Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG): Providing Deeper Insights into Russia’s Arctic Capabilities by Stuart Curtis and James (Jamie) Stevenson
25 April, 2020 – Training at Franz Josef Land Russian-Arctic archipelago, Russian paratroopers testing new equipment developed for extreme cold weather operations. Image distributed by Russian Ministry of Defense.
Image URL: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/russian-arctic-training-1.5563691
TRADOC G-2 continually updates content for the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG). Over the last year, based on continuing community interest in the Arctic and the publication of the Army’s January 2021 Arctic Strategy, WEG content analysts have updated a wide range of assets to better account for Russia’s Arctic-capable military equipment. Previous updates were highlighted in the October-December 2019 edition of Red Diamond.
In Spring 2021, DoD once again identified Russia as an advanced threat that poses a persistent challenge to U.S. national security.[1] Russia’s formidable, sustained military presence in the Arctic exacerbates this challenge. Russia views itself as the natural leader in the Arctic for several reasons. Roughly one-third of the country lies above the Arctic Circle.[2] More than half of the inhabitants of the Arctic and more than half of the Arctic landmass are Russian. Also, the Arctic represents the shortest route to North America, so much of Russia’s strategic deterrent is based in the Arctic. This region provides the Russian economy with large amounts of hydrocarbon resources and, during the summer months, provides a sea line of communication between Russia’s easternmost and westernmost territories. Russian military improvements that enable Arctic influence and control and secure long-term strategic interests are not surprising.[3]
[1] Roger McDermott, Russia’s Northern Fleet Upgraded to Military District Status, Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, January 6, 2021, https://jamestown.org/program/russias-northern-fleet-upgraded-to- military-district-status/
[1] Andrew S. Bowen, Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities, IN FOCUS, June 30, 2020, Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11589
Russia’s presence and operations in the Arctic are managed primarily by its Northern Military District, formerly known as the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command, which serves as both a military district and an operational strategic command.[4] Highlights of the Northern Military District’s activities in the Arctic area of responsibility (AOR) include deploying ground and air mobility systems, increasing its combat aircraft presence, improving coastal missile defenses, sustaining sea combat patrols and exercises, conducting combined arms training, and refining electronic warfare capabilities. With these Russian activities in mind, the additions and updates to the WEG provide a linkage between Russian activities in the Arctic region and the relevant systems and platforms in use.
Russian military priorities in the Arctic include strategic deterrence, employing conventional power in the Barents Sea region, and securing Russia’s Arctic sea lanes. Forces assigned to the Northern Military District include air defense division in Severomorsk and an Arctic Air Squadron with fighter-bombers. The Northern Fleet includes Russia’s only aircraft carrier and nuclear cruiser, seven ballistic missile submarines, and dozens of submarine, naval aviation, and surface assets. Ground forces include two Army Arctic motorized rifle brigades and a Naval Infantry brigade in addition to support formations. These are the forces who operate much of the equipment below. If needed, Arctic-based forces can draw upon three Guards airborne/air assault divisions that are based south of the Arctic Circle but have reinforcement of the Arctic forces as an assigned mission. These units will not have as much purpose-built equipment as the Arctic units do, but they do train in the Arctic, including the high Arctic, regularly. Other Russian forces rotate periodically to high latitudes for training exercises.
[1] Lloyd J. Austin III, United States Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for All Department of Defense Employees, Message to the Force, 4 March 2021. Address Advanced Threats, Extract: “… we will ensure that we remain fully ready to respond to and effectively deter nation-state threats emanating from Russia….”
[2] Nicolay Laverov, Russia – Volume 1, Area Studies, Regional Sustainable Development Review, 2009
[3] Roger McDermott, Russia’s Northern Fleet Upgraded to Military District Status, Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, January 6, 2021, https://jamestown.org/program/russias-northern-fleet-upgraded-to- military-district-status/
[4] Andrew S. Bowen, Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities, IN FOCUS, June 30, 2020, Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11589
Arctic Ground Mobility
Citing a good characterization of known mobility challenges, the Arctic comprises vast swampy tundra, mountains, rivers, large quantities of boulders, and limited roads which complicate mobility and maneuver.[1] In spite of those conditions, Russia continues improvements to airborne forces and amphibious capabilities by giving priority to deployments and upgrades for its Arctic security operations capability, which supports the Northern Sea Route and other Arctic areas of interest.[2] Of course, terrain and weather considerations cannot be inflated when planning for Arctic operations and the equipment necessary to ensure unimpeded mobility. Given these ongoing activities, the following platforms are addressed to highlight unique ground mobility vehicles and cold-weather airlift transport.
The Vityaz DT-30PM Amphibious All-Terrain Tracked Carrier is capable of nearshore offload from an amphibious landing ship, and can negotiate waterways in severe ice conditions. This carrier proved effective as a troop and cargo carrier and as a weapons system platform during Vostok-2018, which was an exercise that included soldiers and equipment from Russia’s Arctic Brigade.[3] The DT-30PM is an excellent recovery vehicle and has a high “pull” ratio, approaching an immobilized vehicle from multiple directions. In addition, these transporters are effective for search and rescue teams operating in extreme conditions and feature a fully-enclosed forward-control cab that provides seating for a driver and four passengers.
Vityaz DT-30PM Amphibious All-Terrain Tracked Carrier Source: Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/Search/WEG/Vityaz%20DT-30PM
[1] Dr. Lester W. Grau, A Cold, Soggy, Boggy, Slog: Ground Forces in Higher Latitude Combat, Infantry Magazine, April-July 2016, https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2016/APR-JUL/pdf/2)%20Grau_Slog.pdf
[2] Clifton B. Parker, Russia’s Arctic Military Build-up Explained, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/russias-arctic-military-build
[3] Atle Staalesen, A large-scale Russian military exercise is coming to the Arctic, The Barent’s Observer, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2018/12/large-scale-russian-military-exercise-coming-arctic
[1] Atle Staalesen, A large-scale Russian military exercise is coming to the Arctic, The Barent’s Observer, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2018/12/large-scale-russian-military-exercise-coming-arctic
Entering field testing and limited service in 2018, the Charborz M3 Arctic Buggy variant is expected to improve mobility across ice and snow as recently demonstrated in Russian Special Forces training. This buggy is armed with a top-mounted machine gun, allows for additional troop capacity, and can tow light infantry on sleds. During testing, Russian news outlets provided ample data on the reported success of this vehicle as a highly mobile carrier to support either Special Forces missions or conventional platoon- and company-size infantry tactics.[1]
Charborz M3 Russian Arctic Buggy Source: Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/Search/WEG/charborz
Russian demonstrations of aircraft capabilities during Arctic operations and exercises show that Russia’s arctic air presence represents a formidable capability. Press releases on high interest “scrambled” combat aircraft from deployed squadrons offer updated performance and capability data on a competitive mix of interceptors, bombers, and multirole aircraft, all supported by an assortment of C4ISR and sustainment platforms. This information, in part, informs WEG analysis. These aircraft are launched from air bases in northern Russia, the Rogachovo airfield on Yuvhny Island separating the Barents and Kara Seas, and airfields on remote archipelagos in the Arctic Ocean.
[1] Nikolai Litovkin, Russia has developed a versatile new buggy for its special forces, Russia Beyond, 22 May 2019, https://www.rbth.com/science-and-tech/330389-new-russian-buggies-for-army
Newer to the WEG is the Tu-160 “Blackjack” which is a supersonic, variable-geometry bomber similar to the USAF B-1 bomber.
The “Blackjack” is a competitive system with recent activity involving polar air combat exercises and air-refueling training over the East Siberian Sea. Also, recently completed aircraft modernization upgrades for the “Blackjack” include low observable coatings, engine power and efficiency improvements, increased operational range, new avionics, improved cockpit, and new communications.
Tu-160 (Blackjack) Russian Strategic Bomber Source: Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/Search/WEG/Tu-160
Also available in the WEG is the MiG- 31BM “Foxhound,” which is a highly competitive system fielded in units rotating to the southern island of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago. Originally designed as a supersonic interceptor, the “Foxhound” is assessed as one of the fastest jets in the world. In addition, the MiG-31K variant is modified to carry a nuclear-capable, air-launched ballistic missile. This strategic capability presents political and military considerations to what could potentially be a fourth dimension to Russia’s nuclear deterrence framework.[1] These combat aircraft represent a Russian air capability that is active over the Arctic skies.
MiG-31 Russian Interceptor/Attack Aircraft Source: Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/Search/WEG/Mig
[1] Cynthia Roberts, Revelations about Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy, War On The Rocks, 19 June 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/revelations-about-russias-nuclear-deterrence-policy/
Cynthia Roberts, Revelations about Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy, War On The Rocks, 19 June 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/revelations-about-russias-nuclear-deterrence-policy/
Russia’s military activities in the Arctic also include extensive investments into missile defense systems.[1] With emphasis on complex coastal defense systems defending the NSR, these systems are components of its Arctic anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubble, which allows Russia to better defend its territory and deny aerial, maritime, or land access.[2] Deployed to defend NSR sea approaches are SS-N-26
“Strobile” anti-ship cruise missile systems which entered Russian service in 2010. Recent “Strobile” configurations include the Bastion-P launch system featuring the Belarusian MZKT-7930 special wheeled chassis which has excellent mobility in rough Arctic terrain. Many SS-N-26 Bastion-P batteries have been deployed over the last four years to support Barents Sea exercises, and this anti-ship missile system is one of several key coastal defense capabilities for Russia’s Northern Fleet.[3]
SS-N-26 (Strobile) Russian Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Source: Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/Search/WEG/strobile
[1] Pavel Devyatkin, Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Military and Security (Part II), The Arctic Institute, 13 February 2018, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-arctic-military-and-security-part-two/
[2] Mathew Melino and Heather A. Conley, The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), https://www.csis.org/features/ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence
[3] Trude Pettersen, Northern Fleet gets Bastion mobile coastal missile, The Barents Observer, 25 February 2016, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2016/02/northern-fleet-gets-bastion-mobile-coastal-missile-systems
[1] Mathew Melino and Heather A. Conley, The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), https://www.csis.org/features/ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence
[1] Trude Pettersen, Northern Fleet gets Bastion mobile coastal missile, The Barents Observer, 25 February 2016, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2016/02/northern-fleet-gets-bastion-mobile-coastal-missile-systems
Defending NSR air approaches are S-400 high to medium air defense (HIMAD) systems. The S-400 is an updated WEG entry; it has proven to be quite complicated to operate and deploy over a wide coverage area. It is known that S- 400 regiments require the integration of airborne early warning aircraft, and given the expanse of Arctic coverage areas, an economy-of-force application of aircraft is not possible. Essentially, a sizable number of aircraft are required to detect any forward tracking information within the S-400 air defense network.[1]
Other S-400 operational vulnerabilities to consider relate to typical areas of sustainment and communications. First, there are significant fuel and maintenance expenses required to operate a large number of airborne early warning aircraft to support effective S-400 operations. Also, there is a requirement for air defense aircraft to be launched or be “on alert,” and deployment arrays require separate short-range air defense systems positioned in defense of widely dispersed S-400 battery locations. These factors increase sustainment demands and require a high reliance on air-interface networking, all of which is complicated, susceptible to error, and extremely expensive. Given the high number of deployments combined with great logistical and operational expense, these two coastal defense systems represent, in part, Russia’s increased investments to restrict access and promote interdiction capabilities in both the Arctic maritime and air domains.[2] A variety of other coastal defense assets that enable Russia’s defense of the NSR and sustain its Arctic A2/AD effort are found in the WEG.
S-400 Triumph Russian Long-Range Surface-to-air Missile System Source: Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/S-400_Triumph_(SA- 21_Growler)_Russian_Long-Range_Surface-to-air_Missile_System
[1] Peter A. Wilson and John V. Parachini, Russian S-400 Surface-to-Air Missile System: Is It Worth the Sticker Price?, The Rand Blog, 6 May 2020, https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/05/russian-s-400-surface-to-air-missile- system-is-it-worth.html
Forecasting and route planning information are essential to NSR sea navigation, and Russia has continued its efforts to maintain information about weather, ice, sea-state through the use of satellites, shipboard helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, shore-based and drifting ice stations, and drifting buoys. Over the last 70 years, Russia emplaced thousands of navigation markers, light buoys, light beacons, radar reflectors, and radar beacon responders throughout the Arctic.[1] Also, civilian security coordination between Russian search and rescue (SAR) centers and information collection and intelligence sharing activities during joint military exercises in the Arctic underscore the impressive level in maintaining situational awareness and a common operating picture of the Arctic.[2] [3]
Ironically, with all the Russian investment in resources to improve navigation along the NSR and during Arctic exploration, there is still a deficit of radio navigation infrastructure to service the vast expanse of the Arctic seas. Found onboard Russian military and commercial vessels is the Kvitok 3IA Russian radio navigation receiver, which is the receiving component for wide area radio navigation networks along the NSR that connect the eastern and western passages. The 3IA receiver is used to integrate into several navigation networks such as the Chayka (Russia’s version of Loran) network chains in the Barents and Kara Seas. Of note, radio navigation receivers are considered a reliable navigation solution to infrequent and intermittent satellite-based geolocation anomalies, which is a topic of ongoing research by international navigation and timing experts.[4]
In addition, legacy global navigation satellite system (GLONASS) geolocation devices can sometimes lose their exact position, in part, to high Arctic atmosphere interference, also described as high latitude ionosphere irregularities.[5] While, in contrast, there is a favorable performance consideration in terms of accuracy based on higher orbits and increased availability of GLONASS
NPI-2 Personal Navigation Receiver
Source: Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/NPI-2_Russian_Personal_Navigation_Receiver
[1] The Northern Sea Route, Its Development and Evolving State of Operations in the 1990s; Nathan D. Mulherin, Cold Regions Research & Engineering Laboratory, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (April, 1996), page 38
[2] Pavel Devyatkin, Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Military and Security (Part II), The Arctic Institute, 13 February 2018, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-arctic-military-and-security-part-two/
[3] Luc Rainville, Jeremy Wilkinson, Mary Ellen J. Durley, Scott Harper, Julia DiLeo, Martin J. Doble, Andrew Fleming, David Forcucci, Hans Graber, John T. Hargrove, John Haverlack, Nick Hughes, Brett Hembrough, Martin O. Jeffries, Craig M. Lee, Brendon Mendenhall, David McCormmick, Sofia Montalvo, Adam Stenseth, Geoffrey B. Shilling, Harper L. Simmons, James E. Toomey IV and John Woods, Improving Situational Awareness in the Arctic Ocean,Frontiers in Marine Science, 25 November 2020, https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2020.581139/full
[4] Navigation and Timing Foundation, https://rntfnd.org/2017/08/09/gps-problems-in-russia-try-chayka/
[5] Russian GNSS Devices, Page 7, https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/psa/activities/2015/RussiaGNSS/Presentations/52.pdf
6 Ionosphere Irregularities, https://earth-planets-space.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40623-016-0506-1
[1] Luc Rainville, Jeremy Wilkinson, Mary Ellen J. Durley, Scott Harper, Julia DiLeo, Martin J. Doble, Andrew Fleming, David Forcucci, Hans Graber, John T. Hargrove, John Haverlack, Nick Hughes, Brett Hembrough, Martin O. Jeffries, Craig M. Lee, Brendon Mendenhall, David McCormmick, Sofia Montalvo, Adam Stenseth, Geoffrey B. Shilling, Harper L. Simmons, James E. Toomey IV and John Woods, Improving Situational Awareness in the Arctic Ocean,Frontiers in Marine Science, 25 November 2020, https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2020.581139/full
[1] Navigation and Timing Foundation, https://rntfnd.org/2017/08/09/gps-problems-in-russia-try-chayka/
[1] Russian GNSS Devices, Page 7, https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/psa/activities/2015/RussiaGNSS/Presentations/52.pdf
[1] Ionosphere Irregularities, https://earth-planets-space.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40623-016-0506-1
spacecraft.[1] Also improving both sea and ground geolocation capabilities in the Arctic, Russian modernization of its GLONASS constellation includes adjustments to spacecraft orbits and upgrading downlink signal protocol.[2] A popular GLONASS receiver used by Russia’s Arctic ground forces is the NPI-2 wearable GLONASS receiver, which is assessed to be increasingly comparable to
U.S. military GPS receivers such as the Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR), which has an excellent track record of providing effective navigation assistance to support operations.[3]
The NSR is considered navigable year- round from Murmansk to the river seaport of Dudinka, with the risk of large sea ice masses going out to sea. Despite sea ice melt observations from climate change studies, the physical aspects of navigating the NSR remain a significant issue in certain areas. From Novosibirskiy Islands (aka New Siberian Islands) to Wrangel Island, navigation is through first and multi-year sea ice with icebreaker assistance; usually two icebreakers accompanying a small convoy of vessels. One such icebreaker is the Ilya Muromets-Class Russian Icebreaker, which is in service in the Northern Fleet and routinely escorts combat and support ships along the northwestern coast of Siberia. Commissioned in 2017, this is the first icebreaker built for the Russian Navy in almost 40 years. Also, it is the largest icebreaker ever built for the Russian Navy and can carry up to 50 combat-equipped marines.
Ilya Muromets Class Russian Icebreaker Source: Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/Search/WEG/Ilya%20Muromets-
[1] Anton Lavrov, Russia’s GLONASS Satellite Constellation, Moscow Defense Brief Magazine, 14 September 2017, https://bmpd.livejournal.com/2845443.html
[2] GLONASS Satellites and Signals, GPS and GNSS for Geospatial Professionals, Department of Geography, Penn State University, https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog862/node/1874
[3] Defense Advanced GPS Receive (DAGR), https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/product/defense-advanced- gps-receiver
Anton Lavrov, Russia’s GLONASS Satellite Constellation, Moscow Defense Brief Magazine, 14 September 2017, https://bmpd.livejournal.com/2845443.html
GLONASS Satellites and Signals, GPS and GNSS for Geospatial Professionals, Department of Geography, Penn State University, https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog862/node/1874
Defense Advanced GPS Receive (DAGR), https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/product/defense-advanced- gps-receiver
Assisting with ice reconnaissance missions, the An-24LR aircraft features a side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) which enables ice reconnaissance, ice-breaker guiding and route reconnaissance for both military and commercial vessels. The SLAR payload is configured inside detachable pods and typically affixed under the wing. The LR model is a variant to the highly reliable An- 24 “Coke” transport aircraft, and is considered a valuable component supporting NSR navigation.
An-24 (Coke) Russian Transport/Passenger Aircraft Source: Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/Search/WEG/AN-24
Russian tactics in the Arctic are tailored to account for weather and terrain effects. To the extent possible, ground forces will maneuver using speed, surprise, and integrated combined arms to disrupt and overwhelm the enemy. With an emphasis on counter-reconnaissance and target acquisition, an effective combat vehicle in use is the BTR-82A armored personnel carrier (APC), which is an amphibious system that can quickly maneuver in Arctic terrain. It is fitted with a climate control system designed to ensure the stable operation of the vehicle’s sights and mission systems in the extreme cold of the Arctic.
BTR-82A Russian 8x8 Amphibious Armored Personnel Carrier Source: Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/List/Infantry_Vehicles&Armore d_Personnel_Carriers_(APCs)&Amphibious_Armored_Personnel_C arrier_(APC)&Russia_(RUS)&PRO_Azerbaijan&PRO_Bangladesh&P RO_CFE_Treaty&PRO_Hungary&PRO_Russian_Federation&PRO_Sy ria&Land
The APC also features an improved transmission and is powered by a diesel engine that is engineered to start quickly when cold. Another key combat vehicle is the amphibious MT-LBu “Toros” tracked personnel carrier. The “Toros” is an Arctic-adapted vehicle used for carrying personnel and equipment in support of maneuvering forces, and can also serve as command and control vehicle. In addition to deep cold, this vehicle can operate in rugged, high latitude terrain. Russia maintains one of the world’s largest main battle tank (MBT) inventories.
Adding firepower to these tactics is the T-80BVM MBT, designed specifically for use in the Arctic and fielded primarily to coastal defense units in Russia’s northern territories, with many observed in Northern Military District garrisons. [1] [2]As with most modern Russian MBTs, this tank features a 125mm smooth bore main gun with a typical basic load that includes high explosive, anti-tank (HEAT) and armor-piercing, fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) ammunition. The gas-
turbine engine is thought to provide a significant advantage in Arctic conditions as it can start relatively quickly compared to a standard diesel; the turbine engine allows the tank to start in under one minute compared to forty-five minutes with an unheated diesel engine. These combat platforms work, in part, to find and fix the enemy and create conditions for the employment of artillery to quickly destroy enemy formations. Recent training for Northern Military District artillery units reveals typical indirect fire systems that would likely be used to service such targeted formations.[3]
T-80 BVM Russian Main Battle Tank Source: Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/Search/WEG/bvm
[1] Alexander Mladenov and Krassimer Grozef, Red Strom Rising: Russian Tank Modernization, Land Warfare International, October/November 2018, Volume 9, Number 5
[2] New more powerful tanks roll into Northern Fleet garrisons https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/02/new-more-powerful-tank-rolls-northern-fleet- garrisons
[3] Over 1,000 Northern Fleet artillery troops to hold firings in Russian Arctic drills, TASS, Russian News Agency, 4 August 2020, https://tass.com/defense/1185719
Alexander Mladenov and Krassimer Grozef, Red Strom Rising: Russian Tank Modernization, Land Warfare International, October/November 2018, Volume 9, Number 5
New more powerful tanks roll into Northern Fleet garrisons https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/02/new-more-powerful-tank-rolls-northern-fleet- garrisons
Over 1,000 Northern Fleet artillery troops to hold firings in Russian Arctic drills, TASS, Russian News Agency, 4 August 2020, https://tass.com/defense/1185719
A mainstay indirect fire system familiar to the force is the 2S1
“Gvozdika” Arctic variant, a 122mm self-propelled howitzer which is a legacy system that has proven to be an integral artillery weapon. While the design is old and its 122mm gun lacks the range of modern howitzers, it can still be effectively used in combined arms operations. One can find this self-propelled howitzer in one of the high-mobility Arctic brigades of the Northern Military District’s 14th Army Corps.
According to a recent military posture review, the 80th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (MRB) is described as a high-mobility force specifically tailored to operate in Arctic conditions, and the organic artillery fielded in the brigade is the 2S1.[1] The 2S1 is mounted on a modified MT-LB chassis which has wider tracks that increase mobility in rugged terrain, and crew compartment heaters to keep gun crews warm. Its reliability as an old performer for Russian ground forces is balanced by a few vulnerabilities, as it reportedly takes about twenty minutes to prepare for amphibious operations, and additionally, due to its weight, the vehicle can only carry 30 rounds while in the water.[2] These combat systems represent a portion of the assets Russian ground forces can move and synchronize to find, fix, and finish enemy forces in the Arctic.
2S1 (Gvozdika) Russian 122mm Self-Propelled Howitzer Source: Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/2S1_(Gvozdika)_Russi an_122mm_Amphibious_Self-Propelled_Howitzer_(SPH)
Accounting for electronic warfare (EW) lessons learned from previous military operations in Ukraine and Syria, Russia has considerable data that informs future operations and modernization on the EW front.[3] [4] In addition, EW experts worldwide increasingly believed that Russia had taken a huge leap forward in its EW capabilities, but the current Russian invasion of Ukraine may reshape that conclusion. As one might expect, Russia’s EW capabilities in the Arctic include a typical mix for a named advanced threat, and examples of these technologies include: cellular communications jamming, GPS location spoofing, satellite jamming, and disrupting early warning aircraft.[5]
[1] Mathieu Boulegue, Arctic Force Structure, Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic, Chatham House, 28 June 2019https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/06/russias-military-posture-arctic/4-arctic-force-structure
[2] Peter Suciu, In the 1960s the Soviet Union Developed an Amphibious Howitzer, 6 June 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/1960s-soviet-union-developed-amphibious-howitzer-186985
[3] OSCE Special Monitoring to Ukraine (SMM), 10 AUG 2018, https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission- to-ukraine/390236
[4] Madison Creery, The Russian Edge in Electronic Warfare, Georgetown Security Studies Review, 26 June 2019, https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2019/06/26/the-russian-edge-in-electronic-warfare/
[5] Roger McDermott, Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capability: Training and Procurement, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 76, https://jamestown.org/program/russias-electronic-warfare-capability-training-and- procurement/
These are high priority activities for Russia to sustain in the “High North” given the creation of an electronic warfare center under the command of the Northern Military District.[1] In late 2020, the Northern Military District Center for Radio-Electronic Warfare conducted a field test of resources from its Murmansk battalion, deploying collection and jamming systems at test ranges on the Kola peninsula.[2]
One of these systems, the Krasukha family of EW systems. Featured is the IRL257E Krasukha-4 electronic warfare system, which is a competitive tier 2 system. The Krasuha-4 is a broadband multi- functional jamming system designed to target low earth orbit satellite signals, ground-based radars, airborne surveillance radars, and radar-guided weapons. It is also suspected of being able to damage internal electronic components on targeted radar, EW, and communications systems.
1RL257E Krasukha-4 Russian Mobile Multifunctional Jammer Source: Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/Search/WEG/krasukha
Complementing Krasukha coverage is the RB-341V Leer-3 EW system. It is one of Russia’s newest drone-based EW systems. The Leer-3 combines jammers and several Orlan-10 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to manipulate, exploit, and disable cellular networks. An example of exploitation is the system’s purported ability to enable spoofing actions on mobile network subscribers. The Leer-3 is also reportedly capable of blocking specific mobile devices impeding other non-targeted devices.
Leer-3 Russian Drone-Based EW System Source: Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/Search/WEG/leer-3
To gain a better understanding of Russia’s Arctic proficiency, the WEG is a great reference to find information about the systems and platforms that enable Russian military forces to operate in the Arctic. Russia’s military forces are inextricably linked to the Arctic, which makes gaining
[1] https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/military-assets-arctic-russia-west-correlation-forces
[2] Thomas Nilsen, Russia exercises long-range radio-electronic warfare on Kola, The Barents Observer, November 04, 2020, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en//security/2020/11/russia-exercises-long-range-strategic- radio-jamming-kola
To gain a better understanding of Russia’s Arctic proficiency, the WEG is a great reference to find information about the systems and platforms that enable Russian military forces to operate in the Arctic. Russia’s military forces are inextricably linked to the Arctic, which makes gaining deeper insights into Russian Arctic- capable systems an important facet of understanding the operational environment. Long standing investment in Arctic development and military capability continues to enable Russian military forces to operate and sustain themselves for extended periods of time, year-round, in isolated locations in the Arctic. Russia continues to demonstrate a high priority on Arctic military operations and presumably challenges any nation with Arctic interests. As a foundational research tool for training, WEG users are encouraged to view the recent addition and updates to the WEG help to provide a greater understanding about Russian activities in the Arctic region.