All - this is the paper written by Blue Horizons and their network that is driving senior leader discussion at HAF - DJL
Developing Strategic Advantage through C2 of the Global Sensor to Effects Grid
Blue Horizons Program at Air University
1 Sept 2016
This concept paper explores how the USAF can develop strategic advantage through mastery of command, control, and exploitation of the global sensor and joint effects grids. Only the USAF fields a high volume C2 platform that synchronizes and integrates the global ISR architecture with joint effects at the theater-to-tactical level anywhere in the world. This platform provided the United States with a distinct military advantage since Desert Storm. Today, multiplying threats and highly contested theaters threaten this advantage, requiring innovation by Airmen to prevail.
The operational challenge an improved C2 formula must solve is what to do about decreased tempo due to threatened access, attacks on forces, or area denial. The inability to maintain sensor and weapons density at range over time threatens the US ability to gain control, find targets and hold them at risk—all preconditions for deterrence, crisis stability and assurance. Contending in this environment requires US commanders to maximize the utility of the tempo their forces produce. Given this, a future USAF C2 concept that connects sensor and effects grids must:
Equip and posture for rapid deployment of sensor and effects grid enablers globally to exploit speed and agility, bolster deterrence and assurance, and build enduring advantage. In the future, showing one is able to find is becoming as important to deterrence as showing one is willing to strike. National will and cursor on target may not be enough. The find-to-effects loop must close within the time available, since most targets are becoming dynamic or deeply buried.
A marriage of hypersonic strike and proliferated tactical space offer an opportunity for advantage. The tyranny of distance is, in reality, the tyranny of time. Going faster turns a 40 minute Mach 0.8 reaction time into five minutes at Mach 7.0. Speed diminishes the asymmetry road mobile and area denial capabilities provide. The key lies in finding and deciding in time.
Re-imagining tactical space to build finding and decision advantage includes rapid deployment of the right sensor and coms grid, with the right dwell, regardless of weather or EMS environment. Private sector investment in space launch could reduce low earth access costs by 300 to 1000 percent. Lower cost launch provides an opportunity to employ tactical satellites designed to last months, not years, leveraging non-space qualified sensors to keep technical pace, Big Safari to leverage existing investment, and software defined radios to support coms, cyber, or EA.
Reaping competitive advantage requires thinking differently about space. A tactical space concept conforms more to the flexibility and employment doctrine of airpower than traditional space. This kind of responsiveness produces both operational and strategic effects. Operationally, it enhances custody operations by providing direct sensor control and assured integration with other capabilities; enables new orbital geometries; and allows rapid deployment to new inclinations and for reconstitution. All of this complicates other’s situational awareness. Strategically, it complements national technical means; offers a visible signal of resolve; offsets most anti-access/area denial by going over, not through; and expands escalatory options to enable crisis stability. On a cost basis, it may prove more effective than basing and defending airborne or other alternatives. While space is vulnerable, so are other domains. Tactical space’s relative affordability and flexibility creates sustainable resilience against losses. Pairing tactical space with responsive effects and other joint airborne and cyber capabilities closes the show-you-can-find, show-you’re-willing-to-strike, and show-you-can-close deterrence loop provided the system delivers a decision in time. Sensemaking and a new ATO process improve this.
Organize and equip for sensemaking of large volumes of unstructured data; share this understanding across the coalition to enable rapid decision, new targeting schemes and new methods of assessment. Today’s big data leads to big understanding, improves detection of threats, expands options for targeting (i.e., elite networks), makes deception easier to detect, and offers alternative forms of assessment (i.e., political effect) far beyond today’s conception of BDA. The power of cross cueing and gap filling between unstructured internet data, joint and coalition force sensors, and national technical means cannot be understated.
Private sector actors who have mastered big data do so with combinations of operators, data scientists and algorithm-based team mates. Operators help frame the problems, data scientists build solutions, algorithms do the work, and visualizations provide the insight in real time and at scale. At present, the commercial sector and intelligence community are pacing this capability, and the AF lacks adequate data science capacity to follow.
A major part of a C2 overhaul is redesigning the ISRD as a data aggregator. Sharing of data remains an issue, but for largely for cultural rather than technical reasons. Resolving the data security and ownership dilemma requires active senior leadership to resolve. An ISRD mission shift requires a 24/7/365 operation. Modern conflict is continuous; different commands may find themselves in different “stages” of conflict at the same time. Doctrinal phases are becoming compressed. Activities to develop patterns must become continuous and ongoing.
Ensure air and space activities and joint effects remain AOC focused to ensure integration and synchronization; scrub and update the traditional ATO process as a hybrid continuous cycle. The 72-hour ATO cycle was designed with a fixed target and CAS war in mind. The system is not broken, but can be improved to leverage lessons and advances in technology. Parts of the 72-hour deliberate planning process that provide predictability of operations are still necessary. But process governing collection and targeting nomination, prioritization, and execution needs updating.
A new concept for target and collection nomination, prioritization and management would link process and technology at three levels to allow full visibility of valid, authorized targets; prioritized collection requests; restricted activities regardless of domain; and execution status. At the highest level, aggregation of certain joint authorities would allow components see prioritization as it occurred and monitor execution status. To achieve this, a flexible crowd sourcing tool, similar to WAZE, would allow multiplayer nomination, visualization, and automation to reduce labor. Blockchain or similar encryption would assure data validity.
Once validated and prioritized, the target or collection request would flow to Combat Plans for evaluation and planning. Human/machine teaming, advanced modeling and simulation tools, and heavy use of automation would reduce touch labor and speed planning. An intelligent collaboration and bandwidth savvy tool, similar to Uber, would use autonomy to allow Combat Plans to package available capabilities quickly and pass a set of targets and collects (including alternates) to both Combat Operations and mission commanders at the forward edge with ROE and acceptable risk built in. This guidance would include the set of all-source capabilities available for the mission commander’s use regardless of location. Mission commanders would then coordinate the force using a machine assistant and execute based on force capabilities and acceptable risk.
Equip for maneuver in the electromagnetic spectrum to gain advantage. Assumptions about end-to-end connectivity and the speed of information is central to any C2 concept. This boils down to radios, relays, and waveforms. Accordingly, the starting point of any AF C2 initiative should be a communications overhaul, including rapid fielding of frequency diverse, software defined radios, agile antennas, cognitive network management software, gateway on chip technology and cloud architectures. The investments simplify C2 and reduce workarounds. A new concept will not work without some kind of near term, next generation radio roadmap. They are the absolute foundation to any competitive advantage gained from a service-wide C2 initiative.
Provide for rapid assessment of enemy attacks on tempo and forces available, fuel logistics, and disposition of recovering forces to enable sustainable dispersed operations.
Given the degree of threat against bases, a future C2 model must create a dedicated capability to direct recovery of forces and determine status of bases, assets, people and logistics. Although COMAFFOR led, its location is likely a new AOC division. This function is critical in highly contested environments to allow the JFACC to anticipate tempo generation over the next 6-12 hours. In gaps where tempo is diminished, the JFACC may substitute other effects to achieve JFC objectives.
Ensure AOCs remain Joint Task Force Headquarters ready. The AOC serves as the senior Air Force C2 element, but its structure/TTPs were designed specifically to integrate air and space effects leading others to claim it is unable to meet JTF requirements. Options to enhance the AOC’s capacity to serve as a JTF headquarters include leveraging the COMAFFOR staff, developing a standing, deployable JTF, or adapting the existing AOC structure. Of these options, tailoring the AOC’s Strategy Division to serve as a JTF-HQ core staff and developing a deployable JTF ops center based on cloud technologies may provide the best option.
The AOC’s Strategy Division is optimally directed by an O-6 and manned by ASG graduates with backgrounds in planning or strategy. JTF responsibility cannot be a pickup game. The officers would form the core of a JTF staff and would be rounded out by AOC and C-NAF officers who have completed a JTF training program, mission qualification program and participated in a JTF exercise. The AF would certify a JTF command through participation in a combined Blue Flag and Red Flag. Cloud infrastructure would allow light deployment of HQ equipment that configures automatically.
Conclusion: Why Re-inventing Air Force C2 offsets highly contested environments. Re-inventing Air Force C2 enables five critical capabilities to overcome the limited tempo challenge.
1. Opens new approaches to targeting and assessment. Sensemaking allows deep insight into the networks and associations of elite leaders of all stripes around the world. This insight extends not only to who is related to whom, but what is being said to whom and what is being done. This opens new opportunities for strategic and operational suasion and assessment of actions, particularly in the competitive space between peace and war.
2. Enables a conventional tetrad. A new C2 concept enables formation of a conventional tetrad marrying undersea, cyber, space and long range air capabilities. It would provide an assured, multi-axis, all-source response to attacks on allied forces and reduce benefits of anti-access/area denial technologies. This reinforces deterrence and provides new tools for crisis stability.
3. Pushes synchronization, integration and deconfliction forward. A new AF C2 construct pushes fusion of capabilities forward, where highly trained mission commanders can maximize the utility of forces in context. This vision requires a perfect blend of training and technology. The AF Weapons School is producing the first generation of instructors who understand the requirements to do this well. Execution requires immersive training for AOC staff and mission commanders.
4. Enables allies. Sensemaking and C2 tools could enable interoperability and incentivize investment in affordable defensive systems enhanced by high-end US fusion at low risk and cost.
5. Effective without requiring omniscience. Designs must include resilience to cope with system stresses and allow leaders to exercise judgment and initiative at all levels on partial or imperfect data.