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Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, activity in Eastern Ukraine, saber rattling regarding the Baltics, deployment to Syria, and more assertive behavior along its borders have piqued interest in the Russian Armed Forces. This increased interest has caused much speculation about their structure, capabilities, and future development. Interestingly, this speculation has created many different, and often contradictory, narratives about these issues. At any given time, assessments of the Russian Armed Forces vary between the idea of an incompetent and corrupt conscript army manning decrepit Soviet equipment and relying solely on brute force, to the idea of an elite military filled with Special Operations Forces who were the “polite people” or “little green men” seen on the streets in Crimea. This book will attempt to split the difference between these radically different ideas by shedding some light on what exactly the Russian Ground Forces consist of, how they are structured, how they fight, and how they are modernizing.
For DoD CAC card holders, this book is available in a briefing format (PowerPoint) on Intelink:
Authoritarian regimes are, by their very nature, insecure. They tend to view Western democracies as an existential threat to their way of rule and they fear the development of any type of opposition or protests in the streets. In Russia’s case, the latter fear of protests leading to a “color revolution” often appears as important as the ISIS threat to its southern border. Lacking political legitimacy, they rely on two factors to sustain their leadership, patriotism and control. This study discusses the latter issue from both a civilian and military point of view. Russian President Vladimir Putin, a former KGB operative, is all about control. In his excellent book The Invention of Russia, Arkady Ostrovsky recounted one conversation about Putin: “Anything you control is safe. Anything you don’t control by definition represents a threat—that is their mental framework, and a KGB officer is always a KGB officer.”
This work is divided into two parts. Part One looks at the system of control that Putin has either continued or developed anew in his twelve years as president. Part Two is focused on several military aspects of control. These include not only command and control issues but also the methodical manner in which Russian military analysts establish control parameters over their environment.
Control over the granting of impunity is this book’s definition of winning. The geography of impunity is sanctuary. To control impunity and sanctuary, the book highlights attention to anonymity; inventorying as an indispensable knowledge activity; withdrawal and pursuit as key operational and strategic concepts; deception as a compulsory element of strategic thinking; geography as the academic discipline of choice; property analysis as tool for exposing the distribution of power; distance as a key variable in the measurement of relative power; civil engineering and construction as noble activities; personal dignity and honor as key quantities of a durable victory; adaptation of classic strategy as operational artistry; and formal property regimes as a basis of peaceful social compacts.
This book is divided into three parts. Part one addresses President Vladimir Putin’s personality, Russian methods of developing strategy, and the Russian thought process for evaluating military affairs (forecasting, correlation of forces, forms, and methods of thought). Part two addresses the nature of future war, focusing on future war’s new weapons and organizations (to include aerospace, robotics, electronic warfare equipment, and unmanned aerial vehicles, among other pieces of equipment) and the DARPA-like organizations that have been created to increase Russia’s focus on science and technology developments. Part three address geopolitics, in particular the Russian militarization of the Arctic and the rationale behind their operations in Ukraine. All three parts help analysts in their attempts to uncover the vector (s) in which Russian military capabilities and actions are heading. The nation’s theorists have absorbed lessons learned from the contemporary conflicts of others and placed increased focus on the development of new technologies to protect their national interests and attain specific strategic goals.
Books on guerrilla war are seldom written from the tactical perspective and from the guerrilla’s perspective. Fangs of the Lone Wolf: is an exception. These are the stories of low-level guerrilla combat as told by the survivors. They cover fighting from the cities of Grozny and Argun to the villages of Bamut and Serzhen-yurt, and finally the hills, river valleys and mountains that make up so much of Chechnya. Dodge Billingsley, the primary author was embedded with Chechen guerrilla forces after the first war, so he knows the country, the culture, the key actors and the conflict. Yet, as a Western outsider, he is able to maintain perspective and objectivity. He traveled extensively to interview Chechen former combatants who are now in hiding or on the run from Russian retribution and justice. Commissioned by the USMC, the military professional will appreciate the book’s crisp narration, organization by type of combat, accurate color maps and insightful analysis and commentary. The book is organized into vignettes that provide insight on the nature of both Chechen and Russian tactics utilized during the two wars. The vignettes show the chronic problem of guerrilla logistics, the necessity of fighting positions, the value of the correct use of terrain and the price paid in individual discipline and unit cohesion when guerrillas are not bound by a military code and law. Guerrilla warfare is probably as old as man, but has been overshadowed by maneuver war by modern armies and recent developments in the technology of war. Fangs of the Lone Wolf provides a unique insight into what is becoming modern and future war.
China’s cyber policy has become partly visible to foreign nations through observation, tracking, and inference. The policy appears to have three vectors. The first vector is in the public opinion or “soft power” arena, where China professes to be led by a policy of active defense and cooperation with other nations over cyber issues. The second and most prominent vector is China’s exhibited capability to conduct strong and stealthy intelligence and reconnaissance activities against nation’s worldwide, using the guise of anonymity to hide these efforts. The third vector is the offensive character of China’s cyber strategy. It contains the theoretical backing for preemptive cyber operations against other nations in times of crisis. These three aspects—peace activist, espionage activist, and attack planner—dominate China’s cyber policy. Some are always hidden from view while others are demonstrated daily. Three Faces of the Cyber Dragon is divided into sections that coincide with these vectors.
There is long history of writings on mountain combat that include such luminaries as Clausewitz and Engels. Yet the allied force in Afghanistan frequently displayed a reluctance to go and remain in the mountains. Les Grau has been writing on mountain combat before the US invasion of Afghanistan. During a trip to Afghanistan, Les and Chuck Bartles decided to do a book on foreign perspectives of mountain combat. Their goal was to share this information with units deploying to Afghanistan and mountain training centers. This book is a collection of foreign articles and foreign source-based articles on mountain operations, tactics, movement, maneuver, training, artillery and aviation support, reconnaissance, communications and logistics. This book is not US Army doctrine, rather it offers alternative views to help forces adapt to a challenging environment and carry out their mission.
Recasting the Red Star describes Russia’s modernization effort in a comprehensive fashion. The Defense Ministry’s military reform effort and the operational environment implied in Russia’s national security strategy (2009) and military doctrine (2010) are described. The Soviet culture of military thought is examined to include a short history of Tsarist and Soviet military traditions. These chapters serve as a reference point for the traditions behind Russia’s modernization effort. Next the author examines technological developments, such as Russia’s concept of high-technology deception, information war, reconnaissance- and information-strike systems (a C4ISR equivalent), and resulting future war construct. Finally, the book closely examines the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008. These chapters question why Russia and Georgia went to war, how information warfare figured into the conflict, and, most important of all, “who set the bear trap.”
This is a reproduction of a 1932 book published by General Skeen, who began fighting the Pushtun in 1897. His military career took him to fighting Boxers in China, the “Mad Mullah” in Somaliland and Germans on the Western Front of World War I. He always returned to British India where fighting the fractious Pushtun continued to be a problem. He was a brigade commander during the Third-Anglo-Afghan War, commanded the Kohat-Kurran field force and fought in the Waziristan campaign. He commanded the Northwest Frontier District and in 1924-1928, served as the Chief of Staff of the Indian Army. He knew the Pushtun and frontier fighting better than almost any other British officer. He wrote this book as a guide for company-grade officers fighting the Pushtun. Les Grau had read General Skeen’s book during the Soviet-Afghan War and, after the United States invaded Afghanistan, decided that this would be a welcome addition to the field libraries of allied commanders who were fighting the Taliban-who are ethnic Pashtun. Les and Bob Baer added copious footnotes to General Skeen’s work to explain the “Britishisms” and terms and concepts. They also wrote an introduction to explain the history, context, geography and application of Skeen’s classic work.
Chinese observations of warfare in the information age have resulted in a widespread transformation and metamorphosis of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from a mechanized to an informatized force. This transformation has affected nearly every aspect of China’s military from strategy to logistics to educational development.The Dragon’s Quantum Leap intends to peel back the transformation process and uncover the impact of new modes of thought on several key segments of military development (culture, stratagems, crisis management, deception, and reconnaissance among other elements) that digital-age thought is affecting. It expands the scope but not the basic theoretical theme of the author’s two previous works on Chinese information warfare concepts. They were Dragon Bytes, which covered Chinese IW activities from 1999-2003; and Decoding the Virtual Dragon, which covered Chinese IW activities from 2003-2006. The Dragon’s Quantum Leap updates these concepts and activities to mid-2009 and completes the author’s trilogy on the topic. As with the author’s previous works, this book primarily uses original Chinese source material.
This book argues that the quality of foreign real property systems be made a priority issue in US diplomatic, military and intelligence thinking and strategy. The text does not argue that creating better land records will assure peaceful coexistence. Formal real property record systems correlate with peaceful societies, but the principle assertion here is in the negative. Even with formal records, functioning property courts, and a free and fluid market in land a place may still suffer violent dissention. However, a polity that does not formalize ownership rights and duties, especially rights and duties related to land, will not enjoy peace. Comprehensive, precise, transparent expression of real property is a necessary precondition of peace; places outside the lines of formal property necessarily slump toward possession by force. From this assertion others follow that bear on the way global security is pursued.
This book expands upon Dragon Bytes, the author’s earlier work on Chinese information warfare (IW) activities from 1999-2003. Decoding the Virtual Dragon explains how Chinese IW concepts since 2003 fit into the strategic outlook, practices, and activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The book offers IW explanations directly from the pens of Chinese experts. There are few intermediate filters. In some cases direct translations of key Chinese terms are offered. The Chinese authors discuss the application or relation of IW to strategic thought, the transformation plans of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the revolution in military affairs (RMA), and the revolution in knowledge warfare and cognition. The book thus serves as a source for the fundamentals of Chinese military thought and demonstrates how IW/IO has been integrated into the art of war and strategy.
In August 2005, ten top Chinese scholars traveled to the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to share their ideas with American participants during a symposium that was hosted by the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office. These scholars brought with them their in-depth research and analysis on a host of topics that impact Central Asia, including energy security, border disputes, and the “three evils” (terrorism, separatism, and extremism), which have been a key objective in combatting by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). They also addressed the role other countries, such as China, Russia, India, and Pakistan, have played in the region. The book is a compilation of the papers that made up the presentation from the visiting scholars. It includes a chapter written by Brigadier General (retired) Feroz Khan from the Pakistan Army, a keynote speaker during the symposium. It is broken down into three parts. The first part offers a framework of understanding of China’s Central Asia policy and relations. Part two covers specific issues and concerns. Part three covers the way ahead. The authors’ unique foreign perspectives on the issues that have drawn concern over Central Asia, give readers a more insightful and diverse view on the region.
This book explores the impact of the Cyber Age on military thinking and operations worldwide. Four issues are examined: the contrast between the concept of “cyber operations” used by civilians, including criminals and terrorists, and the concept of “information operations” used by armed forces; the differences in information operations (IO) theory among the US, Russian, and Chinese militaries; the manner in which militaries use information operations in peace and in war; and the impact of cyber and information processes on the mind, the military machine, and their interface.
This work examines China’s information-war (IW) theory and practice from 1995-2003. The effort rests upon the author’s sustained and diligent research in Chinese open sources. Some specialists among the international audience may be surprised by the themes addressed in these sources and the presentation of key issues. The Chinese openly discuss not only computer network attacks and electronic preemption but also the development of IW units and an “integrated network-electronic warfare” theory (which closely approximates the US theory of “network-centric warfare”).
In 1996, The USMC commissioned Ali Jalali and Les Grau to travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan to interview Mujahideen commanders about their combat experience in fighting in the Soviet-Afghan War. Ali was a former Afghan Colonel who attended the Soviet Frunze Academy, fought as a Mujahideen against the Soviets and was a radio journalist for the Pushtu and Dari Voice of America broadcasts. Ali is famous throughout the Afghan community and had amazing entre with all factions. Ali and Les conducted in-depth interviews of Mujahideen commanders in order to gain their tactical insights. This is not a history of the Soviet-Afghan War, although enough history is included to place the events by time and external factors. It is a series of combat vignettes related by Mujahideen participants that shows the good and the bad, the mistakes and successes of guerrillas fighting conventional forces. It is not about right and wrong, rather it is about surviving against the overwhelming firepower and technology of a superpower. It is the story of combat from the guerrilla’s perspective-the story of brave people who fought without hope of winning because it was the right thing to do. The book has been translated into Dari and distributed within the Afghan Armed Forces.
This book was written by Soviet officers who had served in Afghanistan and returned for the extensive Command and Staff course at the Frunze Combined Arms Academy in Moscow. While they were at the Academy, the History of the Military Art Department had the Afghanistan veterans write vignettes of their experience. They analyzed these, edited the best and added commentary as lessons learned for future war in mountain-desert terrain. The department published them as an in-house a book in 1991. The book was intended for internal use only, and, as such, shows both the good and the bad. Mistakes and successes both illustrate the hard lessons learned in fighting guerrillas on rough terrain. It is not a history of the Soviet-Afghan War, rather it is a series of snapshots of combat as witnessed by young platoon leaders, company commanders, battalion commanders, staff officers and advisers to the Afghan government force. It is not a book about right and wrong, rather it is a book about survival and adaptation as young men come to terms with a harsh, boring and brutal existence punctuated by times of heady excitement and terror. This book was part of a US/Russian military exchange following the collapse of the Soviet Union.