The deviation from their doctrine has been significant. -Jack Watling Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare1
The deviation from their doctrine has been significant.
-Jack Watling
Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare1
In the days and weeks leading up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the vast majority of military analysts, retired generals, and news pundits predicted a quick victory by the Russian military. Many of these assessments were based, for the most part, on studies of Russian equipment and doctrine. But, as Phillips Payson O’Brien stated, “Having good equipment and good doctrine reveals little about how an army will perform in a war. To predict that, you must analyze not only its equipment and doctrine but also its ability to undertake complex operations, its unglamorous but crucial logistical needs and structure, and the commitment of its soldiers to fight and die in the specific war being waged. Most important, you have to think about how it will perform when a competent enemy fires back.”2 Plans are only solid until action is taken, then they likely change based on the circumstance. Solid plans based on doctrine should account for needed modifications, but in the case of Russia’s invasion into Ukraine, it appears that both the plans and following actions deviated from their doctrine.
The current Russian campaign in Ukraine has revealed an army whose soldiers are deficient in training and equipment, and junior and senior officers woefully unprepared to fight a large-scale combat operation (LSCO). This article will explain the recent evolution of Russian military doctrine and examine how far the Russian army deviated from its stated doctrine during its assault on Kyiv in the early months of 2022.
Russian Doctrine
Prior to its invasion of Ukraine, the Russian military appeared formidable. Indeed, Russian New Look reforms in 2009 launched a massive rearmament program, including the establishment of “permanently ready forces” that reorganized forces and revamped the personnel staffing practices of field units manned by professional voluntary enlistment soldiers. These new brigades and divisions were to provide a ground force capable of independent actions against both conventional and irregular aggressors. The desired end-state was a combined arms force capable of conducting short, high-intensity campaigns during the initial period of war. However, the Russian military’s campaign in Ukraine thus far has revealed an army either unable or unwilling to follow the major tenants of its established doctrine. As senior research fellow Jack Watling pointed out—
Russian doctrine – the theory of how the army should fight – is clear, precise, well evidenced and conceptually elegant. Russian doctrine is often far ahead of western military theory. This creates a methodological challenge for intelligence assessments of Russian operation, because if they are executed as described in higher military orders, then the conclusion is often that they would succeed. The practice, however, rarely matches the theory.3
With the advent of its New Generation Warfare in 2009, Russia ushered in a host of new concepts resulting in an updated military doctrine by 2014 and further revised in 2021. After the military’s sub-par performance in Chechnya and Georgia, Russian leadership realized that much, if not all, of the ground forces were understaffed, poorly trained, ill equipped, and inadequately led. With these factors as motivation, the Russian political and military leadership used the analysis of Western military forces to identify strengths and weaknesses of those forces and warfighting methods to develop new organizations and formations. The results of that analysis precipitated the reorganization of Russia’s military.
Russia labeled the resulting ground forces reorganization concept as “New Look.” The primary objective of this concept was exploiting the perceived weaknesses of Western forces and minimizing exposure of ground forces to direct combat with the West unless battlefield overmatch is achieved. The Russian military appeared to make great strides in combat readiness, electronic warfare, automated command and control complexes, force structure changes, and logistics. It also seemed that Russian battlefield management had shifted to be more driven by commanders and that tactical leaders had increased authority and a corresponding expectation to use initiative to quickly respond to sudden battlefield changes.4
Russian divisions with subordinate regiments as well as brigades reporting directly to an army higher headquarters (combined arms army or tank army) were to be task organized for combined arms missions. Combined arms units were to integrate available forces and means allocated by the senior commander. Both brigades and regiments were to form task-organized tactical groups. Often, these would include battalion tactical groups to perform assigned missions. In order to execute both offensive and defensive tactics, Russian forces were to apply analytic intelligence methods and scientifically substantiated decision making. These factors would allow the Russian army to better understand battlefield conditions that could impact the operation, determine the tactical functions required, and calculate the appropriate allocation of combat power needed to accomplish the mission.
In the realm of offensive doctrine, the Russian army presented the concept of nonlinear, no-contact war, where it would be necessary to use all forces and effects to set the conditions for successful direct offensive engagement. It was clearly understood by the Russian military that the active ground forces were not designed for continuous LSCO, and if Russian ground forces were to engage in LSCO, it would require the employment of conscripts and mobilization of reserves.5
The Assault on Kyiv
In the early morning hours of 24 February 2022, Russia began its invasion of Ukraine. The campaign was designated a “special military operation” by Russian President Vladimir Putin, so consequently there would be no mobilization and no massive employment of conscripts. Even before the operation began, Russian doctrinally-based decision making was replaced by what appeared to be “poor assumptions.”6 For the assault on the capital of Kyiv, this was particularly true. As one newspaper report surmised, the attack on Kyiv failed to take into account “the mettle of the Ukrainian military, the durability of the Zelensky government and the determination of the Ukrainian people to resist.”7
A key component of Russian ground forces doctrine, the calculation of correlation of forces and means (COFM), was not used. The Russian army would normally use the COFM as an indicator of the relative combat power between its forces and those of the enemy to determine the probable superiority of one force over the other. Russian doctrine states that commanders and staffs calculate COFM at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels throughout the entire area of operations, including in sectors beyond the main sector. A report by the European Council on Foreign Relations clarified some of the assumptions mentioned above: “Putin’s wishful thinking about the power of the Russian military is reflected in his apparent expectation that it could conquer Ukraine with only 150,000 military personnel.”8 Ukraine’s 250,000 soldiers outnumbered the Russians and certainly did not meet the typical criteria of three-to-one offensive to defensive forces needed for the campaign to be successful. The report further stated, “Putin seems to have decided to launch the invasion based on the expectation that Ukrainian citizens would surrender without a fight and their political leaders would run away.”9
Russian forces were able to get to the outskirts of Kyiv within 48 hours, but heavy Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) resistance and lack of air superiority stunted the assault, allowing UAF to mount counterattacks and hinder Russia’s ability to move supplies and ammunition forward to reconstitute their first echelon forces.10 Heavy combat losses coupled with the inability to resupply led to Russian forces retreating and, in many instances, abandoning equipment and supplies. Doctrinal failures, such as inability to mass fires in order to break through UAF defenses and lack of air superiority, portrayed key vulnerabilities within the Russian military that raise the question of why a superior combined arms army with decades of time to perfect its tactics failed against a smaller regional force. Critics say it can be attributed to “purposeful misreporting to siphon ministry dollars, feigned negligence, outright theft and other endemically corrupt practices,” 11 which would explain why the transformation from a top-down force to a combined arms-centric force with a strong noncommissioned officer corps has not fully materialized within Russia’s military. This was further evidenced when, after Russian Armed Forces sustained heavy losses to its officer corps, battalion size units’ ability to call for fire deteriorated and they relied on higher echelons to support fire missions, which caused sluggish response times that degraded their ability to effectively counter UAF’s indirect fire capabilities.
Implications
Putin’s plan to force a swift regime change in Ukraine has been met with an uncompromising fortitude of the Ukrainian populace that has led to a prolonged military engagement with no concrete conclusion in sight. Ukraine’s will to fight, coupled with Russia’s miscalculations in the early days of this conflict, created a prolonged war of attrition. It also garnered interest and inquiries from everyone watching because of how unexpectedly the conflict has progressed. Some early observations and lessons will prove useful to the United States in both what we expect from Russia going forward and how we can improve our future force. For instance, Russia’s inability to reconstitute and resupply its forces outside of Russian controlled territories has proven to be a critical vulnerability that was quickly exploited in the battle for Kyiv. And, although these missteps reveal a deviation from their doctrine, it is important to not assume that Russia will make the same mistakes against a NATO or U.S. force; indeed it is highly likely that Russia would plan differently for such a conflict, and the Russian military is quickly learning and adapting from its experience in Ukraine.12 In the future, Russia is likely to try to draw near-peer adversaries closer to their borders to ensure main lines of communication exist to execute their tactics doctrinally, preventing some of the problems they have encountered in Ukraine. The United States will benefit from noting what Russia is doing now and considering how they will adapt and improve in the future.
1 Watling, Jack. Email to author. 22 September 2022.2 O’Brien, Phillips Payson. “How the West Got Russia’s Military So, So Wrong.” The Atlantic, 31 March 2022, How the West Got Russia’s Military So, So Wrong - The Atlantic (accessed 8 October 2022).3 Watling, Jack. “Russia’s underperforming military capability may be key to its downfall.” The Guardian, 18 September 2022, Russia’s underperforming military capability may be key to its downfall | Ukraine | The Guardian (accessed 9 October 2022).4 Crowther, Alexander. “Russia’s Military: Failure on an Awesome Scale.” CEPA, 15 April 2022, Russia’s Military: Failure on an Awesome Scale - CEPA (accessed 9 October 2022).5 Kofman, Michael and Lee, Rob. “Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design.” War on the Rocks, 2 June 2022, Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design - War on the Rocks (accessed 9 October 2022).6 Sonne, Paul; Khurshudyan, Isabelle; Morgunov, Shrhiy; and Khudov, Kostiantyn. “Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian valor, Russian blunders combined to save the capital.” The Washington Post, 24 August 2022, Battle for Kyiv: How Ukrainian forces defended and saved their capital - Washington Post (accessed 10 October 2022).7 Sonne, Paul; Khurshudyan, Isabelle; Morgunov, Shrhiy; and Khudov, Kostiantyn. “Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian valor, Russian blunders combined to save the capital.” The Washington Post, 24 August 2022, Battle for Kyiv: How Ukrainian forces defended and saved their capital - Washington Post (accessed 10 October 2022).8 Davydenko, Denys; Khvostova, Margaryta and Lymar, Olga. “Lessons for the West: Russia’s Military Failures in Ukraine.” European Council on Foreign Relations, 11 August 2022, Lessons for the West: Russia’s military failures in Ukraine – European Council on Foreign Relations (ecfr.eu) (accessed 10 October 2022).9 Davydenko, Denys; Khvostova, Margaryta and Lymar, Olga. “Lessons for the West: Russia’s Military Failures in Ukraine.” European Council on Foreign Relations, 11 August 2022, Lessons for the West: Russia’s military failures in Ukraine – European Council on Foreign Relations (ecfr.eu) (accessed 10 October 2022).10 Davydenko, Denys; Khvostova, Margaryta and Lymar, Olga. “Lessons for the West: Russia’s Military Failures in Ukraine.” European Council on Foreign Relations, 11 August 2022, Lessons for the West: Russia’s military failures in Ukraine – European Council on Foreign Relations (ecfr.eu) (accessed 10 October 2022).11 Shinkman, Paul. “How Russian Corruption Is Foiling Putin’s Army in Ukraine.” USNews, 31 August 2022, https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2022-08-31/how-russian-corruption-is-foiling-putins-army-in-ukraine (accessed 29 October 2022)12 Shinkman, Paul. “How Russian Corruption Is Foiling Putin’s Army in Ukraine.” USNews, 31 August 2022, https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2022-08-31/how-russian-corruption-is-foiling-putins-army-in-ukraine (accessed 29 October 2022)