20151229 Bartles - Getting Gerasimov Right

Getting
Gerasimov
Right
Charles K. Bartles

 

On 26 February 2013, chief of the Russian General Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov published The Value of Science Is in the
Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking
the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier (VPK) (Military-Industrial Courier). In this article, Gerasimov lays out his perspectiveÑand the prevalent view in Russian security circlesÑof the recent past, present, and expected future of warfare. This article was pub- lished about a year before the Maidan protests that set in motion the events leading to the eventual annex- ation of Crimea and Russian-sponsored insurrection in eastern Ukraine.1 The chain of events that followed the Maidan protests could in no way be foreseen by Gerasimov, but his article is often cited in the West
as Gerasimov's Doctrine for the way Russian forces conducted its operations.
In this vein of Western thinking, Gerasimov's ar- ticle is often interpreted as proposing a new Russian way of warfare that blends conventional and uncon- ventional warfare with aspects of national power, often referred to as hybrid warfare. This article will attempt to put Gerasimov's article, which was written for a Russian audience, in context for U.S. readers to explain some allusions that are sometimes missed or misunderstood.
The Russian Chief of General Staff
For background, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff is often equated with the Russian General Staff, but this is a great understatement of the Russian General Staff 's importance. The Russian chief of the General
(Photo courtesy of the Press Service of the Russian Defense Ministry) Chief of the Russian General Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov
Staff has far more authority than any flag grade officer in the U.S. military. He is responsible for long-term planning duties equivalent to both the U.S. Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the unified com- batant commanders. In addition, he has oversight
of strategic transportation equivalent to that of U.S. Transportation Command, force doctrinal and capa- bilities development, and equipment procurement for all branches of the Ministry of Defense. He even has an inspector-general-like function for ensuring that General Staff standards and regulations are adhered to.
Also, although the chief of the General Staff does not have operational control of the force, he does have day-to-day control (in peacetime) of the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye (Main Intelligence Directorate, commonly known as GRU), which is a directorate of the General Staff, and several strategic assets including the Russian airborne, which functions as a strategic reserve.
In the hierarchy of the Russian government, there are uniformed officers serving in positions technically above the chief of the General Staff, but
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arguably none of these assignments are as prestigious.
Elaboration on Strategic Foresight
In general, it is a duty of the Russian general staff to use foresight to develop the theory and practice of future war. This is the context in which Gerasimov's article is written. The use of the term foresight in the article's title is not coincidental, and the term has a specific military definition in the Russian lexicon:
Foresight (military) is the process of
cognition regarding possible changes
in military affairs, the determina-
tion of the perspectives of its future development. The basis of the science
of foresight is knowledge of the objective laws of war, the dialectical-materialist analysis of events transpiring in a given concrete-histor- ical context.2
In Russian military thought, foresight is directly linked to military science, with military science being the science of future war.3
The General Staff takes a rather academic ap- proach to the endeavor of military science, including the use of a peer-review-like process that functions by opening debates on ideas through the publication of articles in various outlets, including profession-
al journals. There are several often-used outlets for the military's academic discussion and debate, most notably the journal Voyennaya Mysl (VM) (Military Thought), which is published by the General Staff. Gerasimov chose to publish this article in VPK, a different, but also commonly used journal for such ideas. The VPK is a private newspaper, owned by the quasi-government-controlled Almaz-Antey company, which focuses on the military and military-industrial complex matters. VPK also serves as a frequent venue for top military leaders to inform the force, tout suc- cesses, and propose reforms.
This particular article, like other such articles by senior military leadership, was likely published in the VPK in order to reach a much larger audience than the rather dry VM. The intended audience for Gerasimov's article may not even be in the Russian armed forces,
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(Photo by Efrem Lukatsky, Associated Press) Hundreds of thousands of protesters poured into the streets of Ukraine's capital, Kiev,
8 December 2013, toppling a statue of Soviet-era leader Vladimir Lenin and blockading key government buildings during escalating protests against the government. Gen. Valery Gerasimov has stated that the greatest dangers to Russia are so-called color revolutions.
but instead in Russia's senior political leadership. Russia has powerful militarized intelligence and security services that compete with the Ministry of Defense for resources. Gerasimov's article may have been intended to send a message that the Ministry of Defense can meet Russia's current and future threats, an import- ant message in a resource-constrained environment.4 No matter what reason the article was published, it is important to keep in mind that Gerasimov is simply explaining his view of the operational environment
and the nature of future war, and not proposing a new Russian way of warfare or military doctrine, as this article was likely drafted well before the start of the Maidan protests.
The Russian Narrative of the United States and Forced Regime Change in the Post-Soviet Era
For U.S. readers, Gerasimov's linking of the Arab Spring and color revolutions (and in later comments, the Maidan Movement) with military capability devel- opment may seem odd. In order to put his comments in context, it is necessary to look at the Russian view of warfare and forced regime change as it has developed since the end of the Cold War.
In the Russian view, transgressions against the post-Cold War international order began with the partition of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, when Russia was at her weakest. While the Western narrative of
RUSSIAN VIEW
 
   Traditional Approach for Achieving Political-Military Goals
 Search for a pretext to launch a military operation
Military Operation
Opposing State
Iraq
1991, 1998, 2003
Yugoslavia 1999
Haiti 1994, 2004
Afghanistan 2001
                   Figure 1. Adapted from a briefing given by Gen. Valery Gerasimov during the Russian Ministry of Defense's Third Moscow Conference on International Security13
is that most Russians still resent this U.S./ NATO action.
Thus, it is no sur- prise Russia justified many aspects of its Crimea annexation on the lessons learned and precedents set by the West in Yugoslavia, which led to the even- tual independence of Kosovo.5 Additionally, post-Kosovo, the
most obvious U.S. regime change op- erations occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq. Russia views those operations as having been very similar to the Kosovo operation. In the Russian view, the pattern of U.S. forced regime change has been as follows: deciding to execute
a military operation; finding an appropriate
NATO's Yugoslavia intervention is one of military action to prevent mass genocide, Russia has a much dif- ferent view. Most Russians generally view the NATO bombing campaign as having been illegal because it was conducted without the approval of the UN Security Council and believe that Serbia was simply being punished for engaging in counterterrorism operations, albeit with some excesses. The most egregious sin, from the Russian view, was the partitioning of Yugoslavia. This action set a precedent for external actors to make decisions about the internal affairs and territorial integ- rity of sovereign nations alleged to have committed some wrong. It is important to note that Russia was dealing with its own Islamic insurgency at the same time in the North Caucasus. This may have caused Russian concern about a similar NATO action tak-
ing place inside Russia. One consequence of Western intervention resulting in the destruction of Yugoslavia
pretext such as to prevent genocide or seize weapons of mass destruction; and finally, launching a military operation to cause regime change (figure 1).
However, Russia believes that the pattern of forced U.S.-sponsored regime change has been largely sup- planted by a new method. Instead of an overt military invasion, the first volleys of a U.S. attack come from
the installment of a political opposition through state propaganda (e.g., CNN, BBC), the Internet and social media, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). After successfully instilling political dissent, separat- ism, and/or social strife, the legitimate government has increasing difficulty maintaining order. As the security situation deteriorates, separatist movements can be stoked and strengthened, and undeclared special opera- tions, conventional, and private military forces (defense contractors) can be introduced to battle the govern- ment and cause further havoc. Once the legitimate
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government is forced to use increasingly aggressive methods to maintain order, the United States gains a pretext for the imposition of economic and political sanctions, and sometimes even military sanctions such as no-fly zones, to tie the hands of the besieged govern- ments and promote further dissent (figure 2).
Eventually, as the government collapses and anarchy results, military forces under the guise of peacekeepers can then be employed to pacify the area, if desired, and a new government that is friendly to the United States and the West can be installed (figure 3).
This theory may sound far-fetched to U.S. ears but is a very common view throughout the former Soviet Union. This narrative also sheds some light on the Russian government's hostility toward NGOs.6 Though there are usually no allegations of NGOs being directly or indirectly controlled by foreign governments, most Russian reporting on NGOs purports that they are simply being funded because they have an objective to influence a particular government in a given way, or to just cause general instabil-
ity. An interesting aspect
of these allegations is that
the Central Intelligence
Agency (a favored
scapegoat for any Russian
misfortune) is no longer
typically mentioned;
the usual culprits (in the
new narrative) are the
U.S. State Department
and United States
Agency for International
Development (USAID).7
the threat is coming increasingly from more indirect and asymmetric methods. This change in the nature of the threat to Russia's sovereignty is causing Russian military development to increasingly focus on obtain- ing improved capabilities to counter those asymmetric and indirect threats.
The means required to implement these capabilities will be as diverse and asymmetric as the threats they are intended to counter and could come in the form of undeclared conventional forces, peacekeepers, special operators, Cossacks, private military companies, foreign legionnaires, biker gangs, Russian-sponsored NGOs, and cyber/propaganda warriors.8
Hybrid War, the Nature of War, and Models
Probably the most misunderstood aspect of Gerasimov's article is the idea of indirect and asym- metric methods that has been interpreted by the West as hybrid war. Of note, there is a general consensus in
From a Russian mili- tary perspective, this new Western way of war has many implications that can be easily identified
in Gerasimov's article and Russia's current military doctrine. In the past, the primary threat of foreign-forced regime change has come from an army storming across the border. In contrast, today,
Figure 2. Adapted from a briefing given by Gen. Valery Gerasimov during the Russian Ministry of Defense's Third Moscow Conference on International Security13
RUSSIAN VIEW
   Adaptive Approach for Use of Military Force
No
 Military train- ing of rebels by foreign instructors
Supply of weapons and resources to the anti-government forces
Application of special operations forces and private military com- panies
Reinforcement of opposition units with foreign fighters
Concealed Use of Military Force
  Search for (creation of) a Pretext for Military Operation
 Protection of civilians and foreign citizens
Accusing a con- flicting party of using weapons of mass destruction
Has the resistance of the opposing side been suppressed?
Yes
     Military Operation
 Change of Political Regime
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   New Approach for Achieving Political-Military Goals
  Adaptive use of force
Open military interference
   Search for a pretext to launch a military operation
Concealed use of force
Application of private military companies
 Special operations forces application
Support to armed opposition
   Nonmilitary means
Color Revolutions
 Opposing state
Figure 3. Adapted from a briefing given by Gen. Valery Gerasimov during the Russian Ministry of Defense's Third Moscow Conference on International Security13
understanding of the previ- ously discussed color revo- lutions and the Arab Spring. The view that NGOs are the means of an indirect and asymmetric method of war makes it very clear that Gerasimov is talking about something very different than the Western notion of hybrid war.9
One of the most interest- ing aspects of Gerasimov's article is his view of the relationship on the use of nonmilitary and military measures in war. The lever- aging of all means of national power to achieve the state's ends is nothing new for Russia, but now the Russian military is seeing war as being something much more than military conflict. As the graphic from Gerasimov's article illustrates (figure 4), war is now conducted by
a roughly 4:1 ratio of non-
Russian military circles that hybrid war is a complete- ly Western concept as no Russian military officer or strategist has discussed it, except to mention the West's use of the term, or to mention the West's use of hybrid warfare against Russia.
The Russian military has been adamant that they do not practice a hybrid-war strategy. Moreover, there have been many Russian commentaries that state this concept is nothing new, that the aspects of hybrid war mentioned by Western analysts have been practiced since warfare began.
However, it is difficult to compare the terms because there is no recognized definition for the terms, either in Russia or the West. Undoubtedly, there is some overlap about what these terms likely mean, but it is clear that hybrid war refers to a much narrower scope of activities than the term indirect and asymmetric methods. One example that clearly illustrates the difference in the terms is the Russian
military and military measures. These nonmilitary measures include economic sanctions, disruption of diplomatic ties, and political and diplomatic pressure. The important point is that while the West considers these nonmilitary measures as ways of avoiding war, Russia considers these measures as war (figure 4).
Some analysts in the West, having read Gerasimov's article and viewed current Russian operations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, have created models for a new Russian way of warfare. Although these models may be useful analyzing past actions, not much stock should be put in them for predicting the nature of future Russian operations. In Gerasimov's own words, Each war represents an isolated case, requiring an un- derstanding of its own particular logic, its own unique character.10 He is saying that there is no model or for- mula for understanding the operational environment or the exercise of national power in every war scenario. Each instance of a problem will be looked upon as a
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unique situation that will require the marshalling of the state's resources in whatever way is necessary. Although Russia may respond similarly to two
different situations, this is not an indicator of a specific formula for action, rather it just means the similarity of the situations required similar responses. At the tac- tical level, models and formulas are essential for deter- mining the correlation of forces needed for victory, but
at the operational and strategic levels, a much different approach is required (figure 5).
The U.S. Threat to Russian Strategic Deterrence Capabilities
A cornerstone of Russia's national security policy is the concept of strategic deterrence. Russia's theory of strategic deterrence is based upon the premise that
RUSSIAN VIEW
   Military conflict
Direct military threat
Targeted military threat
Potential military threat
Neutralization of military conflict Localization of military conflict
   6. Reestablishment of peace (postconflict regulation)
  The transformation of differ- ences into contradictions and their recognition by the military-political leadership
1. Covert origin
Deepening contradictions
2. Strains
Crisis reaction
   3. Initial conflicting actions
4. Crisis
5. Resolution
  The formation of coalitions and alliances
The search for methods of regulating a conflict
 Nonmilitary measures
Political and diplomatic pressure
   Military measures
Formation of the political opposition
Economic sanctions
Disruption of diplomatic relations
Economic blockade
Transition of economy to military lines
Carrying out com- plex measures to reduce tensions in relations
    Actions of opposition forces
Change of the political-military leadership
 Conduct
Military measures of strategic d
Correlation of nonmilitary and military measures (4:1)
eterrence
Strategic deployment
Information conflict
 Conduct of military operations
Peacekeeping operations
       Figure 4. Graphic from Gerasimov article in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, 26 February 2013, translated by Charles Bartles
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The use of military forces
Traditional forms and methods New forms and methods
The use of political, diplomatic, economic and other nonmilitary measures in combi- nation with the use of military forces
 -initiation of military operations after strategic deployment -frontal clash of large groupings of line-units, the basis of
-the destruction of personnel and weaponry, and the conse- quent possession of lines and areas with the goal of the seizure of territories
-destruction of the enemy, destruction of the economic poten- tial and possession of his territories
-the conduct of combat operations on the ground, in the air and at sea
which consists of ground troops
-the command-and-control of groupings of line units (forces)
within a framework of a strictly organized hierarchical struc- ture of command-and-control agencies
 -initiations of military operations by groupings of line-units (forces) in peacetime
-highly maneuverable, noncontact combat operations of inter- branch groupings of line-units
-reduction of the military-economic potential of the state by the destruction of critically important facilities of his military and civilian infrastructure in a short time
-the mass use of high-precision weaponry, the large-scale use of special operations forces, as well as robotic systems and weapons based on new physical principles and the participa- tion of a civil-military component in combat operations
-simultaneous effects on line-units and enemy facilities through- out the entire depth of his territories
-warfare simultaneously in all physical environments and the information space
-the use of asymmetric and indirect operations
-command-and-control of forces and assets in a unified information space
 Figure 5. Graphic from Gerasimov article in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, 26 February 2013, translated by Charles Bartles
the threat of a mass employment of primarily strategic nuclear forces will cause such an amount of damage to an aggressor's military and economic potential under any circumstances that the cost of such an endeavor will be unacceptable to the aggressor. Even in the worst of economic times, Russia has been able to rely on her strategic nuclear forces for such strategic deterrence.
However, after NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia, Russia saw NATO's interference with what it per- ceived as an internal matter in Yugoslavia as something that might be replicated in its own breakaway region, Chechnya. In response, Russia incorporated the concept into its 2000 Military Doctrine of de-escalation that says if faced with a large-scale conventional attack it could respond with a limited nuclear strike.11 In the past, the relatively weak condition of Russia's conventional forces required Russia to change the conditions for the use of strategic nuclear forces as a strategy for deter- rence, but the parity and deterrence value of nuclear forces was never questioned. The combination of the United States' development of the anti-ballistic missile defense and Prompt Global Strike (capability to conduct a precision strike on any target in the world in less than hour) programs in the 2000s changed this status quo of
parity for the first time. Russia believes that a combi- nation of these two programs would severely degrade Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent, especially with the addition of hypersonic weapons.12
Other Salient Observations of Note
Gerasimov's view of the future operational envi- ronment is in many ways very similar to our own. Like us, he envisions less large-scale warfare; increased use of networked command-and-control systems, robot- ics, and high-precision weaponry; greater importance placed on interagency cooperation; more operations in urban terrain; a melding of offense and defense; and a general decrease in the differences between military ac- tivities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
Interestingly, despite some very similar views, he and his staff are approaching these problems in some very different ways. Russia is experimenting with some rather unconventional means to counter hostile indirect and asymmetric methods, but Russia also sees conventional military forces as being of the utmost importance.
At a time when the U.S. military is cutting back on heavy conventional capabilities, Russia is looking at a similar future operational environment, and doubling
 
down on hers. While the United States increases its special operations forces (SOF), Russia is keeping her SOF numbers relatively static and is entrusting her conventional forces to perform many SOF functions, not by necessity, but by design.
The biggest difference in how Gerasimov per- ceives the operational environment is where he sees threat and risk. His article and Russia's 2014 Military Doctrine make apparent that he perceives the primary threats to Russian sovereignty as stem- ming from U.S.-funded social and political move- ments such as color revolutions, the Arab Spring, and the Maidan movement. He also sees threats in the U.S. development of hypersonic weapons and the anti-ballistic missile and Prompt Global Strike programs, which he believes could degrade Russian
strategic deterrence capabilities and disturb the cur- rent strategic balance.
Conclusion
Gerasimov's position as chief of the General Staff makes him Russia's senior operation-strategic planner and architect for future Russian force structure and capability development. In order to execute these duties, the individual in that position must have the foresight to understand the current and future operating environ- ments along with the circumstances that have created those environments and will alter them. Gerasimov's article is not proposing a new Russian way of warfare or a hybrid war, as has been stated in the West. Moreover, in Gerasimov's view of the operational environment, the United States is the primary threat to Russia.
RUSSIAN VIEW
  Charles K. Bartles is a Russian linguist and analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has deployed in various assignments as an officer of the Army Reserve to Afghanistan and Iraq. He also has served as a security assistance officer at U.S. embassies in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. He has a BA in Russian from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, and an MA in Russian and Eastern European Studies from the University of Kansas.
 1. Gabriel Gatehouse, The Untold Story of the Maidan Mas- sacre, BBC, 12 February 2015, accessed 5 November 2015, http:// www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31359021.
2. Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1983), 585, s.v. foresight.
3. Jacob Kipp, The Methodology of Foresight and Forecasting in Soviet Military Affairs, Soviet Army Studies Office, Fort Leaven- worth, Kansas, 1988, accessed 30 October 2015, http://www.dtic. mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a196677.pdf.
4. Mark Galeotti, The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War, In Moscow's Shadows (blog), 6 July 2014, ac- cessed 5 November 2015, https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress. com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear- war/. Any assessment of Gen. Gerasimov's article should include a thorough read of Galeotti's blog on the topic. Galeotti's blog also provides a translation of the article with inline commentary that is invaluable.
5. Nathan Hausman, Competing Narratives: Comparing Perspectives on NATO Intervention in Kosovo, December 2014, accessed 30 October 2014, http://www.cla.temple.edu/cenfad/ SAand JROTC/documents/Hausman%20US-Russia%20Kosovo.pdf.
6. Roger N. McDermott, Protecting the Motherland: Rus- sia's CounterÐColor Revolution Military Doctrine, Eurasia Daily Monitor 11, 18 November 2014, 206, accessed 30 October
2015, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_ news%5D=43094&no_cache=1#.VJzJe14AA; Tony Papert, Moscow Conference Identifies 'Color Revolutions' as War, Executive Intelligence Review, 13 June 2014, accessed 30 Octo- ber 2015, http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2014/eir- v41n24-20140613/07-25_4124.pdf; Anthony H. Cordesman, Russia and the 'Color Revolution': A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the US and the West, Center for Strate- gic & International Studies, 28 May 2014, accessed 30 October 2015, http://csis.org/publication/russia-and-color-revolution; Aliyev: 'Maidan' Was Being Prepared in Azerbaijan, Money for which Was Brought by 'Fifth Column' NGOs, Interfax, 8 Septem- ber 2015.
7. Velimir Razuvayev, Senators Approve First List of Russia's Foes, Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, 9 July 2015, accessed 14
July 2015, http://www.ng.ru/politics/2015-07-09/3_senatory. html; Putin agrees that USAID is trying to influence politics in Russia, Interfax, 20 September 2012; Veronika Krasheninnikova, Who Is Serving in USAID? Watching over the Health of Russians Are American Career Military Persons and Security Specialists, Komsomolskaya Pravda online, 25 September 2012, accessed 30 October 2015, http://www.kp.ru/daily/25955/2896580/.
8. Charles K. Bartles, Russia's Indirect and Asymmetric Meth- ods as a Response to the New Western Way of War, publication
Notes
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forthcoming; 2014 Russian Military Doctrine, accessed 30 October 2015, http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec- 8deb3530.pdf.
9. Ruslan Puhkov, The Myth of Hybrid Warfare, Nezavisimaya Gazeta online, 29 May 2015, accessed 30 October 2015, http:// nvo.ng.ru/realty/2015-05-29/1_war.html; Jacob W. Kipp and Roger N. McDermott, The Bear Went Under the Mountain: Is Russia's Style of Warfare Really New? European Leadership Network online, 15 December 2014, accessed 17 January 2015, http://www. europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-bear-went-under-the-moun- tain-is-russias-style-of-warfare-really-new_2263.html.
10. General Valery Gerasimov, The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations, Voyenno-Promysh- lennyy Kurier online, 26 February 2013, accessed 30 October 2015, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14632.
11. Nikolai N. Sokov, Why Russia calls a limited nucle-
ar strike 'de-escalation,' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 13 March 2014, accessed 30 October 2015, http://thebulletin.org/ why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation.
12. O. Yu. Aksyonov, Yu N. Tretyakov, and Ye N. Filin, Basic Principles of a System to Assess Current and Anticipated Damage to Key Strategic Deterrence System Elements, Military Thought 24(3), 2015, 44Ð51; Charles K. Bartles, Russia's Way of Maintain- ing Strategic Deterrence, publication forthcoming;Russia Taking 'Prompt Global Strike' Countermeasures, Interfax, 30 October 2015.
13. Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman attended the Russian Ministry of Defense's third Moscow Conference on International Security on 23 May 2014. While in attendance, Cordesman was able to take pictures of Gen. Valery Gerasimov's slide presentation. A
few of the presentation's key slides (figures 1, 2, and 3) have been substantially recreated to accompany this article. Cordesman later produced a report on the conference that includes a broader selection of not only the slides presented by Gerasimov, but a selection of materials presented by other participants. The report is titled A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the US and the West. It may be viewed in its entirety at the Center for Strategic & International Studies website, accessed 20 November 2015, http://csis.org/publication/russia-and-color-revolution.
            Report can be accessed at http://csis.org/publication/russia-and-color-revolution
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