/or ambush identified or expected enemy elements as they attempt to withdraw or reinforce. When a security element conducts these functions, the element is described as a fixing or ambush element.) If the guerrilla leader believes a security element has sufficient combat power to engage an enemy, a security element becomes, on order, an action element.

Action Element(s)

With the arrival of fire support assets from the guerrilla brigade, the guerrilla battalion commander believes he

has sufficient combat power to engage suspected enemy elements located in his AOR. He orders two of his company commanders to configure their guerrilla companies to accomplish designated functional tasks. Action elements receive a functional designation that specifically describes the nature of the action they conduct. (In figures 2 and 3, guerrilla action elements transition to specific tasks of ambush, raid, or fix. Guerrilla companies are the guerrilla battalion's primary raid elements against the logistics site and enemy soldiers at the construction site near the Zang Bridge.)

As an enemy element is located, situation reports to the guerrilla company and battalion headquarters provide information updates on enemy forces and their probable intentions. With the approval of the guerrilla battalion commander, the action elements attack the enemy with the purpose to fix, defeat, and/or destroy the enemy in a kill zone. The primary kill zone is the area occupied by enemy logistics elements along Highway 7 west of the Zang Bridge. An additional kill zone focuses on dismounted enemy in a platoon-size bivouac near the Zang Bridge.

The action tasks can be achieved through—

- Direct or indirect fires, and/or a combination thereof.
- Defeat and capture of an enemy element and/or materiel in a raid.
- Destruction of an enemy element in an ambush.
- Occupation of an objective.

Support Element(s)

One or more support elements can perform various support tasks. (The lack of trained subordinate guerrilla units in specific functional capabilities requires guerrillas to apply general tactical skills as listed in “Functional Support of a Reconnaissance Attack” below.)

Functional Support for a Reconnaissance Attack

A reconnaissance attack typically requires several types of support that can include reconnaissance, fire support, logistics, and INFOWAR. Functions and tasks such as mobility, countermobility, and air defense may

be performed by guerrillas with specialized skills. (See figure 1.)

Reconnaissance

There are two basic methods for conducting reconnaissance in a reconnaissance attack. The first option is for guerrillas to organize separate reconnaissance elements ① to find and report the location of enemy forces. The reconnaissance elements are tasked, on order, to transition into security elements to fix, defeat, or destroy the enemy forces. The second option is for a security element to perform its own reconnaissance in order to find and fix a designated enemy force.

Fire Support

Fire support in a reconnaissance attack focuses on—

- Fires in support of reconnaissance, security and/or action elements that are in contact with enemy.
- Support maneuver of reconnaissance, security and/or action elements.
- Defeat and/or destruction of a fixed enemy.

In this example, the guerrilla brigade commander provides the guerrilla battalion with one 107-mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL) platoon, one 120-mm mortar section, and one section of 122-mm rocket launchers ② with support assets to augment the one remaining 82-mm mortar section of the guerrilla battalion.

The guerrilla battalion commander has the 122-mm rocket launcher sections and 120-mm mortar section infiltrate to firing positions near the southern bank of the Budo River. The 107-mm rocket launcher platoon and 82-mm mortars also position close to the southern river bank for maximum effective ranges into the AOR.

Air Defense

The guerrilla organization uses an all-arms air defense concept. Guerrillas plan to damage and/or destroy tactical enemy aircraft within the range of their available small arms weapons systems. (For more information on the OPFOR all-arms air defense tactic, see TC 7-100.2, pp. 11-11 to 11-13.) In this example, the guerrilla battalion has no specialized air defense weapons.

Engineer

Engineer support to a reconnaissance attack usually focuses on mobility and to improve security and/or freedom of maneuver. The guerrillas have no organic combat engineer units. Mobility and countermobility tasks are performed by guerrillas with specialized skills. In this example, guerrillas with expertise from civilian engineering occupations and/or previous training by SPF teams concentrate on emplacing rudimentary obstacles and IEDs along planned withdrawal routes to disrupt any pursuit by the enemy after a successful reconnaissance attack.

Guerrillas from the battalion's sapper platoon are task-organized with each FP to assist in infiltrating through the enemy's security elements and support attacks on enemy field positions. (**Note.** Guerrilla sappers are not engineers; they are trained to perform several typically raider and engineer functions.)

Logistics

Guerrillas will carry sufficient materiel to be self-sufficient while north of the river. After the reconnaissance attack, guerrillas may be required to subsist on the local economy before returning to a guerrilla safe haven. Several caches ③ established south of the river and along planned primary and alternate routes of withdrawal will resupply water, food, ammunition, and medical supplies.

Information Warfare

INFOWAR activities in this reconnaissance attack are primarily executed to—

- Protect elements of the guerrilla battalion from being detected.
- Deceive enemy elements on guerrilla operations and intentions.
- Deceive enemy elements on guerrilla unit locations.
- Create a false sense of security in the enemy.
- Fix enemy elements.

The guerrilla commander deceives the enemy concerning the strength and composition of his forces, their current deployment and orientation, and intended manner of employment with the support of information warfare (INFOWAR) deception. When successfully conducted, deception activities ensure that the guerrilla battalion achieves tactical surprise and enhances guerrilla force survivability.

The SPF advisors design simulative electronic deception (SED) with two of their INFOWAR teams to mislead the enemy on current operations of the guerrilla battalion. With the assistance of the SPF INFOWAR teams, the remnants of the guerrilla battalion's third company establish unit simulations ④ with a network of radio emitters to emulate emitters and activities found in guerrilla companies. Locating the communications equipment at sites away from the actual guerrilla battalion complex battle position (CBP) and two company assembly areas, the INFOWAR teams uses techniques such as several controlled breaches of radio security. The deception traffic convinces the enemy that company-size or less guerrilla units are relocating to the south and have no elements north of the river.

The INFOWAR deception succeeds in creating a false sense of security in the enemy. Earlier guerrilla reconnaissance indicated that the enemy is very lax in unit security during their roving patrols and temporary observation posts north of the river. Similar lax security is observed at the logistics site and the bridge area.

Executing a Reconnaissance Attack

In this example (Figure 1, 2, and 3), a guerrilla battalion commander requires information about the enemy's location, dispositions, military capabilities, and/or tactical intentions in his AOR north of the Budo River. Guerrilla security elements are initially south of the river. Active supporters in the civilian population north of the Budo River report that governing authority security forces along the river are limited to several small team-size roving patrols and temporary OPs from West Creek to Dirt Creek. Coalition forces are operating with governing authority forces throughout the area.

There is no indication of an enemy advance to the south. However, civilian reports note an increase in coalition motor vehicle traffic on Highway 7 and dismounted military forces doing construction work south of the Zang River near the Zang Bridge. Additional

reports indicate a logistics site is being developed along Highway 7 west of the Zang Bridge.

The guerrilla battalion commander recognizes that the enemy will take significant measures to protect a major logistics site from guerrilla interdiction and attack. He knows that he must act quickly before additional enemy forces arrive in the area. He must fight for detailed information about the enemy. Although the reconnaissance attack is the most ambitious and least

commander coordinates with his guerrilla brigade commander for additional mortar and rocket launcher support. The guerrilla battalion commander orders a reconnaissance attack.

The guerrilla battalion commander uses special-purpose forces (SPF) to advise on rebuilding his organizational capabilities as he conducts ongoing missions. This action complements the SPF INFOWAR teams support with deception activities.




Figure 1. Planning a reconnaissance attack (example)

preferred method to gain information, the guerrilla battalion commander is in a situation where other means cannot provide him with timely information and intelligence on enemy locations and capabilities. Recent combat actions have severely reduced his organic battalion fire support. Only two guerrilla companies remain as effective units. The guerrilla battalion

Graphic control measures assigned by the guerrilla battalion orient the reconnaissance elements with routes ⑤ and identify particular areas or points to observe and report on during its maneuver. Reconnaissance elements can use control measures such as check points, terrain features, orientation objective (OBJ), and/or objective rally points. The

reconnaissance elements have adequate combat power for their own reconnaissance and security capability. The reconnaissance elements receive a situational update from guerrilla security elements posted along the southern river bank prior to infiltrating north across the Budo River.

The guerrilla battalion commander deploys several reconnaissance elements north into his AOR. He intends to identify and fix enemy units deep in his disruption zone and support reconnaissance attacks with his long-range indirect fires of the battalion.

The reconnaissance elements infiltrate past the enemy security screen to conduct reconnaissance, report, and maneuver along designated routes and check points. The reconnaissance elements tasks include—

- Infiltrate through the enemy's security elements.

- Report any enemy reconnaissance units and/or observation posts located along the north river bank and higher terrain.
- Locate and target enemy combat and artillery forces in assembly areas and/or temporary positions or facilities.
- Locate and target enemy logistics sites.
- Locate and target company and battalion command posts.
- On order, engage to fix and defeat designated enemy forces.

The guerrilla battalion commander can delegate the decision of when to attack enemy elements to each subordinate commander, or he may reserve the authority to attack until two or more identified locations are targeted for nearly simultaneous attacks. In this example, the guerrilla battalion intends to




Figure 2. Conducting reconnaissance and security actions (example)

conduct nearly simultaneous attacks on enemy units and/or activities. The commander will announce the time of his attack decision based on the information and intelligence obtained from the reconnaissance reports of his reconnaissance elements.

If an individual reconnaissance element has an unexpected encounter and engagement with enemy elements, it will develop the tactical situation without becoming decisively engaged. Supporting mortar or rocket fires will be provided only on order of the guerrilla battalion commander.

Route ALPHA

(See figure 2.) As the reconnaissance elements infiltrates across the Budo River to check point ALPHA , it reconnoiters along the designated route and reports activity it observes and clears each check point along the route. The element leader avoids an enemy roving patrol that appears to be moving toward the West Creek. He tasks a team ① to keep the enemy roving patrol under observation, sends a situation report, and continues to conduct reconnaissance to the north toward check point BRAVO.

No other enemy forces are observed as the reconnaissance element occupies an ambush site ② near check point CHARLIE and establishes an OP ③ near check point DELTA. The element leader continues to observe the bridge crossing at West Creek. He is also to block any enemy forces that attempt to escape to the west from the logistics site or enemy forces that attempt to reinforce from the west across the bridge. The patrol leader reports his readiness and continues to observe for any activity along the road and at the West Bridge.

Route BRAVO

The reconnaissance element encounters no enemy forces as it infiltrates across the Budo River to check point ECHO and moves north along its designated route. After clearing check points FOXTROT, GOLF and as it approaches check point HOTEL and Objective 2, the forward reconnaissance team observes a major logistics site ④ in operation along the north side of Highway 7. No defensive positions are visible but camouflage nets conceal a number of wheeled vehicles and supplies. A number of fuel carriers are concentrated in a small area next to the road with a line of bulk fuel vehicles configured for rapid refueling operations. After

reporting the enemy forces and locations, the element leader prepares an attack-by-fire position ⑤ as a raid element and waits for the guerrilla company ⑥ that is following as an action element. The guerrilla battalion commander directs that if conditions after the attack-by-fire task indicate that some of the guerrillas can physically raid the logistics site, the platoon-size raid element will quickly collect information from the site and then withdraw to the north. The guerrilla company will withdraw to the south and cross south of the Budo River.

Route ECHO

The reconnaissance element observes an enemy roving patrol on high ground at the river line near check point INDIA. The reconnaissance element maneuvers through a valley at check point JULIET and along a major ridgeline after infiltrating past the enemy patrol. Near Check Point KILO, the element observes a combat outpost ⑦ oriented south near the highway. The element leader reports the squad-size element stationary at the Highway 2 site and establishes an attack-by-fire position on high ground to the north and rear of the enemy combat outpost.

The leader transitions his reconnaissance element to a fixing element and sends a small reconnaissance element to continue north to check point LIMA. This reconnaissance element identifies a dismounted enemy force ⑧ of about platoon-size strength doing road improvement and construction work near Objective 3 at the Zang Bridge. This report causes the guerrilla battalion commander to shift his guerrilla company in the eastern part of his AOR to occupy an attack-by-fire position ⑨ oriented on the platoon-size enemy force. After sending another situation report, the reconnaissance element links up with the guerrilla company and provides an updated situation report. The reconnaissance element returns to its security element leader and prepares to participate with the fixing element in the attack-by-fire task on the combat outpost.

Route GOLF

The infiltration by reconnaissance element the across the Budo River to check point MIKE occurs without incident. After crossing Dirt Creek, the element finds evidence of enemy dismounted traffic on the north-

south trail but observes no enemy as the reconnaissance element continues north to check point NOVEMBER and OSCAR on its designated route. The element reports observations at check points that allow for rapid movement of the guerrilla company. The reconnaissance element occupies an ambush position ⑩ near check point OSCAR as an ambush element along

elements mass their direct fires when the first rockets and mortar rounds land in the kill zones. The nearly simultaneous indirect and direct fires are devastating at the logistics site and construction location near the river.

Several fuel vehicles in the logistics site explode within seconds from incoming rocket and mortar fires. Large




Figure 3. Conducting a reconnaissance attack (example continued)

the trail system oriented to the northeast. The ambush element leader reports his readiness and continues to observe across the Zang River and along the trails for any enemy activity.

Synchronizing the Reconnaissance Attack

(See figure 3.) The guerrilla battalion commander orders his fire support to engage the designated targets ① of the logistics site along Highway 7 and the dismounted enemy force at the Zang Bridge in a simultaneous attack. The guerrilla companies and platoon-size action

black clouds billow above the tree canopy. Confusion among the logisticians is obvious as many vehicles speed out of the site in a reckless manner and head east and west along several trails and unimproved dirt roads. Several vehicles run into each other in the confusion and partially block a road leading to the highway. Small arms fire and antitank grenades destroy other vehicles as they approach or enter the highway.

Multiple rockets landing near the enemy bivouac near the Zang Bridge cause similar damage to construction equipment and enemy soldiers. Most of the first volley

of rockets land beyond and to the west of the bivouac. The guerrilla company engages the unprotected crews with direct fires and damages or destroys most of their trucks. A second and third volley of rockets lands in the midst of the position and damages or destroys all of the wheeled or towed equipment.

The platoon-size fixing element near the enemy combat outpost along Highway 2 initiates its attack-by-fire ② when guerrilla rocket and mortar fire is heard impacting on the enemy to the north. The fixing element's direct fires immediately fix the enemy soldiers. Direct fires coming from the enemy combat outpost are ineffective and sporadic.

The platoon-size ambush element ④ near the West Bridge waits and focuses their attention primarily to the west. Surprisingly, no vehicles appear from the west or the east. Although reports from guerrilla elements at the logistics site state that wheeled vehicles are moving out of the logistics site toward the bridge, no enemy vehicles appear. The guerrilla platoon leader at the West Bridge waits and continues to observe. A similar situation occurs in northeast with the platoon-size ambush element ⑤ ready to ambush any enemy reinforcements. No enemy units appear.

The nearly simultaneous engagements on the Highway 7 logistics site and Zang Bridge site last approximately 20 minutes. The guerrilla battalion commander orders the guerrilla companies and other action elements to disengage. The ambush element at the West Bridge disperses to the northwest ⑥ and the ambush element near Dirt Creek moves ⑦ to the southeast. The guerrilla companies and platoon-size elements initiate their withdrawals to the south toward rally points ⑧ near the Budo River. The platoon-size action elements participating in the attacks on the logistics site and combat outpost reorient to act as rear security ⑨ for the withdrawing guerrilla companies.

Indirect fires support the guerrillas as they withdrawal. When guerrilla indirect fire support is no longer required, the guerrillas quickly displace ⑩ their rocket launchers and mortars to avoid counterbattery fires of the enemy.

The guerrilla companies and elements reform in assembly areas south of the Budo River. All four platoon-size elements rendezvous with their companies south of the river within four to seven days.

Assessing the Reconnaissance Attack

The guerrilla battalion commander achieved a tactical success with his decision to conduct a reconnaissance attack in his AOR. In deceiving the enemy north of the river regarding his real intentions, the guerrilla battalion commander completely surprised the enemy. Reports from local civilians reported that the reconnaissance attack damaged or destroyed critical combat power and sustainment capabilities of an infantry battalion.

The guerrilla battalion experienced minor losses in comparison to the enemy. When the platoon-size action elements report to their guerrilla companies, the total guerrilla battalion losses were four guerrillas killed in action, five seriously wounded, and seven lightly wounded. Three guerrillas were unaccounted for in the after action reviews.

The guerrilla brigade commander was very pleased with how the battalion commander used his tactical initiative to deceive the enemy with SPF advisors and SPF INFOWAR assets. The massed guerrilla battalion and brigade indirect fires, combined with guerrilla direct fires, were devastating on the enemy. Major enemy operations south of the Zang River did not occur until the following dry season and provided a significant period of time for guerrilla recruitment and training in the guerrilla brigade AOR.



See the WEG Highlight on the following page for more information about the Russian 122-mm 1-Round Rocket Launcher 9P132.

WEG HIGHLIGHT: RUSSIAN 122-MM 1-ROUND ROCKET LAUNCHER 9P132

The [Worldwide Equipment Guide \(WEG\)](#) was developed to support OPFOR equipment portrayal across the training community. The WEG is not a product of the U.S. intelligence community. The WEG is a TRADOC G-2 approved document. Annual WEG updates are posted on AKO.

This WEG sheet and short commentary complements the above article, *Guerrilla Reconnaissance Attack against a Coalition Force*. The OPFOR irregular forces (guerrilla, special purpose forces, or other light forces) are like any present day, or potential, light adversaries that the U.S. military could face on the battlefield (such as Afghanistan or Libya). Irregular forces tend to prefer mobility that is offered by such a lightweight, man-portable rocket launcher. The system can be disassembled for easy transport into two one-individual loads – the tube (27 kg) and the tripod sight assembly with a remote firing device (27 to 28 kg). The tripod legs also fold for ease of transport. Each 9M22M rocket can be broken down into two one-man loads for transport. It takes approximately two minutes to assemble each rocket and the system can be quickly assembled (depending on the expertise of the crew).

The weapon system is mostly effective as an instrument of harassment and suppression. When assembled, the launcher has three course elevation positions. The crew can use an electrical remote control with an electrical impulse generator and battery to fire the individual launcher. The 9P132 is incapable of firing the 9 foot version rockets of the BM-21 and similar 122-mm systems. This type of system is effective for mobile irregular forces such as OPFOR Guerrillas, or insurgents in Afghanistan. Systems like the 9P132 can be found globally and provide for a maneuverable indirect fire threat to U.S. and Coalition Forces.

 		Weapons & Ammunition Types 122-mm rocket Frag-HE	Typical Combat Load 1
SYSTEM Alternative Designations: DKZ-66, BM-21P, Grad-1P, 9K510 Date of Introduction: Mid to late 1960's Proliferation: At least 5 countries Description: Crew: 4-5 (includes ammunition bearers) Combat Weight (kg): Loaded: 101 Unloaded: 55 Length (m): 2.50 Width (m): 1.53 Height (m): 1.00 Emplacement Time (min): 2.5 Displacement Time (min): 2 Radio: R-107M ARMAMENT Launcher: Caliber, Type, Name: 122-mm, 9P132 Number of Tubes: 1 Launch Rate: 1 round per minute Loader Type: Manual Reload Time: .67 minutes (approximately 40 seconds) Traverse (°): Left: 7 Right: 7 Total: 14 Elevation (°) (-/+): +10/+40°		FIRE CONTROL Indirect Fire: PG-1M Panoramic Telescope (PANTEL) Collimator: K-1 VARIANTS None MAIN ARMAMENT AMMUNITION Caliber, Type, Name: 122-mm Frag-HE, 9M22M Indirect Fire Range (m): Minimum Range: 3,000 Maximum Range: 10,800 Warhead Weight (kg): 19.4 Rocket Length: (m): 1.90 Maximum Velocity (m/s):: 450 Fuze Type: PD Caliber, Type, Name: 122-mm Illuminating Rocket Projectile, 9M42 Indirect Fire Range (m): Minimum Range: 1,000 Maximum Range: 5,000 Rocket Weight (kg): 27 Rocket Length: (m): 1.90 Other Ammunition Types: Smoke	

MONTHLY WRAP-UP OF CTID DAILY UPDATES

CTID analysts produce a daily [CTID Daily Update](#) to help our readers focus on key current events and developments across the Army training community. Available on AKO, each *Daily Update* is organized topically across the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). This list highlights key updates during November 2012. The *Daily Update* is a research tool, and an article's inclusion in the *Update* does not reflect an official U.S. Government position on the topic. Also, CTID does not assume responsibility for the accuracy of each article.

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- 02Nov—**Colombia:** [FARC attack in Timbiqui, Cauca kills 2, injures 2](#)
- 02Nov—**Syria:** [Syrian rebels kill 28 soldiers, video shows “executions”](#)
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- 05Nov—**Egypt:** [Egyptian forces desert North Sinai positions amid multiple terror alerts](#)
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
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