U.S. TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity

Red Diamond

Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Volume 3, Issue 12 DEC 2012

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

RAFTE Here Soon ..2
Guerrilla Raid.....5
LeT Threat.....9
INFOWAR.....13
OPFOR Ready.....16
Iron Dome.....22
Know the Threat ...27
Daily Review.....29

Red Diamond is a newsletter published each month by TRISA at CTID. Send your suggestions to CTID on article content.

ATTN: Red Diamond

Dr. Jon H. Moilanen
CTID Operations, BMA
and
Mrs. Angela Wilkins
Chief Editor, BMA

DATE IS CRITICAL LINKAGE OF TRAINING TO READINESS

by Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate

TRADOC G-2 developed, published and assisted in the implementation of the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE). DATE fundamentally changed the face of Army training providing a complex but common Operational Environment that allows linkage of training events across Home Station, Combat Training Centers, and TRADOC Centers of excellence. DATE provides training conditions grounded in today's intelligence to prepare for tomorrow's fights.

Gary E. Phillips
Director, TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity

BEST OF 2012 – RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST

by Dr Jon H. Moilanen, CTID Operations and Chief, Red Diamond Newsletter

This issue of the TRISA Red Diamond spotlights several articles of that gained particular interest in 2012. The topics range analyses of real-world threats in an operational environment (OE) that U.S. and coalition forces could be deployed, international tensions between or among states, and description of selected weapon systems and capabilities that can affect tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict. Other articles express how the opposing force (OPFOR) of the U.S. Army's *Opposing Force Program* applies of such capabilities for unit and activity training and readiness. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of the regular and irregular OPFOR are documented in the U.S. Army's training circular 7-100 series. These training circulars continue to be updated in 2013 with the intention of unlimited distribution in situational awareness and understanding of the threat.

ACTIONS in 2013

Do you have a "threats" topic you would like discussed in the TRISA Red Diamond?

Submit your concept for consideration in a 2013 issue of the *Red Diamond*.

Email your topic recommendations to:

Dr. Jon H. Moilanen, CTID Operations, BMA CTR
jon.h.moilanen.ctr@mail.mil

and

Mrs. Angela M. Wilkins, Chief Editor, BMA CTR
angela.m.wilkins7.ctr@mail.mil

REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCE TRAINING ENVIRONMENT (RAFTE) COMING SOON!

by CTID Operations

The Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) is currently producing the first Regionally Aligned Force Training Environment for Africa. The RAFTE will be a TRADOC G-2 approved publication that serves as a supplement to the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) publication. The purpose of the RAFTE is to highlight specific OE conditions and characteristics that are unique to a region not included in the DATE. Real-world conditions will be translated into generic and representative conditions for each RAFTE produced. This allows for trainers focused on a specific region to be able to use the RAFTE as the baseline document for decisive action training scenario development. Each RAFTE will contain three sections: 1) OEs under review – matrix of conditions; 2) Discussion of unique conditions by OE variables; 3) Conditions in the DATE that do not apply to the RAFTE. CTID is currently soliciting feedback from key senior leaders on a draft of RAFTE-Africa 1.0. The final publication date for RAFTE-Africa 1.0 is Spring 2013.

Each RAFTE will be built through collaboration between CTID and each ASCC staff. The ASCC staff will identify the key conditions that must be replicated for any regionally aligned force BCT training for that region. CTID will then integrate these conditions into a package within the DATE framework that provides exercise planners with the tools and conditions necessary to provide realistic challenges across all the OE variables while also retaining a focus on conditions specifically appropriate to the region covered by a particular RAFTE. Decisive action training scenarios built from a RAFTE provide the perfect blend of conditions appropriate to a specific region and conditions appropriate to maintaining task proficiency.

The DATE and RAFTEs are not scenarios. They are tools to support the development of a scenario. Each training venue is responsible for the production of each scenario based upon the conditions represented in the documents, albeit with TRISA-CTID as a partner.

RAFTEs will be used by all combat training centers (CTCs), power projection platforms, exercise divisions, Centers of Excellence, and home station venues to support decisive action training.

Each RAFTE provides a single source for OE conditions required for such training events for appropriate regionally aligned forces. Future Red diamonds issues will update RAFTE developments as they occur.

Each RAFTE eliminates the requirement to develop an operational environment (OE) for each training venue. Resources and time can be programmed and used more effectively in support of training exercise objectives.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES DRIVE UNIT TRAINING

Use Army TC 7-101, Exercise Design

by Mr. Pat Madden, Training-Education-Leader Development Team/MCTP LNO (BMA CTR)

The initial planning and steps taken to execute unit training exercises are the most critical. During the initial planning phase, exercise planners must be provided with important information such as available exercise resources, troop lists, and the amount of time available to complete the training. However, the most important of all these initial, critical planning factors are the training unit's proposed training objectives. This is important is because the accomplishment of training objectives is the primary reason exercises are conducted (Army TC 7-101, *Exercise Design*). Designing an exercise without first developing training objectives is analogous to sailing a ship without a rudder. Training objectives are also an essential first step because they provide a list that states the measurable outcome that the training unit desires to achieve. Once provided, the exercise planners can then begin to build on this critical foundation. Understanding what training objectives are and how they fit within exercise design is vital to ensuring a successful unit training event.

The composition of training objectives consists of tasks, conditions, and standards (FM 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations*). The task describes the "what" of the training objective and is the important first step in its development. The doctrinal publication from which unit commanders or their higher headquarters can select training tasks is from FM 7-15, *Army Universal Task List* (AUTL). The AUTL provides a common, doctrinal structure for collective tasks that support Army tactical missions and operations conducted by Army units and staffs (FM 7-15). These collective tasks are referred to as Army tactical tasks (ARTs).

Providing the basis for tactical unit exercises is the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Standardized Mission Essential Task List (METL). The METL reflects the capabilities a specified unit must have and is derived from its table of organization and equipment or table of distribution and allowance mission statement (FM 7-0). The various unit mission essential tasks (METs) are expressed as ARTs from the AUTL.



HQDA (G-3/5/7) maintains the official listings of these fundamental collective tasks that operational units, brigade and above, are designed to perform in any

operational environment (OE). For training and readiness reporting, the unit's METL and supporting task groups do not change regardless of the unit's mission. The next higher commander normally selects the collective tasks the unit will train during a unit exercise to achieve task group proficiency. The METL also provides the foundation for the unit's training strategy, and subsequently, its training plans. Commanders focus training on the most important tasks—those that help units prepare to conduct operations. Once selected, these METs and supporting task groups become the building blocks from which training objectives are further developed depending on the type of unit, exercise, and training mission (see HQDA Standardized METL example for a Heavy Brigade Combat Team below). The comple*te list of app*roved HQDA Standardized METLs can be found at https://atn.army.mil/fso/default.aspx (see example).

Standardized METL for Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT)

METL 3: Conduct Defensive Operations	**ART 7.2**
Task Group 1: Conduct a Defense (Bn-Bde)	07-6-1-28
Supporting Tasks	
- Coordinate Air-Ground Integration when Providing Close Combat Attack (CCA) Support	01-6-0436
- Employ Lethal Fires in Support of the BCT	06-6-5066
- Conduct Mobility, Countermobility, and or Survivability	07-6-6082
- Synchronize Close Air Support	17-6-0308
- Conduct Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Synchronization and Integration	17-6-1007

The conditions of training objectives describe "where" a unit performs a task. The "where" is based on the selected or directed OE. The OE is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*). Once the identified tasks and conditions are defined then the standards, or the "how," can be developed. Standards are the acceptable level at which a task must be performed to ensure successful task completion (FM 7-15). "How" a unit performs a task is based the OE, doctrine, concept of operations, and standard operating procedures. When combined, tasks, conditions, and standards provide the solid foundation for planning, conducting, and evaluating training exercises.

The timely importance of developing unit training objectives during the initial planning of exercise design is also critical to the opposing force (OPFOR). Only after unit training objectives are developed can the OPFOR begin to accurately plan for the appropriate training response. The exercise planners accomplish this by conducting countertask analysis. The primary source of tasks the OPFOR must perform in order to counter training units is the OPFOR Tactical Task List located in Appendix B of Army TC 7-101. Planners must refer to this list first when conducting countertask analysis. Only if the OPFOR Tactical Task List does not contain an appropriate countertask to the training unit's task is one selected from the AUTL (Army TC 7-101). Once the appropriate OPFOR task list is developed, the OPFOR mission, order of battle, and task organization can then be developed. For a complete discussion of OPFOR exercise development see Chapter 2, Army TC 7-101.

Developing training objectives does not mean there are not other exercise parameters which do play an important part in the initial development of training exercises. Clearly, important steps, such as the commander's training assessment, must be done in order to ensure the tasks selected are high priority, collective training needs. Resources such as available training facilities/areas, amount of time available for training, and an accurate troop list are also important steps in the planning of an exercise. (For a complete list see Chapter 2, Army TC 7-101) However, without the foundation of a standardized METL from which to build training objectives, commanders have no measurable means to conduct, assess, or adjust training or report unit readiness. Furthermore, determining resources and troop lists also becomes difficult if there are no training objectives from which to base decisions on the adequacy of training areas or troop lists. Even the issue of time should not be the primary driver for training exercises.

Complete, prioritized training objectives are the center of gravity for the successful planning and execution of unit training exercises. Derived from AUTL, the HQDA Standardized METL provides the tasks from which conditions and standards can be developed. This in turn drives the appropriate OPFOR countertasks. Attempting to build an exercise without first defining what, where, and how the training will be accomplished not only invites inefficiencies but, more importantly, defeats the purpose of the training exercise. When linked together in the proper design sequence, training objectives provide a basis for planning, conducting, and evaluating unit training exercises.

GUERRILLA RAID WITH A MOBILE ROCKET LAUNCHER

Using OPFOR MRL to Raid an Enemy POL Facility

by Dr Jon H. Moilanen, CTID Operations (BMA CTR)

An Opposing Force (OPFOR) *raid* is an attack against a stationary target for the purposes of its capture or destruction that culminates in the withdrawal of the raiding force to safe territory. Raids can secure information and deceive the enemy. The keys to the successful accomplishment of any raid are surprise, firepower, and violence. The raid ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. This raid uses a multiple rocket launcher (MRL) to attack a semi-permanent petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) installation and motor park.

Functional Organization of OPFOR Guerrilla Raid

The size of the raiding force depends upon its mission, the nature and location of the target, and the enemy situation. Regardless of size, the raiding force typically consists of three elements: raiding, security, and support.

Raiding Element

The raiding element executes the major task to ensure success of the raid. In this example, the task-organized MRL section within the MRL platoon is the raiding element. It conducts the MRL attack on the target. An SPF team accompanies the MRL platoon leader and MRL section to advise and observe the raid.

Security Element(s)

The security elements are focused on preventing surprise by any enemy security forces. The primary threat to all elements of the raiding force is being discovered and defeated by the enemy prior to execution of the raid. Security elements of the MRL platoon deploy to locations where they can delay the enemy if he approaches the MRL platoon along any ground avenue, and allow other elements of the raid to disperse and not be decisively engaged.

Support Element(s)

The support elements assist in setting the conditions for success of the raid. The support elements provide forward observation teams to adjust MRL fires, logistics support, and some local security. The MRL platoon leader would normally command and control the raid from within the support element; however in this example, he is located with the MRL during the fire mission. A videographer locates with the guerrilla company commander at a distant vantage point to videotape and audio-record the raid for release to media outlets.

> ***RAID***
>
> ***A raid* is an attack against a stationary target for the purposes of its**
>
> - **Capture or**
> - **Destruction**
>
> **that culminates in the withdrawal of the raiding force to safe territory.**
>
> **TC 7-100.2, *Opposing Force Tactics***

Background Situation (see figure 1 and 2)

The local insurgent organization leader ① recognized the lucrative target of a POL installation that had expanded from a temporary refueling point on the enemy's main supply route to a major POL installation and maintenance halt for POL truck convoys. Insurgent coordination with a neighboring state openly hostile to the governing authority in the region of the insurgency resulted in covert support to guerrilla units of the local insurgent organization. A special-purpose forces (SPF) advisory team ② arrived at the insurgents' complex battle position to plan with the insurgent leader and his guerilla battalion commander for the first-ever MRL raid in the area. The target is the POL site.

An SPF team trained approximately 30 guerrillas from an infantry guerrilla platoon to begin forming an MRL platoon. The training in tactics, maintenance, and logistics was conducted at a safe haven ③. This raid would use one Type 63 MRL (107-mm) and center on a six-guerrilla MRL section. Other guerrillas would act as security elements, observations teams, or assist in security and support tasks. All guerrillas were cross-



Figure 1. Guerrilla raiding element



Figure 2. Guerrilla raid on POL facility

Figure 3. Terrain typical of the guerrilla AOR

trained in MRL skills, but would continue to act as infantry squads or teams during this raid. Logistics and transport were a significant consideration to get the MRL within range of the POL installation.

Infiltration and exfiltration from the area would have to be accomplished in hours of darkness. Given a successful raid, the SPF promised delivery of two more MRLs to outfit a full MRL platoon of three MRL sections.

The MRL Raid

Prepare. While the guerrillas were training for the raid, the SPF contracted with local civilians for mules to haul the disassembled MRL, ammunition, fodder, water, and other equipment. The MRL platoon moved to a staging area ④ in the mountains. Constant surveillance of activities along the main supply route indicated that enemy patrolling and reconnaissance toward the mountain range was nil. Security operations of the enemy were mainly stationary observation posts and combat outposts (COPs) oriented near the main supply route.

Move and Hide. With final preparations and pre-combat checks confirmed in the staging area, the MRL platoon and SPF advisors moved down the mountain escarpment at night to a hide position ⑤. Planning had considered alternatives of how to best conduct the raid, but the terrain and distance to get within range of the target dictated that the platoon descend into the valley plain in darkness and hide during daylight in a gulley. The maximum range of the rockets was 8,500 meters; so the firing position had to be within this distance to the POL installation. The entire platoon moved tactically with a small advance party and security element in the lead. The main body and a small rear party of the platoon followed once the trail was confirmed as secure. Four guerrilla security elements deployed to provide early warning and to disrupt any approach of an enemy patrol. Two of these security elements were also designated to be observation teams during the conduct of the MRL fire mission. All MRL platoon elements remained stationary in their positions during the daylight hours.

Near dusk, the raiding element moved into its firing position ⑥ with the reassembled MRL and pre-positioned rockets. Security elements reported no enemy activity in the vicinity, and the observation teams were ready to observe and adjust fire on the POL installation. Support elements assisted in the final stocking of rockets near the firing position. Support elements moved most of the mules and all other equipment to a subsequent hide position along the exfiltration route and waited.

Attack. The MRL was set on an azimuth and range to the POL site. The first volley of 12 rockets was loaded in a deliberate manner with a mix of fragmentation high-explosive (Frag-HE) and HE-incendiary rockets. Observation teams reported that they were ready to observe and adjust fires. The MRL section was ready. The platoon leader gave the order to fire. The first volley took about 10 seconds to complete its firing cycle. Rockets landed short and about 400 meters west of the POL installation, but some rockets did land near the POL motor park.

The second volley of 12 rockets took only minutes to load. The MRL section manually adjusted the MRL for deflection and elevation. The MRL platoon leader ordered the section to fire the second volley. The rockets landed much closer to the POL site with two rockets igniting a large ground fuel blivet. This triggered additional fires in the area. After adjustments in deflection to the MRL, the MRL platoon leader ordered the section to fire the third volley. Rockets landed in the main POL installation processing point and caused much damage to buildings and other infrastructure. Several POL tanker-trucks exploded from the fragmentation and white phosphorus, and ignited a number of other trucks that were unable to evacuate the motor park surrounded by earth berms.

Figure 4. Fuel blivets in enemy POL installation

The guerrilla company commander, several other insurgent leaders, and a videographer ⑦ were located near a mountain crest to observe and record the attack. The videographer recorded the entire raid using a high-resolution lens from his vantage point. He also recorded leaders praising the attack as they observed the massive black clouds rising into a gray evening sky. The scene of devastation was a major psychological coup when the video and audio tapes were released almost immediately to media outlets with a message of insurgent defiance.

Hide. Even as the last of three volleys was being fired, security elements were starting to move for a rendezvous with the raiding element of the MRL platoon. The observation teams withdrew as the final rounds hit the POL installation. Guerrilla guides posted along the route assisted the hasty withdrawal on a moonless night and provided additional security. The MRL was man-handled on a marked route into a hide position ⑧. The guerrillas hid in ravines and camouflaged their positions with natural foliage on tarps and blankets for all platoon elements and animals. No movement was authorized in positions during daylight hours and was strictly enforced.

Exfiltrate. As darkness arrived, the MRL platoon started a slow winding exfiltration along a dry intermittent stream bed. Throughout the wee hours, guerrillas and mule teams divided into smaller groups to traverse separate trails ⑨ up the escarpment. As darkness lightened into pre-dawn shadows, all of the MRL platoon and equipment arrived safely at their rally point. The guerrillas suffered no casualties and the MRL platoon was available for the next mission. The insurgents had proved their ability, and were soon provided with two additional MRLs to organize a full-strength MRL platoon for their ongoing guerrilla campaign in the insurgency.

(**Note**. See chapter 3 of TC 7-100.2 for more information on raid tactics. See the *Worldwide Equipment Guide*, Volume 1, Chapter 7 for more information on the Type 63 (107-mm) MRL, page 7-38. Organizational data for guerrilla units and an MRL platoon and support can be found in Administrative Force Structure (Organizations) of FM 7-100.4, *OPFOR Organization Guide*. The MRL platoon and section data is in the weapons company of the guerrilla battalion at pp. 63 and 65; the observation team is at p. 58. The original guerrilla platoon and squad structure can be found in the guerrilla battalion of the guerilla brigade at pp. 33 and 35. Organization is tailored and task-organized to the mission.)

LASHKAR-E-TAIBA

Threats in a Complex Operational Environment

by Laura Deatrick, OE Assessment Team (ISC-CG CTR)

From 26-29 December 2008, the world watched in horror as ten armed men staged a three-day assault against multiple civilian targets in Mumbai, India. Investigations by India, the United States, and the United Kingdom revealed the responsible party as Lashkar-e-Taiba, a militant Islamist group based in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The new OEA Team Threat Report, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: The Three-Headed Snake*, examines the group's history, philosophy and goals, ties with other organizations, and common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), translated as "Army of the Pure," is intimately entwined with two other Islamist organizations: Markaz Dawa ul-Irshad and Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Any discussion of one is limited, if not impossible, without reference to the other two. The three groups are so closely related that they may be considered as three heads of a Medusa snake.

Markaz Dawa ul-Irshad, meaning "Center for Preaching and Guidance," was founded in either Pakistan or Kunar province, Afghanistan in the late 1980s to aid the fight against the Soviets. It was established by Muhammad Hafiz Saeed, Zafar Iqbal, and the late Abdullah Azzam – the last being closely associated with Osama bin Laden. Funding to start the organization was reportedly provided by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)

OPFOR in Training and Readiness

Terrorist cells similar to LeT in a training scenario can be realistic when simulating the complexity of varied operational environments. Vignettes can present attacks on military and civilian infrastructure, or key personnel in the political, military and/or social communities. INFOWAR psychological effects can often be as effective or more effective than physical damage or destruction of a terrorist attack.

agency, bin Laden, and Azzam. The group set up a headquarters campus in Muridke, Pakistan, with Saeed as its amir (leader).

After the departure of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, Markaz began to shift its focus toward other conflicts. LeT was started in 1990 as the jihadist wing of Markaz. Based in Muridke and headed by Saeed, its initial focus was the continued fight over Kashmir. The group entered the region for the first time in 1990 and began receiving assistance from the ISI for its Kashmir efforts in 1992. LeT committed its first attack in 1993 – against an Indian military base across the Line of Control in Poonch – killing several.

In mid-1999, LeT and several other Islamist militant groups, along with Pakistani military forces, invaded the Indian side of the Line of Control and occupied the Kargil Heights. This caused significant consternation in the international community, and the situation was not resolved until Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was pressured to convince the groups to withdraw. LeT did as requested, only to introduce a new tactic – the fidayeen – into the fight a few months later.

In November of that year, two LeT members stormed the Indian Army headquarters in Srinagar and killed several Indian soldiers before being killed themselves. This fidayeen attack was different than previous militant tactics in that the perpetrators, while not committing suicide, had no expectation of surviving. LeT reached another organizational milestone in December 2000 when it launched its first assault in India proper, attacking the Indian Army's Red Fort in New Delhi.

After the events of 11 September 2001 General Musharraf – under pressure from the U.S. – arrested LeT amir Saeed, but he was subsequently released. In keeping with its focus on international terrorism, the U.S. included LeT in the 05 December Terrorist Exclusion List. Only eight days later, five men stormed the Parliament building in New Delhi, India, leaving at least seven dead and 18 wounded. Though not claiming credit, the attack was believed to be a joint operation of LeT and Jaish-e-Muhammad. The U.S. Department of State (USDoS) designated LeT as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on 26 December, and the organization was banned in Pakistan by General Musharraf on 12 January 2002.

Even before it was banned, the group appeared to be changing tacks. Saeed formally dissolved Markaz in December 2001, splitting it into two groups. The first organization was the already existing LeT, which was to remain focused on jihad, but only in Kashmir. To this end, a new central committee was appointed, consisting entirely of Kashmiris, with Maulani Abdul Wahid Kashmiri as leader. LeT had operated freely and openly in Pakistan until this time – fundraising, recruiting, and claiming credit for attacks. At this point, the group moved its headquarters from the Muridke campus to Muzaffarabad, in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and stopped claiming credit for attacks – starting with the Indian Parliament attack that month.



The second organization that came from the dissolution of Markaz was a new group that Saeed named Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), or "Society for Preaching." JuD inherited Markaz' educational and humanitarian activities, such as running schools and medical facilities, and supplying preachers and speakers for local mosques. The organization also inherited the Muridke campus and a large portion of Markaz/LeT's leadership including Saeed himself, who became amir.

Though JuD was officially formed as a separate, unrelated organization, it continued to provide support to LeT through fundraising and recruiting. Many experts believe JuD to be a front group for LeT or merely LeT under another name. Despite the obvious close ties of the two organizations, JuD has consistently denied all ties with LeT and claimed itself to be purely a humanitarian organization.

LeT continued to perform attacks across the Line of Control and in India proper after 2001. In August 2003, twin car bombings in Mumbai killed over 50 and wounded double to triple that number. Indian authorities attributed the attack to LeT. Three months later and perhaps not coincidentally, JuD was placed on the Pakistani watch list. However, the group continued to operate openly and unhindered in the country. Another major bombing in India, this one in New Delhi, occurred in October 2005 and was also blamed on LeT.

At the present time, LeT remains one of the largest active militant groups in Kashmir.

That same month, Kashmir experienced a massive earthquake that killed more than 70,000. JuD immediately became a major source of humanitarian aid in the region – providing food, shelter, and medical care for the refugees – with funding said to be from private donations. Working from a long-term view, the organization was still actively involved in relief efforts a year after the quake. JuD took advantage of the opportunity presented by this humanitarian work to re-open offices that had been closed with the banning of LeT and to begin fundraising openly.

On 11 July 2006, seven commuter trains were bombed in Mumbai. Over 200 died and more than four times that number were injured. After extensive investigation, Indian authorities determined that the attack was a joint operation of LeT with the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). They also concluded that the two groups had not only coordinated their actions, but also received support from the ISI.

On 26 November 2008, ten terrorists began an attack in Mumbai against six different civilian targets, ranging from a rail station to two hotels. Lasting over 60 hours, the assault finally ended after the death of nine perpetrators and the capture of the tenth. Both dead and injured numbered in the low hundreds. Investigations by the U.S., UK, and India uncovered a very sophisticated LeT attack that was supported by both the ISI and the Pakistani Army.

Both the U.S. and the United Nations declared JuD to be an alias for LeT in December 2008, and Pakistan banned the group during the same month. The country denied LeT's involvement for months, but eventually arrested and charged seven individuals – including a senior LeT leader – with planning the assault. Saeed was placed under house arrest, but was released around six months later due to lack of evidence. As of this writing, Pakistan continues to deny official involvement in the attack, and none of the cases have gone to trial.

The Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation (FeF) was established in 2009 after JuD was declared a terrorist organization by the United Nations. Branded as an Islamic charity, it engages in humanitarian relief activities while acting as a front organization for JuD. The group supplied aid to refugees fleeing the Taliban takeover of the Malakand area in 2009, and provided relief during the flooding in 2010. FeF claimed legitimacy after a USAID administrator visited and delivered supplies to one of its relief camps in August 2010. Only three months later, the USDoS declared it to be an alias for LeT.

At the present time, LeT remains one of the largest active militant groups in Kashmir. It has not performed a major attack in India proper since 2008, but has limited itself to skirmishes across the Line of Control. Saeed is most likely still in control of the organization, despite all claims to the contrary. His goals are also unchanged, as is evidenced from an April 2012 sermon in Lahore in which he publically called for jihad against the United States.

Including groups such as LeT and JuD can provide several benefits when emplaced in a training scenario. Fidayeen attacks against a military installation employ only a small number of local participants and are easy to mimic in the home-training environment. Strong ties between humanitarian organizations and militant groups are commonplace in many potential operational environments and require coordination between troops in the field and intelligence analysts to discover their relationships. Large-scale attacks against civilians give ample opportunity for troops to practice basic first-responder medical skills.

The *Lashkar-e-Taiba: The Three-Headed Snake* Threat Report provides information to the training community on this militant Islamist group. It contains a review of the group's history, philosophy and goals, and ties to other organizations. In addition, it discusses LeT's funding sources, significant attacks, facilities, and international links. The report also contains common group TTP and detailed training implications.

WHERE'S THE LINE?

Rebels, insurgents, criminals, revolutionaries, smugglers, and drug traffickers.

by Marc Williams, Training-Education-Leader Development Team/JRTC LNO (ISC-CG CTR)

During a recent hybrid threats training session at Fort Polk, one Soldier asked "Where's the line? These rebels, insurgents, criminals, and drug traffickers all look the same." Good question with a difficult answer: the line between these elements is vague and uncertain, and often blurred by their actions and intent. It is very important for an intelligence operator to understand people like this may not fit into a clean pigeonhole with an accurate definition.

It also does not help that there are numerous definitions for the same element. Or that many writers use the varying titles interchangeably. You will often see the terms "insurgent", "rebel", "guerrilla", "extremist", and "militant" clumped together in media sources. The problem gets more difficult when these people begin to do business with known criminals such as smugglers, drug trafficking organizations (DTO), hired killers, thieves, and extortionists.

The line gets even more complex when revolutionary or resistance groups stop "hiring out help" and instead engage directly in criminal activity to finance their operations. Militancy is expensive. Materials are required and a militant organization must pay its fighters and provide food and lodging. Many also give stipends to the widows and families their fighters leave behind. Additionally, the organization needs safe-houses, transportation (e.g., pickup trucks or motorcycles), communications equipment, computers, weapons, munitions and facilities and equipment for training. There will be overhead costs for travel, fraudulent identification papers, buying influence, paying inside sources, and direct bribery of government officials. If a group does not have a State sponsor, funding must be procured through different means, and that is often through crime.

How can intelligence personnel analyze this? These groups will resort to crime for financing and use terrorism to enforce their will against local populace, government elements, and competitors. So are they rebels, insurgents, militants, criminals, or terrorists?

Organization	*Primary Country*	*Criminal Sources of Revenue*
Taliban	Afghanistan	Drug production; smuggling
TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan)*	Pakistan	Kidnapping for ransom; cargo diversion; bank robbery; street crime; cybercrime
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)*	Colombia	Taxation of the illegal drug trade, ransom kidnappings, bank robberies, and extortion of large landholders, multinational corporations, and agribusiness; cattle and vehicle theft
ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)*	Colombia	Taxation of the illegal drug trade; ransom kidnappings; extortion from petroleum companies
Sendero Luminoso *	Peru	Drug trafficking
MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta)	Nigeria	Oil diversion; kidnapping for ransom; extortion of oil companies
MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front)	Philippines	Kidnapping for ransom; extortion
NPA (New People's Army)*	Philippines	"Revolutionary taxes"/extortion of farmers, businessmen, and mining firms
RIRA and **CIRA** (Real Irish Republic Army and Continuity IRA)*	Northern Ireland	Gun & explosives smuggling; WMD training, robbery, extortion, "tiger kidnapping"
ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna)*	Spain	Extortion; arms trafficking; robbery
ISI (Islamic State of Iraq)	Iraq	Armed robbery directed against banks, currency exchanges, gold markets and jewelry shops
PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê)*	Turkey	Drug trafficking

Irregular threats and their sources of revenue

INFOWAR: OPPOSING FORCES AND PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

OPFOR Information Warfare in Complex Operations

by Jerry England, Threat Integration Team Leader

Perception management involves measures aimed at creating a perception of truth or stability that best suits opposing force (OPFOR) objectives. Perception management integrates a number of widely differing activities that use a combination of true, false, misleading, or manipulated information. Targeted audiences range from enemy forces, to the local populace, to world popular opinion. At the tactical level, the Irregular OPFOR seeks to undermine an enemy's ability to conduct combat operations through psychological warfare (PSYWAR) and other perception management activities aimed at deterring, inhibiting, and demoralizing the enemy and influencing civilian populations.

INFOWAR Activities

- **PSYWAR**
- **Direct action**
- **Public affairs**
- **Media manipulation**
- **Media censorship**
- **Statecraft**
- **Public diplomacy**
- **Recruitment**
- **Fundraising**

The various perception management activities include efforts conducted as part of—

- PSYWAR.
- Direct action.
- Public affairs.
- Media manipulation and censorship.
- Statecraft.
- Public diplomacy.
- Regional or international recruitment and/or fundraising for affiliated Irregular forces.

The last three activities traditionally may be considered strategic or operational in nature and not suitable for the tactical level. However, information communications or related technology and global dissemination of the 24-hour news cycle has empowered the Irregular OPFOR to implement complex perception management activities such as social activism to effect change, garner global support, and generally shape the operational environment to their purposes. Often considered the bottom rung of political statecraft, grassroots activism involves groups that are willing to battle the establishment to obtain their objectives. The Irregular OPFOR can enable political and civic leaders at all levels to engage the population to accept their ideology and support the OPFOR cause.

The Irregular OPFOR at times will compete for limited resources either from its higher headquarters or from an external supporting state. This competition appears to the outside observer as disjointed or lacking the discipline needed for unity of effort. Individual leaders of the Irregular OPFOR, however, are allowed to develop their own lines of operation as they see fit given the unique set of circumstances of their area of responsibility and the means at their disposal. When a particular tactic is proven to be effective, it will be replicated as necessary in order to exploit success, increase the perception of legitimacy for the Irregular OPFOR cause, and to give the impression of progress. This sort of "groping in the dark" for a successful strategy means that the Irregular OPFOR is able to experiment to find what works and to receive rewards when it arrives at an effective tactic. The key is to open as many inroads as possible and to increase the likelihood of windows of opportunity for the Irregular OPFOR to exploit the political, economic, or social situation.

In some cases the operational variables of PMESII-PT will determine whether or not a local area will require all of the elements of statecraft for a complete perception management campaign. Important issues such as regional conflicts, underprivileged and underrepresented populations, and the location of political, commercial, or economic power all have the potential to be targets of an INFOWAR campaign plan. As the Irregular OPFOR assesses the local environment and the enemy's center of gravity is determined, INFOWAR planners will target select groups, organizations, and individuals for a variety of perception management activities.

Although the Irregular OPFOR maintains that perception management activities conducted at the tactical level

must be consistent with, and contribute to, the OPFOR's operational and strategic goals, the Irregular OPFOR is allowed much more discretion on the ways and means of achieving its perception management objectives. For example, forming a partnership with a charitable organization or a local business leader in order to obtain secure lines of communication as well as a recruiting pool would be a natural extension of the strategic public diplomacy effort necessary to influence the local populace. If there is a religious or other ideological approach available, the OPFOR can leverage this to buy credibility by establishing educational organizations. The Irregular OPFOR provides a conduit for recruiting indoctrination and long-term influence. Additionally, the Irregular OPFOR has the freedom to provide immediate assistance and disperse funds without delay during times of crisis or whenever there is an opportunity to meet a particular objective. This gives the Irregular OPFOR the opportunity to be the so called "first with the most" in the struggle for hearts and minds.

Social Activism

Local partnerships and projects are regarded by the OPFOR as enhancing the strategic and operational goal of the Irregular OPFOR but are not necessarily prescribed by the higher command. The objective is to provide a working solution that is culturally acceptable to the target population and does not compromise the core ideology of the OPFOR. The Irregular OPFOR seeks to integrate its activities into the target society and does this by providing the essential services for everyday life. Through cultural acceptance and shared goals, INFOWAR operators are able to develop trust and loyalty among the society and create opportunity for future projects. Other examples of grassroots assistance given to a disenfranchised segment of the population by the Irregular OPFOR could include—

- Establishment or purchase of a local business or industry in order to buy influence, generate funds for military or paramilitary activities, and provide access to lines of communications.
- Cash payments to victims of both natural and manmade disasters.
- Support to religious, educational, or charitable institutions for public relations purposes and recruitment.
- Provision of services such as welfare, disaster relief, or policing in order to delegitimize the existing government.
- Monetary support to religious, political, academic, or business leaders who are willing to support the Irregular OPFOR cause.
- Establishing a parallel legal process where the population can obtain a just resolution for disputes without unwanted corruption by external values.

Example: "Civic Dissension Intercede Committee" South. Africa (Photo CC by Discott)

If properly employed, the results of perception management activities become ingrained into everyday life of the target population and can be viewed as a positive force. The targeted population gets the services denied to them by the current structure while the Irregular OPFOR is able to move freely among the population and establish a support structure for future operations. Perception management activities are regarded by the enemy as propaganda, despite the fact that the Irregular OPFOR enjoys more influence over the population than the existing government does. The Irregular OPFOR is able to maintain contact with the target population in an overt way that further legitimizes it. By providing opportunities for education, work, and charity, the Irregular OPFOR receives in return loyalty and support for its cause. The Irregular OPFOR may adopt a long-term strategy that allows it to fully integrate into all aspects of society. The fact that it administers resources and services that are unavailable to the targeted population increases its influence and makes affiliation with its cause a desirable end state.

Example: Irregular Organization displays banners on a public street. (Photo CC by Aotearoa at pl.wikipedia)

Disaster Response

Response to disaster, whether natural or manmade, is viewed by the Irregular OPFOR as another opportunity to gain influence and support in a region. Human suffering on a large scale sets the conditions for chaos and an over extension of the state's resources. In many regions of the area of operations, disaster relief services are inadequate, and there is usually an inordinate amount of suffering before any assistance becomes available. Because of its access to resources and support systems that are outside the government's bureaucratic structure, the Irregular OPFOR can enable a more comprehensive response to natural disasters in certain targeted areas. In some cases, it will augment the current regime's disaster relief and attempt to integrate and legitimize its role in assisting the population. In other situations it will supplant the existing structure and outperform the competition. The goal is to be the first with the most in terms of aid and assistance. Disaster response efforts may include—

- Evacuation of personnel from threatened areas.
- Provision of humanitarian relief such as food and temporary shelter.
- Long-term plans to rebuild structures destroyed by the disaster.
- Cash payments to victims to pay for immediate needs or to compensate a loss.

The combination of these services including grassroots activism, social services, and disaster response coupled with a political message and a strong military presence allows the Irregular OPFOR to establish its legitimacy and build support among the population to make inroads for future operations.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT POSTERS

Situational Awareness and Understanding in an OE

by Walt Williams, Training-Education-Leader Development Team Leader

To Training developers often look for various media or devices to enhance student learning. More important are their efforts of determining the best method of getting key points of the desired training or education message disseminated to learners. Recently, the Training Education and Leader Development (TELD) Team received inquiries from our various customers for the location of current OE Posters that could be used at their respective facilities.

The TELD Team was able to retrieve an OE poster developed by the U.S. Army School of Music at Virginia Beach, Virginia (see poster) as a quick reference guide for students to understand the OE. The poster is divided into four parts. The first part discusses the definition of an OE. The second area contains a brief discussion of the operational variables. The third area discusses the mission of Army Bands in various OE's. Finally, the fourth area provides a graphic overview of the locations of Army Bands around the world.

An electronic version of this poster is located at the following address:

https://www.milsuite.mil/book/docs/DOC-34784.

The poster can be downloaded and adapted and printed for use. (See poster at page 25 of this newsletter issue.)

OPFOR: GETTING READY FOR THE FIGHT

Organizing the OPFOR Battlefield at the Tactical Level

by Mike Spight, Training-Education-Leader Development Team/JMRC LNO (ISC-CG CTR)

The Opposing Force (OPFOR) fully understands that one of the real keys to victory on the battlefield is the ability to rapidly transition from defensive to offensive operations, and also from linear to nonlinear force geometry in the field. Ideally, this should be done rapidly, before the enemy (BLUFOR) can determine what is happening and counter the move. Flexible, adaptive operations are the hallmark of the OPFOR whether BLUFOR is in a training environment at a Combat Training Center (CTC), while conducting Home Station Training with a non-fulltime OPFOR drawn from installation assets, or when participating in a simulation (Warfighter Exercise).

Once given his mission by higher, the OPFOR commander must be able to visualize *WHAT* he is tasked to accomplish. Once he has that firmly in mind, he can then focus on the *HOW*, and the foundation of the *How* is o*rganization of the battlefield*. Specifically, the commander must determine where to position his forces, their mission, and what zones will he establish for this engagement. These are critical questions than can only be answered by an OPFOR commander who can see the ***What*** and ***How***, and then translate that vision into clear Commander's Guidance to his Staff, whose responsibility is to then transform that vision into Battle (Operational) Orders.

The OPFOR commander will have an assigned area of responsibility (AOR) directed by his higher headquarters, which includes land, bodies of water, and the air space above. The commander is responsible for both mission success and failure in his AOR. The OPFOR designates smaller AORs for subordinate units to conduct operations, and these AORs can be linear or nonlinear.

The OPFOR commander's entire AOR is surrounded by a line of responsibility (LOR) which is directed by his higher headquarters. He cannot conduct operations or fire beyond the boundaries of his LOR without first coordinating with and receiving permission from higher headquarters.

An AOR for a DTG or BTG will normally consist of three basic zones: support zone, battle zone and disruption zone, and these three zones may also contain attack and kill zones. Note that Bn/BDET and below do not normally have their own disruption zones, but may conduct operations within their higher headquarters' disruption zone if tasked to do so.

The OPFOR commander will determine what zones will be required for the mission. There is no requirement for all three to be used; there could be a battle zone, but no disruption zone, or vice versa. Again, the intent is to provide the senior commander and his subordinate commanders with as much flexibility and agility to achieve their objective(s) as possible, without hindering them with any unnecessary, artificial control measures.

As an operation progresses, it's important to understand that as the OPFOR moves forward (following a successful offensive or defensive action) what was the disruption zone will move forward and may change into a subsequent battle zone. Designations are not permanent, and must be responsive to the changing situation and physical positions on the ground as ground is gained or lost.

The Disruption Zone

Simply put, it is the ground and air space where the disruption force conducts its operations and executes its disruption tasks. This is accomplished by making contact with BLUFOR and fixing them with direct and/or indirect fires in order to set the stage for success in the battle zone. Focus is on critical BLUFOR units/systems (mission command, reconnaissance, air defense, engineer) to destroy or attrite them to a level where BLUFOR infantry and armor assets are basically unsupported and rendered ineffective. Additionally, OPFOR recon assets locate and maintain contact with BLUFOR, keep constant "eyes on," and render any movement by BLUFOR elements subject to indirect fires and engagement (if possible) by close air support assets. The overall effect is to "disrupt" BLUFOR offensive or defensive preparation or execution, and to

adversely affect the BLUFOR commander's operational tempo.

The Battle Zone

It is here, in the battle zone, where the OPFOR will exploit the results achieved by its disruption force, and will attempt to achieve decision over BLUFOR. In the battle zone, whether conducting offense or defense, the OPFOR will seek to make maximum effective use of all of its assets to defeat BLUFOR. Examples include the following: penetrate BLUFOR defensive positions so that the exploitation force can break through; seize terrain; inflict casualties on BLUFOR unit(s); fix BLUFOR elements so that they cannot move about the AOR; and possibly locate and engage other OPFOR units.

The Support Zone

The support zone is where the OPFOR's logistics and personnel support, mission command nodes, reserves, and other assets are located, and ideally is in an area that is unobserved by and unknown to BLUFOR. The intent is for this area to be as free of BLUFOR activity (including recon and Special Forces [SF]) as possible due to the efforts of OPFOR security forces specifically tasked with responsibility for rear area security. Obviously, there is heavy reliance on camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) by OPFOR service and support units located in the support zone, as all of these disciplines are critical to avoiding detection by BLUFOR recon or SF assets.

The Attack Zone

This zone could be located in either the battle or disruption zone, and is assigned to a subordinate OPFOR unit for the purpose of executing a specific offensive mission. This provides exact guidance to the subordinate unit commander and adjacent OPFOR units, that an offensive operation will be executed at X location on X date time group. Although attack zones are present in the offense and defense, it particularly provides control over offensive operations conducted by a subordinate unit (Bn or BDET) within the context of a larger defensive battle at Brigade or BCT level where more control by higher headquarters is often required.

The Kill Zone

The kill zone is the area designated by the senior commander where BLUFOR assets will be engaged and destroyed. It may be located in the battle or disruption zones (offense or defense) and in the support zone, particularly during the defense. Typically, a kill zone is located in an area that provides OPFOR with superior fields of fire and protection from BLUFOR observation, direct and indirect fire systems.

Examples

Example A provides an uncomplicated view of a linear AOR including support, battle and disruption zones and attack and kill zones. This depicts a generic offensive action by the OPFOR

.



Example A. OPFOR offensive actions in a linear AOR

Example B provides a more complex view of a linear AOR, including adjacent units beyond the LOR on the DTG's left flank. Here again, OPFOR is conducting an offensive operation featuring three separate battle zones.

Example C depicts a nonlinear DTG AOR containing three separate BTG AORs, and their specific disruption, battle, support, attack and kill zones. Note BLUFOR presence in the form of a SPOD (seaport) and APOD, and that the entire DTG AOR is surrounded by its higher headquarters (OSC) disruption zone.



Example B. OPFOR offensive operations featuring three separate battle zones



Example C. OPFOR nonlinear DTG AOR containing three separate BTG AORs

Conclusion: Getting Ready for the Fight

Once he understands the ***Why,*** the ability to "see" the operational environment, and then conceive, develop and mature his vision for the pending operation is critical for the OPFOR commander. Much like the design of a large skyscraper, stadium, or bridge, the design of a battle–whether offense or defense–must be based on a clear view of a desired end state.

This design constitutes the foundation of ***How*** the OPFOR will conduct its operation with regard to managing the operational environment. The OPFOR is ready to fight.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OVER THE SPRATLY ISLANDS

Conflict Between and Among States for Resources and Influence

by Dave Pendleton, OE Assessment Team (ISC-CTR)

In the Pacific Ocean, six countries have now been engaged in a dispute for well over 60 years about some pieces of land that measure no more than two square miles in total size—the Spratly Islands. Brunei, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim all or part of more than 400 islands, banks, reefs, shoals, atolls, and cays located in the South China Sea that compose the Spratly Islands. The TRISA Threat Product, Spratly Islands Dispute, breaks down the South China Sea's importance, the history of the Spratly Islands, each of the six countries' claims to the islands, and the current effects on American foreign policy including the deployment of U.S. military forces to Australia.

The U.S. government deems the Spratly Islands important because of their strategic location in the South China Sea. About 25% of the world's ocean-going cargo passes through the area annually with 200 ships traversing the South China Sea daily. Hydrocarbon-rich Middle Eastern countries provide Japan with 75% of its energy imports from ships that must travel the waters near the Spratly Islands. Additionally, the PRC, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand rely upon imports that also must cross the South China Sea. Underneath the blue waters, hydrocarbon resources abound. Some experts believe that the area beneath the Spratly Islands and the immediate vicinity contains anywhere between 28 and 213 billion barrels of oil, which is greater than Kuwait's known oil reserves. Experts also estimate that the South China Sea contains anywhere from 35 to 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, approximately the same as Qatar's proven gas reserves. Energy companies already operate four natural gas and 29 oil fields near the Spratly Islands. For good measure, the waters surrounding the Spratly islands remain one of the world's best fishing locations. Whatever country controls the Spratly Islands could not only disrupt the shipping that passes through the South China Sea, but ownership also legitimizes that country's claim to the hydrocarbon resources that lie beneath that part of the Pacific Ocean.

> Six states have been engaged in a dispute for well over 60 years concerning islands in the South China Sea that measure no more than two square miles in total size—the Spratly Islands.

The Spratly Islands are scattered islets that cover an area 500 nautical miles from north to south and 400 nautical miles from east to west, approximately 400 nautical miles from the PRC's south coastline. The islands cover about 310,000 square miles of ocean or approximately 38% of the South China Sea. Only about 33 of the islands remain above sea level at all times, while the other islands are only sporadically visible. Only seven of the islands exceed 0.2 square miles in total area, while the islands' total land size amounts to less than two square miles. Most of the Spratly landforms contain no freshwater sources or any land-based resources, which forces the residents to receive all logistical support from the outside world.

All claimant countries except Brunei occupy at least one of the islands and station military troops on some of the islands they claim. Vietnam occupies the most islands,

27, with a total of 600 troops. The Philippines is next with 595 troops, down from a one-time high of 1,000 military personnel, on only eight islands. The PRC occupies seven of the islands with only 260 troops. Malaysia deploys approximately 70 troops on three islands. Taiwan garrisons only one island, the largest, with 112 military personnel, down from a high of almost 600 troops over a decade ago.

The history of the Spratly Islands dates back to their discovery by Chinese explorers in 200 BC and provides the present day PRC with one of its strongest arguments for control of all the islands. Since the 15th century, except for a time during World War II, a Chinese representative has controlled part of the Spratly Islands. After World War II, none of the other five countries that now claims all or part of the Spratly Islands objected when China took back control of the Spratly Islands from Japan. At the San Francisco Peace Treaty conference in 1951, Japan formally ceded its rights to the Spratly Island to China, who then supposedly owned the islands legally. In 1992, to further strengthen its claim, the PRC used the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to claim the Spratly Islands based upon the continental shelf clause where a country controls the ocean out to the end of its continental shelf. Since 1988, the PRC has continued to occupy seven islands with about 260 Chinese marines.

Taiwan also claims all of the Spratly Islands based primarily on its belief that the Taiwanese Kuomintang government is the legitimate Chinese government with all the same historical connections that the PRC claims between China and the Spratly Islands. In 1947, Taiwan became the first country to occupy any of the Spratly islands when it placed settlers on the largest island, Itu Aba. Under international law, continuous and peaceful sovereignty of an area can be used as a legal basis to establish land ownership by a country. Since 1956, Taiwan has peacefully deployed troops to Itu Aba with unchallenged control from any country.



Source: CIA *The World Factbook*

Southeastern Asia. The Spratly Islands are a group of reefs and very small islands in the South China Sea, about two-thirds of the way from southern Vietnam to the southern Philippines

Vietnam claims all the Spratly Islands as well, but the country does not possess long-standing historical ties to the islands like the PRC and Taiwan. The Annam Empire, Vietnam's ancestor, explored the Spratly Islands in 1815 and published a map in 1834 that showed the islands as part of its empire. The map, however, did not differentiate between the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, a group of islets farther to the north

and closer to the PRC's coastline. In 1933, France claimed the Spratly Islands for Vietnam, its colony. At the aforementioned 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty conference, Vietnam claimed that the islands always belonged to its country and disputed China's claim to them. In 1975, the first Vietnamese map that occurred after the country's unification showed the Spratly Islands as part of Vietnam. This claim, however, renounced the previous North Vietnamese position dating back to 1938 that supported PRC ownership of the Spratly Islands. In 1975, Vietnam occupied 13 of the islands. Now, Vietnam has 600 military personnel scattered on 27 of the islands.

While the Philippines claims only 60 of the Spratly Island landmasses, their position is even more tenuous than that of Vietnam. In 1956, a Philippine explorer discovered and charted 53 islands and reefs in the South China Sea. The Philippines views the eastern islands in the Spratly archipelago as another island group, the Kalayaan Islands, not the Spratly Islands. The Philippine government claimed the islands due to their closeness to the main Philippine islands, their uninhabited status, and that no other country had claimed them, so there was no need *not* to place them under Philippine jurisdiction. In 1974, the Philippine government attempted to strengthen its claim as it labeled the Kalayaan Islands as strategically important to the country's defense. In 1978, the Philippines used the UNCLOS clause that gave a country that bordered the ocean a 200-mile mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as another reason that the 60 eastern islands belonged to their country.

About 25% of the world's ocean-going cargo passes through the area annually.

Approximately 200 ships traverse the South China Sea daily.

The UNCLOS continental shelf and EEZ clauses caused almost as many problems in the South China Sea as they solved, as Malaysia used both clauses to claim 12 of the Spratly Islands closest to its country. Malaysia now garrisons three of the largest islands it claims as its possession with 70 troops to bolster its ownership claims. Brunei also uses the UNCLOS continental shelf and EEZ clauses to claim the Louisa Reef, a submerged rock formation in the Spratly Archipelago, as part of its country.

Recent disputes over the Spratly Islands between the six countries date back to World War II, when Japan forced the French out the islands so the Japanese navy could use them for submarine bases. In 1974, the PRC won a battle for the Paracel Islands, defeating a joint naval task force composed of South Vietnamese and American forces. Shortly after unification of the two Vietnams and response to the attack in 1974, Vietnam occupied 13 of the Spratly Islands. In March 1987, Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces battled each other, with each losing a single ship. The Vietnamese navy, however, saw 120 sailors drown during the naval encounter.

Almost exactly a year later, PRC and Vietnamese forces once again clashed at Johnson Reef with the result that the PRC gained control of six additional islands while Vietnam seized control of 15 additional reefs. In March 1995, Philippine naval forces seized PRC fishing boats, detained 62 Chinese fishermen, and destroyed PRC sovereignty stone markers on a number of reefs and shoals in the Spratly Islands.

In 1995, Chinese and Vietnamese forces again fought a naval battle, this time in the vicinity of Mischief Reef. Once again, Vietnam came out the loser with 50 sailors killed in action.

In the summer of 2011, the Spratly Islands again became a lightning rod for both military action and political diplomacy. Last May, Vietnam accused the PRC of using its surveillance ships to deliberately cut the exploration cables of one of Vietnam's ships surveying seismic activity within its own 200-mile long EEZ. Less than a month later, Vietnam claimed that the PRC cut another sonar cable belonging to one of PetroVietnam's boats. The PRC retaliated with the allegation that Vietnamese naval ships were chasing away Chinese fishing vessels that operated in the South China Sea near the Spratly Islands. Later in June, the Vietnamese navy conducted live-fire drills 25 miles off its coast in disputed waters also claimed by the PRC.

In the same month, the U.S. Ambassador told his Filipino luncheon audience that his country would support their position in the Spratly Islands dispute. In late June, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution that condemned the use of force to decide territorial disputes in Southeast Asia to include the Spratly Islands.

In early July, the PRC criticized the U.S. Senate not understanding or appreciating the regional situation. Then on 19 November, the U.S. President met with Chinese officials with one of the topics being the South

China Sea territorial disputes. These talks came only days after the president announced that the U.S. would permanently station a Marine Air-Ground Task Force in Australia.

The U.S. presence in Australia will begin with deployment of 200-250 Marines in early 2012 with the total number of military personnel, mainly Marines, rising to 2,500 troops by 2016. The U.S. military personnel will operate out of existing Australian sea and air bases. The most likely locations for the Marines to use as bases include the Royal Australian Navy Base HMAS (Her Majesty's Australian Ship) Connawarra near Darwin; the Royal Australian Navy Base HMAS Stirling located south of Perth, and the Royal Australian Air Force Base Tindal 200 miles Southeast of Darwin. The U.S. Navy already makes port calls at both naval bases.

The U.S. government has a number of reasons why it is most likely deploying military personnel to Australia at this time. First, it counters the PRC's growing influence throughout the Pacific, as evidenced by the recent decision for a PRC forward base on the island of Seychelles in the Indian Ocean. Second, Australia is located near the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, both strategic locations (see Threat Product Strategic Choke Points). Third, it returns the U.S. to a more global posture after a decade of emphasis on the Middle East through the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Fourth, forward basing of U.S. ships has its advantages in that it reduces travel time to and from home ports, generates less wear and tear on ships and equipment, and opens up the possible expansion use of crew rotations to increase deployment time. Fifth, the Australian military has the up-to-date infrastructure necessary to support a modern military. Sixth, the U.S. and Australia have enjoyed a great relationship since 1917, fighting as allies in World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and now in Afghanistan. Lastly, this deployment possibly lays the foundation for future engagement with other Asian nations such as India, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

The announcement of the Marines' future deployment to Australia has already achieved some positive effects vis-à-vis the PRC position on the Spratly Islands. Reporters immediately after the conference wrote that the Chinese were less bellicose in their statements about their position on the South China Sea territorial disputes. In a speech on 6 December 2011, however, the Chinese President Hu Jintao stated that the Chinese navy should make extended preparations for warfare and accelerate its transformation and modernization in order to safeguard national security. The true meaning of Hu's words can probably never be truly determined, but the PRC's naval action will speak for itself. The PRC may believe that the deployment of U.S. Marines to Australia indicates America's willingness to do what is necessary to ensure the freedom of the seas in the South China Sea, and Hu's speech may be only rhetoric to placate his domestic audience.

ISRAEL'S IRON DOME

Mobile Short Range Air Defense System

by Kris Lechowicz, Threat Integration Team

The Iron Dome is short range air defense artillery (ADA) system developed by Israel as a supporting system for the "lower level threat" for Israel's multi-layered missile defense. The system is a mobile short range (up to 2.5 and 45-mile engagement radius) ADA system that was supplemented with U.S. funding. This system can engage and negate improvised indirect threats such as mortars and rockets that are common to groups like Hamas and Hezbollah (see WEG Sheet on Improvised Rocket Launchers following this article).

The Indirect Threat

These short range rockets are easily manufactured by threat groups and proliferate worldwide. These recurring indirect short range mortar/rocket threats are similar to what U.S. soldiers faced in Iraq and currently experience in Afghanistan.

Mission

The Iron Dome can engage multiple simultaneous short range threats from rockets or artillery rounds. The development of the Iron Dome started in 2007 and it was

deployed in 2011.The system reports a success rate of between 70-79% (overall 75% in 2011).

An estimate from Israel indicates that 10-15 batteries would be sufficient to defend most of Israel's urban population centers. The Iron Dome is being considered for export to a number of countries including South Korea, Singapore, and India.

Based on the success rate of the system, more countries may invest in the Iron Dome. Israel has current plans to upgrade and develop the functionality of the system in the near future.

The Battery Functions

One Iron Dome Battery includes:

- Multi-mission capable radar, or the Mini Raz MMR (EL/M-2084)
- Mission command center, or the "Battle Management & Weapons Control (BMC)"
- "Interceptor" system (3 systems per battery) with 20 Tamir "interceptor" rockets in each system (60 rockets in battery)
- The Tamir rocket has electro-optic sensors and steering fins that allow the rocket to be highly maneuverable.

1. "Interceptor" system

2. Battle Management & Weapons Control (BMC)

3. Mini Raz MMR (EL/M-2084)

How the System Works

The main mission of the Iron Dome is to protect highly populated areas from indirect threats. The Iron Dome carries out this mission by using its radar to identify and "backtrack" threat trajectories from rockets or artillery rounds. The radar sends the data to the BMC for trajectory analysis and potential impact projection (risk assessment). If the threat is deemed actionable, the "interceptor" rocket is launched to negate the indirect threat. After launch, the BMC continues to track the threat providing the interceptor rocket with updates on target location. The BMC can send a message with the point of origin to aircraft or artillery within an estimated 25 seconds of detecting a potential threat. The interceptor rocket tends to engage the threat over "neutral area" with less population density, which greatly reduces the threat of collateral damage.

Negative

- The system cannot successfully engage targets within a shorter range, which leaves towns on the Gaza border vulnerable to indirect fire.

- An Iron Dome battery is estimated to cost 50 million USD, with each Tamir interceptor rocket to be $50,000 in additional cost.
- Mass attack from multiple rockets could potentially overwhelm the system.

Positive

- LTC Shabtai Ben-bocher (head of the Lower Layer Wing of Israel's Shield Administration states that the Dome System will continue to upgrade and improve intercept capabilities.
- Open source reporting indicates that the Iron Dome has been reasonably successful in engagement rates.

The Israeli Iron Dome appears to be a successful ADA system that has been tested under fire. On a tactical level, U.S. soldiers may deploy to areas that have Iron Dome systems and should be aware of such ADA capabilities. The Iron Dome in the near future may also be used in conjunction or integrated with U.S. ADA systems. Improvised indirect rockets remain a useful tool for militant groups worldwide and will continue to be a threat for U.S. forces no matter where they are deployed.

OPFOR MORTAR DISPLACEMENT

Training and Teamwork Improve Proficiency

by Walt Williams, Training-Education-Leader Development Team Leader

The emplacement/displacement times of fire support units are difficult to quantify precisely. They reflect the size of the unit, the type of equipment used by the unit, the unit's training level; the crew's fatigue level, environmental conditions, and a number of other factors. Thus, a mortar crew uses varying displacement techniques. For example, an 81/82-mm mortar crew can generally displace the mortar in 65 seconds or less. The time is based upon the following criteria:

- The unit is trained to appropriate national standards and has received a rating of "good" (or its equivalent). This rating includes proficiency in mechanical training, crew drill, and fire commands.
- It is daylight, the weather and terrain are moderate, and there are no specialized clothing requirements—i.e. nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protective equipment for the crews.
- Other factors (equipment operational readiness rates, training, environment, fatigue, etc.) will alter these numbers (normally increasing them).

***Example*: Guerrilla Mortar Squad**

The displacement time does not include the crew displacement to a rally point at a designated distance away from the occupied position. The OPFOR squad leader generally determines a firing unit rally point at least 300 meters away from the occupied position. The OPFOR bases this distance for displacement on the target location error by enemy countermortar and counterbattery radar, the dispersion pattern of submunitions, and possible projectile delivery errors. The rally point location is given to each crewmember and the fire direction center (FDC). The mortar crew may travel to the rally point by foot, vehicle, animal, etc.

The techniques of taking a mortar out of action will vary from gun crew to gun crew. For example, an 81-mm gun crew (consisting of four personnel) may take the following steps:

- The squad leader will issue the command, "Out of Action."
- One of the gun crew (normally an ammunition bearer) will retrieve the aiming posts. The gunner will remove the sight and place it in the sight box or a unique carrying case.
- One of the gun crew (normally the assistant gunner) will remove the barrel from the yoke assembly. This entails turning the barrel 90 degrees, lifting up on the base end of the barrel and removing the barrel from the yoke assembly. Another member of the gun crew or the squad leader will retrieve the bipod and the ammunition bearer will retrieve the baseplate.

During displacement the mortar crew proceeds in the most expeditious manner to the rally point. Upon arrival at the rally point, the gunner will remove the M53 sight unit (from the sight box or carrying case), place an elevation of 800 mils and a deflection of 3,800 mils, and return the sight unit in the carrying case or sight box. Additionally, all equipment is properly secured and a check of all equipment and personnel is conducted prior to movement to the crew's alternate or temporary position. The rally point is occupied no longer than 3-5 minutes. The gun crew remains vigilant in providing local security throughout the displacement process as they are vulnerable to observation and attack by enemy ground forces.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

from OE Posters on page 15

With AKO access, see—

OE Environments to 2028



Threat Fusion and Antiterrorism Awareness

by CTID Operations

ARMY iREPORT-ALWAYS ALERT

Be Alert and Report Suspicious Activity

ALWAYS ALERT-*NEVER FORGET*

WEG HIGHLIGHT: 7.62-MM LIGHT MACHINEGUN RPK

The *Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG)* was developed to support unclassified OPFOR equipment portrayal across the training communities. The WEG is not a product of the U.S. intelligence community. The WEG is a TRADOC G-2 approved document. Annual WEG updates are posted on AKO.

Ammunition	Typical Combat Load
7.62-mm	
Ball	1,000
Tracer	
API	
Tracer	
Incendiary	
Total	

SYSTEM
Alternative Designations: none
Date of Introduction: 1964
Proliferation: Widespread
Description:
Weight (kg):
Empty (w/o magazine) (kg): 4.9
Loaded (with magazine): 5.67 w/40-rd mag
Mount: Bipod
Length (mm):
Overall: 1,035
Barrel: 591
Quick Change Barrel: No
Rate of Fire (rd/min):
Cyclic: 650
Practical (auto): 150 (80 sustained, see note)
Practical (semi): 50
Fire Mode: Selective
Operation: Gas
Feed: 40 round-curved box or 75-rd drum magazine. Can also use the 30-round curved box magazine used by the AKM .

SIGHTS
Name: N/A
Type: Leaf sights
Magnification: None

Night Sights Available: yes, (luminous front/rear)

AMMUNITION
Name: M1943 (57N231S)
Caliber/length: 7.62x39-mm
Type: Ball, steel core
Range (m):
Effective: 800
Maximum: 800
Armor Penetration: 6 mm mild steel plate at 300 m
Steel helmet at 1,000 m
Flak vest at 60 m
Muzzle Velocity (m/s): 718
Name: M1943 (T-45 or 57N231P)
Caliber/length: 7.62x39-mm
Type: Ball-Tracer
Range
Effective: 800
Maximum: 800
Trace (m): 800
Muzzle Velocity (m/s): 718
Name: M1943
Caliber/length: 7.62x39-mm
Type: API
Armor Penetration (mm @ 0° obliquity @ 500m): 8
Muzzle Velocity (m/s): N/A

VARIANTS
RPKS: Folded stock version (820 mm in length)

Note. The RPK is the machinegun variant of the AKM and as such is an extended version of the AKM. It has a longer, heaver barrel than the AKM (591-mm vs 414- mm). Most moving parts are interchangeable with the AK-47 or AKM assault rifles. The sustained rate of fire cannot exceed 80 rounds per minute due to "cook off". It has been replaced by the 5.45-mm RPK-74 in many armies.

With AKO access, find the *Worldwide Equipment Guide* at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/21872221

ITEMS OF INTEREST IN *CTID DAILY UPDATES*

Knowing the Threats for Training, Education, and Leader Development Readiness

by Marc Williams, Training-Education-Leader Development Team/JRTC LNO (ISC-CG CTR)

CTID analysts produce a daily *CTID Daily Update* to help our readers focus on key current events and developments across the Army training community. Available on AKO, each *Daily Update* is organized across the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). This list highlights key update samples during **December 2012**. The *Daily Update* is a research tool, and an article's inclusion does not reflect an official U.S. Government position on the topic. CTID does not assume responsibility for the accuracy of each referenced article.

03 December. Colombia: Colombian Army reportedly seizes surface-to-air missile from FARC

04 December. AFRICOM: Collaborating extremist groups worry AFRICOM commander

05 December. U.S.: Fatal incident reflects new boldness among offshore smugglers

06 December. Kenya: One dead, eight wounded in Nairobi bomb blast

07 December. Russia: Russia's homegrown insurgency: Jihad in the North Caucasus

10 December. Syria: Rebel groups in Syria make framework for military

Turkey: 6 Patriot batteries, 600 foreign troops to be deployed in Turkey

11 December. China: China establishes its first laser propulsion laboratory

12 December. Space: North Korea fires rocket and puts satellite in orbit

13 December. Japan: China flies into Japanese airspace for the first time in history

14 December. Honduras: The struggle to survive in the most violent country in the world

17 December. Cyber security: Cyber's next chapter: penetrating sealed networks

18 December. Pakistan: Karachi polio killings: Vaccination workers shot dead

19 December. Egypt: The battle for the Sinai

21 December. South Sudan: South Sudan army shoots down UNMISS helicopter, four dead

26 December. Al Qaeda: U.S. drone strike kills Jordanian, Yemeni AQAP operatives in Yemen

27 December. Central African Republic: Rebels advance, UN and U.S. pull personnel, and President Requests help from France and U.S.

CTID Points of Contact

Director, CTID	DSN: 552
Mr Jon Cleaves	FAX: 2397
jon.s.cleaves.civ@mail.mil	913.684.7975
Deputy Director, CTID	
Ms Penny Mellies	DAC
penny.l.mellies.civ@mail.mil	684.7920
Operations Officer, CTID	
Dr Jon Moilanen	BMA
jon.h.moilanen.ctr@mail.mil	684.7928
Threat Integration Team Leader	
Mr Jerry England	DAC
jerry.j.england.civ@mail.mil	684.7960
Threat Integration Team	
Mr Kris Lechowicz	DAC
kristin.d.lechowicz.civ@mail.mil	684.7922
Threat Integration Team	
Ms. Steffany Trofino	DAC
steffany.a.trofino.civ@mail.mil	684.7934
Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG)	
Mr John Cantin [in transition]	BMA
_____.ctr@mail.mil	684.____
Training & Leader Development Team Leader	
Mr Walt Williams	DAC
walter.l.williams112.civ@mail.mil	684.7923
Training & Leader Development Team/NTC LNO	
LTC Terry Howard	USAR
terry.d.howard.mil@mail.mil	684.7939
Training & Leader Development Team/JRTC LNO	
Mr Marc Williams	ISC-CG
james.m.williams257.ctr@mail.mil	684.7943
Training & Leader Development Team/JMRC LNO	
Mr Mike Spight	ISC-CG
michael.g.spight.ctr@mail.mil	684.7974
Training & Leader Development Team/MCTP LNO	
Mr Pat Madden	BMA
patrick.m.madden16.ctr@mail.mil	684.7997
OE Assessment Team Leader	
Mrs Angela Wilkins	BMA
angela.m.wilkins7.ctr@mail.mil	684.7929
OE Assessment Team	
Mrs Laura Deatrick	ISC-CG
laura.m.deatrick.ctr@mail.mil	684.7907
OE Assessment Team	
Mr Dave Pendleton	ISC-CG
henry.d.pendleton..ctr@mail.mil	684.7952
OE Assessment Team	
Mr Rick Burns	BMA
richard.b.burns4.ctr@mail.mil	684.7897
OE Assessment Team	
Mr Jim Bird	Overwatch
James.r.bird.ctr@mail.mil	684.7919

YOUR Easy e-Access Resource

AKO *Three "Click"* Drill-Down



Find Your Topic – Do Your Research

What We Do for YOU

- **Determine OE Conditions**
- **Publish Operational Environment Assessments (OEAs)**
- **Publish OE Threats**
- **Publish Army OPFOR Doctrine**
- **Assess Threat-Enemy and Their TTP**
- **Support Terrorism Awareness**
- **Produce Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE)—previously titled Full Spectrum Training Environment**

All CTID products can be found on AKO. Check out all of our products at:
www.us.army.mil/suite/files/11318389