This Running Estimate…

• Multiple surveys indicate that Russian domestic support for the “special military operation,” in October and November, ranges from a high of 76% to a low of 25%; however, polling suggests that a majority of Russians support negotiations to end the war.
• The Kremlin has long prepared its political narrative within the media space, resulting in strong domestic support and moderate political support from Russia’s traditional partners in under-developed countries.
• Putin leverages his close partnership with the Russian Orthodox Church's Moscow Patriarchate as an influential conduit for his information fight.
• Reasonably broad Russian influence in the “Global South” did not bring a strong, equivalent level of opposition to the UN resolution condemning Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian Oblasts.
• China pushes Russian narratives about Ukraine both independently and in coordination with Moscow, as part of its global influence campaign.
• Turkish media is heavily influenced by the cooperation between Erdoğan and Putin.
• The Iranian regime supports Russia in its “special military operation,” but the Iranian people are conflicted on the matter.
• Russia has generated state-by-state support across Africa with longstanding, widespread information campaigns, but that support has not led to consistent, pro-Russia voting behaviors at the UN. However, there also is no unanimity across the continent against Russia.