U.S. ARMY TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity

TRISA

Red Diamond

Contemporary Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID)

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New Operational Environment Assessment for Afghanistan

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The OEA Team published an update to the operational environment assessment (OEA) for Afghanistan in May 2011. The purpose of an OEA is twofold. First, an assessment provides a detailed description and analysis of an operational environment (OE); second, it presents a methodology for the application of the OE framework to any real-world OE. The OEA framework is an analytical construct developed to explore the complex and ever-changing combination of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect real-world military operations within a given OE. The framework provides a method to describe the conditions of military operations and capabilities, and is applicable across leader development, education, and training environments as well as real-world contingency planning or predeployment exercises.



OEAs are intended to support the Army training community in the development and execution of mission rehearsal exercises (MRXs), training exercises/events, and general cultural awareness training. This OEA, focused on Afghanistan, presents a discussion of the PMESII-PT variables, a trends analysis across variables, and a list of potential and realistic events in Afghanistan.

Every OE is different. Each one is dynamic and multi-dimensional with its own degree of complexity. To better understand each OE's uniqueness, one needs to study and understand the variables, their synergy, and their overall influences on military operations. An OEA helps define the OE's nature and characteristics and seeks to present an understanding of the variables and their impact across the OE.

Each OEA discusses the **political**, **military**, **economic**, **social**, **information, infrastructure**, **physical environment** and **time** (PMESII-PT) variables and their related effects, as well as exploring potential trends across the specific OE being analyzed. The analysis presented in this OEA is based upon open-source research, and all information contained herein is UNCLASSIFIED. This OEA is not an official intelligence assessment or intelligence product, nor should it be used in such a manner.

NEWSLETTER DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

OEA: Afghanistan

An OEA contains three key sections. Each section provides a comprehensive and complimentary look at the variables as they apply to Afghanistan. The three sections are: 1) **Variables of the OE**, 2) **Trends Analysis,** and 3) **Events List**.

Section 1: Variables of the Afghanistan OE

This section provides a detailed look at the OE in terms of the PMESII-PT variables. The discussion will focus on the key dimensions of each variable as well as its operational impacts. The variables are not limited to simply providing an understanding of an OE; they also represent a compendium of conditions that require management within an OE. Commanders and Soldiers must understand and manage the conditions of the variables and their effects. Each variable contains information gathered from various unclassified sources. Sources include government research reports, academic analysis, key think-tank publications, and other credible news sources.

The **political variable** describes the political system in Afghanistan as it exists today. Hamid Karzai serves as president of Afghanistan's central government, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The variable explicitly demonstrates that a central government and a president do not equal a strong government. The nature of Afghanistan's social makeup, physical environment, lack of infrastructure, and limited methods for information dissemination prevent any level of unity among its citizens. The traditional system of governing, which is primarily at the tribal level, still exists today. Loyalty is to family first, then clan, then tribe. Loyalty to a central government is a concept beyond the comprehension of most Afghans.

The **military variable** explains that although the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) demonstrate significant improvement and continue to pursue an increase in numbers, their skill level still has not reached the stage necessary to fight the insurgency alone. Illiteracy and retention remain serious barriers to achievement and reliability. The ANA and ANP do not yet successfully demonstrate the consistent ability to protect the GIRoA and the Afghan people from insurgents. The planned US troop withdrawal will surely impact ANSF operations, although it does not mean that no US troops will remain in country to provide support. In fact, the US recently promised that US forces will remain in Afghanistan until 2014, although the role may change. General David Petraeus commented that "The momentum achieved by the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2005 has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in a number of important areas . . . . However, while the security progress achieved over the past year is significant, it is also fragile and reversible."

The **economic variable** demonstrates Afghanistan's lack of economic development and how that deficiency undermines the GIRoA while the poor economy allows the insurgency and drug culture to thrive. Although a modern banking system exists, *hawala* still serves as the preferred method to transfer money. The inability to track money exchange allows for the extreme level of corruption that occurs throughout every transaction, from the government, to the military, to the Taliban and insurgents, to the average citizen. Although Afghanistan possesses potential resources to exploit for economic gain, the country currently imports more than it exports, and it consumes all its internal oil production.

The **social variable** highlights the significant role that the Islamic religion plays in every aspect of Afghanistan's culture, from family structure, to business dealings, to warfighting. Muslims in Afghanistan view Islam as a way of life, not simply something they think about at a weekly religious service, in contrast to many people in Western cultures. Troops deployed to Afghanistan must understand Islam's principles and how the religion will affect the military's interactions with Afghan people at all levels of society.

The **information variable** attests to the ever-growing importance of information warfare (INFOWAR) in Afghanistan. Perception management serves as a key aspect of any INFOWAR campaign, and this applies particularly in Afghanistan. The Taliban operates a skilled INFOWAR campaign with techniques such as night letters and YouTube videos to sway the population to their desires, while they simultaneously discredit the GIRoA. The coalition must continuously strive to counter these messages and implement messages of its own that boost the GIRoA's value in the eyes of its people.

OEA: Afghanistan

The **infrastructure variable** reveals that, despite billions of dollars in aid for infrastructure development throughout the country, not much has changed from how Afghanistan looked 100 years ago. Many development projects suffer from a lack of maintenance. Large distances separate Afghanistan's largest cities, with poor roads, few railroads, and air travel available only to the richest citizens. The capital, Kabul, is the largest Afghan city, followed by Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, and Kunduz. Of the 24% of Afghans who live in urban areas, only 20% of those can access basic utilities such as clean water and electricity on a regular basis. Afghanistan's high annual urbanization rate of 5.4% strains these scarce resources and pressures the GIRoA to show it can provide for its people.

The **physical environment** variable depicts Afghanistan's difficult terrain, full of mountains and deserts that suffer winter snow storms, summer droughts, year-round windstorms, and earthquakes that can occur at any time. The terrain puts the insurgent at a significant advantage over any outsider due to his familiarity with the mountains, which is especially critical for survival. Locals also hold a physical advantage to outsiders because of their acclimation to both the summers' extreme dry heat and the winters' harsh cold. Soldiers who know where the enemy might hide and can effectively use vehicles and equipment on inhospitable ground will be critical for mission success.

The **time variable** comprehensively portrays Afghanistan's past and the significance of the country's history on its present. This variable enables the reader to understand how Afghanistan came to its current situation today as a community, which really is not much different than 2,000 years ago. Afghans perceive time quite differently than Westerners. Most Afghans demonstrate little sense of urgency for punctuality or to complete tasks by an imposed deadline. The Afghan people will spend as much time as necessary to intimately know those they conduct business with; and until the Afghans establish that trust, very little actual business will occur. The time variable includes an extensive **time annex** listing the history of events that shaped the country into its current condition.

PMESII-PT Variable	OE: Afghanistan
Political	**Islamic Republic;** centuries-old tribal politics dominate and make the central government weak; dozens of political parties further weaken any attempt at a sense of national identity; strong Islamic influence; democratic elections held for president and parliament; GIRoA receives fickle support from Afghans; seeks independence yet relies heavily on support from US/ISAF and multiple NGOs
Military	**Developing Afghan National Security Force (ANSF);** personnel numbers reached 240,000 in 2010; illiteracy negatively affects the Army, Air Force, and Police; ethnic tensions, corruption, low pay, and equipment maintenance issues predominate; Army contains primarily light infantry
Economic	**Weak economy;** 2010 GDP: $23.35 billion; GDP per capita: $800; 35% unemployment; 36% population below the poverty line; exchange rate: ~45 Afghanis to US$1; official/formal banking system exists, but hawala still serves as the primary means of money exchange within the country
Social	**Muslim culture;** 80% Sunni Muslim, 19% Shia Muslim, 1% other; tribal culture; ethnically 42% Pashtun, 27% Tajik, 9% Hazara, 9% Uzbek, and 13% other; 28% literacy rate; 24% urban with a 5% average annual increase
Information	**Monitored information environment;** word of mouth serves as the primary means of communication, followed by radio and TV; any anti-Islamic material or broadcast will be shut down; Internet is highly used by Taliban as an effective INFOWAR tool
Infrastructure	**Undeveloped;** most Afghans (80%+) cannot access electrical power, potable water, or modern sewage treatment methods; population is 76% rural, 24% urban; most travel conducted over poor roads; cell phones dominate due to scarcity of landlines; potential development of natural gas pipeline in planning stages
Physical Environment	**Landlocked;** bordered by Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan; approximately 60% of terrain is mountainous; limited natural water resources; wide temperature fluctuations; prone to natural disasters such as flood and earthquakes
Time	**Not sensitive to Western sense of urgency;** relationships take precedence in business, politics, and all other matters; uses solar Islamic, lunar Islamic, and Gregorian calendars; five-year election cycle for president; harvest cycle is May-September, with poppies harvested in the spring

OEA: Afghanistan

Section 2: Trends Analysis

This section provides a look at possible near-term (three, six, and 12 months out) trends across the OE as they apply to each variable. They describe potential actions and results for each variable in Afghanistan according to analysts' best assessments. The trends will provide the user with a set of expectations across each variable that can be used to support training events and exercise design.

Key Themes for Afghanistan

Several issues in the country of Afghanistan dominate across all variables of the OE. Most prevalent, and hindering Afghanistan's development into a self-sustaining nation, are its drug culture, endemic corruption, the history and mindset of the people, and insufficient security.

Afghanistan's drug culture pervades and is supported my many facets of society. Afghanistan's terrain and weather, combined with poor infrastructure (which limits access to water), signify that many legal crops are difficult to grow. Poppies, on the other hand, grow easily in Afghanistan's climate, are inexpensive for poor farmers, and bring the greatest return on investment. Despite the fact that poppy growing is illegal and drug production is considered immoral by most Afghans, they see it as the best way to provide for their families. Perpetuating the drug culture from another angle are the insurgents who encourage the crop by offering farmers money for it. The insurgents, of course, turn around and sell it for a much greater price. The third element contributing to the drug culture is the GIRoA. Although the government is explicitly against it, enforcement is sparse.

The endemic corruption throughout Afghan society is perhaps the most difficult problem to solve. It truly is a way of life for the Afghan people, no matter one's social class. It is so much a part of society that most Afghans accept it without question. Even if some key leaders decide to attempt to eradicate this practice, enforcement would be nearly, or completely, impossible.

The history and mindset of the people encompasses multiple aspects of Afghan society, from the drug culture and corruption already discussed to other issues such as religion and what can be described as a "wait and see" attitude. The concept of time for Afghans is vastly different than how Westerners perceive time. Afghans believe that certain things will happen regardless of their actions. They also have a unique survival instinct. Conflict is a never-ending part of life for them, so they will choose to support whichever side is winning as a means of self-protection. So, even if the Taliban, for instance, has proven to bring harm to them in the past, they can be easily swayed to believe that it was the fault of an outside force, and therefore ally themselves with Taliban forces. This type of capricious behavior has cause a never-ending cycle of untrue allegiances, which ultimately means the Afghans are loyal to no one outside of their own families and tribes.

Finally, lack of or insufficient security stifles progress in Afghanistan. Infrastructure developments, some costing inordinate sums, are often destroyed or fall into disrepair because of lack of security. Unsecured infrastructure is an easy target for insurgents. This becomes a situation of one step forward, two steps back. Lack of security for infrastructure translates to lack of progress for the Afghans. Security concerns also affect education of young Afghan people. On many occasions the Taliban has threatened and even harmed school children and their families to the point that parents choose to keep their children home where they are safer. Ultimately, poor security translates to lack of confidence in the GIRoA, which is yet another hindrance to the success of a unified, national government for Afghanistan.

Section 3: Events List

This section provides a list of realistic yet fictional potential events that could occur in Afghanistan. The list supplies the reader with specific examples of the significance of the PMESII-PT variables in relation to a myriad of events that do and could occur in Afghanistan.

OEA: Afghanistan

Each event is tied to the Mission Essential Task List (METL) to clearly show the tactical-level connection between the event, its related activities, and possible OE variable conditions. Events from the list may be used to aid scenario development or to script events to support scenarios. Each event is listed at the top of the table, with three to four potential related activities, followed by their likely OE variable conditions. The bottom of each table links possible METL tasks, but is not necessarily all inclusive. Events were analyzed to ensure that the details of each variable in Section 1 support the possibility of the event, and that each event requires tactical intervention to make it useful to units in training.

Points of Contact and Product Location

Comments, suggestions and feedback on all OEAs are welcome. Please send comments to penny.mellies@us.army.mil. OEAs and related products are posted on AKO at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/11318389.

OEAs available include:

OEA 1: Iraq

OEA 2: Afghanistan

OEA 3: North Korea

OEA 5: Iran

OEA 6: Horn of Africa

Hybrid Threats Train the Trainer Course On-line

TRADOC G2 TRISA recently hosted its annual Hybrid Threats, formerly known as Contemporary Operational Environment (COE), "Train the Trainer" Course of Instruction (COI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 25-29 April 2011. The course covered Hybrid Threats and associated OPFOR application as depicted in the TC 7-100 series of field manuals (organization, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures). All COI presentations are now on AKO.



Article of Interest

Countering Extremist Ideology as a Wide Area Security Training Objective

by LTG Robert L Caslen, CAC Commander, and Mr. Gary Phillips, TRISA Director

In 2006, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT). Although this plan may seem dated in 2011, with the publication of myriad other documents that contain guidance on terrorism and counter-insurgency, the contents of the plan and description of countering extremist ideology remains extremely relevant. The NMSP-WOT identifies extremist ideology as the strategic center of gravity for terrorist organizations. Countering extremist ideology requires taking actions that empower "moderates" to becoming engaged in rejecting the ways and means of extremists among their own community and society. The plan lists ways for coalition forces to enable moderates to reject violent extremists by providing security for moderates to express their views and opinions, humanitarian assistance to demonstrate benevolence and reinforce local governments, military-to-military contacts to enable security forces and to support military leaders, conduct of operations in a fashion that acknowledges cultural sensitivities and avoids undercutting local authorities, and finally the execution of military information support operations that can amplify the voices of moderates.

Before going any further it is necessary to understand how one can roughly categorize people in terms of extremist ideology. Secularists do not prescribe to any particular ideology. They can also be characterized as pragmatists, open to a wide range of solutions that will solve a problem or resolve an issue. Moderates usually hold to an ideology but believe in pluralism and tolerance as a way to dialog about differences. Orthodox members hold to a rigorous and often rigid application of an ideology and have little tolerance for those who do not embrace the tenets of the ideology. Orthodox members rely on the strength of their beliefs and proselytizing of non-believers as the key to converting those who are simply blind to the truth. Extremists go well beyond orthodox members and actually espouse and execute violence to further the ideology. They attempt to destroy competing ideologies and repress people who profess differing views.

Countering extremist ideology has been a fundamental part of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It can be argued that in most cases countering extremist ideology is a fundamental part of wide area security (WAS) as an Army core competency. The question this paper addresses is how to set the conditions of the operational environment (OE) at a training venue (i.e. home station or Combat Training Center [CTC] training) to allow leaders and units to both gain an appreciation of the task to counter ideological support to terrorism and then to train to standard.

The first step must be to provide the leaders of the unit in training sufficient pre-exercise information so that they can recognize how ideology may shape the fight in their particular area of operations. The internal divisions of a population in an area of operations between secularist, moderate, orthodox, and extremist must be determined and identifying factors and behaviors assessed. The unit leaders must also determine how the internal divisions can potentially be harnessed to achieve mission objectives of the WAS mission.

The information that gets the unit leaders started down this path for analysis should be provided as part of the "road-to-war" and other preparatory scenario materials provided to the unit. These should be in sufficient detail to allow a thorough analysis and identification of the likely mix of the population in terms of ideology.

At a training event, role players and civilians on the battlefield need to be organized into groupings that reflect the relative mix of secularists, moderates, orthodox, and extremists that were portrayed in the exercise preparation materials. In a sense this makes every civilian on the battlefield a role player. They must temper their actions to reflect their ideological belief posture. For example, secularists need not be held to following an ideology if it interferes with their well being and security. Extremists will be expected to conduct violent acts against those they deem as blasphemers to their ideology including people of the same race and religion that are not in agreement with the extremists.

Article of Interest

The second step is to provide a continuing information flow to the leaders and unit in the training event on the attitude of the population toward the legitimacy of the local government. The provision of essential services, security, and enforcing the rule of law are all areas where scenario injects and other information need to be provided to the training audience so that there are cues to adjust the focus of military operations. The perceived legitimacy of the local government is key to countering extremist ideology. When the government can provide security and a quality of life that far exceeds that offered by extremists the bulk of the population will side with the government and marginalize the extremists.

How the unit conducts military operations during the training event should be monitored as a cue to the actions of the role players and civilians on the battlefield. Reckless or clumsy operations that ignore cultural sensitivities and do harm to the population may result in an increase in extremists and moderates who will tolerate extremists. The negative trend must be apparent to the leaders in terms of population behavior and information flow to the unit generated by the exercise controllers. This same logic can be applied to the leader's and unit's methods and conduct of military-to-military engagements and military information support operations. Done poorly extremists increase, moderates grow unwilling to speak out or take action, and the situation in the AO deteriorates.

Perhaps the key factor in effective application of the tools to counter extremist ideology is time. Empowering moderates to speak out and take positive action requires building trusting relationships and objective proof (walking the talk). In an 8 -14 day CTC rotation there is simply not sufficient time to understand the OE, prepare plans to execute operations that focus on countering extremist ideology, build the necessary relationships, and then execute. When one adds the need to also rekindle the skills necessary for combined arms maneuver (CAM) in that short timeline, it becomes apparent that countering extremist ideology planning and operations must be done as part of home station training that leads to the CTC rotation OE with all the elements in place for full execution of this task.

Countering extremist ideology is clearly the central task WAS in the current and midterm OE. As the indentified strategic center of gravity for transnational terrorist groups and certainly the central focus of many ongoing insurgencies (e.g. Muslim Brotherhood), CTC and home station training must begin to formally address setting the appropriate OE conditions to enable training on this task. This will require adjustments on how role players and civilians on the battlefield are used and levy a requirement for "wrap-around" information to the unit in training that provides the fidelity in understanding the OE and the effects of their actions.

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/32652640 (link updated 08 Nov 2011)



The next publication in the TC 7-100 series will be TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics (to be published in Summer/Fall 2011). This is an updated version of what was originally FM 7-100.2, of which a 2004 draft has been posted on the TRISA-CTID AKO site. The 2004 draft has now been replaced there by the most current draft of TC 7-100.2, in which some chapters (1,3,4, 5, and 7) are completely edited and ready for publication, while others are still in a partially edited status. However, even the partially edited chapters represent a significant improvement over the 2004 draft.

OEA Team Product

Attack at Abdullah Shah Ghazi Shrine

by Laura Deatrick



Islam declares itself to be a religion of peace, but for centuries has been on both the giving and receiving end of violent attacks. Current times are no exception. Recently, Pakistan has experienced a rash of assaults against shrines (graves) of Sufi saints. The new OEA Team threat report, Sufi Shrine Bombings in Pakistan, examines attacks occurring during the past twelve months.

Sufism, a variant of Islam, is a religious movement that is not without its controversies. Followed by both Sunni and Shia Muslims, adherents express their faith through singing, dancing, and visiting holy sites, including shrines where devotees offer prayers to the saints buried there. Sufism has been widely practiced in Pakistan for hundreds of years and possesses both a much larger following than militant Islam and important theological differences. Several important Sufi leaders have declared suicide bombing to be incompatible with Islam, while militants view Sufi practices as heretical.

During the past year there have been four instances of bombings at important Sufi shrines within the country. The first occurred at Data Darbar shrine in Lahore, the second at Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine in Karachi, the third at Baba Farid shrine southwest of Lahore, and the fourth at Sakhi Sarwar shrine west of Multan. Three of the four attacks, including the one at Abdullah Shah Ghazi, had TTP that were very similar in nature and execution.

The Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine, dedicated to the saint of the same name, is the most important Sufi shrine in Karachi and was attacked on 7 October of last year. Two teenage suicide bombers entered the crowded outer compound of the shrine on the busiest night of the week. Detonating themselves just minutes apart, the attack resulted in the death of nine adherents and the wounding of at least 60 more. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TiTP) subsequently claimed responsibility for the attack.

The attacks at Data Darbar and Sakhi Sarwar shrines were similar to the Abdullah Shah Ghazi bombing. All three involved multiple young male suicide bombers on foot, with detonations occurring at times and locations that would maximize casualties. The TiTP was probably responsible for the first attack, and claimed credit outright for the second and third. The TiTP's motive was likely two-fold: to discredit the government and destabilize the country through a perceived lack of security and to retaliate against Sufi leaders for their recent pronouncements against suicide bombings.

The Sufi Shrine Bombings in Pakistan threat report provides information to deploying units, trainers, and scenario developers of the emerging threat to Pakistani Sufi shrines. It contains a review of all four recent shrine bombings and an analysis of their similarities and differences. In addition, a discussion on possible responsible parties, motives, and the likelihood of continued attacks is contained in the report.



Graphic 1: Layout of Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine compound.



Graphic 2: TTP used at Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine compound.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)

Threat Bullets

Terrorism TTP – Keep it Simple…
Threats Terrorism Team (T3)
Know the Threat – Know the Enemy





Silencer-Small Arms ATK:

Surveil the Target

Direct action assassination cell develops a group of potential targets and conducts a review of security measures at proposed attack sites. **Law enforcement officers** are selected with the intention of degrading local confidence in the safety and security provided by the legal governing authority.

Rehearse

Several rehearsals confirm the positioning and timing for the attack cell. In this example, the **accomplice** causes **deception;** an **observer** overwatches the reactions for analysis, and warns **assassin** if unexpected response forces approach during the traffic jam confusion.

Attack - Assassinate

A deception of a stalled car is abandoned in the main streetway with blaring horn to attract a crowd. The traffic officer starts to move from his traffic control point toward the car and into the expanding crowd. The observer confirms no other LE in vicinity and informs assassin via cellular phone. Assassin moves from rear and **shoots LE officer with a pistol-silencer**. Assassin walks calmly within the mass crowd temporarily and gradually departs area.

Exploit Psychological Effect

As crowd realizes a LE officer has been shot, the observer remains at the attack site to record **reactions** by LE and medical first responders. Assassin, observer, and the deception accomplice **disperse to separate urban safe havens**. Terror cell claims responsibility in media blitz and threatens continued assassinations.

Monthly Wrap-Up of CTID Daily Update



CTID analysts produce a *Daily Update* to help focus our readers on key current events and developments which may be of interest across the Army training community. Each *Daily Update* is organized topically across the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). The following list is a highlight of developments in April 2011. CTID does not assume responsibility for the accuracy of each article. The *Daily Update* is a research tool and an article's inclusion in the *Update* does not reflect an official US Government position on the topic. The *CTID Daily Update* is posted daily on AKO.

1 May: U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace.

2 May: Taliban use child bomber at start of offensive.

2 May: Clashes erupt between Khyber tribesmen and Lashkar-e-Islam fighters.

3 May: Iran launches second domestically built large warship.

4 May: Turkish-born al-Qaeda leader killed in Chechnya.

4 May: U.S. and Estonia forge new cyber relationship.

4 May: 11 security personnel killed by Naxalite rebels.

5 May: Drug submarines: Colombia's underwater cocaine traffic.

6 May: Northrop unveils Firebird optionally piloted vehicle.

6 May: Hezbollah setting up operations near U.S. border.

6 May: PKK leader threatens Turkey with great war.

10 May: Police fine tunnel under Arizona-Mexico border.

10 May: Inside the new Taliban offensive.

10 May: From the Sea: PLA doctrine and the employment of sea-based airpower.

11 May: IED casualties on the rise in Afghanistan.

12 May: Enter Unit 8200: Israel arms for cyber war.

13 May: First test flight for biggest China drone.

16 May: Clashes in northern Algeria kill one soldier and two militants.

17 May: Denmark to lay claim to North Pole.

18 May: IAEA fears Iranian hackers.

19 May: Canadian border bigger threat than Mexican border.

19 May: Negara Islam Indonesia (NII): The father of modern radical Islam.

20 May: Foreign military activities in Asian EEZS: Conflict Ahead? (free PDF download until 15 July.)

23 May: Thousands protest against U.S. drone attacks in Karachi.

23 May: Thousands flee as Sudan army seized flashpoint town.

24 May: Attacks kill five in Kirkuk, Iraq.

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

Find Your Topic – Do Your Research

What We Do for YOU

- **Determine OE Conditions**
- **Publish Operational Environment Assessments (OEAs)**
- **Publish OE Threats in FSO**
- **Publish Army OPFOR Doctrine**
- **Assess Threat-Enemy & TTP**
- **Support Terrorism Awareness**

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