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Systems warfare is the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) overarching theoretical framework for identifying and targeting critical or vulnerable systems or the interdependence of systems. The PLA’s concept of systems warfare is an adaptation of older Chinese tactical and operational principles. This approach applies to its basic military philosophies; the principles of active defense, deterrence, and deception; and operations in all domains. The PLA classifies all of its capabilities and that of its opponents, ranging from ballistic missiles and strike fighters to cyber operators and special operations forces, as systems. Each system has inherent strengths and weaknesses. The PLA believes that if key adversary systems are rendered ineffective, the enemy’s ability and will to fight will crumble.
The PLA’s systems warfare concept consists of two fundamental ideas: first, creating purpose-built operational systems that combine key capabilities under a single command; and second, using these operational systems to asymmetrically target and exploit vulnerable components of an opponent's system. If done effectively, this method will render the opponent's key systems ineffective. The PLA believes that by destroying, isolating, neutralizing, or offsetting key capabilities, the enemy's will to resist will degrade, and victory will be achieved.
Systems warfare is the most recent PLA effort to operationalize principles outlined by Sun Tzu and Mao. The PLA's employment of systems warfare supports several traditional military strategies—including preclusion, isolation, and sanctuary—throughout all domains and at all levels of war. Preclusion is achieved by keeping enemy commanders and forces off-balance through asymmetric means, such as deception and information warfare, while simultaneously denying the use of vast geographic areas through long-range reconnaissance-strike capabilities. Isolation is achieved by jamming or manipulating communications between units, employing psychological warfare to confuse and segregate enemy units from one another, then rapidly maneuvering to isolate them physically. Sanctuary is achieved through a mix of protection, defensive planning, information warfare, and deception operations. Sanctuary includes not only safety from physical attack but safety from enemy information operations.
Chinese systems warfare concepts align with some U.S. warfare principles. Chinese systems warfare is similar to the U.S. concept of center of gravity (COG) analysis. Joint Publication 5-0 defines COG analysis as identifying and attacking the critical capabilities and critical vulnerabilities that will affect an enemy's “source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.” Both the U.S. COG analysis and the Chinese systems warfare approach seek ways to destabilize the enemy's ability to mass combat power by bypassing enemy strength and exploiting key enemy weaknesses. However, systems warfare differs from Western military thinking in that it does not consider the human in the fight as an essential element of the combat system. Rather, humans are viewed as subcomponents of systems, to be assessed and targeted like any other subcomponent. China sees adversary’s networks as the backbone of the system of systems. Moreover, the PLA appears to recognize domains in the same way as the United States and is actively seeking to enhance multi-domain capabilities and cross-domain integration for systems warfare.
Many of the PLA's systems to prosecute systems warfare are not standing capabilities but rather purpose-built in times of conflict. The PLA intends to build task-organized suites of capabilities to strike specific weak points of its opponent's critical systems during war. These suites of capabilities are called operational systems. Each operational system consists of five main subcomponents: the command system, the strike system, the information warfare system, the intelligence system, and the support system. Building operational systems is similar to creating task forces but broader in scope, trying to develop a comprehensive suite of capabilities under a single command. An operational system consists of several groups—subordinate entities custom-built for a specific mission, task, or purpose. One or more groups represent virtually every battlefield function.
The most common examples of employing systems warfare are targeting networks instead of shooters, sensors instead of aircraft, or command and communication nodes instead of maneuver forces. The PLA includes diplomatic efforts undermining international alliances, offensive cyber operations disabling air or seaport operations, and special operations forces undermining civilian morale through covert operations in systems warfare.
SYSTEMS WARFARE AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL
Warfare typically involves imposing one's will on an opponent by using direct lethal attacks or the threat of attack. The PLA view maneuver as the action to obtain an advantageous position for such an attack. Thus, ground combat units maneuver to isolate their opponents, then defeat them in detail; create numerical or firepower advantages at key locations on the battlefield; or deceive opponents into believing their position to be indefensible. The PLA Army still views land warfare through this lens. However, on the modern battlefield, it sees non-physical attacks as equal to, or more important than, direct lethal attacks. For example, an opponent may be isolated by disabling or denying communications rather than being physically surrounded and cut off. An opponent may believe its position untenable by having vulnerable nodes of its systems rendered ineffective rather than having the systems destroyed. An opponent may view continued resistance as futile—not because of the direct threat of physical force—but because it has been deceived into thinking its situation is hopeless. In other words, system warfare takes the basic principles outlined by Sun Tzu and Mao and applies them to conflict utilizing modern, high-technology weapons systems.
The PLA Army stresses a modular approach to building operational systems for tactical employment. The PLA also recognizes that the less radical the reorganization, the more cohesive a unit will be. The combined arms battalion structure is designed to reflect this. It is the basic building block of the tactical operational system, and it is intended to be employed in something close to its organic or peacetime configuration. Conversely, the combined arms brigade is intended to be easily augmented or task-organized as conditions dictate, flexibly employing a variety of subordinate combined arms battalions, supporting battalions, or other nonorganic capabilities.
At the tactical level, systems warfare focuses primarily on targeting high-value battlefield systems such as radars, command and communication nodes, and field artillery and air defense systems. It can include specific armored vehicles and essential logistics support systems. Examples of tactical systems warfare include using heavy rocket artillery to defeat or destroy enemy radars and artillery systems, electronic warfare to suppress or neutralize enemy command and communication networks, and deception operations to target enemy leadership's situational understanding.
Understanding the Chinese approach to systems warfare is vital to U.S. military preparations for potential conflicts with China. The PLA may describe systems warfare using different official names, including system destruction warfare and system confrontation. Yet, these terms refer to the same basic concept: a conflict wherein systems clash with one another in an attempt to neutralize, destroy, or offset key capabilities and thus grant one side a decisive advantage. Therefore, it is necessary that the U.S. Army identify and protect its critical assets, systems, nodes, and networks. In protecting these components, the Joint Force may be able to mass combat power and achieve the decisive advantage in the event of a war with China.