This Running Estimate…

• Multiple surveys indicate that Russian domestic support for the “special military operation,” in October and November, ranges from a high of 76% to a low of 25%; however, polling suggests that a majority of Russians support negotiations to end the war.
• The Kremlin has long prepared its political narrative within the media space, resulting in strong domestic support and moderate political support from Russia’s traditional partners in under-developed countries.
• Putin leverages his close partnership with the Russian Orthodox Church's Moscow Patriarchate as an influential conduit for his information fight.
• Reasonably broad Russian influence in the “Global South” did not bring a strong, equivalent level of opposition to the UN resolution condemning Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian Oblasts.
• China pushes Russian narratives about Ukraine both independently and in coordination with Moscow, as part of its global influence campaign.
  Turkish media is heavily influenced by the cooperation between Erdoğan and Putin.
• The Iranian regime supports Russia in its “special military operation,” but the Iranian people are conflicted on the matter.
• Russia has generated state-by-state support across Africa with longstanding, widespread information campaigns, but that support has not led to consistent, pro-Russia voting behaviors at the UN. However, there also is no unanimity across the continent against Russia.