



Red Diamond

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NORWEGIAN LONE WOLF SHOOTER/ BOMBER

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
by H. David Pendleton

Anders Behring Breivik never seemed like a domestic terrorist despite the Norwegian security service's knowledge about Breivik's purchase of a large quantity of fertilizer that could become a bomb or his membership in an Oslo shooting club. Breivik's patience made the bomber/shooter appear above suspicion and his ability to keep his plans to himself made the attacks successful. (See the TRISA Threat Report "[Anders Behring Breivik-Norwegian Lone Wolf Bomber](#)" for additional information on the attacks).

Breivik spent over nine years raising funds, writing his manifesto, and planning the twin attacks that occurred on Friday, 22 July 2011, in Oslo, Norway and twenty miles northwest of the first attack at Utoeya Island. Despite losses in the stock market, Breivik accumulated over \$700,000 to fund his attacks primarily through the sale of a communications company that he founded. He specifically set aside four years of his life, 2002-2006, to raise the money necessary to carry out his plans.

In 2002, the lone wolf terrorist began writing his manifesto that attempted to articulate the reasons for his attack, primarily his dislike for the lax immigration policies of the current Norwegian government. Breivik maintained a fear that Muslims would eventually become the majority in Oslo and threaten European civilization. He also detested the incursion of political correctness and multiculturalism throughout Norwegian society.

Unlike many other terrorists who plan weeks or months ahead, Breivik planned his attacks years in advance. In 2005, he joined an Oslo gun club to gain legal access to both rifles and pistols. When his attempts to purchase an AK-47 from the Prague (Czech Republic) criminal underworld failed in September 2010, Breivik used his long-term membership in the Oslo gun club to legally purchase a semi-automatic rifle and Glock pistol.



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To cover up the six tons of fertilizer that he used to build his vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), Breivik rented a farm north of Oslo and founded “Geofarm” to grow vegetables as a cover for his real purpose. The large fertilizer purchase alerted the Norwegian security forces, but the Geofarm appeared legitimate so the police stopped their surveillance after 24 hours because of the lack of suspicious activity. The farm's remote location also allowed Breivik a secluded site to make and test the explosive concoction used in the VBIED.

Breivik, who spent almost a decade to plan the attacks, departed the Geofarm after 1251 hours on 22 July 2011 and drove a rented Volkswagen Crafter (mini-van) loaded with 2,100 pounds of homemade ammonium nitrate-based explosives to Oslo where he parked it between the prime minister's office building and Norway's Oil and Energy Department buildings. After Breivik set the bomb's fuse, he departed the area in another rental vehicle. At 1526 hours, the VBIED exploded and killed eight people who ranged in age from 26 to 61. The bomb also injured approximately 36 others, but did not destroy the prime minister's building as Breivik planned.

Sometime on the 20-mile drive to a fjord northwest of Oslo, Breivik changed into a police uniform, a subterfuge for his planned secondary attack on Utoeya Island where a camp operated by the ruling Labour Party (AUF) was in session. The shooter convinced a ferryman to take him to Utoeya Island under the ruse that it was a routine police matter related to the earlier Oslo bombing. Upon his arrival on the island, Breivik asked the youths to gather around and, soon after, began to shoot the campers, counselors, and anyone else located on the island.

Police received their first notification of a shooter on Utoeya Island at 1726 hours, but it took almost an hour before the police could reach the remote location. The Oslo SWAT team chose to drive the 20 miles to Utoeya Island instead of waiting for a helicopter to take them. All pilots for the Oslo police department were on vacation and, even if the pilots were available, the Oslo police department only operated small observation helicopters—not nearly large enough to hold a SWAT team. The SWAT team thought about asking the Norwegian military for assistance, but all military helicopters were down south and would take some time to reach Oslo. In essence, the fastest method for the SWAT team was by automobile.

Upon arrival at the fjord at 1809 hours, where the local police had already been waiting since 1752 hours for a suitable boat to take them to the island, the SWAT team piled their equipment in a hastily acquired watercraft. Due to the weight of the equipment and the SWAT team members, the boat immediately took on water that killed the engine. The SWAT team and local police then commandeered several local civilian boats to take them across to Utoeya Island where they eventually arrived at 1825 hours.

Upon their arrival, Breivik was still hunting and shooting the people on the island and in the water, as many victims attempted to swim to the other shore to escape death. Several campers swam to a secluded cave area on the island only reachable from the water where they remained hidden in relative safety from the shooter. The police yelled for the shooter to surrender soon after their arrival on the island and at 1827 hours, Breivik stepped out from behind some brush with his hands held high above his head. Breivik's rifle and pistol lay on the ground about 50 feet from him, but the domestic terrorist still possessed quite a large amount of ammunition. Breivik surrendered without a struggle because he wanted to use the legal system to highlight his cause.

Even though Breivik thought of Utoeya Island as his secondary target, many more people died at the campsite than in Oslo. On the island, Breivik killed 69 people and wounded approximately 60 others. The shooter killed 35 males and 34 females that ranged from 14 to 51 years of age. The average age of the victims was only 19.6 years old, but the median age was even younger, 18 years old. Most of the dead were participants in the camp sponsored by the ruling AUF Party.

Breivik freely admitted to both attacks, but has yet to plead guilty to the charges of terrorism, destabilization of vital societal functions, and causing a serious fear in the population. Due to security concerns and fear that Breivik would use the court to deliver speeches supporting his cause, the Norwegian government held closed-door hearings for the terrorist's arraignment. Breivik remained isolated during his first four weeks in custody while two psychiatrists determined his mental health. There is no decision yet on whether Breivik is competent to stand trial. Breivik can receive no mail and cannot entertain any visitors except for his lawyer. Norwegian law allows only a maximum penalty of 21 years in prison, but the government can continue to detain those criminals deemed a danger to society.

Breivik's twin attacks caused several repercussions throughout Norway. First, the government postponed the normal political campaign season for the 12 September 2011 elections by about one month. Second, the Norwegian prime minister announced the creation of a "22 July Commission" to investigate the attacks. Third, the government will add 100 new police positions to the areas affected by the attacks. The Norwegian government will also create a future memorial to the victims, contribute to the cost of the funerals, and may compensate victims or their relatives under a recently passed law. No decision has been made whether to repair or raze the damaged prime minister's building.

The attacks, however, caused major implications for Norway with the strongest effects on the political system. If Norway reduces the openness of its society, ironically, then Breivik's actions partially obtained their desired results. Some observers believe some Norwegians from the political center may embrace the tightening of immigration policies to keep out Muslims because of a belief that the Islam's intolerance of liberal society is incompatible with their own values. The Norwegian Progress Party (FrP), slightly right of center politically, may also attempt to exploit the immigration issue to continue its recent growth.

Lone wolf terrorists will always prove more difficult to catch before they act than those that participate as part of a group. Within a terrorist group, a reluctant participant may get cold feet and alert the police of the impending attack. Any number of laws and police will not stop the determined individual that wants to carry out an attack against a person, group, or government. Due to his patience and meticulous planning, Anders Behring Breivik was that type of person.

The national training centers would find it difficult to introduce this type of lone wolf attack into training scenarios. Exercises do not last long enough to replicate the length of time that Breivik took to plan and execute his attacks. The training centers could, however, introduce a lone wolf bomber/shooter into a scenario that has no relation to the sides actually involved in the scenario.




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Afghanistan Turban Bombings

by Laura Deatrick

During the past ten years, insurgents and criminal elements in Afghanistan and Iraq have come up with many creative ways to kill those they view as enemies. From using pressure-plate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) placed in roads to female suicide bombers wearing burkas, they continually search for ways to bypass security precautions and deal a fatal blow to their intended targets. [Afghanistan Turban Bombings](#), a new OEA Team threat report, examines the emerging trend of male suicide bombers hiding explosive charges in their turbans.



Turbans have traditionally been exempt from searches in Afghanistan due to a combination of practical and cultural reasons. Most Afghans consider turbans to be religious headgear, and requiring a man to remove it is viewed as a sign of disrespect. In addition, a turban is fashioned by wrapping a long piece of cloth around the head in a manner specified by the individual's ethnic and religious background. Taking one off requires considerable time, as the cloth must be unwound in its entirety.

Three suicide IED attacks involving bombs placed in turbans occurred within a five-week period this summer. All three bombings took place in southern Afghanistan two in Kandahar Province and one in neighboring Helmand Province. The first two attacks targeted specific people, namely the chief of the Kandahar provincial religious council and the mayor of Kandahar City, while the target of the third attack is unknown.

The tactic used was simple and effective for targeted killings: enter the compound where the target is located, seek out the intended individual, and detonate explosives when in close proximity. The first two attacks were successfully carried out in this manner. In the third, the Afghan National Police manning the security checkpoint apparently determined that the bomber was a threat and prevented him from passing, at which point the bomber detonated himself.

Parties responsible for the bombings are currently unknown. Though insurgents such as the Taliban are natural suspects, claims of responsibility regarding these bombings either deviate from the norm or are nonexistent. Both the first and third attacks were unclaimed, while the Taliban took credit for the second. In the latter case, the Taliban initially professed ignorance of the attack, then after claiming it denied that it was a "turban bomb." (Of note: the Taliban has a history of taking credit for attacks it did not perform.) In addition, in the past the Taliban has not hesitated to lay claim to other morally questionable tactics, such as bombings in mosques/shrines and female suicide bombers.

Three possibilities exist. The first is that the Taliban was responsible for all of the attacks but, fearing a strong negative reaction from the populace due to the tactic used, chose to remain silent on two of them and deny the method used in the third. The second possibility is that the Taliban was responsible for the first and/or third attack and falsely claimed the second before learning the method used, thus compelling the ensuing "not -a-turban-bomb" assertion. The third possibility is that the Taliban did not perform any of the attacks and, having falsely claimed the second, could not subsequently backtrack so it issued a denial regarding the tactic used. Given the inconsistencies enumerated in the previous paragraph, the first possibility is unlikely and the second is questionable. The most likely scenario is the third, with the Taliban actually objecting to "turban bombs" on moral/religious grounds.

The [Afghanistan Turban Bombings](#) threat report provides information to deploying units, trainers, and scenario developers of the emerging threat of IEDs placed in religious headgear such as turbans. It contains a detailed review of all three turban bombing incidents, as well as a discussion on possible responsible parties and motives.

OEA Team

The Call of the Kornet: The Proliferation of an Advanced Anti-Tank Guided Missile in the Middle East

by Justin Lawlor

In less than ten years, the Russian-origin Kornet Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) (NATO: AT-14 Spriggan) has proliferated rapidly in the Middle East from the hands of special operations forces (SOF) in well-armed states to heretofore technically limited terrorist elements. This proliferation of a capable ATGM has implications for the US Army training community; such proliferation directly counters the armored mobility advantage of US and Western forces and also provides a credible threat to helicopter and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations.

The Russian military originally designed the Kornet to supplement previous Russian ATGMs, such as the AT-4 and AT-5, with improved capabilities due to increased range, accuracy, and greater effectiveness. Unlike earlier wire-guided ATGMs, the Kornet's laser guidance allows for a larger engagement envelope and more reliable guidance. While the manufacturer claims the Kornet possesses top attack capability and terminal homing, this is unlikely. However, the Kornet likely does have advantages of firing team's survivability and the missile's terminal effectiveness over previous Soviet-designed ATGMs.

The manpack Kornet, known as the Kornet-MR, possesses a range of roughly three kilometers, and the ability to penetrate 1,000mm of rolled hardened steel with 90% probability of a hit. The Kornet's missile can maintain a velocity of 255 meters per second (m/s) to its maximum range, producing an average time of flight of 22 seconds to its maximum distance. A tandem shaped charge gives the Kornet a capability to defeat reactive armor.



US forces first encountered the Kornet in Operation Iraqi Freedom 1 (OIF1), where at least one credible media report suggests the Kornet, in the hands of Iraqi SOF, successfully engaged M1 Abrams and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. In the 2006 war in Lebanon between Lebanese Hezbollah forces and the Israeli Defense Forces, other media reports claim that the Kornet engaged Merkava main battle tanks (MBT) successfully as part of the generally effective Lebanese Hezbollah strategy to canalize and then engage Israeli armored vehicles.

A recent report from Gaza states that the Kornet, in the hands of Palestinian militants - likely HAMAS - was used in a terror attack against an Israeli bus that caused a fatal injury to the lone passenger, a 16 year old Israeli boy. The purpose behind using a sophisticated anti-tank weapon against a soft target like a civilian bus is unclear. It is possible that the attack served as a training event against a non-threatening, non-cooperative target, and/or intended to send a message that the HAMAS-oriented militants now possessed the Kornet, and thus forcing Israel to change its force protection posture.

The Kornet's optimal role is as a primary anti-armor or anti-air ambush weapon. Due to the requirement for support, the user can fire the Kornet from a prepared position along a likely armor avenue of advance. Kornet firers can use either a flatbed truck mount with drop sides or a tripod mount to successfully operate the AT missile. A well-trained crew can emplace the Kornet on its tripod mount, acquire and engage the target, break the weapon down, and depart in about two minutes. Operators can break down the entire Kornet system to make it completely man-portable or load into civilian vehicles to move to a new firing position or hide site.

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It is likely, especially for non-state actors, to record the attack for information warfare (INFOWAR) purposes. Compared to an improvised explosive device (IED), the ATGM increases the chances to successfully attack high-value targets with less susceptibility to enemy protective countermeasures.

In an anti-air role, the Kornet would be most effective against loitering targets at low altitude, like observation helicopters and UAVs performing route reconnaissance or other missions on a predictable path. While there is no evidence yet of any successful Kornet anti-air attacks, the threat cannot be discounted.

The Kornet's limitations include the requirement for the firer to maintain visual contact on non-cooperative targets and the limited training that non-state Kornet crews will probably receive. Insurgent threat forces are not expected have access to training simulators and similar devices, and will have to depend on operational experience to gain competency. Thus, threat elements may use engagements on "soft" targets such as civilian targets as possible "training evolutions."

Compared with the US BGM-71 TOW, the Kornet possesses a roughly equivalent range. However, it is likely that the Kornet cannot fully optimize the missile's range due to the aiming optics, terrain, user familiarity, and other factors, except in the most permissive and optimum terrain, personnel, tactical, and weather conditions. The Kornet possesses about the same armor penetration capability as the later TOW-2A and TOW-2B and, due to its size, is more suitable for manpack operations than the TOW. Overall, the Kornet roughly equals the US TOW in capabilities and effectiveness, but surpasses the Iranian-derived TOW, known as the Toophan, also based on earlier TOW systems.

The Kornet represents a *Worldwide Equipment Guide* Tier 2 weapon that continues to proliferate rapidly to non-state actors. With capabilities on par with the US TOW ATGM, the Kornet can provide a legitimate threat to US armor and air assets in a number of potential engagement scenarios. As the threat actors obtain more Kornets and conduct more training on the weapon, the ability to effectively employ the weapon will also undoubtedly increase. Considering the tactical overmatch in armor capability that Western forces represent to the majority of potential threats, smaller and cheaper weapons that promise to somewhat level the tactical playing field will become increasingly popular. As the US continues to find ways to ameliorate the effects of IEDs, the threat's current economy-of-force answer to armored mobility overmatch, the increased use of the Kornet will continue.



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OPFOR Doctrine Team

The Starstreak Surface-to-Air Missile in a Ground Role

by Kris Lechowicz

The air defense and aviation communities have long known that the Starstreak high-velocity surface-to-air missile (SAM) is extremely accurate and lethal. The Starstreak is high-precision, countermeasure resistant SAM, with laser beam-rider guidance, and a range of 7 km.

Starstreak has a very high probability (95%+) of hit against less maneuverable aircraft, especially helicopters conducting terrain flying such as nap of the earth. The Starstreak is fast—very fast. Once fired it speeds towards its target at approximately 4,500 fps. The high velocity permits destruction of an aircraft/target from 7 km in a bit over 5 seconds—thus denying the target either the time to evade or to counter the missile. The system is not vulnerable to infrared or radar countermeasures, and again, the missile's high rate of speed (mach 4) reduces other intercept means. In addition to its great speed, the Starstreak's missiles are also difficult to see and/or track due to its smokeless propellant which creates a minimal visual signature.

Although designed as a high-velocity SAM, the Starstreak is also a very effective anti-armor (not antitank) weapon. The submunitions can penetrate vehicles with over four inches of armor at the same 7 km range it can destroy an aircraft. With a unique combination of three beam-riding explosive submunitions, the missile and its 3 KE penetrator tungsten alloy darts (15.5" x .87") contain approximately 16 oz of explosives with a delayed impact activated fuse.

The combinations mentioned above give weapons like the Starstreak a permanent place in the ground role and as a lethal air defense weapon. It can be successfully employed against ground targets in an antimateriel or antipersonnel role, such as lightly armored vehicles, snipers, C2 facilities, POL storage, critical equipment, and other materiel targets.



The missile costs 1/2 to 1/3 of competing MANPADS. The system also could be used as a fire support asset to complement anti anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) launchers and vehicle weapons. This combination of attributes makes the Starstreak a dynamic weapon which can be used in a number of different roles.

In addition to a MANPADS version, the Starstreak is manufactured in several variants, tracked chassis, etc. See the data sheet on page 8 for additional technical data on the Starstreak and its variants. For information on the Starstreak as an air defense weapon, see Chapter 2 of TC 7-100.2, *OPFOR Tactics* and Chapter 5, Volume II of the *Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG)*.



WEG

British Air Defense/Anti-Armor (High Velocity Missile) System Starstreak

 		Weapons & Ammunition Types	Typical Combat Load
<p align="center">Starstreak Lightweight Multiple Launcher</p>		<p>Ready missiles</p>	<p align="center">Dismount 3 Team in Vehicle 5</p>
<p>SYSTEM Alternative Designation: Manportable Shoulder-Launched (SL) Starstreak. Date of Introduction: 1997 vehicle (SP HVM), 2000 man-portable (-SL) Proliferation: At least 6 countries Target: FW, heli Description: (SL configuration) Crew: 2 with a loader (one possible)</p>	<p>Other Missiles Starstreak II: Improved missile has 8-km range and better precision. Fielded 2010.</p> <p>Lightweight Multi-role Missile/LMM: A 13 kg lower-cost 8-km missile with 1.5 Mach speed. It has a single 3-kg tandem (HEAT/HE) warhead and proximity fuze. Due in 2012, it was successfully launched by Camcopter S-100 as a UCAV. Next option due is a semi-active laser-homing or dual-mode (LBR/SAL-H) missile.</p>	<p>A demonstrator was the LML on a Panhard tactical truck.</p> <p>Starstreak II: Improved launcher uses Starstreak or Starstreak II missile. It has an auto-tracker for hands-free guidance. It was fielded in 2010.</p> <p>Starstreak Lightweight Vehicle (LWV): Land Rover truck converted into an SP SAM system with a 6-canister launcher, ADAD auto-tracker, and TV/thermal FCS. This launcher can be mounted on other vehicles.</p> <p>Armored Starstreak or (SP HVM): Vehicle is a Stormer tracked APC chassis, with an 8-missile launcher. The passive IR fire control system uses ADAD, an auto-tracker and thermal sight. The launcher can be mounted on other vehicles.</p> <p>Seastreak: Single-stage missile naval variant in a 12-missile launcher, with mm-wave radar FCS.</p> <p>Optional Use: As a low-cost air defense/anti-armor (multi-role) system, Starstreak can be employed against ground targets, such as light armored vehicles, and snipers in bunkers or buildings. The missile and its darts, with a unique combination of penetrator and following Frag-HE, have been successfully tested against vehicle targets. With a missile cost of 1/2 to 1/3 of competing MANPADS, the system could be used as a fire support asset to complement ATGM launchers and vehicle weapons. See Vol 1, pgs 5-2 and 52 regarding anti-armor use.</p> <p>Thor: British Multi-Mission Air Defense System is a RWS, with 4 missile launchers, TV, FLIR, and an auto-tracker. Weighing .5 mt, it mounts on trucks, vans, TUVs, APCs, etc., with a remote operator. Designed for Starstreak, launchers, it can also mount other MANPADS, and ATGMs, such as Ingwe, TOW, HELLFIRE, Mokopa, Spike, etc.</p>	
<p>ARMAMENT Launcher Name: Aiming Unit System Dimensions: See Missile System Weight (kg): 24.3 with missile Reaction Time (sec): <6 Time Between Launches (sec): <30 sec Reload Time (sec): <25 sec est Fire on the Move: Yes, in short halt</p>	<p>FIRE CONTROL Sights w/Magnification: Day sight: Avimo stabilized optical sight with lead bias system Field of View (°): INA Acquisition Range (m): 7000+ Night sight: Thales clip-on thermal sight Acquisition Range (km): 4-5 est</p>		
<p>Missile Name: Starstreak Range (m): 300-7,000 max (guided) Altitude (m): 0-5,000 Dimensions (mm): 1400 length 127 diameter: Max Missile Speed: 1,364 m/s, Mach 4 Propulsion: Canister launch booster, bus missile, and 3 darts (sub-missiles) Flight Time to max range (sec): 5-7 Guidance: Laser beam rider (LBR) SACLOS Warhead Type: Three 25-mm darts with tungsten KE case and an HE fill Penetration (mm KE): 120+ all LAVs (Equal to 3 x 40-mm APFSDS-T rds) The HE detonates post-penetration. Fuze Type: Contact with time delay. Probability of Hit (Ph%): 60 FW, >95 heli (each dart 67% for heli). Self-Destruct (sec): Yes. INA</p>	<p>Other Acquisition Aides: ADAD: British passive thermal IR scanners on remote tripod or vehicle mount with 240° FOV automatic cueing.</p> <p>Missile team employs an azimuth plotting board (e.g., Russian 1L15-1), for direction of approach on aerial targets (see pg 5-33).</p>		
	<p>VARIANTS Most common version is the -SL one.</p> <p>Starburst: Javelin SAM system adapted for Starstreak LBR guidance. In production</p> <p>Lightweight Multiple Launcher (LML): Pedestal launcher for three missiles (above). The launcher can also be mounted on a light vehicle, e.g., TUV.</p>		

Training and Education Team

Mexican DTO Tactics

by Marc Williams

Currently in Mexico there is an ongoing irregular war between government forces (law enforcement and military) and drug trafficking organizations (DTO). While many incidents between DTOs and government forces are chance contacts, the DTOs generally employ guerrilla-type actions such as ambushes, raids, home invasions, street kidnappings, and targeted assassinations. This article will discuss a relatively new tactic (for the DTOs), the attack.

Irregular warfare (IW) is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will [Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)]. The DTOs are waging this war to win legitimacy over the State to operate as a *de facto* government by removal of the existing structure and emplacement of its own structure enforced with terror tactics. This ideally would give them the ability to reduce friction in the flow of illegal drugs, but misses the equally large problem of violent competition within the DTOs.

Mexico's drug war, several DTOs have begun using a rudimentary type of attack to directly challenge government checkpoints, hard sites (police stations, communications stations, and armories), and as a counterreconnaissance measure. There is strong evidence that DTO operators with military experience (such as Los Zetas) conduct rudimentary weapons and tactics training, detailed reconnaissance, mission planning, and some form of rehearsal (such as a briefback) prior to mission execution.

Police and military have increasingly used traffic checkpoints to attempt to intercept DTO operators and interdict the flow of weapons, personnel, and equipment. They also conduct aggressive reconnaissance operations using ground and air assets. The DTO reaction in the last year is to conduct increasingly large dispersed attacks against checkpoints, hard sites, and recon patrols.

While some of these attacks may appear to be a simple "drive-by shooting" or even a chance contact, there are specific incidents that point to an attempt to incorporate dispersed attacks in order to confuse government forces and attrite them, but not to hold ground. In the incidents below, the operators converged on a single point from multiple directions to engage government forces or rival DTOs. They begin to show some adaptation of military tactics, or possibly training from former military personnel.

- ◆ On **18 January 2011**, at around 0050 hours, a group of armed men traveling aboard 12 vehicles murdered five men (all between the ages of 20 and 30) near the intersection of Soldadores and Obreros Streets in the La Alianza neighborhood in **Monterrey**. This intersection is a common point of sale for drugs. Recovered from the crime scene were dozens of AK-47 and AR-15 shell casings.
- ◆ On **23 March 2011**, Mexican soldiers conducting patrols encountered a 12-vehicle convoy enforced by heavily armed men in **El Caimán, Sinaloa**. This encounter provoked a confrontation that left two hitmen dead. Following this incident, the gunmen traveling in the 12 vehicles mentioned above abandoned them and took off on foot. Those items seized from the interiors of these vehicles were identified as follows:

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- ☐ 14 AK-47s
- ☐ (1).50 caliber Barrett rifle
- ☐ 2 grenade launchers
- ☐ Magazines
- ☐ Ammunition
- ☐ 5 grenades
- ☐ Bulletproof vests
- ☐ Radio communications equipment
- ☐ 12 vehicles (some of which were armored)

- ◆ On **18 May 2011** at around 0200 hours, a confrontation between Guadalupe Municipal Police and Los Zetas operators traveling in a 12-vehicle convoy was reported on Pablo Livas and Eloy Cavazos Avenues in **Guadalupe, Nuevo Leon**. This initial confrontation extended to Israel Cavazos Avenue and finally ended at the intersection of Xochimilco Avenue and the highway that leads to Reynosa. Weapons utilized during this attack were reported as bazookas, at least four grenades, and high caliber weapons (hundreds of spent shell casings were recovered from the area surrounding the incident). Items seized from an abandoned Mazda vehicle utilized by the Los Zetas during the confrontation included:

- ☐ AK-47 assault rifle
- ☐ Magazines
- ☐ Rounds of ammunition
- ☐ Tactical equipment
- ☐ Radio communication equipment
- ☐ Personal items including clothes, blankets, pillows, food, and drinks

- ◆ On **30 May 2011**, soldiers were attacked by a group of gunmen traveling in seven vehicles while conducting land reconnaissance along the San Miguel Zapotitlan-Villa de Ahome road, near the Macapule village of **Ahome, Sinaloa**. Soldiers quickly repelled the attack and in the process, killed two gunmen. Those items seized following this confrontation were reported as follows:

- ☐ 7 rifles
- ☐ 2 handguns
- ☐ (1) 40-mm grenade launcher
- ☐ (2) 40-mm grenades
- ☐ 27 black rockets
- ☐ 78 magazines
- ☐ 2,736 rounds of ammunition
- ☐ 4 vehicles
- ☐ Tactical equipment

On **02 July 2011** at approximately 0345 hours, a group of hitmen travelling in at least 50 pickups opened fire on a federal police base in **La Piedad, Michoacan**. Officers quickly responded to this attack which initiated a gunfight that lasted approximately 30 minutes. According to unofficial reports, three hitmen were killed during this attack and one was arrested. Recovered from the crime scene were at least 5,000 shell casings.

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- ◆ On **21 August 2011**, Army soldiers repelled an attack initiated by gunmen traveling aboard multiple vehicles in **Jalpa, Zacatecas**. The confrontation and subsequent pursuits lasted a few hours, during which time the following incidents transpired:
 - Eleven suspects were killed. Of these individuals, four were killed after they accidentally dropped a grenade which detonated inside of their vehicle.
 - One soldier was killed while another three were wounded.
 - Eight suspects were arrested to include four men, three women, and one female minor.

Analysis of the above incidents shows DTO use of automatic weapons, grenades, grenade launchers, heavy caliber weapons, body armor, side arms, radios, antitank weapons, and armored vehicles. These incidents tended to be short and extremely violent. While well armed, the operators do not appear to be well trained or well rehearsed. This is evidenced by their large number of casualties (including fratricide) and loss of equipment. However, if these attacks continue, the DTOs will learn from their mistakes and we can expect to see these become more sophisticated, especially in the areas of mission execution, exfiltration plans, and employment of a reserve force to bolster faltering attacks. Anticipate a better communications plan also. Better secure communications do not require high tech equipment, but can also include inexpensive gear such as telephone scramblers and GPS jammers, or the decidedly low-tech technique of “radio listening silence.” Given the growing reports of improvised explosive devices throughout the northern Mexican states, ambushes could be used to cover exfiltration, and secondary devices used to inflict more terror on personnel responding to the incident. Just as we saw irregular forces improve against us in both Iraq and Afghanistan, we can expect the same from the Mexican DTOs.



OPFOR TTP

Insurgent Raid Example

by Jon Moilanen

This example of a raid by an opposing force (OPFOR) insurgent organization requires two breaches in order to accomplish its mission. The tactical situation demonstrates a deliberate planning process. Detailed reconnaissance and surveillance allows the insurgent leader to adjust a planned raid in order to secure two detained insurgent leaders. A *raid* is an attack against a stationary target for the purpose of its capture or destruction that culminates in a withdrawal of the raiding element to safe territory. Raids can also be used to secure an item or personnel.

Background Situation

Recent mass demonstrations were approved by local tribal leaders in response to water rationing and restrictions on flour distribution in designated sections of the city by the governing authority. The regional insurgent organization and its local political spokesperson encouraged this public protest and incited several outbreaks of riot. Local Insurgents instigated acts of arson and random small arms fire (SAF) at local law enforcement members attempting to contain the damage being caused by the demonstrations. Several fire fighters and emergency medical technicians were wounded and two were shot and killed as they attempted to extinguish building fires and assist injured citizens in side streets and on the main plaza.



Figure 1-1. Rioting incited by insurgents at a mass demonstration

Regular army units and internal security forces (ISF) of the governing authority entered the area and regained control of the neighborhoods with swift mass arrests of civilians. The ISF cordon was very effective and two key insurgent leaders were apprehended as part of the cordon arrests before they could exfiltrate from the demonstrations. Fortunately for these insurgent leaders, their true identity was not uncovered by law enforcement officials during the rapid movement of demonstrators into a detainee holding facility operated by the ISF. Using a smuggled cellular telephone, insurgents were able to communicate their location in the facility to the local insurgent organization, and report on security measures they observed inside the detainee holding facility. The two insurgent leaders were aware that a raid was being planned to rescue them from the holding facility.

Before the raid, several actions set conditions for the attack and breach of the detainee facility. Attacks by sniping and improvised explosive devices (IED) on a main convoy route north of the detainee holding facility during the previous afternoon and early evening were a significant increase in recent OPFOR insurgent activity in the urban area, but the attacks were not indicative of a pending raid on the facility.

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Reaction forces responding to the IED attacks on the route were ambushed and suffered several wounded and three damaged vehicles. North of the detainee holding facility, additional IEDs were placed on major and supplemental roadways to force the commitment of explosive disposal elements and enemy coalition or governing authority security forces. As part of the enemy coalition presence, extraregional forces were embedded with governing authority regular army forces at the invitation of the governing authority. Periodic sniping by insurgents continued throughout the day, and caused continuous deployment of available response forces. An IED detonation in an underpass southeast of the detention facility during the late afternoon closed the four-way intersection to all traffic, and committed the local police to the site.

Planning and Preparing for the Raid

The detainee holding facility (see figure 1-2) is one of several potential targets that insurgents have had under surveillance for months. An insurgent target folder has current information on the normal functioning of the facility, work rotation schedules, the number of guards operating inside the detainee holding facility and in guard towers, security measures used at two gates, and when detainees are allowed into common areas within the facility.




Figure 1-2. Intelligence collection on detainee facility

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These data and other intelligence allow the insurgent organization to adapt a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack into a raid on the detainee holding facility. The task is to secure the two insurgent leaders who were recently detained. The raid complements an original attack purpose to cause a mass release of detainees, and gain popular support for local insurgent initiatives against the governing authority. It will also discredit the government and enemy coalition forces' ability to provide security to the population. The insurgent website continues to report harsh conditions, ruthless beatings, and torture of civilian detainees in the facility.

Functional Organization of Elements to Conduct a Raid

The OPFOR task organization for this raid incorporates a large number of insurgent direct action cells as improvised elements organized to perform specific mission functions. The size of the raiding force is approximately 40 to 50 insurgents. The OPFOR doctrinal concept to conduct a raid uses three main types of elements:

- ◆ Raiding elements.
- ◆ Security elements.
- ◆ Support elements.

Raiding Elements

These OPFOR raiding elements have the mission is to gain entry into the detainee holding facility, locate the two insurgent leaders, and extract them for movement to a safe house. The raiding elements are armed primarily with automatic weapons and grenades, and are mounted on motorcycles. Several motorcycles are designated with only a driver and will be the means to quickly linkup and remove the insurgent leaders from the detainee holding facility. Other motorcycles have a driver and a gunner.

Security Elements

OPFOR insurgent reconnaissance and surveillance elements locate themselves for continuous collection on enemy coalition and governing authority forces. Some positions are manned permanently by local insurgents and embedded in the normal activities of the urban neighborhoods. Insurgents man other positions on rotating and periodic bases to mask surveillance activities.

During the raid, some insurgent security elements delay any enemy coalition or governing authority response forces that deploy from the district headquarters (see figure 1-3) in the center of the city. Other security elements deploy to locations to assist in channeling any responding forces along selected ground approaches into ambush sites.

Security for the insurgents from governing authority rotary-wing aircraft relies on all arms air defense during the raid. Designated insurgent elements with an air defense task use volley fire with antitank grenade launchers (ATGL) and massed SAF to disrupt aerial insertion of relief forces and aerial observation of raid actions inside the detainee holding facility. These insurgent elements can also augment other OPFOR insurgent elements against approaching mounted or dismounted response forces.

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


Figure 1-3. Governing authority and enemy coalition response capability

Some insurgent security elements may have to accept decisive engagement in order to protect the extraction of the insurgent leaders from the detainee holding facility. The initial and primary breaches require security of near and far sides at each of two breaches.

Support Elements

OPFOR support elements enable and assist in setting the conditions prior to, during, and after the raid. Support and security roles may overlap. For example, a primary task of reconnaissance and surveillance is to locate and track activities in and near the detainee holding facility, and the normal law enforcement patrol routes in the vicinity of the detainee facility. Another task is to report the approach of response forces during the raid.

The support elements provide capabilities such as fire support and logistics support to the raiding and security elements. Support elements in this raid have assigned tasks as follows:

- ◆ Conduct information warfare (INFOWAR) activities to deceive and surprise.
- ◆ Conduct diversionary actions.
- ◆ Provision insurgent cells with necessary logistics.
- ◆ Delay response forces at designated ambush sites.
- ◆ Defeat guard tower ability to interdict the breach.
- ◆ Provide direct and indirect fire support.
- ◆ Employ all arms air defense for air defense.
- ◆ Breach the wall. (Breaching is a support task within the raid, and the OPFOR may more specifically identify the support element that performs this task as the breaching element.)
- ◆ Secure the breach site.
- ◆ Provide mobility and countermobility effects.
- ◆ Contain ISF inside the detainee holding facility.
- ◆ Delay reaction forces in any pursuit of released insurgent leader detainees.
- ◆ Conduct INFOWAR activities after the raid to spotlight insurgent success and discredit the ISF and governing authority.

Command and Control of the Raid

One insurgent leader (see figure 1-5) is in command of the raid. He will select a position ① near the government detainee holding facility where he can best control the multiple concurrent actions before, during, and after the extraction of insurgent leaders from the holding facility. Communication among insurgent elements is primarily by hand-held and cellular telephones.

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Any concerns of seniority, mission, and priority of effort among disparate insurgent cells involved in this mission are remedied during terrain table rehearsals and face-to-face coordination among insurgent leaders. The key leaders being held inside the detainee holding facility use a smuggled cellular telephone to maintain situational awareness.




Figure 1-4. Legend for subsequent figures

OPFOR Tasks in Conducting a Raid

The insurgents conduct five main subtasks in a raid. In addition to the four subtasks for an OPFOR raid as presented in TC 7-101, *Exercise Design* (2010), this particular raid also involves a subtask of breach.

Infiltrate. Elements of the local insurgent organization conduct undetected movement into the objective area (see figure 1-5). Assets and weapons will be secured at safe houses or caches ② for easy access just prior to the raid. Insurgent elements rehearse their routes to selected positions and report their readiness. Some insurgent elements have already occupied observation posts (OPs) ③, security points ④, and concealed assembly areas ⑤. Insurgent support elements occupy positions ⑥ just prior to the raid. The INFOWAR element occupies a vantage point to videotape and audio record the attack on the main gate. For several weeks, some of these elements have been observing conditions continually at the detainee holding facility and monitoring probable response routes of reaction forces.

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


Figure 1-5. Infiltrate into the objective area

Isolate. Security and support elements deploy, on order, to ensure additional enemy forces do not join the engagement unexpectedly. Actions may include providing early warning, preventing the enemy from gaining accurate information and intelligence, preventing or disrupting enemy maneuver, and/or a combination of these actions. Obstacles and ambushes block or delay enemy coalition and governing authority response forces.

Security elements take actions during the raid to ensure enemy coalition and governing authority forces cannot link up with ISF guards inside of the detainee holding facility. They accomplish this action through camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures; countermobility tasks; direct or indirect fire engagements; and a variety of other tactical means.

Breach. In order to conduct this raid, the local insurgent organization breaches the main and service gate. First, a suicide VBIED breaches the main gate. Soon after the first breach, SAF and ATGL fires open the service gate breach. This enables one raiding element to enter on motorcycles through the main gate and another through the service gate. (OPFOR organizations carry sufficient equipment, whether field expedient or preplanned, in order to penetrate basic enemy obstacle systems and urban construction and debris. OPFOR obstacle reduction techniques can be found in Chapter 12 of TC 7-100.2.)

Secure. The raiding element secures and extracts the two insurgent leaders as the primary task in this raid, and brings the two insurgent leaders to a safe house. A supporting subtask is the release of other detainees in the detainee holding facility. This mass release of detainees into the immediate community and neighborhoods assists in the extraction of the insurgent leaders.

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Exfiltrate. Once the local insurgent leader in command of the raid knows that the raid is successful, insurgent elements are directed to move from their positions and disperse into the local population. The raid makes this exfiltration problematic. However, insurgents plan to use the confusion of the major detainee release into the surrounding neighborhoods to draw attention away from the rescue of the insurgent leaders and their exfiltration to a safe house. A detailed after-action review of the raid will record tactics, techniques, and procedures to be sustained and/or improved in future actions.

The Raid on a Detainee Facility

The Initial Breach. At a designated time prior to daybreak, a large dump truck loaded with explosives emerges from a side street about 200 meters from the main gate. This suicide VBIED accelerates rapidly ① toward the access control point. (See figure 1-6.) Movable barriers and barbed wire in the access approach do not stop the truck as it speeds toward the gate. The facility guards at the gate cannot stop the truck with their SAF. The gate guards are consumed as the suicide VBIED smashes through a final barrier and detonates at the wall just to the right of the main gate.

The explosion is the signal for a medium mortar element ② to start indirect fires on the guard barracks. Even with a confirmed direction of fire and range, some mortar rounds impact northeast of the detainee holding facility in neighborhood housing outside of the facility. The suicide VBIED destroys the gate and opens a large breach in the wall of the facility. The shock of the explosion rumbles through the neighborhood area and a large plume of smoke rises from the facility.

Insurgent support elements use a support by fire position ③ and attack by fire position ④ to ensure enemy guard elements defending the detainee holding facility are neutralized or destroyed. Support elements also assist movement through the breaches of the main gate and service gate with near side and far side security.

The suicide VBIED detonation is the signal for several other immediate actions by insurgent elements. A guard inside the detainee facility, actually an insurgent member, shoots and kills two guards and wounds two other guards in the control area ⑤ of the main detention building. He provides keys to known insurgents being detained in order to allow a mass release of prisoners into the main yard of the detainee holding facility.

An insurgent security element receives a report from an OP of two armored wheeled vehicles of the extraregional force approaching from the northeast. The security element ambushes the first vehicle ⑥ as it turns a street corner into a kill zone. The vehicle is disabled by SAF and ATGL fires. One crewman emerges and crawls into a side street. No one else exits from the burning vehicle. A security element ambushes a patrol vehicle ⑦ of the governing authority's regular military forces as it approaches from the northwest. The vehicle is damaged and immobilized but the crew members cannot be observed by the security element or the nearby insurgent OP.

Detainees exit the detainee building and the mass of released individuals ⑧ moves toward the main gate. The ongoing firefight at the service gate on the northern wall prevents the released detainees from moving toward this exit point.

Secure the Objective Area. A raiding element on six motorcycles ① enters the detainee holding facility through the main gate as one of two raiding elements. (See figure 1-7.) Mortar fires stop ② based on a report from an observer in the support by fire element near the main gate. Some of the insurgents on motorcycles dismount and use small arms and hand grenades to keep detainee facility guards from exiting their barracks. A support by fire element secures the near side ③ of the breach at the main gate. A designated security element enters with the motorcycle raiding elements to secure the far side ④ of the breach.

As the mass of released detainees continues to exit the main detention building, several insurgents dismount their motorcycles and direct all detainees toward the main gate. This creates a surge toward the main gate breach and mass dispersal of released detainees east into the surrounding community.

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



Figure 1-6. Isolate the objective area

Northeast of the detainee facility, an OP reports to an insurgent security element that no one has exited the burning vehicle but that the second armored wheeled vehicle is maneuvering to the south along side streets. The insurgent security element shifts to an alternate firing position ⑤ and prepares to engage the vehicle if the vehicle appears at a major intersection. The security element attacks by fire and destroys the vehicle and crew at the intersection kill zone.

The Primary Breach. Shortly after the main gate explosion, a support by fire element secures the service gate ⑥ on the north wall (see figure 1-7). Positioned in or on top of buildings near the service gate of the detainee facility, the guard towers at the northwest and southwest corners of the detainee holding facility continue to receive small arms and ATGL fire. The two guards at the service gate are killed. Any resistance from the north tower ceases quickly, and SAF suppresses the west tower except for sporadic yet ineffective small arms fire from the tower. This same support by fire element secures the near side of the service gate breach.

The support by fire element assists a raiding element on eight motorcycles ⑦ to enter the detainee facility through the service gate. The facility administrative offices are not in full operation at this time of the morning and are cleared easily by insurgents ⑧ after a brief firefight. Two of these motorcycles secure the far side of the breach and assist other insurgent elements to contain the guard force inside their barracks building.

Four motorcycles go directly to the northwest corner ⑩ of the main detention building facility to secure the two insurgent leaders at the designated linkup point. Detainees continue to run out of the main gate and into the surrounding community.



Exfiltrate. The raiding element with the rescued leaders exits the facility on motorcycles ① from the northern service gate (see figure 1-8). The insurgent leaders are passengers on two motorcycles which race to the west and southwest ① along a series of side streets toward a safe house. Two motorcycles accompany the insurgent leaders as mobile security elements. Other insurgent motorcycles exfiltrate along multiple routes ② to the northwest and north. An insurgent OP repositions ③ to report on alternate avenues of approach to the facility. A security element ④ repositions to delay any pursuit by enemy coalition and governing authority reaction forces, and other security elements start to exfiltrate. Another insurgent security element ⑤ moves to an alternate position based on OP reports, and prepares for an engagement.

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As enemy coalition and governing authority reaction forces respond to the attack from the local district headquarters located to the east, hasty IEDs placed in roadways combined with ambushes, delay or block routes used by reaction forces. An IED ⑥ is command detonated by an insurgent security element. One roadblock includes a large commercial truck positioned across a street along the most likely response route. Some obstacles include antitank mines and anti-personnel mines ⑦ laid openly on probable street approaches. An insurgent security element ⑧ attacks by fire when a lead enemy coalition response vehicle stops in front of the mines in the street. Obstacles continue to channel response forces to supplemental routes and slow timely response by the reaction forces.

The insurgent leader of the raid confirms that the two rescued insurgent leaders are safely removed to a safe house. Concise reports arrive from OPs that remain in the community for surveillance. The insurgent leader closes the informal communication net, and the headquarters and other support elements ⑨ exfiltrate from the area. An after-action review assesses the success of the mission and what tactics and techniques must be sustained or improved in future actions.




Figure 1-8. Exfiltrate and engage enemy reaction forces

The Effects of the Raid on a Detainee Facility

In planning this raid, the insurgent leader identified the necessary resources, recognized the time constraints required for a swift and violent tactical action, and recognized that the success of penetrating the detainee holding facility and securing the breach was crucial to releasing the two insurgent leaders from the holding facility.

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Surprise and deception were essential aspects of the tactical action. The initial breach, primary breach, and use of the civilian mass exit from the detainee holding facility were integral to the task of securing the two insurgent leaders.

The insurgent website spotlighted this successful raid with videotape and audio narrative to demonstrate the inept performance of the governing authority ISF in failing to adequately secure their detainee holding facility. Regular military forces of the governing authority were demeaned as lackeys of a corrupt regime, and enemy coalition forces were criticized as unwanted invaders to the region. Appeals to join the insurgent movement cited religious obligation and familial-tribal grievances, and encouraged citizens to actively support the local insurgent organization. Other INFOWAR initiatives highlighted the freeing of approximately 150 local citizens that had been incarcerated, in some cases, for more than one year without judicial process.

Even though information and intelligence on the detainee holding facility had been coerced from some local vendors, the insurgents realized the value of co-opting citizen support without force with the stated intention of releasing relatives and friends from detention. Insurgents experienced an increase in active and passive support in several sectors of the city by citizens, and noted that local clerics were less critical of insurgent activities in their public statements.

The insurgent organization demonstrated the ability to effectively conduct a raid with multiple, nearly simultaneous direct actions in an urban environment with minimal losses to their force. The specific actions of the breaches and extraction of two insurgent leaders had been conducted effectively in 20 to 25 minutes as the product of deliberate planning, detailed previous reconnaissance and surveillance, rehearsals by the designated insurgent elements, and unity of local insurgent organization command. Support elements outside of the detainee facility continued to engage response forces for an additional 30 to 45 minutes that concluded with isolated sniping and several IEDs and mines emplaced in open view to slow response forces.

Besides the suicide driver-bomber in the VBIED at the main gate, insurgent losses were four killed, five wounded, and two unaccounted for who were presumed to be captured. The two insurgent leaders were safeguarded locally for several days before exfiltrating across the international border to a safe haven.

Note. For more OPFOR doctrinal information and tactical illustrations on a raid, see Chapter 3 of TC 7-100.2, *Opposing Force Tactics*.



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
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