(2) Antiterrorism and Stability Operations

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership considers terrorism to be a continuing political and military threat, although they routinely blur the lines between true antiterrorism operations and a broader campaign aimed at expanding CCP control over the Muslim ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang Province and over separatists in Tibet. The CCP has framed its antiterrorism policy and laws within a broader concept known as the Three Evils—terrorism, religious extremism, and separatism—and its conduct of antiterrorism operations has raised grave concerns of widespread and systemic humanitarian abuses against the Uyghurs.[1] Nevertheless, The CCP’s antiterrorism response has provided opportunities for bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the United States, particularly against designated terrorist organizations such as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement.

Antiterrorism and stability operations are conducted by a variety of organizations within the Chinese government, including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) regular and special operations forces (SOF), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), and local law enforcement. These actions include domestic law enforcement, stability operations, maritime security, and international stability operations. The PLA broadly categorizes antiterrorism as a means of maintaining domestic and international stability, while the PAP’s focus is largely domestic and concentrated on internal threats and dissent. This article discusses national-level antiterrorism and stability operations, focusing predominantly on the missions undertaken by PLA Army (PLAA) and PAP units under the control and direction of the CCP.

Image: Task-organized People’s Armed Police mobile detachment (example)

OVERVIEW OF PLAA ANTITERRORISM OPERATIONS

China takes a far more sweeping position against terrorism than most Western nations. According to official CCP documents, the PLA defines terrorism as acts of violence that disrupt national unity and societal stability and cause casualties or damage to property. The Chinese definition also demonstrates the central role that societal stability plays in the minds of CCP leaders. Instead of only acts of violence perpetrated to achieve a political or social objective, the Chinese definition also includes acts that threaten peace and stability within the country. This, in turn, gives Chinese authorities a broad set of circumstances in which antiterrorism laws and operations can be applied.

Analysis of available PLA doctrine and academic writings indicates that the PLA recognizes several characteristics that shape antiterrorism activities: urgency, complexity, significant effects, joint nature, and asymmetry.

• URGENCY. Antiterrorism missions are urgent in nature. Generally speaking, the initiative during a terrorist attack or campaign rests with the terrorist. Proactive antiterrorism efforts are possible, but they are limited in effectiveness by the difficulties associated with identifying and neutralizing potential terrorists before they strike. This makes most antiterrorism activities reactionary and time sensitive. Constant vigilance is important for any unit or organization charged with responding to terrorism and rapid response to a terrorist event is one of the most important elements in preventing casualties, maintaining stability, and preventing further terrorist acts.
• COMPLEXITY. Antiterrorism missions are complex. Terrorist activities are sophisticated, often making use of media, religious or political factionalism, civilians, and international actors to manipulate the situation to the terrorists’ advantage. Terrorists try to gain regional or global sympathy by framing their attacks as defending religious freedom or promoting justice or democracy. This requires antiterrorism forces to be equally sophisticated and aware of the implications their actions.
• SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS. One of the primary features of terrorism is that the psychological and political effects of terrorist acts can often exceed the actual physical effects. Terrorism is designed to amplify the impact of violence by disrupting lives, bringing anxiety to a society, and pressing those conducting antiterrorism efforts to overreact. These effects may be realized even when a terrorist operation fails. A terrorist threat may be enough to achieve the desired effect. Antiterrorism efforts must be valued according to their ability to directly root out and defeat terrorist elements as well as maintain long-term peace, prosperity, and stability of the society.
• JOINT NATURE. Antiterrorism operations must be joint in nature. Antiterrorism missions require cooperation between different elements, perhaps more than for any other security activity. The complexity of terrorist activities, along with the fact that they often cross international borders, puts a premium on open and effective cooperation. In this context, joint refers to three different forms of cooperation: between the military, police, and civilian antiterrorism units domestically; between the political and military arms of the government; and between international actors.
• ASYMMETRY. Terrorists seldom enjoy parity in equipment or training to that of their opponents, so they instead seek to offset these disadvantages by attacking vulnerable targets. Most antiterrorist organizations are also asymmetric in nature. Terrorists employ ambushes, raids, and sabotage, while antiterrorists employ their own ambushes, along with careful counterattacks, search and annihilate, and infiltration methods.

PRINCIPLES OF ANTITERRORISM OPERATIONS

China believes that the most effective way to reduce any terrorist threat is to suppress it while it is still in its embryonic stage. According to official CCP documents, the Party treats antiterrorism differently than traditional military operations. The PLA and the rest of the Chinese security apparatus are believed to apply the following principles to antiterrorism operations:

• ACTIVE PREVENTION. Active prevention requires antiterrorism forces to take constant, targeted, preventative measures to identify and subdue a terrorist plot before it reaches a more active stage. PLA and other Chinese security leaders must also take measures to reduce the vulnerability of terrorist actions by hardening potential targets, keeping the local population informed, and ensuring emergency response capabilities are robust and well maintained.
• RAPID REACTION. In spite of the best efforts to actively prevent them, terrorism events typically occur with little or no warning. This requires the Chinese security forces and responders to plan carefully for different contingencies and react rapidly when a terrorist attack occurs. These organizations should be localized and know the population, terrain, and other characteristics of their assigned area. They must train and prepare for different courses of action to save time when actual events occur. When an attack does occur, the planning is quickly updated to meet the needs of the real-world situation. The priorities in these situations are to secure the immediate area, reduce or contain civilian casualties, and rapidly try to kill or capture the terrorists involved.
• JOINT ACTIONS. The complex legal framework of antiterrorism activities requires a joint approach to antiterrorism operations. PLAA, PAP, Chinese militia, national police, and local police must are expected to work together under a unified command structure. Because terrorism activities can take on a wide variety of different forms, structures, and capabilities, antiterrorism forces must be able to adopt from passive and cooperative to high intensity postures. Though not observed, it is expected that this approach requires a true joint command that has the authority to unify and coordinate actions across numerous organizations.
• LEGALITY. A significant element of a terrorist action is undermining the rule of law and the customs and observances of a population. Some terrorists deliberately attack important institutions to magnify the effect of their violent actions by eliciting reactions of anger and fear from their victims. The PLA recognize that while it may seem prudent in the short term to shelve laws and decency in order to defeat the terrorist threat, behaving in a violent, illegal, or insensitive way toward the local population helps to breed future terrorists and may cost commanders the trust of the people they are trying to protect.

PRINCIPLES OF STABILITY AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

Stability and security operations are conducted in accordance with a fixed set of principles like all other PLA activities. The principles governing stability and security operations are meant to be broader in scope and less restrictive than other Chinese military principles. This is in keeping with the view that stability and security missions are more complex and ambiguous than other operations, and thus they require greater latitude for leaders to act in accordance with their judgment.

• SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. While situational awareness is required for military units of all types, it is of particular importance for security units operating in concert with PLA units on an active campaign. Security force commanders must be acutely aware of the general objectives and strategy of the military forces they are supporting, and may be required to operate with little or no direct oversight in securing rear areas, supply and communications lines, and key assets. Security forces may also be required, in dire situations, to face more powerful opponents to delay the enemy or buy time for the supported force to reposition or retreat. Security forces must be prepared to make this sacrifice either when called upon or when they recognize the situation requires it.
• KEY-POINT CONCENTRATION. Security forces operate with far less density than do regular army units. Contiguous deployments throughout the security zone are likely impossible, considering available forces and the number of different assets that must be defended. Commanders must carefully prioritize what they want to defend and from what type of threat. This enables the security force to properly allocate its subordinate forces to concentrate greater security on key points throughout the security zone. At the same time, security forces must be able to continue operations even when enemy forces are moving through the security zone.
• DEFENSE FOCUS. Security forces may be outnumbered when facing conventional opponents or irregular opponents. This makes offensive actions difficult, as security forces will seldom be able to concentrate sufficient combat power to attack and destroy an opponent. Instead, they must focus on the defense, building their operations around protection of key points, enabled by entrenchments using a defense-in-depth approach. The doctrine of active defense still applies; when a security unit can achieve local superiority, it must attack and spoil the enemy’s preparations. Security units contribute significantly to the victory of the larger military force by delaying enemy forces, attrition of enemy formations, or disaggregating enemy capabilities in the security zone, setting the enemy up for decisive defeat by a counterattack.

Chinese military doctrine for antiterrorism and stability operations will continue to evolve to meet the expanding global requirements of the CCP. Currently the PLA’s antiterrorism efforts are domestically focused; however, as China’s role within the international order expands, the likelihood of Chinese antiterrorism and stability operations in foreign countries will increase. China’s increasing expeditionary efforts in stability operations can already be seen in areas of Africa, such as Sudan, where an incident in July 2016 resulted in the deaths of the first Chinese soldiers in hostile action outside China since the end of the Korean War. This means that U.S. forces may encounter the PLA in unexpected areas and must prepare for the associated challenges. 

[1] Li, Enshen. "Fighting the Three Evils: A Structural Analysis of Counter-Terrorism Legal Architecture in China." Emory Int'l L. Rev. 33 (2018): 311.