Information Operations in Belarus by John Cantin
Belarusian Government Use of Information Operations since the 2020 Election
Since the election in Belarus in the summer of 2020, the Belarusian government and security services of Victor Lukashenko’s regime have engaged a well-organized resistance using technology and social media to organize, inform, and persuade individuals to join or support the resistance. The Belarusian government has countered with its own information operations effort to disrupt demonstrations, marches, etc., while identifying leaders, enablers, and the foot soldiers of the anti-Lukashenka movement.
Figure 1. Protesters clashed with police on election night. Photo from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Hope And Horror: How Belarus Has Changed Since An Election Ignited A Crisis One Year Ago (rferl.org)
As the protests became more numerous and frequent in the fall of 2020, the Belarus Intelligence Services ramped up their efforts to infiltrate and disrupt antigovernment groups.[1] The Belarusian KGB (Belarus was the only former Soviet Republic to keep the KGB name) also began an information campaign that accused anyone who opposed the Lukashenko government of being a terrorist.
Information Operations Execution and Implementation
The Belarusian KGB doubled down on their “terrorist” theme by flooding social media with dubious news reports, blogs, tweets, etc. that highlighted the opposition allegedly committing various crimes and fomenting unrest in Belarus at the behest of Western-backed spies and operatives. These messages and themes have been constantly broadcasted on Belarus’s official government television, radio, and social media since the August 2020 election.
This allowed the KGB to do several things, such as identifying resistance leaders, enablers, and financers as the resistance movement became bigger and more complex. Once resistance members were identified, the KGB classified them as terrorists and began to name journalists, politicians, bloggers, and their families and associates. This proactive, offensive effort by the Belarusian intelligence and security services left the antigovernment movement in a mostly reactionary mode, focused on protecting their networks vice challenging the regime’s control.
By pushing the narrative that the government’s crackdown on the opposition is an anti-terrorism fight, the government was able to successfully legitimize its efforts. While the information effort is typically aimed at other governments and international organizations, the primary target of Belarusian information operations is the Belarusian people themselves.
In the guise of conducting anti-terrorism operations, the government proceeded to identify and label opposition figures and their family members and associates, the media, and anyone else the Belarusian government wanted to get rid of as terrorists. The government named several politicians (Sergei Tsikhanouskaya, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Valery Tsepkalo, and Siarhei Tsikhanouski) and journalists (such as Roman Protasevich) as terrorists and/or terrorist sympathizers, and issued arrest warrants for hundreds of opposition leaders and supporters. All of the arrests were well publicized on the official state media outlets with a clear message for Belarusians: do not participate in or tolerate dissent or you will end up in jail, as will your family.
Belarusians weren’t the only target for the government’s information campaign; the international community watching Belarus was also a key target. When Belarus forced an international flight to land and then detained wanted journalist/opposition figure Roman Protasevich and his girlfriend without real consequences from the international community, the Belarusian government used this incident as evidence of their victory over terrorism.
The fact that the Belarusian government seems to have gotten away with violation of international laws, norms, and customs only cements the image of Lukashenko and the government as invulnerable to outside influences and pressure and as successfully setting the narrative at home.
Now that Russia has invaded Ukraine, there is evidence of both the Belarusian government and the resistance directing information capabilities in support of Russia or Ukraine accordingly. In light of the conditions in Ukraine the last two years and potentially some comparisons that could be drawn between Putin and Lukashenko, this is a serious condition in the operational environment that must be monitored. “The Putin regime also has a large, complex, somewhat opaque network of nonstate hackers at its disposal, from cybercriminals it recruits to front companies it finances to patriotic hackers it directs. And now, quite clearly, that Russian cyber power has extended to Belarus—as the Kremlin leverages the Belarussian government to launch cyber and information operations in service of its war on Ukraine.”[2] This is a real-world example of just how potent regional alliances can be no matter how informal they are.
Implications for U.S. Training
Rotational training units should familiarize themselves with DATE World nations and understand that any of the countries in DATE World have the capability, strategic interests, and foresight to execute information warfare (INFOWAR)[3] to gain an advantage against the U.S. Control of the information domain is essential to the success of governments in stamping down opposition. They will have reliable, redundant methods to put out their message and block opposing views. They also have the additional home-field advantage which presents a challenge that U.S. forces will have to grapple with in future theaters of operation. U.S. forces need to train to be able to stay on message while at the same time refining and adapting in order to counter enemy INFOWAR. Moreover, U.S. forces need to consider how they can preempt enemy INFOWAR in order to stay one or two steps ahead.
Preemption and interdiction may come down to simply ending the enemy’s ability to communicate its message (or anything else) or otherwise render it ineffective. Training to get ahead of enemy INFOWAR and messaging will reduce the enemy’s overall effectiveness on the battlefield. Enemy forces also have the advantage of human terrain familiarity and cultural norms, customs, etc., so U.S. forces need to consider these conditions in their intelligence processes and prepare to exploit.
References
10 AUG 2020 https://www.euronews.com
[1] Belarus election: Protesters clash with police after disputed presidential vote, Euronews,
[2] Justin Sherman. “The Cyber Conflict Isn’t Limited to Ukraine.” Barron’s 4 March 2022. https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-cyber-conflict-isnt-limited-to-ukraine-51646405827
[3] See TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics. Chapter 7, Information Warfare.