By Vincent P. Matteo
Introduction
One of the most famous failures in training and preparation of a world-class military force was when the Imperial Japanese Navy conducted a campaign-level wargame in May 1942 to validate the plan to destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The plan’s primary failure in the wargame was that it required U.S. forces to react exactly as the Japanese military predicted. This premise created a false sense of security for the Japanese military, which relied on its poor knowledge of the United States. When the United States did not react to the Japanese attack as expected, Japan showed an inability to react to a changing environment throughout the rest of the Pacific War. To prevent a similar training failure against future unknown enemies, the U.S. Army uses complex realistic scenarios based on the DATE World.
The DATE World provides the U.S. Army training community with a detailed description of the conditions across four regions of the globe: Africa, Caucasus, Europe, and Pacific. It presents trainers with a tool to assist in the construction of scenarios for specific training events, but does not provide the scenario. The DATE World offers discussions of OE conditions through the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) variables. The DATE World is relevant for all U.S. Army units (Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve) that participate in Army or joint training exercises.[16]
DATE World provides a common training OE, accessible to U.S. Army, Joint, and International partners, created from open-source information and the U.S. Army Training Circular (TC) 7-100 series of documents regarding opposing forces (OPFOR).[17] DATE is produced and maintained under the oversight and approval of TRADOC G-2.
As the Army’s training OE charged with creating realistic and complex challenges, DATE World provides the U.S. Army with the ability to train for any contingency from mission rehearsal exercises to maneuver-based warfighter exercises.[18] The OE in DATE World provides a background for conducting simulated large-scale combat operations to practice essential tasks based on approved mission-essential task lists. This article will demonstrate the versatility of DATE World, the functionality of the OE Data Integration Network (ODIN), and the training value of the DATE World OE using DATE Pacific as an example.
The Operational Environment and Data Integration Network
ODIN is the authoritative digital resource for the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG), training publications, DATE World and force structure information, and the Virtual OPFOR Academy (VOA).[19] The main components of ODIN consist of these sections—
DATE Pacific Operational Environment and Scenario Primers
In DATE Pacific, the five notional countries of Belesia, Gabal, Olvana, North Torbia, and South Torbia coexist in a state of steady competition. They are located in the vicinity of the East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Philippine Sea.[20] The stability of the region is tenuous and may be upset through politically or economically charged events, or the accumulation of drivers of instability that may precipitate a conflict within the region. The nations within DATE Pacific are also interconnected with the states in other DATE World regions and can exert influence and trigger events in those regions. Conflict within the DATE Pacific region may lead to the intervention of external nations which may be honoring treaty agreements; commitments based on membership in international or intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations or Association of Southeast Asian Nations; or acting in their own national interest. Scenario construction begins with the development of a road to war (RTW)—a series of critical events leading to a volatile environment—that shapes the scope and focus of a training event. The RTW and scenarios for any DATE OE will vary depending on the focused echelon of training and the training objectives of the DATE user.
Figure 1: The DATE Pacific Region
Using the DATE Pacific Environment
With the inclusion of nonstandard scenario components and vignettes integrated into an exercise, the DATE Pacific OE is uniquely positioned to facilitate training multi-domain operations with echeloned formations that conduct intelligence, maneuver, and strike activities across all five domains (air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace) as well as the information environment and the electromagnetic spectrum.[21] The DATE Pacific topography is well suited for enabling distributed ground operations, as well as naval, amphibious, and littoral operations. Additionally, the DATE force structure tool provides the flexibility to tailor threat formations and capabilities to satisfy training unit requirements.
In the DATE Pacific OE, any of the five countries can be used as a friendly, enemy, or neutral actor. The most likely antagonists in the region are North Torbia and Olvana, based on their national strategic goals, political policies, and regional aspirations. These two countries have been developed with the military capabilities, economic conditions, and willingness to conduct information warfare (INFOWAR) that most closely align with potential adversaries in the real-world Pacific region.
North Torbia’s self-imposed isolationism and its military first policies, paired with economic sanctions levied by the international community, leads to it having a particularly sensitive and reactive geopolitical posture. Olvana is the region’s most influential actor, with hegemonic aspirations, a steadily growing economy, and modern military capability all combining to position it as a major regional and global power.
Next, this article will explore specific hooks in the DATE Pacific content that scenario developers can use to build a scenario with Olvana as the enemy. Scenario designers use a simple RTW formula: Desire + Capability + Instability = Conflict/RTW. The following brief descriptions outline how a complex challenge can be designed.[22] Note that this is just one example of many possibilities.
DESIRE: Olvana’s Approach to Competition
Political. Olvana intends to exert control over what it perceives as its sphere of influence, and impose its will in other areas of the world to further its economic and political goals. While its national borders have been set for over half a century, Olvana contends that its dominion extends into territory claimed by other regional actors. It supports North Torbia as a proxy to offset other actors within the region, and uses economic and military intimidation to influence other regional actors. Olvana’s political relationship with Belesia and Gabal is complex and, at times, tense, in part because of territorial disputes and Olvana’s competitive advantage in regional markets.
Military. Driven by national interest, Olvana maintains the largest military in the DATE Pacific region. The Olvana People’s Army (OPA) is composed of a land force, a naval force (Olvana People’s Navy, or OPN), and an air force (Olvana People’s Air Force, or OPAF). Olvana maintains and strengthens its hegemony by actively deploying advisors to various countries and by regional sales of military weapons to its allies.
Figure 2: The OPA 75 INFOWAR Brigade within its Chain of Command
Information and Information Warfare. Olvana’s INFOWAR capability is highly developed and leads the world in a number of critical areas. Olvana utilizes the full range of INFOWAR operations to present a credible peer-level threat to the United States and its regional partners. Olvana’s INFOWAR is directed toward information detection sources, information channels, and information-processing and decision-making systems. Olvana aims to gain information superiority against adversaries and disrupt their information control capabilities, while maintaining and protecting its own information systems and capabilities. To achieve these aims, Olvana actively looks to establish information dominance during competition, enabling it to shape the information environment should a crisis or conflict emerge.
CAPABILITY: Information Warfare and Space
In its drive for regional hegemony, Olvana is in a state of constant competition with both regional and global actors, exploiting regional conditions to the extent possible while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict. Olvana achieves this through the integration of diplomatic and economic actions, unconventional warfare, INFOWAR (social media, false narratives, and cyber attacks), the actual or threatened employment of conventional forces, and covert support to likeminded geopolitical proxy entities.[23]
Olvana’s INFOWAR capability is highly developed. To achieve information dominance, Olvana adheres to the following fundamental principles when conducting INFOWAR:[24]
Olvana’s Information Warfare Capabilities
Electronic Warfare. Olvana has the most advanced and robust electronic warfare (EW) capability across all echelons and services in the Western Pacific. Olvana’s ability to synchronize EW effects maximizes convergence across the air, land, maritime, and cyberspace domains.[25]
Computer Attack. Olvana’s cyberspace warfare capability is among the world’s best. It integrates offensive and defensive cyberspace operations to support larger objectives. Olvana’s offensive cyberspace capabilities include distributed denial of services and hacking, and its defensive capabilities consist of surveillance and counter-intrusion. Olvana can conduct computer attacks against domestic or international targets. Successful operations are based on deniability and outcome. Additionally, it is possible that Olvana is also training personnel from North Torbia in cyberspace warfare operations.[26]
Information Attack. Olvana’s information attack capability ranks among the best in the world. Olvana is expert at integrating information attack with other INFOWAR elements.[27]
Deception. Olvana’s deception operations are world class. At the strategic level, its deception operations consist of false actions conducted by diplomatic officials, fake military targets, and propaganda. At the tactical and operational levels, Olvana can employ high-fidelity decoys that, when deployed, deceive or confuse adversary collection assets.[28]
Physical Destruction. Olvana recognizes the importance of physically destroying enemy INFOWAR capabilities. Olvanan doctrine stresses the eventual destruction of enemy INFOWAR assets after their neutralization. Among these assets is a growing antisatellite capability. This effort includes a robust sensor-to-shooter kill chain using a variety of ground-based radar and visual sensors to cue ground-launched missiles. It is likely that antisatellite efforts would attempt to neutralize adversary space-based surveillance and communications efforts early in any potential conflict.[29]
Protection and Security Measures. Olvana’s protection and security measures continue to evolve. Sustained investment in training for all personnel that use information systems is intended to ensure that personnel adhere to published directives.[30]
Perception Management. Olvana’s perception management is a robust and integral part of its INFOWAR program. The objective is to portray the government as a powerful and peace-loving member of the international community. Olvana uses different initiatives in the diplomatic, economic, and information realms to project itself as a non-threatening regional power. While publicly portraying a positive image to the international community, other Olvanan elements covertly expand Olvanan influence abroad, especially within emerging and smaller nations.[31]
Olvana’s Use of Space
Regional Satellite Telecommunications. Olvana possesses a wide range of satellite capabilities. Most are suited for dual use by the OPA, OPN, OPAF, and civilian users. Olvana operates seven commercial telecommunications satellites and four military communications satellites utilizing Ku- and C-band transponders in a geostationary orbit. If necessary, the commercial satellites may be used to support military operations.[32]
Regional Navigation Satellites. Olvana operates 16 navigation satellite systems using E-band transponders. The combined systems create a network of navigation services and provide coverage of the Asia-Pacific region. The services are free to civilians and licensed to the Olvanan government and military.[33]
Regional Drivers of INSTABILITY
Drivers of instability enhance the OE without providing prescriptive elements. The drivers exist to show areas of tension and historical use of capabilities that could be introduced into the training event without disrupting the accomplishment of mission-essential tasks. The drivers could be used as a capability to plan against or to mitigate undesired effects thereof.[34] There are several primary regional drivers of instability associated with Olvana.
International Order. Olvana’s actions indicate its strategic intent is to change the status quo in the South China Sea. Olvana’s position seems to be one of entitlement, citing its territorial claims and economic status as a reason to have a much greater say in how the international order should operate in the South China Sea.
Olvana’s Line of Maritime Sovereignty. Olvana’s claims of maritime territory extend approximately 500 km from its shores into the South China Sea. These unilateral claims are disputed by other regional actors, but appear to be the basis for Olvana to claim large swaths of territory for security and economic reasons. Olvana’s claims are based on historical legacy and are generally not accepted by others within the regional and global communities. Olvana exercises its authority in disputed maritime territories by taking actions to ensure its own freedom of navigation throughout the South China Sea. However, Olvana does not extend such freedom to its regional competitors, creating the potential for military escalation as regional actors’ warships operate in close proximity to each other.
Artificial Islands and Territorial Status. Olvana has sought to bolster its maritime claims by converting small outcroppings of sand and rock in the South China Sea’s international waters into habitable installations, thus extending its land-based territorial claims. This includes building military infrastructure on previously uninhabited islands, including runways and air defense systems. These military outposts, often built in disputed territories, are ostensibly changing the facts on the ground regarding territorial claims.
Creating a Road to War
Using training objectives and command-directed tasks, an RTW is developed to highlight the logical progression to conflict, providing depth to scenarios. It also identifies OPFOR attributes and capabilities for scenario designers to build a peer or near-peer OPFOR. The following is an example of a potential RTW that a scenario developer could construct to highlight OPFOR INFOWAR capabilities for a training unit to defeat. This example RTW is for a fictitious exercise scheduled for the fall of 2021:
Next Steps
At the theater level, DATE Pacific has provided a comprehensive OE, easily accessed on the ODIN platform. It is the responsibility of scenario designers to use the foundational conditions described on ODIN to design a scenario and add detail or make adjustments to the OE where needed to achieve training objectives. Using the force structures provided on ODIN, they develop an order of battle for OPFOR and a plan for the OPFOR to execute. The designers also develop blue theater or land component commander-level products to provide to a higher headquarters.
The DATE OE provides the foundational/encyclopedic information needed to inform planning and the context for the required assumptions to complete the military decision-making and order production process. Exercise planners and scenario writers may also use DATE to develop area-specific, cross-domain challenges for a training unit to negotiate. Carrying forward the concept of Olvanan INFOWAR, an information operations expert may develop a DATE World-informed training vignette to counter Olvanan perception management operations and integrate friendly military information support to operations. A public affairs expert could challenge the training unit’s public affairs section to counter Olvanan perception management and develop command messaging.
The potential scenarios that can be developed using the authoritative content on ODIN are endless. TRADOC G2 analysts are available to assist if needed.
References
Costello, John and Joe McReynolds. China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era, edited by Phillip C. Saunders. Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies China Strategic Perspectives, No. 13. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2018.
Defense Intelligence Agency. China Military Power Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win. Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019. www.dia.mil/Military-Power-Publications.
Department of the Army. The Army Universal Task List, ADRP 1-03. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2015.
Department of the Army. Irregular Opposing Forces, TC 7-100.3. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014.
Department of the Army. Opposing Force Tactics, TC 7-100.2. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2011.
Department of the Army. TRADOC Standard Scenarios for Capabilities Development, TR 71-4 (Rescinded). Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014.
Department of the Army. The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Intelligence 2020 – 2040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-1. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2017.
Department of the Army. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2018.
Department of the Army. Exercise Design, TC 7-101. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2010.
Marra, Michael A. “Troubled Waters – 10 Flashpoints in the South China Sea: Friction Points that May Lead to War.” Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2018.
Saunders, Phillip C., Arthur S. Ding, Andrew Scobell, Andrew N.D. Yang, and Joel Wuthnow, eds. Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, Assessing Chinese Military Reforms. Washington, DC: National Defense National Defense University Press, 2019.
Thomas, Timothy L. “Nation-State Cyber Strategies: Examples from China and Russia.” In Cyberpower and National Security, edited by Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K. Wentz. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2009. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1216674/cyberpower-and-national-security/.
[16] US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Date World,” ODIN, accessed May 14, 2020 https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATEWORLD.
[17] Department of the Army, TRADOC Standard Scenarios for Capabilities Development, TR 71-4 (Rescinded) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014).
[18] Department of the Army, Operations, ADP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2019), 3-1.
[19] US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “WEG,” ODIN, accessed May 14, 2020 https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/.
[20] US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Pacific,” ODIN, accessed May 14, 2020 https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Pacific/.
[21] Department of the Army, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2018), x.
[22] US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Olvana,” ODIN, accessed May 14, 2020 https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Pacific/Olvana.
[23] Department of the Army, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2018), iii-vi.
[24] Timothy L. Thomas, “Nation-State Cyber Strategies: Examples from China and Russia,” in Cyberpower and National Security, ed. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K. Wentz (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2009), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1216674/cyberpower-and-national-security/.
[25] US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Olvana,” ODIN, accessed May 14, 2020 https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Pacific/Olvana.
[26] US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Olvana,” ODIN, accessed May 14, 2020 https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Pacific/Olvana.
[27] US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Olvana,” ODIN, accessed May 14, 2020 https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Pacific/Olvana.
[28] US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Olvana,” ODIN, accessed May 14, 2020 https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Pacific/Olvana.
[29] US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Olvana,” ODIN, accessed May 14, 2020 https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Pacific/Olvana.
[30] US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Olvana,” ODIN, accessed May 14, 2020 https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Pacific/Olvana.
[31] US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Olvana,” ODIN, accessed May 14, 2020 https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Pacific/Olvana.
[32] US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Olvana,” ODIN, accessed May 14, 2020 https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Pacific/Olvana.
[33] US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Olvana,” ODIN, accessed May 14, 2020 https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Pacific/Olvana.
[34] Michael A. Marra, Troubled Waters – 10 Flashpoints in the South China Sea: Friction Points that May Lead to War (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2018), 1-29.
For more information, or support from TRADOC G-2, please contact Angela M. Williams, angela.m.williams298.civ@mail.mil Produced by the US Army TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment and Threat Analysis Directorate