1 Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: What Are We Observing?

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: What Are We Observing?
by Jennifer Dunn

On the 24^th of February, as warned by the U.S. intelligence community, Russia invaded Ukraine with the largest mobilization of conventional ground forces seen in decades. This recent aggression, part of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War that dates back to 2014, is an example of large-scale combat operation (LSCO) by a near-peer actor, for which the U.S. Army has been training, equipping, and manning itself to confront

For nearly a year, Russia prepared to execute this operation in Ukraine, slowly building up forces along Ukraine’s border by moving tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery, air defense, reconnaissance, and other enabling assets forward. Open-source reporting first highlighted the buildup in April of 2021, noting that the troops massing on Ukraine’s eastern border comprised the largest force Russia had mustered since it annexed Crimea in 2014.[1] Between April 2021 and February 2022, the U.S. government and intelligence community, in conjunction with European partners, monitored Russia’s movements warning that as Russia’s troop numbers increased along Ukraine’s borders, the likelihood of Russia invading also increased.

U.S. Government sources estimated that at the start of the invasion, Russia had massed roughly 120 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) along the Ukrainian border, the largest mobilization of any Army seen in Europe since World War II.[2] As such, this operation presents a unique opportunity for military analysts across the Department of Defense to observe, develop insights, and generate lessons learned to inform future U.S. military modernization requirements.

Organizations across the U.S. Army are coordinating in a concerted effort to accomplish this critical task. TRADOC, tasked to lead this effort, has begun capturing a running estimate of what we know based on what we’re seeing in Ukraine. Below summarizes three initial findings to date:

• Russia’s approach to large-scale conflict with its modernized military is untried and thus far, at just about four months into the conflict, their actions are producing mixed results. Notably:
  • BTGs, as the unit of action, are proving to be too small for combined arms. This in conjunction with terrain has significantly impacted Russia’s ability to mass.
  • Russia’s training strategy, focused on the BTG, lacks multi-echelon concepts that are key to winning in LSCO.
  • Russia’s senior leaders have Syrian combat experience, but lack LSCO experience.

• Russia is fighting Ukraine, not the United States or NATO. According to Russian doctrine, Russia has a pretty nuanced view of conflict and they would likely categorize this conflict as “local war/armed conflict” as opposed to “large-scale war.” These terms and their definitions are key because how Russia fights a “local war” (i.e. non-U.S. adversary) will likely differ from how Russia will fight “large-scale war” (NATO or U.S. as adversary).[3] We cannot view Russia’s actions in this conflict in isolation.

• Russia is learning from its mistakes. After the early challenges we observed, Russia has implemented changes to improve performance, at least in some areas. These include the establishment of a unified commander, implementation of convoy discipline, and execution of a tactical pause for reconstitution and regeneration.

• Since resuming operations post-pause, Russia’s tactics now more closely reflect U.S. understanding of Russian doctrine: they are employing extensive use of fires and using their maneuver forces to support artillery in achieving focused regional objectives. We are also seeing Russia employ electronic warfare capability to greater effect.

Other noteworthy observations

• Information has had significant demonstrable impacts across the competition continuum (competition, crisis, and conflict) with strategic, operational, and tactical implications.
• The use of unmanned aerial vehicles and anti-tank guided missiles in this conflict highlights the proliferation of small, “cheap,” disposable, and highly lethal systems.
• Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance conducted by government, military, and commercial systems.
• Urban terrain (and other complex terrain) presents a challenge for executing operations.
• Russia’s challenges with conducting LSCO are noticeable in planning (seizing opportunities) and poor command and control.
• Russian LSCO includes hybrid/mixed forces: conventional, unconventional, proxies, militia, and cyber/information actors.
• Contested logistics and force generation have presented a significant challenge for Russia.
• Russian electronic warfare and cyber operations have “uneven” application and impacts.
• Russia has demonstrated the intent and capability to escalate the conflict with the use of chemical, biological, radioactive, or nuclear weapons.
• Russia has exhibited unconstrained use of fires with and area effects munitions.

As noted, the above observations are drawn from a running estimate and subject to change as the conflict continues. This estimate was generated from analysts’ observations and coordinated with representatives across the Army training, education, leader development, and modernization communities. TRADOC G-2 hosts a weekly analytic session with members of these communities to review the estimate and capture new threat observations. If you’re interested in monitoring the progress of this running estimate, or even contributing to the community’s body of work, consider joining us on MS Teams.

TRADOC - continues to play a key role in collecting threat observations and insights to inform the greater Army efforts to generate lessons learned (LL). The LL identified from this process will inform Army modernization efforts across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.

All of this information is available on TRADOC’s Russia Landing Zone, including the ability to view the Running Estimate, join the community of practice, or submit an observation. The Russia Landing Zone is located at How Russia Fights Landing Zone – OE TRADOC (army.mil).

Want to know what China is learning about the Russia Ukraine conflict? That is available on the China LZ located at How China Fights Landing Zone – OE TRADOC (army.mil).

Recognizing that the latest version of FM 3.0 is being relooked based on LL from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, we anticipate that there will be subsequent updates to training materials, and other related assessments that will significantly impact Army training. Our intent is to ensure we provide exercise planners, scenario developers, curriculum developers, and instructors with what they need to know to continue to train and develop Soldiers and leaders with threat-informed training materials.

[1] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-usa-idUSKBN2BV2Z3

[2] https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/01/31/how-big-is-russias-military-build-up-around-ukraine; https://www.nytimes.com/article/russia-ukraine-nato-europe.html

[3] To read more, check out the soon to be published ATP on Russian Tactics.