Russia’s military has served as an important model for China in the past, and while the organization of the two countries’ forces and doctrine have long since diverged in important ways, Russia’s conduct of a modern, large-scale and “informationized” war will hold some important lessons for the Chinese military. As the Chinese military has the opportunity to observe Russian equipment and tactics and their performance against sophisticated Western equipment, it will take aggressive steps to address the weaknesses it sees within its own capabilities. The war also highlights ways in which China’s military modernization efforts have already put some of its capabilities ahead of Russia’s, likely allowing it to avoid some of Russia’s failures in a conflict. Specifically, China is likely to be more capable in terms of conducting air superiority operations and long-range precision strikes, and its communications, ISR, and logistics systems are likely to be more robust.
Notes on Scope and Sources
The following is an attempt to summarize the lessons likely being taken by senior Chinese leaders and strategists within the Chinese military from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Note that while the war also holds important lessons for China in the realms of information operations, economic hardening against sanctions, and other areas, this article focuses on those directly related to military performance. Importantly, it is also intended to help prevent U.S. observers from taking incorrect lessons away from the war through mirror imaging of Russian capabilities with Chinese ones. While Chinese media covered previous Russian military operations against Ukraine (which began in 2014), discussion of the current war in military-focused publications has been more muted. As a result, this study draws on the smaller body of direct commentaries on current Russian military performance, combined with a much larger set of analyses of Russian military performance in other recent conflicts. This is then compared to Chinese descriptions of how it operates, derived from authoritative Chinese publications as well as relevant modernization efforts to derive the lessons most likely to be taken from the war by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Why China’s Lessons from the Russian Military Matter
It is important to emphasize up front that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the PLA are learning organizations that regard studying as a means of making significant breakthroughs to improve everything from China’s technological development to tactical proficiency. Lacking direct experience in large-scale ground combat since 1979,[ii] China makes a very close study of modern conflicts, directly incorporating those lessons into its theories of warfare.[iii] China’s observation of the war in Ukraine, and particularly of Russia’s experience, matter more than others for a number of reasons.
First and foremost, Russia has been a logical model for China given their similar strategic problems, such as large, complicated land borders on the Asian landmass and multiple potential sources of domestic instability in the form of restive ethnic minorities. The degree to which the PLA has benefitted from Russian military equipment, professional military education systems, and development of military theory (doctrine) and technical expertise should not be understated. Historically, the Soviet Union played a foundational role not only in assisting the CCP in its formation, but also equipping the PLA in the late stages of the Chinese civil war, and in the establishment of China’s defense industries. While intense distrust and border skirmishes along the northeast and western borders made the Soviet Union China’s primary threat for decades, Soviet equipment remained critical models for modernization. Large-scale technical and professional military exchanges began after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and Russia became the largest available source of military arms due to restrictions placed on China by most Western countries after the Tiananmen Square Massacre. China began to send dozens of military officers to Russian military academies each year starting in the 1990s.
This influence extended far beyond equipment and training. Russia’s military reforms, such as those under Defense Minister Serdyukov (2008-2012), which saw reorganization of military academic institutions and adoption of a joint regional command, seem to have had a large degree of influence on subsequent Chinese military reorganization.[iv] Chinese analysts have looked to Russia’s experience in the Caucasus for lessons in dealing with internal problems.[v] Russia has also helped Chinese forces gain experience through multiple large-scale joint military exercises since 2005.[vi]
Russia’s wars have also been a major source for the PLA’s efforts to absorb lessons for itself. PLA strategists have studied particularly closely Russia’s actions in Syria and Ukraine since 2014.[vii] Discussions of Russia appear nearly as often as references to developments in U.S. doctrine in authoritative books by PLA institutions, as do mentions of Russian military reforms and other topics in Chinese Military Science [ 中国军事科学], the PLA’s premier academic journal.[viii] Russia’s performance in this modern conventional conflict is therefore important as a case study[ix] for China, and serves as a test case for elements of its own operational art, such as the outlines of known campaign plans like the “Joint Island Landing Campaign,” “Joint Counter-Air Raid Campaign” [联合反空袭战役], and the “Joint Firestrike Campaign” [联合火力突击作战]. The war has revealed the tremendous difficulty in achieving these effects against a peer or near-peer opponent. In Ukraine, PLA leaders are seeing ideas they have drawn direct inspiration from being tested under fire, likely in many cases by Russian officers with whom they have interacted. Seeing those ideas fail is leading to questions regarding the prudence of emulating Russian ideas and equipment. There is a stark contrast between Russia’s military performance and capabilities that China has already developed.
To choose just a few examples, these observations where Russia’s role as an exemplar has been tarnished and where China is likely superior can be grouped into observations on communications, use of long-range precision strikes and airpower, electronic warfare (EW), and logistics.
Communication Systems and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Effective communications are a bedrock element of combined and joint operations. Observers have noted a severe lack of coordination among Russian troops, leading to, among other things, dismal effectiveness in air defense.[x] Other unconfirmed sources have suggested that Russian forces are using unencrypted radios, allowing easy tracking of their movements and even targeting of command positions. China places great emphasis on links between various levels and is deploying “integrated command platforms” [一体指挥平台] to service arms to improve integration with ISR assets. Chinese futurists frequently mention dispersed forces integrated through these systems and capable of conducting coordinated operations. Russian ISR support to combat operations also appears to be grossly lacking. China, by comparison, has made ISR a priority, and the full extent of its airborne and ground-based ISR capabilities being deployed at all levels is extensive.[xi]
Russian Use of Long-Range Fires and Airpower
An essential feature of all three of the campaigns referenced above in Chinese writings is the simultaneous concentration of fires and effects in other domains in the first minutes of a fight. There are descriptions of how the campaign would proceed to envision coordinated multi-domain strikes—including cyber, EW, and massive use of air-, ground-, and sea-launched cruise and ballistic missiles—against key nodes to paralyze a country’s national decision-making and military communications apparatus. Russia’s actions here offer a powerful case study. One of the most puzzling things about the invasion for observers has been Russia’s insufficient use of airpower and missile strikes in the opening stages of the conflict. Russia began the war with several hundred (possibly more[xii]) long-range missile strikes against strategic targets attempting to paralyze[xiii] the Ukrainian military and facilitate a quick victory. However, these strikes do not appear to have been effective. As the conflict proceeded, Russia appeared to begin running low on long-range munitions, though major strikes were periodically launched with mixed success.[xiv] Ukrainian missile defenses have also been able to significantly blunt these offensives and Russia has experienced limited success in suppressing Ukraine’s force of ballistic missiles. [xv],[xvi]
Effective use of ballistic and cruise missile strikes is, if anything, even more important to Chinese conceptions of victory in several campaigns. Taiwan and Japan are building significant long-range strike capabilities of their own. While China has assembled a much larger[xvii] arsenal of tactical ballistic missiles and rocket artillery (with the capacity[xviii] to build more), the apparent ineffectiveness of long-range strike in the war in Ukraine and relative success of defenses may cause the PLA to reassess the number necessary to successfully carry out a campaign. In addition to a mediocre showing in long-range strike, Russia appears to have only been able to maintain an intense air campaign for a short period before the Ukrainians were able to begin blunting the effectiveness of the campaign.[xix]
Anecdotal reporting from journalists in Ukraine suggests that Ukraine can largely move military equipment without fear of airstrikes.[xx] Ukrainian aircraft have been able to continue operating with some degree of impunity months into the conflict, despite their operating areas being near Russia‘s and the relative ease with which a modern combatant should be able to detect their location. This can be attributed to insufficient training in large-scale joint air operations,[xxi] which China has engaged in for almost a decade and are increasing in sophistication,[xxii] but the failure also potentially speaks to fundamental problems with the platforms being used.
Commentaries in publications associated with China’s defense industries have noted the poor performance of Russian air power and platforms. [xxiii] China has long been a major customer of Russian military aircraft. Cooperation with the Soviet Union in the 1950s helped lay the foundation for China’s aviation industry. Later, sales of fighter jets such as the Su-27 and Su-30 in the 1990s provided China with its most capable fighters.[xxiv] Open-source researchers have documented at least 19 Sukhoi fighter, attack, and strike aircraft losses on the Ukrainian side and 61 Sukhoi aircraft of various types lost on the Russian side.[xxv] Another analysis noted that Russian aircraft losses had been partly due to their need to fly low and slow to drop non-precision munitions due to insufficient stockpiles.[xxvi] The apparent need of Chinese experts to speak up for the strength of a family of platforms that China has so widely invested in or copied reveals Chinese uncertainty about how its forces would perform in a conflict.
Electronic Warfare
EW has proven to be a critical component of the war in Ukraine. As one of the largest developers of EW systems, Russia’s performance in this conflict holds important lessons for China. A review of articles in authoritative Chinese military media outlets showed close attention paid to the performance of these systems and Russia’s development of new systems as it recovered from the 2008 war with Georgia through its experience in Syria.
A significant body of pre-war Chinese-language articles praised Russian EW systems—many of which are now being tested in Ukraine. One discussion of the Palantin EW system that Russia began deploying in 2019 noted that the system was representative of Russia’s ability to maintain advantages over the United States in some areas and create room for strategic maneuver.[xxvii] Another analysis of the Polye-21 jamming system highlighted its ability to effectively jam satellite guidance signals over a broad area and noted that the system incorporated improvements to help overcome U.S. efforts to make GPS signals more resistant to jamming.[xxviii] Another article acknowledged that the Polye-21 “underperformed” in Syria but “is only the tip of the iceberg in Russia’s development of electronic warfare.”[xxix] Other articles described the Epic EW system as increasing the efficiency of Russian EW by 40–50 percent.[xxx] The same assessment noted that the system was a significant improvement on the Krasuha-4, which proved effective against U.S. cruise missiles in Syria. Due to its incorporation of artificial intelligence, Epic is reportedly better at switching between targets more quickly and was effective against drone swarms.
However, available evidence from the conflict appears to contradict these rosy assessments of Russia’s EW capabilities. A report by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) notes that the Russian military took some time to begin effectively deploying its EW forces and that Ukraine has managed to maintain satellite communications and even tactical radio communications.[xxxi] Chinese observers have also commented on this poor performance. One article criticized Russia’s insufficient shaping of the information battlespace, noting that the “Russian Army [has] failed to achieve effective information control [信息控制] on the battlefield. It has failed to effectively destroy Ukraine’s facilities for basic communications and failed to effectively interfere with the Ukrainian Army’s wireless communications—particularly ground-to-air communications.”[xxxii] The article argues that Russia failed to make sufficient efforts in improving EW, lessons it should have learned from the significant losses it suffered against a much weaker opponent in Georgia in 2008.[xxxiii] While assessments may have been over-optimistic for their ability to affect communications, for China, the degradation in enemy long-range precision strikes is a critical priority and will likely spur continued investment.
Logistics
The famous stalled line of Russian advance outside Kyiv in the early stages of the war will go down in history as a reminder that logistics remains critical even in modern warfare. If anything, logistics must now be much more agile due to the ease of discoverability in the “everything observable all the time” world of rapid-revisit satellite imagery. Ukrainian use of drones like the Turkish TB2 has led to great success against these vulnerable ground lines of communication and has driven home that point. Russia also appears to have failed at even more basic things, such as feeding its soldiers. There are widespread reports of Russian soldiers being given expired MREs [meals, ready to eat] and that the Russian government has asked for help.[xxxiv] The contrast here with the tactical and strategic logistical support system that China has built is stark.
China would need to marshal a massive force to take Taiwan, coordinating not only the assembly of a ground force numbering over 100,000 ground troops, but thousands more in the form of other services. Not surprisingly, then, strategic logistics—the mass movement of personnel and supplies—has been a significant focus for China. In September 2016, China created the Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF) to ensure that the PLA can carry out integrated joint operations.[xxxv] The JLSF operates an extensive network of support bases and works closely with private companies to ensure maximum utilization of all available assets during a national mobilization. The PLA has signed strategic cooperation agreements with companies, including China Railway Express, Post Express, and SF Express.[xxxvi] China also enacted the National Defense Transportation Law in 2017 to further facilitate this activity.[xxxvii] In 2018, China successfully tested the effectiveness of these efforts in its largest-ever observed logistics exercise.[xxxviii] China has also invested significantly in even more basic logistics support capabilities.[xxxix]
Implications
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the political complications of China’s relationship with Russia appear to have prevented authoritative Chinese military commentators and strategists from weighing in on the progress of the conflict, but the implications for China’s planned ways of war are clear. Western observers should, however, take note of the stark contrast between Russian failures and the much more advanced preparations taken by China to avoid these pitfalls. As Chinese observers further absorb the lessons of this war, we can be sure that they will search out potential weaknesses and address them.
Particularly in authoritarian states, the cost of war in blood can have real political consequences for a ruling regime. Both Russia and China have relatively recent experience of this: Red Army veterans who served during the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan (Afgantsy) and Chinese veterans of the Sino-Vietnamese war in 1979 emerged as the core of vocal—if quickly suppressed—political movements.[xl] The Ukrainian military’s general staff has claimed that Russia has lost up to 40 percent of the units initially sent into Ukraine in February.[xli] Some Russian sources indicate that more than 90,000 Russian troops have been killed, are missing in action, died from wounds, or have been permanently disabled since the beginning of the war.[xlii] The high number of casualties and lack of real victories that could be spun for a domestic audience behind the walls of a censored media environment is already posing challenges for Putin’s domestic control.
Xi Jinping’s position is likely secure, though frustration with a zero-COVID policy, economic malaise, and his centralization of power led to rare public outbursts calling for his removal only days before the start of the 20th Party Congress in October. Xi and the other senior CCP and PLA leaders likely recognize that they would only weather catastrophic losses in a war with great difficulty. We can be assured that the PLA will work hard to avoid making mistakes similar to Russia’s and will continue to widen the qualitative gap it has already achieved with its historical exemplar.
Senior CCP leaders regularly hold “study sessions” bringing in experts on emerging technologies or new social developments. These have, in the past, resulted in major policy pushes such as China’s acceleration of adoption of military civil fusion as a strategy after a briefing by a PLA scholar who made an extensive study of the topic in the U.S. and a push for quantum development after a September 2013 briefing given by Quantum physicist Pan Jianwei, who was later tapped to lead China’s efforts. The PLA has in the past demanded that greater efforts be made at all levels to learn. See, respectively Alex Stone, The Architect of China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy: Jiang Luming, CASI, 29 January 2021. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/CASI%20Articles/2021-01-29%20Jiang%20Luming_Bio.pdf and Elsa B. Kania & John K. Costello, "QUANTUM HEGEMONY? China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership," CNAS, 12 September 2018. https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-Quantum-Tech_FINAL.pdf, 8.
[ii] Conflicts with Vietnam continued through 1991 though these were largely limited to cross-border artillery exchanges and small-scale firefights. China has also sent peacekeepers abroad for over 30 years, with more than 40,000 service members serving in 25 UN peacekeeping missions. At least 16 PLA soldiers serving on these missions have died.
[iii] Andrew Scobell, David Lai, Roy Kamphausen Eds. Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars, U.S. Army War College, November 2011. https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2163.pdf.
[iv] Yevgen Sautin,” The Influence of Russian Military Reform on PLA Reorganization,” China Brief, 28 March 2016. https://jamestown.org/program/the-influence-of-russian-military-reform-on-pla-reorganization/.
[v] Yu Bin, “Learning from The Neighbors: The People’s Liberation Army Examines The Small Wars And Counterinsurgencies Waged By Russia” in Andrew Scobell, David Lai, Roy Kamphausen edited “Chinese Lessons From Other Peoples’ Wars,” Strategic Studies Institute, November 2011, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA553490.pdf, 277-319.
[vi] Wang Haiyun [王海运], “Yang Haiyun: Seventy Years of Sino-Russian Military Relations: Retrospect and Reflection” [王海运：中俄军事关系七十年：回顾与思考], 14 August 2019.https://web.archive.org/web/20220318113744/https://www.aisixiang.com/data/117680-2.html.
[vii] For example: Apocalypse of the Syria War [舒利亚战争启示录] (2017) by Ma Jianguang [马见光], a senior colonel in the PLA who received a Ph.D. from St. Petersburg University, served in the Chinese embassy in Moscow and is a leading PLA expert on Russia systematically examines Russia’s use of hybrid warfare and the “dronification” [无人化] of modern warfare in that conflict.
[viii] Examples include: Yu Shujie [于淑杰], “From Traditional War Concept to the War Outlook in the Information Age—On Russian Views on Basic Issues of Modern Warfare” [从传统战争理念到信息时代的战争观— 试论俄罗斯对现代战争基本问题的看法], China Military Science, no. 5 (2014); Zhang Ping [章平], “An Exploration into Russia's Military Reform” [饿军战区联合作战指挥体制改革的诺干思考], China Military Science, no. 3 (2015). Wang Jinhua [王金华], “Twists and Turns of Russia's Road of Military Transformation” [俄罗斯军事转型之路的艰难曲折], China Military Science [ 中国军事科学], No. 5, 2017; Li Yun [李赟], “Russia's 'New Look' Military Reform: A Reconsideration” [俄罗斯 ‘新面貌’军事改革及对其再思考], Chinese Military Science [ 中国军事科学], No. 5, 2017.
[ix] The international community’s responses to the war also offer lessons for how it might respond were China to invade Taiwan. Ukraine is regarded as a test of how the United States would react if China took action against Taiwan. U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken for example has said that “Others are watching, others are looking to all of us to see how we respond” with implied reference to China. See Peter Martin, “U.S. Sees China Watching Ukraine Crisis as Proxy for Taiwan,” Bloomberg, 11 February 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-11/u-s-sees-china-watching-ukraine-showdown-as-a-proxy-for-taiwan Blinken
[x] Gustav Gressel, “Combined farces: Russia’s early military failures in Ukraine,” ECFR, 15 March 2022. https://ecfr-eu.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/ecfr.eu/article/combined-farces-russias-early-military-failures-in-ukraine
[xi] For a contemporary overview of the state of Chinese C4ISR see Peter Wood with Roger Cliff, “Chinese Airborne C4ISR,” CASI, 23 December 2020. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Infrastructure/2020-12-17%20PRC%20Airborne%20C4ISR_eBook.pdf.
[xii] According to an unnamed senior U.S. defense official was quoted as saying that Russia had launched more than 1,000 missiles and early warning sites were struck in the initial phase of the war. Foreign Policy National Security reporter Jack Detsch @JackDetsch, Twitter, 17 March 2022. https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1504512775627980807.
[xiii] Equally, Russian use of irregular and special forces to sabotage and kill key leaders—known roles for PLA special forces—including multiple alleged assassinations attempts against Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, have been repeatedly rebuffed.
[xiv] On 10 October, Russia launched a large retaliatory strike for the destruction of the Kerch Bridge in early October. According to a Ukrainian government account, the launch involved at least 75 missiles, but 41 were shot down. Defense of Ukraine [official Ukrainian government account], Twitter, 10 October 2022. https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1579382837631127557; Another source cites the Ukrainian air force saying that 83 were launched and 43 shot down. “Russia has launched 83 missiles today, says Ukrainian air force” BBC News, 10 October 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-63193124.
[xv] In March, for example, there were unconfirmed reports that Russian strikes involving an estimated 70 missiles were almost entirely destroyed by air defenses. “26 March: Russia launched 70 missiles but only 8 reached Ukraine – The Insider,” Pravda [Ukraine], 27 March 2022. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/27/7335033/.
[xvi] Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Video reportedly showing a Ukrainian Tochka-U tactical ballistic missile launch from yesterday. “Twitter, 18 March 2022. https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1504802491636097025.
[xvii] IISS estimates from 2019 for example indicate that the Russian army has a relatively small force of tactical missile launchers (Iskanders, which launch ballistic missiles or cruise missiles and older Totchka launchers) compared to China’s inventory of over 300 SRBM and GLCM launchers, not to mention stocks of MRBMs and IRBMs. See: “DOD report to Congress on Chinese Military Developments,” DOD 3 November 2021, 180. https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.
[xviii] For an open-source assessment of this capacity and overview of recent developments see Peter Wood and Alex Stone, China's Ballistic Missile Industry, China Aerospace Studies Institute, 11 May 2021. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLARF/2021-05-11%20Ballistic%20Missile%20Industry.pdf.
[xix] Justin Bronk with Nick Reynolds and Jack Watling, “The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence,” Royal United Services Institute, 7 November 2022. hxxps://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air-War-Ukraine-web-final.pdf, p.6
[xx] For example: “Ukrainian roads are full of military convoys carrying tanks, long-range artillery, and even S-300 in broad daylight every day, in addition to fuel and ammo. Don’t think there was a single strike on a moving target outside immediate frontline areas — Russia lacks that capacity.” Yaroslav Tofimov (Chief Foreign-Affairs Correspondent of The Wall Street Journal), Twitter, 18 March 2022. https://twitter.com/yarotrof/status/1504773264282996736?s=20&t=qSFGhwx6lzEL-dN6x0yC3A
[xxi] Justin Bronk, an air warfare specialist at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in the UK has analyzed Russian air power’s failure to achieve air dominance--much less supremacy--or to effectively support Russian ground forces during the war, noting that, among other causes is the fact that Russia has no equivalent to the large-scale complex air exercises held by adversaries such as Red Flag and therefore lack the ability to operate as part of large formations in realistic conditions. See: Justin Bronk, "Is the Russian Air Force Actually Incapable of Complex Air Operations?," RUSI, 4 March 2022. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-defence-systems/russian-air-force-actually-incapable-complex-air-operations.
[xxii] The PLA Air Force for example holds at least five annual large-scale air exercises. See Jana Allen and Kenneth Allen, The PLA Air Force's Four Key Training Brands, CASI, 31 March 2018. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1082745.pdf. In 2019 another annual exercise, focused on airborne electronic warfare was established "New PLA Air Force Training Exercise Focuses on Electronic Warfare, " OE Watch, December 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/346387.
[xxiii] “After being shot down one after another, will the ‘famous’ Sukhoi series work?” [ 接连被击落, “大名鼎鼎”的苏霍伊系列到底行不行了?], China Aviation News, 7 June 2022. https://www.cannews.com.cn/2022/0607/345056.shtml Note: China Aviation News is a publication of AVIC, China’s state-owned enterprise for aviation.
[xxiv] Several designs were also reverse engineered including the J-11B, J-16.
[xxv] For a thorough cataloging of these losses via OSINT see: “Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx Blog, 24 February 2022 (regularly updated), https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html; “Attack On Europe: Documenting Ukrainian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine,” Oryx Blog, 24 February 2022 (regularly updated), https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-ukrainian.html; Russian losses include at least one each of the advanced Su-30 (which China appears to have reproduced as the J-16) and the Su-35 (which China purchased in 2015). Russia agreed to the sale in 2012, and the first were delivered in 2016, but the full complement of 24 was not delivered until 2019. See: Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia Completes Delivery of 24 Su-35 Fighter Jets to China,” The Diplomat, 17 April 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/russia-completes-delivery-of-24-su-35-fighter-jets-to-china/.
[xxvi] “After the Russia-Ukraine conflict, what shortcomings in air power will Russia make up for?” [俄乌冲突后，俄罗斯将大补哪些空中力量短板?], China Aviation News [中国航空新闻], 21 April 2022. https://www.cannews.com.cn/2022/0421/342277.shtml.
[xxvii] “Analysis of the Russian Army ‘Palantin’ Integrated Electronic Warfare System” [解析俄军”帕兰庭”综合电子战系统], People's Daily Online (Official PRC government media), 16 June 2022. http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0610/c1011-32443334.html.
[xxviii] “Russia deploys new electronic warfare system” [俄列装新型电子战系统], China Defense News [中国国防报], 23 April 2019. http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0423/c1011-31044640.html.
[xxix] Yang Yang, Ma Jianguang, Zhang Zhaoxin “What are the advantages of the Polye-21 EW System” [“田野-21”电子战系统有何优势?], Popular Science China/China Science Communication [科普中国], 28 April 2021. https://junshi.gmw.cn/2021-04/28/content_35290704.htm.
[xxx] Liu Yunhua [刘云华], Kang Jing [亢靖], Sun Xiheng [孙熹恒], Xie Yongkang [谢永康, Li Jiayi [李佳怿 ], “Analysis of 'Epic,' the Russian military's new electronic warfare system” [解析俄军新型电子战系统”史诗”], China Military Online, 7 December 2021. https://www.81.cn/w-j/2021-12/07/content_10113267.htm.
[xxxi] Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Ukraine at War: Paving the Road from Survival to Victory, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 4 July 2022. https://ik.imagekit.io/po8th4g4eqj/prod/special-report-202207-ukraine-final-web.pdf, 12.
[xxxii] “After the Russia-Ukraine conflict, what shortcomings in air power will Russia make up for?” [俄乌冲突后，俄罗斯将大补哪些空中力量短板?], China Aviation News [中国航空新闻], 21 April 2022. https://www.cannews.com.cn/2022/0421/342277.shtml.
[xxxiii] Ibid.
[xxxiv] Kevin Liptak, Natasha Bertrand, Katie Bo Lillis, Kylie Atwood and Jennifer Hansler, “China has expressed some openness to providing military and financial aid to Russia, US cable suggests,” CNN, 14 March 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/14/politics/us-china-russia-ukraine/index.html.
[xxxv] Kevin McCauley, “Modernization of PLA Logistics: Joint Logistic Support Force,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 15 February 2018. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/McCauley_Written%20Testimony.pdf; see page 6 for a map of major facilities by the author.
[xxxvi] Peter Wood, “Military-Civil Fusion Cooperation in China Grows in the Field of Logistics” OE Watch, February 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/301719.
[xxxvii] This is also part of China’s broader Military-Civil Fusion Strategy. For a comprehensive view of this strategy and its implications see Alex Stone and Peter Wood, “China's Military-Civil Fusion strategy--A View from Chinese Strategists,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, 15 June 2020. “https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Other-Topics/CASI_China_Military_Civil_Fusion_Strategy.pdf.
[xxxviii] Peter Wood, “Chinese Military Launches Largest-Ever Joint Logistics Exercise” OE Watch, 1 February 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/300577.
[xxxix] Peter Wood, “New ‘Fast Food’ to Replace Rations and Field Kitchen Meals in the PLA” OE Watch, 1 December 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/263219.
[xl] For the Chinese case see for example Neil Diamant, Embattled Glory: Veterans, Military Families and the Politics of Patriotism in China, 1949-2007 (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).
[xli] “Ukraine claims Russia lost up to 40 per cent of invasion units, fourth general killed,” South China Morning Post, 16 March 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/3170653/ukraine-claims-russia-lost-40-cent-invasion-units-fourth-general.
[xlii] "Russia’s ‘irrecoverable losses’ in Ukraine: more than 90,000 troops dead, disabled, or AWOL," Meduza [Russian independent media], 12 October 2022. https://meduza.io/en/news/2022/10/12/russia-s-irrecoverable-losses-in-ukraine-more-than-90-000-troops-dead-disabled-or-awol.