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New Developments in China’s Nuclear Deterrent by Brad Marvel
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) successfully detonated their first nuclear device in the deserts of Eastern Xinjiang In October of 1964. Though American and Soviet intelligence organizations were aware of the impending test, the populations and political leadership from both countries seemed taken by surprise by the speed of China’s nuclear advancement.
Even before this first test, the U.S. and its allies struggled to contextualize China as a nuclear power. This struggle continued throughout the latter half of the 20th century and seems to have accelerated as China’s wealth, military power, and international profile all expanded over the last two decades. China has done little to alleviate this problem, consistently refusing to engage any external party in any meaningful arms talks, or even to explain in any detail the specifics of their nuclear weapons policy.
This article explores some of the history behind the West’s understanding—and misunderstandings—of China’s nuclear arsenal, explains what is now known (and not known) about the contemporary Chinese nuclear capability, and looks at the future and how nuclear weapons interact with the “China Dream.
Zhou Enlai announces China’s first successful nuclear test in 1964 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Zhou_Enlai_announced_the_success_of_China%27s_atomic_bomb_test.jpg
Background
Nuclear weapons were a critical wedge issue driving the Sino-Soviet split. The USSR—seeing China as a vital ally in the great power competition in Asia—enthusiastically supported China’s emerging nuclear program in the late 1950s. As the PRC and USSR gradually fractured along mostly ideological grounds, however, Soviet support for a nuclear China began to waver.[1] Mao himself likely put the final nail in the coffin of Soviet nuclear technical support when he shared his views on nuclear war in 1957:
“We shouldn’t be afraid of atomic missiles. No matter what kind of war breaks out, conventional or nuclear, we will win. . . . If the imperialists unleash war on us, we may lose more than 300 million people. So what? War is war. The years will pass and we will get to work making more babies than ever before.”[2]
The Soviets, embroiled in a growing Cold War and rather desperate to avoid any sort of nuclear exchange with the West, were horrified. Statements like these coupled with an increasingly contentious political relationship irreparably fractured the PRC/USSR partnership, and the Soviets withdrew all support for China’s nuclear ambitions by 1959.[3] Ironically enough, the CIA was just as alarmed as the Soviets were about China’s emergent nuclear status, concluding in 1963 that China “holds the view that a nuclear war would destroy capitalism and leave the field clear for Chinese survivors to build a new world.”[4]
The reality was that China was not nearly as fanatical as Mao’s posturing led its competitors to believe. The backdrop for China’s nuclear ambitions was far more pragmatic than ideological: during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954–58, China had directly faced the threat of unilateral nuclear intervention from the United States. This threat was very real: the U.S. threatened nuclear attack publicly on multiple occasions, while the Joint Chiefs privately and officially recommended that President Eisenhower order nuclear strikes on the Chinese mainland.[5] President Eisenhower rejected this course of action and the PRC subsequently agreed to a ceasefire before the conflict escalated to a major war.
The die was cast, however, and the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) now enthusiastically backed the development of a nuclear deterrent. Mao’s blustering about nuclear war turned out to be more theater than a legitimate strategy: as China entered the world of nuclear powers, the CPC made clear their nuclear policy shortly after their first nuclear test in 1964: “The Chinese Government hereby solemnly declares that China will never at any time and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.”
Having experienced firsthand what they would later describe as “nuclear blackmail” during the Taiwan Strait Crisis, China’s new nuclear strategy made sense as one aspect of what the Chinese still called a “People’s War.” The PLA was oriented strictly toward self-defense, but nuclear weapons were a necessity to meaningfully defend oneself against nuclear-equipped opponents. The “No First Use” policy was at the heart of this strategy: China endeavored to maintain its
U.S. Navy aircraft deployed to the Taiwan Strait in 1958 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:F4D-1_Skyrays_VF-213_on_USS_Lexington_(CVA-16)_off_Taiwan_1958.jpg
[1] (Torigian, 2021)
[2] (Zedong, 1957)
[3] (Torigian, 2021)
[4] (Central Intelligence Agency, 1963)
[5] (Kulacki, 2020)
6. (Li Bin, 2016)