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Throughout its history, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has emphasized offensive operations. The idea that war can only be won by attacking is fundamental to Mao’s People’s War theory, and China tested it throughout the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War. PLA leaders historically have emphasized the spirit of the attack—what Westerners would call élan or esprit de corps—as the only way their military forces could overcome the technological, firepower, and training superiority of their opponents. Developing this spirit in their formations was a fundamental skill of PLA leaders. Indeed, the role of political officers and commissars was in large part to help develop a unity of purpose underpinning the spirit of the offensive.
The PLA Army (PLAA) today takes a similar view toward offensive operations. In keeping with Mao’s principles, PLAA operations focus on destroying enemy formations rather than taking ground. PLAA forces seek to use a mix of maneuver, deception, and firepower to preclude enemy actions, isolate enemy units, and then fight the isolated enemy to annihilation. PLAA units integrate advanced deception and information warfare capabilities to fix enemy forces and then conduct decisive attacks on enemy weak points. They employ firepower not only as an enabler of maneuver, but also as an offensive tactic in itself: employing massed fires to destroy, neutralize, or fix opponents. As such, objectives are often described as enemy formations.
PLAA offensive operations are performed to accomplish one or more of the following objectives:
This article draws from Chapter 7 of ATP 7-100.3 outlining the PLAA’s methodology for planning and executing tactical offensive actions. The PLAA considers tactical offensive actions to be the decisive form of land operations. China’s active defense strategy relies on effective and credible tactical offensive actions, which destroy an opponent’s will to fight, as the basic contribution of ground forces.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN AN INFORMATIONIZED BATTLEFIELD
The PLAA recognizes six important trends related to transparency, precision munitions, electronic warfare (EW), operational tempo, multidimensional battle, and cost that impact offensive operations on the informationized battlefield. PLAA leaders and planners must account for these trends when considering and conducting all types of offensive operations.
THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE INFORMATIONIZED BATTLEFIELD. Advanced multispectrum surveillance, networked intelligence, and the connected world have combined to make true deception much harder to achieve than it was in the past. Units will find it far more difficult to assemble, move, and prepare for offensive operations without the enemy uncovering their intent. Commanders are instructed to integrate deception plans across the entirety of the information spectrum, and they must always assume that they are being surveilled by a clever enemy.
THE PROLIFERATION OF PRECISION MUNITIONS. Precision munitions enable rapid, deep, and precise targeting of critical assets across the informationized battlefield. Firepower no longer requires mass; effective synchronization of precision munitions can achieve the same effect that formerly required dozens of attack sorties or hundreds of guns. Precision platforms usually overlap one another to achieve a combined arms effect, and their targeting is enabled by advanced multispectrum surveillance. Commanders must always assume the enemy can strike them. Commanders must reduce vulnerability by physically and electronically protecting their forces, neutralizing or defeating attacks by precision munitions, moving rapidly, and deceiving the enemy to throw off its targeting process.
THE IMPORTANCE OF EW. The PLAA not only puts a high priority on its own offensive EW capabilities, it also anticipates that enemy EW capabilities will contest its network and communications capabilities. EW has the potential to offset precision munitions, sensors, and joint communications networks, creating an environment where aggression and short-range firepower can prove decisive. As this is equally true for both Chinese forces and their opponents, electromagnetic protection is a high-priority PLAA mission. PLAA leaders and units are instructed to train in communications blackout conditions, relying on ingenuity and tactical competency to overcome the effects of communications isolation, and wherever possible, use communications means that are not susceptible to enemy EW efforts.
THE RAPID TEMPO OF OPERATIONS. The informationized battlefield moves quickly, and changes in the environment can be unpredictable and sudden. Motorized and mechanized ground units, along with aerial units, can traverse vast distances in short periods of time. Firepower systems can range distant targets and react quickly to new targeting information. All of these developments likely mean that windows of opportunity for commanders to seize the initiative are getting smaller. Commanders must be mentally agile to take advantage of these windows in the absence of direction from higher echelons, particularly if the situation deviates from the planned one. Comprehensive planning and training helps to ensure that units can take advantage of the smallest window of opportunity when it is presented.
THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL BATTLEFIELD. The informationized battlefield involves all dimensions and domains. Thus, commanders must think three dimensionally and integrate capabilities across all domains. The PLAA fears enemy airpower, multispectrum surveillance, and precision firepower, and it seeks to offset these capabilities through integrating its different operational systems. At the same time, commanders and planners must ensure that PLAA forces can strike through all domains in a synchronized, intelligent manner, to effectively isolate enemy units and defeat advanced enemy systems.
THE FINANCIAL COST OF MODERN WAR. The weapons that populate the informationized battlefield are high technology and often very expensive. Outfitting an entire force is an exercise in national economics as much as military strategy. Precision munitions are lethal and effective, but they are also expensive and stockpiles of them are minimal. The logistics train, which begins with manufacture and ends on the battlefield, must be up to the task of supplying the PLAA with sufficient modern systems and munitions. Once initial stockpiles are depleted, whichever nation or military that can best sustain its forces will enjoy a significant advantage in combat.
The PLAA is advancing its capabilities and doctrine to win offensively against the U.S. Army. As a result, U.S. Army leaders should take note of the preparation and considerations the PLAA makes for the modern battlefield. PLAA firepower, joint integration, and maneuver concepts provide U.S. Army leaders with valuable insights into Chinese military thought. As the PLAA continues to evolve from mechanized to informationized and further to intelligentized operations, offensive actions and capabilities will remain of the utmost importance.