(4) Chinese Information Operations

Information Operations (IO) are one of the most important components of China’s way of war. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) uses IO to dominate its opponents and separate its adversaries internally and from their allies beginning during the Competition phase with an adversary. The PLA will also use IO continuously across strategic, operational, and tactical missions during the Crisis and Conflict phases. Tactically, the PLA will use IO to detect and acquire long-range targets, execute precise attacks from beyond the line of sight, and conceal its intent.[1] The PLA believes that IO can limit adversarial advantages and reduce threats to its forces.

     IO comprise a wide variety of capabilities with the intent to influence others in the information environment. The PLA’s IO include information warfare (IW)—also known as information confrontation—and psychological warfare. IW, consists of offensive and defensive actions that directly support military operations; whereas, psychological warfare pertains to deception, trickery, and concealment. IW is conducted as part of a campaign, which the Chinese define as a series of integrated operational battlefield activities that target enemy sensors, information channels, information processing, and decision making.

     The PLA’s IO objective is to gain information dominance (or superiority). Information dominance means to deprive the enemy of information, deny or disrupt the enemy's ability to control information, and to ensure friendly forces enjoy the freedom of maneuver in the information domain. The PLA considers information dominance to be the new “high ground” in warfare, similar to the view of the air domain during the mid-20th century. Moreover, the PLA sees IO as cost-effective since it can achieve significant effects with relatively minimal expenditure in resources or risk to PLA forces.

       The PLA’s IO has four primary characteristics: universal permeation, high target value, the importance of integration and synthesis, and the linkage between attack and defense. The U.S. Army will need to consider these characteristics when it conducts its own offensive information operations so we can achieve our objectives.

• UNIVERSAL PERMEATION: IO permeate all domains and are used throughout all campaigns. Due to the widespread reliance on networked systems and information technology, IO affect every aspect of modern conflict. Without information superiority, the Chinese believe that they cannot achieve dominance in other domains: land, sea, air, or space. If the information battle is lost, the PLA cannot gain the initiative for the larger campaign, and campaign activities will be less effective or otherwise blunted. IW will likely begin before formal hostilities, making it an indicator for an armed conflict. IO activities must be planned before hostilities, actively support PLA forces during a war, and be maintained through security and stability operations after hostilities have ended.
• HIGH TARGET VALUE: Information systems are high-value targets for Chinese IO. The PLA defines information systems very broadly, including sensors, information management systems, communication network systems, and decision-making centers at all echelons. The Chinese consider information systems to be the brain and senses of a modern force. The PLA prescribes a mix of capabilities, lethal and nonlethal, when targeting enemy information systems. According to the PLA’s systems warfare theory, targeting system components is the best way to undermine the rest of the system, and destroying or neutralizing systems is an effective way of neutralizing or defeating a stronger enemy. Therefore, attacking enemy information systems is a high-priority mission, while defending friendly information systems is of equal importance.
• IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATION AND SYNTHESIS: IO require a high level of integration and synthesis of a wide variety of systems, personnel, and functions. Effective integration of these components is one of the unique aspects of IO. Similarly, the broader information campaign must integrate deception, feints, or camouflage tactics to maximize effectiveness.
• LINKAGE BETWEEN ATTACK AND DEFENSE: Information attack and defense must be closely linked because the Chinese view them as mutually supporting. Information attack is most effective when friendly information and information systems are carefully protected, while information defense is enhanced when offensive actions disrupt enemy information systems. The PLA believes that the initiative cannot be seized or held without effective integration of both attack and defense. Similarly, the PLA views IO as a zero-sum game, meaning any advantage gained must not be undermined by information lost.

PLA soldiers prepare an attack exercise at a base in Shenyang, China, Aug. 16, 2017. / Source: DOD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Dominique A. Pineiro

Four principles describe the PLA’s concept of IO: actively attack, target nodes, achieve synthesis, and protect tightly. These principles of tactical information operations must be understood by the U.S. Army and its partners and allies to protect our forces and effectively employ our capabilities in other domains.

• ACTIVELY ATTACK: Attack is the primary method to gain the initiative in an IO campaign. The PLA stresses aggressive and integrated attack methods as the best way to attain information superiority. It also believes it is harder to regain the initiative once it is lost in an information war, so emphasis is placed on seizing it early in the campaign. IO's is important in early action because its clandestine nature makes it easily concealed, its low manpower and resource requirements make operational sustainment relatively easy, and reliance on the electromagnetic spectrum makes information systems inherently vulnerable. A robust initial attack takes advantage of these factors, but it requires the conditions to be set long before active hostilities commence.
• TARGET NODES: The PLA defines a node as a critical component of an information system that either provides a capability or links other nodes. This context refers primarily to sensors, information processing centers, and the network backbone that enables them. A nodal attack tries to identify, isolate, and target these objects, and it is the centerpiece of the IO campaign. Destroying or neutralizing nodes is the most efficient IW operation: if a critical node is destroyed or neutralized, all systems reliant on it become degraded or disabled. Nodal attack embodies the basic principle of targeting points of weakness, and, if applied appropriately, it can weaken enemy system strong points through isolation and confusion. It is best employed in an integrated manner with psychological warfare to maximize chaos and extend the effects of nodal destruction.
• ACHIEVE SYNTHESIS: For the PLA, synthesis in an IO campaign implies a variety of measures intended to coordinate and synchronize both psychological warfare and IW efforts. Synthesis includes coordinating information attack and defense to maximize the efficiency of both; deconflicting actions so that one does not interfere with another; ensuring that all efforts are unified in their objectives; and, focusing on building mutually supportive efforts that create a larger effect than their separate activities would alone. The concept of adjustment is important to effective synthesis because of the need to assess and change operations quickly without extensive planning. IO are inherently fluid; changes are rapid and often unpredictable. Agility in operations is vital to ensuring IW efforts are pursuing the right targets and achieving desired effects. The primary focus of adjustment is to evaluate different friendly systems and their respective targets and then deconflict actions accordingly.
• PROTECT TIGHTLY: Although the PLA views attack as the most important aspect in an IW campaign, it also recognizes that it must blunt the enemy's attacks to gain information superiority. The PLA views information defense as fundamentally more difficult than information attack due to its broad reliance on—and, compared to most adversaries, disparity in—information systems. Indeed, the PLA considers comprehensive information defense to be a practical impossibility, so it emphasizes building systems with resiliency and redundancy. While its information defense is typically passive, the PLA may also use active defense, such as an information attack or counterattack to undermine enemy information attack efforts.

Information Operations are an integral part of PLA operations to shape the operational environment, shaping popular perceptions in contested space, limiting adversaries’ relative advantage across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic spheres, and degrading adversarial capabilities. As the United States and our allies continue to work to bolster regional and global partnerships to deter Chinese aggression and malign influence, IO will become an increasingly important tool of Chinese power to contest U.S. efforts to maintain the status quo of the rules based international order. Recognizing what to expect from the PLA’s IO—both its characteristics and principles—will help the U.S. Army protect its information processing and intelligence collection capabilities before and during maneuver operations during the Crisis and Conflict phases. Ultimately, effective IO can enable Army commanders to make timely decisions while limiting PLA forces’ ability to mass their combat capabilities if Conflict occurs.

[1] OE WATCH, MARCH 2020, “Considering The Ground Battlefield Under Informatized Conditions”, 26-27