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Though the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) considers the offense to be the decisive form of warfare, it emphasizes defensive operations because centuries of invasion and occupation have made defending Chinese territory from outside aggression the PLA’s most sacred mission. Additionally, the PLA Army (PLAA) believes that defense is an inherently stronger form of war, as the defender enjoys advantages of terrain and time unavailable to the attacker. The informationized battlefield, however, has reduced these traditional advantages.
A well-planned and coordinated defense is a critical component of every combat action. The objectives of the defense are to attrit attacking enemy forces, retain key positions or terrain, buy the commander time and decision space, seize the initiative from the enemy, and transition to offensive operations. While it is not possible to destroy an opponent through defensive actions alone, a tenacious and well-executed defense enables decisive follow-on offensive operations.
As we have seen with the offense, the shift in Chinese military thought from mechanized to informationized warfare has also changed the PLAA’s paradigm of defensive operations. The following article is an excerpt from Chapter 8 of ATP 7-100.3.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE INFORMATIONIZED BATTLEFIELD
The PLAA still maintains that defense is a fundamentally stronger form of warfare than offense, but it acknowledges that many elements of the informationized battlefield have changed the traditional dynamics between attack and defense. Most—though not all—of these changes benefit the attacker, making defensive operations more difficult than they have been historically. The PLAA has identified four major trends on the informationized battlefield that influence defensive operations: increasing arduousness, fewer inherent advantages, more dynamism that is required, and the increasing importance of offensive actions.
Increasing Arduousness. Multiple factors have combined to make combat for the defender more difficult than in the past. While ground commanders once only had to concern themselves with enemy land forces, enemies can now strike simultaneously or consecutively from multiple domains. This requires, in turn, a comprehensive multidomain defense that can effectively blunt or check enemy actions, even when coming from unexpected directions. Commanders must also defend their forces not only from physical attack, but also from information, electromagnetic, and psychological attack: a capable opponent will target enemy troops’ morale and cohesion through a variety of channels. Finally, the depth and variety of enemy firepower systems have increased substantially in recent years. Long-range artillery and missile strikes, air strikes, attack helicopter operations, direct action by special operations forces (SOF), and electromagnetic and network attack capabilities allow an enemy to target the full depth of friendly formations and defended areas. There is no safe space on the informationized battlefield.
Fewer Inherent Advantages. Historically, a defender enjoyed several fundamental advantages that translated to nearly every combat action: greater ability to conceal one’s forces and deceive the enemy; better use of terrain to cover and harden one’s position; improved communications and coordination due to interior lines and known terrain; and more time to make the best use of the deployment area and battlefield depth. Conditions on the informationized battlefield have eroded all of these advantages. Concealing one’s own forces and deceiving the enemy about deployments and dispositions is far more difficult because of advanced wide-area multispectrum intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. In the past, one only needed to win the ground reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance battle, but the informationized battlefield uses air, space, and cyber intelligence collection in addition to more advanced ground-based capabilities. Precision munitions and long-range strike capabilities have eroded several basic defensive advantages offered by terrain, making it far more difficult to effectively harden defensive positions. The enemy can also effectively target the command and communication systems of a defensive position in ways never before available. Electronic warfare methods, such as communications jamming and meaconing, and network attack are capable of destroying, disabling, degrading, or manipulating the command and communication backbone of a defensive position. Finally, the defender’s classic advantage of depth has been eroded or eliminated by capabilities that enable the enemy to strike into deep areas. Deep areas that were once generally considered secure can now be targeted with both lethal and nonlethal attack methods, even when many miles from forward areas.
More Dynamism that Is Required. As modern offensive operations demand rapid thrusts that target weak points from unexpected directions, the common practice of defending strong points with a relatively static approach is now obsolete. Static formations, even in a strong defensive position, will quickly be bypassed, isolated, and then annihilated by a competent attacker. Instead, defense must be considered a dynamic action characterized by rapid movement and decisive concentration of combat power at key times and places. Information superiority coupled with mobility, enables the defender to rapidly detect and appropriately respond to enemy offensive actions, regardless of where they might occur. This approach to defense is in keeping with the PLAA’s new emphasis on decentralization because lower-echelon commanders must be able to react appropriately to unexpected events without input from a higher echelon. While the hasty defense was once considered a last-ditch option, it is today the cornerstone of a PLAA defensive operation versus a capable opponent.
Increasing Importance of Offensive Actions. While seeming somewhat paradoxical, offensive actions within a broader defensive operation are considered to be of heightened importance. Due to the conditions of the informationized battlefield, counterattacks have increased in their lethality and unpredictability. A well-timed and -executed counterattack can disrupt, defeat, or spoil an enemy’s offensive action just as effectively as a well-planned defense, and the counterattack enjoys all the advantages of other offensive actions: enhanced firepower, enhanced reconnaissance, multidomain options, and the elements of surprise and initiative. The PLAA approach to defense-by-offense prescribes the use of depth attacks and aggressive maneuver to put the counterattack group in the best possible position, concentrating combat power against enemy weak points and enabling the isolation and destruction of enemy offensive groups.
HOW THE PLAA PLANS THE DEFENSE
PLAA doctrine prescribes a large number of steps for planning and executing a defensive operation, which can be consolidated into seven major phases:
Each phase is part of every defensive operation to some degree, but the phases are not necessarily sequential. Because they are largely in response to enemy actions, they may be conducted in varied order or concurrently. The planning for these phases includes organizing the defensive battlefield and building the defensive groups that comprise the operational system.
Build the Command System. As with offensive operations, the PLAA prefers to carefully plan and organize major defensive operations. Meticulous planning enables greater redundancy and depth in the defense, improved overall security measures, a more effective deception plan, and a greater chance of a decisive counterattack. The centerpiece of the defensive plan is the deployment of the command posts. A defensive operation makes use of at least two, and ideally four, command posts. The base command post is the commander’s primary location, and it will typically be located to best coordinate between frontier defense and depth defense units, oriented toward the enemy’s anticipated main axis of attack. The commander may also establish an advance command post in a more forward position. The rear command post is led by the deputy commander, and it is deployed in a well-defended location. Its primary role is to organize logistics and rear area defense. If possible, a reserve command post is established along a possible route of egress or in a well-defended rear location, ready to take over for the base or advance command post should either of them come under threat.
The PLAA makes careful use of terrain and geographic control for the defense. There are two primary features that a commander must identify to make best use of the terrain. First is the main direction of defense, which informs the combat group of the orientation of the enemy’s anticipated primary effort. Commanders are expected to take into account higher echelon and adjacent-unit missions, specified defensive tasks, the unique characteristics and tendencies of the opponent, and terrain throughout the defensive zone. Second, the commander must establish key defense points (KDPs). KDPs are the specific features within the defensive zone that are most important to the integrity of the overall defense. They are not limited to key terrain and may include a command or network node, a key unit or leader, or even a piece of information. Commanders should keep the number of KDPs small, choosing only those points critical to the successful execution of the defensive battle. KDPs should also be phased, allowing for them to change during the course of the battle. The defensive plan should be centered on maintaining these KDPs, which assists commanders in prioritizing their available resources.
The defensive zone is subdivided into between two and five secondary zones, each with a specific set of objectives and different set of tactics: deep area, frontal blocking zone, frontier defense zone, depth defense zone, and rear defense zone. While the PLAA used to be highly prescriptive about the physical sizes of these defensive zones, it has gradually moved to a more flexible approach. These secondary zones should account for terrain, friendly and enemy capabilities, and higher echelon missions. They should also facilitate integration of friendly units and capabilities.
Deep areas are those that are not targetable by a defensive group’s organic weapons systems. They may still be occupied by elements of the defensive group conducting reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, and screening missions, but these elements operate independently. SOF elements also occupy deep areas, and both air and missile support may be employed in support of deep-area operations. The primary purpose of deep-area operations is to disrupt and slow the enemy advance while providing the defensive group commander with critical intelligence about the enemy’s strength, disposition, and possible objectives.
The frontal blocking zone is the forward-most area of the defensive zone. It is analogous to the Western security zone, and it is designed in much the same way. The frontal blocking zone is occupied by units performing screen or cover missions, and it serves as the primary early warning, disruption, reconnaissance, and counter-reconnaissance zone for the main body. The frontal blocking zone should orient toward the enemy’s primary axis of advance—particularly its primary reconnaissance axis. This zone should be positioned sufficiently in front of the main body to give the commander time and decision space, usually between 3 and 5 km for a combined arms brigade. The frontal blocking zone is likely occupied primarily by the cover group.
The frontier defense zone is typically the combat group’s primary defensive area. It should contain most KDPs and the preponderance of combat power. Units should seek to conduct a strong defense within the frontier defense zone, trying to force the enemy to commit most of its combat power and leave its forces vulnerable to counterattack. The frontier defense zone is primarily occupied by one or more frontier defense groups and possibly a depth group. Operations in this zone are centered largely on active resistance to enemy assaults. Fortifications and entrenchments should be as extensive as time and resources allow, and units should be prepared to conduct stubborn and brave resistance, possibly in the face of significant odds. The base command post is typically located in this zone, while the advance command post will be either forward in the zone or rearward in the frontal blocking zone.
The depth defense zone extends behind the frontier defense zone, and it serves as the deep area of the defensive zone. Depth defense groups—the heart of the counterattack force—are deployed here to react quickly and appropriately to the enemy’s assaults in the forward defensive areas. Combat reserve groups may be stationed in this zone to reinforce or assist forward units. A single depth defense zone may serve as the deep area for multiple frontier defense zones. Operations in the depth defense zone should ensure mobility, protection of the depth defense group from air or artillery assault, and the concealment and secrecy of counterattack operations. The reserve command post, if established, will likely be located in this zone.
The rear defense zone is the deepest area of the defensive zone, and it contains logistics, equipment support, and other rear area units and capabilities, including the rear command post. This zone is occupied primarily by rear area security units—possibly People’s Armed Police (PAP) units in addition to PLAA security forces—and it may also house depth or the combat reserve groups. The rear defense zone ensures protection against enemy deep artillery, air strikes, and enemy SOF or guerrilla actions in rear areas, and it ensures mobility to enable retrograde or reinforcement movements through the zone.
Organize Reconnaissance. The reconnaissance effort is a critical enabler of a defensive operation. Reconnaissance must be comprehensive and well planned, extending through all domains and the depth of the battlefield. This effort concentrates on three primary intelligence objectives: disposition and intent of enemy forces; terrain; and conditions of the battlefield—civilians, weather, the electromagnetic environment, and so on. Reconnaissance commences immediately upon receipt of warning orders: commanders rapidly build and deploy the reconnaissance and intelligence group to facilitate rapid, accurate, and continuous scouting for the main body. Deep and forward reconnaissance units surveil and disrupt enemy forces in deep areas. As the situation develops, additional reconnaissance forces, having been held in reserve, are deployed to key areas of the battlefield to enhance situational understanding.
Reconnaissance groups are often charged with disrupting enemy operations, typically as part of a screen or cover force. This requires a mixture of stubborn resistance and prudent tactical offensive actions, usually in the form of raids coupled with entrenched units. These activities are intended to force the enemy to deploy earlier than it would like, buying the commander decision space and revealing the enemy’s plan of action. At the same time, counter-reconnaissance actions are meant to spoil the enemy’s efforts to ascertain friendly force dispositions, leaving it ignorant as to the strong and weak points of the defense. Reconnaissance screens may try to funnel or steer enemy forces toward areas of strength.
Reconnaissance information should be carefully analyzed and processed to give the commander the clearest possible picture of the battlefield. The commander must identify the most important elements of information, and the reconnaissance and intelligence group must strive to answer any questions as clearly and accurately as possible. Intelligence filtering enables the commander to judge friendly and enemy situations; make best use of terrain, weather, and the conditions of the electromagnetic spectrum; and then distill the ground truth from the “fog of war.” In contrast to its historical approach of top-down intelligence, the postreform PLAA places greatest value on the lower-echelon commander’s situational understanding, above that which is handed down by upper-level leadership. Lower-level commanders are encouraged to act decisively based on their own judgment, though they must consider the higher-echelon mission and intent.
Organize the Defensive Group and Deploy. The combat power that comprises the defense is organized into a defensive group, the combat group assigned to the defensive mission. This operational system is built in the same way as any other tactical operational system, using the combined arms brigade as the primary force provider and the combined arms battalion as the primary building block. Capabilities are organized into one of four primary groups, each with a distinct mission: the frontier defense group, the depth defense group, the combat reserve group, and the cover group. A combat group may contain some or all of these, and it may contain more than one of each. Additional groups that may be employed include a firepower strike or artillery group, an air defense group, an electronic and network warfare group, and a combat support group. In addition, the commander may designate teams for specific missions, such as antitank, mobile artillery, obstacle construction or reduction, or rear defense.
Once the defensive group is assembled, groups deploy to the defensive zone. This action should be undertaken quickly, allowing time for adjustments and amendments to orders after the groups reach their initial positions. The cover group typically has the mission of scouting, occupying, and securing the defensive area, enabling the other groups to move into place quickly and safely. Any enemy reconnaissance or scouting elements in the defensive area must be aggressively attacked and driven off, ensuring secrecy of movement and disposition of friendly forces. These operations are likely performed in tandem with ongoing friendly reconnaissance efforts.
Secrecy of movement is a critical component as follow-on friendly forces occupy their assigned defensive positions. Commanders are expected to assume that the enemy is watching and should employ concealment and deception as much as possible. Commanders are also expected to account for the threat of artillery bombardments, airborne or ground-based radars, and information operations efforts targeting the combat group throughout this phase.
Engineering construction begins immediately as the groups enter the defensive position. Engineers’ priorities are determined primarily by terrain, enemy capabilities, and time available. A hasty defense may only allow simple structures, such as improvised obstacles and firing positions. With more time available, a more elaborate defense may allow for extensive tunnels, entrenchments, field structures, permanent shelters, and fallback positions. The PLAA emphasizes the use of irregular units, such as local militia and local populations, for engineering construction efforts. All engineering efforts focus heavily on KDPs.
Spoil the Enemy’s Preparations. Once the reconnaissance efforts determine the enemy’s presence and disposition, the defensive group commences efforts to spoil the enemy’s offensive plan. In most cases, this phase involves two primary efforts: spoiling attacks and firepower assaults. Ideally, these efforts are conducted concurrently to achieve a combined-arms effect. Spoiling efforts are not intended to be decisive; instead, they are seen as enabling the main defensive efforts and eventual counterattacks.
Spoiling attacks, also called harassing attacks or harassing assaults, are limited-scope offensive actions that are designed to disrupt enemy movement and cohesion, reduce enemy morale, develop PLAA situational understanding, and manipulate the enemy commander’s decision making. Spoiling attacks may take the form of offensive ground action, air attack, or information attack. Spoiling attacks target key enemy formations or capabilities, trying to engage them when they are in a vulnerable state, such as during movement. Ground spoiling attacks often employ hit-and-run tactics—such as raids—and commanders are warned not to become decisively engaged. Enemy assets such as communications systems, high-value weapons systems, and lines of communication (LOCs) are the most prized targets. Forces that conduct spoiling attacks are often expected to act independently, and thus they must be skilled and flexible. Objectives for spoiling attacks may include disrupting enemy command and communication to forward units, inflicting casualties, destroying or neutralizing key systems, and slowing the enemy’s advance. Spoiling attacks occur throughout the defensive operation, and they are of particular importance in defeating any enemy breaches of the main defensive line.
Firepower assaults employ artillery groups or firepower strike groups to target enemy offensive forces with destructive massed fire. The firepower assault may employ a firepower assault zone, a predetermined and pretargeted area serving as an ambush point. If employed, firepower assault zones should be located along the enemy’s expected avenue of approach or on terrain the enemy is likely to occupy. A firepower assault seeks to decimate the enemy formation when it is most vulnerable, either during movement or during a halt in open terrain. The best practice is to integrate the firepower assault with other attacks, particularly spoiling attacks by reconnaissance forces, to maximize the accuracy of fire and the combined-arms effect of multidimensional threats. Commanders must, however, ensure that the groups that conduct the firepower assault do not expose themselves to enemy counterfire unnecessarily, as it is likely that the enemy would conduct a counterfire attack once it discovers friendly artillery forces. Commanders may employ mobile artillery in the firepower assault role or may rely on hardening or deception to protect their artillery force.
Resist the Enemy’s Assaults. The main defensive effort occurs when the enemy commences its main assault through the defensive zone. The enemy’s attack consists of a mixture of maneuver, firepower, and information attack. It is coordinated and synchronized to overwhelm, destroy, or force the withdrawal of friendly units. The focus of the resistance phase is to blunt the enemy’s attack; sap its combat power, cohesion, and morale; and put it in a vulnerable position. This allows the defender to seize the initiative through aggressive counterattacks and then transition to the offense. The PLAA anticipates fighting throughout the depth of the defensive zone, and it offers three guidelines to inform commanders during this critical phase: wage simultaneous resistance, prioritize combat strength, and use proper countermeasures.
The enemy’s attack will likely target the full depth of the defensive zone with depth assaults, flanking assaults, and encircling maneuvers. These various actions must be resisted using a comprehensive and integrated approach. Resistance may take the form of symmetric, force-on-force actions—such as meeting an armored thrust with an armored reserve—or it may be asymmetric, such as using an electromagnetic attack to confuse and neutralize an enemy air depth assault. Commanders must anticipate heavy enemy activity within the defensive zone and skillfully and flexibly move their own forces—taking advantage of interior LOCs and knowledge of terrain—to meet and defeat the various enemy actions. Commanders primarily employ blocking actions and repositioning actions during resistance.
Blocking actions involve a group or unit standing fast and tenaciously defending a specified position, with the intent to stop or delay an enemy action, reduce enemy cohesion, and inflict casualties on enemy units. Blocking actions should only be conducted when necessary, or when terrain or other factors make such actions highly advantageous, because they make a unit or group vulnerable to encirclement, isolation, and firepower attack. Blocking actions should be supported with firepower, obstacles, and reinforcements. They are ultimately intended to enable follow-on actions, such as counterattacks.
Repositioning actions are movements conducted by units or groups during the course of the defense. Commanders mix repositioning and blocking actions to conduct a tenacious withdrawal, ceding unimportant territory to the enemy only after inflicting heavy casualties. Skillful defense alternates blocking and repositioning in such a way that resistance is continuous and no unit is ever exposed to enemy assault.
Effective resistance is underpinned by effective prioritization of combat strength. This guideline references the broader People’s War principle of prioritization, but with a focus on defensive action. As a defensive group is assaulted through multiple domains and from multiple directions, the commander makes decisions about how and where to commit reserves and reposition units. Enemy thrusts should be met with the least amount of force believed necessary. This differs significantly from offensive actions, where commanders are encouraged to concentrate as much combat power as possible against key objectives. Commanders should seek to minimize movement—especially long-distance movement—during critical phases of resistance. If a unit must move long distances, it is essentially unavailable as a fighting force. Commanders must prioritize the value of moving a unit during a defensive action, carefully considering the loss of the unit’s combat power during the movement period and the vulnerability of the unit to enemy action. High-quality, comprehensive reconnaissance and intelligence is essential to effective prioritization.
Even the best defensive action is inherently reactionary. The defensive group must assess and react to the enemy, rather than dictating the fight on its own terms. This means that defensive combat places a higher premium on employing the right tactical means to counter enemy capabilities. Commanders must have a clear picture of the enemy capabilities they are facing and build operational systems to effectively counter their anticipated opponent. So too must commanders rapidly and effectively react to the enemy’s actions as the situation unfolds, deploying friendly combat power to counteract enemy penetrations and assaults.
Counterattack. The counterattack, also called the mobile assault, is typically the culmination of a defensive operation. It requires the defensive group to mass combat power and conduct an aggressive, decisive attack against one or more enemy units, with the intent of disintegrating the enemy attack and forcing the enemy to either rapidly retreat or face annihilation. Counterattacks happen throughout a defensive action on smaller scales, but the decisive counterattack at the tactical level likely involves either the depth defense group or the combat reserve group conducting multidimensional penetrations of an enemy assault force. These penetrations target weak or exposed flanks of the enemy formation.
The timing and axis of the counterattack is critical. It should be timed to the moment when the enemy attack has culminated, and enemy forces are possibly overextended, low on supplies, and beyond their supporting or security elements. Resolute defense throughout the frontal blocking zone and the frontier defense zone should create favorable conditions for the attack, magnifying the combat power of the counterattack force. A counterattack should include one or more of four phases, which may be concurrent or in varying order.
The first of these phases, concentration of firepower, is often the touchstone that begins the counterattack in earnest. Commanders may use any combination of indirect fire—possibly in the form of a firepower assault—direct fire, and information attack, concentrated on the most powerful part of the enemy’s formation. In many situations this will be the enemy’s armored spearhead, and so the concentration of fire should involve a large number of antitank weapons. Concentrated fire disrupts the enemy’s attack, creates casualties, and destroys key weapons systems, opening a window of opportunity for the counterattack to break through the enemy’s exposed flank.
Neutralizing significant or dangerous breakthroughs is the second phase. Enemy forces that have achieved significant penetrations in the defensive zone can threaten the counterattack with defeat or destruction. Breakthroughs can be sealed off using firepower or direct attack, or the can be neutralized by attacking enemy LOCs. Sealing off breakthroughs does not mean that the enemy units must be annihilated; it only ensures that they cannot threaten the counterattack force as it conducts its mission. Once the counterattack is successful, the remaining enemy units will be isolated and encircled, enabling their destruction or forcing their withdrawal.
The third and decisive phase of the counterattack should take the form of a small-scale offensive operation. Ideally, a commander executes an attack that involves penetrations from multiple directions and through multiple domains, preventing the enemy from massing combat power and confusing it about the disposition and axis of the main effort. Direct assaults on the enemy’s front are the preferred method of attack, as this fixes the enemy and immediately targets its most valuable units. Pincer movements are considered a secondary approach, and while they may be effective at targeting the enemy’s exposed flank, they require longer movement and more time, which exposes the counterattack force to enemy artillery or direct attack. Firepower assaults can cut off or block access to the rear, while blocking units work to stop further penetrations. The assault targets the enemy’s center of gravity, attempting to isolate enemy units throughout the defensive zone.
As the counterattack commences, commanders assess its effectiveness. If it is effective, they may order fourth phase to commence, a continuation of the attack or consolidation of the gains. If it is ineffective, they may order the counterattacking force to assume a defensive posture and resist any further enemy advances. Regardless of effectiveness, commanders must immediately deploy the defensive group to retain KDPs, whether they are still held by friendly forces or have been recently retaken by enemy forces. Commanders should anticipate the enemy sending reinforcements or conducting supporting attacks promptly after it recognizes the threat of the counterattack. Having the defensive group deployed and in place to block these attacks helps to ensure that the gains achieved by the counterattack are not lost.
Consolidate or Withdraw. During or after the counterattack commanders face a critical decision about how to proceed with the defensive battle. If the counterattack succeeded in decimating, blunting, or neutralizing the enemy assault, commanders may consider ordering a follow-on attack into the enemy’s depth. Alternatively, they may consider holding fast, reinforcing and entrenching the current position to better resist any further enemy assaults. Commanders must consider casualties sustained, the overall readiness of available troops, the vulnerability of the enemy, and the advantages gained by each course of action when making a decision to continue advancing or hold in place.
If the counterattack was unsuccessful or the defensive group suffered serious casualties during the counterattack, the commander may order a withdrawal. The withdrawal should be orderly and decisive, with available groups conducting alternating retrograde operations and blocking actions. No unit should ever be exposed to an enemy pursuit attack. The deployment of air defense groups to deter or defeat attack by air is particularly important. Units are particularly vulnerable to firepower attacks during withdrawals. Concealment and cover are important for the unit, and the firepower or artillery groups must prioritize counterfire operations if any unit is in the process of withdrawal.
The PLAA prescribes a general order of precedence for a combat group’s withdrawal. First, the cover group exits the frontal blocking zone. Next, all support and logistics groups exit the rear area. Then the main body and firepower and artillery groups exit the frontier defense zone. This leaves the combat reserve, or rear group, to conduct a rearguard or screening action in the rear defense zone, ensuring that all other groups move to safety. The combat group commander must designate an assembly area that is both accessible and defensible, then rapidly establish a new defensive zone and begin entrenching as quickly as possible.
Understanding PLAA defensive actions will be necessary for U.S. Army leaders and warfighters at all levels. Chinese defensive doctrine, coupled with the PLA’s strike capabilities, may preclude the Joint Force from being able to mass combat power in the manner that was seen before Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. The PLAA views the defense as central to a successful military campaign, but it believes that offensive operations will be decisive to any future victory. The growing sophistication of Chinese technology, the advancement of theory and the character of warfare, and the importance of integrated campaign planning present formidable obstacles in the event of armed conflict between China and the United States and our allies. Each of these factors increase the importance to the U.S. Army of operating effectively as a Joint Force and with key coalition partners if we are to prevail.