Ukrainian national identity, since the 19th century, has been marked by periods of independence followed by coerced absorption into the Russian imperial sphere. The Ukrainians possess a distinct ethnic, linguistic, and cultural heritage that has historically struggled to balance fierce independence and forcible integration into Russian (and Soviet) political systems. The idea of Ukrainian national identity has become key to Ukraine’s resistance to the current Russian invasion, which Ukrainians view as a continuation of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict that began in 2014. This article will explore four key periods in Russo-Ukrainian relations: Sovietization of Ukraine, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the “Revolution of Dignity” and Crimea/Donbas conflict, and post-2022 invasion.
Ukrainian national resilience, and effective national resistance, are closely tied to the ideas and perceptions of what it is to be Ukrainian within a multi-ethnic framework consisting of ethnic Ukrainians, ethnic Russians, Crimean Tatars, Ukrainian Jewish diaspora, and other minority groups. Ukrainian ethnic and cultural divisions can be exploited by foreign actors to foster conflict. This diversity can also give strength to an emerging Ukrainian cultural identity.
Sovietization and the Holodomor
Ukraine first emerged as a modern political entity in the aftermath of the First World War in the form of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR). The UNR was short-lived, having been granted autonomy from the Russian Empire in 1917 and succumbing to Soviet military domination following the Peace of Riga in 1921. During the short life of the UNR, governments rapidly turned over and a dizzying array of foreign alliances were formed. The short and chaotic life ended after a war between the Bolsheviks (forces of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and later the Ukrainian SSR) and the armed forces of the UNR. The boundaries of the early Ukrainian SSR mirrored the pro-Russian break-away republics from the 2014 conflict, comprising eastern and southern Ukraine and briefly maintaining a capitol in Kharkiv. Following the Peace of Riga, the UNR was dissolved and the capital of the Ukrainian SSR was moved to Kyiv. Both during and after the Ukraine-Soviet War, the Bolsheviks undertook a policy of Sovietization in Ukraine according to the “theory and practice of national self-determination.”
Cultural Sovietization was politically complete by December 1922 with the signing of the treaty between Soviet Russia, Soviet Belarus, Soviet Transcaucasia, and Soviet Ukraine forming the USSR. Economic Sovietization began almost immediately. By 1929 the Soviet regime was heavily invested in the collectivization of Ukrainian agriculture. Resisters of collectivization began being labeled as “enemies of the Soviet state,” facing property confiscations and deportation to Siberia and Soviet Central Asia. By 1932 the collectivization policy had failed, ushering in the dual genocidal hardships of grain confiscation and forced Russification. During 1932–33, upwards of 13 percent (3.9 million people) had starved or were deported to Siberia. Simultaneously, Russian authorities ordered that Ukrainian language books be destroyed and schools conduct classes in Russian, and they reversed Soviet social policies that had fostered a sense of national identity within Ukraine.
The effects of the Holodomor and subsequent forced migration of the Ukrainian people would still be felt a decade later during the Nazi German invasion of the Soviet Union. The aftermath of Sovietization of Ukraine and subsequent man-made famine would lead Ukrainian citizens to view the initial German invasion as a liberation. The Ukrainians made several contributions to the German war effort, including the Ukrainian Partisan Army, which fought Soviet and Polish troops in western Ukraine, as well as the formation of the 14th Waffen SS Grenadier Division in Lviv, a Nazi division manned by Ukrainian nationals. The themes of Russian-led Soviet repression and western Ukrainian-Nazi collaboration have become important narratives in the ongoing information war between Ukraine and Russia. Russia continues to push themes of denazification of a Western-leaning Ukraine, while Ukrainian resistance organizations continue to highlight threats of agricultural collectivization, grain thefts, and the forced incorporation into the Russian education system in the temporarily occupied territories.
Collapse of the Soviet Union and Ukrainian Independence
During the final days of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian national identity would return to the center of Ukrainian social and political life. In the mid-1980s, the decline of Soviet power accelerated because of economic hardship, military defeat in the Soviet-Afghan war, and the catastrophic nuclear accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. The negative effects of the latter were borne almost exclusively by Ukrainian and Belorussian citizens and can still be felt today. A renewed emphasis on Ukrainian language and culture accompanied independence movements in Soviet satellite states and constituent republics on the fringe of Soviet empire. The reawakening of an independent Ukrainian national identity began in the western regions and spread throughout the country.
In August 1991, the Ukrainian Rada announced the nation’s independence from the Soviet Union. The referendum passed with 83 percent or more of the vote in most oblasts. The only region that ratified independence by a simple majority (53 percent) was Crimea. Even the more Russified eastern provinces of Luhansk and Kharkiv supported independence by 83 percent, with Sumy (86 percent), Odesa (85 percent), and Mykolaiv (89 percent) being the only regions that did not exceed a 90-percent vote in favor of independence.
Although the vote was resoundingly in support of independence, several regions stood out as less supportive. These regions were key players in the formation of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, and would again pivot towards Russia as Ukraine continued to struggle through privatization of the economy and liberalization of the government. These actions culminated in Ukraine’s period of foreign policy whiplash of the 2000s and 2010s, resulting in regular power exchanges between pro-Western and pro-Russian parties.
The Road to Midian: 2012 Parliamentary Election
The 2012 parliamentary elections have been identified as a watershed event on the road to the current Ukraine crisis. Public figures that seek negotiated peace with Russia based on neutrality and territorial concessions often cite the 2012 election results as an example of regional will, affinity for Russia, and regional self-determination. However, the 2012 election results were the high-water mark for support of the pro-Russian Party of Regions (PoR), led by then-President Viktor Yanukovych.
The 2010 presidential election and subsequent 2012 parliamentary elections are widely viewed as a reaction to Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution and emerging ties with the European Union. The election showed significant geographical, ethnic, and linguistic tensions. The eastern and southern regions of Ukraine voted for pro-Russian (or Euro-skeptic) political parties, with support being as high as 65 percent in Donetsk, 52 percent in Crimea, and 57 percent in Luhansk. Kharkiv, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhia additionally showed strong plurality support for the PoR with approximately 40 percent support in these regions. These regions have historically shown stronger ethnic and linguistic ties with Russia and would all play significant roles in the opening stages of the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Changes to Ukrainian law that removed the ability to vote by bloc, which was viewed as weakening the Euro-skeptic position, were a significant grievance following the election.
Following the 2012 elections, the Yanukovych government began undermining broader Ukrainian-European integration while drawing Ukraine closer into Moscow’s orbit. The contentious 2012 election and Yanukovych’s controversial polices led directly to the Revolution of Dignity (Euromaidan) in 2014 and Russia’s reaction. The Revolution of Dignity was painfully divisive to the Ukrainian public, exposing longstanding rifts between the regional views of Ukraine and its role in Europe. Ukrainians living east of the Dnieper River were more likely to support alignment with Russia than more Euro-centric Ukrainians living west of the river. Immediately following the removal of Yanukovych from power, violent protests began in the Donbas and Crimea regions. These protests and the Ukrainian Anti-Terrorism Operation— which was conducted by the Ukrainian Armed Forces following the MINSK accords to contain aggressive Russian actions in Ukrainian-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast—would result in deniable, but direct, Russian involvement in the conflict, beginning the Russo-Ukrainian War.
Crimea and Donbas
Following the political fallout of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity and the impeachment of Yanukovych, Russia quickly began to destabilize Ukrainian government control of Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk. Russia moved to annex Crimea through a referendum that is widely acknowledged as illegitimate. Following the success of Russian hybrid warfare in the Donbas and Crimea, Ukraine increasingly turned to the West to grow its defense capabilities. The announcement of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) ushered in a brief but intense conflict in the Donbas followed by the Minsk II ceasefire agreement and the transition to static, defensive warfare.
The Minsk II agreement was to be overseen by the formation of a Ukrainian/separatist Joint Coordination Committee and observers from the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). During the period of frozen conflict, both NATO (via Joint Multinational Training Group Ukraine) and Russia (through the establishment of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps) sought to develop the defensive capabilities of both respective partners in Ukraine.
Years of conflict along the line of contact hardened both Ukrainian and separatist positions. From the Minsk II ceasefire to the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, OSCE observers reported ceasefire violations by both Ukrainian and separatist forces. As Ukraine gained military capacity, Russia began circulating disinformation concerning planned Ukrainian offenses in the Donbas. The constant threat of escalation reinforced the national identities of ethnic Russians in Ukraine cleanly along the Minsk II border. Polling from as early as 2016 indicates that the Donbas conflict increased the sense of Ukrainian citizenship among ethnic Russians in areas controlled by Kyiv by 24 percent. Residents of the DPR and LPR saw the inverse, with 54 percent less likely to identify as Ukrainian.
The results of the 2019 Ukrainian parliamentary election best capture the changing dynamic of views on Ukrainian statehood. The 2019 election portrays Ukraine’s views on citizenship, Ukrainian nationality, and coherent Ukrainian citizenship despite ethnic or linguistic considerations. The 2019 election overwhelmingly swept the Servant of the People Party of President Zelensky into power on a platform of centrist policies, Westward leaning foreign policy, and Ukrainian nationalist domestic outlook. The party overwhelming won power in most of Ukraine, with the notable holdouts being the Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions.
Post 2022 Invasion
Following the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Ukrainian people have effectively rallied to the defense of their nation as a free and independent entity. Indications of broad popular resistance were observed in the buildup to the invasion. Popular and voluntary participation in local defense organizations, digital and information preparation, and spontaneous peaceful protest in recently occupied areas were observed with regularity. Press interviews with Ukrainians since the invasion reflect a growing sense of national resolve and determination. As word of Russian atrocities spread, ethnic minorities have continued to embrace Ukrainian identity. Support among the Ukrainian people to join the European economic system increased from roughly 60 percent to 91 percent since the Russian invasion.
Ukrainians continue to staunchly resist Russian attempts to dismember the Ukrainian state and fracture their national identity. Support for Russia among ethnic Russians in areas such as Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv has been replaced with a willingness to defend Ukrainian statehood from Russian domination. Early press interviews indicate that ethnic Russians in those regions feel that they have borne the brunt of the Russian offensive, increasing their perception of Ukrainian identity and will to resist in regions that have historically been pro-Russia.
Implications
By understanding the historical, cultural, and regional issues surrounding conflicts, U.S. Army personnel will be better prepared to understand partner, ally, and adversary perceptions of the conflict and, therefore, support Ukrainian National Resilience and National Resistance. Both Ukraine and Russia have relied on themes and messages from their shared contentious history to motivate their respective populations during this conflict, with the latter often stripping important historical context from these themes. Denazification in Ukraine resonated exactly because portions of the Ukrainian population supported German military operations on the Eastern Front during World War II. Russia was able to remove context or nuance from the decision of some Ukrainians because the Russians failed to honestly explore the conditions in Ukraine during Sovietization in the 1920s and 1930s. Understanding this long view of the conflict will allow the Army to develop effective themes and messages while identifying the root issues used in adversarial themes during information confrontation.
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