Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) have changed the face of modern warfare. As UAS have matured in capability, they have taken on a wide range of warfighting tasks. UAS have allowed armed forces to broadly increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, freeing troops and manned assets to handle other activities. UAS have also improved the range and precision of over-the-horizon targeting capability. As UAS technology continues to proliferate, these capabilities will likely reach less capable state and non-state actors. With increased availability, affordability, and capability, threat actors will reduce the United States' traditional technological advantage.
This article covers the current and emerging UAS doctrine of China’s People's Liberation Army (PLA), as outlined in ATP 7-100.3, analysis by the Foreign Military Studies Office, and unclassified information from the Worldwide Equipment Guide. Throughout this article, both the terms "UAS" and "unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)" are used. Unless otherwise stated, "UAS" refers to the entirety of an unmanned system—ground station, operators, and communications networks. "UAV" refers to the specific vehicle, a component of that system.
China is a world leader in UAS development and production, which is reflected in the widespread use of Chinese UAS throughout all echelons of the PLA. The PLA Army (PLAA) employs advanced medium-altitude unmanned aircraft (UA) as surveillance platforms at the theater and group army echelons, and they have likely weaponized some of these systems. PLAA brigades and battalions operate lightweight UA, and units as small as squads or patrols use man-portable UAS. The PLAA also employs weaponized anti-radiation and electronic warfare UA. The PLA Navy uses UAS for long-range surveillance and weaponized variants for antisubmarine operations. The PLA Air Force operates a variety of long-range UAS that support national and theater-level operations and weaponized systems that conduct precision strike missions.
Chinese doctrinal concepts for using UAS on the battlefield are closely tied to the progression from mechanized warfare to "informationized” warfare. Informationized warfare is China’s concept for taking advantage of technological change and emphasizes the role of information in gaining military advantages.[1] The UAS role in informationized warfare is referred to as UAS “Fleet Operations.” UAS Fleet Operations centralize management of multiple UAS under a unified command. In an informationized battlefield, UA use onboard computers and common communication networks so that a group of UAS can cooperate. A UAS group can multiply combat power through efficient coordination, enhanced flexibility, and scalability. However, information technology capabilities among the PLA’s UAS are not yet fully mature, capable UAS are not fielded across the PLA, and many of its UAS are vulnerable to electronic warfare.
Reconnaissance is perhaps the most important tasks for UAS in Chinese tactics. According to Chapter six of ATP 700-1.3, deep reconnaissance is broadly defined as reconnaissance operations in areas beyond by a given unit’s organic weapons systems. For the PLAA combined arms brigade, this means the areas past the ranges of its tube and rocket artillery, from approximately 35 kilometers (km) to 100 km and extending through the remainder of the theater of operations. This area typically contains enemy command posts, supply areas, air and seaports, reinforcement routes and staging areas, and long-range fires.
PLA deep reconnaissance operations consist of a mix of long-range, high-endurance UAS; a variety of manned and unmanned ground sensors; long-range SOF and similar light infantry units; and space-based systems. A significant portion of deep reconnaissance assets are organic to the theater command's reconnaissance and intelligence brigade, while others are national-level assets. Deep reconnaissance operations support national and strategic missions as well as tactical operations. Deep reconnaissance capabilities in support of the tactical operations provide targeting for long-range fires, supply commanders with imagery and signals intelligence, and may deliver kinetic effects on enemy formations. Much of the collection performed in support of tactical echelons is performed by manned and unmanned aircraft, with dismounted ground forces in support. UAS may augment observer teams—the most basic element of reconnaissance—and these teams may even operate small UAS without additional support.
The PLAA has also adopted UAS to support its artillery—particularly its long-range rocket artillery. Fire direction, targeting, and forward observation with UAS have been major areas of investment for the PLAA. Combined arms brigade artillery battalions have fire-finding radars, battlefield surveillance radars, long-range electro-optical and infrared sensors, sound-ranging equipment, and well-equipped mounted and dismounted forward observers to integrate with their UAS.. We assess the PLAA’s integration of sensors and shooters is agile, redundant, and reliable based on the significant emphasis it places on training for the battlefield surveillance and targeting missions.
Chinese investment in UAS development has resulted in several highly capable UAS that provide a broad spectrum of capability to the PLA. The below examples in the Worldwide Equipment Guide are but a few of the Chinese UAS available.
Image: Chengdu Pterodactyl (OE World Wide Equipment Guide)
The Chengdu Pterodactyl, also known as Wing Loong, is a medium-altitude long-endurance UAV, developed by the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group in China. It is designed for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. The air vehicle can also be equipped with air-to-surface weapons for strike operations and perform civil missions such as disaster assessment, meteorological and environmental protection. The system has been compared, at least in appearance, to the U.S. MQ-1 Predator. Based on official marketing material, the Pterodactyl can carry the BA-7 air-to-ground missile, YZ-212 laser-guided bomb, YZ-102A anti-personnel bomb, and 50-kg LS-6 miniature guided bomb.
The ASN-105 is a medium tactical UAV in service with the PLA. It is designed to perform real- time battlefield surveillance and intelligence collection. Guided by GPS navigation, the ASN-105B is launched by rocket boost and lands with a parachute. An ASN-105 system is made up of six UAVs, a main ground-control station, a mobile ground-control station, an image-processing shelter, a TV/infrared image interpreting shelter, and a launcher. The ASN-105B may have a redesigned fuselage and changes to the engine. Models displayed in 2004 had a more square-shaped fuselage, increased wing chord and modified engine exhaust. It has a maximum takeoff weight of 160 kg (350 lb) and a ceiling of 6,000 m (19,700 ft).
Image: ASN-105 (OE World Wide Equipment Guide)
The Caihong-4, or CH-4, is a long-endurance UAV believed to be in service with the PLA since 2014. It features a 40-hour battery life. The CH-4 is a mixed attack and reconnaissance system with six weapons and a payload of up to 345 kg. It can fire air-to-ground missiles from an altitude of 5,000 meters (16,400 feet); therefore, the aircraft can stay outside of the effective range of most anti-aircraft guns. Externally it is similar to the Pterosaur air vehicle with a V-shaped tail, long wingspan, and tail propeller but with a redesigned nose.
Image: CH-4 (OE World Wide Equipment Guide)
China’s development and proliferation of increasingly advanced UAS will pose a risk to the U.S. Army including from loitering munitions and new doctrinal concepts to employ these systems. This risk will evolve as China moves from informationized warfare to intelligentized warfare, developing new doctrinal concepts to employ these systems, such as employing loitering munitions and swarming small autonomous systems that are networked and cooperating to achieve a military objective. Chinese military theorists believe that autonomous swarming systems “…will likely become the “blade of victory” in the hands of commanders at all levels on the future battlefield.”[2] In that vein, the U.S. Army must learn to counter current UAS threats while keeping an eye toward the future.
[1] https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/225-the-pla-close-combat-in-the-information-age-and-the-blade-of-victory/
[2] Mad Scientist Blog 225, April 2020, TRADOC G2, Translated from Jiefangjun Bao, 2020, 225. The PLA: Close Combat in the Information Age and the “Blade of Victory” | Mad Scientist Laboratory (army.mil)