In February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an integrated attack along multiple axes to seize and occupy Ukraine. Ukrainian forces’ denial of Russia’s objective in the initial phase of the operation is an example of how the resolve and resilience of a smaller nation can create decisive effects against a larger threat. However, it is likely that information warfare also played a critical role. ADP 6-0, Mission Command, describes how information communications is necessary for effective command and control (C2).[1] Collaboration between Ukrainian private tech industry and mobile phone companies has shaped the information environment throughout the invasion. And, while Russia made notable mistakes, the Ukrainian government’s use of its telecommunications infrastructure—especially the effective integration of smartphones, social media, and messaging apps—effectively established an information advantage over the Russian invaders. This integration of civilian infrastructure to meet technology gaps and close vulnerabilities emphasizes how the information environment remains a central element to battlefield success.
Ukraine Adapts to the Information Environment
After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and establishment of opposition forces in the Donbas, the Ukrainian government was forced to adapt to a contested information environment characterized by Russia’s advanced information confrontation techniques. Destruction of radio, television, and other public emergency communications by attacking Russians forced Ukrainian defenders to fuse old and new technologies to maximize what remained of the country’s military and civilian networks.[2] Analog technologies using wired telephones and vehicle-mounted couriers to reduce electronic signatures were integrated with modern commercially available smartphone technology to increase operational reach and avoid detection by Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.[3] Ukraine adopted a whole-of-society approach to civil defense, enlisting private sector software developers and mobile telecommunications companies. Along with partners and allies, this further tapped into the integration of civilian networks and technology using policies designed to build technological and cognitive resilience against Russian active measures.[4]
Understanding that most Ukrainian citizens own smart phones, Ukrainian forces began to rely on individual soldiers’ personal devices to relay messages to avoid being located by Russian EW capabilities. Ukrainian forces used social media applications like Telegram and Viber to maintain contact with supporters and other units in the field while blending in with common data traffic over civilian mobile networks.[5] Redundancy built into the networks by the telecommunications companies maximized coverage and made the C2 structures more resistant to Russian electronic and physical attacks. Apps providing news and other vital information quickly replaced radio and television towers destroyed by Russian attacks.[7] By February 2022, when Russian president Putin embarked on the “special military operation” to seize Ukrainian territory, the use of apps and other commercial technology had developed into a flexible and adaptable civil-military defense network.
Civil-Military Cooperation, Commercial International Assistance
Integration of smartphone technology into Ukraine’s civil defense required unprecedented collaboration between the government, software developers, and commercial mobile providers to deploy the technical solutions, bandwidth, and interoperability needed to establish and maintain a digital ecosystem for Ukrainian national defense.
The new Ministry of Digital Transformation, established in 2019, launched a government app called Diia [translation: Action] that provided state services to Ukrainians and met specific wartime needs such as assistance for displaced persons and money advances for lost and damaged property.[9] The smartphone technology streamlined governmental processes and brought legitimate government solutions to authorized users. In addition to Ukraine’s government-sanctioned applications, the affiliated IT Army used social media, messaging apps, and facial recognition software to assist Ukrainians to develop a “crowd-sourced kill chain” that, as part of its battlefield damage assessment process, identified deceased Russian soldiers and informed their families before the Russian government could do so.[10] Navigation and messaging apps assisted civilians fleeing the battle zone by integrating eyewitness accounts and images with media reports to highlight danger areas. The Ukrainian fusion of civilian and military technologies established a technical and cognitive resilience among combatants and noncombatants through ground-up, trust-based networks.
Ukrainian mobile and satellite phone providers improved network resilience by donating technology, reducing barriers to usage, and rebuilding damaged networks to provide the digital backbone needed to support Ukraine’s wartime digital demands. Ukraine’s major telecom companies merged their network coverage, expanded services, and reduced data charges to make voice, SMS, and internet access available to Ukrainian users regardless of their telecom company subscription. To preserve technical and cognitive resilience in Ukraine’s information environment, mobile companies, along with the Ukrainian Security Service, disabled Russian and Belarussian ability to access Ukrainian mobile networks for C2 and propaganda dissemination by denying access to phones with Russian SIM cards and locating and disabling Russian message relay sites.[11] The whole-of-society approach adopted by the Ukrainian government and its mobile phone companies was key to maintaining morale and garnering a positive international response while establishing and maintaining an information advantage against Russian advances.[12]
Russian Forces Targeted Information Capabilities Using Lethal and Non-Lethal Means
The Russian military tried to apply its experience in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa to disrupt Ukraine’s information advantage, but it failed to control the information environment beyond its sphere of influence. Russia has sought to exploit the relationship of technology to “information and psychological” superiority.[13] Concepts like “reflexive control,” which involves analyzing various anticipated enemy reactions to harsh psychological pressure to induce operational shock, is an example of Russian expertise in information warfare.[14] Russian forces attempted to disrupt Ukrainian C2 using both lethal and technological means, seizing or destroying more than 400 base stations and 60,000km of fiber optic cables.[15] The operations were specifically targeting the Ukrainian forces’ advantage from its civilian networks. However, in some cases, the Russian forces in Ukraine were dependent on these same networks, making it easy for Ukrainians to exploit Russian communications for targeting. Despite Russia’s understanding of information in modern warfare, the information advantage mostly fell to Ukraine whose adaptive policies and innovative industry outmatched Russia’s centrally planned, government-controlled active measures.
To deny the use of commercial networks to the Ukrainians, Russia tried to commandeer Ukrainian mobile networks in occupied areas. In these cases, Russian mobile phone companies changed the country affiliation of seized telecom infrastructure by making it part of the Russian network and issuing SIM cards that identified users as Russian. The changes made calls from the captured regions to Kyiv and other locations appear as a long-distance call, which incurred extra charges and cast doubt on the reliability of information. The new network may provide visibility about users’ contacts for Russian intelligence operators.[16]
Implications: Techniques for Effective C2 Using Commercial and Military Technologies
ADP 6-0, Mission Command describes how information communications are necessary for effective C2. In a highly contested cyber environment, a fighting force’s ability to use all available means of communication may be the difference between success and failure on the battlefield. Cyber activity in the war in Ukraine has evolved from individual and isolated cyber events to a significant part of the fog of modern warfare. The real-time immediacy and steady flow of disinformation makes controlling the information environment critical. Additionally, the protection and targeting of means of transmission are part of a larger battle for control of critical infrastructure that converges warfighting capabilities in a new way using digital technologies. Elements of digital ecosystems—including physical, informational, and human—are leveraged and exploited by combatants using lethal and nonlethal means to establish, maintain, or deny information advantage at echelon. The side that can seize and adapt available networks gains operational reach, intelligence, C2 functions, and the ability to message the local population. This value of keeping networks intact versus denial by destruction is a decision that commanders will need to make if they are expected to control the information environment. The techniques require technical skills as well as whole-of-society consideration of government policies, military protection, and civilian buy-in necessary for full integration of seized networks.
[1] Headquarters, Department of the Army. Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate. 2019.
[2] Harwell, Drew. “Instead of Consumer Software, Ukraine’s Tech Workers Build Apps of War.” Washington Post. 24 March 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/24/ukraine-war-apps-russian-invasion/. Account required.
[3] Peterson, Nolan. “Old School Answers to Russia’s Modern Electronic Warfare Weapons.” Coffee or Die. 7 February 2022. https://www.coffeeordie.com/ukraine-russia-electronic-warfare.
[4] England, Jerry. “TRADOC G-2 Worldwide Equipment Guide: DJI-Phantom COTS UAV.” Red Diamond. August 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/gckn/p/reddiamond.
[5] Lumb, David. “How Ukrainian Civilians are Using Phones to Share the Invasion With the World.” CNET. 14 March 2022. https://www.cnet.com/tech/mobile/how-ukrainian-civilians-are-using-phones-to-share-the-invasion-with-the-world/.
[6] Lumb, David. “How Ukrainian Civilians are Using Phones to Share the Invasion With the World.” CNET. 14 March 2022. https://www.cnet.com/tech/mobile/how-ukrainian-civilians-are-using-phones-to-share-the-invasion-with-the-world/.
[7] Burgess, Matt. “Russia is taking Over Ukraine’s Internet.” Wired. 15 June 2022. https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-russia-internet-takeover/.
[8] Bergengruen, Vera. “’It’s Our Home Turf.’ The Man on Ukraine’s Digital Frontline.” Time. 15 March 2022. https://time.com/6157308/its-our-home-turf-the-man-on-ukraines-digital-frontline/
[9] Valeriya Ionan. “After the War.” Harvard Advanced Leadership Initiative. 29 November 2022. https://www.sir.advancedleadership.harvard.edu/articles/digital-transformation-in-ukraine-before-during-after-war. In 2019, Ukraine established the Ministry of Digital Transformation, which sought to create a “state in a smartphone” app that would enable technological resilience through established trust protocols and electronic accountability.
[10] Drew Harwell, “Ukraine is Scanning Faces of dead Russians, then Contacting the Mothers.” Washington Post. 15 April 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/04/15/ukraine-facial-recognition-warfare/. Account required.
[11] Mc Daid, Cathal. “Profiling Russian Operators emerging in occupied Southern Ukraine.” ENEA. 30 September 2022 https://blog.adaptivemobile.com/profiling-russian-operators-emerging-in-occupied-southern-ukraine
[12] Maraochko, Daniil. “Kyivstar will Provide Ukraine with UAS 300MIL for the Restoration for the Digital Infrastructure.” Kyiv Post. 4 July 2022. https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/kyivstar-will-provide-ukraine-with-uah-300-mil-for-the-restoration-of-digital-infrastructure.html.
[13] Timothy Thomas, “The Evolving Nature of Russia's Way of War,” Military Review, July August 2017.
[14] Farwell, James P. and Darby J. Arakelian. "Using Information in Contemporary War." Parameters 46, no. 3 (Autumn, 2016): 71-86, https://lumen.cgsccarl.com/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/using-information-contemporary-war/docview/1861027416/se-2.
[15] Bergengruen, Vera. “The Battle for Control Over Ukraine’s Internet.” Time. 18 October 2022. https://time.com/6222111/ukraine-internet-russia-reclaimed-territory/
[16] Burgess, Matt. “Shadowy Russian Cell Phone Companies are Cropping Up in Ukraine.” Wired. 21 September 2022. https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-war-mobile-networks-russia/.