TTR Russia v 1.1 October 2015

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

• The Russians have employed Hybrid Warfare and Indirect Action to counter NATO and Western influence for over seventy years.
  • Hybrid Warfare is the use of political, social, criminal, and other non-kinetic means employed to overcome military limitations.
  • Indirect Action can be defined as the need for Russia to defend its interests and sphere of influence in its former states and satellites.
• Although Western observers characterize the actions of Russian Armed Forces as hybrid warfare, the Russian Army practices its long-established tactics with new attention to advanced developments in many areas such as precision weapons, command and control (C2) and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and electronic warfare (EW), and including direct and indirect application of these. The nature of these tactics is derived from Russia's focused assessment of specific neighborhood threats and its long-time focus on security superiority in its Near Abroad.
• Russia continues to maintain military bases in its former states to exert influence and control.
• The Russians used conventional tactics in Georgia in 2008 and used indirect and asymmetric approaches in Crimea in 2014 and eastern Ukraine in 2014-2015.
• The Euromaidan protests and overthrow of the Yanukovych government triggered the Russian incursion into Crimea and the seizure of the naval base at Sebastopol.
• Russian intelligence operatives and SPF were instrumental in the success of the Crimea operation and are now assisting pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine.
• Russia may use these tactics in other areas such as Moldova, Transniestra, and the Baltic states.