New Developments in China’s Nuclear Deterrent
by Brad Marvel

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) successfully detonated their first nuclear device in the deserts of Eastern Xinjiang In October of 1964. Though American and Soviet intelligence organizations were aware of the impending test, the populations and political leadership from both countries seemed taken by surprise by the speed of China’s nuclear advancement.

 Even before this first test, the U.S. and its allies struggled to contextualize China as a nuclear power. This struggle continued throughout the latter half of the 20^th century and seems to have accelerated as China’s wealth, military power, and international profile all expanded over the last two decades. China has done little to alleviate this problem, consistently refusing to engage any external party in any meaningful arms talks, or even to explain in any detail the specifics of their nuclear weapons policy.

This article explores some of the history behind the West’s understanding—and misunderstandings—of China’s nuclear arsenal, explains what is now known (and not known) about the contemporary Chinese nuclear capability, and looks at the future and how nuclear weapons interact with the “China Dream.

Zhou Enlai announces China’s first successful nuclear test in 1964 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Zhou_Enlai_announced_the_success_of_China%27s_atomic_bomb_test.jpg

Background

Nuclear weapons were a critical wedge issue driving the Sino-Soviet split. The USSR—seeing China as a vital ally in the great power competition in Asia—enthusiastically supported China’s emerging nuclear program in the late 1950s. As the PRC and USSR gradually fractured along mostly ideological grounds, however, Soviet support for a nuclear China began to waver.[1] Mao himself likely put the final nail in the coffin of Soviet nuclear technical support when he shared his views on nuclear war in 1957:

“We shouldn’t be afraid of atomic missiles. No matter what kind of war breaks out, conventional or nuclear, we will win. . . . If the imperialists unleash war on us, we may lose more than 300 million people. So what? War is war. The years will pass and we will get to work making more babies than ever before.”[2]

The Soviets, embroiled in a growing Cold War and rather desperate to avoid any sort of nuclear exchange with the West, were horrified. Statements like these coupled with an increasingly contentious political relationship irreparably fractured the PRC/USSR partnership, and the Soviets withdrew all support for China’s nuclear ambitions by 1959.[3] Ironically enough, the CIA was just as alarmed as the Soviets were about China’s emergent nuclear status, concluding in 1963 that China “holds the view that a nuclear war would destroy capitalism and leave the field clear for Chinese survivors to build a new world.”[4]

The reality was that China was not nearly as fanatical as Mao’s posturing led its competitors to believe. The backdrop for China’s nuclear ambitions was far more pragmatic than ideological: during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954–58, China had directly faced the threat of unilateral nuclear intervention from the United States. This threat was very real: the U.S. threatened nuclear attack publicly on multiple occasions, while the Joint Chiefs privately and officially recommended that President Eisenhower order nuclear strikes on the Chinese mainland.[5] President Eisenhower rejected this course of action and the PRC subsequently agreed to a ceasefire before the conflict escalated to a major war.

The die was cast, however, and the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) now enthusiastically backed the development of a nuclear deterrent. Mao’s blustering about nuclear war turned out to be more theater than a legitimate strategy: as China entered the world of nuclear powers, the CPC made clear their nuclear policy shortly after their first nuclear test in 1964: “The Chinese Government hereby solemnly declares that China will never at any time and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.”

Having experienced firsthand what they would later describe as “nuclear blackmail” during the Taiwan Strait Crisis, China’s new nuclear strategy made sense as one aspect of what the Chinese still called a “People’s War.” The PLA was oriented strictly toward self-defense, but nuclear weapons were a necessity to meaningfully defend oneself against nuclear-equipped opponents. The “No First Use” policy was at the heart of this strategy: China endeavored to maintain its

U.S. Navy aircraft deployed to the Taiwan Strait in 1958
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:F4D-1_Skyrays_VF-213_on_USS_Lexington_(CVA-16)_off_Taiwan_1958.jpg

[1] (Torigian, 2021)

[2] (Zedong, 1957)

[3] (Torigian, 2021)

[4] (Central Intelligence Agency, 1963)

[5] (Kulacki, 2020)

6. (Li Bin, 2016)

territorial sovereignty and military relevance, but staunchly refused to be drawn into the ever-growing nuclear arms race now being run by its two largest global competitors.

Over the next few decades, China continued to advance its nuclear capability, adding intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in the early 1970s, and intercontinental-range missiles (ICBMs) by the end of the 1970s. The number of warheads and missiles, however, remained very low. As American and Soviet arsenals expanded significantly through the 1980s (culminating with a combined total of around 63,000 warheads between the two by 1986),[1] China never fielded more than a couple hundred warheads of its own.

American and Russian nuclear stockpiles, 1945-2005
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:US_and_USSR_nuclear_stockpiles.png

China’s small nuclear warhead stockpile and limited number of delivery platforms essentially dictated the country’s nuclear tactics throughout the Cold War. Nuclear exchanges are fundamentally one of two different types: counterforce or countervalue. Counterforce strikes attempt to destroy or disable the opponent’s military power, primarily their nuclear forces. Countervalue strikes are essentially the final expression of deterrence-by-punishment, typically targeting large population centers as retaliation for a nuclear strike. Counterforce tactics require large numbers of warheads and the ability to target them with relative mass and precision, while countervalue tactics require only the ability to deliver warheads in the vicinity of very large target areas. China’s No First Use policy made the development of any significant counterforce capabilities unnecessary. And so, China’s nuclear fleet remained small, and China largely recused itself from the many years of arms-limitation talks that finally resulted in major drawdowns of the U.S. and Soviet/Russian nuclear fleets.

The end of the Cold War aligned roughly with a new birth of the PLA and a new vision for China’s place in the world. Mao’s vision of an insular and self-sufficient communist state was gone, replaced by what would become known as the “China Dream.” The PRC now envisioned itself as a future great power, wielding both soft and hard power to back Chinese interests both regionally and globally. Comprehensive modernization of the PLA and a nearly complete revision of PLA doctrine were at the heart of this new vision, but the Chinese nuclear strategy remained more or less the same as it had been for half a century.  It would not be until the late 2010s that China’s

[1] (Nagdy, 2020)

nuclear arsenal—and possibly its nuclear policy, strategy, and tactics—began to show signs of evolution.

The Modern PLA Nuclear Capability and Doctrine

Mobile, land-based ballistic missiles have long been one of the PLA’s flagship capabilities. As such, these missiles were the natural choice for the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps’—later the PLA Rocket Forces’ (PLARF)—frontline nuclear delivery mechanism from the very beginning of the Chinese nuclear program. Unlike most other nuclear powers, the PRC never really attempted to build a true nuclear triad: the simultaneous fielding of a global strike capability featuring land-based ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and free-fall nuclear bombs dropped from fixed-wing aircraft. Chinese development instead focused on building small numbers of truck-launched missiles, whose small signature and mobility would allow them to survive an enemy’s first strike and launch a retaliatory countervalue strike. These ICBMs were augmented by very large numbers of shorter-range missiles, able to threaten several potential regional opponents. Additionally, the PLA Navy attempted to field a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) in the early 1980s, to mixed results, and is in the process now of building a fleet of relatively modern SSBNs armed with capable, modernized SLBMs.[1]

As China’s nuclear force expanded its capability, the No First Use policy remained strictly in place.[2] PLARF nuclear forces are kept in a relatively low state of readiness: nuclear warheads are stored separately from their delivery mechanisms, and the number of warheads and intercontinental delivery platforms remains very small. This approach yielded two very important advantages from the Chinese perspective. First, it allowed them to develop a meaningful nuclear capability at a relatively low cost. Nuclear forces of all types are expensive, and the PLA of the 1980s and 90s was highly resource constrained. The relative cheapness of the small-scale PLA nuclear force enabled substantial modernization elsewhere in the PLA while preserving the strategic value of a nuclear deterrent. Second, China’s No First Use policy helped to facilitate the

[1] (Funaiole, 2021)

[2] (Li Bin, 2016)

development of a massive and sophisticated conventional ballistic missile capability that became the core of China’s regional area-denial strategy.

This at first seems somewhat counterintuitive—how did nuclear policy enable conventional weapons?

The Intermediate Problem

Nuclear crises were regular occurrences as the United States and the Soviet Union rapidly expanded their nuclear forces early in the Cold War. As both sides matured their nuclear doctrine, the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) became the central thesis informing policy decisions and arms limitations treaties. MAD essentially posits that nuclear war is fundamentally unwinnable: any nuclear exchange inevitably leads to mass nuclear war, and likely, the extinction of humanity, or at the very least, the destruction of your own country.

Intermediate-range nuclear missiles were probably the most serious threat to the MAD balance. This also seems somewhat counterintuitive, as they are in general far less expensive, powerful, and capable than ICBMs or SLBMs. The issue arises from their short-range, and consequently, very short amount of time between launch and impact. ICBMs and SLBMs fly high and far, their huge engines giving ample signatures for satellites to detect, and their long flight times plenty of time to plan and execute a retaliatory strike. Shorter-range missiles are harder to detect and give little to no time to react, thus making a “decapitation” strike (an attempt to “win” a nuclear war by destroying the opponent’s ability to retaliate) more possible, which in turn, undermines MAD.[1] This reality eventually forced the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia to agree that short- and medium-range missiles were too much of a threat to MAD, and a bilateral treaty banning their development and use—the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty—was ratified in the late 1980s.[2]

China, meanwhile, argued that their No First Use policy exempted them from the problems addressed by the U.S./USSR arms limitation talks. The Chinese position claimed their small nuclear arsenal and low readiness level prevented them from executing a “decapitation” strike, and thus, they were free to develop missiles of any range and in any number. This resulted in China fielding the world’s largest and most sophisticated IRBM fleet, with the implicit promise that most of these systems are conventionally armed. As such, China’s opponents didn’t need to assume PLARF IRBMs launched against regional targets were nuclear-armed, and thus, a full-scale nuclear response was not required.[3] This dynamic held more or less firm for over 30 years. Developments in recent years, however, are rapidly changing the strategic environment.

Emergent Issues: Chinese Nuclear Policy and Expansion

Over the last two years, three major changes arose that promise to dramatically alter the strategic landscape on which China’s nuclear policy is based: the death of the INF treaty, the development of new and far more capable PLARF delivery systems, and the expansion of the Chinese nuclear fleet.

Pressure on the INF treaty began soon after it was ratified, but didn’t culminate until U.S. tensions with both Russia and China in the late 2010s became untenable. As mentioned above, China publicly developed large numbers of very capable intermediate-range missile systems, while Russia likely did the same surreptitiously. The gradual proliferation of threat long-range precision strike systems put the United States at significant operational risk, and the U.S. suspended the INF treaty in early 2019. Russia followed suit the next day.[4] Predictably, both sides quickly began developing (or revealing) new longer-range strike platforms, and China’s status as the sole conventional long-range strike superpower evaporated, as did the decades-long established MAD balance between the U.S. and Russia.

The death of the INF treaty roughly coincided with breakthroughs in new PLA strike systems. While several of these were simple upgrades to existing cruise and ballistic missile systems, one new capability in particular—the hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV)—proved particularly alarming to the U.S. and its allies. HGVs have been around in one form or another for many years, but generally lacked the precision and resilience to reliably deliver a nuclear warhead. HGVs are particularly problematic to the MAD dynamic due to the way they fly: instead of the relatively simple ballistic trajectory taken by a conventional ICBM, HGVs can conduct significant maneuvers on re-entry. This makes detecting and countering HGVs more challenging, which puts further pressure on MAD: HGVs show significant promise as a “decapitation” weapon.[5]

Finally, also in the late 2010s, China embarked on the first significant expansion of its nuclear force in a generation. Citing the vulnerability of their current systems to counterforce strikes, the PLARF began building large numbers of new missile silos and warheads, alarming both the United States and countries throughout the region. DIA suggests that China may field as many as 1,000 warheads by the end of the 2020s, which would make their arsenal entirely comparable to both the United States and Russia. The mix new of silos and warheads also has the distinct possibility of creating the basis for a future-ready nuclear force, and thus, a potential Chinese counterforce tactic. That said, China repeatedly reiterated its No First Use policy, and this looks unlikely to change in the near future.

[1] (Gassert, 2020)

[2] (Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles, 1987)

[3] (Li Bin, 2016)

[4] (Witte, 2019)

[5] (Cone, 2019)

 (Bugos, 2021)

Toward A New Nuclear Dynamic

 The world’s nuclear weapons environment changed little between the end of the Cold War and the late 2010s. Then, seemingly overnight, new developments drastically altered the landscape, creating a far more precarious and less predictable scenario. It is clear that new arms talks are necessary, but the decline in Russo-American relations and China’s outright rejection of any sort of discussion are actively precluding such talks from taking place. This lack of open discussion is simultaneous with the rapid ongoing development of new systems, some with unprecedented and potentially unbalancing capability sets.

The most difficult problem facing China at present is how to maintain its conventional long-range strike capability in the face of its nuclear forces’ expansion. Assuming China does indeed build 

large numbers of new warheads and nuclear-capable strike platforms, the United States and the nations of the Western Pacific may no longer be able to take No First Use at face value, and thus the launch of any ballistic missile from Chinese shores targeting any U.S. ally in the region may be assumed to be nuclear. This dynamic seriously undermines the PLARF’s impressive conventional strike capability, as China would have to consider the consequences of a nuclear exchange even when conducting a conventional strike.

In short, China is at a significant strategic crossroads: if it wishes to maintain its current strategy and tactics in the Western Pacific, it must reach an understanding with the U.S. and its allies as to the state of its nuclear forces.  If not, China risks a massive and potentially unintentional escalation of conflict. Understandably, a powerful nuclear deterrent is an important aspect of China’s hoped-for ascension as a world power, but as the U.S. and USSR learned generations ago, nuclear brinksmanship is a dangerous and largely unproductive path to take.

References

Bugos, S. (2021). Pentagon Sees Faster Chinese Nuclear Expansion. Retrieved from Arms Control Association: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-12/news/pentagon-sees-faster-chinese-nuclear-expansion

Central Intelligence Agency. (1963). Central Intelligence Bulletin, article on "Communist China-U.S.SR- Nuclear Capability,".

Cone, P. P. (2019). Assessing the Influence of Hypersonic Weapons on Deterrence. United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies.

Funaiole, M. P. (2021). A Glimpse of Chinese Ballistic Missile Submarines. Retrieved from Center for Strategic and International Studies: https://www.csis.org/analysis/glimpse-chinese-ballistic-missile-submarines

Gassert, P. (2020). The INF Treaty of 1987, A Reappraisal. Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History.

Kulacki, G. (2020). Outrider. Retrieved from The Taiwan Strait Crisis 1954-58: https://outrider.org/nuclear-weapons/articles/taiwan-strait-crisis-1954-58

Li Bin, T. Z. (2016). Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Nagdy, M. R. (2020). Our World in Data. Retrieved from Nuclear Weapons: https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons

Torigian, J. (2021, October 21). Foreign Policy. Retrieved from China’s Nuclear Program Baffled Soviet Intelligence: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/21/china-nuclear-program-baffled-soviet-intelligence/

(1987). Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles.

Witte, M. D. (2019). Without the INF Treaty with the U.S., Russia can build its arsenal of intermediate-range missiles, Stanford scholar says. Retrieved from Stanford News: https://news.stanford.edu/2019/02/01/u-s-suspension-nuclear-arms-treaty-russia-means/

Zedong, M. (1957). Alpha History. Retrieved from QUOTATIONS: THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 1949-65: https://alphahistory.com/chineserevolution/quotations-peoples-republic/