02 21st Century Large-Scale Combat Operations: Emergent Lessons Learned from Russia’s “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine By Ian Kersey, TRADOC G-2

Introduction

The TRADOC G-2 began capturing Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) observations emerging from the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict in early March 2022 using an internal MS Teams Channel named TR-G2 Russia-Ukraine Crisis Monitoring. This channel enables the TRADOC G-2 staff and greater TRADOC community to: 1) collaborate and discuss virtually all aspects of the conflict via the Posts tab; 2) perform knowledge management tasks associated with OSINT products produced and received using the Files tab; and 3) document and “bin” conflict observations via individual data records (by both Key TRADOC –G-2 Assessments and Warfighting Functions) using the Insights tab. As of 1 March 2023, TRADOC G-2 has recorded more than 3886 observations, capturing what we are learning about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P).

Battle Rhythm 

Every Monday morning, the TRADOC G-2 facilitates a Red/Green Scrum via MS Teams, reviewing each of the observations captured during the preceding week. Each of the observations’ authors update the data records they have entered in accordance with the Scrum’s recommended edits. Following each Scrum, a draft of the weekly TRADOC Running Estimate is produced, highlighting significant CUI observations, organized by Key Assessment, with their associated DOTMLPF-P implications.  A companion classified TRADOC Running Estimate is also produced each week from key Intelligence Community products. TRADOC G-2 leadership reviews the CUI and classified versions of the TRADOC Running Estimate  every Wednesday to ensure that they do not contain contradictory or conflicting information, resulting in final versions of the CUI and classified TRADOC Running Estimates. The CUI TRADOC Running Estimate is then posted to both the internal TR-G2 Russia-Ukraine Crisis Monitoring and the external TR-G2 Russia-Ukraine Observations MS Teams channels. The latter channel allows individuals outside of the Command (but holding a valid CAC) to access the CUI TRADOC Running Estimate via a controlled environment. The classified TRADOC Running Estimate is distributed via JWICS along with other classified TRADOC G-2 content throughout the Command, to HQDA, and across the Army. These MS Teams channels also host Key Assessment papers and an expanding series of papers on various topics related to large-scale combat oeprations (LSCO). Please refer to the separate article in this issue of Red Diamond for more information on this series.

Additionally, a companion Blue Scrum is facilitated by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), capturing insights on how Ukraine is fighting and the associated implications for the U.S. Army. TRADOC G-2 staff at Ft. Leavenworth participate in this Scrum, helping to ensure that both the Red/Green and Blue Scrum efforts remain synchronized and integrated. The TRADOC G-2 Analysis and Control Element (ACE) submits biweekly and monthly reports to CALL summarizing what we have learned about the Russian war effort. The following figure illustrates how the two Scrums are collectively informing Army modernization efforts.

Process

Key Tasks supporting the Red/Green Scrum include:

• Knowledge management duties, to include uploading OSINT material onto the TR-G2 Russia-Ukraine Crisis Monitoring MS Teams Channel Files tab, and highlighting each new addition in the Post tab;
• Inputing observations onto the Insights tab;
• Executing the Red/Green Scrum, a review of each of the observations captured during the preceding week;
• Updating the weekly TRADOC Running Estimate infographic, highlighting key observations and associated U.S. Army DOTMLPF-P implications;
• Synchronizing the CUI and classified TRADOC Running Estimate with TRADOC G-2 leadership every Wednesday to preclude contradictory or conflicting reporting;
• Finalizing, obtaining G-2 ACE and OPSEC/FDO approval, and publishing the CUI TRADOC Running Estimate on both the internal TR-G2 Russia-Ukraine Crisis Monitoring COI and the external TR-G2 Russia-Ukraine Observations MS Teams channels;
• Developing a narrative synopsizing our observations from each week’s CUI TRADOC Running Estimate for incorporation into the weekly ACE Production Highlights message to TRADOC G-2 Senior Leaders and publication on both MS Teams channels; and
• Developing Red/Green Scrum input for the CALL biweekly and monthly reports, detailing the insights we have learned regarding Russia’s combat operations in Ukraine and the associated Army implications for LSCO.

What We’ve Learned So Far

Strategic observations include:

• Winning LSCO requires effective conditions setting: Russia failed to set the conditions before launching operations, with inadequate preparation, sequencing, and exploitation.

• Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) and Air Dominance essential to LSCO:

Russia failed at SEAD, relegating its aerospace forces to launching standoff munitions from afar.

• Extensive war stocks and secure supply chains needed to sustain LSCO:

Russia’s expenditure of precision standoff munitions combined with global sanctions necessitated its use of cross-domain fires.

• LSCO requires rapid and scalable reconstitution and force generation plans:

Russia’s significant combat losses required extensive, repeated Battalion Tactical Group reconstitution efforts using Soviet-era equipment and indiscriminate manpower, such as pro-Russia separatist militias and Wagner professional military contractors, while Russia’s armed forces recruited, equipped, and deployed new “volunteer” battalions.

• Effective command and control necessary for Multi-Domain Operations:

Russia is conducting operations in the land, sea, air, and cyber domains, but it has been unable to synchronize and scale integrated operations to date.

Additional observations include:

• Today’s transparent battlefield requires small, mobile command posts with reduced electro-magnetic spectrum emissions and distributed command and control.
• Operating in a contested electromagnetic environment requires mission command and a unit trained to maintain operations security and primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communications plans.
• Logistics units, command posts, air defense capabilities, and reserve forces are high payoff targets for an adversary. Rear-area protection from ground and air attack is key to maintaining offensive momentum.
• Units need to plan for the use of combat formations in counter-reconnaissance roles to secure main supply routes, mobile and defended logistics packages, forward ammunition supply points, and forward-area refueling points.
• The Russian Army is an artillery first ground force. Units that can integrate joint fires with their maneuver will be more survivable during LSCO, especially during offensive operations.
• Protection of formations and critical capabilities could require additional dismounted infantry, active protection systems, and organic and mobile counter-unmanned aerial systems/counter-rocket artillery mortar capabilities to defend against anti-tank guided missiles and top attack munitions.

For More Information

 If you have access to Army Office 365 and would like to view our CUI TRADOC Running Estimates via our external TR-G2 Russia-Ukraine Observations MS Teams channel, please send an email request to Ian Kersey at ian.g.kersey.ctr@army.mil.