5 Implementing Chinese Tactics in Training Events, part 1 Defense

Implementing Chinese Tactics in Training Events, part 1 Defense by James (Jay) Hunt

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics, provides key insights for the U.S. Army training, professional education, and leader development community on how Chinese ground forces approach tactical operations. This article series provides a comparison of concepts and conditions presented in the ATP with the opposing force (OPFOR) as described in the Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series and the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE). It is intended to suggest practical areas of emphasis for training developers’ incorporation of ATP conditions and S2 development of threat models.

Each article discusses purposes and philosophies that might shape a training event road-to-war and main tactics, battlefield organization, and control measures, implementing force groupings and highlighting  ground conditions or battle drills. This article focuses on implementing ATP 7-100.3 conditions for a defense.

For this series and compliance with AR 350-1 and TRADOC Regulation 350-70, examples will use the fictional country of Olvana, the DATE Pacific large regional hegemon that presents many of the conditions of China as described in the ATP.

An expanded view of defensive operations.

ATP 7-100.3 describes the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) view of defensive operations as its most sacred mission in defending Chinese territory from outside aggression (para 1-10). During offensive action, the defense plays a key role to preserve forces, control key terrain, maintain the initiative, and attrition of enemy combat power (para 8-1). This approach is not significantly different from the composite doctrinal OPFOR or almost any modern military.

Table 1 Comparison of Defensive Purposes

What might be considered new is the ongoing evolution that the PLA that recognizes the potential impact of a multi-domain environment and a connected and informationized battlefield. Chinese perceptions of traditional advantages, such as terrain and developed positional defenses, are evolving to account for attacks across a range of capabilities at depth with the likelihood of communications disruption. Largely based on concerns that communications will be attacked and command and control will be affected, there is an increased acceptance of initiative-taking and emphasis on mission understanding at lower echelons of command. While this may be aspirational in the near term, the modeling of leadership similar to Western forces will continue to shape PLA robustness in the face of multi-domain attacks.

Developer Tip: Portrayal of Olvanan defenses should present targetable nodes throughout their depth requiring a range of offensive capabilities, including long-range fires, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and electronic warfare (EW) attacks.

Main Tactic Selection

Assuming that a defense of some kind is warranted, determining the type and composition will vary greatly based on the commander’s training requirements.

For scenarios in which the Olvanans are conducting a defense of a large area, they will likely field large groupings of forces for their Operational Combat Group. These will mainly consist of light forces. These forces will usually conduct some form of positional area defense leveraging fortifications and predetermined kill zones (“annihilation zones” in the ATP) to destroy the attackers with coordinated direct and indirect files. As the force structure both real and fictionalized develops, these groupings will task organize more heavy forces and specialized groupings to mitigate penetration risk of their defensive line.

Where Olvana has projected or built up forces away from their mainland, the force structure may have a significantly heavier profile. The ATP suggests that such a combat grouping would still rely on light infantry supported by task-organized heavy and anti-tank elements to form a main defensive line, but the decisive element would be a large armor-heavy counterattack force similar to how the U.S. Army might execute a mobile defense. The ATP describes these forces as the Frontier Defense Group and the Depth Defense Group respectively (4-48, 4-49). The ATP suggests that the conduct of this form of defense reflects a measure of adoption of selected Western tactics and techniques by the PLA.

ADRP 3-90, para 4-15                                                        TC 7-100.2, para 4-62 through 65

Table 2 Comparison of Mobile Defense and OPFOR Maneuver Defense

Developer Tip: Either form of defense may be used to meet commanders’ training requirements. The road-to-war narrative should allow for situational ambiguity to ensure commanders and analysts are challenged when developing situational understanding of enemy courses of action (ECOA).

Organizing the Battlefield

Describing operational zones and other control measures is a common method of organizing a unit area of responsibility and operations. The ATP suggests that PLA battlefield organization is evolving from being highly prescriptive about the physical sizes of these zones to a more flexible approach with two or more zones described for defensive operations (8-15). This is similar to the OPFOR construct of arranging zones and control graphics based on functional roles with each zone describing specific roles and likely activities to meet mission parameters. Terms are different, but the roles and activities are mostly very similar.

Table 3 Comparison of Battlefield Zones, ATP 7-100.3 vs TC 7-100.2

The ATP suggests that, where the OPFOR generally places significant combat power in the disruption zone, the Chinese model presents a Western-style screening and covering force forward. The combat power is shifted to the main defense (“Frontier Defense Group“) and the counterattack (“Depth Defensive Group”). The Chinese model supports these forward security forces with long-range fires and possibly short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) or rockets.

Figure 1 Sample Functional Layout for OPFOR Area Defense

Figure 2 Sample Functional Layout for Olvanan Mobile Defense

Force Groupings and Roles

The ATP describes a Chinese force structure that is evolving to meet its expanded understanding and tactics. The highly structured and rigid deployment patterns of previous generations are starting to give way to more flexible and dynamically task-organized groupings. This “building the plane in flight” makes threat modeling difficult, forcing developers and analysts to focus on roles and tactical functions rather than stock hierarchies. As noted in the ATP, Chinese naming of these groupings is similarly flexible and appears to be unstandardized and still somewhat in development.

Table 4 Comparison of Force Groupings, ATP7-100.3 versus TC 7-100.2

The Cover Group, deployed to screen or cover generally 3–5 kilometers forward of the defensive line focuses on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Compared to the OPFOR security and disruption zone elements, it has much less emphasis on disruption activities and counterreconnaissance action against robust elements.

The ATP suggests that compared to what would be the focus of the OPFOR disruption zone, there is much less emphasis on using irregular elements to enable the regular forces. While there is discussion of the “People’s struggle,” this sort of assistance would likely be present only in a defense of the mainland, and even then minimally effective. The area forward of the main defense (“Frontal Blocking Zone”) still plays an important role in supporting the defense. The emphasis is more shaping and guiding versus disruption or disaggregating. The coordinated use of obstacles, limited objective attacks, deception, electronic warfare, and indirect fires direct the attacking forces into kill zones (“annihilation zones”) where they might be actioned, or towards the more fortified segments of the main defense.

The main defense (“Frontier Defense Group”) is generally similar to the OPFOR defenses. As stated previously, forces with heavy assets will shift the action element role to the counterattack and resource it with additional forces accordingly.

Where the OPFOR leverages indirect fires at maximum range and air power to execute deep strikes, the ATP suggests a significantly different approach. SRBM and rockets might be used instead of close air support (CAS) to strike at deep targets and disrupt attacking forces.

The force structures of the fictional DATE countries, particularly Olvana, are similarly adapting. As of this writing, the Olvana Army force structure is being updated to facilitate a more agile grouping and organizing. The existing Olvana force structure may still be used to represent the conditions described in the ATP. The example below illustrates how elements from the current Olvanan force structure (two brigades with additional elements) might be task organized into a combat group with combined arms brigades (CA-BDEs) to be more representative of conditions described in the ATP.

Figure 3 Sample Task Organization of Olvana Force Structure

Unique Conditions and Techniques

There are several conditions that ATP 7-100.3 presents that might be incorporated into training events that demonstrate the application of Chinese tactical preferences. These should not be construed as prescriptive but may provide unique add-ins to training event requirements.

Breakout (8-79). The ATP suggests that the evolution of the Chinese military mindset is trending towards increased lethality of coordinated, complementary fires. The belief that most mechanized opponents will seek to encircle and isolate units or groups from their formation makes this a significant concern for commanders. This may be in part a reaction to Western forces’ heavy use of isolation and containment to disaggregate forces. This action is similar to elements of several OPFOR Tactical Tasks and is under consideration for addition to the list. OPFOR personnel should consider training this as a battle drill. Commanders should expect breakout as a programmed reaction to an attempted isolation action.

Anti-landing and Air Defense (9-47). The defensive depth portrayed in the ATP makes defending the Depth and Rear Defense Zones a challenge. China fears the use of vertical envelopment to conduct air insertions of troops into rear areas, and it relies heavily on security forces to counter this threat. While dispersed, security forces are expected to detect and neutralize smaller aerial insertions and infiltrations of SOF elements. Their desired technique is to conduct anti-air ambushes when helicopters are most vulnerable—descending and immediately after landing. This requires security forces to detect and track enemy air elements as they move into the security zone, then rapidly mass combat power in and around the landing zone. Anti-air ambushes may be aggressively forward deployed and integrated with observation posts and radar along the most likely air avenues of approach. The ATP also suggests that the Chinese are acutely aware of the propaganda value of thwarting an air insertion and downing aircraft. OPFOR planners might incorporate intentional gaps in the rear areas to bait air insertions for optimized anti-landing actions.

Increased initiative. The previously discussed desire to develop lower-echelon leaders’ situational awareness and initiative is an ongoing process. The Chinese assumption that communication interference will detract from their coordination and synchronization may be manifested in training events. Units should ensure that this fear is realized with extensive use of multi-domain attack vectors against command and control capabilities. It would also be accurate for OPFOR, in the face of such interference, to have a company or platoon exercise initiative by doing something unexpected. Analysts should be challenged with identifying incongruous behavior that might suggest opportunities or threats.

Conclusion

The shift in emphasis to China is a challenge to all Soldiers. Training developers, OPFOR personnel, and unit commanders all must maintain awareness of the evolving understanding of the pacing threat and ensure that training events reflect its unique characteristics. They are not the Russians, Krasnovians, Missourians, or Cortinians. The composite OPFOR as described in the TC 7-100 series and the DATE actors are valuable and flexible tools to implement the mindset and unique characteristics of Chinese tactics.