Fundamental C2 functions, tensions and tradeoffs – Lt Col Dave “Sugar” Lyle
As it is with any inherently multidisciplinary activity where competing interests and imperatives are in play, the practice of Command and Control is much more about understanding tensions and balancing tradeoffs than it is about finding optimum solutions. Although not exhaustive, these are a few useful ways to think about the basic processes of command and control, and what tensions are inherent in the command and control of any activity.
Basic C2 Functions expressed as an OODA loop:
OBSERVE
ORIENT & DECIDE
ACT
OODA within execution
Authority vs Control
The ability to assume control does not necessarily mean that one has the authority to do so – the authority AND risk acceptance still rests with the appropriate echelon of command, and to design a system that removes the capability for a designated authority to issue commands would subvert the chain by physical design or bureaucratic routine (e.g. a true “Deadhand” nuclear launch machine)
Dispersal vs Consolidation
Dispersal increases resilience and reduces vulnerability to losses from a single strike or nodal loss, but it increases the costs of communication & coordination, logistics, protection, etc.
Communication & Coordination
These are closely related, but should not be conflated – communication is a prerequisite for coordination, but even if communication is perfect, coordination may still be difficult.
Autonomy vs Interdependence, as related to Centralization and Decentralization
Autonomy decreases the synergy and efficiency that can be produced by coordinated effort, but is more resilient to attacks against communication and coordination functions. Interdependence creates increased synergy, adaptability, and efficiency, but also creates new vulnerabilities depending how much the larger system is dependent on key nodes and functions. There is no “optima” minus context.
Efficiency vs Effectiveness
This is usually presented as a false dichotomy between local and wider concerns– efficiency is ultimately about creating effectiveness at a higher level of scale in terms of effects and reach.
Procedural control vs positive control
Procedural control can constrain authorities and allow for execution with minimum or no communication after initial guidance is communicated, but it cannot easily flex to new situations that the mission type orders have not anticipated if the flex requires coordination with other entities. Positive control increases the ability to flex and coordinate execution in the face of changing circumstances, but it requires both communication and coordination depending on how much the “execution script” must change to maintain the strategic and political relevance of tactical actions.
Well-ordered problems and processes vs complex processes
Well-ordered, stable situations lend themselves to scripts that can be described and captured in plans and mission type orders. Complex situations depend more on flexible, adaptive networks than scripted plans to successfully adapt to the new situation (although the plan can be a common point of departure for flexible execution).
Robustness vs Resilience
Robustness means being strong against a specific kind of threat, but inflexible against others. Example: the Great Pyramid has been strong against the elements for thousands of years, but is not designed to survive a massive truck bomb exploded from the inside. Resilience is weak in specific areas, but can quickly rejuvenate itself in the aggregate. Example: a coral reef that regrows itself around points of damage, and can’t be destroyed by one strike.
Maintaining initiative vs observing and reacting
Maintaining the initiative provides advantage in that it lets you set the tenor and tone of an engagement in times of places of your choosing, which can create tactical advantage and reduce uncertainty. It does not necessarily create an advantage if the enemy is resilient against your attack and can counter it (the US response to Pearl Harbor), if you miscalculate context and cause undesired escalation (US forces in the Korean war provoking China’s entry into the war) or have made faulty assumptions about your aim (e.g. ADM Halsey chasing the dummy carrier force at Leyte Gulf).
“Force provider” vs “force consumer” roles and networks
“Force provider” authorities - service component, or AFFOR in our case - come from Title 10 via service authorities and networks. “Force consumer” - joint functional components, or CFACC in our case – come via the Geographic Combatant Command and alliance chains of command. Different rules, networks, and authorities involved in either side, even if both are “warfighters” and must work closely together
Quality vs Quantity
Sometimes “Quantity has a quality all its own”. This is closely related to costs.
Force & Strategy you’d like vs. the ones you can afford
Strategy without resourcing = fantasy and delusion