Primarily I disagree with the definition of "operational" as a 'range'.
It seems to me its a 'reach'.
There is a vast difference here.
A 'reach' defines the *activity* a force undertakes to traverse a distance between its strategic staging node and the tactical zone entry.
There is a vast overcomplexity introduced here by throwing every possible futuretech and the kitchen sink as supposed influences on this force movement.
What the force leader wants to know is how to get from pont A to point B by *avoiding* all these influencers to preserve a) Operational Security, and b) element of surprise to secure initiative and generate offencive momentum in the attainment of operational and mission objectives.
This is not going to change in future.
So, why the need to describe how we will live, create, think, and prosper? How is this relevant to the plan's operational reach phase?
The other question is, what is stopping the USA taking advantage of new technologies, new doctrine and revised strategic concepts to effectively challenge enemy military forces across multiple domains?
And, I think doctrine should be #1 on that list, not technology.
For post-2035 period there is a statment that I cannot comprehend, "breakthroughs in technology and convergences in terms of capabilities, which lead to significant changes in the character of warfare. During this period, traditional aspects of warfare undergo dramatic, almost revolutionary changes which at the end of this timeframe may even challenge the very nature of warfare itself."
There is no 'traditional' aspects to warfare! Warfare is always changing. The only traditional aspects left in the British Army are some names and aspects of uniforms of the original unit.
The nature of warfare is to defeat the enemy, preferabbly decisively. That is not going to change.
There is no 'character' of warfare, but there is character of "operational reach" - it can be attainable, or not. It can be permissable or denied. It may be traversed expeditiously, or at a crawl. It may be planned or ad hoc.
These are all factors that influnce planner's decision making. If futuretech impacts on these factors, they need to be explored and countered as capabilities.
What is wrong with this paper?
The writers are addicted to Advanced Technology.
It is not disputed that technology will develop and influence warfare, but that is not what warfare is about.
Warfare is about DOCTRINE - Military doctrine is the fundamental set of principles that guides military forces as they pursue national security objectives.
One principle is the selection and maintenance of aim in projecting force.
Another is not to be predictable.
Another is to see, but not be seen, i.e. don't let them see you coming!
The attainment of initiative, momentum and surprise would still be force multipliers all technological factors being equal if the insight about US enemies is to be accepted as true.
Technology serves doctrine. It is an error to design technology first, then seek to derive new principles of warfare to guide forces, principles never tested by the vast history of military expereince.
This is because technology is a VARIABLE, but doctrinal principles ase a CONSTANT.
'Chasing' variables is somewhat like trying to fix the bycicle chain while pedalling, assuming one gear.
The breakthroughs in doctrine that challenges the very nature of warfare itself are available now without the very significant investment in Advanced Technology suggested by this article.
It does require rethinking warfare from the US perspective as a maritime power which hasn't been done since 1945.
Its called - disruptive manoeuvre in the littoral, because USA is a maritime power, and this is in the Constitution
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